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Fiscal stress, changing public expectations and
shifting responsibilities for services due to
devolution have prompted many local governments
to consider restructuring service delivery. This web
site is designed to provide local governments with
information on restructuring trends and innovations
in public sector service provision, public-private
partnerships, privatization, inter-municipal
cooperation and contracting back-in. Local
government is concerned with promoting economic
development and Professor Warner's research
explores the role of collaboratives and investments
in social infrastructure, such as child care, on
economic development.
This web site is a project of Professor Mildred
Warner in the Department of City and Regional
Planning and the Cornell Cooperative Extension at
Cornell University.
Recent News
Warner contributes to the New
York Times' "Room for Debate"
section on privatization.
Linking Economic Development
and Child Care
This research project aims to
better identify the economic
linkages of child care from a
regional economy perspective.
About Professor Warner
Papers, course syllabi, and a short
bio are available.
About Professor Warner
Contact Professor Warner
About this site
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Professor Warner's Research
Professor Warner's research explores the role of community collaborations and investments in social
infrastructure in promoting local and regional economic development. Recent articles include the following in
addition to a Special Issue of Community Development: The Journal of the Community Development Society
on the Economic Importance of Child Care for Community Development.
Warner, M and Christine Weiss Daugherty 2004. "Promoting the ‘Civic’ in Entrepreneurship: The Case of Rural
Slovakia," Journal of the Community Development Society Vol 35, No. 1.
Warner, M.E. and Zhilin Liu 2005. Regional Economic Development and Local Services: The Case of Child
Care, International Journal of Economic Development. 7(1).
Warner, M.E. and Zhilin Liu 2006. "The Importance of Child Care in Economic Development: A Comparative
Analysis of Regional Economic Linkage," Economic Development Quarterly 20(1):97-103.
Warner, M.E., 1999. "Collaborative Planning Broadens the Local Economic Development Policy Debate."
Journal of Planning Education and Research. 19:201-206. (Earlier version CRP Working Paper #169)
Child Care as Economic Development
The early childhood care and education field is at an exciting
moment. Across the US, there is increasing recognition of the
economic importance of child care. Early care and education is
being recognized as an important economic sector in its own right,
and as a critical piece of social infrastructure that supports
children's development and facilitates parents' employment. The
Linking Economic Development and Child Care Research Project
aims to better identify the economic linkages of child care from a
Innovative Economic Development Strategies
Traditionally local government economic development policy has focused on attracting new business through
incentives and subsidies. However new economic development approaches emphasize investment in the social
infrastructure necessary to support a vibrant, creative, entrepreneurial economy. Many states are looking at
the importance of infrastructural supports such as child care on regional economic well being. At the city and
neighborhood level governments are exploring new public private partnerships to increase investment in
downtown business districts (Business Improvement Districts). Often initiated by non-profit associations or
community development corporations, these innovative approaches have come to scale and now attract
support from the majority of local governments.
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regional economy perspective. We support states and localities
interested in using an economic development framework to build
coalitions with the economic development community, business
interests and policy makers to help craft new approaches to child
care finance.
Linking Economic Development and Child Care
Innovative Economic Development Strategies
Survey results show community-based economic development strategies focused on low income
neighborhoods are commonly supported by cities in partnership with non profit organizations.
Innovative Economic Development Strategies
Business Improvement Districts
While effective in promoting economic development, BIDs also raise important issues about governance and
control over public space.
Business Improvement Districts: Issues in Alternative Local Public Service Provision
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Professor Warner's Research
Professor Warner has written papers on
decentralization, privatization, and free trade. Many
of these papers are available online.
View related papers on decentralization
View related papers on privatization
View related papers on free trade
Some of Professor Warner's work in this area is on
national and New York State trends in local
government restructuring.
Privatization
Privatization is a worldwide phenomenon. In recent
years all levels of government, seeking to reduce
costs, have begun turning to the private sector to
provide some of the services that are ordinarily
provided by government. The spread of the
privatization movement is grounded in the
fundamental belief that market competition in the
private sector is a more efficient way to provide
these services and allows for greater citizen choice.
In practice, however, concerns about service quality,
social equity, and employment conditions raise
skepticism of privatization. In New York State, labor
concerns are also a major issue. Although empirical
studies do not provide clear evidence on the costs
and benefits of privatization, public perception and
pressure for improved government efficiency will
keep privatization on the government agenda.
Research on privatization
Regionalism
The modern metropolitan area typically contains
multiple political jurisdictions. Public choice theorists
argue political fragmentation will enhance choice and
efficiency in local government service provision.
However, the political fragmentation of the
metropolitan area makes it difficult to address
economic development, service provision or
democratic voice at the regional level.
Consolidationists argue that regional government is
the solution. However, support for regionalism is
weak. Alternatives such as inter-municipal
cooperation or functional consolidation (specific to a
service) have been much more popular. These
solutions also raise problems of equity and
democratic representation and the ability to address
Reinventing Government
Sparked by privatization and business-model
prescriptions for government, a debate has emerged
as to the primary responsibilities of public
managers. There are those who see public
administration as akin to a business-providing a
choice of services to citizens, at the lowest possible
cost. Others believe that public management's
Government Restructuring
This site profiles research by Professor Warner and colleagues on the nature of local government restructuring
in the United States. The site also contains a review of the literature on government restructuring including
annotated bibliographies and links to summaries of many of the articles and books cited.
Recent Articles on Privatization and Decentralization by Mildred Warner
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the need for broader multi-functional coordination.
Professor Warner quoted in 3/9/09 Wall Street
Journal article "Localities Facing Merger Push"
Research on regionalism
responsibilities extend beyond this, to the
preservation of public values such as equity,
accountability and citizen voice. From this debate
stem questions about the nature of citizenship, and
the proper relationship between a democratic
government and its citizens.
Research on reinventing government
Decentralization
Decentralization refers to the global trend of
devolving the responsibilities of centralized
governments to regional or local governments. The
promise of decentralization is to enhance efficiency
(through inter-governmental competition and fiscal
discipline) and democratic voice (though enhanced
local voice over service provision). Decentralization
works best in settings where there are strong
traditions of democracy, accountability and
professionalism in subnational government.
Decentralization may enhance productive efficiency
but will undermine allocative efficiency by making
redistribution more difficult, especially in areas with
regional inequality.
Research on decentralization
Network Governance, Citizenship
and Free Trade
As government shifts from direct provision to use of
third parties for service delivery, new challenges
with respect to management, accountability and
citizenship are raised. It may actually be harder to
exercise control or ensure accountability when
government is part of an interdependent network.
This is why many scholars use the term governance
rather than government to describe current
conditions. These network governance arrangements
alter the nature of citizenship as well, creating a
democratic deficit. This section concludes with an
overview of the recent free trade agreements and
their impact on democracy and governments' ability
to use third parties for public service provision.
Research on network governance, citizenship
and free trade
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Special Projects
National and State Trends
Professor Warner's research on national and New York state trends in local government restructuring.
Contracting Back In
While privatization is the most popular form of alternative local government service delivery, longitudinal
analysis shows these contracts are not stable over time.
Free Trade and State and Local Government
An overview of state and local government concerns about free trade. Case studies, resolutions and letters
illustrate how state and local governments are asking for a balance between free trade objectives and local
government authority.
Options for County Nursing Homes in New York State
This web page is the product of several months of collaborative research between County Nursing Facilities of
New York, Inc. (CNFNY), the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA), and the Department of City and
Regional Planning at Cornell University. Our goal in carrying out this research was to develop a better
understanding of the current status of New York's county homes.
Transfer of Development Rights
Local governments undertake transfer of development rights (TDR) programs to use the market to implement
and pay for development density and location decisions. TDR programs allow landowners to sever
development rights from properties in government-designated low-density areas, and sell them to purchasers
who want to increase the density of development in areas that local governments have selected as higher
density areas.
Business Improvement Districts
While effective in promoting economic development, BIDs also raise important issues about governance and
control over public space.
Prison Privatization
The movement towards the privatization of corrections in the United States is a result of the convergence of
two factors: the unprecedented growth of the US prison population since 1970 and the emergence out of the
Reagan era of a political environment favorable to free-market solutions.
Corruption
Corruption has been identified as a major barrier to economic and social development in developing countries,
and considerable research as been done into the causes of and the solutions to corruption in these countries.
Labor-Management Cooperation
As local governments nationwide struggle with demands for quality service delivery and fiscal constraints,
they are employing a number of strategies. While these include privatization and intermunicipal cooperation,
another technique that can lead to greater efficiency and cost savings is labor-management cooperation.
Background articles and a special report examine some of the critical issues surrounding effective
implementation of cooperative labor-management practices.
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Contracting Back In
Case Studies of Contracting Back In
New survey evidence shows that public officials are
finding that privatization has its limits. While
contracting out continues to be widely used by many
local governments, the practice of "contracting back
in" - where governments choose to resume in-house
production following a period of privately produced
service - is becoming increasingly common. These
are cases of local governments bringing previously
contracted work back in- house.
Local Government Restructuring
Survey in New York
Summary of survey results
Database of local government restructuring
cases in New York State
These pages contain information about service
delivery restructuring among towns and counties in
New York State, based on a survey completed in
1996 and 1997. The summary of survey results
presents the key findings of the survey,
accompanied by graphic illustrations. You can also
search the database created from the survey results
to find out more about specific instances of
restructuring in New York State towns and counties.50 State Database
Child Care and Economic Development 50 State
Database
Many organizations provide data on early care and
education. This database provides an overview of all
current, national sources of comparative data on the
early care and education sector including: child care
economic data, demographic data, and early care
and education program (policy) data.
Summary of Child Care Economic
Impact Studies
Summary of Child Care Economic Impact
Studies
The Summary of Child Care Economic Impact
Studies is a qualitative database of state and local
studies (completed and in-progress) about the
economic impact of child care.
Databases
Below are two interactive, searchable databases available directly from this site.
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Fiscal stress, changing public expectations and
shifting responsibilities for services due to
devolution have prompted many local governments
to consider restructuring service delivery. This web
site is designed to provide local governments with
information on restructuring trends and innovations
in public sector service provision, public-private
partnerships, privatization, inter-municipal
cooperation and contracting back-in. Local
government is concerned with promoting economic
development and Professor Warner's research
explores the role of collaboratives and investments
in social infrastructure, such as child care, on
economic development.
This web site is a project of Professor Mildred
Warner in the Department of City and Regional
Planning and the Cornell Cooperative Extension at
Cornell University.
Recent News
Results of a Spring 2008 national
survey of planners released;
Professor Warner speaks at
conferences in Orlando and
Singapore.
Linking Economic Development
and Child Care
This research project aims to
better identify the economic
linkages of child care from a
regional economy perspective.
About Professor Warner
Papers, course syllabi, and a short
bio are available.
About Professor Warner
Contact Professor Warner
About this site
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Recent News
Mildred Warner contributed The Pendulum Swings Again to the New York Times' "Room for Debate"
section on privatization.
Warner, M.E. 2011. "Water Privatization Does Not Yield Cost Savings," in Reclaiming Public Water:
Achievements, Struggles and Vision from Around the World, Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe
Observatory. Released at the World Water Forum in Cape Town, South Africa for World Water Day, March
22, 2011.
Hefetz, Amir and M. Warner, 2004 ("Privatization and Its Reverse: Explaining the Dynamics of the
Government Contracting Process," in Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory, 14(2): 171-
190) was selected as one of 30 exemplary articles in the first 20 years of the journal.
Council of Global Unions - Quality Public Service Conference, Geneva, Switzerland Oct 12-14, 2010.
Warner, Mildred E. and Amir Hefetz 2010, "Privatization and Reverse Privatization in US Local
Government Service Delivery, 2002-2007," Paper prepared for Public Service International Council of
Global Unions Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, Oct. 2010
Resources from conference
Big Ideas in Local Government Conference, Atlanta, GA October 2009
Alliance for Innovation
International City/County Management Association
Publications of special interest:
Warner, Mildred E. 2010. "The Future of Local Government: 21st Century Challenges," Public
Administration Review, 70(S-II): 145-147.
Sclar, Elliott, 2009. The Political-Economics of Infrastructure Finance: The New Sub Prime, Paper
presented at Annual Meeting Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Center for
Sustainable Urban Development, The Earth Institute Columbia University.
Warner, Mildred E. 2009. Local Government Infrastructure - and the False Promise of
Privatization. A Century Foundation Report. New York: Century Foundation.
Warner et al. 2009. Planning for Family-Friendly Communities: Issues and Opportunities.
Warner, Mildred E. and Jennifer Gerbasi. 2004, "Is There a Democratic Deficit in the Free Trade
Agreements? What Local Governments Should Know," Public Management 86:2 (16-21).
Oslo, Norway Conference, November 2008, 
Strategies to Deal with Privatization and to Achieve Quality Public Services,
Public Services International
Professor Warner's PowerPoint
Singapore Conference September 2007,
Reasserting the Role of the Public in Public Service Provision National University of Singapore
Professor Warner's Paper: Warner, M.E. 2008. Reversing Privatization: Rebalancing Government Reform,
Policy and Society, 27(2): 163-174.
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Professor Mildred Warner
Professor
Department of City and
Regional Planning
Cornell University
B.A., Oberlin College, 1979
M.S., Cornell University, 1985
Ph.D., Cornell University, 1997
Mildred Warner is a Professor in
the Department of City and
Regional Planning at Cornell
University where her work focuses primarily on local
government service delivery and new community
development models for addressing human services.
Her work shows potential for market based solutions
in public service delivery but also raises cautions
about the uneven incidence of markets in depressed
inner city and rural areas. Dr. Warner's research
explores the issues of privatization, devolution and
economic development.
Dr. Warner is author of one edited volume and more
than 70 refereed articles, book chapters, extension
and consulting reports. She has received major
research grants from the USDA National Research
Initiative and Hatch program to look at the impacts
of devolution and privatization on local government
service delivery, and from the U.S. Dept. of Health
and Human Services and the W.K. Kellogg
Foundation to explore the regional economic impacts
of child care. She consults widely on economic
development policy, local government and child care
issues at the local, state and national levels. She
has worked closely with International City County
Management Association, National League of Cities,
National Association of Counties and public sector
unions such as AFSCME and CSEA. She was a
visiting scholar with the Economic Policy Institute in
2005. She has been a featured speaker at local
government conferences in Australia, New Zealand
and Spain, and child care conferences all over the
United States.
About Professor Warner
C.V.
Search or browse Warner publications
Download Warner photo in high resolution black
and white or low resolution color
E-mail Professor Warner
Courses Taught
These courses have been taught by Professor
Warner recently:
CRP 5074: Economic Development Workshop:
Planning for Family Friendly Cities
CRP 7201: Research Design (article
summaries)
CRP 418/618: Government Policy Workshop:
Financing Child Care
CRP 412/612: Seminar: Devolution,
Privatization, and the New Public Management
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Dr. Warner has a Ph.D. in Development Sociology, a
Masters in Agricultural Economics from Cornell
University and a BA in History from Oberlin College.
Previously she served as a program officer with the
Ford Foundation for three years and as Associate
Director for nine years of Cornell's Community and
Rural Development Institute where she brought
policy makers, community development practitioners
and academics together to explore new approaches
to community development.
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About this Site
Governments are exploring ways to enhance service delivery and promote economic development.  This web
site is designed to provide local governments and economic developers with  information on economic
development strategies and a review of experience with local government restructuring, specifically
privatization, regionalism and decentralization. Survey research and case studies from across the country are
profiled, as well as summaries of relevant research by Professor Warner and others. 
This site is developed and maintained by Professor Mildred Warner with support from students in the
Graduate Program of the Department of City and Regional Planning.  The site is an integral part of Professor
Warner’s extension program as part of Cornell Cooperative Extension.  Research reported here is supported by
an array of grants listed in Professor Warner’s C.V.  Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations
expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the views of funders.  A major update to the
article summaries section was completed by Rachel Gage in Summer 2004.  Brian Lukoff has served as
webmaster since 2000.
Questions and comments on this site may be directed to: Mildred E. Warner, Associate Profesor, Department
of City and Regional Planning 215 W. Sibley Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-6701. Phone 607-255-
6816. Fax 607-255-1971. Email: mew15@cornell.edu. 
Some documents on this site are available in Microsoft Word and PDF format. To view Microsoft Word
documents, download the Microsoft Word Viewer. To view PDF files, download Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Presentations are available in Microsoft PowerPoint format. To view Microsoft PowerPoint presentations,
download Microsoft PowerPoint Viewer.
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Search Cornell
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Municipal Year Book, 2001
Washington DC:  pp.21-27
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Business Improvement Districts: Issues in Alternative Local Public Service
Provision
by Mildred Warner, James Quazi, Brooks More, Ezra Cattan, Scott Bellen and Kerim Odekon
June 2002
Introduction
Economic Development Impact
Targeting Public Investment
Management of Public Space
Democratic Accountability
Best Practices
Case Studies
State Enabling Legislation
Bibliography
Web Resources
Introduction
Throughout the country and in cities such as New York, San Francisco, Cleveland and Philadelphia, Business
Improvement Districts (BIDs) have been able to maintain cleaner and safer streets, decrease storefront
vacancy rates, and address social welfare issues. BIDs levy assessments on real property for specific
improvements beyond which local governments can reasonably provide. They have been effective in reversing
decline and promoting commercial development in urban areas.
In general, BIDs are formed following a proposal by a group of property owners in a geographically defined
area to fund supplemental governmental services (e.g. cleaning and maintenance), non-governmental
services (e.g. landscaping, marketing and promotion), and capital investments (e.g. sidewalk widening). The
municipality in which a BID is located collects the BID's supplemental property tax assessments through its
general taxation powers and distributes them to the BID. A board of directors composed of property owners,
merchants, residents and public sector representatives is then given authority by the government to
undertake projects and programs within the district.
While the ability of BIDs to achieve their goals is rarely questioned, concerns have been raised over whether
the success of BIDs has come at a cost. This website profiles the issues raised by both proponents and critics
in a number of areas and provides case studies focussed on material from New York State to illustrate these
points.
Economic Development
IDs are quasi-public entities established to provide services and promote economic development within a
designated district. City government officials, business and property owners, and economic development
experts have realized the provision or expansion of existing infrastructure is only a part of what attracts and
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retains businesses. The creation of locally-based organizational structures that are responsive to district
interests and satisfy community needs are essential to promote downtown areas as viable sites for ongoing
reinvestment.
Proponents
A. BIDs have the ability to revitalize deteriorating urban areas.
In response to the challenges of decentralization and fiscal federalism, local governments have employed a
wide range of alternatives including transferring the production of many traditional public goods and services
to the private sector (privatization). BIDs represent an innovative approach to service delivery in that local
collective action, outside of the government, results in the provision and payment for supplemental
goods/services demanded by those within a district. Given the limited funding municipal governments have to
initiate programs for urban regeneration, BIDs present another option to reverse urban decline.
Currently, there are over 1,200 BIDs in operation in the United States and Canada with the phenomenon
quickly spreading abroad. The Alliance for Downtown New York, Inc., manages the Downtown-Lower
Manhattan BIDs and reports on the economic development initiatives of the city and various BIDs. These
include incentives such as affordable pre-wired space to high tech startups, energy incentives and real estate
tax abatements. (Search 'economic development' in the Downtown Alliance homepage.)
[http://www.downtownny.com/]
See: Grand Central Partnership, Times Square BID
B. Under the proper environmental conditions and organizational structures, BIDs are useful tools in
attracting new business and investment.
Though not all BIDs are equally successful, findings from the Center for Urban Research and Policy at
Columbia University indicate that implementing a BID with an organizational form that matches the goals of
the stakeholders is a key element in BID effectiveness. In New York State there are three organizational
forms that BIDs take: corporate BIDs that contain large amounts of office and retail space and operate in
wealthier parts of the city; main street BIDs that operate in areas of the city that have lost commercial and
retail business to the suburbs; and community BIDs that cover small neighborhoods and offer limited
services.
[http://sipa.columbia.edu/CURP/resources/metro/v01n0402.html]
Critics
C. BID programs for economic development do not address urban blight - they displace undesirable groups
and business activities to neighboring districts.
While BIDs have the ability to promote economic development within the district of operation through
enhanced service provision and capital investment projects, these results may be accomplished by displacing
urban ills outside of the district's boundary. BID activities may result in pockets of poverty within a city and
lead to further deterioration of the areas immediately outside of the BID.
See: Grand Central Partnership
Targeting Public Investment
Once a BID is formed, mandatory assessments fund capital investments and additional services to fill the gap
between the level of services provided by the city and those demanded by business and property owners in
the district. Though investment targets the interests of business and property owners of the district, the
additional services provided benefit the broader consuming public as well. These inequalities in local public
service provision that BIDs effect may be justified by their contribution to greater community well being. 
Proponents 
A. The additional services provided are justified because BIDs pay directly for these services.
The declining capability of municipal governments to provide public services to business districts has resulted
in the decline of older downtown areas and the flight of retail and commercial business to the suburbs and
industrial parks. BIDs are established as a response to this trend, levying assessments for specific
improvements and additional services beyond which local governments can reasonably provide. BIDs therefore
utilize collective action to raise the funds to fulfill the unmet demand for public services, ensuring that locally
raised taxes are spent locally and that downtown areas remain competitive places to locate business.
See: State of California Proposition 218
B. BIDs may be effective in reducing the unequal distribution of public services.
Proponents of BIDs argue that inequality in local public service provision is acceptable to a degree because
business districts require more services to accommodate the influx of consumers and workers. The clean, safe
public spaces that BIDs have been successful in creating benefit city residents as well as business and
property owners within the district and have positive spillover effects outside of the district. By engaging in
these activities, BIDs reduce the inequality of public service provision between the city and suburbs, making
downtown areas more competitive. BIDs also have the ability to increase a municipality's tax base, allowing
local governments to improve public services to property owners and tenants citywide.
See: Baltimore Downtown Partnership, Pitkin Avenue BID
Critics 
C. BIDs may exacerbate the uneven distribution of public services.
BIDs are created because municipal services are perceived to be inadequate. As a result, BIDs by definition
provide a higher level of public services than their surroundings, encouraging a model of public service
provision where services are provided based on an area's ability to pay. The creation of BIDs may then create
cycles of inequality in which areas with better services attract more business and profits while under served
areas continue to deteriorate. The improved service provision within a district may also decrease support by
business and property owners for city-wide provision of services.
See: Grand Central Partnership, Baltimore Downtown Partnership
D. The ability of BIDs to borrow may crowd out investment in other areas of a city.
The assessment fees paid by property owners within a district are collected by the government and
transferred to the BID's board of directors to fund additional services and capital investments. If a BID
decides to fund additional services in excess of its total receipts from assessments, money borrowed counts
against the city's limit and may constrain investment in other areas of the city. 
See: Grand Central Partnership
Management of Public Space
The process of creating a BID involves defining the geographic area in which the BID will operate. While BIDs
have the authority to initiate programs for specific improvements, the public spaces within BID districts
remain under the jurisdiction of the municipality. Though BIDs have the potential to increase public voice by
helping downtown areas remain competitive with suburban shopping malls, conflicts between civil liberties
(e.g. free speech and demonstration) and the commercial interests of the BID management board may lead
to concerns over the privatization of public space. 
Proponents
A. BIDs may increase democratic voice by enhancing the vitality and sustainability of public space.
BIDs were initially created to help downtown businesses compete with suburban shopping centers and strip
malls. In most states, suburban shopping malls are considered private property and, as such, reserve the
right to stop activities of groups using the malls' common areas for political activities such as pamphleting,
protesting, and signature gathering. By contrast, the public spaces within BIDs remain under the jurisdiction
of the municipality and must maintain the democratic ideals of free speech and demonstration.
See: Ithaca Downtown Partnership
Critics
B. BIDs privatize public space by excluding those that detract from the commercial goals of the BID
members.
BIDs may limit citizen voice by privatizing public space within a district. Public streets, parks and plazas serve
the dual role of attracting shoppers and providing a 'living room' in which the daily activities of the city's
public life are carried out. The 'clean and safe' programs that BIDs initiate to attract consumers can limit
citizen voice and dislocate less desirable citizens through the privatization of public space. In some instances,
allegations have been made that these programs involve the removal of the homeless and unauthorized
vendors.
See: Grand Central Partnership
Democratic Accountability
Though successful in achieving their economic goals, concerns have been voiced about the public
accountability of BIDs. Dissent focuses on concerns over the nature of BID governance, which varies from
state to state, district to district and within the same city. BIDs pose a problem of limited accountability to
the groups their actions affect: district residents, municipal governments, consumers, the non-consuming
public and the BID's own business and property owner constituents.
Proponents
A. A BID's approval process can be structured to ensure accountability.
To establish a BID, property owners within a proposed district are required to develop a District Management
Plan and give notice to all residents and business and property owners of their intent. The District
Management Plan must be approved by the City Council based on recommendations provided by an advisory
committee. Assessment fees are then determined through the advisory board that supervises the BID's
operations and submits yearly service plans.
The BID structure may also include weighted voting systems where the costs of district projects are assessed
against land in accordance with the benefits accruing to each particular property. The State of California and
other Western states have also mandated 'sunset requirements' that require BIDs to have their charters
reviewed and re-approved every 3-10 years. The approval process is normally via a vote of property owners
and a five year time period is preferable as it enables BIDs time to produce results and introduces incentives
for accountability. 
See: State of New York Enabling Legislation for BIDs, State of California Proposition 218
B. Monitoring policies can be formed to ensure accountability.
Though municipal governments are involved in the creation of BIDs, participation often decreases dramatically
once the district is established. Some BIDs have yielded to concerns over democratic accountability and have
installed residents, business owners and other non-property-holding stakeholders (e.g. local officials) to the
BID's board. Annual reports, outside audits, and conflict of interest rules also aid in making the actions of
BIDs more transparent.
See: Ithaca Downtown Partnership
Critics
C. A BID's influence within a district may co-opt local government authority.
In establishing a BID, New York State law requires approval of the borough president, city planning
commission, city council and state comptroller. Once a BID is formed, however, no review of BID activities is
required nor is approval needed to initiate any specific programs or improvements. Further, since property
owners are guaranteed the majority, municipal governments may be unable to exert control over BID
activities. 
See: Grand Central Partnership
D. BIDs are sometimes realized due to lack of informed opposition rather than majority approval.
The burden of responsibility for preventing the formation of a BID falls on the objectors rather than its
supporters. In order to prevent the formation of a BID, 51 percent of property owners must file an objection
with the city clerk. Dissent is further constrained by limiting judicial review to thirty days. Furthermore, once
a BID has been established, non-consenting property owners are mandated to pay assessments. 
See: Madison Avenue BID
E. A BID's voting structure may violate the constitutional principle of one-person, one-vote by favoring
property owners over residents.
BIDs employ a plurality system of voting that creates a system where property owners are represented and
tenants are not. These systems work against organizing around new themes, contingencies, and the needs of
non-property-owners that live, work or operate businesses within the district. Because BIDs constitute
districts that are 'specialized in purpose, narrow in scope and limited in effect,' BIDs have generally been
exempt from the one person, one vote doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause. However, because property
owners control BIDs, supplemental services reflect the needs and choices of business and property owners.
Where the needs of residents and property owners differ, the needs of residents may not be met.
See: Kessler v. Grand Central, NOHO BID
Best Practices
Though BIDs can and have revitalized downtown areas, issues of concern have been raised over the loss of
accountability and oversight in the pursuit of economic development. The following presents a list of
recommendations of how to limit the negative affects of BIDs without constraining their ability to promote
economic development. Best practices in governance, equity and economic development aim to further
successful public-private partnerships between BIDs and their respective municipalities.
B. BID dissolution and the implementation of sunset clauses.
Once a BID has been formed, it has the potential to exist forever. Due to legislation preventing BIDs with
outstanding debt from being dissolved, a BID management board may secure continuation by issuing bonded
debt or incurring further debt through ongoing activities. Furthermore, once a BID has been established there
is generally little or no monitoring of the level of satisfaction property owners have with the BID.
Sunset clauses have been implemented in many states and require that BID charters be renewed after a
period of 3-10 years. Term limits ensure a degree of accountability to the BID property owner constituents -
if activities sponsored by the board do not reflect the needs of the stakeholders, the BID can be dissolved.
C. Restructuring the complaint resolution process.
The lack of a formal complaint resolution process allows BIDs to resolve disputes informally without official
documentation or the compilation of a complaint log. Consequently, it is impossible to assess the number of
complaints that have been made or the nature/severity of these complaints. Implications of the lack of a
formal complaint resolution process can best be seen in the allegations made against the Grand Central
Partnership (GCP).
Requiring a formal complaint resolution process and the compilation of official complaints has the potential to
serve as an early warning system for larger institutional problems. In the case of the GCP several complaints
were made but recorded prior to both lawsuits. A formal log of all complaints, including the date and time of
occurrence, should be presented to both board members and municipal government officials to correct any
managerial deficiencies.
See: Grand Central Partnership
D. Installing performance measurement standards.
Due to the lack of formal performance indicators for BID activities, informal, visual methods are often utilized
to assess BID performance. This is most problematic in the case of monitoring economic development that
BID activity is designed to stimulate. The lack of adequate assessment of how much improvement occurs in a
district makes it difficult to understand how well a BID is fulfilling its mandate.
See: Pitkin Avenue BID, Times Square BID
Case Studies
Baltimore Downtown Partnership. Baltimore, MD.
The Baltimore Downtown Partnership (BDP) works throughout six downtown neighborhoods and represents
500 businesses. The BDP is engaged in activities that promote living, working, and recreating in downtown
Baltimore. To accomplish these goals, the BDP undertakes programs in the areas of sanitation, security,
parking, housing, beautification, marketing, and general economic development.
Downtown Baltimore was widely known for its high crime rate. To change negative perceptions developed
among area employees, consumers and visitors, the BDP hired 'Safety Guides' to discourage crime by
curtailing the presence of the homeless. The Downtown Partnership has been working with the Baltimore Gas
and Electricity Company and the city to install surveillance cameras along the commercial streets of the
BID. While this public-private partnership has been touted as a successful tool in fighting crime, it also raises
concern over the delegation of police power to less accountable, private entities such as BIDs.
[www.godowntownbaltimore.com]
Grand Central Partnership. New York, NY.
Centered on Grand Central Station, a New York City landmark and daily point of entry for thousands of
commuters and visitors, the Grand Central district is home to the nation's largest and wealthiest BID. The
Grand Central Partnership (GCP) was established in 1988 and covers 76 million square feet of commercial
space within a 68-block area of mid-town Manhattan. It's irregular boundaries reach north to south from East
35th Street to East 54th, and east to west from 2nd Avenue to 5th.
The Homeless
Established by district property owners in 1988, the Grand Central Partnership (GCP) was primarily a response
to the physical and economic deterioration of an area recognized as one of the city's largest homeless
encampments. To address the homeless condition, the GCP commenced a 'clean and safe' program aimed at
moving the homeless off the streets and into shelters.
To achieve this goal, formerly homeless men were hired to persuade the homeless to take advantage of a
GCP social service program held at a local church, which included shelter, meals, and job placement services.
The GCP estimates that 150 homeless individuals were placed in full-time jobs. They also claim a 50%
reduction in crime.
The GCP clean and safe program came under scrutiny when a small scandal erupted over allegations that
'goon squads' were using force to remove homeless individuals that would not willingly leave (1995). Whether
or not violent tactics were used, the GCP was exposed for exercising poor judgment in the use of untrained
formerly homeless men as social service workers. Further scandals emerged over the $1.15 hourly rate paid
to social service workers, which was justified as having been established as an outreach program.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the City's Department of Homeless Services
both conducted investigations into these allegations. Ultimately, HUD rescinded its $547,000 grant, and Chase
Manhattan Bank cancelled its $450,000 contract with the GCP. Soon afterwards the city comptroller issued a
critical audit of the Grand Central BID and in the summer of 1998, citing 'persistent noncompliance with
municipal directives' the city of New York declined to renew the Grand Central District Management Agency's
(GCDMA) contract to manage the BID. 
The finance committee's own review found that two independent incidents (1990, 1992) had been reported in
which Grand Central Partnership Social Services Corporation (GCSSC) workers were alleged to have used
excessive force in removing homeless individuals. Both cases resulted in $5 million lawsuits against the
GCSSC and in neither case were the allegations formally detailed, documented or reported to the board of
directors. Furthermore, the GCSSC was unable to prevent further incidents/allegations because the
documentation process was inadequate to provide a reasonable level of accountability for staff members. The
failure to implement an adequate complaint resolution process limits understanding of how many complaints
have been made against the BID or the nature of those complaints.
Kessler Vs Grand Central
The Grand Central District management Agency (GCDMA) was taken to court by district residents over
complaints alleging that the structure and activity of the Grand Central Partnership (GCP) denied equal voting
power and representation on the GCDMA board. District courts ruled in favor of the GCDMA on the grounds
that the GCDMA is a special, limited purpose entity that disproportionately affects one class of the BID's
constituents, property owners. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the management of the BID exercised
general governmental power sufficient to require that that the board's elections comply with the one person,
one vote requirement. The court ruled that the mere designation of an elected body to perform a large
number of functions does not trigger the one-person, one-vote requirement.
Finance
The ability of the Grand Central Partnership (GCP) to borrow money was counted against the city's ability to
borrow. In addition to real property assessments, the Grand Central District Management Agency (GCDMA)
raised funds through the issuance of bonds totaling $32 million. These bonds counted against the city's
constitutional debt limit, effectively limiting the amount of money the city could raise in future bond issues
and possibly crowding out investment in other areas. Since then, the city of New York, under Mayor Giuliani,
discontinued the ability of BIDs to issue bonds in order to protect its own ability to borrow and minimize the
risk of legal repercussions should the BID default on its financial obligations.
[http://tenant.net/Oversight/bid97/bid97.html#grandcentral] 
[www.grandcentralpartnership.org]
Ithaca Downtown Partnership. Ithaca, NY.
The Ithaca Downtown Partnership (IDP) was formed in 1994 as a 'main street' BID to reverse the declining
course of the city's downtown shopping district. The IDP has been primarily engaged in business attraction
and marketing activities though it has become increasingly involved in environmental programs (streetscape
beautification and events programming). As a result, there is little trash on the mall, the planters are full of
flowers and free concerts are offered in the summer. Since the IDP's inception, downtown vacancy rates have
declined and property values have started to rise.
A first attempt at establishing the BID garnered a 56 percent approval among property owners. Originally, the
area under consideration extended from 'The Commons,' a public outdoor pedestrian mall, to Route 13, an
arterial highway serving the City's primary center for economic activity. The city acknowledged the conflicting
interests within such a broad district and did not establish the BID. Instead, the City scaled back the district,
leaving The Commons as its focus, to gain 75 percent approval.
The IDP board is notable for its more public-private structure, comprised of ten property owners, four
commercial tenants, one residential tenant, and four public sector representatives (one Alderperson, the
Mayor, the Director of Economic Development, and one member of the County Board of Representatives). In
addition, the BID does not have jurisdiction over the policies that govern The Commons. Rather, the city has
established a twelve-member Commons Advisory Board, on which the IDP director has an appointed position.
The Commons Advisory Board is responsible for allocating permits for activities in the public space and as a
result, the Commons maintains more of its public goods nature. For example, a political demonstration during,
but unrelated to, Cornell University's Parents' Weekend in the fall of 2001 resulted in complaints to the IDP
by its merchant members. Merchants alleged that the protesters would scare away customers during one of
the busiest shopping weekends of the year. Despite the concern voiced by merchants, the Commons Advisory
Board gave the protesters a permit illustrating the fact that the IDP does not have direct control over the
public space in which it operates. 
The multifaceted nature of The Commons has at times created tensions between property owners/merchants
and the public. The Commons is a favorite place for teenagers who are viewed as loiterers that detract from
the district. The IDP has worked with district businesses and the city to utilize passive techniques to
discourage loitering.
[www.downtownithaca.com]
Madison Avenue Business Improvement District. New York, NY.
The Madison Avenue BID in New York City is an example of a BID that was realized due to lack of informed
opposition rather than majority approval. A one-week intensive survey conducted on the district's 765
property owners excluded 497 owners for their residential status. In that one-week period, the survey
garnered a response from 50 of 268 commercial property owners, and of the 50 only 12 were actually
registered commercial property owners. The balance of property owners, not reached by the survey, first
became aware of the BID and its operations when they received their first assessment bill from the
Department of Finance. A major blunder for the BID came in 1997, when Mayor Giuliani found it necessary to
advise the Madison Avenue BID's security department to rescind the distribution of a flier advising the BID's
businesses to close and secure valuable merchandise on the day of the Puerto-Rican Day Parade. 
[http://tenant.net/Oversight/bid97/bid97.html#madison]
NOHO Business Improvement District. New York, NY.
The NOHO BID, New York City's 38th BID, was formed in 1995 to offer marketing support and community
assistance, including sanitation and security services to the area within which it operates. The NOHO New
York BID has been criticized for being mainly comprised of residential property owners and tenants, and not-
for-profit groups as opposed to commercial property owners and tenants. At the BID's inception, 80 percent
of the BIDs budget was being raised from property owners while 20 percent was coming from the NYC Capital
Funds. In essence, commercial property owners in New York City's NOHO BID were subsidizing 80 percent of
the BID's budget despite their limited involvement and participation within the BID and its board of directors.
[http://tenant.net/Oversight/bid97/bid97.html#noho]
Pitkin Avenue Business Improvement District. Brooklyn, NY.
The Pitkin Avenue BID includes 200 retail businesses and encompasses 14 blocks in the Brownsville
neighborhood of Brooklyn. At its inception, The Pitkin Avenue BID faced a high crime rate that deterred
shoppers from coming into the area. After instituting a Security Network Program through collaboration with
the New York Police Department (NYPD), incidents have declined significantly.
The Pitkin Avenue BID is cited even by critics of BIDs for its innovative security provision that has tracked
crime across the district to ensure that policies work to reduce crime rates rather than displace them to
neighboring locations. Monthly statistics were compiled to record criminal activity on a block by block basis
and the times at which these incidents occurred. All radio calls and personnel visits made to local merchants
were also accounted for. Additionally, the BID monitored the number of NYPD officers patrolling the area,
providing an accurate assessment of the level of service received from the city. 
The fact that the Pitkin Avenue BID was able to achieve such a level of sophistication in the area of security
and program monitoring with a relatively limited budget ($113, 903 annually, 1995) indicates that other BIDs
could do more to quantify performance. The implementation of performance standards allows BIDs such as
Pitkin Avenue to assess how well services are being provided and indicate when changes in service provision
must be made.
[http://www.nymtc.org/downloadablepgs/tep/nyc/nyc33.pdf]
Times Square Business Improvement District. New York, NY.
The Times Square BID was established in 1992 to transform the neighborhood around 42nd Street from a
neighborhood associated with squalor, pornography and vice to a clean, safe and friendly area. The Times
Square district, stretching from 40th to 53rd Streets and between Sixth and Ninth Avenues, contains over
1500 businesses, 27 hotels and 268 restaurants. With an operating budget of $5.9 million (unchanged since
1998) much of the BID's activities have been directed towards attracting jobs and investment to the district,
carrying out market analysis and structuring public/private partnerships for redevelopment projects.
The Times Square BID involves itself in issues of economic development, public safety, sanitation, events
programming and the maintenance of the Times Square Visitors Center. To assess the contribution the BID
has made to the economic development of the district, the Times Square BID tracks fluctuations in
commercial and retail rents and leasing availability. The Times Square Annual Report (October, 2000)
estimates the total retail potential in the Times Square district to be $1.646 billion, an 88% increase from the
1992 valuation ($877.5 million) at the time of the BID's inception. The dramatic increase in retail potential
within the district can be attributed to both the increase in total retail space (approximately 10% of new
leasing in Manhattan between July 1, 1999 and June 30 2000 occurred in Times Square) and the appreciation
of property values. Availability rates have decreased 67.6% between 1991 and 1999 (65.7% in all of midtown
Manhattan during the same period) and average asking rents have also increase steadily. In addition to
monitoring rents and leasing availability, the Times Square BID also monitors the number of new jobs created
in the district. Total employment in the Times Square area (zip codes 10019 and 10036) has increased from
229,107 to 261,114 in 1999 (13.9%) and 27% from 1991. 
The Times Square BID also engages itself in several other activities that contribute to the revitalization of the
district. Outdoor advertising campaigns serve as engines for economic development within the district adding
$76 million to taxable property values alone. Rents for the most visible signs run from $400,000 to $3 million
per year (a total of $125 million per year), the signs themselves advertise the district and are testimony to
the traffic that comes through the area. Signage in Times Square has increased threefold in the last three
years.
Declining crime rates have also contributed to increased use of the district by shoppers and tourists (An
assessment of the impact of BID activities on the tourism industry in can be found on the Times Square
homepage under annual reports, 2000). Police officers operating from two precincts in the Times Square area
are supplemented by 45 BID public safety officers (patrolling from 9:30am till midnight) and two BID
vehicles. Together the NYPD and BID security personnel have worked to reduce crime in the area 60.6%
since 1993. 
[www.timessquarebid.org]
State Enabling Legislation
State of New York Legislation Enabling the Formation of Business Improvement Districts. [NYS Consolidated
Law Article 19A]
In 1980, the New York State Legislature passed enabling legislation allowing cities to independently establish
Business Improvement Districts. According to this legislation, the establishment of a BID must follow an
approval process detailed below.
The approval process begins when a sponsoring organization (e.g. Local Development Corporation (LDC),
chamber of commerce, area property owners) decides to form a BID. The sponsoring organization must then
engage in extensive local outreach, typically lasting over a year, and intended to make all property owners,
commercial tenants and local government officials within a proposed district aware of the intent to form and
provide opportunity to participate in the planning process. Activities in this stage of the approval process
include the formation of an outreach plan listing planned activities and a timeline for their accomplishment.
Additionally, sponsoring organizations must demonstrate that all tenants and property owners have been
given opportunity to discuss the budget, assessment and services of the proposed BID, provide
documentation (in the form of signature gathering, creation of a database of properties and property
owners/merchants within the district) of outreach activities, and present signed letters of support form
property owners.
As part of the outreach process, a district plan is created detailing the boundaries, services to be provided,
budget, assessment formula (taking into account square footage, frontage, or assessed valuation), funding
sources and management information. The following, under §980-a NYS Consolidated Law (Article 19A), must
be included in a district plan:
S 980-a. Contents of the district plan. The district plan shall contain the following:
(a) a map of the district;
(b) the written report or reports of the legislative body containing:
a description of the boundaries of the district proposed for establishment or extension in a manner
sufficient to identify the lands included
a description of the present and proposed uses of these lands;
the improvements proposed and the maximum cost thereof;
the total annual amount proposed to be expended for improvements, maintenance and operation;
the proposed source or sources of financing;
the proposed time for implementation and completion of the district plan;
any proposed rules and regulations to be applicable to the district;
a list of the properties to be benefited, and a statement of the method or methods by which the
expenses of a district will be imposed upon benefited real property, in proportion to the benefit received
by such property, to defray the cost thereof, including operation and maintenance. Notwithstanding any
inconsistent provision of section nine hundred eighty-f of this article, the plan may provide that all or any
class or category of real property which is exempt by law from real property taxation and which would
not benefit from the establishment or extension of the district may nevertheless be included within the
boundaries of the district but such property shall not be subject to any district charge;
a statement identifying the district management association for the district; and
any other item or matter required to be incorporated therein by the legislative body.
After the district plan has been submitted to the legislative body of the municipality, has been made available
to in the municipal clerk's office for public inspection and is printed in the official paper or newspaper of that
municipality, owners of real property within the district opposed to the plan have 30 days to file objections at
the municipal clerk's office. If either the owners of 51% of the assessed valuation of all benefited real
property or at least 51% of the owners of real property within the district file objections, the district will not
be established.
If there is not sufficient objection and the legislative body finds that notice of all required hearings was
published and mailed as required by law, that all property owners assessed will benefit from the
establishment of the district and that all real property benefited is included within the proposed limits, it is
determined that the establishment of the district is in the public interest. Upon review by the state
comptroller and adoption of local law approving the establishment of the district the BID is formed. 
For the complete documentation of New York State enabling legislation for BIDs under Article 19A of New
York State Consolidated Law including tax and debt limitations, details of the district management association
and amendments to the district plan, see:
[http://www.centralbid.com/Article19A.htm] 
State of California, Proposition 218, a.k.a. "The Taxpayer's Right to Vote Act."
The Constitution of the State of California requires that assessment of additional taxes be based upon the
proportionate special benefit received by any one parcel. Therefore, associations that desire to form a BID
must consider the degree to which a property owner will benefit from the extra services provided when
allocating the tax rates. Communities in California have often complied with this law by creating zones that
reflect the level of service directly received by each parcel.
Cal Const, Art XIII D § 4 (2001), § 4. Procedures and requirements for assessments.
(a) ".Only special benefits are assessable, and an agency shall separate the general benefits from the special
benefits conferred on a parcel."
(e) ".the agency shall consider all protests against the proposed assessment.the ballots shall be weighted
according to the proportional financial obligation of the affected property."
Proposition 218, passed by voter initiative in 1996, limits the ability of local governments to raise taxes,
assessments or fees to fund government services. In general, it mandates property taxes to require a two-
thirds vote of the electorate if the fee is imposed for property related services. Also, the fee may not exceed
the amount necessary to conduct a regulatory program or to provide the service for which the fee is
imposed.
[http://www.phi.org/talc/Prop218_fact.htm]
In the City of Long Beach, California, the Downtown Long Beach Associates (DLBA) have created an
assessment based on additional services received. The parcels within the district were divided into five zones
according to the level of service provision. Each property owner then pays an amount determined by the
value assigned to that zone multiplied by the store frontage and the lot square footage. This type of
assessment allows for a more equitable method of payment in direct relation to services rendered.
[http://www.silcom.com/~taxabo/prop218.htm]
[www.mainstreetgrp.com/bidcasestudy.html]
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Privatization
Privatization is a worldwide phenomenon. In recent years all levels of government, seeking to reduce
costs, have begun turning to the private sector to provide some of the services that are ordinarily
provided by government. The spread of the privatization movement is grounded in the fundamental belief
that market competition in the private sector is a more efficient way to provide these services and allows
for greater citizen choice. In practice, however, concerns about service quality, social equity, and
employment conditions raise skepticism of privatization. In New York State, labor concerns are also a
major issue. Although empirical studies do not provide clear evidence on the costs and benefits of
privatization, public perception and pressure for improved government efficiency will keep privatization
on the government agenda. A review of recent literature on the theoretical and practical debates on
privatization follows. A set of links to Professor Warner's research on national and New York State trends
is also available on this site.
Overview
Theory--Competition
The theory of privatization is fundamentally based on the notion of competition and the efficiency and choice that it
engenders.
Theory--Competition Critiques
Competition is rarely found in markets for public goods because of the fundamental structure of such markets.
Theory--Coasian Bargaining and Transaction Costs
Coasian bargaining creates the potential for market solutions to the provision of public goods. However it raises the issue of
transactions costs which may be hard to manage.
Theory--Political Economic Critiques
Privatization is not only about economics; it is also about politics. Political interest groups play a major role. Privatization also
represents an overarching political agenda to alter the relationship between government and citizen.
Empirical Studies - Trends
Empirical Studies - Reviews of Other Studies
Empirical Studies--The Contracting Process
Issues surrounding contracting out include the cost of information and monitoring and the need to create a level playing field
for competitive bidding between public workers and the private sector. The contracting process is dynamic (contracting out
and back in) and requires governments to play a market structuring role.
Empirical Studies--Regional Differences
New York State
Labor Concerns
Legal Concerns
International Experience
Special Projects
Overview
Search Cornell
Most privatization research is based on case studies. The following books by E. S. Savas and Elliot Sclar lay
out key theoretical and empirical arguments for and against privatization. Proponents argue that private firms
are more efficient than government because of economies of scale, higher labor productivity, and fewer legal
constraints. He faults government service provision for its monopoly status and inability to be responsive to
citizens' needs, resulting in inefficient, one-size-fits-all services. Critics argue that the nature of government
services makes many of them inappropriate for privatization. They also point out that contracting may entail
hidden costs, because of lack of information, the need for monitoring, and "low-ball" bidding. They note that
in some places creating the competition necessary for effective contracting is impossible, and suggest that in
practice privatization is more complicated than it seems.
Savas, E. S. 1987. Privatization: The Key to Better Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.  Savas, an
advocate of privatization, describes the theory and practice of privatization and alternative service delivery
arrangements, illustrating the appropriate use of various privatization techniques.
Sclar, Elliot, 2000.  You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.  Elliot Sclar lays out and critiques the standard market-based arguments for
privatization, using local government case studies. He concludes that advocates of privatization should
proceed with caution.
Theory--Competition The theory of privatization is fundamentally based on the notion of competition and
the efficiency and choice that it engenders.
Tiebout, Charles 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy 64:416-424.  In
this classic article based on public choice theory, Charles Tiebout puts forth a model for determining the
optimum expenditure level for public goods. He treats residents as consumers, who “shop around” for the
communities that best fit their preferences. The competition among communities forces them to provide
public goods at the most efficient level.
Boyne, George A. 1996. "Competition and Local Government: A Public Choice Perspective." Urban Studies 33
(4-5): 703-721.   Competition and Local Governance
Bennett, Robert. 1990. "Decentralization, Intergovernmental Relations and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare
Agenda?" Pp. 1-26 in Decentralization, Local Government and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda, ed.
Robert Bennett. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  This article puts privatization in a theoretical context. Both
decentralization and privatization reflect decentralizing trends from state to market and state to local levels of
government.
Theory--Competition Critiques Competition is rarely found in markets for public goods because of the
fundamental structure of such markets.
David Lowery, 1998. "Consumer Sovereignty and Quasi-Market Failure" Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, pp.137-172.  The intention of quasi-markets is to promote consumer sovereignty and
efficient provision of goods and services. Lowery contends that quasi-markets often fail to meet these
objectives due to 1) failure of market formation (lack of competition), 2) failure by preference error on the
part of consumers and 3) failure by preference substitution (the difference between individual and collective
wants). Direct government provision of goods and services, with its hierarchy and bureaucratic controls, may
be needed precisely because it is less responsive to market influences.
Sclar, Elliot, 2000.  "What’s Competition Got to Do with It? Market Structures and Public Contracting,"
Chapter 4 of You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell
University Press.   In this chapter, Sclar challenges the argument that privatization creates competition, and
therefore efficiency, in the public sector. Due to the nature of public goods, which may be less profitable and
more complicated to deliver, most public contracting has no competition (monopoly) or minimal competition
among very few firms (oligopoly).
Kodras, Janet. 1997. "Restructuring the State: Devolution, Privatization, and the Geographic Redistribution of
Power and Capacity in Governance." Pp. 79-96 in State Devolution in America: Implications for a Diverse
Society. Ed. Lynn Staeheli, Janet Kodras, and Colin Flint. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews 48. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.  Kodras outlines some of the major arguments for and against three methods of changing how
government services are provided: privatization, devolution to lower levels of government, and simply
abandoning service provision to the nonprofit sector.
Warner, M.E., 2003. "Competition, Cooperation and Local Governance," chapter 19 pp 252-262 in Challenges
for Rural America in the Twenty First Century, edited by David Brown and Louis Swanson, University Park,
PA: Penn State University Press.  
Theory--Coasian Bargaining and Transaction Costs Coasian bargaining creates the potential for market
solutions to the provision of public goods. However it raises the issue of transactions costs which may be
hard to manage.
Webster, Christopher J., (1998). "Public Choice, Pigouvian and Coasian Planning Theory," Urban Studies
35(1):53-75  This article contrasts Pigouvian (welfare) and Coasian economics in the context of planning
theory, and gives examples from land-use planning. Webster suggests that Coasian bargaining may provide
solutions to the problem of public goods provision.
Staley, Samuel and Lynn Scarlett. 1997. "Market Oriented Planning: Principles and Tools." Los Angeles:
Reason Public Policy Institute. http://www.rppi.org/ps236.html  
The Reason Public Policy Institute promotes market solutions over government regulation.  This article
provides an example of Coasian bargaining with respect to land use planning. Staley and Scarlet propose
changes to current planning processes, to streamline the development process and reduce transaction costs.
They argue that in order to accommodate evolving societal land use needs, governments should use market
based bargaining procedures that involve only direct stakeholders.
Williamson, Oliver 1999. “Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective,”
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15(1):306-342. Williamson examines public bureaucracy through
the lens of transaction cost economics, pointing out that public bureaucracy, like other modes of governance,
is well suited to some transactions and poorly suited to others. Williamson claims that there is an efficient
place for public bureaucracy, but that each type of governance (markets, hybrids, firms, regulation), has its
own place.
Zerbe, Richard O. and Howard E. McCurdy. 1999. "The Failure of Market Failure," Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management 18(4):558-578.  Zerbe and McCurdy argue that the case for eliminating market failure
through the internalization of externalities is flawed, and that governments should intervene in the
marketplace only when they have the ability to lower transaction costs
Sclar, Elliot 2000.  "All in the System: Organizational Theories and Public Contracting," Chapter 5 of You
Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press. 
 Chapter 5: All in the System – Organizational Theories and Public Contracting Sclar points out that public
contracting is difficult and the transaction costs are often quite high.
Theory--Political Economic Critiques Privatization is not only about economics; it is also about politics.
Political interest groups play a major role. Privatization also represents an overarching political agenda to alter
the relationship between government and citizen.
Feigenbaum, Harvey and Jeffrey Henig.  1994.  "The Political Underpinnings of Privatization: A Typology".
World Politics 46 (Jan. 1994): 185-208.  The authors discuss the different political lenses through which
privatization is viewed. They emphasize pragmatic privatization as a means of cost-cutting, tactical
privatization as a way of rewarding allies, and systemic privatization to change institutional structures and
societal ideologies. They article primarily focuses on systemic privatization.
Henig, Jeffrey 1989-90. "Privatization in the United States: Theory and Practice." Political Science Quarterly.
104(4):649-670.  Henig traces the development of the theory and the practice of privatization in the United
States until 1989-90. He argues that privatization is a new name for an old practice of government
contracting. He points to the political nature of the privatization agenda and questions its long term viability.
Frug, Gerald E. "Alternative Conceptions of City Services," in City Making: Building Communities without
Building Walls. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.  Frug criticizes Tiebout’s model as leading to cities
which resemble self-segregated voluntary associations of consumers who want privatized services, which
these consumers view as “objects of consumption” for those who can afford to pay. He also reviews several
attempts to modify the Tiebout model.
Starr, Paul. 1987. "The Limits of Privatization." Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute.  This article
provides a theoretical critique of privatization and its potential effects on justice, security, and citizenship.
Starr also disputes two main arguments of privatization advocates: that with privatization 1) choice will
increase and 2) costs will be reduced.
Folbre, Nancy 2001. " Measuring Success," in The Invisible Heart. New York: The New Press. Pp 53-82.
 Folbre discusses the adverse effects privatization and competitive pressures on the quality of services in care
sectors. Standard economic measures used to make privatization decisions fail to accurately assess the real
costs and benefits of care.
Kabeer, Nalia.  "’Rational Fools’ or ‘Cultural Dopes’? Stories of structure and agency in the social sciences.".
Chapter 2 pp16 – 48 in The Power to Chose; Bangladeshi Women and Labor Market Decisions in London &
Dhaka, New York: Verso, 2000.  Kabeer discusses two contradictory positions in social science theory that
attempt to explain social and economic change. Neo-classical economics focuses on the individual while
structural approaches propose that larger social structures explain human behavior. Kabeer offers a
compromise between the two as a better model, using Bangledeshi women in the labor force as an example.
Empirical Studies - Trends
Warner, M.E. and Amir Hefetz 2004.  "Pragmatism over Politics: Alternative Service Delivery in Local
Government, 1992-2002," chapter in The Municipal Year Book 2004. Washington, DC: International City
County Management Association.   ICMA has been tracking local governments’ use of alternative service
delivery approaches since 1982, finding that privatization trends have actually change little over the years.
What has risen most dramatically over the 1992-2002 time period is the use of mixed public/private
provision.
Warner, M.E. and Amir Hefetz, 2001.  "Privatization and the Market Role of Government," Briefing Paper,
Economic Policy Institute, Washington, DC.  Available at epinet.org.   This article uses national data published
by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) for the period 1982 to 1997 to show that
service delivery by public employees remains the dominant form of service provision over the wide range of
restructuring alternatives and that privatization has not increased dramatically. It evaluates two theories as to
why privatization has not increased: government failure and quasi-market failure.
Greene, Jeffrey D. 1996. "How Much Privatization: A Research Note Examining the Use of Privatization by
Cities in 1982 and 1992." Policy Studies Journal 24 (Winter): 632-640.  Green reviews survey results of the
International City/County Management Association for 596 cities, between 1982 and 1992, that gauged how
much municipalities had privatized and their reasons for privatization. The study used two indicators of
privatization, privatization levels, and privatization diversity.
Empirical Studies - Reviews of Other Studies
Boyne, George A. (1998). "Bureaucratic Theory Meets Reality: Public Choice and Service Contracting in U.S.
Local Government." Public Administration Review. 58(6): 474-483.  Statistical methods used in studies cited
by public choice theorists lack critical control variables and a reliable measure of competition, and therefore
lead to invalid conclusions. Boyne aims to reevaluate the empirical evidence on the effects of service
contracting by United States local governments.
Boyne, George A (1998).  "The Determinants of Variations in Local Service Contracting: Garbage in Garbage
Out?" Urban Affairs Review, Vol.  34, No. 1, pg. 150-163.  Boyne offers an overview of various empirical
studies that focus on the determinants of why certain local governments opt to contract out. Boyne aims to
answer two questions: 1) To what extent do empirical studies provide an explanation of variations in service
contracting? 2) Does the evidence improve our understanding of why different local governments adopt
different policies?
Empirical Studies--The Contracting Process Issues surrounding contracting out include the cost of
information and monitoring and the need to create a level playing field for competitive bidding between public
workers and the private sector. The contracting process is dynamic (contracting out and back in) and requires
governments to play a market structuring role.
Hefetz, Amir and M. Warner, 2004. "Privatization and Its Reverse: Explaining the Dynamics of the
Government Contracting Process" Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory, 14(2):171-190.
Available at http://jpart.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/14/2/171?ijkey=156SEfUPE3BE2&keytype=ref  
This article shows that the level of contracting back in previously privatized services is significant among local
governments in the US. A statistical model assessing the reasons for such behavior is presented.
Warner, M.E. with Mike Ballard and Amir Hefetz 2003.  "Contracting Back In – When Privatization Fails,"
chapter 4 pp 30-36 in The Municipal Year Book 2003. Washington, DC: International City County
Management Association.  Between 1992 and 1997, the most common forms of alternative service delivery
(privatization to for-profits and non-profits and inter-municipal cooperation) increased only slightly. The
stability in these trends belies a more dynamic process of contracting out and back in which reflects the key
market structuring role played by local governments.
Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2002  "Applying Market Solutions to Public Services: An Assessment of
Efficiency, Equity and Voice," Urban Affairs Review, 38(1):70-89.  The authors assess the efficacy of market
solutions for metropolitan public service provision by comparing privatization with inter-municipal cooperation
and evaluating each on efficiency, equity and democracy grounds. They find both alternatives promote
efficiency, but equity and voice are more associated with inter-municipal cooperation than privatization.
Ballard, Michael J. and M.E. Warner 2000. "Taking the High Road: Local Government Restructuring and the
Quest for Quality."  Pp 6/1 - 6/53 in Power Tools for Fighting Privatization, American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees: Washington DC.  Available at
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/reports/highroad/  Using detailed case studies, this report outlines two
alternative strategies for improving local government service delivery—the "high road” which uses new
management innovations to increase internal productivity, and the “low road” which focuses on downsizing
and contracting out.
Sclar, Elliott. 1997. "The Privatization of Public Service: Lessons from Case Studies."Washington, D.C:
Economic Policy Institute.  This article presents several case studies that show public sector employees can
provide a more efficient alternative to privatization: the Albany Department of Public Works, highways in
Massachusetts, and Indianapolis Fleet Services.
Lehmann, Scott. Privatizing Public Lands. 1995. New York: Oxford University Press.  Lehman takes the special
case of public lands and shows the limits of market allocation mechanisms.
Miranda, Rowan and Allan Lerner. (1995). "Bureaucracy, Organizational Redundancy and the Privatization of
Public Services." Public Administration Review 55(2): 193-200.  Privatization alone may not lead to better
quality or cost reduction in public service delivery. Miranda and Lerner note the relatively high level of mixed
(public and private) production for the same service and seek to explain how such redundancy could still be
efficient. They argue redundancy can enhance competition, provide a benchmark for costs, and ensure failsafe
security in the event of contract failure.
Sclar, Elliot D., K. H. Schaeffer, and Robert Brandwein. 1989. "The Emperor's New Clothes: Transit
Privatization and Public Policy." Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute.  This article uses the example of
the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, which has mandated state and local transit authorities to
privatize their operations, to illustrate that private sector delivery of public goods and services is not nearly
as advantageous as its proponents claim.
Moulder, Evelina. 1994. "Privatization: involving citizens and local government employees." Baseline Data
Report 26 (1): 1-7.  This article summarizes the results of a survey conducted by the International
City/County ManagementAssociation (ICMA) in 1992 on local area alternative service delivery, focusing on the
involvement of workers and citizens in decisions to contract for government services.
Pack, Janet Rothenberg. 1989. "Privatization and Cost Reduction." Policy Sciences 22: 1-25.  Pack evaluates
the success and sustainability of service cost reduction from the perspective of the economic model of cost
minimization through competitive bidding.
The Reason Foundation (http://www.reason.org/privatizationctr.html), established in 1978, provides excellent
materials on privatization, through their Privatization Center. Advocating public policies based upon individual
liberty and responsibility and a free-market approach, the Center undertakes to practical policy research.
Their annual year book, Privatization, describes recent developments in privatization, including the following
articles.
The Reason Foundation. 1996. "The Politics of Privatization." Privatization 1996. Based on excerpts of several
mayors' remarks, this article argues competition is the key to smaller government. The latter part presents
the job-loss impact of privatization.
The Reason Foundation. 1997. "Creating the Right Institutions for Competitive Government." Privatization
1997. This article describes how to create a level playing field between in-house public units and outside
private providers, called "competitive neutrality," when setting up a public-private competition program.
Empirical Studies--Regional Differences
Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2003. "Rural-Urban Differences in Privatization: Limits to the Competitive State,"
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 21(5): 703-718.   Despite two decades of experience
with privatization, US local government use of contracting in public service delivery remains relatively flat.
Market approaches to public goods provision emphasize the competitive state, and attribute limited degree of
privatization to bureaucratic resistance. Rural development theory emphasizes the uneven impact of market
solutions in rural communities. Using national data on US local government service delivery from 1992 and
1997, we analyze differences in local government service-delivery patterns by metropolitan status.
Discriminant analysis suggested that structural features of markets are more important than the managerial
capacity of government leaders in explaining lower rates of privatization among rural governments. These
structural constraints limit the applicability of competitive approaches to local government service delivery.
Our results suggest that cooperation, as an alternative to privatization at the local level and as a source of
redistributive aid at the state level, may provide a more equitable alternative for disadvantaged rural
communities.
Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2002. "The Uneven Distribution of Market Solutions for Public Goods," Journal of
Urban Affairs, 24(4): 445-459.  Using national data on local government service delivery from 1992 and
1997, this article assesses the distribution of privatization and inter-municipal cooperation across localities in
the metropolitan region and finds them most common among suburbs.
New York State
Warner, M.E. and Robert Hebdon. 2001 "Local Government Restructuring: Privatization and Its Alternatives,"
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 20(2):315-336.  Rather than treating public and private provision
of public goods and services as a strict dichotomy, a 1997 survey of chief elected township and county
officials in New York shows local governments use both private and public sector mechanisms to structure the
market, create competition and attain economies of scale. In addition to privatization and inter-municipal
cooperation, two alternative forms of service delivery not previously researched, reverse privatization and
governmental entrepreneurship, are analyzed.
Warner, M.E. 2000. "Structuring the Market for Service Delivery: A New Role for Local Government." pp 85-
104 in Local Government Innovation: Issues and Trends in Privatization and Managed Competition, Robin
Johnson and Norman Walzer eds.  Westport, CT: Quorum Books.  Case study analysis of reverse privatization
among New York State towns and counties shows how governments engage the market to ensure
competition, control and attention to community values. The nature and relative importance of three
alternatives to privatization – inter-municipal cooperation, reverse privatization and governmental
entrepreneurship are described.
Warner, M.E. and R. Hebdon "Local Government Restructuring in New York State: Summary of Survey
Results"  Restructuring in New York State primarily involves public sector innovation rather than privatization.
Intermunicipal cooperation was the predominant form of restructuring, while privatization was the second
most common form of restructuring. Significant levels of reverse privatization and governmental
entrepreneurship were also found. Incidence of restructuring was highest among counties, and in the
following service areas: public works, public safety, and general governmental support functions.
Search the database of case studies on local government restructuring in New York State:
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/db/lgr/search.asp
Hebdon, Robert, and Hazel Dayton Gunn. 1995. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization at the Local Level in
New York State." Community Development Report. Ithaca, NY: Community and Rural Development Institute,
Cornell University (http://www.cardi.cornell.edu/local_government/community_governance/000244.php)
 Hebdon and Gunn provide a brief overview of the privatization debate, at the level of local service delivery.
Savas, E. S., ed. 1992. Privatization for New York: Competing for a Better Future. The Lauder Report; A
report of the NYS Senate Advisory Commission on Privatization. New York.  This volume provides a review of
experiences with privatization in New York State and recommendations for expanding its use, from a
proponent's perspective. It also introduces the experiences of other states and cities, and the special
experiences gained in Britain.
Labor Concerns
Another major issue is the impact of privatization on job security and employment. Proponents claim that
public sector workers are not harmed by privatization. Displaced workers can be hired by contractors or
transferred to other government positions. Organized labor, however, is very concerned about layoffs, erosion
of wages and benefits, and decreased levels of union membership with privatization. Empirical studies show
that privatization has not had a major impact on wages and working conditions (Pendleton 1997), but it can
have significant effects on labor relations (Hebdon 1995). Opponents present case studies that show public
sector employees can provide more efficient alternatives to privatization (Sclar 1997). The expertise and
experience of many government employees may make them better at providing government services, and
management techniques like total quality management are making the public sector more efficient.
Chandler, Timothy, and Peter Feuille. 1994. "Cities , Unions, and the Privatization of Sanitation Services."
Journal of Labor Research 15 (1): 53-71.  This article analyzes the relationship between unionization and
government decisions to contract out sanitation services using a conceptual framework that emphasizes
political considerations.
Chandler, Timothy, and Peter Feuille. 1991. "Municipal Unions and Privatization." Public Administration Review
51 (1): 15-22.  The authors examine the impacts of unionization on local governments' decision to contract
out sanitation services, based on a survey of 1,541 municipalities between 1973 and 1988.
Hebdon, Robert. 1995. "Contracting Out in New York State: The Story the Lauder Report Chose Not to Tell."
Labor Studies Journal (Spring): 3-29.  The author sees privatization as a disruptive, harmful way of cost
saving. Examining the history of collective bargaining in New York State, he emphasizes the negative impact
of privatization on unions and workers.
Pendleton, Andrew. 1997. "What Impact Has Privatization Had on Pay and Employment:A Review of the UK
Experience." Industrial Relations 52 (3): 554-579.  The article analyzes the theoretical and actual impact of
privatization on labor conditions in the United Kingdom. The article concludes privatization does not have a
consistent and strong effect on pay and employment.
Donovan, Ronald, and Marsha J. Orr. 1982. "Subcontracting in the Public Sector: The New York State
Experience." Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.  The authors examine subcontracting out transportation services
in school districts in New York State. They propose a list of standards to judge when subcontracting should be
subject to negotiation and arbitration.
Legal Concerns
Legal concerns beyond labor issues are also important considerations in privatization. Legal debate starts from
the argument that the public and private sectors are essentially different and their separate functions can be
logically designated. The following articles raise concerns about constitutional protections of citizens and
emphasize the legal characteristics of public entities. Opponents worry that privatization may threaten
citizens' constitutional rights.
Moe, Ronald C. 1987. "Exploring the Limits of Privatization." Public Administration Review 47 (Nov/Dec): 453-
460.  This article argues the most important distinction between private and public entities lies in the concept
of sovereignty that inheres in the public sector, giving it rights and immunities that the private sector does
not, or at least ought not, possess.
Sullivan, Harold J. 1987. "Privatization of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights." Public
Administration Review 47 (Nov/Dec): 461-467.  This article reviews the judicial decisions concerning the
scope and applicability of national constitutional protections on privatization. It also examines and identifies a
number of arrangements between government and private service providers that immunize both the
government and private entities from constitutional restraints.
Starr, Paul. 1987. "The Limits of Privatization." Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute.  This article
provides a theoretical critique of privatization and its potential effects on justice, security, and citizenship.
Starr also disputes two main arguments of privatization advocates: that with privatization 1) choice will
increase and 2) costs will be reduced.
Gerbasi, Jennifer and M.E. Warner, June 2003.  "The Impact of International Trade on State and Local
Government Authority, " Dept. of City and Regional Planning Working Papers #204.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University. Available at  http://government.cce.cornell.edu/?/doc/reports/freetrade/#book1 /   Free trade has
been pursued to expand markets and create jobs. However, the new trade agreements (NAFTA, WTO, FTAA,
GATS) reach beyond traditional customs and tariff regulations and impacts all government activity that may
affect foreign trade. There is some concern in the governance community that these changes may lead to
federal preemption of traditional powers reserved to states and localities.
Warner, Mildred and Jennifer Gerbasi. "Rescaling and Reforming the State under NAFTA: Implications for
Subnational Authority." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research December 2004 Vol 28(4): 853-
73.  This paper describes the new governance features of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and illustrates how they work out at the national, subnational and local scales using cases from the United
States and Mexico. The authors show how NAFTA’s governance structure is undermining subnational and local
government authority in legislative and judicial arenas.
Jennifer Gerbasi, Jennifer and Mildred Warner. 2004, "Is There a Democratic Deficit in the Free Trade
Agreements? What Local Governments Should Know," Public Management 86:2 (16-21).  
International Experience
Kohl, Benjamin, 2004. "Privatization and Regulation: A cautionary tale from Bolivia," submitted to
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, forthcoming 28(4) 2004.  Kohl uses the Bolivian
experience with privatization to illustrate the limitations of privatization in developing countries.
Shughart, William F. II 1999. "Interest Group Theory of Government in Developing Economy Perspective," in
Institutions and Collective Choice in Developing Countries ed by Mwangi Kimenyi and John Mbuku. Brookfield,
VT: Ashgate Publishing Co. pp 169-198.  This paper outlines the interest group or the ‘capture’ theory of
government: the same behavioral assumptions of maximization of self-interest that explain decision-making of
the market can be used to explain the behavior of public policy makers.
Graham, Carol. 1998. Private Markets for Public Goods: Raising the Stakes in Economic Reform. Washington
DC: Brooking Institute Press.  In this book, Graham examines the use of markets to increase the efficiency of
the public sector. She uses case studies of Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Czech Republic and Zambia to assert that
private market incentives such as competition and choice strengthen participation and improve performance.
Schick, Alan (1998). "Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand’s Reforms."  World Bank
Research Observer 13(1):123-131.  New Zealand’s government agencies are run by independent public
managers who contract out most services and are monitored for accountability. Schick’s article looks at New
Zealand’s system, both the benefits and cost, and finds reason that this system would not work for
developing countries with large informal economies.
Clifford Wirth, "Transportation Policy in Mexico City: The Politics and Impacts of Privatization" Urban Affairs
Review, Vol. 33, No. 2, November 1997, pp. 155-181.  In this article, Wirth challenges the idea that
privatization occurs only when public sector responsibilities are shifted to private providers. He advocates a
cost-benefit analysis that includes social and environmental externality costs and claims that local
government officials should be accountable for both the decisions they choose to take and the one they
refuse to make.
Canadian Council for Public/Private Partnerships, 1996. National Opinion Research. Toronto. The Canadian
Council for Public/Private Partnerships surveyed over 200 governments across Canada to assess: 1) current
partnership activities, 2) planned partnership activities, 3) perspectives on partnerships and, 4) support for
implementing partnerships.
Special Projects
Gratto, Andre, Bryan Preston, and Thor Snilsberg. Mitigating Corruption in New Public Management.  Ithaca
NY:  Cornell University Department of City and Regional Planning.  This article provides an environmental
framework for reducing potential for corruption.
McFarland, Stephen, Chris McGowan and Tom O’Toole (2002).  "Prisons, Privatization and Public Values."
Ithaca NY:  Cornell University Department of City and Regional Planning.  
Warner, Mildred, James Quazi, Brooks More, Ezra Cattan, Scott Bellen and Kerim Odekon (2002)  Business
Improvement Districts:  Issues in Alternative Local Public Service Provision.  Ithaca NY, Cornell University
Department of City and Regional Planning.  
Transfer of Development Rights Programs: Using the Market for Compensation and Preservation (2002).
Jason Hanly-Forde, George Homsy, Katherine Lieberknecht, Remington Stone. This article reviews the
challenges to Coasian bargaining solutions for planning.
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  Issues	  in	  Local	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Environment	  and	  Planning	  C:	  Government	  and	  Policy,	  26(1):	  104-­‐109,	  editorial	  overview	  
to	  special	  issue.	  
Local	  government	  privatization	  has	  not	  delivered	  as	  expected	  on	  cost	  savings.	  	  
Using	  empirical	  studies	  from	  North	  America	  and	  Europe,	  we	  show	  that	  local	  
governments	  are	  pragmatic	  managers	  who	  must	  manage	  costs,	  markets	  and	  
political	  interests	  simultaneously.	  	  Using	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  actors,	  
interests	  and	  incentives,	  we	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  cost	  savings	  and	  demonstrate	  the	  
importance	  of	  alternative	  management	  approaches.	  	  We	  argue	  analyses	  of	  local	  
government	  contracting	  must	  address	  the	  dynamics	  of	  market	  management	  and	  
do	  so	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  framework	  that	  includes	  both	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  
and	  interests.	  
	  
Bel,	  Germà,	  Robert	  Hebdon,	  and	  M.	  E.	  Warner,	  2007.	  “Local	  Government	  Reform:	  	  
Privatization	  and	  Its	  Alternatives,”	  Local	  Government	  Studies,	  33(4):	  507-­‐515,	  editorial	  
overview	  to	  special	  issue.	  
Privatization	  is	  only	  one	  of	  several	  alternatives	  for	  local	  government	  reform.	  	  
Problems	  with	  lack	  of	  cost	  savings	  and	  the	  challenges	  of	  contract	  management	  
have	  led	  local	  government	  reformers	  to	  explore	  other	  alternatives	  including	  
municipal	  corporations,	  relational	  contracting	  and	  dynamic	  market	  
management.	  	  Empirical	  analysis	  shows	  concerns	  with	  fiscal	  stress,	  efficiency,	  
and	  managing	  political	  and	  citizen	  interests	  drive	  the	  reform	  process	  more	  than	  
ideology.	  	  We	  argue	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  framework	  is	  needed	  that	  gives	  
attention	  to	  a	  wider	  array	  of	  alternatives	  for	  institutional	  reform.	  
	  
Articles	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  2011.	  	  “Water	  Privatization	  Does	  Not	  Yield	  Cost	  Savings,”	  in	  Reclaiming	  
Public	  Water:	  Achievements,	  Struggles	  and	  Vision	  from	  Around	  the	  World,	  Transnational	  
Institute	  and	  Corporate	  Europe	  Observatory.	  Released	  at	  the	  World	  Water	  Forum	  in	  
Cape	  Town,	  South	  Africa	  for	  World	  Water	  Day,	  March	  22,	  2011.	  
This	  article	  describes	  a	  meta	  analysis	  of	  all	  published	  large	  scale	  studies	  of	  water	  
privatization	  from	  around	  the	  world	  which	  shows	  privatization	  does	  not	  yield	  
cost	  savings.	  It	  then	  shows	  how	  these	  results	  should	  have	  been	  predicted	  by	  a	  
more	  careful	  reading	  of	  economic	  theory.	  	  The	  article	  then	  presents	  privatization	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experience	  of	  US	  local	  governments	  in	  water	  	  where	  public	  managers	  
demonstrate	  a	  latent	  understanding	  of	  the	  theoretical	  limitations	  of	  privatization	  
in	  services	  that	  lack	  competition,	  are	  hard	  to	  monitor	  and	  are	  natural	  
monopolies.	  
	  
Hefetz,	  Amir	  and	  Mildred	  E.	  Warner	  2011,	  “Contracting	  or	  Public	  Delivery?	  The	  
importance	  of	  service,	  market	  and	  management	  characteristics,”	  Journal	  of	  Public	  
Administration	  Research	  and	  Theory,	  forthcoming.	  DOI	  10.1093/jopart/MUR006	  
Analysis	  of	  local	  government	  contracting	  decisions	  typically	  focuses	  on	  
transactions	  costs	  related	  to	  service	  characteristics,	  especially	  asset	  specificity	  
and	  difficulty	  of	  contract	  management.	  	  This	  analysis	  expands	  the	  focus	  to	  
include	  market	  characteristics	  (competition),	  citizen	  characteristics	  (public	  
interest	  in	  the	  service	  delivery	  process),	  and	  place	  characteristics	  (metro	  status	  
and	  public	  management).	  	  A	  2007	  survey	  of	  U.S.	  city	  managers’	  rankings	  of	  67	  
services	  by	  transactions	  costs,	  competition	  and	  citizen	  interest	  is	  combined	  with	  
a	  2007	  national	  survey	  of	  city	  managers’	  sourcing	  decisions	  (direct	  public,	  inter-­‐
government	  cooperation,	  for	  profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  contracting).	  	  Multinomial	  
logit	  models	  of	  service	  delivery	  sourcing	  choice	  find	  metro	  status	  and	  
competition	  are	  key	  explanatory	  variables.	  	  Inter-­‐governmental	  cooperation	  
represents	  an	  important	  public	  market	  alternative	  when	  contract	  management	  is	  
difficult	  and	  competition	  is	  low.	  	  For	  profit	  contracting	  is	  less	  common	  when	  
citizen	  interest	  is	  high	  and	  competition	  is	  low.	  	  Governments	  with	  professional	  
managers	  appear	  more	  effective	  in	  addressing	  citizen	  interests,	  political	  and	  
labor	  opposition	  and	  market	  management	  challenges.	  	  	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  2011.	  “Club	  Goods	  and	  Local	  Government:	  Questions	  for	  Planners,”	  
Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Planning	  Association,	  forthcoming.	  
Private	  approaches	  to	  urban	  service	  provision	  are	  becoming	  more	  popular.	  	  This	  
paper	  explores	  examples	  of	  club	  goods	  -­‐	  Common	  Interest	  Developments	  for	  
housing,	  Business	  Improvement	  Districts	  for	  commercial	  areas,	  and	  Economic	  
Development	  Zones	  for	  commercial	  and	  industrial	  areas	  -­‐	  and	  assesses	  their	  
implications	  for	  local	  government.	  While	  these	  club	  approaches	  can	  shift	  the	  
burden	  of	  infrastructure	  finance	  to	  direct	  groups	  of	  users,	  they	  also	  fragment	  
urban	  service	  delivery	  and	  justify	  unevenness	  in	  service	  quality	  across	  the	  city.	  
Emphasis	  is	  given	  to	  how	  clubs	  internalize	  benefits	  to	  members	  of	  the	  club,	  but	  
shed	  externalities	  onto	  the	  broader	  local	  government	  system.	  	  A	  critical	  
governance	  concern	  is	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  long	  term	  ability	  of	  local	  government	  to	  
coordinate	  across	  disparate	  elements	  and	  interests	  in	  the	  community.	  
	  
	  
Warner,	  Mildred	  E.	  and	  Amir	  Hefetz	  2010,	  “Privatization	  and	  Reverse	  Privatization	  in	  US	  
Local	  Government	  Service	  Delivery,	  2002-­‐2007,”	  Paper	  prepared	  for	  Public	  Service	  
International	  Council	  of	  Global	  Unions	  Conference,	  Geneva,	  Switzerland,	  Oct.	  2010	  
http://www.qpsconference.org/content/resources	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Contracting	  out	  for	  urban	  infrastructure	  delivery	  has	  been	  an	  important	  reform	  
pursued	  by	  cities	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  However,	  using	  national	  
surveys	  of	  US	  municipalities	  conducted	  by	  the	  International	  City	  County	  
Management	  Association,	  this	  paper	  shows	  that	  rates	  of	  new	  contracting	  are	  
balanced	  with	  reverse	  contracting	  –	  bringing	  previously	  privatized	  services	  back	  
in	  house.	  	  Reversals	  reflect	  problems	  with	  service	  quality	  and	  lack	  of	  cost	  savings	  
in	  contracted	  services.	  	  Recognition	  or	  the	  asset	  specific	  nature	  of	  infrastructure	  
services,	  the	  need	  for	  monitoring	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  political	  opposition	  help	  
explain	  these	  reversals.	  	  	  
	  
Warner,	  Mildred	  E.	  and	  Raymond	  Gradus.	  2010.	  “The	  Consequences	  of	  Implementing	  a	  
Child	  Care	  Voucher:	  Evidence	  from	  Australia,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  USA.”	  Social	  Policy	  
and	  Administration	  (forthcoming).	  
In	  the	  Netherlands,	  the	  USA	  and	  Australia	  public	  funding	  has	  promoted	  parental	  
choice	  by	  introducing	  a	  voucher	  for	  child	  care,	  where	  parents	  are	  free	  to	  choose	  
the	  provider.	  The	  policy	  experiments	  in	  these	  three	  countries	  and	  the	  outcomes	  
provide	  useful	  information	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  introducing	  a	  voucher	  in	  
the	  child	  care	  market.	  We	  show	  the	  voucher	  system	  can	  be	  effective	  in	  
increasing	  demand,	  but	  there	  can	  be	  uneven	  supply	  responses.	  The	  structure	  of	  
the	  voucher	  income	  scheme	  and	  quality	  controls	  affect	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  supply	  
response.	  	  We	  argue	  that	  voucher	  schemes	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  complex	  
nature	  of	  the	  child	  care	  market	  and	  the	  substitutability	  among	  free	  public	  care,	  
private	  market	  care	  and	  unpaid	  household	  care.	  	  To	  secure	  quality	  and	  access,	  
government	  must	  also	  play	  a	  coordinating	  role	  that	  vouchers	  alone	  can	  not	  
supply.	  
	  
Warner,	  Mildred	  E.	  2010.	  	  “The	  Future	  of	  Local	  Government:	  21st	  Century	  Challenges,”	  
Public	  Administration	  Review,	  70(6).	  
Local	  governments	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  face	  challenges	  regarding	  service	  delivery,	  
finance,	  the	  workforce	  and	  citizen	  engagement.	  	  While	  privatization	  was	  a	  major	  
innovation	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  lack	  of	  costs	  savings	  and	  the	  
loss	  of	  public	  values	  in	  market	  provision	  are	  prompting	  reversals	  in	  privatization,	  
increases	  in	  regulation	  and	  new	  approaches	  to	  government	  enterprise.	  	  The	  21st	  
century	  must	  focus	  on	  rebuilding	  the	  capacity	  of	  local	  governments	  to	  finance	  
critical	  infrastructure,	  attract	  and	  retain	  a	  skilled	  labor	  force	  and	  engage	  citizen	  
in	  designing	  innovative	  solutions	  to	  address	  public	  problems.	  	  Innovations	  in	  
public	  service	  delivery	  will	  move	  beyond	  public	  private	  partnerships	  to	  models	  
which	  more	  affectively	  balance	  accountability,	  equity	  and	  efficiency	  concerns.	  
	  
Bel,	  Germà	  ,	  Xavier	  Fageda	  	  and	  Mildred	  E.	  Warner	  2010.	  “Is	  Private	  Production	  of	  Public	  
Services	  Cheaper	  than	  Public	  Production?	  A	  meta-­‐regression	  analysis	  of	  solid	  waste	  and	  
water	  services,”	  Journal	  of	  Policy	  Analysis	  and	  Management,	  29(3):	  553-­‐577.	  
Privatization	  of	  local	  government	  services	  is	  assumed	  to	  deliver	  cost	  savings	  but	  
empirical	  evidence	  for	  this	  from	  around	  the	  world	  is	  mixed.	  We	  conduct	  a	  meta-­‐
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regression	  analysis	  of	  all	  econometric	  studies	  examining	  privatization	  for	  water	  
distribution	  and	  solid	  waste	  collection	  services	  and	  find	  no	  systematic	  support	  
for	  lower	  costs	  with	  private	  production.	  Differences	  in	  study	  results	  are	  
explained	  by	  differences	  in	  time-­‐period	  of	  the	  analyses,	  service	  characteristics,	  
and	  policy	  environment.	  We	  do	  not	  find	  a	  genuine	  empirical	  effect	  of	  cost	  
savings	  resulting	  from	  private	  production.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  to	  ensure	  cost	  
savings,	  more	  attention	  be	  given	  to	  the	  cost	  characteristics	  of	  the	  service,	  the	  
transaction	  costs	  involved,	  and	  the	  policy	  environment	  stimulating	  competition,	  
rather	  than	  to	  the	  debate	  over	  public	  versus	  private	  delivery	  of	  these	  services.	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  and	  Amir	  Hefetz.	  2010.	  “Service	  Characteristics	  and	  Contracting:	  The	  
Importance	  of	  Citizen	  Interest	  and	  Competition,”	  pp	  19-­‐27	  in	  The	  Municipal	  Year	  Book	  
2010.	  Washington,	  DC:	  International	  City	  County	  Management	  Association.	  
Theory	  suggests	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  provide	  a	  service	  in	  house	  or	  via	  contracting	  
will	  be	  determined	  primarily	  by	  service	  characteristics,	  e.g.	  	  specific	  physical	  
infrastructure	  or	  technical	  expertise,	  and	  	  difficulty	  in	  contract	  specification	  and	  
monitoring.	  However	  a	  2007	  national	  survey	  of	  US	  local	  government	  managers	  
shows	  that	  citizen	  interest	  and	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  local	  market	  may	  
be	  more	  important.	  	  Across	  66	  measured	  services,	  the	  average	  level	  of	  
competition	  is	  less	  than	  two	  alternative	  providers.	  	  For	  rural	  areas	  there	  is	  only	  
one	  alternative	  provider	  on	  average.	  	  Thus	  contracting	  out	  often	  results	  in	  
substituting	  a	  private	  monopoly	  for	  a	  public	  monopoly.	  	  This	  helps	  explain	  why	  
direct	  public	  delivery	  remains	  the	  primary	  service	  delivery	  mode.	  	  	  
	  
Warner,	  Mildred	  E.	  2009.	  “Regulatory	  Takings	  and	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements:	  Implications	  
for	  Planners,”	  Urban	  Lawyer,	  41(3):	  427-­‐443.	  
International	  trade	  agreements	  bring	  a	  new	  dimension	  to	  the	  ongoing	  debate	  
between	  public	  regulation	  and	  private	  property	  rights.	  	  Since	  NAFTA	  US	  free	  
trade	  agreements	  have	  promulgated	  an	  expanded	  view	  of	  private	  property	  
rights,	  elevating	  foreign	  investors	  to	  the	  level	  of	  nation	  states,	  challenging	  
government	  regulations	  as	  unfair	  barriers	  to	  trade,	  requiring	  governmental	  
compensation	  for	  partial	  (regulatory)	  takings,	  and	  substituting	  private	  tribunals	  
for	  the	  public	  courts.	  	  Articulated	  at	  the	  global	  and	  national	  scales,	  these	  new	  
definitions	  have	  profound	  implications	  for	  planners	  at	  the	  state	  and	  local	  levels.	  	  	  
The	  implications	  for	  planning	  deserve	  more	  serious	  consideration.	  
	  
Bel,	  Germà	  and	  Mildred	  Warner	  2009	  “Managing	  Competition	  in	  City	  Services:	  The	  Case	  
of	  Barcelona,”	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  Affairs,	  31(5):	  521–535.	  
“Clean	  and	  safe”	  strategies	  are	  part	  of	  urban	  regeneration	  in	  the	  entrepreneurial	  
city.	  These	  strategies	  are	  often	  characterized	  by	  privatization	  and	  public-­‐private	  
partnerships	  which	  enhance	  investment	  and	  create	  a	  city	  space	  more	  amenable	  
to	   tourists	   and	   consumers.	   	   While	   such	   approaches	   promote	   increased	  
investment,	   and	   differentiate	   services	   by	   district,	   they	   raise	   challenges	   of	  
competition,	   cost	   escalation	   and	   public	   participation.	   	   Barcelona’s	   solid	   waste	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management	   strategy	   is	   presented	   to	   show	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   strong	   public	  
coordination	  role	  when	  using	  competition	   to	  promote	   technological	   innovation	  
and	  improved	  quality	  in	  city	  service	  delivery.	  
	  
Warner,	  Mildred	  E.	  2009.	  Local	  Government	  Infrastructure	  and	  the	  False	  Promise	  of	  
Privatization.	  A	  Century	  Foundation	  Report.	  New	  York:	  Century	  Foundation.	  
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/mediapolitics/warner.pdf	  
Public	  infrastructure	  is	  largely	  managed	  in	  America	  by	  state	  and	  local	  governments,	  
which	  also	  provide	  most	  of	  the	  financing.	  	  In	  fact,	  local	  government	  has	  more	  fiscal	  
responsibility	  in	  the	  U.S.	  than	  do	  local	  governments	  in	  any	  other	  nation	  in	  the	  developed	  
world.	  	  	  One	  popular	  answer	  to	  more	  effective	  use	  of	  funds	  has	  been	  to	  bring	  market	  
and	  business	  principles	  to	  such	  services,	  and	  in	  particular	  to	  privatize	  them.	  	  But	  
Warner,	  based	  on	  her	  own	  comprehensive	  empirical	  studies,	  says	  the	  experiment	  in	  
privatization	  at	  the	  state	  and	  local	  level	  has	  not	  been	  satisfactory.	  State	  and	  local	  
governments	  thus	  need	  substantially	  more	  federal	  financial	  support.	  	  She	  provides	  
guidelines	  as	  to	  how	  and	  when	  privatization	  can	  be	  valuable	  and	  when	  it	  will	  fail.	  
	  	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  and	  Amir	  Hefetz	  2009.	  Cooperative	  Competition:	  Alternative	  Service	  
Delivery,	  2002-­‐2007.	  in	  The	  Municipal	  Year	  Book	  2009.	  Washington,	  DC:	  International	  
City	  County	  Management	  Association.	  	  
ICMA	  has	  been	  tracking	  local	  government	  use	  of	  alterative	  service	  delivery	  
mechanisms	  since	  1982.	  In	  prior	  surveys,	  for	  profit	  contracting	  was	  typically	  one	  
or	  two	  percentage	  points	  higher	  than	  intergovernmental	  contracting,	  but	  in	  the	  
2007	  survey	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case.	  Learning	  from	  their	  experience	  with	  for	  
profit	  and	  mixed	  contracting,	  local	  governments	  are	  now	  using	  
intergovernmental	  contracting	  as	  the	  preferred	  contracting	  alternative.	  The	  2007	  
survey	  shows	  direct	  public	  delivery	  and	  mixed	  public-­‐private	  delivery	  have	  fallen	  
back	  to	  their	  1997	  levels	  and	  for	  profit	  privatization	  and	  non	  profit	  contracting	  
are	  flat.	  	  What	  has	  grown	  is	  inter-­‐governmental	  contracting.	  However,	  lack	  of	  
sufficient	  private	  competition	  remains	  a	  problem,	  and	  monitoring	  service	  quality	  
and	  citizen	  satisfaction	  is	  getting	  less	  attention	  than	  in	  2002.	  	  Failure	  to	  
adequately	  monitor	  contracts	  typically	  leads	  to	  reductions	  in	  future	  contracting.	  
	  
Warner,	  Mildred	  E.	  2009.	  Civic	  Government	  or	  Market-­‐Based	  Governance?	  The	  Limits	  of	  
Privatization	  for	  Rural	  Local	  Governments,"	  Agriculture	  and	  Human	  Values.	  26(1):133-­‐
143.	  
Thomas	  Lyson	  argued	  that	  civic	  markets	  were	  possible	  and	  could	  have	  positive	  
impacts	  on	  rural	  development.	  Increasingly	  local	  governments	  are	  being	  forced	  
into	  market-­‐based	  governance	  regimes	  of	  privatization,	  decentralization	  and	  free	  
trade.	  This	  article	  explores	  the	  impacts	  of	  these	  trends	  on	  rural	  local	  
governments	  in	  the	  U.S.	  These	  market	  trends	  can	  erode	  civic	  foundations,	  but	  
recent	  data	  show	  local	  governments	  are	  balancing	  markets	  with	  civic	  concerns	  
and	  giving	  increased	  attention	  to	  citizen	  interests	  in	  the	  service	  delivery	  process.	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Bel,	  Germa	  and	  M.E.	  Warner	  2008,	  “Does	  privatization	  of	  solid	  waste	  and	  water	  services	  
reduce	  costs?	  A	  review	  of	  empirical	  studies,”	  Resources,	  Conservation	  &	  Recycling,	  
52:1337-­‐1348.	  
Cost	  reduction	  was	  the	  key	  benefit	  claimed	  by	  privatization.	  We	  conduct	  a	  
review	  of	  all	  published	  econometric	  studies	  of	  water	  and	  waste	  production	  since	  
1970.	  Little	  support	  is	  found	  for	  a	  link	  between	  privatization	  and	  cost	  savings.	  
Cost	  savings	  are	  not	  found	  in	  water	  delivery	  and	  are	  not	  systematic	  in	  waste.	  
Reviewed	  studies	  build	  from	  public	  choice,	  property	  rights,	  transactions	  costs	  
and	  industrial	  organization	  theories.	  We	  conclude	  public	  choice	  theory	  is	  too	  
focused	  on	  competition,	  which	  is	  typically	  not	  present	  in	  quasi	  markets.	  Property	  
rights	  theory	  gives	  attention	  to	  ownership	  and	  service	  quality,	  but	  absent	  
competition,	  ownership	  makes	  little	  difference	  on	  costs	  borne	  by	  municipalities.	  
Transactions	  costs	  argues	  privatization	  is	  best	  when	  contracts	  are	  complete	  –	  a	  
rare	  situation	  in	  public	  service	  markets.	  We	  find	  the	  industrial	  organization	  
approach	  most	  useful	  in	  explaining	  results	  because	  it	  directly	  addresses	  
incentives,	  sector	  structure	  and	  regulatory	  framework.	  Overall,	  the	  empirical	  
results	  show	  the	  importance	  of	  market	  structure,	  industrial	  organization	  of	  the	  
service	  sector,	  and	  government	  management,	  oversight	  and	  regulation.	  Because	  
there	  is	  no	  systematic	  optimal	  choice	  between	  public	  and	  private	  delivery,	  
managers	  should	  approach	  the	  issue	  in	  a	  pragmatic	  way.	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  2008.	  “Reversing	  Privatization,	  Rebalancing	  Government	  Reform:	  Markets,	  
Deliberation	  and	  Planning,”	  Policy	  and	  Society,	  27(2):	  163-­‐174.	  
The	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  witnessed	  a	  profound	  experiment	  to	  
increase	  the	  role	  of	  markets	  in	  local	  government	  service	  delivery.	  	  However,	  that	  
experiment	  has	  failed	  to	  deliver	  adequately	  on	  efficiency,	  equity	  or	  voice	  criteria.	  	  
This	  has	  led	  to	  reversals.	  	  But	  this	  reverse	  privatization	  process	  is	  not	  a	  return	  to	  
the	  direct	  public	  monopoly	  delivery	  model	  of	  old.	  	  Instead	  it	  heralds	  the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  new	  balanced	  position	  which	  combines	  use	  of	  markets,	  
deliberation	  and	  planning	  to	  reach	  decisions	  which	  may	  be	  both	  efficient	  and	  
more	  socially	  optimal.	  
	  
Warner,	  Mildred	  E.	  and	  Germa	  Bel	  2008.	  “Competition	  or	  Monopoly?	  Comparing	  US	  and	  
Spanish	  Privatization,”	  Public	  Administration:	  An	  International	  Quarterly,	  86(3):	  723-­‐736.	  
Differences	  in	  national	  traditions	  of	  public	  intervention,	  institutional	  
arrangements,	  and	  public	  service	  markets	  make	  local	  public	  services	  an	  area	  of	  
great	  diversity.	  Our	  objective	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  undertake	  a	  comparative	  study	  of	  
how	  local	  governments	  arrange	  for	  delivery	  of	  water	  and	  waste	  services	  in	  the	  
U.S.	  and	  Spain.	  We	  find	  that	  levels	  of	  privatization	  are	  higher	  in	  Spain	  than	  in	  the	  
U.S.	  	  We	  review	  organizational	  reform	  in	  the	  two	  contexts	  and	  compare	  service	  
delivery	  data	  using	  national	  surveys	  from	  each	  country.	  	  We	  conclude	  that	  lower	  
and	  less	  stable	  privatization	  in	  the	  U.S.	  stems	  in	  part	  from	  adherence	  to	  public	  
choice	  emphasis	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  market	  competition	  over	  public	  monopoly.	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By	  contrast,	  the	  Spanish	  municipalities	  reflect	  more	  of	  an	  industrial	  organization	  
approach,	  and	  create	  hybrid	  public/private	  firms	  which	  benefit	  from	  both	  market	  
engagement	  and	  economies	  of	  scale	  available	  under	  monopoly	  production.	  	  
Hipp,	  Magdalena	  and	  Mildred	  Warner	  2008.	  “Market	  Forces	  for	  the	  Unemployed?	  
Training	  Vouchers	  in	  Germany	  and	  the	  U.S.”	  Social	  Policy	  and	  Administration,	  42	  (1):	  77-­‐
101.	  
Vouchers	  are	  meant	  to	  increase	  competition	  and	  consumer	  choice	  in	  public	  
service	  markets.	  Using	  the	  example	  of	  training	  vouchers	  for	  the	  unemployed	  in	  
the	  U.S.	  and	  Germany,	  we	  show,	  however,	  that	  deficits,	  both	  on	  the	  demand	  and	  
the	  supply	  side	  of	  the	  market,	  create	  problems	  with	  preference	  alignment	  and	  
market	  formation.	  Information	  asymmetries	  undermine	  choice	  by	  the	  
unemployed	  and	  reduce	  government	  control	  over	  the	  training	  system.	  Ironically,	  
restrictions	  meant	  to	  compensate	  for	  these	  information	  deficits	  further	  inhibit	  
competitive	  market	  formation.	  Evaluation	  data	  on	  training	  vouchers	  from	  both	  
countries	  show	  that	  voucher	  systems	  do	  not	  increase	  choice,	  but	  weaken	  the	  
partnerships	  public	  employment	  agencies	  previously	  had	  with	  training	  providers,	  
and	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  shortage	  of	  high	  quality	  and	  specialized	  training	  as	  well	  as	  
creaming	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  training	  participants.	  Theoretical	  justification	  for	  
vouchers	  is	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  choice	  and	  consumer	  sovereignty.	  Using	  this	  
framework	  to	  analyze	  the	  changed	  relationship	  between	  government,	  private	  
training	  providers,	  and	  jobseekers	  we	  challenge	  the	  efficacy	  of	  vouchers	  as	  a	  
delivery	  mechanism	  in	  complex	  public	  service	  markets	  such	  as	  job	  training.	  	  
Warner,	  Mildred	  E.	  and	  Amir	  Hefetz	  2008.	  “Managing	  Markets	  for	  Public	  Service:	  The	  
Role	  of	  Mixed	  Public/Private	  Delivery	  of	  City	  Services,”	  Public	  Administration	  
Review,68(1):150-­‐161.	  
The	  privatization	  experience	  of	  U.S.	  municipalities	  shows	  declining	  use	  of	  
complete	  contracts	  and	  a	  dramatic	  rise	  in	  mixed	  public/private	  delivery	  (joint	  
contracting)	  of	  city	  services.	  Our	  analysis	  shows	  city	  managers	  have	  recognized	  
the	  need	  to	  move	  beyond	  a	  simple	  dichotomy	  between	  market	  delivery	  and	  
public	  planning	  to	  an	  approach	  that	  balances	  concerns	  with	  efficiency,	  market	  
management	  and	  citizen	  satisfaction.	  	  New	  public	  management	  stresses	  the	  
importance	  of	  competition	  and	  efficiency,	  transaction	  costs	  economics	  
emphasizes	  the	  challenges	  of	  contract	  management,	  and	  new	  public	  service	  
gives	  primary	  concern	  to	  citizen	  engagement;	  but	  city	  managers	  see	  the	  need	  to	  
balance	  all	  three.	  	  We	  use	  probit	  and	  generalized	  estimation	  models	  to	  analyze	  
International	  City	  County	  Management	  Association	  (ICMA)	  data	  for	  1992,	  1997	  
and	  2002,	  and	  show	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  middle	  position	  where	  city	  managers	  
integrate	  markets	  with	  public	  delivery	  and	  give	  greater	  attention	  to	  citizen	  
satisfaction	  in	  the	  service	  delivery	  process.	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  “Privatization,	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  and	  the	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Challenge	  of	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements,”	  Administration	  and	  Society,	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Use	  of	  quasi-­‐markets	  for	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  requires	  clear	  property	  rights,	  
a	  predictable	  adjudication	  process	  and	  low	  transaction	  costs.	  	  These	  may	  be	  
undermined	  by	  new	  restrictions	  on	  government	  action	  found	  in	  the	  new	  
generation	  of	  free	  trade	  agreements.	  These	  trade	  agreements	  privilege	  foreign	  
over	  domestic	  investors,	  replace	  public	  courts	  with	  private	  arbitration,	  supplant	  
traditional	  standards	  for	  legislation	  by	  requirements	  to	  be	  “least	  trade	  
restrictive,”	  and	  forward	  a	  new	  definition	  of	  “takings”	  that	  requires	  
governmental	  compensation	  for	  lost	  potential	  profits	  from	  regulatory	  action.	  	  
These	  features	  undermine	  the	  governance	  structure	  necessary	  to	  reduce	  
transaction	  costs	  of	  delivering	  complex	  public	  services.	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33(4):	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City	  service	  delivery	  requires	  planners	  and	  city	  managers	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  
public-­‐private	  dichotomy	  and	  explore	  the	  benefits	  of	  interaction	  between	  
markets	  and	  planning.	  Using	  International	  City	  County	  Management	  survey	  data	  
on	  U.S.	  local	  governments	  from	  1992,	  1997	  and	  2002,	  we	  find	  a	  shift	  where	  
reverse	  contracting	  (reinternalisation)	  now	  exceeds	  the	  level	  of	  new	  contracting	  
out	  (privatisation).	  We	  model	  how	  a	  theoretical	  shift	  from	  New	  Public	  
Management	  to	  New	  Public	  Service	  in	  public	  administration	  mirrors	  a	  behavioral	  
shift	  among	  city	  managers.	  	  Results	  confirm	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  economic	  
concerns	  with	  political	  engagement	  of	  citizens	  and	  lend	  empirical	  support	  to	  a	  
theory	  of	  Social	  Choice	  that	  links	  Communicative	  Planning	  with	  market	  
management.	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U.S.	  local	  governments	  are	  characterized	  by	  political	  fragmentation.	  	  This	  creates	  
problems	  of	  coordination	  and	  efficiency	  at	  both	  the	  metropolitan	  and	  rural	  
scales.	  	  While	  political	  consolidation	  is	  rare,	  voluntary	  cooperation	  between	  
municipalities	  is	  quite	  common.	  	  This	  paper	  explores	  whether	  a	  system	  of	  
voluntary	  cooperation	  can	  achieve	  efficiency	  and	  equity	  objectives	  without	  
losing	  local	  voice	  and	  identity.	  	  Using	  data	  from	  the	  International	  City/County	  
Management	  Association	  survey	  of	  more	  than	  1200	  municipalities	  over	  the	  
1992-­‐2002	  decade,	  probit	  models	  of	  inter-­‐governmental	  contracting	  are	  
constructed.	  	  Findings	  show	  the	  efficiency	  benefits	  of	  cooperation	  have	  eroded	  
over	  time	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  adequate	  public	  monitoring.	  	  Results	  on	  
equity	  are	  indeterminate.	  	  While	  citizen	  voice	  was	  in	  support	  of	  cooperation	  at	  
the	  beginning	  of	  the	  decade,	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  true	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade.	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Results	  suggest	  the	  need	  for	  a	  more	  democratic	  form	  of	  inter-­‐municipal	  
cooperation	  to	  ensure	  accountability,	  responsiveness	  and	  efficiency.	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  Guayaquil,”	  Grupo	  FARO	  –	  Fundación	  para	  el	  Avance	  
de	  las	  Reformas	  y	  las	  Oportunidades,	  for	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank.	  
Many	   Latin	   American	   countries	   face	   similar	   water	   problems:	   deteriorating	  
systems	   and	   networks,	   lack	   of	   access	   to	   water	   and	   sewage	   for	   many	   of	   the	  
populations’	   poorest	   and	   governments	   without	   the	   resources	   or	   expertise	   to	  
invest	   in	   change.	   Unfortunately,	   there	   is	   little	   consensus	   on	   how	   to	   improve.	  
Many	   countries,	   including	   Ecuador,	   have	   embarked	   on	   various	   forms	   of	  
privatization	   to	   increase	   investment	   in	   infrastructure	   and	   improve	   service	  
provision	   and	   water	   quality.	   In	   light	   of	   contradictory	   evidence	   on	   effects	   of	  
privatization,	   we	   look	   at	   water	   providers	   in	   two	   cities	   in	   Ecuador,	   Guayaquil	  
which	  privatized	   and	  Quito	  which	   implemented	   reforms	  but	  maintained	  public	  
delivery.	  	  In	  this	  study,	  we	  measure	  several	  indicators	  of	  water	  coverage,	  quality,	  
and	  prices	  in	  both	  cities,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  privatization	  of	  water	  services	  in	  
Guayaquil.	   We	   then	   compare	   changes	   in	   these	   indicators	   (before	   and	   after	  
privatization)	   between	   the	   two	   cities	   to	   establish	   an	   association	   between	  
differences	  and	  the	  privatization	  of	  water	  services.	  Our	  data	  allow	  us	  to	  control	  
for	  income	  and,	  thus,	  evaluate	  how	  these	  indicators	  have	  changed,	  particularly,	  
among	  the	  poor.	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Policy	  and	  Research	  40(6):612-­‐631.	  
Privatization	  and	  decentralization	  represent	  market-­‐based	  approaches	  to	  
government.	  	  Designed	  to	  increase	  efficiency	  and	  responsiveness	  of	  government,	  
these	  approaches	  also	  limit	  the	  potential	  for	  redistribution.	  	  A	  key	  question	  is	  how	  
will	  rural	  governments	  compete	  in	  such	  a	  market	  based	  system?	  	  Will	  they	  be	  
favored,	  as	  their	  reliance	  on	  market	  provision	  for	  public	  goods	  is	  higher	  due	  to	  the	  
smaller	  number	  of	  services	  provided	  by	  government?	  	  Or	  will	  they	  be	  less	  able	  to	  
compete	  due	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  sparsity	  which	  may	  make	  them	  less	  attractive	  to	  
market	  suppliers?	  	  Data	  from	  the	  United	  States	  covering	  the	  period	  1992-­‐2002,	  
show	  that	  rural	  areas	  are	  not	  favored	  by	  either	  of	  these	  trends	  –	  privatization	  or	  
decentralization.	  	  Managerial	  weakness	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  shortfall.	  	  Rural	  areas	  
are	  not	  as	  attractive	  to	  market	  suppliers	  and	  thus	  are	  disadvantaged	  under	  market	  
based	  service	  delivery	  approaches.	  Although	  national	  policy	  continues	  to	  advance	  
a	  privatization	  agenda,	  policymakers	  should	  be	  concerned	  about	  the	  uneven	  
impacts	  of	  such	  market	  based	  approaches.	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Decentralization	  reflects	  a	  global	  trend	  to	  increase	  the	  responsiveness	  of	  state	  and	  
local	  governments	  to	  economic	  forces,	  but	  it	  raises	  the	  challenge	  of	  how	  to	  secure	  
redistributive	  goals.	  	  Theoretically,	  as	  the	  equalizing	  impact	  of	  federal	  aid	  declines	  
under	  devolution,	  we	  expect	  sub-­‐national	  state	  level	  government	  policy	  to	  
become	  more	  important	  and	  geographic	  diversity	  in	  local	  governments’	  efforts	  to	  
raise	  revenue	  to	  increase.	  	  This	  paper	  explores	  the	  impact	  of	  state	  fiscal	  
centralization	  and	  inter-­‐governmental	  aid	  on	  local	  revenue	  effort	  using	  Census	  of	  
Governments	  data	  for	  county	  areas	  from	  1987	  for	  the	  Mid-­‐Atlantic	  and	  East	  North	  
Central	  region	  of	  the	  United	  States	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  rural	  counties.	  	  	  
The	  1987	  period	  is	  chosen	  because	  it	  is	  the	  first	  year	  that	  state	  policy	  trends	  
diverge	  from	  federal	  decentralization	  trends	  and	  both	  state	  aid	  and	  state	  
centralization	  increased	  while	  federal	  aid	  to	  localities	  continued	  to	  decline.	  	  Using	  
a	  neural	  network	  approach,	  we	  explore	  the	  spatially	  differentiated	  impact	  of	  state	  
policy	  and	  find	  complementary	  responses	  in	  effort	  among	  some	  localities	  and	  
substitution	  responses	  among	  others.	  	  Classification	  tree	  analysis	  of	  this	  diversity	  
shows	  that	  decentralization	  and	  the	  competitive	  government	  it	  promotes	  are	  
likely	  to	  exacerbate	  inequality	  among	  local	  governments	  under	  decentralization.	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  and	  Jennifer	  Gerbasi.	  2004.	  “Rescaling	  and	  Reforming	  the	  State	  under	  
NAFTA:	  Implications	  for	  Subnational	  Authority,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  and	  
Regional	  Research.	  28(4):853-­‐73.	  
The	  new	  free	  trade	  agreements	  are	  rescaling	  governance	  in	  ways	  that	  have	  critical	  
implications	  for	  subnational	  governments.	  	  	  The	  nation	  state	  is	  not	  simply	  being	  
hollowed	  out,	  rather	  a	  new	  governance	  nexus	  is	  forming	  –	  of	  nation	  states,	  
multinational	  corporations	  and	  international	  agreements	  -­‐	  which	  explicitly	  
excludes	  subnational	  and	  local	  government	  voice.	  	  This	  paper	  describes	  the	  new	  
governance	  features	  of	  the	  North	  American	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (NAFTA)	  and	  
illustrates	  how	  they	  work	  out	  at	  the	  national,	  subnational	  and	  local	  scales	  using	  
cases	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Mexico.	  	  NAFTA	  provides	  the	  template	  for	  other	  
free	  trade	  agreements	  including	  the	  Free	  Trade	  Area	  of	  the	  Americas	  (FTAA)	  and	  a	  
growing	  number	  of	  bilateral	  agreements.	  	  We	  show	  how	  NAFTA’s	  governance	  
structure	  is	  undermining	  subnational	  and	  local	  government	  authority	  in	  legislative	  
and	  judicial	  arenas.	  	  Designed	  to	  advance	  privatization	  of	  public	  services,	  these	  
agreements	  undermine	  the	  very	  ability	  of	  local	  governments	  to	  use	  markets	  for	  
public	  goods	  by	  defining	  traditional	  state	  and	  local	  governance	  mechanisms	  as	  
‘non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  to	  trade.’	  	  Contradictions	  between	  private	  profit	  and	  public	  
interest	  appear	  at	  the	  subnational	  level	  but	  their	  resolution	  is	  engaged	  at	  the	  
global	  level	  between	  private	  investors	  and	  the	  nation	  state.	  Recognition	  of	  this	  
rescaling	  requires	  attention	  to	  the	  reforming	  state	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  
subnational	  authority	  and	  democratic	  representation	  and	  voice.	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Empirical	  evidence	  shows	  local	  government	  contracting	  is	  a	  dynamic	  process	  that	  
includes	  movements	  from	  public	  delivery	  to	  markets,	  and	  from	  market	  contracts	  
back	  to	  in-­‐house	  delivery.	  This	  “reverse	  contracting”	  reflects	  the	  complexity	  of	  
public	  service	  provision	  in	  a	  world	  where	  market	  alternatives	  are	  used	  along	  with	  
public	  delivery.	  	  We	  develop	  a	  methodology	  to	  link	  responses	  to	  national	  surveys	  
and	  create	  a	  longitudinal	  data	  set	  that	  captures	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  contracting	  
process.	  	  We	  present	  a	  framework	  that	  incorporates	  principal	  agent	  problems,	  
government	  management,	  monitoring	  and	  citizen	  concerns,	  and	  market	  structure.	  	  
Our	  statistical	  analysis	  finds	  government	  management,	  monitoring	  and	  principal	  
agent	  problems	  to	  be	  most	  important	  in	  explaining	  both	  new	  contracting	  out	  and	  
contracting	  back-­‐in.	  	  Professional	  managers	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  
monitoring	  and	  the	  need	  for	  public	  engagement	  in	  the	  service	  delivery	  process.	  	  
The	  results	  support	  the	  new	  public	  service	  that	  argues	  public	  managers	  do	  more	  
than	  steer	  a	  market	  process,	  they	  balance	  technical	  and	  political	  concerns	  to	  
secure	  public	  value.	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  and	  Amir	  Hefetz	  2004.	  	  “Pragmatism	  over	  Politics:	  Alternative	  Service	  
Delivery	  in	  Local	  Government,	  1992-­‐2002,”	  chapter	  in	  The	  Municipal	  Year	  Book	  2004.	  
Washington,	  DC:	  International	  City	  County	  Management	  Association.	  	  
In	  response	  to	  increased	  interest	  in	  privatization,	  ICMA	  has	  been	  tracking	  local	  
governments’	  use	  of	  alternative	  service	  delivery	  approaches	  since	  1982.	  	  What	  is	  
interesting	  about	  the	  trends	  is	  how	  little	  they	  have	  changed	  over	  these	  years.	  	  
Almost	  all	  governments	  responding	  to	  the	  ICMA	  surveys	  use	  at	  least	  one	  form	  of	  
alternative	  service	  delivery.	  	  However,	  despite	  strong	  political	  support	  for	  
privatization	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  opposition,	  direct	  public	  delivery	  is	  still	  the	  most	  
common	  form	  of	  service	  delivery.	  For	  profit	  privatization	  and	  inter-­‐governmental	  
contracting	  are	  the	  most	  common	  alternatives	  and	  their	  usage	  has	  ranged	  from	  
15-­‐20	  percent	  of	  services	  over	  the	  period	  with	  a	  slight	  drop	  from	  1997	  to	  2002.	  	  
Use	  of	  non-­‐profit	  contracting	  has	  been	  stable	  at	  less	  than	  half	  the	  rate	  of	  for	  profit	  
privatization.	  	  What	  has	  risen	  most	  dramatically	  over	  the	  1992-­‐2002	  time	  period	  is	  
the	  use	  of	  mixed	  public/private	  provision.	  	  These	  data	  suggest	  local	  governments	  
are	  mature	  and	  experienced	  in	  their	  use	  of	  alternative	  service	  delivery.	  	  The	  2002	  
survey	  results	  show	  lack	  of	  competitive	  markets	  and	  problems	  with	  contractor	  
performance	  as	  explanations	  for	  the	  relative	  flatness	  of	  the	  trends.	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Jennifer	  Gerbasi,	  and	  Mildred	  Warner.	  2004,	  “Is	  There	  a	  Democratic	  Deficit	  in	  the	  Free	  
Trade	  Agreements?	  What	  Local	  Governments	  Should	  Know,”	  Public	  Management	  86:2	  
(16-­‐21).	  	  Available	  at	  
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/PublicManagement.pdf	  
In	  the	  past,	  trade	  treaties	  have	  focused	  on	  customs	  regulations	  and	  tariffs	  that	  are	  in	  
the	  purview	  of	  the	  federal	  government.	  The	  new	  trade	  agreements,	  however,	  reach	  
into	  nearly	  every	  aspect	  of	  government.	  Free	  trade	  goals	  focus	  on	  removing	  
perceived	  barriers	  to	  the	  flow	  of	  money,	  services,	  and	  goods.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  new	  
generation	  of	  free	  trade	  agreements	  presents	  these	  challenges	  to	  state	  and	  local	  
governmental	  authority:	  1)	  Superior	  rights	  are	  granted	  to	  foreign	  investors,	  2)	  
Private	  international	  tribunals	  replace	  public	  courts,	  3)	  Many	  public	  services	  may	  be	  
subject	  to	  free	  trade	  provisions,	  4)	  Free	  trade	  goals	  conflict	  with	  government	  
charters,	  5)	  Free	  trade	  agreements	  cause	  a	  democratic	  deficit.	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.,	  2003.	  “Competition,	  Cooperation	  and	  Local	  Governance,”	  chapter	  19	  pp	  
252-­‐262	  in	  Challenges	  for	  Rural	  America	  in	  the	  Twenty	  First	  Century,	  edited	  by	  David	  
Brown	  and	  Louis	  Swanson,	  University	  Park,	  PA:	  Penn	  State	  University	  Press.	  	  
Privatization,	  decentralization	  and	  civic	  participation	  are	  common	  themes	  
characterizing	  the	  changing	  structure	  and	  organization	  of	  local	  governments.	  	  	  	  
Privatization	  and	  decentralization	  are	  based	  on	  the	  positive	  power	  of	  
competition	  to	  ensure	  governmental	  efficiency	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  citizen	  
voice.	  These	  trends	  represent	  important	  innovations	  but	  they	  also	  bring	  new	  
challenges.	  Successful	  decentralization	  requires	  administrative	  and	  financial	  
capacity	  and	  effective	  citizen	  participation,	  but	  many	  rural	  governments	  lack	  an	  
adequate	  revenue	  base	  or	  sufficient	  professional	  management	  capacity.	  	  Rural	  
residents	  have	  relied	  more	  on	  private	  markets	  than	  government	  for	  many	  
services;	  however,	  rural	  areas	  have	  also	  suffered	  from	  under	  development	  due	  
in	  part	  to	  uneven	  markets.	  	  As	  we	  move	  into	  the	  21st	  century,	  government	  
innovation	  based	  on	  competition	  may	  give	  way	  to	  innovations	  based	  on	  
cooperation.	  	  Cooperation	  between	  levels	  of	  government	  and	  with	  private	  sector	  
and	  civil	  society	  actors	  may	  offer	  greater	  potential	  for	  efficiency	  and	  equity	  than	  
competitive	  markets.	  	  However,	  cooperation	  will	  also	  bring	  challenges.	  	  The	  
governance	  of	  cooperative	  networks	  will	  require	  new	  mechanisms	  for	  
accountability	  and	  voice.	  	  	  Ensuring	  equity	  and	  participation	  in	  these	  new	  
governance	  structures	  will	  be	  especially	  important	  for	  rural	  communities.	  	  	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  and	  A.	  Hefetz.	  2003.	  “Rural-­‐Urban	  Differences	  in	  Privatization:	  Limits	  to	  
the	  Competitive	  State,”	  Environment	  and	  Planning	  C:	  Government	  and	  Policy	  21(5):	  703-­‐
718.	  
Despite	  two	  decades	  of	  experience	  with	  privatization,	  U.S.	  local	  government	  use	  
of	  contracting	  in	  public	  service	  delivery	  remains	  relatively	  flat.	  	  Market	  approaches	  
to	  public	  goods	  provision	  emphasize	  the	  competitive	  state,	  and	  attribute	  limited	  
privatization	  to	  bureaucratic	  resistance.	  Rural	  development	  theory	  emphasizes	  the	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uneven	  impact	  of	  market	  solutions	  in	  rural	  communities.	  	  Using	  national	  data	  on	  
U.S.	  local	  government	  service	  delivery	  from	  1992	  and	  1997,	  we	  analyze	  
differences	  in	  local	  government	  service	  delivery	  patterns	  by	  metropolitan	  status.	  
Discriminant	  analysis	  shows	  that	  structural	  features	  of	  markets	  are	  more	  
important	  than	  managerial	  capacity	  of	  government	  leaders	  in	  explaining	  lower	  
rates	  of	  privatization	  among	  rural	  governments.	  	  These	  structural	  constraints	  limit	  
the	  applicability	  of	  competitive	  approaches	  to	  local	  government	  service	  delivery.	  	  
Our	  results	  suggest	  cooperation,	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  privatization	  at	  the	  local	  level	  
and	  as	  a	  source	  of	  redistributive	  aid	  at	  the	  state	  level,	  may	  provide	  a	  more	  
equitable	  alternative	  for	  disadvantaged	  rural	  communities.	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  with	  Mike	  Ballard	  and	  Amir	  Hefetz	  2003.	  	  “Contracting	  Back	  In	  –	  When	  
Privatization	  Fails,”	  chapter	  4	  pp	  30-­‐36	  in	  The	  Municipal	  Year	  Book	  2003.	  Washington,	  
DC:	  International	  City	  County	  Management	  Association.	  	  
Between	  1992	  and	  1997,	  the	  most	  common	  forms	  of	  alternative	  service	  delivery	  
(privatization	  to	  for	  profits	  and	  non	  profits	  and	  inter-­‐municipal	  cooperation)	  
increased	  only	  slightly.	  Service	  delivery	  by	  public	  employees	  remained	  dominant.	  	  
The	  stability	  in	  these	  trends	  belies	  a	  more	  dynamic	  process	  of	  contracting	  out	  and	  
back	  in	  which	  reflects	  the	  key	  market	  structuring	  role	  played	  by	  local	  
governments.	  	  During	  this	  period,	  96%	  of	  responding	  governments	  newly	  
contracted	  out	  at	  least	  one	  service	  and	  88%	  brought	  at	  least	  one	  contracted-­‐out	  
service	  back	  in	  house.	  The	  reasons	  for	  contracting	  back	  in	  include	  lack	  of	  a	  
competitive	  market	  of	  alternative	  suppliers,	  difficulties	  with	  contract	  specification,	  
and	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  monitoring.	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  and	  A.	  Hefetz.	  2002.	  “The	  Uneven	  Distribution	  of	  Market	  Solutions	  for	  
Public	  Goods,”	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  Affairs,	  24(4):	  445-­‐459.	  
Using	  national	  data	  on	  local	  government	  service	  delivery	  from	  1992	  and	  1997,	  this	  
article	  assesses	  the	  distribution	  of	  privatization	  and	  inter-­‐municipal	  cooperation	  
across	  localities	  in	  the	  metropolitan	  region	  and	  finds	  them	  most	  common	  among	  
suburbs.	  Coasian	  economics	  argues	  market	  solutions	  may	  offer	  an	  alternative	  to	  
regional	  government	  in	  the	  fragmented	  metropolitan	  area.	  However,	  our	  
discriminant	  analysis	  shows	  the	  use	  of	  market	  solutions	  is	  highest	  in	  suburban	  
communities	  that	  also	  exhibit	  high	  income	  and	  low	  poverty.	  	  Thus,	  market	  
solutions	  appear	  to	  reflect	  the	  inequality	  among	  municipalities	  in	  the	  
metropolitan	  region.	  Some	  system	  of	  regional	  market	  governance	  is	  still	  needed	  
to	  internalize	  the	  costs	  arising	  from	  regional	  inequality	  in	  public	  service	  delivery.	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  and	  A.	  Hefetz.	  2002	  	  “Applying	  Market	  Solutions	  to	  Public	  Services:	  An	  
Assessment	  of	  Efficiency,	  Equity	  and	  Voice,”	  Urban	  Affairs	  Review,	  38(1):70-­‐89.	  
Political	  fragmentation	  in	  metropolitan	  regions	  makes	  equitable	  and	  efficient	  
delivery	  of	  public	  services	  difficult.	  	  Regionalism,	  although	  promoted	  as	  more	  
equitable	  and	  rational,	  has	  found	  limited	  political	  support.	  	  Public	  choice	  theory	  
argues,	  against	  regionalism,	  that	  political	  fragmentation	  can	  promote	  competition	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and	  efficiency	  by	  creating	  markets	  for	  public	  services.	  	  	  We	  assess	  the	  efficacy	  of	  
market	  solutions	  for	  metropolitan	  public	  service	  provision	  by	  comparing	  
privatization	  with	  inter-­‐municipal	  cooperation	  and	  evaluating	  each	  on	  efficiency,	  
equity	  and	  democracy	  grounds.	  	  Using	  probit	  regression	  analysis	  of	  a	  national	  
survey	  of	  local	  government	  service	  delivery	  from	  1992	  and	  1997,	  we	  find	  both	  
alternatives	  promote	  efficiency,	  but	  equity	  and	  voice	  are	  more	  associated	  with	  
inter-­‐municipal	  cooperation	  than	  privatization.	  
	  
Ballard,	  Michael	  J.	  and	  M.E.	  Warner	  2000.	  “Taking	  the	  High	  Road:	  Local	  Government	  
Restructuring	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  Quality.”	  	  Pp	  6/1	  -­‐	  6/53	  in	  Power	  Tools	  for	  Fighting	  
Privatization,	  American	  Federation	  of	  State,	  County	  and	  Municipal	  Employees:	  
Washington	  DC.	  	  Available	  at	  http://www.cce.cornell.edu/restructuring/	  
All	  local	  governments	  face	  challenges	  to	  improve	  service	  delivery.	  	  This	  report	  
outlines	  two	  alternative	  strategies—the	  "high	  road”	  which	  uses	  new	  management	  
innovations	  to	  increase	  internal	  productivity,	  and	  the	  “low	  road”	  which	  focuses	  on	  
downsizing	  and	  contracting	  out.	  	  This	  study	  provides	  a	  longitudinal	  look	  at	  
contracting	  and	  presents	  detailed	  case	  studies	  of	  municipalities,	  which	  have	  
brought	  back	  in	  house	  previously	  privatized	  services.	  	  These	  case	  studies	  provide	  
empirical	  evidence	  on	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  contracting	  and	  the	  potential	  
for	  internal	  restructuring	  as	  an	  alternative.	  	  	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  2001.	  “State	  Policy	  Under	  Devolution:	  Redistribution	  and	  Centralization,”	  
National	  Tax	  Journal	  Vol	  LIV(3):541-­‐556.	  
Political	  theory	  argues	  redistributive	  spending	  is	  best	  made	  at	  higher	  levels	  of	  
government,	  but	  under	  devolution,	  state	  policy	  becomes	  the	  most	  significant	  
arena	  for	  redistributive	  activity.	  	  Using	  Census	  of	  Government	  data	  for	  1992,	  this	  
paper	  compares	  Federal	  and	  State	  aid	  to	  county	  areas	  and	  considers	  the	  role	  of	  
state	  centralization	  of	  fiscal	  responsibility	  on	  local	  revenue	  raising	  efforts.	  Both	  
the	  magnitude	  and	  redistributive	  nature	  of	  state	  aid	  are	  greater	  than	  federal	  aid.	  	  
However,	  because	  state	  centralization	  has	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  reducing	  local	  fiscal	  
stress,	  differences	  in	  state	  policy	  choices	  create	  a	  very	  uneven	  landscape	  of	  local	  
tax	  effort.	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  and	  Robert	  Hebdon.	  2001	  “Local	  Government	  Restructuring:	  Privatization	  
and	  Its	  Alternatives,”	  Journal	  of	  Policy	  Analysis	  and	  Management	  20(2):315-­‐336	  
Local	  government	  restructuring	  should	  no	  longer	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  simple	  dichotomy	  
between	  private	  and	  public	  provision.	  A	  1997	  survey	  of	  chief	  elected	  township	  and	  
county	  officials	  in	  New	  York	  shows	  local	  governments	  use	  both	  private	  and	  public	  
sector	  mechanisms	  to	  structure	  the	  market,	  create	  competition	  and	  attain	  
economies	  of	  scale.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  privatization	  and	  inter-­‐municipal	  cooperation,	  
two	  alternative	  forms	  of	  service	  delivery	  not	  previously	  researched,	  reverse	  
privatization	  and	  governmental	  entrepreneurship,	  are	  analyzed.	  Logistic	  
regression	  on	  the	  201	  responding	  governments	  differentiates	  the	  decision	  to	  
restructure	  from	  the	  level	  and	  complexity	  of	  restructuring.	  	  Results	  confirm	  that	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local	  governments	  are	  guided	  primarily	  by	  pragmatic	  concerns	  with	  information,	  
monitoring	  and	  service	  quality.	  	  Political	  factors	  are	  not	  significant	  in	  the	  
restructuring	  process	  and	  unionization	  is	  only	  significant	  in	  cases	  of	  simple	  
restructuring	  (privatization	  or	  cooperation	  used	  alone).	  	  	  Fiscal	  stress	  is	  not	  a	  
primary	  motivator,	  but	  debt	  limits	  do	  encourage	  more	  complex	  forms	  of	  
restructuring.	  Restructuring	  service	  delivery	  requires	  capacity	  to	  take	  risks	  and	  is	  
more	  common	  among	  experienced	  local	  officials	  in	  larger,	  higher	  income	  
communities.	  	  Restructuring	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  complex,	  pragmatic	  process	  
where	  governments	  combine	  public	  and	  private	  provision	  with	  an	  active	  role	  as	  
service	  provider	  and	  market	  player.	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  and	  Amir	  Hefetz,	  2001.	  	  “Privatization	  and	  the	  Market	  Role	  of	  
Government,”	  Briefing	  Paper,	  Economic	  Policy	  Institute,	  Washington,	  DC.	  	  Available	  at	  
epinet.org.	  	  	  
Using	  longitudinal	  data	  from	  1982	  to	  1997,	  we	  show	  that	  the	  local	  decision	  to	  
provide	  public	  services	  is	  complex	  and	  dynamic.	  	  Local	  governments	  use	  a	  range	  
of	  service	  restructuring	  alternatives	  including	  privatization,	  mixed	  public/private	  
provision	  and	  cooperation	  between	  governments.	  	  Service	  delivery	  is	  a	  dynamic	  
process	  reflecting	  changing	  citizen	  demand	  for	  services	  and	  new	  privatization.	  	  
The	  data	  also	  show	  significant	  instability	  in	  contracts,	  including	  contracting	  in	  -­‐	  
the	  reverting	  back	  to	  public	  provision	  of	  previously	  privatized	  services.	  	  	  This	  
“reverse	  privatization”	  may	  reflect	  problems	  with	  the	  contracting	  process	  itself,	  
limited	  efficiency	  gains,	  erosion	  in	  service	  quality	  or	  concern	  over	  the	  loss	  of	  
broader	  community	  values	  associated	  with	  public	  service	  delivery.	  	  Privatization	  
does	  not	  imply	  a	  retreat	  of	  government	  but	  rather	  a	  more	  active	  engagement	  
with	  the	  market.	  	  Whether	  as	  regulator,	  contractor	  or	  direct	  service	  provider,	  
local	  governments	  manage	  markets	  to	  create	  competition	  and	  ensure	  service	  
quality	  and	  stability.	  	  	  This	  pragmatic	  market	  structuring	  role	  is	  critical	  to	  ensure	  
that	  both	  efficiency	  and	  the	  broader	  public	  benefits	  of	  service	  delivery	  are	  
achieved.	  
	  
Warner,	  M.E.	  2000.	  “Structuring	  the	  Market	  for	  Service	  Delivery:	  A	  New	  Role	  for	  Local	  
Government.”	  pp	  85-­‐104	  in	  Local	  Government	  Innovation:	  Issues	  and	  Trends	  in	  
Privatization	  and	  Managed	  Competition,	  Robin	  Johnson	  and	  Norman	  Walzer	  eds.	  	  
Westport,	  CT:	  Quorum	  Books.	  
Case	  study	  analysis	  of	  reverse	  privatization	  among	  New	  York	  State	  towns	  and	  
counties	  shows	  how	  governments	  engage	  the	  market	  to	  ensure	  competition,	  
control	  and	  attention	  to	  community	  values.	  	  The	  nature	  and	  relative	  importance	  of	  
three	  alternatives	  to	  privatization	  –	  inter-­‐municipal	  cooperation,	  reverse	  
privatization	  and	  governmental	  entrepreneurship	  are	  described.	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Regionalism
The modern metropolitan area typically contains multiple political jurisdictions.  Public choice theorists
argue political fragmentation will enhance choice and efficiency in local government service provision. 
However, the political fragmentation of the metropolitan area makes it difficult to address economic
development, service provision or democratic voice at the regional level.  Consolidationists argue that
regional government is the solution.  However, support for regionalism is weak.  Alternatives such as
inter-municipal cooperation or functional consolidation (specific to a service) have been much more
popular.  These solutions also raise problems of equity and democratic representation and the ability to
address the need for broader multi-functional coordination.
 
This page outlines the theoretical issues underlying political fragmentation and regionalism. It also highlights
some policy solutions and alternatives to regionalism such as inter-municipal cooperation and discusses some
of the legal and accountability concerns raised by these approaches.
Theory: The Benefits of Political Fragmentation
Regionalism and its Challenges
an overview of the regionalism debate.
Regional Policy Innovations
Alternatives to Regionalism: Intermunicipal Cooperation and Functional Consolidation
Intermunicipal Cooperation and Functional Consolidation are some alternatives to the political fragmentation associated with
regionalism.
Accountability Issues
concerns about how intergovernmental arrangements can ensure accountability and equity.
Legal Concerns
the legal process and considerations behind decisions to implement intermunicipal cooperation.
Experiences in New York State
examinations of the potential benefits of regional cooperation and its applicability in New York State.
Theory: The Benefits of Political Fragmentation
Tiebout, Charles 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy 64:416-424.   In
this classic public choice theory article Charles Tiebout puts forth a model for determining the optimum
expenditure level for public goods. He argues there is a market of local governments where mobile 'consumer
citizens' "shop around" for the communities that best fit their preferences. The competition among
communities forces them to provide public goods at the most efficient level.
Boyne, George A. 1996. "Competition and Local Government: A Public Choice Perspective." Urban Studies 33
(4-5): 703-721.  Boyne discusses the different types of competition in local government, and the structure
and implications of each one.
Regionalism and its Challenges an overview of the regionalism debate.
Search Cornell
Briffault, Richard 2000. "Localism and Regionalism." Buffalo Law Review 48(1):1-30.  Widespread resistance
to regionalism is not due to disagreement with the notion of the region as a socio-economic and ecological
entity, but rather to political reasons, especially the power of localism to ensure democratic voice.
Frug, Gerald. 2000. "Against Centralization," Buffalo Law Review. Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 31-38    Frug argues
against the widespread assertion that centralization and government consolidation is the only solution to
solving metropolitan problems. He believes that decentralization can work as long as there is a constant
dialogue across jurisdictions regarding the urban problems that affect everyone in a metropolitan area.
Lowery, David 2000. "A Transactions Costs Model of Metropolitan Governance: Allocation versus Redistribution
in Urban America," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10(1)(January):49-78.  Lowery
offers a critique of the public choice approach to local governance and a synthesis of the case for
metropolitan consolidation. First, the nature of individual decision making implicit within the case for
consolidation is examined. Second, its propositions on boundaries are discussed. And third, consolidationist
assumptions about institutions and individual choice are evaluated in light of the public choice case for
jurisdictional fragmentation.
Bollens, Scott 1997. "Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity Strategies." Stanford Law and Policy
Review 8(2):11-23.   Although regionalism is a way to combat urban inequality, Bollens criticizes current
models of regionalism, citing the difference between “things regionalism” and “people regionalism.” Things
regionalism is based on systems (transportation, water, etc) and may exacerbate inequality, while people
regionalism is focused on community development in place. Bollens offers ten Metropolitan Equity Strategies
aimed at alleviating inner city poverty and metropolitan segregation by way of people regionalism.
MacLeod, G., 2001. "New Regionalism Reconsidered: Globalization and the Remaking of Political Economic
Space." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25.4 (December): 804-829(26).  This article
gives an assessment of “New Regionalist” research. The goal is to analyze why some regions have grown so
effectively and why one scheme for growth may not work for every region. The author delineates his ideas for
the future of regionalism, as related to globalization.
Brenner, Neil (1999)."Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-scaling of Urban Governance in the
European Union," Urban Studies 369(3):431-451.  Globalization results in reterritorialization: to adapt to
global competition, states are reorganizing themselves to give their major urban areas new capacity. It is the
implications of this reterritorialization, stemming from the contemporary capitalist expansion, that Brenner
argues we must properly conceptualize and study as part of the emerging literature on globalization.
Jessop, Bob 1997. "The Entrepreneurial City: Re-imaging localities, redesigning economic governance or
restructuring capital," pp 28-41 in Transforming Cities: Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions ed.
by Nick Jewson and Susanne MacGregor. Routledge: London.   Jessop contextualizes the idea of the
entrepreneurial city. He claims that the forces of globalization, including the decreasing sovereignty of the
national state, make it necessary for cities to adopt new methods of production and governance in order to
become the drivers of the global economy.
Regional Policy Innovations
Orfield, Myron.1997. "Metropolitics: Coalitions for Regional Reforms," Brookings Review. 15(1):6-
9.http://www.brookings.edu/press/review/winter97/morfield.htm  Orfield discusses the processes of sprawl
and socio-economic polarization, and then offers regionally-implemented methods for attacking the resulting
concentration of poverty.
Also available:  Orfield Myron, 1997. Metropolitics.  Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.   This popular
book discusses how using maps, the Minneapolis-St. Paul region was able to see the need for metropolitan
government.
Rusk, David. 1993. Cities without Suburbs. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.  David Rusk,
former Albuquerque mayor and New Mexico state legislator points out that elastic cities, that capture their
suburbs, have lower social problems and better fiscal status. He presents three options for the creation of
metro governments: empowering urban counties, consolidating cities and counties, and combining counties
into regional governments.
Rusk, David, 1999. Journeying Through Urban America. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. Chapter
1: Inside Game, Outside Game  Through the use of US Census Data, David Rusk classifies cities as “elastic”
or “inelastic.” Elastic cities are able to absorb population growth within the central municipality, therefore
achieving diversity and economic development, while inelastic cities lose population growth to the suburbs,
causing the loss of their white middle class and decline of their tax base. Rusk compares the “inside game” of
fighting decline within a city to the most-important “outside game” of employing regional strategies such as
city-county consolidation.
THE RUSK REPORT, Thu., Nov. 20, 1997, Twin Cities Tax Base Sharing. David Rusk describes the tax base
sharing plan, in place since 1971, among the municipalities of the Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan region.
Alternatives to Regionalism: Intermunicipal Cooperation and Functional Consolidation Intermunicipal
Cooperation and Functional Consolidation are some alternatives to the political fragmentation associated with
regionalism.
Intermunicipal cooperation may be defined as an arrangement between two or more governments for
accomplishing common goals, providing a service, or solving a mutual problem. It is one of the most useful
strategies for achieving efficient and effective service delivery. Nationally, it is a more popular form of service
restructuring than privatization. This page highlights the relevant literature on several aspects of
intermunicipal cooperation, with links to more in-depth summaries.
Functional consolidation involves cooperation across jurisdictions for a common service. Transportation
authorities or water and sewer districts are common examples. The challenge of functional consolidation
however is the inability to address issues that cross functional boundaries.
Foster, Kathryn 1996. "Specialization in Government: The Uneven Use of Special Districts in Metropolitan
Areas." Urban Affairs Review 31(3): 283-313.  Foster assesses four alternative theoretical perspectives on the
uneven use of special districts in local government service delivery. The number of special districts has
increased remarkably in the past several decades, and this article is an attempt at explaining the motivations
behind district use.
Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2002. "The Uneven Distribution of Market Solutions for Public Goods," Journal of
Urban Affairs, 24(4): 445-459.  Using national data on local government service delivery from 1992 and
1997, this article assesses the distribution of privatization and inter-municipal cooperation across localities in
the metropolitan region and finds them most common among suburbs that also exhibit high income and low
poverty. Thus, market solutions appear to reflect the inequality among municipalities in the metropolitan
region.
Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2002  "Applying Market Solutions to Public Services: An Assessment of
Efficiency, Equity and Voice," Urban Affairs Review, 38(1):70-89.  This article assesses the efficacy of market
solutions for metropolitan public service provision by comparing privatization with inter-municipal cooperation
and evaluating each on efficiency, equity and democracy grounds.
Parks, Roger, and Ronald Oakerson. 1993. "Comparative Metropolitan Organization: Service Production and
Governance Structures in St. Louis, MO, and Allegheny County, PA." Publius 23: 19-39.  In this article, the
authors identify and measure key structural characteristics of "fragmented" metro areas, employing a
comparative study of two metropolitan city-counties: St. Louis City and County, MO, and Allegheny County
(Pittsburgh), PA. They introduce a conceptual tool for measurement of production structure (horizontal versus
vertical nature of service, and integration versus differentiation of governments).
Cigler, Beverly A. 1994. "Pre-Conditions for Multicommunity Collaboration." Pp. 39-58 in Toward an
Understanding of Multicommunity Collaboration. AGES Staff Report 9403. Washington, DC: USDA, ERS.  Cigler
argues that intergovernmental collaboration can build the capacity of rural local governments, which often
lack the necessary resources and expertise to adequately provide government services and conduct policy
decision-making activities. However, "truly collaborative ventures" are system changing, and thus potentially
threatening to existing government entities. She describes the conditions are necessary to get positive results
from collaboration.
Oakerson, Ronald. 1987. "Local Public Economies: Provision, Production and Governance." Intergovernmental
Perspective13:3/4, pp. 20-25.  The author distinguishes provision from production. "Provision" refers to
collective choices that determine goals, standards, and arrangement for service, whereas "production" means
the more technical process of transforming inputs into outputs. Oakerson demonstrates the options linking
provision with production: self-production, coordinated production, joint production, intergovernmental
contracting, private contracting, franchising, and vouchering. Among these options, intergovernmental
contracting and private contracting are the most widely practiced in the United States.
Jansen, Annica. 1994. "Multi-Community Collaboration and Linkages: A Framework for Analysis." pp. 59-76 in
Toward an Understanding of Multicommunity Collaboration. AGES Staff Report 9403. Washington, DC: USDA,
ERS.  Jansen defines four types of intergovernmental relationships by means of local capacity (having the
institutions necessary to deal with information) and centrality (having organizational linkages with the political
and economical center of decision making). The author argues that when both centrality and local capacity
are higher or both are absent, the relationship is stable. When there is a disparity between levels of
centrality and local capacity, however, a region will seek to equalize the force.
Lyons, W.E. and D. Lowery. 1989. “Governmental Fragmentation Versus Consolidation:
Five Public Choice Myths about How to Create Informed, Involved and Happy Citizens,”
Public Administration Review 49(6):533-43.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). 1974. "Local Government Reorganizational
Issues." The Challenge of Local Government Reorganization. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.  Theorists have developed various models for government service assignment, which include criteria
such as polycentricity/decentralization, federation/consolidation. These models all have supporters who claim
their various merits based on the criteria of efficiency, equity, public satisfaction with service, and so on.
Empirical findings show that no model appears to be completely effective or without deficiencies.
Accountability Issues concerns about how intergovernmental arrangements can ensure accountability and
equity.
Perlman, Ellen. 1993. "Secretive Governing: Authorities proliferate; So Does Possible Misconduct." City and
State. March 1, pp. 9-11.  This article notes that the number of special intergovernmental districts increased
by 12% between 1987 and 1992. The author cites several reasons why legislative bodies choose to create
special districts: 1) they are a way of skirting state constitutional limits on taxation, spending, and borrowing.
2) they enable state and local governments to appear to be cutting their budgets while continuing to ensure
service provision 3) they are a tools for intergovernmental collaboration cutting across political boundaries to
meet regional needs. However, due to the lack of direct public accountability, there is a high possibility of
abuse such as nepotism, overpricing, and mismanagement.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). 1974. "Alternative Government Structures."
Government Functions and Processes: Local and Areawide. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
 After evaluating many types of intergovernmental cooperation in terms of authority, efficiency, equity, and
accountability, this article suggests that comprehensive reforms to existing local governments--federation,
city-county consolidation, and urban county--provide an effective strategy in the area of accountability, equity
and authority. Patchwork strategies--intergovernmental service agreements, functional transfers, and
multipurpose areawide districts--are less effective in the area of equity and accountability.
Legal Concerns the legal process and considerations behind decisions to implement intermunicipal
cooperation.
Carpinello, George F., and Patricia E. Salkin. 1990. "Legal Processes for Facilitating Consolidation and
Cooperation Among Local Government: Models from Other States." Albany, NY: Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute
of Government.  This article introduces the legal structure and processing to facilitate cooperation,
consolidation among local government entities in U.S. and a few foreign countries. The authors suggest that in
order to enforce the changes more efficiently and effectively, some special preparations must be required
such as giving voters a periodic opportunity to express their desire to study options.
Coon, James A. n.d. "Intergovernmental Cooperation." Local Government Technical Series. Albany, NY:
Department of State.  This article discusses possible reasons for considering formal intergovernmental
cooperation and presents practical and legal considerations. The author points out that the desirability of
cooperative efforts among governments depends on economies of scale, convenience of performing the task,
distribution of natural resources, surplus physical facilities, and the need for duplication of services. In
addition, the author addresses legal information needed for two types of formal cooperative agreements:
service agreements and joint agreements.
Briffault, Richard. "The Law of Local Government Restructuring and Cooperation in New York." 
In New York State, local governments have the power to cooperatively provide any facility or service they
provide individually. However, actual annexation or consolidation of units of government is more difficult. The
New York State legislature is limited by the Home Rule Amendment, which prevents the state legislature from
make laws for annexation without the consent of voters of the affected local governments. This article
discusses under what conditions the New York State legislature is limited by the Home Rule Amendment.
Experiences in New York State examinations of the potential benefits of regional cooperation and its
applicability in New York State.
Warner, M.E. and Robert Hebdon. 2001 "Local Government Restructuring: Privatization and Its Alternatives,"
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 20(2):315-336.  This article explores the complexity of
government restructuring, pointing out that restructuring should not be viewed as a simple dichotomy
between public and private service provision.
Benjamin, Gerald and Richard Nathan. 2001. Regionalism and Realism: A Study of Governments in the New
York Metropolitan Area. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. Press.
New York State Office of the State Comptroller. 1994. "Local Government Cooperative Service Provision."
Albany, NY.  (http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/muni/publicat.htm) In this study of intermunicipal
cooperation, the Office of the New York State Comptroller has provided a wealth of information, ranging from
guiding legal principles to general agreement guidelines, that could facilitate a practical solution for
governments seeking to improve the delivery of their services. This paper provides several pieces of advice
on how best to determine whether a particular activity is suitable for intermunicipal cooperation. For example,
a cost negotiation and comparison is suggested to determine whether intermunicipal cooperation could
improve an activity's efficiency and effectiveness.
Liebschutz, Sarah F. 1990. "The New York Experience with Cooperation, Coordinating Structures, and
Consolidation: Selected Case Studies."  This article presents six case studies of intergovernmental cooperation
in New York State. The examples of successful intergovernmental cooperation have the common element of
emphasizing a participatory process and cooperative problem solving rather than immediately solving a
concrete problem.
Benjamin, Gerald. 1990. "The Evolution of New York State's Local Government System." Albany, NY: Nelson
A. Rockefeller Institute of Government.  This paper explains the evolutionary development of four types of
local governments in New York State: counties, towns, cities and villages. The author points out that these
four types of local governments have converged in their structure and powers since the Civil War, thereby
increasing their similarities than their differences.
Short, John. 1990. The Contract Cookbook for Purchase of Government Service, 2nd ed. Council of State
Governments and the National Association of State Purchasing Officials.
The author argues that contracting and purchasing is most successful when it is administered by a purchasing
manager housed in a central purchasing office within a jurisdiction, as opposed to charging department heads
and managers with the responsibility on an ad hoc basis. Short believes that the role of the purchasing
manager is central to the success of contracting services, so there is a crucial need for purchasing managers
to examine established process of purchasing and contracting and to see where there is opportunity for
improvement and innovation.
The Council of State Governments, State and Local Government Purchasing, Chapter 14, "Cooperative
Purchasing: Local, State and Federal Government."
This chapter covers the essential policies and necessary practices to form successful cooperative purchasing
agreements among local and state governments. Cooperative purchasing is defined as arrangements by which
two or more entities buy under the same contract or agreement. This article provides information and advice
on the process of cooperative purchasing.
State Commission on the Capital Region. May 1996. "Growing Together Within the Capital Region," Draft
Report. Albany, N.Y.: Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government.  This report outlines ways local
governments can work together to solve common problems by sharing information and identifying areas
where cooperation would be beneficial. The authors view intermunicipal cooperation as the key to improving
efficiency.
Desfosses, Helen. 1994. "Regionalization-Who Needs It?" Regional Report 1, no. 1. Key Bank Center for
Regional Studies (March).  In the Capital Region people are discovering they need regional solutions to
problems that spill over political boundaries. Regionalization refers to the growing interest among local
governments and nongovernmental organizations to join force to tackle problems that defy solution within
established political boundaries. This article introduces some successful examples of regionalism.
Broome County Partnership Council, Final Report. 1991. Binghamton, NY.  This report details the
recommendations of a task force charged with exploring opportunities for municipalities, county government,
and school districts to share and consolidate their efforts to provide desired levels of service to the public in
more efficient, cost effective, and quality conscious ways. It includes a number of fairly radical suggestions for
consolidation of local governments.
Nathan, Richard P. "Keynote Address: Reinventing Regionalism." Regional Plan Association, April 26, 1994.
 Nathan gives several reasons why governmental consolidations have been part of our history and may help
solving some of government's current problems.
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Reinventing Government
Sparked by privatization and business-model prescriptions for government, a debate has emerged as to
the primary responsibilities of public managers. There are those who see public administration as akin to
a business—providing a choice of services to citizens, at the lowest possible cost. Others believe that
public management’s responsibilities extend beyond this, to the preservation of public values such as
equity, accountability and citizen voice. From this debate stem questions about the nature of citizenship,
and the proper relationship between a democratic government and its citizens.
The New Public Management
is a concept articulated by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler in their 1992 book Reinventing Government. It applies the
business customer service model to government. Citizens are seen as customers and the administrative role is streamlined
by converting policy alternatives into market choices. This approach focuses on results and promotes competition inside and
outside government. We highlight the debate and recent empirical research.
The New Public Service
is a reaction to the New Public Management. It focuses on the mission of government, and how to determine the collective
pubic interest. The authors believe that there are considerations that should come before cost and efficiency, and that citizen
participation should be a major factor in decisions. They see the role of the administrator as very complex: synthesizing the
needs of citizens, interest groups, elected representatives, etc.
Social Capital and Citizen Empowerment
Social Capital theories recognize the importance of norms and networks in determining social, political and economic
relations. There can be a positive synergy between citizen participation and governmental effectiveness. This is why planners
place so much attention on citizen participation.
The New Public Management is a concept articulated by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler in their 1992 book
Reinventing Government. It applies the business customer service model to government. Citizens are seen as
customers and the administrative role is streamlined by converting policy alternatives into market choices.
This approach focuses on results and promotes competition inside and outside government. We highlight the
debate and recent empirical research.
Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is
Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.  The authors describe how ten new operating
principles, many adapted from the private sector, can revamp the way government functions, providing
numerous examples.
Osborne, David, and Peter Plastrik. 1997. Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for Reinventing
Government. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.  This followup to Reinventing Government details the practical
application of principles designed to make government more effective, entrepreneurial, responsive, creative,
and accountable.
Tendler, Judith (1997).  Good Governance in the Tropics. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.  Tendler’s
research is unique in that it centers on the good government practices and the role of central government in
ensuring effective decentralization. Cases are drawn from Cearà, Brazil.
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Feldman, Barry, M.  1999.  "Reinventing Local Government:  Beyond Rhetoric to Action."  The Municipal
Yearbook.  Washington, DC, ICMA.  Town manager Barry Feldman initiated a study to find out how much the
rhetoric of Reinventing Government has gone from academic debate to actual implementation.
Ballard, Michael J. and M.E. Warner 2000. "Taking the High Road: Local Government Restructuring and the
Quest for Quality."  Pp 6/1 - 6/53 in Power Tools for Fighting Privatization, American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees: Washington DC.  Available at
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/reports/highroad/  Using detailed case studies, this report outlines two
alternative strategies for improving local government service delivery—the "high road” which uses new
management innovations to increase internal productivity, and the “low road” which focuses on downsizing
and contracting out.
Schick, Alan (1998). "Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand’s Reforms."  World Bank
Research Observer 13(1):123-131.  Schick outlines why developing countries need to first establish a formal
public sector, a strong rule-based government, and an internal market as a foundation in order to successfully
apply New Zealand’s public management model.
Labor Management Cooperation:  An alternative to external restructuring is process improvement within
government itself.  For more information on labor-management cooperation generally, click here.  For specific
examples among local governments in New York State click here.  For a detailed case of labor management
cooperation among nursing homes, in New York State click here.
The New Public Service is a reaction to the New Public Management. It focuses on the mission of
government, and how to determine the collective pubic interest. The authors believe that there are
considerations that should come before cost and efficiency, and that citizen participation should be a major
factor in decisions. They see the role of the administrator as very complex: synthesizing the needs of citizens,
interest groups, elected representatives, etc.
Denhardt, Janet and Robert Denhardt. The New Public Service: Serving, not Steering. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk
2003.  In Janet and Robert Denhardt’s 2003 book The New Public Service, the authors offer a synthesis of
the ideas that are opposed to the New Public Management presented by Osborne and Gaebler. Their model
for governance builds upon and expands the traditional role of the public administrator, which they call the
Old Public Administration, and contrasts with the New Public Management.
Denhardt , Robert B. and Janet Vinzant Denhardt (2000).  "The New Public Service: Serving Rather than
Steering."  Public Administration Review 60(6):549-559.   The authors examine the theoretical basis of the
reinvention movement, such as 1) its use of the market model, 2) its emphasis on customers, and 3) its
glorification of entrepreneurial management, in the light of “democratic governance,” which especially
emphasizes “citizenship.”
Blanchard, Lloyd A., Charles C. Hinman, and Wilson Wong, 1997. "Market-Based Reforms in Government:
Toward a Social Subcontract?" Administration and Society 30(56) 483-512.  The authors employ the concept
of the Social Contract to examine changes in government/market relations within the US context, historically.
The article starts by defining the fundamental reciprocal relationship between governments and citizens and
examines how this relationship is being changed due to government restructuring.
Moore, M. H. (1995). Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government. Cambridge, MS: Harvard
University Press.  Moore sees the role of the public administrator as grounded in a clear
sense of ethics and public mission—what he calls “Public Value.” Moore believes that
citizens receive adequate opportunity to have their voices heard from the electoral
process. Therefore, it is up to the administrators, using their professional ethics and
sense of mission, to make substantive judgments as to what is valuable and effective.
Social Capital and Citizen Empowerment Social Capital theories recognize the importance of norms and
networks in determining social, political and economic relations. There can be a positive synergy between
citizen participation and governmental effectiveness. This is why planners place so much attention on citizen
participation.
Robert Putnam has popularized the concept of social capital in America. While Putnam focuses primarily on
inter-personal relationships, Skocpol emphasized the role of government in encouraging the development of
social capital. Their debate is chronicled in the articles below.
Robert D. Putnam, "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life" The American Prospect no. 13
(Spring, 1993) (http://epn.org/prospect/13/13putn.html).
Robert D. Putnam, "The Strange Disappearance of Civic America," The American Prospect no. 24 (Winter
1996). http://epn.org/prospect/24/24putn.html
Theda Skocpol, "Unravelling From Above," The American Prospect no. 25 (March-April 1996): 20-25
(http://epn.org/prospect/25/25_cnt2.html).
Robert Putnam, "Robert Putnam Responds," The American Prospect no. 25 (March-April 1996): 26-28
(http://epn.org/prospect/25/25_cnt.html#putn).
 Warner, M.E. 1999. "Social Capital Construction and the Role of the Local State." Rural Sociology.
64(3):373-393.  This paper looks at the role the state can play in building social capital. Three key factors:
autonomy, linkage and returns on investment for both intermediaries and participating residents, are shown
to affect social capital construction.
Feldman, Martha & Anne Khademian (2001). "Principles for Public Management Practice from Dichotomies to
Interdependence."  Governance and International Journal of Policy and Administration 14(3):339-361.  The
authors emphasize the role of society, the primacy of process that invites public participation and monitoring,
and the need for administrators to be open to change.
Frug, Gerald E. "Alternative Conceptions of City Services," in City Making: Building Communities without
Building Walls. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.  Frug presents his concerns over the Tiebout
model of public choice and other scholars’ attempts to amend it. He responds to these individualistic and
consumer-oriented city models with one of his own, the fortuitous association model.
Crocker, Jarle, William Potapchuck and William Schechter 1998. Systems Reform and Local Government:
Improving Outcomes for Children, Families and Neighborhoods.  Washington DC:  Center for Community
Problem Solving.  The authors of this booklet believe that reforming local governments can result in positive
change in the lives of children and families. They offer ideas local governments can adopt to spur citizen
involvement in communities and neighborhoods.
Abers, Rebecca, 1998. "From Clientelism to Cooperation: Local Government, Participatory Policy and Civic
Organizing in Porto Alegre, Brazil," Politics and Society 26(4): 511-537.  The authors describe the Grants for
Blocks program, which began in 1993 in Savannah, GA, as an example of a local government initiative to
increase citizen involvement in the community. The program gives small grants to citizens for neighborhood
improvement projects of their own design.
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Decentralization
Decentralization refers to the global trend of devolving the responsibilities of centralized governments to
regional or local governments. The promise of decentralization is to enhance efficiency (through inter-
governmental competition and fiscal discipline) and democratic voice (though enhanced local voice over
service provision).  Fiscal federalism – the assignment of tax and expenditure authority to the lowest
level of government possible - creates the discipline and market features necessary to ensure productive
efficiency.  Decentralization works best in settings where there are strong traditions of democracy,
accountability and professionalism in subnational government.  It does not provide a short cut to
governmental capacity in situations where these preconditions are absent.  Decentralization may enhance
productive efficiency but will undermine allocative efficiency by making redistribution more difficult,
especially in areas with regional inequality.  Thus decentralization should be used with caution in
situations where there are concerns with inequality, corruption and weak managerial capacity or weak
democratic traditions.  The articles profiled below discuss the potential and challenges of decentralization
both in the US and in developing countries.
Decentralization: A Global Trend
Theories of Decentralization: the Competitive State in a Global World
Devolution and Welfare Reform in the US
Decentralization: A Global Trend
Litvack, Jennie, Junaid Ahmad and Richard Bird 1998. "Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries,"
Washington, DC: The World Bank.   http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/urban/cds/mf/rethinking.html.
 Litvack et al discuss the considerations for implementing decentralization in developing countries. Many of
the assumptions made in the literature on decentralization don’t hold for developing countries, such as the
presence of exit opportunities, and voice. Possible approaches to this complex problem are discussed.
Tendler, Judith (1997).  Good Governance in the Tropics. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.  Tendler’s
research is unique in that it centers on the good government practices and the role of central government in
ensuring effective decentralization cases are drawn from Cearà, Brazil.
Prud’homme, Remy (1995).  "The Dangers of Decentralization," World Bank Research Observer 10(2):201.
 This critique of fiscal federalism theory concludes that a loss of national redistribution of wealth due to
decentralization will cause greater localization of wealth, greater disparity between rich and poor regions, and
the loss of capacity of the national government to influence the market to soften times of crisis.
Bennett, Robert. 1990. "Decentralization, Intergovernmental Relations and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare
Agenda?" Pp. 1-26 in Decentralization, Local Government and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda, ed.
Robert Bennett. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  Bennett describes the worldwide movement from "welfarist" policy
to "post-welfare" policy. During the post-World War II era, a system of entitlements was developed in many
Western nations and the state became a major provider of education, health services, land-use planning, and
housing. In recent years, however, there has been a shift in thinking, and in the U.S., the idea of "new
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federalism" has gained great currency.
Kodras, Janet. 1997. "Restructuring the State: Devolution, Privatization, and the Geographic Redistribution of
Power and Capacity in Governance." Pp. 79-96 in State Devolution in America: Implications for a Diverse
Society. Ed. Lynn Staeheli, Janet Kodras, and Colin Flint. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews 48. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.  Kodras outlines some of the major arguments for and against three methods of changing how
government services are provided: privatization, devolution to lower levels of government, and simply
abandoning service provision to the nonprofit sector.
Stohr, Walter (2001).  "Introduction" in New Regional Development Paradigms:  Decentralization, Governance
and the New Planning for Local-Level Development. Eds. Stohr, Walter and Josefas Edralin and Devyani
Mani.  Published in cooperation with the United Nations and the United Nations Centre for Regional
Development: “Contributions in Economic History Series,” Number 225.  Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
 Stohr discusses the relationship between globalization and decentralization, and examines decentralization as
a tool for achieving equity.
Theories of Decentralization: the Competitive State in a Global World
Tiebout, Charles 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy 64:416-424.   In
this classic article based on public choice theory, Charles Tiebout puts forth a model for determining the
optimum expenditure level for public goods. He treats residents as consumers, who “shop around” for the
communities that best fit their preferences. The competition among communities forces them to provide
public goods at the most efficient level.
Boyne, George A. 1996. "Competition and Local Government: A Public Choice Perspective." Urban Studies 33
(4-5): 703-721.  Boyne discusses the different types of competition in local government, and the structure
and implications of each one.
Peterson, Paul. 1995. The Price of Federalism. Washington, Brookings Institute. In this
book, Peterson examines New Federalism in the context of modern economic reality. He
asserts that because of the mobility of labor and capital, states are in greater competition
with each other than ever before, causing them to focus more on economic development
and less on social welfare. Therefore, welfare should remain the responsibility of the
federal government, even as other basic governmental programs are devolved.
Peterson, Paul. 1981. City Limits. University of Chicago Press.
Cerny, Philip G. 1999. "Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy." European Journal of Political Research,
26:2.  In this article Philip Cerny analyzes democracy, specifically its form and function in today’s globalized
world. He asserts that liberal democracy is being eroded through increased globalization and internationalism,
and therefore factors such as public accountability, responsiveness, policy capacity, and legitimacy are all in
decline. The result is the emergence of ad hoc public and private governance structures that undermine the
democratic state from above and below, leading to a “durable disorder” of overlapping and competing
institutions.
Donahue, John D. 1997. "Tiebout? or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s Devolution Debate."
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4) 73-82.  Donahue outlines the discontinuities between the Tiebout
model of interjurisdictional competition and the reality of American cities in the age of devolution.
Donahue, John D. 1997. Disunited States. New York: Basic Books.  Donahue argues that decentralization is
not, in fact, the solution to America’s governance problems. There is little evidence that the public sector will
be more efficient at the state level than it is the federal level. Instead, America should focus on the
challenges of mitigating cynicism in government on the public’s part and narrowing the gap between the
benefits expected from government and citizen willingness to endure taxation.
Brenner, Neil (1999)."Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-scaling of Urban Governance in the
European Union," Urban Studies 369(3):431-451.  Globalization results in reterritorialization: to adapt to
global competition, states are reorganizing themselves to give their major urban areas new capacity. It is the
implications of this reterritorialization, stemming from the contemporary capitalist expansion, that Brenner
argues we must properly conceptualize and study as part of the emerging literature on globalization.
Jessop, Bob 1997. "The Entrepreneurial City: Re-imaging localities, redesigning economic governance or
restructuring capital," pp 28-41 in Transforming Cities: Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions ed.
by Nick Jewson and Susanne MacGregor. Routledge: London.  Jessop contextualizes the idea of the
entrepreneurial city. He claims that the forces of globalization, including the decreasing sovereignty of the
national state, make it necessary for cities to adopt new methods of production and governance in order to
become the drivers of the global economy.
Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2003. "Rural-Urban Differences in Privatization: Limits to the Competitive State,"
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 21(5): 703-718.  Despite two decades of experience
with privatization, U.S. local government use of contracting in public service delivery remains relatively flat,
and rural governments privatize less than others. Using national data on U.S. local government service
delivery from 1992 and 1997, the authors analyze differences in local government service delivery patterns by
metropolitan status.
Warner, Mildred and Jennifer Gerbasi. "Rescaling and Reforming the State under NAFTA: Implications for
Subnational Authority." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research December 2004 Vol 28(4): 853-
73.  This paper describes the new governance features of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and illustrates how they work out at the national, subnational and local scales using cases from the United
States and Mexico. The authors show how NAFTA’s governance structure is undermining subnational and local
government authority in legislative and judicial arenas.
Warner, M.E., 2003. "Competition, Cooperation and Local Governance," chapter 19 pp 252-262 in Challenges
for Rural America in the Twenty First Century, edited by David Brown and Louis Swanson, University Park,
PA: Penn State University Press.  Successful decentralization requires administrative and financial capacity
and effective citizen participation, but many rural governments lack an adequate revenue base or sufficient
professional management capacity. Rural residents have relied more on private markets than government for
many services; however, rural areas have also suffered from under development due in part to uneven
markets. This chapter explores the emergence of cooperative networks as an alternative to decentralization,
focusing on the preservation of equity and voice.
Devolution and Welfare Reform in the US
Katz, Michael 2001. The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State. New York: Metropolitan
Books.  Michael Katz delineates the current state of social policy in the United States, focusing on the political
and economic trends that limit welfare and its ability to alleviate poverty and inequality. He discusses
inaccurate views Americans hold of welfare, the ascension of conservative political theory, the devolution to
the states, the increased use of private markets to provide social goods, and the impact of these trends on
citizenship.
Peterson, Paul 1995. "Who Should Do What? Divided Responsibility in the Federal System," The Brookings
Review 13(2): 6-11.     Peterson discusses the roles of local, state and federal government in the provision of
two types of public policies, developmental and redistributive. He points to recent history to argue that state
and local governments should fund the development necessary to sustain economic growth, but that federal
government should provide redistribution necessary to compensate those that do not benefit from the growth.
Powers, Elizabeth. 1999. "Block Granting Welfare: Fiscal Impact on the States," Occasional Paper 23.
Washington DC: The Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=309040  Powers discusses the effects
of a change from matching funds to block grants on states’ welfare programs. It is possible that a “race to
the bottom” will be triggered by states trying to cut costs, resulting in stricter eligibility requirements and
reduced benefits.
Weir, Margaret. 1997. “The Uncertain Future of Welfare Reform in the Cities.” The Brookings Review Winter
1997 Vol. 15 No. 1 Pages 30-33. http://www.brookings.edu/press/review/winter97/weir.htm Margaret Weir
examines the effect that the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 will have on cities, as the responsibility for social
welfare is shifted from the national level to the state level, and in turn, to cities and urban counties.
Conlan, Timothy 1998. From New Federalism to Devolution: Twenty Five Years of Intergovernmental Reform.
Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. Press. Chapter 14: "Intergovernmental Reform and the Future of
Federalism."   Conlon examines the development of conservative theories of devolution through the tenures of
Nixon, Reagan and Gingrich. The move toward decentralization can be viewed as the decline of the nation
state as a result of the interplay of political and economic factors. The decline of the nation state and the
increasing demands of citizens from local governments has led to the creation of sub-national entities that
are required to take on more responsibility for provision of goods and services than before, and hence
demand greater local autonomy and policy devolution.
Gold, Steven D. 1996.  "Issues Raised by the New Federalism." National Tax Journal 49(2) 273-87.
http://ntj.tax.org  This article explains the possible effects of devolution on public finance in the United States
at the federal, state and local levels. Gold focuses on the three major aspects of New Federalism that affect
state and local governments: 1) They would receive less federal aid. 2) Some of the most important aid
programs would be changed from matching to non-matching grants. 3) States would have more flexibility in
operating programs.
Warner, M.E. 2001. "State Policy Under Devolution: Redistribution and Centralization," National Tax Journal
Vol LIV(3):541-556. Political theory argues redistributive spending is best made at higher levels of
government, but under devolution, state policy becomes the most significant arena for redistributive activity.
Using Census of Government data for 1992, this paper compares Federal and State aid to county areas and
considers the role of state centralization of fiscal responsibility on local revenue raising efforts. Both the
magnitude and redistributive nature of state aid are greater than federal aid. However, because state
centralization has a large impact on reducing local fiscal stress, differences in state policy choices create a
very uneven landscape of local tax effort.
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Network Governance, Citizenship and Free Trade
As government shifts from direct provision to use of third parties for service delivery, new challenges
with respect to management, accountability and citizenship are raised.  It may actually be harder to
exercise control or ensure accountability when government is part of an interdependent network.  This is
why many scholars use the term governance rather than government to describe current conditions. 
These network governance arrangements alter the nature of citizenship as well, creating a democratic
deficit.  This section concludes with an overview of the recent free trade agreements and their impact on
democracy and governments’ ability to use third parties for public service provision.
1) Network Governance and the Democratic Deficit
2) Citizenship and Governance
3) Free Trade and State and Local Authority
1) Network Governance and the Democratic Deficit
Network management is the key theme in government today, as compared to the hierarchy command and
control approach of the past.  This creates special challenges for management and democracy which are
outlined below.
Salamon, Lester M. (2002).  The Tools of Governance: A Guide to the New Governance.  "The New
Governance and the Tools of Public Action:  An Introduction."  Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Salamon
details the transition from earlier government activities that focused on command and control direct delivery
of goods and services to a new strategy that uses contracts, grants, loans, regulations, etc. to encourage a
network of third parties to satisfy those demands. This leads to new challenges such as managing
decentralized providers/decision-makers and blurred accountability from the diffusion of authority.
Rhodes, R.A.W., (1996).  "The New Governance: Governing without Government," Political Studies XLIV:652-
667.   Rhodes grapples with the significance and definitions of “governance” in a networked system.
Blanchard, Lloyd A., Charles C. Hinman, and Wilson Wong, 1997. "Market-Based Reforms in Government:
Toward a Social Subcontract?" Administration and Society 30(56) 483-512.  The authors employ the concept
of the Social Contract to examine changes in government/market relations within the US context, historically.
The article starts by defining the fundamental reciprocal relationship between governments and citizens and
examines how this relationship is being changed due to government restructuring.
Gutman, Dan 2000. “Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture
of Contacting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty,” Administrative Law
Review 52: 859- 926.
2) Citizenship and Governance
This section traces the evolution of citizenship theory from T.H. Marshall’s concept of
social citizenship, to newer concepts based on a recognition of globalization and the
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importance of culture and place.
Turner, Bryan S. 1990. "Outline of the Theory of Citizenship," Sociology 24(2) (May): 189-217.  Turner
critiques the unitary character of T.H. Marshall’s conceptual framework of citizenship. Citizenship, Turner
proffers, is structured by two contradictory processes. Regionalization and localization define citizenship as
linked to the development and cultural needs of each particular region. Simultaneously, globalization
promotes stronger ties to global institutions and requires the transfer of political responsibilities and economic
processes to the supra-national level.
Marshall, T.H. (1950).  "Citizenship and Social Class" in Citizenship Debates: A Reader ed. by Gershon Shafir,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.  Marshall suggests that citizenship is the basis for legalized
social inequality and looks into England’s history to see how citizenship evolved over time from civil
(individual) rights, to political rights, to social rights. Marshall reveals the inherent conflict between social
citizenship and capitalist market relations.
Holston, James and Arjun Appadurai (1999).  "Introduction" in Cities and Citizenship ed. by James Holston.
 Holston and Appadurai define citizenship as a concept including cultural, civil and socio-economic rights. They
suggest that there is a transition from citizenship as a national unifier to a city-scaled local definition of
personal rights including the right of difference.
Katz, Michael (2001). "Work, Democracy, and Citizenship," epilogue of The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the
American Welfare State. New York: Metropolitan Books.    In the Epilogue to his book, Katz discusses the
tension between ideas of citizenship and the welfare state. He cautions against America’s use of work as a
criterion for full citizenship, and outlines the limits of the market as a structuring mechanism for democratic
governments.
3) Free Trade and State and Local Authority
The new generation of free trade agreements is designed to promote market penetration
in public service delivery.  However attention to creating freer markets has come at the
expense of basic governance protocols potential trumping the courts system, legislation
and citizen voice.
Warner, Mildred and Jennifer Gerbasi. "Rescaling and Reforming the State under NAFTA: Implications for
Subnational Authority." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research December 2004 Vol 28(4): 853-
73.  The new free trade agreements are rescaling governance in ways that have critical implications for
subnational governments. The authors show how NAFTA’s governance structure is undermining subnational
and local government authority in legislative and judicial arenas.
Gerbasi, Jennifer and M.E. Warner, June 2003.  "The Impact of International Trade on State and Local
Government Authority, " Dept. of City and Regional Planning Working Papers #204.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University. Available at  http://government.cce.cornell.edu/?/doc/reports/freetrade/#book1 /   
Jennifer Gerbasi, Jennifer and Mildred Warner. 2004, "Is There a Democratic Deficit in the Free Trade
Agreements? What Local Governments Should Know," Public Management 86:2 (16-21).  
Gerbasi, Jennifer and Mildred Warner, 2002. Why Should Local and State Governments Pay Attention to the
New International Treaties? 
This article is a popular review of the implications of NAFTA for state and local government sovereignty.
Greider, William 2001. “The Right and US Trade Law: Invalidating the 20th Century,” The
Nation, October 15, 2001. 
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20011015&s=greider This article investigates
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, which allows conflicts to be settled out of the court system and out
of public view, by 3-member offshore arbitration panels.
Mooney, Chris 2001. “Localizing Globalization,” The American Prospect 12(12) (July 2-16, 2001).
http://prospect.org/print/V12/12/mooney-c.html.
Longworth, Richard C. 2001 “Government without Democracy.” The American Prospect 12(12) (July 2-16,
2001). http://prospect.org/print/V12/12/longworth-r.html.
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Contracting Back In
While privatization is the most popular form of alternative local government service delivery, longitudinal
analysis shows these contracts are not stable over time. Using ICMA data we can track the dynamics of local
government contracting.  We find contracting back in (or reverse privatization) is growing in importance.  For
more discussion of this phenomenon see, Hefetz and Warner 2004 Privatization and its Reverse.  For a more
descriptive account with case studies, see Warner and Hefetz 2001 Privatization and the Market Structuring
Role of Local Government.
Why are contracts unstable?
Also see Ballard and Warner 2000 Taking the High Road: Local Government Restructuring and the Quest for
Quality (a PDF version is also available) for an analysis of case studies which show why governments bring
the work back in. You may also download our database of case studies of contracting back in.
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Cases
Resolutions
Legislative Briefings
Conference Presentations
Contacts and Links
Publications about Free Trade by Mildred Warner
Free Trade and State and Local Government
State and local governments are interested in
promoting economic development for their
communities. Free trade has been pursued to
expand markets and create jobs. However, the new
trade agreements (NAFTA, WTO, FTAA, GATS) reach
beyond traditional customs and tariff regulations
and impacts all government activity that may affect
foreign trade. There is some concern in the
governance community that these changes may
lead to federal preemption of traditional powers
reserved to states and localities.
This site provides an overview of these state and local
government concerns. Case studies, resolutions and
letters illustrate how state and local governments are
asking for a balance between free trade objectives and
local government authority.
The Impact of International Trade on State and Local Government Authority - An Overview
Overview of State and Local Challenges of Free Trade Agreements
New Rights Bring Investors on Par with Nations
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Since the 1990's, the United States has vigorously pursued and become a
party to international trade agreements such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). Traditional trade treaties are intended to open new commercial
opportunities and technology sharing avenues which promote economic
development by leveling the playing field .
The new trade agreements have the potential to open unprecedented service and goods markets bringing
economic growth to U.S. investors. However, this new generation of trade agreements reaches beyond the
traditional agreements that limit excessive tariffs, import limitations, or customs practices and may change
substantively domestic governance at all levels. Benefits to state and local government will depend in large
part on the interpretation of the agreement regarding state and local government authority.
The WTO, NAFTA, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the upcoming Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) have been formulated to limit government participation in a number of ways in the
name of free market competition. Government measures such as subsidies, taxes, health and environmental
regulations, administrative rules, and government provision of goods and services are viewed as potentially
interfering with the free market disciplines of competition based on price and quality.
New Generation Trade Agreements
Name Signatories Highlighted Impacts on Government
North American Free
Trade
Agreement(NAFTA)
1994
United States
Canada
Mexico
Individual foreign investors can sue nations
Dispute resolution in secret tribunals
Removes state court jurisdiction over cases
Property redefined for foreign investors
The World Trade
Organization (WTO)
1995
144 countries Trade-legal test for all government action
Binding obligations
Financial penalties for government actions
The General Agreement
on Trade in Services
(GATS)
1995
The 144 WTO Countries Liberalizes services listed in the agreement
Government provision exception limited to
those services not offered privately
Water delivery and treatment, schools, and
prisons may be open to competition
The Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA)
In draft form
Expected 2003
34 North, Central and South American
countries and the Caribbean but not
Cuba.
Liberalizes all service sectors not specifically
excluded
Draft includes NAFTA investor rights chapter
May extend foreign investor protection from
performance requirements to domestic
investors
State and local laws may be affected because the trade agreements extend to all levels of government
including administrative agencies or businesses contracted to implement programs legitimized by government
Under NAFTA claims are
decided in closed arbitration;
defended by the federal government;
the state does not have access to the
hearings; and
state law is irrelevant.
The foreign investor is on par with the
nation and chooses the court, the law, and
level of transparency.
Property is defined to include future profits,
market share, and market access which by
their nature would allow compensation for
partial takings, in conflict with the U.S.
takings clause.
authority. The United States is a federalist government in which the federal government shares powers with
the states. Federal law preempts state law where they conflict.[i] Trade agreements become federal law when
congress ratifies them and, therefore, trump state and local law. There is a shift in power from the state to
the federal government whenever the federal government agrees to international obligations that bind the
states. States are duty bound to govern for the benefit of the people of that state, which is a discriminatory
standard by its nature. The federal government, through the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution
prohibits the states from inhibiting interstate commerce in pursuit of local advantage. Federal district courts
hear disputes between foreign parties and the states. The federal courts interpret state law in this process
and are used to avoid state bias, not to supplant federal law. Under NAFTA, foreign investors can bring these
claims to binding international arbitration panels. This avoids both the state and federal domestic court
systems, and any obligation to use U.S. laws. This process lacks the predictability of the U.S. court system
and the framework in which local and state governments function.
Proponents of free trade consider the loss of sovereignty,
and growth of international influence to be a step in the
right direction for international cooperation. By extending
U.S. investor protections to other countries the
agreements help safeguard investments abroad. Some
state and local government associations believe that the
benefits can be attained without limiting the dynamic,
flexible and community-based leadership role of local and
state government actors.
Other analysts believe that the trade agreements shift
powers away from the state toward the federal
government, international arbitration panels, and
individual foreign investors. NAFTA Article 105 and the
NAFTA implementation language specifically assert that
the federal government must take measures to ensure
that sub-national government agents, quasi-governmental organizations or authorized contractors comply
with the agreement obligations. Thus the agreements increase pressure on state and local governments to
defer to international standards rather than community standards or custom.
New Rights Bring Investors on Par with Nations
An "investor" is any person, company or lender with a financial venture that sells goods or services in a
participating country where the investor is considered foreign[ii]. These investors have a right to bring nations
into international arbitration to defend government measures that affect their investments (property)
negatively. These agreements expand foreign investor rights by granting:
property rights greater than domestic citizens and
access to an international court that can award
damages for government actions that impact investor
profits.
The expanded view of "property" is defined to include
future profits, market share, and market access. Partial
losses of profit or use of land may require government
compensation. This is a greater right than U.S. citizens
have under the takings clause. Partial regulatory takings are considered non-compensable, reasonable losses
for the privilege of citizenship in the domestic context[iii].
Foreign investors have also been granted the right to comment on draft legislation that might affect
investments. If displeased with the final legislation, foreign investors can circumvent the legislation and
challenge the law by asking a secretive international arbitration tribunal to declare the law invalid under
Methanex v. U.S.
The Methanex case is resting on whether
the U.S. must enforce environmental laws
that require better underground storage
tanks, or can choose to eliminate MTBE and
only use chemical additives that don’t leak
from the tanks that are now in use.
Methanex claims that under the agreement
the nation should have to pay them for their
loss of business, or repeal the ban and pay
for containers impermeable by MTBE to
prevent the pollution.
California chose to ban MTBE rather than
spend large sums of money to replace tanks
or increasing inspections.
The U.S. court system has awarded
California cities millions in damages from
refineries for the environmental damage
cause by MTBE. In either case, the financial
burden is placed on the government, not
manufacturers or users.
Laws that may have an impact on foreign
investments must pass a test called the
"trade-legal " requirement. Laws must pass
NAFTA on a number of grounds. These changes are the basis of much of the concern voiced by state and
local governments. The concern is not unfounded, and has been reinforced by the actions of some investors.
Several California communities noticed a terrible smell and taste from their water taps. A study of Santa
Barbara revealed that MTBE (methyl tributyl ethanol), an additive used to make gasoline burn cleaner, had
leached into the wells. Separate scientific studies found MTBE to be carcinogenic and very difficult to remove
from water. Aesthetically, a few drops of MTBE can make an Olympic pool-sized reservoir of water taste and
smell like turpentine. Freshwater resources are critical to California, so to protect public health and the
environment, the Governor of California called for a ban of the chemical.
Methanex, a Canadian firm that provides one component
of MTBE, is currently challenging California’s right to ban
MTBE on the grounds that it violates NAFTA Chapter 11
obligations. The company has interpreted the ban as an
expropriation of their market though it accounts for only
6% of their product sales. Methanex further claims that
the state should have pushed for strict compliance with
existing environmental inspection regulations of
underground tanks rather than eliminating the chemical.
To choose the more expeditious route of eliminating the
chemical from the stream of commerce conflicts with
Methanex’s right to be governed by the least trade
restrictive methods available. Methanex is claiming nearly
a billion dollars in damages including good will, reputation
and future profits. The challenge is being entertained by a
tribunal at the time of writing though no arguments have
been made public.
Domestically, the U.S. court system has been supporting
cities affected by this chemical and making gasoline
refiners pay. California cities have sued refiners for MTBE
ground water well pollution. Courts have awarded cities
close to $40 million for remediation.
Implications for State and Local Governance
The manner in which state and local governments protect
public health, encourage sensible growth, economic
development and interpret their laws is in question under
trade agreements. These traditional powers are not
protected, and may be targets for elimination as "non-
tariff barriers to trade" in some instances. The WTO and
NAFTA change the way that laws are made, the
interpretation of those laws in the court system, and the scientific standards on which they are based. Taxes
on foreign businesses operating in the U.S. may be limited by NAFTA as will the ability of states to require
state licenses, certifications, or the residency of key personnel under GATS. Performance requirements, bonds
to ensure a fund for liability in case of dispute, and any preferences for local goods or labor may conflict with
NAFTA. State and local governments are bound to the international trade agreement obligations and must
comply with all of the restrictions on government market intervention.
State Sovereignty Challenged
Some state members of Congress, such as California
Senator Sheila Kuehl and Massachusetts Representative
Byron Rushing are concerned that the obligations may go
a three-part test that proves that:
1. the objective is considered legitimate
under the treaty;
2. it is the least trade restrictive
alternative available; and
3. the measure does not constitute a
disguised restriction on trade.
The analysis does not take into account the
public policies, customs or goals of the
government body making the law. The
treaties require laws to be the least
burdensome necessary to achieve the
legitimate government objective. The highest
priority in the treaties is to encourage,
support and protect foreign investment. All
other priorities are secondary.
so far as to encroach on state sovereignty. Both states
and state legislators support free trade and understand
the importance of foreign markets to US growth.
California boasted $1.7 billion of exports in 1999 and
supported those exports with $13.5 million of subsidies
annually.[iv] Kuehl and Rushing are concerned, however,
that the trade agreements lack procedures that promote
meaningful public input and may undermine domestic
legislation.
States currently pass laws that affect health, property
rights, taxation, development, and environmental
regulations. These laws are generally upheld if they are
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and
do not conflict with or are not less stringent than federal
law. NAFTA further burdens all U.S. "government
measures" that may impact trade to be consistent with
international standards.
Government measures defined loosely are rules or
regulations from any government actor or authorized
contractor. Under the trade agreements, government measures may be challenged if they affect foreign
investment profits, market share, or give preference to domestic investors. To be upheld, the laws have to be
legitimate under international rules rather than rationally related to standards used in the U.S. The penalties
for non-compliance involve huge and unpredictable financial awards. Previous treaties and agreements were
voluntary and were enforced only by tariffs or boycotts. These new agreements extend the interpretation of
”non-tariff barriers to trade” to include many state and local government laws and procedures.
The Legislative Process
Trade agreements have broad implications for the legislative process including changes in the formulation of
laws, the public participation and representation of citizens and foreign investors, and the interpretation in
the courts. Laws must be in compliance with the trade agreement obligations, and may be interpreted in
international tribunals rather than the traditional courts. This circumstance limits citizen input, judicial
interpretation, and the state's role as the democratic representative of citizen voice.
Who Makes These Agreements?
The federal government has the exclusive power to make agreements with foreign governments. The
"treaties" discussed in this paper are actually presidential agreements. They carry the same weight as
treaties, but the ratification process is significantly different. 
For both, the executive branch formulates the U.S. goals by consulting with 30 industry specific advisory
boards and negotiates with foreign nations through the United States Trade Representative (USTR).
For a treaty, the president must be advised by the Senate and receive the consent of 2/3rds of the
Senate. A presidential agreement is approved by both houses, but requires only 51% in each house to
carry. NAFTA was presented as a presidential agreement and the FTAA is also in that format.
Fast-track further limits the role of the Congress in affecting international agreements. Congress has 60
days to review the proposed agreement and then is limited to a yes or no vote. It is limited to 20 hours
of debate. Congress cannot modify the agreement, but must reject it entirely to have it revised. The only
opportunity for state and local governments to safeguard critical programs and get exceptions for specific
laws is to participate in the negotiations before ratification.
Harmonization
U.S. safety standards are
likely to be compromised in
the negotiation for a single
legal standard.
Public Participation Must Include the International Community
Foreign investors will have an opportunity to ensure that the laws passed in the US will not negatively affect
their investments. Regulators and rule makers have to provide a comment period open to all foreign investors
who may be impacted by the resulting government measure. All rulemaking bodies must invest in
communication procedures that announce pending and new rules to all potentially concerned parties including
current and future investors. Investors may take this opportunity to explain to the state or locality why the
proposed legislation or rule might conflict with a trade agreement, and outline how that might translate into
an international arbitration and a substantial financial reward to the investor. These concerns may take
precedence over the will of the citizens and the goals of the state.
Health Laws and Harmonization
Existing laws must also be harmonized with the participating countries. Either all countries have one set of
regulations, or each party may simply accept each others' different laws as comparable or acceptable.
Harmonization results in one law that is a compromise of the other laws. The point is to lower the uncertainty
and transaction costs of investors by having similar laws in all countries whenever possible. The Western
Governor's Association believes state standards may be compromised through this process. State laws
regarding environmental protection, natural resource management and consumer safety are generally more
stringent than the standards used by U.S. trading partners.[v] U.S. federal and state safety standards would
have to be lowered to comply with the required harmonization preempting the states' role in setting the
acceptable risk.
Once laws are harmonized, challenges may still be brought to tribunals
under NAFTA. The controversy over Lindane is a good example. Lindane
was targeted as a persistent organic pollutant (POP). Lindane has been
used to kill head lice and to stop fungal damage in agricultural seeds. In
these applications, Lindane has caused death, seizures and rashes in
children and adults who have come into contact with the chemical.
Equally troubling, the chemical breaks down very slowly once in the
environment. It was considered for the POPs Treaty but was not
included.[vi] Since it was not listed, but remained controversial, the U.S.
and Canada harmonized their laws regarding its use. Lindane was to be
sold freely until July 1, 2001, and the governments would fund a new study to assess the health risk. The
compromise was that all U.S. and Canadian companies would stop manufacturing in December 2000 and sell
the stock over the next six months. When the voluntary agreement was published, the Canadian
announcement said that Lindane could not be used after July 1, 2001, and violators could be subject to a
$200,000 fine. Lindane dropped in value precipitously.
Crompton is a United States manufacturer of Lindane. The manufacturer is now bringing a NAFTA challenge.
Crompton says that it only agreed to take Lindane off the market if the study proved it was harmful, and
that the government is acting in bad faith.[vii] The risk assessment by the governments was never
completed, so Crompton is challenging the scientific basis for the ban. The governments had included the
manufacturers in the initial decision, and Crompton is treating the government like a contractual partner that
is in default rather than a regulatory authority obligated to protect human health. Crompton questions the
need for Lindane to be banned, and is demanding $100 million from Canada for the premature loss of market
share, the retraction of the ban, and return of their license to manufacture the chemical. If the tribunal
allows Crompton to move forward, this challenge threatens the finality of negotiations between parties to
harmonize laws. Financial compensation for affected profits would be valued above the ability of government
to stand by a compromise or otherwise legitimate legislation.
The Precautionary Principle Could Be Challenged
The Lindane case begs the question, “who decides?” Does a manufacturer have a burden to prove a chemical
is safe, or must the government prove certain harm before acting to protect the public? The burden seems to
be placed on the governments in the NAFTA and WTO cases at this time.
State and local
governments protect
public health, encourage
sensible growth,
economic development
and interpret their
laws…These traditional
powers are not
protected, and may be
targets for elimination
Crompton Corporation v. Canada
Lindane was nearly listed as a persistent organic pollutant (POP), which would have banned its use under
the POPs Treaty. It has been used to stop spoilage of seeds as well as an ingredient in lice-removing
shampoo. Canada was permitted to use Lindane on canola seeds, while US farmers treated 13 other
crops. According to some US and European studies, Lindane is carcinogenic and acute exposure
symptoms include seizures, skin rashes, and neuromuscular complaints.. Crompton asserts that the ban
is to benefit Canadian replacement products. This would violate the national treatment requirement that
bans domestic preference over foreign goods. The next round of POPs negotiations may eliminate all use
of Lindane, but Canada may have to pay the manufacturer damages under NAFTA before that is resolved.
U.S. governing agencies are generally allowed to use the precautionary principle to avoid damage to the
public from a substance that is potentially harmful. The precautionary principal is a risk averse policy that
favors erring on the side of safety when scientific evidence suggests that something may be harmful, but
harm is not certain. The trade agreements require a scientific basis for government measures which suggests
that the results of any study be reproducible and statistically significantly different from control groups. Less
information tends to settle questions in favor of using the product until it is proven harmful rather. A
government exercising caution where evidence is forthcoming or scant may be inviting a challenge. The same
government entity may face some liability domestically for not acting quickly enough to protect the affected
public. An imminent NAFTA challenge may make the decisions more economically driven because public policy
and local conditions are irrelevant to international tribunals.
Foreign investors may try to impose international standards to challenge the scientific basis of the state or
local government for restricting the use or release of what is considered a pollutant in the US. For example,
the California legislature was convinced that there was enough scientific evidence that MTBE should not be
introduced to the environment. Other researchers in Germany concluded that it was not dangerous, and the
Canadian manufacturer is claiming that the U.S. should accept those scientific studies. The challenges may be
resolved in the state or local government's favor, but at a significant cost to both the state and the federal
government defender.
Professional Licensing
Harmonization is not limited to health or environmental legislation. NAFTA and GATS require that all laws
affecting investment be as similar as possible in the participating countries.[1] One of the first topics being
considered by special GATS subcommittees is the issue of licenses for professionals. At this time, without the
appropriate license with the credentials required by a state, lawyers, accountants, doctors and other
professionals cannot operate. The trade proponents are striving to come up with universal criteria for licenses
that will allow these services to be traded freely. This is a huge detour from the state character of licenses in
the past that require specific knowledge of local customs and practices.
Protections for Current Laws Weak
There are some general exceptions that exempt open-ended categories of laws.
These exceptions provide a false sense of security because in some cases these
exceptions have sunset clauses, and in others they are available as candidates
for compromises in future rounds of liberalization. The continued obligation to
liberalize is called a "rollback" requirement. The grandfathered laws are
restricted by a "standstill" requirement that means that the law can not be
strengthened. This freezes future lawmaking powers at the point the agreement
is negotiated.[viii]
Exceptions may not protect natural resources
There is no guarantee that exceptions will be interpreted consistently over
time. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has a general
exception for protecting animals, plants, and exhaustible natural resources. It
is not clear what those natural resources are. It is fairly certain that water is
as "non-tariff barriers
to trade"...
U.S. Court System Avoided
Foreign investors can avoid U.S.
state and federal courts. The claims
are heard by an international
tribunal.
The investor and country:
Each select a judge, and jointly
agree on a third.
Jointly select laws to use (the
law of either country or some
international standard)
The tribunal:
is closed to the public
can ignore domestic law
has limited appeals
can award financial penalties
not among them since the USTR and the Supreme Court of the United States
both consider water to be a commodity, and the GATT defines water as all
water other than sea water. Although NAFTA defers to the GATT, NAFTA
preempts the GATT where the two are in conflict, so GATT protections may be
overruled by interpretations of NAFTA. There is a potential conflict between the reserved right to protect
natural resources (GATT Article XX) and the obligation to continue exports of products at the average level of
the previous 36 months (NAFTA Article 15). The implication is that a country would be obligated to continue
natural resource exports regardless of changed local conditions or serious risk of unsustainable depletions.
A U.S. company is challenging a Canadian ban on the export of
fresh water on this basis as well as other national treatment
claims. Sun Belt, Inc. claims that British Columbia, a province of
Canada, expropriated their profits by putting a temporary
moratorium on freshwater export. Sun Belt had contracted with a
local firm to export water to California. Sun Belt is asking for
$1.5 billion in lost profits and the reinstatement of the license to
export. A company spokesperson has claimed that NAFTA has
made them an active participant in Canadian political process,
and a rightholder of Canadian water. NAFTA is controlling
because, in Sun Belt's view, water is a commodity like any other,
and therefore must be traded under NAFTA rules. The case has
not been approved for arbitration by the tribunal at this point,
but is evidence of the types of issues that may be raised under
the agreements. It may inform future decisions of planners,
conservationists and manufacturers alike.
It is important to note that British Columbia’s moratorium was in
effect before NAFTA was signed. Sun Belt is gong back
retroactively to say that it was owed the NAFTA treatment before
the trade agreement was in existence. Legislators may be
concerned that implications of having issues as critical as access
to the freshwater supply can be decided by an international
tribunal with no direct accountability to local citizens. The
tribunals emphasis may be given to economic criteria over local
public health and environmental quality concerns.
The Courts Lose Jurisdiction at the State and Federal Levels
The agreements invite foreign investors not only into the legislative process, but also to interpret laws once
applied. This is a significant shift in influence that limits the ability of the state to act in an autonomous,
independent, self-interested manner. If the resulting measure is perceived as discriminating against foreign
investors, or gives domestic competitors an inadvertent advantage, the foreign investor can challenge the
law. This challenge would be heard in international arbitration. Tribunals are selected by the two parties to
the challenge (an investor and a party country) and they choose the standard of law that will be used to
decide the controversy.
Both the venue and the finality of the courts are modified under NAFTA. The arbitration panels and
international law replace the state courts as the venue for hearing complaints against a state action and the
standards applied. Under NAFTA, the federal government defends the claim in an international setting
according to whichever law the parties choose, which has generally been the international standard. The state
does not directly participate, and state law is not considered unless the parties both agree that it will be the
standard. If a domestic court decision is made, an unfavorable outcome for the foreign investor might
encourage the investor to go into arbitration by claiming discrimination and avoid the state law.
"Civil society is based
above all on the free
generation and
exchange of
information, with
openness and
participation as
prerequisites. It is the
recognition that
decentralized, flexible,
locally rooted responses
are indispensable…"
Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the
Earth
The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States challenge is an example of this threat.[ix] Loewen, a Canadian
funeral home, has been granted standing by a NAFTA tribunal to sue the United States for requiring a bond
before the appeals process. Loewen was found guilty of illegal competitive tactics and was fined $100 million
compensation and $400 million punitive damages award in the Mississippi Supreme Court. Mississippi requires
that appellants post a bond (equal to 125% of the award) which would be due if the appeal fails. Loewen
settled the case for $175 million. Still dissatisfied with the outcome, in 1998 Loewen turned to the NAFTA
process for relief. Loewen is claiming that the actions of the awarding jury and the court have been
influenced by its status as a foreign company, and therefore are challenging the damages award. If Loewen is
successful, there will be broad implications for all U.S. courts. If the NAFTA tribunal protects Loewen by
declaring the Mississippi law invalid, then the impact of NAFTA will be that
investors will not be required to exhaust remedies before going to arbitration,
investors can go through the court system and then challenge it if not satisfied,
court decisions will not be given weight by the tribunal or considered in their deliberations,
no civil dispute with a foreign investor can be considered settled until a tribunal has also considered it.
If Loewen is successful, the U.S. court system could be circumvented entirely.
While this would not be a lenient interpretation, it illustrates the restrictions on
government action integral to the trade agreement. The way the NAFTA is
written the arbitration panels are under no requirement to give the court or
the state laws deference. A single foreign shareholder, without the consent of
the company or country of origin, could claim an investment loss and challenge
the legitimacy of the American court system. The courts would lose their ability
to interpret the law for foreign cases. There would be two standards for
disputes, one for foreigners set by NAFTA, and the traditional U.S. law for
domestic companies and investors.
The Structure of the Agreements Creates a Democratic Deficit
As outlined above, foreign investors have the right to participate in domestic
lawmaking, and if they are not satisfied with that process, can take their
complaints to an international arbitration tribunal that is not available to
similarly situated domestic investors. These arbitration hearings are not open
to the public, and though the U.S. federal government would be a participant
in any claim against a U.S. governmental entity, the proceedings remain behind
closed doors unless both parties agree to make a public disclosure.
The success of the U.S. system is based on the transparency of the process, and the ability of citizens to
participate in debates regarding laws, policies and actions. Public hearings are an opportunity for all
stakeholders to be heard, and ideally come to a balance of interests. The U.S. system is built on the notion of
checks and balances. If a lawmaking body exceeds its authority, the court or the executive can keep the
legislature in check. International trade agreements lack such checks and balances. These trade agreements
give foreign private investors the right to arbitration tribunals to second-guess the legislature and the courts.
International law may be used as proof that a U.S. law is too stringent. Neither U.S. citizens nor state and
local governments are allowed access to these tribunal proceedings.
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States
Loewen Group is a Canadian funeral home that was sued in Mississippi by a local business for unfair
competition. Loewen was found guilty of fraudulent business practices in their expansion effort. The jury
awarded $100 in compensatory damages, and an unprecedented award of $400 million in punitive
damages including emotional distress. Loewen chose to settle for $175 million rather than put up the
required bond for $625 million to appeal the decision. Then the Canadian company decided to take the
The strategic advisory
role of the corporate
interests may raise
concerns. "The
literature on regulation
… is almost universal in
its conclusion that it is
difficult, if not
impossible to prevent
the "capture" of
[regulatory] systems by
the interests they are
supposed to regulate."
Luberoff, 2000
case to a NAFTA tribunal. Loewen asserts that the bond for appeals is not reasonable and forced them to
settle and requests $725 million compensation. The law is of general application, not just for foreign
companies. If successful, Loewen will circumvent the U.S. court system. The facts of the case are not in
question, but the ability of the state of Mississippi to require a bond from domestic and foreign citizens
alike before the appeals process begins. This is a significant threat to the finality of the court system,
and could give foreign enterprises a way to avoid civil penalties for misconduct.
On a procedural level, domestic and foreign businesses have better access to
the negotiators because corporations fill the 30 industry-specific advisory
committees that have direct access to the President and the United States
Trade Representative (USTR). The public can submit written comments to the
Committee for the Participation of Civil Society, or to each negotiating group.
No committee is obligated to respond to citizen inquiries. State representatives
can try to influence Congress and the members of the committees, but are not
privy to the negotiations within the advisory committees. After the trade
agreements are passed, administrative staff often modify the text without
public input. Under GATS, ongoing administrative harmonization is required to
continue the process of liberalizing markets and removing trade barriers. As a
government action, however, foreign investors can demand to be notified of
these changes or seek damages later if profits are negatively impacted.
Enhanced Property Rights Conflict with Land Use Planning
Of all of the roles of local government, land use is the most specific to place.
Many localities post signs at the edge of town announcing that local zoning is in
place, and permits for building and businesses will be required. Zoning affects
a broad range of on site land uses and allowed impacts on neighboring lands
and waterways. The placement of businesses, residences, and the allowed uses of land are local decisions.
Environmental regulations and emissions standards can be set by state governments and sometimes regional
or local governments. The latitude to set restrictive land use regulations or environmental regulations to
protect human health might be challenged under NAFTA and later trade agreements.
Environmental Regulations
The use of zoning balances the benefits of being a citizen with the rights of a landowner to profit from the use
of the property. Commercial enterprises have always been heavily regulated and the courts consider it
foreseeable that the status quo will change. Therefore, domestic investors have no reasonable expectation
that profits from the property will be secured in perpetuity. Foreign investments may use a different standard
for deciding appropriate compensation for losses of market share or profits. Governments may have to pay
for environmentally based restrictions (air, water pollutant restrictions) if the regulations are strengthened
due to a change in circumstance and inadvertently limit the return on investment expected by the foreign
investor. The national government, as the party to the agreement, may be expected to satisfy that lost
expectation of profit.
Land Ownership
NAFTA investor rights would consider restrictions on foreign land ownership or leasing to be
discriminatory. Residency requirements for land ownership, use, or access to resources exist in some
form in Nebraska, Oklahoma, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Wisconsin, Arizona, Colorado, North Dakota,
Montana, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon, Nevada, Alaska, Hawaii, Georgia, California, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and Washington state.
Western Governor's Association
"[T]his broad
interpretation of the
[agreement] could
interfere with
customary and
legitimate zoning laws."
Judge Tysoe, British Columbia
Ownership or Access to Natural Resources
Lack of access to natural resources may be considered discrimination in violation of the national
treatment requirement. States that limit foreign access to minerals or water include Alaska, Montana,
Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, Idaho, and Oregon.
Western Governor's Association 1997
Government compensation for property loss or the act of expropriation or takings is not new. The concept of
takings in the domestic context awards compensation to citizens whose property is used or burdened for the
public good. In the US, only the loss of use of the property in its entirety gets compensation unless the
government physically occupies all or a portion of the land. (The citizen would be compensated only for the
occupied portion). The courts have long held that the diminution of the value of property is insufficient to be
considered a takings. The trade agreements suggest that partial takings may be granted to foreign investors.
This would mean that counties that wanted to place restrictions on land use that required setbacks, buffer
zones or denied dredge and fill permits might have to pay foreign investors for their compliance.
The Metalclad v. Mexico challenge illustrates this expanded definition of takings as well as the potential for
private investors to overrule public health and environmental concerns. Metalclad is a US company that
purchased land in Mexico with the intent of building a processing plant for toxic wastes. The Mexican regional
and federal governments approved the venture. The building commenced and was completed based on
representations of approval from the federal government. The local government never issued a building permit
and refused to on the basis on the environmental impact report. The local government would not allow the
plant to operate because it would have exacerbated the ground water pollution problem. In a desperate
attempt to stop the plant, the community zoned the site as a preserve.
Metalclad took the claim to a NAFTA tribunal and was awarded $16.8 million, (the cost of the building). The
tribunal also could have awarded the lost profits estimated in the business plan or loss of reputation. Judge
Tysoe, one of the judges who sat on the tribunal, voiced concern that this broad interpretation of the trade
agreement could interfere with customary and legitimate zoning laws.[x] The potential for environmental
damage or the health effects of ground water contamination were not considered to be critical to the
determination of the case. The impact on the investor was the main concern of the tribunal.
Note that the community would not allow the property to be used as a toxic
waste facility, but did not say that the property could not be used for other
purposes. A U.S. court would not award takings if there were still economic
uses of the property available. The ability to use the property is protected, but
not a particular use. Particular uses must be consistent with local zoning, and
broader public policies. The trade agreement does not incorporate any of these
criteria in the deliberations. If foreign investors receive similar awards against
the U.S., domestic investors may lobby for equal rights to partial takings in the
future. In fact, this has been proposed in Congress and defeated.
Compensation for partial takings would undermine the basis for land use law in
the U.S.
Economic Development Restricted
Local and state governments use many mechanisms to enhance economic development. Many of the most
successful programs include subsidies or preferences available only to resident businesses, or businesses that
meet a certain criteria for a disadvantaged class. NAFTA and the WTO specifically target subsidies that in any
way give preference to domestic business or discriminate against foreign investors.
Performance bonds, performance requirements, local input and labor requirements and local business
preferences are among the activities that may be interpreted as non-compliant with NAFTA and the WTO.
Programs that may be at risk include:[xi]
Community reinvestment acts
Living wage ordinances
Use of public pension funds for redevelopment
Purchasing criteria other than price and quality
Minority business support
Buy local or buy American policies
Recycled or local content preferences
These programs are common programs used by local governments to support local businesses or draw
investors to the community. The use of economic development to nurture local business is against the free
market principles that guide international trade agreements. The goal of the agreement is to encourage
foreign investment by leveling the playing field through harmonization or freezing regulation so that
investments are more predictable. State and local governments lose flexibility and predictability within that
process.
States use subsidies and tax breaks to encourage economic development, fund services for the poor, and
reward initiatives that fulfill public purposes. These practices may be considered illegitimate if the result gives
the government or domestic investors an edge over foreign investors. Any subsidies available to U.S.
companies must also be made available to foreign concerns. Tax breaks must be available equally and without
residency requirements.
Traditional Government Services May Be Challenged
As a provider of goods and services, governments receive special interest rates to save the public interest on
large capital projects. If a government activity is also provided by private industry, any subsidy or better
lending rates enjoyed by the government may be considered illegal subsidies that favor government providers
over foreign private enterprise. For example, United Parcel Service (UPS) is challenging Canada's right to use
their letter delivery routes to also deliver parcels. UPS claims that access to the Royal Post infrastructure is
unavailable to UPS, and therefore puts the Canadian Post at an unfair competitive advantage. Under the
NAFTA, any subsidies available to domestic market competitors must be available to foreign concerns as well.
Tax breaks must be available equally. UPS, therefore, is demanding either access to this infrastructure, which
would allow their packages to be carried by the Canadian letter carriers at no extra charge, or financial
compensation equal to that value. There is no reason that this challenge could not be posed to the United
States Postal Service if UPS is successful since the U.S. uses the same government-owned corporation
arrangement and delivers the same services. The challenger could be a Canadian investor in Federal Express,
or a sole proprietor with a license to deliver packages in Canada.
UPS v Canada
UPS is claiming substantively that this is a failure to provide national treatment (preferring Canadian
competitors to U.S. counterparts) and an abuse of government monopoly power. Procedurally, UPS is
bringing the challenge under Chapter 11 claiming a breach of a Chapter 15 requirement for Parties to
properly control their government monopolies. UPS contends that any breach of the other chapters in the
agreement are failures to comply with the minimum international standard of treatment required in
Chapter 11. If this argument is accepted, then every violation of any part of the treaty would open a
Party to a Chapter 11 dispute resolution. It is arguable that the dispute resolution section was intended
to prevent discrimination or nationalization of property and was not expected to include other articles of
the agreement.
Privatization Process Altered
Professor John Roberts defines the role of the state as an umpire between private interests, and an advocate
for the public problem of market failure (Appleton 1994 at 206). [xii] Privatization has the potential to offer
alternative provision of public goods and services. State and local governments fulfill this role when they
carefully construct contracts for private industry to provide goods and services traditionally provided by the
state (solid waste disposal, water distribution and treatment, etc.). However, the government has to play a
market-structuring role to promote competitive efficiency while serving broader public values in the public
service.[xiii]
In the NAFTA, GATS and FTAA regime, privatization is a matter of course, not a decision to be made by
individual localities or public utilities. The trade agreements, to varying degrees, liberalize markets to provide
goods and services that have been supplied by the government. Recall that governments provide public goods
in the first place because of market failures such as externalities and free riders. From the GATS each party
specifically lists the services that the government will open to private competition with public providers[2].
There is an exception for services that are provided by government agencies, but the caveat is that the
service must not be available in the marketplace. Thus, the existence of private hospitals, schools and water
treatment plants could open the door for private industry to compete with the government to provide these
services.
Government latitude in a number of areas may be significantly reduced under the agreements. According to
Barry Appleton, a Canadian plaintiff's attorney in NAFTA challenges, the trade agreement was drafted
specifically to restrain the traditional role of the state. Quality and access to public services may be
undermined if governmental control over the contracting process is weakened. Government subsidies
currently used to lower costs and expand citizen access may be claimed by foreign investors as compensation
for lost profit and market share due to the lower cost of government provision.
Costs May be Significant
There may be significant costs incurred by local and state governments in trying to satisfy these international
obligations. Many localities would have to enhance administrative and legal departments to gain the expertise
necessary to communicate the legislative agenda with potential investors in all participating countries.
It is unclear whether the localities and states that are challenged will be financially liable for the damages
awarded to investors. The known challenges against the United States at this time include claims for $1.8
billion. There may be other claims that have not been reported since, there is no obligation for either party of
the arbitration or the tribunal to make it public. (The Loewen claim was admitted only after a Freedom of
Information Act request). A group at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University undertook
a study to assess the potential financial liability posed by international trade agreements. They estimated the
liability at $32 billion in the first four years that all agreements are in effect. Over the following four years
the estimate climbs to $159 billion.[xiv] Legal fees, staff time, and lost productivity of government employees
who will respond to these cases are not included in the estimates.
A Balance Between Economic and Governance Goals
The focus of these agreements is on increased trade and economic growth. These goals are not balanced by
concerns with other public policies and governance goals. The historical legal framework of the U.S. may be
altered dramatically by the property rights expansion for foreign investors. For example, the Clean Water Act
relies on land use management techniques and zoning. The technology-forcing advances required by the
Clean Air Act were costs absorbed by the private industries benefiting from the production of wastes. Both of
these major federal initiatives rely on state and local cooperation and the takings law as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. Government regulatory approaches such as these could be stymied by expropriation awards
under the free trade agreement. Domestically, some litigators stress that rampant takings liability would
bankrupt many local governments or divert financial resources from critical public works.[xv]
Zoning that restricts
development in order to
protect drinking water
sources, wetlands, or steep
coastal areas from mudslides
may have to pay foreign
claims for partial takings if
the tribunals interpret the
actions as expropriations of
land investment profits.
There needs to be a balance between the free trade agenda and the
need for domestic governance. The restrictions and obligations of the
trade agreements are substantial and may impact significantly state and
local governments’ ability to protect their residents, resources, and
economic viability of local industry.
State and local governments are concerned that decision-making based
on local conditions might be severely restrained and burdened by
international interests entirely unfamiliar with the needs of the residents.
Reaction by State and Local Governments
Governments are trying to understand the best way to enjoy the
benefits from markets and free trade provided by the agreements while
retaining state and local governmental authority. The Western Governors Association (WGA), the National
Council of State Legislators (NCSL), and the National League of Cities (NLC) are a few entities that have
made public requests to the US negotiating body, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) for
clarification of or protection from the trade agreement obligations. These entities are not against free trade.
The National Conference of State Legislatures, for example, supports free trade, but recognizes that
reservations can be made to avoid unnecessary preemption and preserve traditional state authority.[xvi]
Similarly, the National Association of Counties (NACo) supports free trade, but not to the exclusion of
federalism. NACo supports accountability including federal identification and communication of all impacts
federal legislation may have on state and local operations.[xvii] Over a dozen counties and municipalities
have passed resolutions requesting protection from the agreements or declaring that they will not participate
in the agreement and do not consider themselves bound. Canadian public unions and some municipalities
have been very critical of the agreement and have requested major revisions or repeal. Some of these groups
have requested that the NAFTA not be used as a template for other agreements without revisions to Chapter
11.
Despite the public controversy over international trade and the clearly communicated concern expressed to
the USTR and members of Congress, the FTAA draft made public in 2000 contained a virtually verbatim
replica of Chapter 11. The ability of state and local governments to eliminate the burdens of the legislative
restrictions and the threat of Chapter 11 liabilities is hindered by the singular focus on the economic benefits
of the agreement. Giving up the state right to immunity provides the corresponding right for U.S. companies
to opt out of the court systems in other signatory countries. Allowing foreign input into our legislative process
opens the door for U.S. business interests to shape foreign laws on subjects that may constrain profits
abroad.
State and local governments could benefit from early participation in the negotiation process and by
educating both their constituencies and representatives in Congress. State and local representatives should
seek to understand the impacts of free trade on their constituents.
Will investor rights may be in conflict with community values?
Will takings legislation, if expanded, could make environmental and health regulations too expensive to
enforce?
Will subsidies and revenues be considered discriminatory?
State and local government representatives are the frontline of democracy and have an obligation to preserve
the democratic, federalist character of the U.S. government. Democracy requires participation, representation,
and debate. Federalism requires a clear delineation of powers shared between the state and federal
governments. International trade agreements blur these distinctions, and grant foreign investors rights,
participation, and representation superior to that of U.S. citizens.
[1] “Affecting investment” is a broad category that encompasses anything that could inadvertently change the property rights or
future expectations of the foreign investor including higher expenses of raw materials which might result in a loss of profit.
[2] GATS is a "bottom-up" approach that includes only what is listed. NAFTA and FTAA are “top-down” treaties, which means that
all services that are not specifically excluded are liberalized.
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Transfer of Development Rights Programs
Using the Market for Compensation and Preservation
Jason Hanly-Forde, George Homsy, Katherine Lieberknecht, Remington Stone
Local governments undertake transfer of development rights (TDR) programs to use the market to implement
and pay for development density and location decisions. TDR programs allow landowners to sever
development rights from properties in government-designated low-density areas, and sell them to purchasers
who want to increase the density of development in areas that local governments have selected as higher
density areas.
TDR programs appear to offer many advantages to local governments that want to control land use but also
compensate landowners for restrictions on the development potential of their properties. TDR programs can
be easier to implement than typical zoning programs; they make development more predictable and use the
market to compensate landowners for lost property value. TDR programs are also more permanent than
traditional zoning regulations.
Although TDR programs appears to be a potentially powerful land use tool, few communities have had
success in using these programs because of the associated challenges . TDR programs do not reduce the
need for zoning and can actually be more complex to administer. Communities may not support TDR
programs, and local governments may have to invest in community education programs to explain them to
the public. Lastly, although the permanency of TDR programs can be an advantage, it may also be a liability,
since a community's land use needs change over time.
Local governments that are interested in TDR programs should consider both how to create a strong market
for development rights in their communities and how TDR programs interact with the 'takings' issue. The final
part of this paper presents advice and information on both these topics and ends with an evaluation of TDR
programs as a governing tool.
What is the history of transfer of development rights programs?
What is a TDR program?
How does a TDR Program Work?
What are the advantages of TDR programs?
What are the challenges of TDR programs?
How can local governments build a market for a TDR program?
Should local governments worry about TDR and 'takings' law?
Is a TDR program a good governing tool?
Conclusions
Landownership was one of the first measures of citizenship in the United States. The passion to protect the
right of property owners to reap economic gain from their land still burns strongly today. Because of this,
local governments often encounter citizen resistance to land use controls that attempt to provide for a public
good. As a result, zoning can be very difficult to implement.
Search Cornell
Many planners tout transfer of development right (TDR) programs as a way to take the politics out of zoning.
With TDR programs, the market makes land use and density allocations and compensates property owners
whose development rights have been limited in order to preserve some societal good, such as open space,
farmland or historic preservation. It is a potentially powerful tool, but in its thirty year history, it seems to
have made little headway in communities across the country. This paper examines TDR programs, their
benefits and their costs and suggests why the adoption of this tool has been limited.
What is the history of transfer of development rights programs?
Zoning was the first widespread attempt to balance individual property rights against the good of society.
Early advocates also suggested that zoning would enhance property values (Karkainen, 1994).
In 1916, New York City enacted the nation's first comprehensive zoning ordinance after a spate of
skyscrapers blocked sunlight from neighboring properties. At the same time, warehouses and factories were
encroaching on fashionable retail areas of Fifth Avenue. The new zoning ordinance set both height and
setback requirements and separated incompatible uses, such as factories and residences (City of New York
Department of Planning, 2002).
From the beginning, critics complained about the unfairness of zoning since it benefits some landowners and
limits others. In 1926 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler
Realty that the legal system recognizes many kinds of unequal burdens (Karkainen, 1994). The Euclid case
required two hearings before the high court narrowly affirmed a community's ability to zone. (Callies, Freilich
and Roberts, 1999)
The idea of transferring development rights between properties was first introduced in New York City with the
passage of that first American zoning ordinance in 1916. It allowed landowners to sell their unused air rights
to adjacent lots, which could then exceed the new height and setback requirements. In 1968, the city
Planning Commission changed the rules to allow transfers between lots several blocks apart (Johnston and
Madison, 1997).
In the early 1980s, the command and control nature of many regulations came under fire as an inefficient.
Policy makers searched for ways to govern using the market (Henig, 1989-90). In 1986, Australia created a
system of tradable fishing permits to stabilize lobster populations. During the first half of the 1990s, a system
of tradable pollution credits in the U.S. cut emissions of sulfur dioxide (which causes acid rain) in half (Brown,
2001). With these successes, market advocates found the world moving in their direction-toward answering
all kinds of societal questions with economics. Land uses proved to be no exception.
What is a TDR program?
Most people have a very two dimensional view of their
property-just a piece of land on which to build a house
or commercial building. But the bundle of rights that
comes with a piece of property is much more complex.
Some physical rights, depicted in Figure 1, include the
rights to build, exploit natural resources, restrict access
and farm. Other legally enforceable rights include the
right to sell the land, subdivide it, rent it out or grant
easements across it.
TDR programs allow landowners to sever the building
(aka development) rights from a particular piece of
property and sell them. Purchasers are usually other
landowners who want to increase the density of their
developments. Local governments may also buy
development rights in order to control price, design
details or restrict growth.
TDR programs strive for two main goals. First, communities can use TDR programs to preserve open space,
agriculture, historic buildings or housing. And TDR programs make such preservation more equitable and
politically palatable by compensating landowners who lose the right to develop their property.
How does a TDR Program Work?
To demonstrate the operation of a TDR program, we have created a fictional farming community called Circle
County.
At first, Circle County is completely devoted to agriculture (Figure 2).
However, its farms face development pressure from a growing urban area
not depicted on the illustration.
At some point that pressure makes it
economically less likely the land would
remain in agriculture (Heikkila, 2000).
Indeed many  farmers call the option
to develop their land their "retirement
plan." When left to traditional zoning,
market pressure often causes low
density development, that is, suburban
sprawl (Figure 3).
 
 
 
However, Circle County government leaders decided to preserve  their rural
character. Under traditional zoning the only option would have been to tell
some farmers that they could not sell their land for development. Instead
the government instituted a TDR program. Farmers in the northern and
western parts of the county could sell their development rights to builders in
the southern and eastern areas designated for more density (Figure 4).
What are the advantages of TDR programs?
HOUSING IN SEATTLE
Seattle, Washington
created a TDR program
for affordable housing in
1985. The TDR program
has created or
preserved 559 units of
affordable housing. It
was recently
reconfigured to create
another 900 units.
(Walker, 2002)
"Zoning is just two
public hearings and one
vote away from
changing."
Jim Lively, Planner
Michigan Land Use Institute
TDR programs compensate property owners.
Local governments use TDR programs to
mitigate the economic impact of land use
regulations, specifically to compensate
landowners for perceived partial takings (Johnston and Madison, 1997). This
planning tool offers landowners a way to recapture some lost economic value
when a property is downzoned[1] from residential use to agricultural use for
preservation purposes.
TDR programs are an easier way to implement zoning.
TDR programs do not replace zoning, but make strong land use regulations
more politically feasible and easier to implement (Barrese, 1983). Local officials
feel less political pressure if landowners are compensated for their "lost" rights.
And a well-constructed TDR program reduces the demand for zoning variances,
since developers will use the market, not their connections to the local zoning
commission, to secure additional development rights.
TDR programs provide private funding for protection.
Finding public funds to protect open space and historic buildings is increasingly difficult as governments
carefully watch their bottom lines. One reason local governments created TDR programs was to leverage
market monies to achieve such goals. (Wolfram, 1981).
TDR programs make development more predictable.
Developers benefit from the clarity and consistency that TDR programs offer (Pruetz, 1997). Instead of
incurring the costs and risks of negotiating for variances, developers can exceed certain zoning regulations
simply by purchasing development rights from other property owners.
TDR programs are more permanent than zoning.
Since TDR uses deed restrictions or conservation easements to sever and
extinguish development rights, public values such as open space and historic
buildings are permanently protected. In contrast, zoning rules can change over
time and with new administrations.
What are the challenges of TDR programs?
TDR programs do not reduce the need for planning.
TDR programs only work in conjunction with strong zoning ordinances and good comprehensive planning.
However, building political consensus on zoning issues is always a challenge. As a result, successful TDR
programs require the commitment and political will of the community (Lane, 1997).
TDR programs can require increased administration.
"[The process of
creating] a valuable
receiving area involves
the kind of higher
density zoning that
many conservation-
minded suburbanites
want to prevent in the
first place."
(Haar and Kayden, 1989, p.
151)
A MODEL TDR PROGRAM:
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD
The Montgomery
County, Maryland is
touted as having one of
the most successful TDR
programs in the nation.
Since its inception in
1980, the county has
protected over 50,000
acres of farmland and
open space.
Montgomery County's
achievement is due in
large part to its success
In reality, TDR programs may be more complicated and expensive to implement than traditional zoning. Local
governments must oversee (or contract out oversight of) the market; track and defend deed restrictions; and
assist in proper preparation of easement documents. In many cases, the local government may regulate the
market through TDR banks[2] or other tools.
TDR programs require increased public education.
Citizens, real estate professionals, lawyers, assessors, and planners all need to be educated in the TDR
process. Since successful programs require community buy-in, local governments must market the program,
using mailings, public meetings, and advertisements. For example, efforts to institute a TDR plan in Santa Fe,
New Mexico started with an all-day workshop (Pruetz, 2002).
Communities may not support TDR programs.
Despite public education efforts, it may be difficult to find areas willing to
accept higher density development (receiving areas), since many people
perceive that high density development decreases property values and quality
of life.
TDR protects preservation values permanently.
Although some consider the permanence of a TDR transfer to be a benefit, it
also limits the future options of a community as societal values and community
characteristics shift.
How can local governments build a market for a TDR program?
Comprehensive land use and fiscal planning
Successful TDR programs start with strong comprehensive plans. Communities must encompass a enough
land to have sufficient sending and receiving areas. Otherwise some kind of regional government or inter-
municipal pact is needed to carry out the program and ensure the fair distribution of development and tax
revenues. The planning process must also accurately gauge the desires of the community for development
and preservation.
The supply side: sending areas
In the areas where land will be preserved, property owners must be motivated
to sell their development rights rather than fully develop the land themselves.
Commonly this is done by downzoning their land to a lesser density. Other
factors may constrain development, such as environmental regulations, site
problems or adequate public facility ordinances[3]. These factors can compel
property owners to sell their development rights. In addition, a favorable
transfer ratio from the sending area to the receiving may make the transfer
lucrative enough to entice sellers. For example, in Montgomery County five
times as many TDR credits  could be transferred out as could be used on site.
The demand side: receiving areas
Designating the receiving areas can be
the trickiest part of setting up a TDR
program (Canavan, 1990). A working
market requires that receiving areas face
a demand for denser development than
is currently allowed. For example, in
Montgomery County developers used TDR
in forming a market for
development rights.
(Montgomery County Planning
Board, 2002)
Grand Central Terminal,
New York City
Grand Central Terminal,
constructed in 1913, is one of
the city's architectural
masterpieces. In the late
1960s, the Penn Central
Transportation Company
wanted to construct a 53-
story 'addition' over the
protected landmark. The city
decided the tower would
destroy the character of the
Terminal, so they allowed
Penn Central to transfer the
development rights to
adjacent properties. (Figure
5)
credits to build, attractive transit-
oriented-neighborhoods around the
Bethesda and Silver Spring Metro transit
stations.
Requirements that development projects
use TDRs are an effective, if coercive, means of forming a market. And
if communities eliminate alternative ways of achieving higher densities,
such as variances, then the purchase of development rights becomes a
necessity. This can have mixed results. The variance process is often
viewed as flawed and tilted towards property interests. However, it can
be much more responsive to changing community needs than a TDR
program.
Other possible incentives for developers to buy building rights include
maximum density bonuses, exemptions from some development impact
fees, or even exemption from certain development standards like
setback, open space, and parking requirements. (Pruetz, 1997)
Community participation in the comprehensive planning processes is
particularly vital in receiving areas since many residents might believe
that high density development lowers property values and diminishes
quality of life.
Rights as currency
In communities with TDR
programs, the rights become the
currency of development. The
development value (not price) of a
TDR credit is set so that one
equals another. Credits can be
bought and sold at any time, not
just when a particular development
in the receiving site is pending.
Also, a TDR should be a general
investment available to anyone,
not just possible developers. Local citizens, land trusts and investors
may all have an interest in the market for other reasons aside from
development.
Sometimes a municipality may step in and act as a broker, buying TDR
credits for later sale. This idea of a TDR bank is increasingly popular.
Municipalities can act essentially as a federal reserve bank influencing the
price of the development rights. Some communities also put conditions
on the sale of rights from their bank in order to influence other aspects
of development, such as design details or affordable housing
TDR and Land Trusts
Since the land trust community has
experience in the facilitation and
administration of purchase of
development right programs, local
governments may want to explore
the possibility of partnerships with
private land trusts.
Local land trusts may be able to
assist with education of the
community, the marketing of the
program and the facilitation of the
conservation easements or deed
restrictions. Clear and
comprehensive contracts between
the local government and the land
trust are an essential element of any
partnership.
So far, private land trusts haven't
had much participation in local
government TDR programs (Land
Trust Alliance, 2002). One notable
exception is that many municipalities
donate the conservation easements
that extinguish transferred
development rights to a local land
trust.
requirements. Finally, if the government buys TDR credits without eventually transferring them to a
developer, the program can be a tool for restricting growth, similar to the more common 'purchase of
development rights' program.
Brokers often step in to facilitate transactions, charging a fee of six to seven percent of the total price just as
in regular real estate transactions. In some cases brokers may wind up advertising their TDR services,
possibly taking over the marketing function from the government (Pruetz, 1997).
Administration
Public education is essential so that everyone remembers the
program goals and learns the operation of the market. Mailings
to and public meetings for landowners in sending areas, potential
developers and  residents of receiving areas are an integral part
of the education effort. TDR program staff can also assist people
with the legal aspects of the program.
When deciding on the number of TDR credits to make available,
most literature recommends setting the ratio of sending credits to
potential receiving credits to at least 2:1. This leaves room for
receiving sites to be developed without fully using TDR credits to
increase density to the maximum allowable. Montgomery County
has used more than half of the sending TDRs but found that the
ratio is down to about 1:1. (Montgomery County Planning Board,
2002) As a result, the price of development rights has
dramatically decreased, so the county is in the process of looking
for more receiving sites.
Communities must monitor the progress of the program to
ensure that goals are met. If local governments do not have the
expertise or interest in administering a program, they can
consider hiring a local land trust or other service provider.
Should local governments worry about TDR and 'takings'
law?
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, in part, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." Traditionally, a taking was defined as a physical
seizure of property by the state.
However, in 1922 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
governmental interference in the form of excessive regulation may be so burdensome to a landowner as to
have the same effect as an actual physical invasion thus establishing the regulatory taking. (Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon). Land use zoning falls under this broad legally-murky category of regulatory takings.
To complicate matters, the High Court has ruled that a landowner must lose total use of the property before
the government pays compensation. A partial taking need not be compensated at all. Consequently, the state
has every incentive to have its actions deemed partial rather than full takings. Some municipalities view TDR
programs as a way to achieve this goal.
In Penn Central v. City of New York, the Supreme Court seemed to indicate that TDR credits have a value
that could prevent a total taking of property - and thus require compensation. However, in the more recent
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, this attitude seemed to change. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Scalia wrote that "TDRs. have nothing to do with the use . of the land to which they are attached. The right
to use and develop one's own land is quite distinct from the right to confer upon someone else an increased
power to use and develop his land." However, Scalia goes on to praise TDR programs as a  valuable land use
tool, but not as a way for the government to avoid a takings claim.  
It must be noted that the Suitum case concerned only the legal outer bounds of the issue - situations in
which parcels in a given sending area are stripped of all rights to build. So long as a bare minimum of
development is permitted on a particular set of landholdings, there may be no 'takings' issue. Montgomery
County cleverly kept within the bounds of this loophole because it rarely zones land as zero-growth. It
implemented a baseline minimum of one dwelling per 25 acres in its sending areas. (The result has been a
proliferation of overpriced rural 'estates', which may be less desirable than maintaining agricultural land, but
may be more attractive than the sprawling alternative.) (Pruetz, 1998)
Also, the Suitum case heard by the Supreme Court might have been deemed a 'just compensation' if Lake
Tahoe had some sort of TDR bank in place, whereby the owner could have quickly and easily sold TDRs at a
fair minimum price without having to enter the marketplace. A TDR bank ensures liquidity and bridges the
time gap between when an owner wishes to sell rights and when a developer needs to purchase them.
Is a TDR program a good governing tool?
Salamon (2002) cites five criteria on which we can judge the quality of a particular governing tool:
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, manageability and legitimacy. How do TDR programs measure up?
Effectiveness
Does the governing tool achieve its intended objectives? This is the most fundamental question that must be
asked. As previously mentioned, there are essentially two goals for TDR programs: preservation and
compensation. The most highly touted programs do well at preserving land and the preservation is, by and
large, permanent. However, even the model program in Montgomery County, Maryland has hit a few snags in
terms of compensation. Due to a lack of receiving area demand, farmers in the sending areas that still hold
development rights find them worth a lot less than when the program started.
Efficiency
Are the results achieved at a reasonable cost? Again there are two ways to examine the efficiency of TDR
programs. One is administrative costs. The other is the cost of preservation. Administrative costs can be
somewhat higher than under traditional zoning. Markets must be formed and monitored. TDR credits must be
created and administered. Also, there are no savings over traditional planning techniques since a
comprehensive plan and complete set of zoning rules must already be in place for TDR programs to work.
On the other hand, sometimes the only way to preserve land or historic places is by buying property or
development rights. That is impossible for many cash-strapped local governments to do with public funds.
TDR programs allow private money to be used to achieve those goals.
Equity
Are TDR programs basically fair and do they redistribute resources to people who need them? TDR programs
try to spread the wealth of development by allowing landowners, especially farmers who equate their ability
to develop their land with their retirement, to recoup their investment. To achieve this, the sending and
receiving areas must be built properly to make sure that TDRs remain valuable. Otherwise, landowners in
sending areas will find their TDR credits worthless and their land still unable to be developed.
However, creating value for landowners in the sending areas creates another equity problem for those in
receiving areas.  Residents of the receiving areas may not want the higher density development. This problem
is particularly severe when the receiving area is an already existing suburb.
Manageability
Creating TDR markets can be a complex task. Decisions must be made to set up sending and receiving
districts, underlying zoning, density planning and credit ratios. Some programs also require government-run
TDR banks. Every choice affects the demand for TDR credits, their price and the success of the program. As
the number of successful models increase, manageability should become easier, but it remains a complex
task.
Legitimacy and political feasibility
A TDR program, with its inherent goal of compensating landowners, is naturally more politically palatable than
typical command and control zoning regulations. However, any kind of land use restriction generates
controversy. Municipalities must build community support for the projects (Johnston and Madison, 1997).
Successful TDR programs cannot be created by the will of an agency. Political legitimacy must be built over
time.
For example, successful TDR programs typically have a pre-existing constituency built around the need for
land use controls. In Montgomery County Maryland, the Planning Commission had extensively studied
farmland economics. In Lake Tahoe, local residents faced an indisputable decline in water quality. In New
Jersey's Pinelands program, the TDR program was the latest effort in a longtime farmland protection program
(Johnston and Madison, 1997). Public education and buy-in are vital.
Conclusions
As policy makers continue to search for ways to use the market as a governing tool, local governments will
continue to consider transfer of development rights programs. TDR programs can be effective, equitable
governing tools that make zoning more politically feasible. These programs offer two key benefits to local
governments: they compensate landowners for lost property value due to zoning, and they use the market to
pay for the preservation of public goods.
However, these programs can be costly and difficult to administer compared to typical zoning. Local
governments must oversee (or contract out) regulation of the market, complex operation for such an unusual
good. Even with education and program marketing efforts, communities may not support TDR programs,
especially when they are on the receiving end of increased density. Lastly, TDR programs usually protect land
or buildings on a permanent basis. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage of this tool.
Communities should be aware that a TDR program is not a substitute for planning and zoning, rather TDR
programs require strong zoning. Therefore, they may not provide a sure-fire way to avoid friction over
property rights issues, although some innovative communities have designed their programs to lessen the
likelihood of takings conflicts.
TDR programs will be most effective in communities facing strong development pressure, where officials
believe it would be difficult to successfully implement traditional zoning restrictions to achieve preservation
goals or where financial resources are not available for municipalities to buy land or development rights on
their own. Montgomery County, MD offers the best example of how a community with these characteristics
has formed and implemented a successful TDR program.
Despite its potential as a land use tool, transfer of development rights programs have been slow to catch on
in communities. While there have been some visible successes, there have been many places where the
schemes fail for one reason or another. So while policy advocates push transfer of development rights
programs, it is likely that pragmatic local government officials are still reluctant to take the lead.
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[1] Downzoning: The practice of reducing the zoning of a property from a more to a less valuable use (e.g. from commercial to
residential or from residential to agricultural.)
[2] TDR bank: A market regulation tool in which governments directly purchase development rights from landowners at a set price
and then sell the development rights to developers in the future.
[3] Adequate Public Facilities Ordinances (APFO) require that sufficient infrastructure, such as water and sewer services, be in
place before any development construction can commence.
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Introduction to Prison Privatization
The movement towards the privatization of corrections in the United States is a result of the convergence of
two factors: the unprecedented growth of the US prison population since 1970 and the emergence out of the
Reagan era of a political environment favorable to free-market solutions. Since the first private prison facility
was opened in 1984, the industry has grown rapidly; gross revenues exceeded $1 billion in 1997. This paper
will examine the industry's growth in the US in recent decades, and its current scope. The evidence for and
against claims that private prisons can realize gains in efficiency will be weighed, and implications of
privatization for other public values including safety, justice, and legitimacy will be examined.
The Evolution and Scope of the Private Prison Industry
The birth of the contemporary American private prison industry may be traced to 1984, when the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service became the first federal agency to contract for private
correctional services, with the Corrections Corporation of America. This initial movement toward the federal
privatization of corrections was quickly followed by contracts for outsourcing developed by the US Marshals
Service and the US Bureau of Prisons in 1986. The first county-level private prison contact was signed in
Search Cornell
1984, between Hamilton County, Tennessee and the Corrections Corporation of America. Shortly thereafter, in
1985, the first state-level contract was signed, between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the United
States Corrections Corporation (NCPA 1995).
In 1987, approximately 3,122 inmates out of 3.5 million inmates were confined in private corrections facilities
in the United States. By 2001, the total United States inmate population had swelled to a staggering 6.5
million inmates—123,000 of whom were confined in private facilities. This 4,000% increase in the number of
prison beds in private hands was fed by the concomitant 90% growth in total inmate populations in the
United States as a whole. (BOJS, 2001). Currently, over 32 states and Puerto Rico have formed contacts with
corrections corporations. Figure 1, below, illustrates the inmate capacity of private prisons by state as of 1999
(Thomas, 2002).
Figure 1
As the above chart shows, per 1999 estimates, Texas, California and Oklahoma exhibit the largest inmate
populations incarcerated in private facilities, with populations of 30,000; 11,000; and 10,000 inmates,
respectively (Thomas 1999).
Although Texas holds the highest number of our nation’s private prison beds, the proportion of inmates in
private facilities to the total Texas inmate population is only 10.1 percent. New Mexico outsources the largest
proportion of its inmate population to private corporations (43.8 percent), followed by Alaska (31.7 percent),
Montana (32.7 percent), Wyoming (28.3 percent), Hawaii 22.9 percent), Wisconsin (16 percent), Mississippi
(16.9 percent), and Tennessee (15.5 percent) (Fig. 2-ok DOC, 2002).
Figure 2
The financing of private corrections facilities varies from state to state, and, concurrently, from facility to
facility. The per diem rate formed though a contract in Okalahoma, for example, may be substantially
different from that formed in Tennessee. In general, however, there are two broad methods of financing the
capital costs incurred through the construction of private corrections facilities – either the corporation
undertakes the construction of the private corrections facility without pubic assistance and rents its services
to a contracting jurisdiction, or the jurisdiction issues bonds to finance facility development. When bonding
occurs, the private corporation normally administers the prison for an established period of time, after which
control is diverted back to the contracting jurisdiction (Leonard, 1990: 71-76).
Operational costs of private corrections facilities vary depending upon both the type of facility and programs
offered to assist in incarceration or rehabilitation. A facility’s security classification has the greatest impact on
its operating cost. In Oklahoma, the average rate for a medium security facility is forty-eight dollars per
prisoner per day. This rate is subject to change with each subsequent contract negotiation. Indeed, in 2002
New Mexico was able to renegotiate the contracted per diem rate for one of its maximum security facilities
from ninety-three dollars to sixty-five dollars. Rates can also be adjusted upward; corrections companies
operating in Oklahoma have realized a forty cent ($0.40) increase in their per diem rates as a material
incentive for the provision of drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs (OK, DOC, 2002).
In 1999 there were 14 private prison corporations operating in the United States, with a total capacity of
122,871. The two largest, Corrections Corporation of America and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation,
operated 55.6% and 21.73% of the total market share, respectively. Table 1 (below) lists the largest private
prison firms operating in the United States, with their total capacity and market share, as of 1999 (Thomas,
Charles, 1999 Census).
Table 1: Firms Operating in the United States in 1999
Management Firm
Capacity of Facilities Under Contract in United
States
Market Share of United States
Contracts
Alternative Programs, Inc. 340 0.3%
Avalon Correctional Services, Inc. 350 0.3%
The Bobby Ross Group 464 0.4%
CiviGenics, Inc. 2,791 2.3%
Cornell Corrections, Inc. 7,138 5.8%
Correctional Services Corporation 6,517 5.3%
Correctional Systems, Inc. 272 0.2%
Corrections Corporation of
America
68,256 55.6%
The GRW Corporation 362 0.3%
Management & Training
Corporation
9,177 7.5%
Maranatha Production Company 500 0.4%
Wackenhut Corrections
Corporation
26,704 21.7%
Totals 122,871 100%
Private Prisons, the Efficiency and Quality Questions
Most arguments for the privatization of prisons revolve around one issue: efficiency. The purpose of
privatization of any government undertaking is to improve the quality of the service provided without
increasing the costs, or to decrease the costs without decreasing the quality of service. It is mainly on the
strength of claims to efficiency that prison privatization expands in scope.
Proponents believe that private prisons not only costs the taxpayer less, but also require the state-run
agencies to operate more efficiently themselves. When private companies are allowed to enter into the
market for prisons, they argue, state run facilities are forced to operate more efficiently or risk losing their
funding. Those who oppose prison privatization point to studies claiming that the superior efficiency of private
facilities has not been conclusively demonstrated (GAO, 1996). Few available studies account for both cost
and quality, making conclusive judgment about efficiency impossible. Insofar as savings are realized, they
argue, it is through making dangerous cuts in labor costs (Greene, 2001). Further, they say, studies
comparing costs have not thoroughly accounted for overhead costs and costs of negotiating contracts, thus
underestimating the cost of private facilities as compared to public ones.
Whenever a public service becomes privatized a question arises as to whether or not the service quality will
be affected, either positively or negatively. But within the realm of prisons though there is a dispute which
has arisen over what quality of service actually means. Some argue that the purpose of a correctional facility
is to rehabilitate the offender, so upon release s/he can reenter society and become a productive member.
Others believe that the purpose of prisons is to lock away those who commit crimes, so that they are not free
to commit additional crimes in society. In this view, prisons are meant to be a deterrent, to help persuade
people from committing the crimes. Generally speaking, there are three main types of issues when looking at
quality.
Security of the institution; number of escapes, number of deaths, etc
Rehabilitation efforts; Drug Rehabilitation, Education, etc.
Quality of life; medical treatment, food, recreational services, etc.
Privatization Proponents
A study of the quality of prisons in New Mexico showed that private facilities had a higher quality of service in
all but one category, “care”, as figure 3 (Montague, Erik; August 2001) below shows.
Figure 3
The study was based on a Bureau of Prisons survey and included both prisoners and correctional staff in the
respondents. When comparing federal, state and private facilities within New Mexico, the private prisons were
more highly rated by respondents in almost every category. Doubts regarding the quality of the facilities are
not supported by this analysis.
Proponents of privatization argue that private prisons, through innovative design and management, and by
realizing economies of scale, can lower the overall costs of incarceration:
Studies in both 1997 and 2000 by the State of Arizona of costs associated with both public and private
prisons found evidence of cost savings:
The 1997 Study found average costs per inmate per day in government prison was $43.08, as compared
to $35.90 in the private prison, estimated savings of 17% (Thomas, 1997)
The 2000 Study found average costs per inmate per day in government prisons was $46.72 in 1998 and
$45.85 in 1999, as compared with the average costs of $40.36 in 1998 and $40.88 in private facilities,
estimated savings, of 13.6% in 1998, and over 10% in 1999. ( Dept. of Corrections, Arizona, October
2000)
Corrections Corporation of America claims that between 1994 and 1998, the states that contracted with
them for prison facilities saved a total of $248 Million in costs. (www.correctionscorp.com)
1996, Louisiana conducted a survey of the costs of three identically built prisons, one run by the state
and the other two by private corporations. The study found that the average per diem rate of the state
facility was $26.76 while the average cost for the private facilities were $22.96 and $23.51, savings of
14 to 16 percent. (Reason Policy Institute, Pg. 4)
Opponents of Privatization
Critics of privatization claim that there are no true efficiency gains from privatization, arguing that
comparative studies of efficiency often ignore a number of key factors, by looking only at the operational
costs (per diem rates). In 1996 the US General Accounting Office brought into question a number of the key
assumptions that the proponents of privatization claim. Ultimately, the GAO found that there was no evidence
conclusively demonstrating efficiency gains from privatization (GAO Reports, GAO/GGD-96-158). The GAO
pointed out flaws in many of the studies touting efficiency gains from prison privatization. They found
virtually no reliable multi-year studies. Those that they did find suffered from flaws including: failinure to
compare similar institutions, failure to account for both cost and quality, or lack of a nuanced account of
hidden costs.
The cost of contract negotiation is an example of a cost that is often overlooked. The process of gathering
proposals from corporations, analyzing them, and determining who is awarded the contract is an expense that
is usually ignored. This is an additional cost that the state must endure in determining whether or not to
contract out the service. Another cost that can raise the operation costs of any given contract is excessive
health care costs. When a contract is negotiated between a state and a private corporation for the costs of a
correctional facility, generally a negotiated health care rate is established, and anything above this amount
must be covered by the state. While the rates negotiated will cover a majority of the health care needs of an
inmate, in cases of severe disease this is not usually the case, and the additional costs must be borne by the
state, which is ultimately responsible for the health of the prison population.
Another possible explanation for the appearance of efficiency gains is the shift in tax burden to local
municipalities. In years past, the mentality of “Not In My Back Yard” (NIMBY) arose whenever a new prison
facility was to be built. Then, as areas began to see that there were possible economic gains by the
placement of a prison near an economically impoverished town, the mentality began to change. Rural towns
began to see prisons as a stable economic source for the area, and municipalities began to offer economic
development funds to private prison corporations for the construction of new facilities within their jurisdiction.
Table 2: Subsidies Given to Corporations (Jail Breaks, 2002)
Operating Company
# of Facilities
in Study
% Of Facilities with
Subsidies
Total Value of Construction
Bonds (in millions)
Total # of
Subsidies Found
Corrections Corporation
of America
37 78% $406.4 41
Wackenhut Corrections 16 69% $165.5 21
Cornell Companies 2 50% $0.0 1
Five Others 5 60% $56.6 4
Total 60 73% $628.6 67
What is often overlooked is that there is no clear evidence of prisons being a strong source of economic
growth. As in the case of military bases, while the creation of a new prison, or the loss of a former older
facility may make people believe that excess economic growth will occur, there is little evidence supporting
these statements. (Hooks, Gregory; 2002).
Public Values
Efficiency aside, prison privatization presents some serious dilemmas regarding public values such as safety,
justice, rehabilitation, and legitimacy.
Safety: Do private prisons pose a threat to the safety of prisoners, prison workers, or the general public?
Justice: Are the mechanisms of private prisons liable to distort sentencing?
Rehabilitation: Can the profit motive be reconciled with the need to prepare inmates for productive lives
after prison?
Legitimacy: Is incarceration an inherently governmental function? Is it right that profits be reaped from
human imprisonment?
Safety
Opponents of private prisons argue that their incentive to cut costs to maximize profits presents a threat to
the safety of prisoners, prison staff, and the public at large. They argue that private prisons tend to have
fewer guards with less experience, which results in an increased rate of violent incidents behind bars. One
study found violent incidents to be as much as 50% more frequent in private prisons (Greene, 2001). Also,
private prisons may pose an increased risk of prisoner escape; a study cited by the Reason Public Policy
Institute, no foe of privatization, found that government-run prisons have fewer escapes, less substance
abuse and greater recreational and rehabilitation measures in place (Moore, Adrian 1998).
Further, some critics of privatization claim that the relative ease with which private industry can construct
new prison cells leads to an over-reliance by government on incarceration at the expense of preventive social
programs-- programs which, they argue, are more effective in preventing violence (Logan, 2002, Currie
1998). A study by Grassroots Leadership found that discretionary funds in the state of Mississippi were being
routed from education to private prisons (www.grassrootsleadership.org).
Industry supporters, on the other hand, argue that through innovation in prison design and operation, private
prisons are made safer than public facilities. Proponents argue that the profit motive creates incentives for
safety, as violent disturbances in facilities leads to greater costs in the long run (Lissner et al, 1998) . A safe
prison, they argue, is a profitable prison.
Justice
Those who oppose prison privatization make the case that the industry has the incentive and the wherewithal
to extend the amount of time convicts will remain in prison, and that this presents a threat to justice. The
industry, they say, can extend sentences in two ways. First, it has thrown its influence, through lobbying and
campaign contributions, behind “tougher” laws such as "three strikes", mandatory minimum sentencing, and
"truth in sentencing" that increase the duration of sentences. The conservative American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC) has been extremely active in advocating truth-in-sentencing and three strikes policies
throughout the United States. This organization is heavily funded by the corrections industry, and indeed
ALEC's Criminal Justice Task Force is co-chaired by Brad Wiggins, a former director of business development
for the Corrections Corporation of America (Bender, 2000). The strength of these kinds of political influence,
opponents fear, will only increase as the industry grows. As one observer notes, corrections corporations have
"paid handsomely to play the public policy game, and will likely do so again"(O'Connell, 2002).
The second way opponents of privatization worry that private firms will distort the administration of justice is
by exerting undue influence on parole hearings. Opponents argue that since prison firms are generally paid
per prisoner per day, they have an incentive to extend inmate stays as long as possible, and so are liable to
reduce prisoner’s chances for parole or good time off by exaggerating or fabricating disciplinary infractions
(DiIulio, 1990).
Industry supporters point out in response to these concerns that industry campaign contributions are smaller
than those made by public sector unions ( Moore, 1998). There is no evidence, they say, of private prison
officials manipulating parole decisions.
Rehabilitation
The profit motive, opponents of privatization say, distorts the function of prisons towards incapacitation and
away from the provision of rehabilitative services that would help prisoners rejoin society productively, and
curb recidivism. Corrections firms have no incentive, they say, to provide costly rehabilitative treatment and
services. Industry analysts respond that it all depends on the contract. There is much potential for contracts
to be structured in ways that provide incentives to firms to provide services such as drug treatment (Lissner,
et al, 1998.). Indeed, in Puerto Rico and Australia, pilot programs are being conducted with so called
"outcome-based contracting", wherein fees are tied to the impact and measured outcomes of incarceration
(Cornell et al, 1998).
Legitimacy
Opponents of privatization argue that it is an illegitimate delegation of government authority to allow private
companies to take control of an integral part of the justice system. Proponents of privatization disagree. They
make a distinction between the function of the courts and that of the prisons. It is the proper duty of the
public sector, they allow, to determine just sentences for violations of the law. But the duty of the prisons,
they argue, is merely to carry out the sentence of the courts, and they see no reason why this task ought
not be delegated to a private entity. Opponents of privatization claim to the contrary that it is difficult or
impossible to distinguish these two functions, given the level of control that prison officials have over the
nature (and, potentially, the duration) of an inmate's stay. Prison officials have the prerogative to impose
disciplinary measures ranging from revocation of yard privileges to the imposition of solitary confinement, and
so have a great deal of control over just how punitive an experience each sentence truly is (DiIulio, 1990).
Shifting Public Values
Champions of the private prison industry justify its continued expansion by pointing to the public will for
increased incarceration. Voters have consistently been supportive of harsher sentencing measures that create
a demand for more prison beds. And yet there is a growing movement that has come to see increased
incarceration in general, and growth of the private prison industry in particular, as a threat to public values.
For example, the mission statement of the Grassroots Leadership organization's "Public Safety and Justice
Campaign" reads:
For-profit private prisons, jails or detention centers have no place in a democratic society. Profiteering from
the incarceration of human beings compromises public safety and corrupts justice. In the spirit of democracy
and accountability, we call for an end to all for-profit incarceration(www.stopprivateprisons.org).
Grassroots Leadership has organized religious, labor, student, and community groups to fight private prisons
through media advocacy, education, lobbying of government officials at all levels, and pressuring corporations
involved in the private prison industry. For example, Sodexho Marriott, the largest single investor in CCA,
divested its holdings in the prison firm in response to pressure on college campuses to cancel food service
contracts. (www.grassrootsleadership.org)
Many states, such as Louisiana and New York, in response to pressure from labor unions and other groups,
have enacted moratoriums on or banned private corrections facilities, while other states, such as Wisconsin,
have enacted statutes that prohibit the construction of private prisons on speculation-- that is, without prior
contract (AFSCME, 2002). While the growth of this billion dollar industry seems to have slowed at the level of
the state prison, the federal government now seems to be contracting for many of its facilities with private
firms (www.grassrootsleadership.org). It remains to be seem whether the efficiency gains promised will be
realized, and whether the government can, through innovative contracting, reconcile the dilemmas that prison
privatization poses with respect to public values.
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Executive Summary:
Corruption has been identified as a major barrier to economic and social development in developing countries,
and considerable research as been done into the causes of and the solutions to corruption in these countries.
Several factors that lead to or mitigate corruption in developing countries have been clearly identified:
Revenue Proximity, Accountability, Information Transparency, Participation, Equality of Power/Wealth and
Culture. In contrast, virtually no research as been directed at corruption in the context of the trends toward
what is known as the New Public Management, or NPM. NPM is a new pattern of governance associated with
the use of a wide range of different “tools” and with a reliance on third parties to manage and deliver
government services. However, the factors of corruption identified by international research can be used to
provide an environmental design framework to advise planners and public officials about the potential for
corruption and how it can be mitigated with the NPM.
The Emergence of New Public Management
New Public Management (NPM) is a public management trend that is gaining popularity throughout the United
States. The NPM style of government involves using a wide range of “tools” like grants, loans, contracts,
vouchers, and other alternatives to direct government provision. Many of these rely on third party actors to
play an active role is delivering government services or to act in the public good. These actors form shifting
networks of third parties that work with each other and with government agencies.
New Public Management is perhaps most distinguished by its use of internal competition to accomplish its
ends but is multi-faceted. Rhodes (1996) notes that NPM refers to two concepts. The most relevant to this
paper is the new institutional economics. "The new institutional economics refers to introducing incentive
structures (such as market competition) into public service provision. It stresses aggregating bureaucracies;
greater competition through contracting-out and quasi-markets; and consumer choice." (Rhodes, 1996.)
The NPM style of government involves distinguishing between policy decisions and service delivery. Service
delivery, proponents of NPM argue, is best left to "entrepreneurial" governments based on principles like
Search Cornell
competition between service providers, outcome based performance standards, decentralized authority,
market mechanisms and other qualities not traditionally found in government bureaucracy. Rhodes notes that
"NPM and entrepreneurial government share a concern with competition, markets, customers and outcomes."
(1996)
How does corruption relate to New Public Management?
As Salamon notes, “What is distinctive about many of the newer tools of public actions is that they involve
the sharing with third-party actors of a far more basic governmental function: the exercise of discretion over
the use of public authority and the spending of public funds.” (Salamon, 2002) As such, New Public
Management has two major implications for corruption. First, NPM creates the potential for corruption in a
wide range of actors and that the flexibility of these networks makes it more difficult to maintain
accountability and oversight. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the line between the government and
private actors becomes increasingly blurred in NPM.
Unfortunately, there is very little empirical research into the relationship between corruption and NPM. Most of
current research focuses on developing counties where development agencies like the World Bank focus most
of their attention. There is also a substantial amount of cross-national studies that compare the level of
perceived corruption across many counties. Neither of these sources looks at corruption at the sub-national
level in developed counties, and this is where NPM strategies are most common.
This paper attempts to move past the lack of empirical research specifically aimed at corruption in NPM
environments by using common themes, lessons and issues taken from the international corruption research.
Hopefully, these factors will help policy makers mitigate corruption in NPM environments by providing an
environmental design framework that reduce the potential for corruption.
What is corruption and why is it bad?
The literature review produced several definitions of corruption. Harrison & Huntington define it as “…efforts to
secure wealth or power through illegal means – private gain at public expense” (Harrison & Huntington, 2001)
However, this defines corruption in terms of legality, which makes it difficult to talk about corruption across
different legal systems. A better definition is “the misuse of public power for private profit.” (Joseph Senturia,
as quoted by Smelser, 1971) This definition encompasses a wider range of activities, but there was concern
that it did not require intentional misuse (as opposed to accidental or unknowing uses of public power that
benefit individuals at the expense of the public). This paper ultimately took these definitions and defined
corruption as the intentional abuse of public power for private gain. This includes all cases where an
organization or individual abuses government authority, influence or funds for private benefit or the benefit of
another private actor.
Empirical research into the effects of corruption shows that it is not simply a moral concern or a matter of
principal. Rather, corruption has a very negative effect on government performance and on the well being of
individuals without money or power. International research has shown that a .78% increase in the rate of
corruption leads to a decline of the income growth among the poor of 7.8% (Lipset and Lenz in Harrison and
Huntington, 2001). It is no surprise, then, that the World Bank called corruption the “single greatest obstacle
to economic and social development.” The perception of corruption also has negative consequences as citizens
are likely to grow cynical of government when they feel the government does not work on their behalf.
Why does corruption occur?
The temptation to abuse public power for private gain is a natural result of peoples’ self-interest. This
temptation can be reduced by creating an environment where corruption is difficult and does not pay.
Planners and policy makers can create such an environment by understanding the environmental factors that
influence corruption.
Environmental Factors of Corruption
As mentioned earlier there is very little research
focusing specifically on corruption within New
Public Management. There is, however, a fair
amount of international research that has been
done on corruption in general and by studying this
we hope to identify environmental factors of
corruption that can be used in any municipal
context. Examining case studies and other
research, primarily done by the World Bank, this
report identifies six environmental factors that
have an impact on corruption in international
contexts. They are: Revenue Proximity,
Accountability, Information Transparency,
Participation, Inequality of Power/Wealth and Culture.
Although each has its own drivers, these factors are closely related to each other and tend to reinforce one
another. Focusing on any one factor at the expense of the others will not effectively curb corruption. Each
factor has to be dealt with individually and as a set.
Proximity of Revenue
Proximity of revenue is how close tax revenues
are to their respective expenditures. The
further removed the source of funds is from
those who decide how the money will be
allocated, the greater the potential for
corruption. ( Fisman & Gatti, 1999.) Take two
different situations: In the first, the Federal
government allocates a portion of its total tax
revenues to a certain state with the
understanding that the state will then allocate
this money appropriately. In the second, the
state taxes its own citizens and then returns
that money to those same citizens in the form
of services, etc. In the second example, the
citizens receiving the services will hold the
provider more accountable as they seek to
“get what they pay for.” Whereas in the first example the state intermediary could opt not to forward federal
money at all or could redirect monies from the intended allocation without the citizens missing the intended
services .
Accountability
Accountability is similar to proximity of revenue but
instead of dealing with money it concerns power. The idea
here is that the closer a decision maker is to the
electorate the less potential for corruption . If the
electorate does not approve of the actions of an elected
official they can vote him/her out of office. If the
electorate does not approve of the actions of an appointed
official or third-party agent, they have much less recourse.
This dynamic is especially
important given the trend in
the United States toward
NPM. Under NPM there is an
increasing reliance upon third-party providers which are even further removed
from the electorate than civil servants and as a result are even more susceptible
to corruption. Long-term contracts that lock in third parties for extended periods
of time may further increase the potential for corruption.
Information Transparency
Informational transparency is the third environmental factor. It contributes to the
reduction of corruption in two ways. The first is that it helps identify those who
are currently engaging in corrupt activities. This could be through audits, open
budgeting processes or contracting and bidding that is open to the public and
the media. The second is that informational transparency creates environments
which are unappealing to those tempted by corruption. Nobody wants to get
caught and so creating environments where the “lights are always on” makes
those who might be tempted by corruption to think twice.
The preponderance of third parties – particularly in the private sector – with the
movement toward NPM has important implications with regard to information transparency. For profit
concerns often view certain types of information as proprietary. This means that they deem this information
necessary for them to maintain a competitive advantage in their respective markets. There may be times
when a public entity may need access to this proprietary information in order to make effective decisions
about the continuation of contracts. In situations like these, information transparency may conflict with the
private proprietary information of the third party. Sacrificing transparency for the sake of relationships with
third parties will increase the potential for corruption.
Participation
Closely linked with information transparency is participation. All the information in the world is useless unless
citizens engage and act upon that information. The opposite is true as well. Participation, regardless of how
well intended, is blind without transparency. To truly mitigate corruption, municipalities need informed
participation and this comes from transparency. In addition to intuitively making sense, research has shown
that democracy (participation) is positively correlated with reducing corruption internationally. (Lipset and
Lenz in Harrison and Huntington, 2001)
Inequalities of Power and Wealth
The fifth environmental factor which contributes to corruption is
inequalities of power and wealth. As the difference between the
“haves” and “have-nots” within a municipality increases there is a
tendency for those with money and power to not only hoard and
increase their shares, but also to strengthen their positions. This
makes it more difficult for those without money or power to engage
in the civic process and have a voice. This is an especially dangerous
factor because it can become self-perpetuating as those in power
institute structural changes to discourage real transparency,
participation and accountability. The result can be a viscous circle
leading to even greater discrepancies in power and a greater
potential for corruption because corruption tends to slow economic
growth in the lower strata.
Inequality also increases the opportunities for what Smelser (1971) calls “crossing-over.” This occurs when
those with wealth or political power, but not both, use one to gain the other. Typical examples include a
police officer using his political power to receive bribes or a business man using bribes to influence
government policy.
Cultural Norms
Robert Merton, in his book Social Theory and Social Structures (1968) details the final environmental factor –
cultural norms. Merton puts forward what is called a “means-ends” schema that suggests corruption is more
prevalent in those cultures that place a high premium on financial achievement or success but which lack the
means to attain these goals. Empirical data bears out this hypothesis in countries such as Russia, South Korea
and Turkey which are relatively low in terms of affluence but which have relatively high cultural norms of
achievement. (Lipset & Lenz. 1998.)
But how are cultural norms and their impact on corruption relevant to NPM? Although there is no data to
support this, there is a striking similarity between the rise of NPM in the United States and the means-ends
schema. As the Federal government continues to pass responsibility for the provision of public goods and
services to the state and local levels there is an increasing expectation of success placed on local
governments to solve problems and provide a growing array of services. However, local governments have
limited powers to raise revenue. They are entirely dependent upon the monies they receive from the state
and federal governments, property taxes, user fees, and other sources of revenue . This is, in effect, creating
the same disequilibrium between expectations for success and the means to achieve them in local
governments in the United States as Merton observed in individuals in other countries. The result will, in all
likelihood, be an increased potential for corruption within local governments as they try to “do more with
less.”
How can corruption be mitigated at the local level?
Mitigating corruption at the local level revolves around taking a proactive
approach to designing the decentralized networks that make up the
backbone of new public management. These networks consist of three key
components: tools, players and rules. Municipalities can best address the
environmental factors of corruption by designing the right balance of these
key components. Like the factors of corruption each has its own primary
elements but they all work together to influence and reinforce each other.
Designing an effective system requires equally diligent attention to all three.
Tools
While tools are often determined by a higher level of government in the
process of policy development, a deep understanding of the tool is critical at
the local level. Tools are the heart of any decentralized system. Tools determine the type of
intergovernmental transfer, the vehicle of that transfer and the delivery system or agency responsible. While
tools can be classified in many ways, it is important to understand that tools have different degrees of
directness and automaticity. These characteristics often determine how and what types of corruption a system
is susceptible to.
Direct tools can be less corrupt because they shorten the distance
between policy and public administration and make it easier to define
the agency accountable for administration. However, as local officials
know, indirect tools such as grants, loan guarantees and vouchers have
become increasingly common. As third-parties gain greater control over
the spending of public monies and the operation of public funds, local
officials must be keen to potential principal agent problems and
emphasize relationships between organizations. (Salamon, 2002.)
Tools with a high degree of automaticity are often popular with local
governments decentralizing the provision of public services. By utilizing
preexisting administrative structures these tools often invite agents with
little or no experience providing public goods to the table (Salamon).
Tools that are highly visible are less prone to corruption. By definition,
such tools allow for transparency and easy access to information by
outside monitors.
Players
Players involve everyone from municipal employees, to elected and appointed officials, to third party
contractors or agents. In NPM we see an increasing number of third party agents. These third-party agents
often vary between localities and differ in their capacity to deliver public goods. A principal agent problem
often exists between local government and its agents. The principal-agent problem refers to the difficulty
employers (the principal) have ensuring that employees (agents) to act in the best interest of the employers.
Depending on the number of third-party agents involved in the network and the level of cooperation required
among agents, principal agent problems can also arise between agents themselves. Third-party agents may
not be accustomed to working with one another and may operate in very different ways. This can make
managing the relationships between agents difficult and may open many opportunities for corruption.
Rules
The rules that govern decentralized networks can not be neglected. Rules can establish working relationships
between agents, improve transparency of information and establish accountability throughout the provision of
public services. Network rules can come from contracts between third parties and municipalities, or they can
come from legislatures in the form of laws. When specified in contracts, the contractual relationship should be
open to amendment by both principals and agents. Ideally, the relationships between agents can be worked
out over time as agencies become familiar with each other’s roles. Network rules need to be sensitive to each
agency’s culture and modus operandi as well as with the intent of limiting the opportunities for corruption.
An example of a very effective rule toward mitigating corruption passed in the Massachusetts legislature is
the Pacheco-Manard Act. This act was passed in response to the ineffectual Weld priviatization efforts in the
early 1990s. It states simply that all contracts must undergo a uniform cost analysis. (Sclar, 2000). Although
a seemingly simply law, it has far reaching impact on both accountability and transparency in contracting and
as a result also serves to mitigate corruption in the Massachusetts contracting process. Before the existence
of this rule, decisions with regard to awarding contracts could be justified in any number of ways. There was
no set accounting standard. With the presence of the Act, however, all parties are measured equally and
contracts are a step closer to being awarded to those best able to provide the services truly needed by the
municipality rather than those best able to game the system or have influential contacts.
Similar to thinking about the changing roles of the players in new public management, the increase in third
party relationships in NPM means that an increasing number of rules that govern an area’s ability to govern
itself will come from contracts. For this reason a special focus needs to be placed on the short-term and long-
term effects contract terms as well as the enforceability of these terms. Much of this will revolve around the
ability to effectively monitor and change contractual relationships. Another way to look at protecting against
corruption in the contracting process is by analyzing whether or not it makes sense to contract out services at
all.
In the case of New Public Management this is a decision that will need to be made continually. This decision
becomes a de facto rules question. Do we stick with the current system (whatever that may be) and its rules
or do we negotiate a new system through a contract (a new set of rules). In his assessment of this process
Sclar offers some important advice on those four things that one should think about continually when making
these types of decisions. (Sclar, 2000.)
1. The first is to utilize good accounting practices regardless of whether you are providing services in house
or contracting out. This includes understanding the true cost of the services in question through the use
of activity-based cost accounting. The other important element here is to always fully account for
transaction cost when contemplating a change in service provision.
2. The second rule is to always compare “three” alternatives. Whereas most people think in terms of should
I contract a service out or not planners should entertain a third option. Namely, should I continue to
provide services in house the way we are now? Should I contract the services out? Or should I
restructure internally and continue to provide services in-house. This third alternative tends to yield the
best results while at the same time being considered the least.
3. The third bit of advice is to make meaningful participation possible. This important bit simply implies that
systems are comprised of people and any rules that are made concerning the development of new rules
for the system should include the various people who will be effected by the rules. This may be unions,
contractors, constituents or others. Both from an intelligence gathering perspective as well as a buy-in
perspective this is crucial to arriving at sustainable solutions.
4. And fourthly, politics needs to be removed from contracting if at all costs. Ideally this would be
accomplished by passing a law banning campaign contributions from contractors but in the absence of
this strict enforcement of accountability and transparency rules will have to suffice.
Tying it all together – Leadership in New Public Management
Thinking about the components involved in the decentralized networks of new public management in terms of
tools, players and rules can be helpful in keeping track of the various forces that may lead to corruption. But
simply keeping track of these forces is not enough. To truly mitigate corruption requires a constant
attentiveness to the interplay of the myriad forces that manifest themselves in the forms of tools, players
and rules and the ability to react accordingly. This is leadership. For, although one can design systems that
help mitigate corruption the new public management, by its very nature of involving so many different
parties, will be constantly changing. As a result, the systems will need to constantly change as well.
Leaders in new public management will need to be fluent in their use and understanding of the various tools,
players and rules available to them. They are the glue that will enable the systems to work. And they are
also the individuals that will need to recognize when the current system is no longer appropriate and needs
to be changed – whether this means contracting out a service, changing contractors or making the decision
not to contract at all. The ability to both interpret and act on situations these situations takes training and
this training takes money. And where does the money come from? It needs to come from the very
municipalities that are trying to save funds by contracting out services. The irony here is that in order to
make the new public management system of government work -- a system that has gained popular appeal by
its purported ability to cut costs through the use of competition -- additional investment in government
workers are needed so as to avoid the expensive threat of corruption.
Irony aside, the important thing to keep in mind here is that in order for corruption to be effectively
mitigated under new public management it will require a new approach to leadership in the public sector. In
order for this to happen effectively norms among the public that have until now not endorsed the types of
leadership training that are more commonplace in the private sector will have to change. So, although new
public management does create the increased possibility of corruption it can be controlled. But this will
require not only a new model of leadership for the public sector but also a new willingness on behalf of
constituents to fund these new models in hopes that in the long run the quality of the services they receive
are commensurate with the money being spent.
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As local governments nationwide struggle with demands for quality service delivery and fiscal constraints,
they are employing a number of strategies. While these include privatization and intermunicipal
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Local Government Restructuring in New York State:
Summary of Survey Results
Mildred Warner1 and Robert Hebdon2
Surveys on restructuring of service delivery were distributed to the chief elected officials in all town (932) and
upstate county (57) governments in New York State from November 1996 to March 1997. A total of 26
counties and 196 towns responded for an overall response rate of 22%. This research, undertaken in
collaboration with the County Legislators and Supervisors Association (now the New York State Association of
Counties) in 1996 and 1997, found that half of responding governments had implemented some form of
restructuring since 1990.
Restructuring in New York State primarily involves public sector innovation rather than privatization.
Intermunicipal cooperation was the predominant form of restructuring, while privatization was the second
most common form of restructuring. Significant levels of reverse privatization and governmental
entrepreneurship were also found. Incidence of restructuring was highest among counties, and in the
following service areas: public works, public safety, and general governmental support functions.
Impact on local budget and economic efficiency were the most important factors in the decision to restructure
services. Concerns with service quality and community values were also important. Labor and management
concerns were also significant but unionization was not considered a major factor. Legal and political
concerns, availability of information and experience with past restructuring were also important. Local
governments in New York State critically assess their restructuring options to enhance efficiency while
maintaining service quality and reflecting community values. Economies of scale and competition are keys to
efficiency, not privatization per se. Thus, local governments employ a variety of restructuring options. They
achieve economies of scale by cooperating with other governments, and they promote competition by
encouraging public sector units to compete with private sector providers. The charts and text below
summarize some of the key findings of the survey.
County governments are
more likely to restructure
than towns. Twenty-six of 57
counties responded. Of these,
21 had restructured. 196 of
932 towns responded. Of
these, 88 had restructured.
Many towns felt they were
too small or too rural to
experiment with alternative
forms of service delivery.
Search Cornell
Governments that restructure in
one area are more likely to
consider restructuring in other
areas as well. Of the 49 percent
of responding governments that
had restructured, most described
several cases of restructuring.
Intermunicipal cooperation is the most
common form of restructuring among
town and county governments in New
York State (54% of the total).
Privatization is the next most common
form (28%) but reverse privatization
(7%) and governmental
entrepreneurship (6%) provide a
counterbalance. Competition is key to
improved efficiency, and local
governments in New York State use
reverse privatization to create
competition between public and private
service providers. Governmental
entrepreneurship is used to achieve
economies of scale within the public
sector by offering services to private
sector customers. Cessation of service
(8%) is rarely chosen as a restructuring
method.
Restructuring was most
common in public works.
This is not surprising since
there is a strong tradition
of highway department
collaboration throughout
New York State.
Administrative support
and public safety were the
next most common areas
to be restructured.
Local officials in New York State take
a pragmatic approach to restructuring.
They are not driven primarily by
political or unionization concerns.
Budgetary impact, economic efficiency
and service quality were the most
important factors in government
decisions to restructure. Technical
issues around service delivery
(management, labor, legal concerns
and information and monitoring) were
next in importance. Community values
about the structure of service delivery
were also important. Politics and
% Max. = The total weighted importance of each factor
divided by the total weighted importance of the highest
scored factor
unionization were not important
factors in the decision to restructure.
Ranking of these factors did not vary
significantly between those
governments that restructured and
those that did not.
Intermunicipal cooperation was
the most common form of
restructuring in all service areas
except health and human
services. Privatization ranked
next in importance. In health and
human services privatization was
the most common form of
restructuring. Reverse
privatization occurred roughly 25
% of the time in health and
human services, parks and
recreation and administrative
support. In public works and
public safety, reverse
privatization was rare.
Intermunicipal cooperation
allows governments to achieve
economies of scale and still
keep services in the public
sector. Historically mutual aid
agreements have been popular
in New York State and
continue to be used widely in
public works and public safety.
Contracting in or out with
other governments is the most
common form of
intermunicipal cooperation.
Although few special districts
have been formed, joint
production of services is
becoming more widespread.
Governments can transfer
authority for service provision
completely to a private sector
player or maintain some
authority over service provision
by contracting out. Town and
county governments in New
York State prefer contracting
out to program transfer as it
allows them to maintain some
authority over service provision.
Contracting out to the private
sector was most common in
public works, transportation and
administrative support services.
Contracting out to the non-profit
sector was most common in
health and human services and
parks and recreation.
 Mildred Warner is Assistant Professor in the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell University.
 Robert Hebdon is Assistant Professor in the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University.
This research was supported by a grant from the USDA Hatch Research Program through the Cornell
University Agricultural Experiment Station and by Cornell Cooperative Extension. Special thanks to Amir
Hefetz for graphics.
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WATER PRIVATIZATION DOES NOT YIELD COST SAVINGS
By Mildred E. Warner 
Proponents of privatization consistently argue that it saves costs due to competitive pressures 
private   providers   face   to   be  more   efficient.     Over   the   last   four   decades   there   has   been 
considerable experimentation with privatization.    Results  are  inconsistent.    Some cases  find 
savings; others do not.    To get beyond the “battle of the case studies” my colleagues and I 
conducted a meta­analysis of all published studies on water distribution  (Bel et al 2010).     A 
comprehensive scientific analysis shows the value of a careful review of theory and empirical 
evidence in making policy choices. Our analysis found no empirical support for cost savings.  
“That private production has failed to deliver consistent and sustained cost savings in these two 
important sectors offers a useful insight to public managers. Cost savings crucially depend on 
the nature of public service markets, the characteristics of the service itself, the geographical 
dimension of the market in which the city is located, and the industrial structure of the sector. 
City managers should proceed with caution.” (Bel et al 2010).
What explains differences  in study results?   Is   it  due to specific  management,   location and 
context factors?  Can differences in study results be explained by type of empirical analysis or 
bias among reviewers and publishers?   Is it possible to draw some broader conclusions about 
whether privatization, in reality, actually leads to cost savings?   What does local government 
experience with water privatization actually show?  
This chapter presents comprehensive research confirming that privatization of water does not 
lead to cost savings.   It also presents data showing privatization is the least common approach 
to water service delivery among US local governments.  These empirical results reflect a careful 
reading of neoclassical economic theory which predicts water would be a poor candidate for 
privatization.  
META­ANALYSIS OF STUDIES WORLDWIDE
When there are mixed results across a range of studies, researchers can employ meta­analysis 
techniques to assess the quality of different study results and determine, given the weight of the 
empirical evidence, whether a given result holds.   This is how it works.   We analyzed all the 
published large scale quantitative studies of water collection from around the world published 
between 1960 and 2009 – seventeen in total (See Bel and Warner 2008 for a thorough description 
of each study).  Eleven of these studies were from the US, three from England and Wales, and 
three from Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa.  These were not case studies.  They were large scale 
cross­sectional studies assessing differences in costs related to public or private production in 
water delivery across many communities (both urban and rural).  Sample sizes were smallest in 
the UK studies (10­30 municipalities),  but large in the US studies (86­319 municipalities per 
study) and the developing country studies (50­655 municipalities per study).  
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What can large scale, cross sectional comparisons of public and private water systems tell us 
about differences in costs?  The majority of the studies (11) found no difference in costs between 
public and private production.   This was true of all the studies conducted outside the US and 
the UK.  Only three studies found private production to be less costly and these studies were all 
from the US during the 1970s and 1980s.  The four studies finding public production to be less 
costly were also from the US.  
To test further for what might explain the differences in study results, we conducted a meta­
regression   analysis   controlling   for   sample   size   (larger   studies   are   more   robust),   country 
(differentiating US and UK studies from others), and functional form of the regression analysis. 
These statistical results confirmed no difference in costs between public and private production 
of water service.   Cost savings were more likely to be found in the earlier studies suggesting  
that   cost   savings,   if   any,   erode   over   time.   Furthermore,  we   found   statistical   evidence   of 
publication bias in favor of cost savings (See Bel et al 2010).
These empirical results challenge the widespread claim that privatization should result in lower 
costs.  Were these unexpected empirical results a result of problems with implementation on the 
ground?  Or is it a more fundamental problem – a misreading of economic theory?  We claim 
the   later.    Neoclassical   economic   theory   argues   for   a   careful   review   of  market   structure, 
incentives and actors to determine when private production might result in lower costs than 
public  production.    Privatization proponents  failed to  understand or   follow basic  economic 
theory.  Expectations of costs savings under privatization are not supported by a careful reading 
of economic theory.  Let me explain.
There are four major bodies of neoclassical economic theory that are relevant to this debate: 
public choice, property rights, transactions costs and industrial organization.  
• Under public choice theory the expectations of cost savings derive primarily from 
competition, but competition is rarely present in public service markets, and almost 
never in water.  In fact, water distribution is a natural monopoly and so introducing 
competition would raise costs.  
• Property   rights   theory  argues  private  owners  will   have   incentives   to   innovative 
because they derive profits from such innovation in a manner that public agencies do 
not.  However, the theory also predicts that private owners will  reduce quality in 
order  to  enhance profits,  unless  careful  regulatory  oversight  is  ensured.    Careful 
regulation is one explanation why cost savings are not found in water delivery – 
private owners find it difficult to shirk when public regulation is strong.  
• Transactions   costs   theory   argues   there   are   transactions   costs   of   contracting 
(information asymmetry, contract management and monitoring) that may be higher 
than the costs of internal delivery. This is especially true in long term contracts for 
asset specific services.  Such services, of which water is one, are not good candidates 
for privatization.  
• Finally industrial organization theory argues that one should look at the entire sector 
– its organization, actors and their incentives – before making a decision to privatize. 
If that had been done by privatization advocates; water privatization would not have 
been promoted.
Anti­privatization advocates often use political economic theory to explain privatization and the 
desire to transfer wealth and power to private partners.  Such theory may explain a lot of what  
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drives privatization practice worldwide.   However, even a conservative reading of standard 
neoclassical economic theory does not support privatization in the case of water service.    Why 
did promoters of privatization choose to ignore the neoclassical economic theory in which they 
are so well trained?  That is a subject others are better prepared to discuss.  My purpose here is  
to clarify what the weight of empirical evidence shows and demonstrate how these results – of  
no cost savings under privatization – should have been theoretically predicted.
US LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE
Next let me turn my attention to the practice of local governments in the United States – the 
region   I   know   best.     Local   government  managers   are   not   economic   theorists.     They   are 
pragmatic managers interested in choosing the most efficient and equitable approach to service 
delivery.    The International  City/County  Management  Association  (ICMA) collects  data  on 
how US city managers deliver a range of public services and we can use this data to determine 
how common and effective privatization is.   The US is a good place to explore this question 
because we arguably have the most favorable conditions for privatization of any nation.   We 
have robust, competitive markets at the local level.    We have city managers who believe in 
market  delivery.    We   have  user   fees   that  make  water   contracts   attractive   and  potentially 
profitable to private purveyors.  And we have a fiscal crisis that causes city managers to look at 
the potential of private investment to upgrade water systems.  What we do not have is a higher 
level of government or an international funder forcing city managers to choose privatization. 
That decision is left to local managers.  Let’s see what they decide.
Over three quarters of US local governments surveyed by the ICMA provide water distribution 
entirely with public  employees.    Over two thirds of  municipalities  provide water treatment 
publicly and over half  provide sewage collection and treatment publicly.    These rates have 
remained relatively stable over time.  For profit contracts only account for six to eight percent of  
service delivery in any of these three service areas.   Governments that do not provide these 
water services directly with public employees are most likely to do so with inter­municipal 
cooperation (14 – 27 percent).    These  inter­governmental  contracts  permit   the realization of 
economies of scale in service delivery while still keeping the service public.  See Table 1 below.
Table 1. Delivery Alternatives for Water Services, US Local Governments, 2002­2007
Pure Public Delivery Water Distribution    Water Treatment   Sewage Collection and 
Treatment
2002 76% 71% 61%
2007 72% 65% 58%
For Profit Contract
2002 7% 6% 8%
2007 6% 6% 7%
Inter­Municipal Cooperation
2002 14% 18% 26%
2007 16% 24% 27%
Author Analysis: ICMA Alternative Service Delivery Surveys 2002: N=1133, 2007: N=1474.
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The overwhelming preference for public delivery of water services among US municipalities 
suggests  local government managers understand something about water markets.    Let’s see 
how their practice illustrates a latent understanding of economic theory.
Recall,   that public choice theory argues competition will  be critical  in determining any cost  
savings from privatization.  What do we know about competition in US local government water 
markets?   I conducted a survey of competition in local service markets with ICMA in 2007.  
Across all responding local governments, the average number of alternative suppliers was less 
than   one   for   water   distribution   (0.79),   water   treatment   (0.88)   and   sewage   collection   and 
treatment (0.67). (See Warner and Hefetz 2010).   These results confirm that water service is a  
natural monopoly.   As one city manager explained to me, “If there is no competition, when I 
privatize,   I   simply   substitute   a   private  monopoly   for   a   public   one.    Monopolies   extract 
monopoly rents.  At least in the public monopoly I can use those rents to extend service.”  
Property rights theory notes private managers will have incentives for innovation, but this may 
come at the expense of service quality as they seek to enhance profit.  ICMA added a question to 
its survey asking why local governments contract back­in previously privatized services.   The 
answers are telling.  Problems with service quality ranks first (61%). Lack of cost savings ranks 
second (52%). Improvements in public delivery rank third (34%).   Political concerns rank last 
(17%). (See Warner and Hefetz 2009).  Recall that water rates in the US are not high with respect 
to household income so this is not a service that raises strong political objections – unless there 
are problems with quality.  City managers understand the critical importance of quality – best 
maintained through direct control.
Transactions  cost   theory   tells  us   that   services   that  are  highly  asset   specific  and difficult   to 
manage   and  monitor   as   contracts,  will   remain   public.     Our   2007   survey  with   ICMA   on 
competition also asked questions about asset specificity and contract management difficulty 
(See Warner and Hefetz 2010).   Water distribution and treatment and sewage treatment were 
the top ranked of all 67 measured services on asset specificity (4.5 on a scale of 1 to 5).   These  
three services ranked in the top fifteen most difficult to manage as contracts (3.5 on a scale of 1  
to 5).   City managers understand the inappropriateness of contracting out services with such 
high transactions costs.
Finally, industrial organization theory tells us to look at the structure of the sector, the actors 
and incentives in a comprehensive manner.  The data presented above for the US show a sector 
dominated by monopoly providers in local markets and a service which is very asset specific 
and  difficult   to  monitor.    Over   the   2002­2007  period,   about   nine  percent   of  US  managers 
experimented  with   a   new   contract   for  water   service.     But   in   the   same   period   a   similar  
percentage   brought   a   previously   contracted   service   back   in   house   (reverse   contract   or 
remuncipalisation).   Although US local government managers are willing to experiment with 
privatization, when it does not work, they bring the service back in house.  Only ten percent of 
water   distribution   contracts   were   stable   over   the   2002­2007   period.   Sewerage   and  water 
treatment   contracts   were   more   stable,   but   these   are   more   likely   to   be   inter­municipal 
cooperative agreements.  When US city managers look for alternatives to direct public delivery 
in water service, they look to inter­municipal cooperation, not for profit privatization.   Inter­
municipal   cooperation  allows   them  to  gain   economies   of   scale,   access   to   greater   technical 
expertise and capital, while still keeping the service public.
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Table 2. Contracting Rates, US Local Governments 2002­2007
SERVICE Stable Public Stable 
Contract
Reverse 
Contract
New Contract
Water Distribution   71.2% 9.7% 9.3% 9.7%
Water Treatment   66.8% 16.4% 7.9% 8.9%
Sewage  Collection   and 
Treatment 
57.3% 25.2% 9.5% 8.0%
Source: 2002 and 2007 ICMA Alternative Service Delivery Survey, Author analysis. 
N=459 US Cities and Counties, respondents to both surveys.
The empirical lessons from thousands of local government managers tell a clear and compelling 
story.  Water service is a poor candidate for privatization.   There are better alternatives.  With 
the weight of empirical and theoretical evidence now firmly showing that privatization is not an 
effective option in water service delivery, maybe international funders will turn their attention 
to the critically important question of alternatives that really work.  The other chapters in this  
book explore those alternatives. 
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Abstract 
Contracting out for urban infrastructure delivery has been an important reform pursued 
by cities in the last decades of the 20
th
 century.  However, using national surveys of US 
municipalities conducted by the International City County Management Association, this 
paper shows that rates of new contracting are balanced with reverse contracting – 
bringing previously privatized services back in house.  Reversals reflect problems with 
service quality and lack of cost savings in contracted services.  Recognition or the asset 
specific nature of infrastructure services, the need for monitoring and the importance of 
political opposition help explain these reversals.   
 
Introduction 
 
Privatization or contracting out of infrastructure service delivery was considered a 
more efficient approach to urban service delivery. However after four decades of 
experimentation with privatization we are seeing that the pendulum is swinging back 
toward public delivery – albeit with new forms of private partnership – short of arms 
length contracting.  What drives these shifts?  Has privatization offered the predicted 
efficiency advantages? What is the impact on service quality? In which service areas 
have reversals been the most common?  Does this have more to do with market structure 
(e.g. the level of competition) or management capacity and political concerns of local 
government? 
Using national survey data collected by the International City/County 
Management Association from municipalities across the United States in 2002 and 2007, 
this paper explores differences in contracting patterns across services.  We differentiate 
stable public delivery and stable contracting from experimentation with contracting.  
Public delivery remains the most common form of municipal service delivery in the US 
and contracting, especially to non profits for social services, has been longstanding 
practice in the US.  Experimentation has occurred at the margins with new contracting 
and reverse contracting - contracting back-in previously outsourced services.  The notion 
behind privatization was that it would offer a superior form of service delivery to urban 
governments.  The reality has been another story and the level of reverse contracting now 
equals the level of new contracting out.  This paper will present results from the most 
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recent data - pairing the 2002 and 2007 surveys - to explain why municipalities reverse 
their contracts.   
Literature Review 
For close to 40 years policy makers have been experimenting with privatization 
(contracting out) as a means to save costs.  Theoretically cost savings were expected 
under privatization due to competitive pressures private providers face to be more 
efficient.  However, research on the privatization experience at the local government 
level challenges this received wisdom (Hirsch 1995, Boyne 1998, Hodge 2000).  
Expectations of costs savings are not well supported by a careful reading of economic 
theory, and empirically the evidence for cost savings is weak (Bel and Warner 2008).  
Theoretically, expectations of cost savings derive primarily from competition, but 
competition is rarely present in public service markets (Johnson and Girth 2009; Bel & 
Costas, 2006; Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2007).  Private owners will have incentives to reduce 
quality (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997), and transactions costs of contracting may be 
higher than the costs of internal delivery (Nelson, 1997; Williamson, 1999).   
Bel, et al. (2010) analyze all quantitative studies of privatization from 1965 to 
2009 of water distribution and solid waste collection - the local government services with 
the widest experience with privatization worldwide.  The authors employ meta-regression 
– a technique that evaluates the significance of common parameters across multiple 
studies – to determine whether the weight of empirical evidence in the 27 studies 
reviewed supports cost savings under private production. The analysis does not support a 
conclusion of cost savings. Furthermore, Bel et al. find statistical evidence of publication 
bias in favor of cost savings. 
That private production has failed to deliver consistent and sustained cost savings 
in these two critical infrastructure sectors offers a useful insight to city managers. City 
managers are under pressure to identify ways to improve the efficiency of public service 
delivery.  However, cost savings crucially depend on the nature of public service markets, 
the characteristics of the service itself, the geographical dimension of the market in which 
the city is located, and the industrial structure of the sector.  
More careful attention is now being given to the challenges of relational 
contracting (Sclar, 2000) and how to manage limited competition in local service markets 
(Johnston and Girth, 2009). Problems with accountability in long term infrastructure 
contracting (Dannin, 2010) and the high transactions costs associated with infrastructure 
contracts (Whitington, 2009) raise questions about the efficiency of contracting.  Planners 
have voiced special concerns over loss of public values due to failure to consider long 
term planning horizons and changing societal needs when structuring these contracts 
(Sclar, 2009).  Public Private Partnerships are coming into vogue – as an alternative to 
privatization – because they maintain a relational interaction that may deal more 
effectively with changing circumstances (Savas, 2000).  However, they also pose more 
serious accountability risks (Miraftab, 2004; Siemiatycki, 2010).  With billions in 
infrastructure investment on the table, planners need to give special attention to the risks 
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and challenges of outsourcing and public private partnerships (Dannin, 2010; Warner, 
2009). 
While privatization assumes market superiority, more recent trends in public 
administration and planning urge the public sector to interact with markets and with 
communities to encourage democratic deliberation (Nalbandian, 1999; Alexander, 2001). 
This alternative reform has been coined the ‗new public service‘ in public administration 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003) and is quite similar to ‗communicative planning‘ in the 
planning field (Sager, 2009).  The result is a dynamic decision making process which 
integrates market mechanisms with citizen deliberation and voice (Warner, 2008; 
Allmendinger, Tewdwr-Jones, & Morphet, 2003). The rise in mixed delivery where 
governments use both private contracts and public delivery for the same service is 
evidence of this shift (Warner & Hefetz, 2008). 
Privatization gained wide attention in the 1980s under the Thatcher and Reagan 
administrations as a means to shrink the size of government, promote market 
development and achieve economic efficiencies.  This political agenda resulted in 
renaming the long standing local government practice of contracting, as ‗privatization‘  
(Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994; Adler 1999).  However, when one looks at the trends over 
time in US local government contracting, they are notable for how flat they are. A recent 
Reason Foundation report shows that for profit contracting among US local governments 
has hovered around 18% for the entire period 1992 to 2007 (Warner and Hefetz 2009).  
What is hidden in these flat trends, however, is experimentation among governments and 
across services – a pattern of new contracting out and reverse contracting which this 
paper will explore.   
 
The first empirical paper to study reverse contracting focused on local 
governments in New York State.  It found reversals were one strategy used alongside 
privatization, inter-municipal cooperation and governmental entrepreneurship in a 
complex array of alternatives local governments use to balance concerns with efficiency, 
service quality, local impacts and politics (Warner and Hebdon, 2001).  The first national 
study of reverse contracting was conducted by Hefetz and Warner (2004) and found 
reversals (at 11% of all service delivery) from 1992 to 1997 were two thirds the level of 
new contracting out (18% of all service delivery).  Privatization peaked among US local 
governments in 1997 and a subsequent study that looked at the period 1997 to 2002 
found that reversals at 18% of all service delivery exceeded new contracting out at 12% 
of all service delivery (Hefetz and Warner, 2007).  This paper provides the most recent 
chapter in a continuing story.  For the 2002-2007 period we find that reversals (11.6%) 
and new contracting (11.3%) are evenly matched.  Notable in all these studies is that the 
dynamics of service delivery are located along the margin, 22-30% of service delivery.  
Privatization has been an experiment that varies over time, place and service.  It is not a 
one-way street toward a superior form of delivery as was once claimed (Savas, 1987).  
Similar reversals have been noted in the UK, which stepped back from 
compulsory competitive tendering in 1998 (Martin, 2002), and where local governments 
have reinternalized previously privatized services (Entwistle, 2005).  Australia and New 
Zealand were also early privatizers who have shifted focus toward rebuilding internal 
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government capacity (Warner, 2008).  The new 2002 Local Government Law in New 
Zealand argued that citizens are more than market-based service customers and local 
governments must balance market forces with other social objectives (LGNZ, 2003). 
Internationally reversals are also gaining more attention.  A study of outsourcing in 25 
Fortune 500 companies and two local governments by Deloitte Consulting reached 
similar conclusions – that outsourcing reduced internal intelligence and control, increased 
risks of service delivery and often failed to find a competitive efficiency market of 
outside suppliers (Deloitte, 2005).  A recent book looking at public service and 
infrastructure projects around the world profiles a reassertion of the role of the public 
sector in public service provision to ensure equity, access and failsafe service delivery 
(Ramesh, et al., 2010).  Even the World Bank (2006), a long proponent of privatization in 
water delivery, has begun to question the viability of its approach. 
The US enjoys perhaps the most robust local markets for private service delivery. 
If privatization were to work well anywhere, it would likely be here.  The US also is the 
only country that has longitudinal data that permit an analysis of contracting dynamics 
over time.  This study will explore new contracting out and reverse contracting for a 
range of locally provided public services – giving attention to service characteristics, 
local market characteristics and political and monitoring concerns. 
Data and Methods  
To measure reversals we combine the International City and County Management 
Association (ICMA) surveys from 2002 and 2007. No national survey directly measures 
reversals in privatization. However the consistency of the ICMA survey design and 
sample frame allows pairing surveys over time to see if the form of service delivery has 
changed.   The ICMA data cover 67 public services and ask how the service is delivered 
– by government directly or through contracts to for-profits, other governments or non-
profits.  The surveys also ask managers about factors that are motivators or obstacles to 
alternative service delivery. 
The ICMA sample frame includes all counties with more than 25,000 population 
(roughly 1,600) and cities over 10,000 population (roughly 3,300). A quarter of all 
governments contacted respond (24% for 2002 and 26% in 2007) but only about 40 per 
cent of respondents are the same in any two paired surveys.  To track changes over time, 
we paired the surveys and found 474 governments that responded to both the 2002 and 
2007 surveys. The paired 2002-2007 sample is a representative subsample of the larger 
surveys.
1
   We complement this data with a supplemental survey ICMA conducted in 
2007 of 164 city managers asking their assessment of 67 urban services by the following 
characteristics: level of competition, asset specificity, contract management difficulty and 
citizen interest in the process of service delivery.  We also use Census of Government 
Finance data from 2002 and Census of Population and Housing data from 2000. 
                                                        
1
 T test comparison of means and Anova show no significant difference by poverty, per 
capita income or population for the paired sample and the 2002 survey.  There is a 
significant difference by population for the 2007 survey as its sample frame included an 
oversample of rural places. 
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The ICMA surveys only ask how the service is currently provided. To determine 
the level of new contracting out, and the level of reverse contracting we coded the data 
into three exclusive categories: the service is provided 1) entirely by government 
employees, 2) by mixed public delivery and private contracts, or 3) by contracts 
exclusively. We combined these exclusive alternatives over time to create a matrix that 
allows us to track changes in service delivery choice as shown in figure 1. This matrix 
method enables us to compare stability in form of service delivery and to assess shifts - 
towards outsourcing or reversals back towards public delivery. This technique is 
explained in more detail in Hefetz and Warner (2004).  
Figure 1 about here 
The combined 2002-2007 data set shows that the level of new contracting out at 
11.3% is almost equal to the level of reverse contracting at 11.6%.  Stable contracts 
constitute 35% of all service delivery, and stable public delivery constitutes 42% of 
service delivery.  See Table 1.   
The highest rates of stable contracting out are found in physical infrastructure 
services like transit, waste management and vehicle towing, and in social services like 
job training, elderly, drug treatment and homeless shelters.  Physical infrastructure 
services are more likely to be contracted to the for-profit sector, while social services are 
more likely to be contracted to the non-profit sector. Hospitals are the one service that is 
completely contracted out and it is evenly split between non-profit, for-profit and inter-
governmental contracts) (data not shown).  The highest rates of stable public delivery are 
found in crime prevention, police and fire, water and sewer services, snow plowing and 
back office support services (personnel, billing, data processing).   Back office services 
are the only services in this group where we see substantial levels of experimentation 
with new contracting out (>10%), but this is matched with similar levels of reverse 
contracting suggesting a lot of experimentation.   
Table 1 about here 
The services of most interest in the current analysis are the ones which exhibit 
high rates of new contracting or reverse contracting.  These are services where there is 
more experimentation going on across municipalities.   Theory would suggest the 
services most likely to be contracted out would have low asset specificity, low contract 
management difficulty and face competitive markets (Savas, 1987).  While service 
characteristics explain part of the reason for new contracting out and reverse contracting, 
they only tell part of the story.  When we rank the top twenty services by level of reverse 
contracting and new contracting we find ten services are on both lists (street repair, traffic 
signs, fleet management, building maintenance, park management, recreation, legal 
services, elderly services and public health).  This suggests a constellation of factors 
including nature of local markets, management expertise and political preferences are 
also important in determining whether contracting is appropriate.   
The ICMA added a question in the 2002 survey asking specifically what reasons 
motivated managers to contract back-in previously contracted services.  The results are 
telling.  In both the 2002 and the 2007 surveys, the top reasons for contracting back-in 
were inadequate service quality (73%, 61%), followed by inadequate cost savings (51%, 
52%).  Other factors included: improvements to local government efficiency (36%, 34%), 
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problems with monitoring (20%, 17%) and political support to bring the work back in 
house (22%, 17%). A similar survey of local governments in Canada found the same 
ranking of reasons for reversing privatization (Hebdon & Jallette, 2007). 
We developed a model to look at the decision to newly contract out or reverse 
contract considering the following variables.  Descriptive statistics of model variables are 
provided in table 2. 
Table 2 about here 
Service Characteristics – Transaction cost economics points to two key characteristics of 
a service – whether the service requires specific assets or technical expertise (asset 
specificity) and the difficulty of contract specification and monitoring (contract 
management difficulty).   In the public sector an additional characteristic is important – 
the level of citizen interest in service delivery.  These measures were taken from the 
supplemental survey ICMA conducted in 2007.  Each characteristic was ranked on scale 
of 1 (low) to 5 (high) for each of the 67 services ICMA measures.  The ICMA survey 
showed significant differences by metro status so we differentiated values by metro status 
(core cities, outlying cities, and independent rural places) for our sample.  See Hefetz and 
Warner (2010) for values for each of the 67 services by metro status. An average value 
for each characteristic for each government was calculated using the mean value for each 
service by metro status and averaging across the actual mix of services each government 
provides.  The set of services provided varies across place, so the variability of the mean 
scores provides independent values for each service characteristic for each place.
2
   
Market Characteristics- Local governments face different local market conditions.  The 
ICMA supplemental survey cited above also measured the number of alternative 
providers for each of the 67 services (0=govt only, 1=1 alt. provider 2=2, 3=3, 
4=4+alternative providers).  Using the same method as described above, we calculated 
the mean level of competition each local government faced for the mix of services it 
provided.  We also measured market management behavior of local governments – the 
level of mixed delivery.  Governments can create a semblance of competition by mixing 
contracts and direct service delivery for the same service. 
                                                        
2
 Mean values by metro status were imputed as expected scores into all provided services 
for each place in the paired survey sample. The final variables used in the regression 
models are the sum of the expected scores across all services provided divided by the 
number of services provided.  
      
The value is the aggregated expected score across all provided services divided by the 
number of provided services where Pj=1 if service j is provided and j=1,2,…s service; 
expscoreej=expected score e for service j, e=asset specificity, contract management 
difficulty, citizen interest, and competition.  
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Fiscal Concerns- A primary motivation for contracting is to reduce costs.  To account for 
fiscal concerns we include average local government expenditure for each local 
government from the Census of Government Finance, whether the local government 
faces fiscal stress and whether inadequate cost savings was listed as a reason for 
reversing contracts.  
Monitoring – To ensure service quality and contract compliance, monitoring should be 
associated with new contracting out.  But problems identified through monitoring could 
lead to more reversals.  We include four measures of monitoring.  If a government noted 
unsatisfactory service quality or problems monitoring contracts as reasons for reverse 
contracting, and if it engaged in a set of activities designed to promote efficiency (desire 
to reduce costs, monitoring service quality, monitoring costs, allowing competitive 
bidding and experimentation with alternatives)
3
.  The efficiency index is included for 
both years 2002 and 2007. We also include a dummy variable if the municipality has a 
council manager form of government. 
Opposition – Opposition to privatization could reduce the level of new contracting out 
and increase the level of contracting back in.  We use an opposition index (opposition 
from employees, department heads, elected officials and restrictive labor agreements) 
from each year, 2002 and 2007.  
Metro Status – Trends in privatization differ by metro status.  Suburbs have historically 
had the highest rates of contracting while metro core and rural communities have had 
lower rates.   
Controls – We also include controls for population and income.  Larger governments 
with greater fiscal and managerial capacity may be more likely to experiment with new 
contracting out and reverse contracting.    
Model Results 
We ran probit models for reverse contracting and new contracting out.  We see 
that service characteristics (related to transactions costs) provide only part of the 
explanation for why places choose to newly contract out or to reverse contract services.  
If a government has a higher level of asset specific services it is more likely to reverse 
contract and less likely to contract out.  See Table 3. This reflects the higher transactions 
costs associated with contracting asset specific services.   However, governments whose 
service mix are on average harder to measure or have more citizen interest show a higher 
level of new contracting out and a lower level of contracting back in.  This is the opposite 
of what we expected but may reflect Stein‘s (1990) notion that governments will seek to 
contract out services that are difficult to measure and have high citizen interest in order to 
                                                        
3
 The efficiency/monitoring index and the opposition index, described below were created 
by summing positive responses to component questions and dividing by the total number 
of questions in the index.  fi/N, where f=1 if checked yes to question and 0 if not, and 
i=1,2,…N for questions.     
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reduce the political burden they face in dealing with such problematic services.  Recall 
many of the services with high levels of new contracting are social services.  These 
results suggest there is a political aspect to service management, not a mere economic 
one. 
Table 3 about here 
Two economic aspects are important: finances and market management.  There is 
no significant effect of fiscal stress on government contracting decisions.   Expenditures 
are higher both for places that reverse contracts (as more services are now inside 
government) and for places that newly contract out (possibly due to lack of cost savings 
from contracting).  Concern with lack of cost savings is associated with a higher level of 
reverse contracting and a lower level of new contracting out, as expected.  
Market management tells an interesting story.  We see that level of competition is 
not significant in either model. Governments face a level of competition in the market 
that they cannot do much about. However, mixed delivery, where government stays in the 
game by providing the service alongside private contracts, is complementary to new 
contracting out and a substitute for reverse contracting.  Mixed delivery is an active form 
of market management which can provide benchmarking to new contracting and this 
pressure on market providers can make reverse contracting unnecessary. 
Metro status shows significant differences.  Metro core cities have higher levels 
of reverse contracting and lower levels of new contracting.  The same is true of more 
populated places.  This may reflect the greater challenges with contracting in more 
heterogeneous urban environments.  Greater management capacity, lack of suppliers in 
complex urban markets or more formalized labor opposition in more populous urban 
governments could be offered as explanations for this metro difference, but our controls 
for council manager, competition and opposition account for those factors. 
Rural municipalities, by contrast, show higher levels of new contracting and 
lower levels of reversals. Rural areas have been slower to experiment with contracting 
(adoption curve) and have less capacity to reverse contracts once the service has been 
outsourced. Suburbs are the reference category – fewer reversals than metro core but 
more than rural places, and more new contracting than metro core but less than rural. 
Suburbs were the early innovators in contracting and their rates reached 20% of service 
delivery in 1997 and have not risen since (Warner and Hefetz, 2009).   
The role of political and management variables is perhaps most interesting for our 
analysis.  Monitoring for efficiency and opposition are two management and political 
features measured in our models.   The results tell an interesting story.  Although we saw 
problems with service quality was the top reason governments cited for reversing their 
contracts, it was not significant in either model.  Neither did recognition of problems with 
monitoring have any effect on contracting direction.  What matters is not what 
governments say are problems, but what they actually do about them. 
Governments that had higher levels of monitoring for efficiency in 2002 have 
higher rates of reversals in 2007.  However, current monitoring levels are associated with 
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lower rates of reversals – suggesting that monitoring can prevent the need for reversals.  
Higher monitoring in 2002 is associated with lower levels of new contracting, but current 
monitoring has no effect.  Prior monitoring exposes problems which can be addressed by 
reversing contracts over time.   A similar lagged effect is found with opposition.  More 
opposition to privatization in 2002 is associated with a higher level of reversals in 2007, 
but current opposition has no effect.  Prior opposition has no relationship to new 
contracting and current opposition has a weak but positive relationship to new 
contracting.  This is the opposite of what such opposition would intend.  These results 
suggest there is an accountability and political voice aspect to reversals but it is a lagged 
effect and is more important in explaining reversals than in explaining new contracting 
out. 
 
Conclusion - Implications for Planners 
Our analysis had shown that levels of new privatization are matched by levels of 
reverse privatization among local governments across the United States.  Although there 
is considerable variation by service, what we also notice is that within the same service, 
some governments will newly contract out while others reverse their contracts, bringing 
work back in house.  Quality problems and lack of cost savings drive the move to 
reinternalize service delivery.  Early monitoring can identify the need for reversals but 
current monitoring and market management through mixed market delivery can reduce 
the need for reversals.  Opposition also can lead to more reversals. 
Simple recognition of problems with service quality and monitoring is not related 
to levels of new contracting or reversals.  What matters is active monitoring and political 
action.  This last result provides an important lesson to urban planners.  There are a host 
of issues involved in urban service delivery and the continued use of contracting – 
especially long term infrastructure contracts and new public private partnership 
agreements - makes attention to quality and monitoring paramount.  Our model results 
show that city managers have begun to recognize the importance of market management 
but attention to monitoring, citizen interest and service quality need to be more closely 
related to contracting levels – in and out – if public values are to be preserved as 
governments continue to experiment with new forms of contracting for service delivery. 
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Th e Future of Local Government: Twenty-First-Century 
Challenges
Local governments in the twenty-ﬁ rst century face 
challenges regarding service delivery, ﬁ nance, the 
workforce, and citizen engagement. While privatization 
was a major innovation in the last decades of the 
twentieth century, lack of costs savings and the loss of 
public values in market provision are prompting reversals 
in privatization, increases in regulation, and new 
approaches to government enterprise. Th e twenty-ﬁ rst 
century must focus on rebuilding the capacity of local 
governments to ﬁ nance critical infrastructure, attract 
and retain a skilled labor force, and engage citizen in 
designing innovative solutions to address public problems. 
Innovations in public service delivery will move beyond 
public private partnerships to models that more eﬀ ectively 
balance accountability, equity, and eﬃ  ciency concerns.
The focus of this essay is on local government and the future of public administration. Where will we be in 2020? Will we continue to see 
an erosion of local government authority, capacity, 
and service delivery? Will markets prove capable of 
ﬁ lling in the gaps? Or will we see a reassertion of the 
importance of local government, with new models 
for regional integration, public 
ﬁ nance, and service delivery 
that emphasize a public role? I 
predict that we will see contin-
ued pressure to pursue market 
approaches and, at the same 
time, a reassertion of the role of 
the public sector.
Prediction 1: Th ere will be reversals in the 
privatization process of the last few decades. In the 
closing decades of the twentieth century, we embarked 
on a bold experiment with privatization, competition, 
and other forms of market-based, consumer-oriented 
government. Th at experiment has shown potential for 
private market solutions to the provision of public 
goods, but it also has shown its limits. Research now 
conﬁ rms that privatization alone does not result in cost 
savings (Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2010; Boyne 1998; 
Hodge 2000). Why? Competition is rarely present in 
local government service markets, and private contracts 
often substitute a private monopoly for a public one. 
Local governments now recognize the need to manage 
their markets for service delivery. Private ﬁ rms’ primary 
objective is proﬁ t, whereas governments’ primary 
objective is the public good. Public–private 
partnerships can help blend public and private 
objectives for mutual gain, but without careful 
attention to accountability and a long-term perspective, 
these partnerships can result in collusion and 
privileging of private interests over the public good.
Th e last decade has witnessed important reversals 
toward public provision in most of the countries that 
were early privatizers (Australia, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States) (Entwistle 
2005; Hefetz and Warner 2004, 2007; Warner 2008). 
Problems with service quality under privatization 
and a lack of cost savings drove these reversals. Th e 
private sector is good at technological innovation, but 
government must provide the “civic core” to markets 
in order to ensure equitable access, high quality, and 
a longer-term investment view (Clark and Bradshaw 
2004; Ramesh, Araral, and 
Wu 2010). New management 
reforms will focus more on 
careful regulation of private 
markets for public goods and 
new hybrid types of public 
enterprise.
Prediction 2: Pressures to privatize will remain high 
at the international level and with regard to 
infrastructure investment. At the international level, 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (under 
negotiation) calls for an expansion in the privatization 
of public service delivery. However, the GATS 
governance structure undermines local government 
authority to set standards, negotiate contracts, and 
pursue redress in cases of contract failure. Th is makes it 
more diﬃ  cult to use privatization as a tool even as the 
GATS insists on opening up local government services 
to more privatization (Gerbasi and Warner 2007).
I predict that we will see 
continued pressure to pursue 
market approaches and, at the 
same time, a reassertion of the 
role of the public sector.
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 eﬃ  ciency in local government service delivery—showing the 
beneﬁ ts of labor–management cooperation (Warner 2009).
Th ird, citizens need to be reengaged in the local governance proc-
ess to recognize the value of public services and to understand the 
need to balance service demands with revenue generation. We need 
a p olicy discourse that recognizes that we need to raise taxes to 
fund public infrastructure. Our economic prosperity depends on it 
(Swartz 2010). Th e federal level has maintained service delivery by 
crafting a false balance between low taxes and massive debt. State 
and local governments are required to balance their budgets. Th e 
next few years will bring extraordinary ﬁ scal crisis at the state and 
local level. If new revenue sources are not found, basic infrastructure 
and social service provision will decline, leading to a downward 
spiral of reduced economic prospects and lower quality of life. 
Experimentation with New Public Management approaches has 
focused on improving eﬃ  ciency. But there are limits to eﬃ  ciency 
gains. In the next decade, we must identify new revenue sources. 
Increased state and federal aid will be required to get through the 
current crisis, but in the longer term, local governments will explore 
the potential of government enterprise (to make money), expand 
user fees, and push for wider revenue raising authority. U.S. local 
governments are the most ﬁ scally autonomous in the advanced 
industrialized world. As we devolve more functions to the local level, 
we must identify the funding sources to ensure a high quality of life.
Prediction 4: Th e proliferation of private “club” approaches to 
providing public goods will further fragment local government, 
undermining the goals of social inclusion and regional 
integration. Many public goods can be provided by private clubs—
swimming pools, security services, roads, and so on—and doing so 
promotes more investment because the beneﬁ ts accrue directly to 
the club members and are not dissipated across a broader public. 
Th is is why Business Improvement Districts (for downtown 
regeneration), and Common Interest Developments (for new 
housing development) are catching on like wildﬁ re across the nation 
and the world (Glasze, Webster, and Frantz 2006). Th ey provide 
ﬂ exibility, diﬀ erentiate interests within the urban area, and promote 
increased private investment in public goods. Th ese special districts 
and private governments outnumber multipurpose public 
government by a factor of 10 or more! By oﬀ ering private solutions 
to public problems, they encourage and empower neighborhood 
interests to solve their own problems.
However, they also fragment the metropolitan region and make 
regional cooperation more diﬃ  cult. Local governments need to reach 
beyond their boundaries and address regional concerns with their 
neighboring jurisdictions. Club approaches at the regional level are 
often focused on a single issue (transportation, water), but we need 
a multifunctional approach to address the challenges of sustainable, 
comprehensive planning. Local governments need to balance frag-
mentation with regional cooperation, diversity with inclusion.
At the community level, these club approaches privilege property 
owners and those already present in the community (Briﬀ ault 
1999). Club approaches are built on common interests and typically 
lead to segregation by income, issue, and location; they provide 
superior services because of their ability to exclude those outside the 
club. But these are not the only stakeholders. Newcomers contribute 
At the local level, we have an infrastructure crisis and a lack of public 
capital for reinvestment. Th e En vironmental Protection Agency (2003) 
and the Congressional Budget Oﬃ  ce (2002) estimate that we will 
need $20–30 billion per year for the next 10 years to rebuild water and 
wastewater systems alone. Prior waves of investment have enjoyed a 
federal and state partnership with public funds to make these public 
i nfrastructure investments (Warner 2009). Th at is needed again, but 
Congress is not focused on public infrastructure and states are strapped 
with serious ﬁ scal crisis.
Local governments will be forced to turn toward more expensive 
and risky private capital to ﬁ nance infrastructure renovation. Th ese 
public–private partnerships will not be cheaper. Th ey also may sac-
riﬁ ce critical public planning goals to short-term ﬁ nancial concerns, 
as shown in the recent decision by the city of Chicago to lease its 
parking meters for 75 years for $1.1 billion. Not only is the present 
value assessed at twice that amount, with energy and climate change, 
the city will likely want to convert the parking lane to new use by 
pedestrians, bike, or dedicated public transit, but is locked in by the 
75-year contract (Sclar 2009). Enthusiasm for privatization, free 
trade, and private investment must be tempered by a longer-term 
perspective that carefully assesses beneﬁ ts and costs, and balances 
public goods values and long-term ﬁ nancial health with short-term 
investment opportunities.
Prediction 3: Th e next decade will witness a rebuilding of the 
capacity of local government. To do so requires (1) rethinking local 
government revenue sources, (2) renegotiating labor relations, and 
(3) rebuilding citizens’ view of society. Th is will be diﬃ  cult, but it is 
essential if we are to have a local government system in 2020 that is 
capable of sustaining economic development and a high quality of 
life. Let’s take each of these challenges in turn.
First, local government revenue is based primarily on regressive tax 
instruments (property tax, sales tax, and user fees), and needs to be 
restructured to capture the growing parts of the economy (services, 
I nternet sales). We also need a new ﬁ nancial partnership with federal 
and state governments, which are more capable of taxing mobile 
factors of production through the income tax. State and federal legis-
latures need to increase intergovernmental aid and give local govern-
ment the revenue-raising tools it needs to meet its service obliga-
tions. Centralizing ﬁ scal responsibility for social services (education 
and health) to the state level, removing local limits on property tax, 
and allowing taxation of Internet sales would be good places to start.
Second, rigid labor systems that discourage ﬂ exibility and innova-
tion and raise costs must be restructured to balance labor costs 
with service demands. Th e current ﬁ scal crisis will force a new 
kind of conversation between management and unions. However, 
as we move into a period of labor shortage (driven by demographic 
change), we need to identify ways to make local government an 
attractive employer. Building a new relationship with public sector 
unions will be required to address labor ﬂ exibility and pension and 
health care system reform, and to ensure that a balance between 
cost savings and employment attractiveness is crafted. Civil service 
protections reduce political interference, but the public sector 
must restructure employment relations to increase its attractive-
ness to young employees as we move into a new century character-
ized by labor shortage. Internal process reform has led to increased 
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to the vitality of our communities. Demographic projections show 
an increasingly diverse constituency especially among the younger 
generation (Myers 2007). We need to ensure inclusion of these new 
citizens and new voices in our urban fabric. If not, local govern-
ment will become like a Swiss cheese, with these clubs as the holes. 
Local government is the connective tissue that holds the disparate 
elements of community together in a broader process of community 
building. Th e proliferation of club good approaches may so stretch 
and weaken the connective tissue that local government may no 
longer be able to maintain the balance.
Frug (1999) argues that community building is the ultimate public 
good, and the ability to engage across diﬀ erence is learned through 
the mixing that is promoted in public service provision. Mixed-
income and mixed-age neighborhoods are more diverse and more 
resilient (Israel and Warner 2008). Research shows that baby boom-
ers want to age in place, and to do so, they need communities that 
integrate young and old in housing and public services (Warner, 
Homsy and Greenhouse). Th e challenge of the new century will be 
to identify new models for integration—across age, income, and 
ethnicity—in urban service delivery. Clubs promote individual 
investment for collective action and citizen engagement in the pro-
duction of services. Th e challenge is to break down the exclusionary 
boundaries. Government should explore ways to restructure the 
current property rights legal basis of clubs, to a broader citizen basis 
and thus limit their fragmentation eﬀ ect on the local community.
Prediction 5: Local government will lead in taking a long-term 
view. Climate change and energy conservation will cause us to 
remake the urban landscape, changing the way we work and travel 
and our approaches to planning. Th e new urban landscape will build 
from the old, but incorporate the new. Distributed energy 
production, distributed work (more telecommuting), less automotive 
travel, and denser development are likely. Local governments will 
review their current planning codes and experiment with new forms 
that allow more mixed use, promote quicker market response to 
changing conditions, and experiment with new approaches to 
transportation, energy production, and service provision.
Th e next decade will be full of serious chal-
lenges. Th e past enthusiasm of public admin-
istration for market approaches and eﬃ  ciency 
models will be moderated with renewed 
attention to the need to rebuild local govern-
ment capacity—ﬁ nancially, managerially, and 
democratically. Th e challenges are great. Our 
hope lies in a local government sector that 
encourages us to practice citizenship, teaches 
us to constructively engage across our diﬀ er-
ences, and helps us build community. Th ese 
are some of the challenges for local govern-
ment in this new century.
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Overview 
  Late 20th century experiment to expand role of markets in 
local government service delivery 
  Privatization experience uneven  
  Lack of cost savings (Bel and Warner 2008a, 2008b) 
  Increases Inequality (Warner 2006) 
  Undermines Citizen Voice (Warner and Hefetz 2002) 
  Reversals appear in the late 1990s 
  Not a return to old bureaucratic delivery, instead 
  A shift to a new mixed position –  
  markets and public delivery  
  Rebalancing Governmental Reform – Pragmatic Approach 
Understanding Reversals 
  Limits to Market Approaches 
  Critical Role of the State 
  In constructing the social and legal 
foundations for markets to function 
  In acting as a market player - ensuring 
competition, regulation 
  In promoting innovation 
  In creating spaces for democracy and 
community building 
  In public planning to build a long term view 
  Challenge – Finding the right balance 
Reversals 
  United Kingdom 
  End Compulsory Competitive Tendering (1998).  
Shift to “Best Value” framework, ‘contestability’, 
‘scrutiny’ 
  New Zealand  
  2002 Local Government law to restore 
governmental capacity and build an 
accountability framework.   
  Recognize multiple roles of local government 
   balance economic development, social wellbeing, 
environmental management and civic engagement. 
Reversals 
  United States – pro-market orientation but 
privatization never compulsory 
  Contracting Out Peaks in 1997 
  Rise in public and mixed public/private 
delivery 
  ensures government capacity – internal 
knowledge, innovation 
  market management  - competition, 
benchmarking & 
  citizen voice in service delivery process 
US Privatization Peaked in 1997 
Average provision as % of total provision 
Source: International City/ County Management Association, Profile of Alternative 
Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data, 1982, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 
Contracting Peaked in 1997 
Dynamic Process of Innovation and Reform  
Source: International City/ County Management Association, Profile of Alternative 
Service Delivery Approaches, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 Washington DC.  (Warner and 
Hefetz 2008) Sample Size 1100-1500 US municipalities nationwide 
Reverse Contracting 
  Local governments re-internalize (in source) 
previously contracted services  
  Reasons: (Managers’ Views) 
  Problems with service quality (61%) and lack of 
cost savings (50%),  
  Internal process improvement within the public 
sector (33%) 
  Citizen interest in bringing work back to public 
sector (25%) 
  Problems with Contract Management (17%) 
  (lack of competition, monitoring difficulties) 
Most Delivery is Stable (contract or public), 
Experimentation is at the Margin 
Average percent of total provision across all places. 
Source: ICMA Survey of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, 1992, 1997, 
2002, 2007 Washington DC.  US Municipalities Paired samples. N=500-600 
(Hefetz and Warner 2004, 2007) 
Cycles of Reform:  
#1 Bureaucratic Management 
Problem – corruption, cronyism 
Solution – Public Bureaucracy - Technical 
Management, Expert Driven Planning, Separate 
Politics from Administration, Attention to Due Process 
New Problems: 
  Bureaucratic Rents 
  Unresponsive, inflexible 
  Inefficient 
  Oversupply public goods 
Cycles of Reform: 
 #2 New Public Management 
Problem: Inflexible, unresponsive, slow 
Solution: More Market – Competition, Privatization, 
Consumer Choice, Performance Management 
New Problems: 
  Markets concentrate – competition erodes 
  Contracting expensive, hard to monitor 
  Relational contracting leads to collusion 
  Citizen voice ≠ consumer choice   
  Competition creates inequality 
  Decisions not socially optimal – preference 
misalignment, information asymmetries  
  Loss of democracy and due process 
Cycles of Reform:  
#3 Reassertion of a State Role 
Problem: corruption, costs increase, lose control 
Solution:  Rebalancing Reform – Markets, 
Government and Citizen Participation 
Democracy 
Citizen 
Participation, 
Public 
Accountability 
Government 
Management 
Internal 
Innovation,  
Due Process 
Balanced Approach to 
Governmental 
Reform 
Markets  
Competition, 
Management & 
Consumer 
Choice 
Learning from Past Reforms - 
Need to Balance Market and State 
  Institutional Framework for Markets is Socially 
Constructed 
  Often lags market development (eg Post Socialist 
Transition) 
  Requires governmental capacity (regulatory standards, 
anti-trust law, enforcement capacity) 
  Many Public Services are Natural Monopolies – public 
monopoly better than competition (Warner and Bel 2008) 
  Human Interaction is more than market exchange: 
Redistribution, reciprocity, engagement 
  Privatization shifted the social contract, undermined 
citizen rights to services 
  Community building is the ultimate public good 
  Public services provide the mechanisms for citizens to 
learn to engage heterogeneous differences  
Government Role 
  Market Manager – ensure competition, create 
institutional foundation for markets, regulation 
  Bureaucratic Management - technical expertise, 
broader, longer term vision  
  Deliberative Space – public engagement 
  Public Service Provision is about more than cost & 
quality, 
  Includes accountability, voice and redistribution 
  Reversals not a return to public delivery of the past 
  Reflect a new balanced approach:  
Markets, Government and Citizen Participation 
Role for Unions:  
Frame the Debate in a New Way 
Old Myths 
  Markets  are superior to government.  
  Public sector workers are selfish and inefficient 
  Current Realities 
  Markets are short term, self interested and unstable, but 
are also a source of innovation 
  Government provides  
  the infrastructure that supports the economy and social 
wellbeing 
  the space for a collective conversation about long term 
societal goals. 
  Public sector workers are innovative, service oriented and 
stewards of the broader public good. 
Role for Unions 
Within Country 
Promote Internal Process Improvement – This is Critical 
 Recognize Need for Labor Flexibility 
 Recognize Need for Customer Service 
Ensure Accountability – be the whistle blowers 
Reclaim the Public Service Ethos - Protect Citizenship 
Rights 
Internationally 
Ensure contracting and labor standards, regulatory 
authority of sub-national governments  
 Watch GATS negotiations (Gerbasi and Warner 2007) 
Sponsor a global conversation about the positive role of 
government 
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Reversing privatization, rebalancing government reform:
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Abstract
The last decades of the 20th century witnessed a profound experiment to increase the role of markets in local government service
delivery. However, that experiment has failed to deliver adequately on efficiency, equity or voice criteria. This has led to reversals.
But this reverse privatization process is not a return to the direct public monopoly delivery model of old. Instead it heralds the
emergence of a new balanced position which combines use of markets, deliberation and planning to reach decisions which may be
both efficient and more socially optimal.
# 2008 Policy and Society Associates (APSS). Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Experimentation with contracting out (privatization) of local government services grew over the 1980s and 1990s,
but we have begun to see reversals in that trend. Compulsory competitive tendering has been abolished in the UK and
Australia; New Zealand elected a prime minister focused on rebuilding internal government service delivery capacity;
and US local government managers began to bring previously contracted services back in house in a process of reverse
privatization. This reassertion of the public role is not the direct government monopoly of the past. Instead we see local
governments using markets, but playing a market structuring role in building competition, managing monopoly and
reducing transactions costs of contracting. But market management is not the only role of government. Managers also
see the importance of engaging citizens in the public service delivery process. This paper describes both theoretically
and empirically how this new approach to governmental reform balances the efficiency benefits of market-type
engagement with the technical benefits of planning and the civic benefits of public engagement.
There has been a shift in understanding of the role of the state in public service delivery over the last few decades. The
old public administration emphasized direct government delivery, hierarchical control, and a separation of politics and
management to ensure due process for citizens and limit outside influence among public employees. This system was
criticized as too slow and inflexible by proponents of theNewPublicManagementwho arguedmarket-typemanagement
approaches could be effectively applied to the public sector (Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). New Public
Management emphasized speed and flexibility and touted the advantages of markets for both greater private sector
engagement and consumer voice for citizens (Savas, 1987).Market solutions suffer from high transactions costs and this
has led to a new emphasis on network governance based on relational contracting and trust (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004;
Brown, Potoski, & van Slyke, 2007). However, the close relationships between contractors and government in network
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governance undermine democratic accountability. The lack of control and accountability in contracting networks has led
others to emphasize citizens are more than consumers and government more than a contract manager (deLeon &
Denhardt, 2000; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Sclar, 2000; Starr, 1987).
One of the intellectual foundations for market approaches to public goods is public choice theory (Tiebout, 1956).
However, the public choice reliance on aggregated individual preferences in a market-type system can lead to public
value failures because it allows no space for a deliberative social process of public participation (Bozeman, 2002).
Problems with preference misalignment cause the aggregation of individual preferences to diverge from the collective
social preference (Lowery, 1998). However, democratic approaches to aggregate individual preferences through
voting may not be socially optimal or stable either according to social choice theory (Sager, 2002a). What is missing in
both these approaches is a space for deliberation to identify collective needs and common solutions. Recent work in
communicative planning and deliberative democracy shows that through deliberation individuals shift preferences
toward more collective goals and thus arrive at a more socially optimal choice (Frug, 1999; Lowery, 2000; Sager,
2002b). When combined with markets and voting, deliberation may be both democratic and efficient.
In this chapter, I argue there is a rebalancing of government reform that capitalizes on the efficiency of markets, the
technical expertise of planning, and the social choice of democracy without the problems of accountability and decision
cycling that occur under any of these strands alone. This paper explores the theoretical basis for the emergence of such a
balanced position, and provides evidence this is occurring in local government practice. Public managers have moved
beyond the dichotomy ofmarkets or planning, and instead embrace amixed positionwhich complements the advantages
ofmarketswith the benefits of public engagement. This balance between deliberation andmarkets recognizes citizens are
more than consumers, and government is more than a market manager. Government creates the space for collective
deliberation to occur and through this process a sense of the social is built. See Fig. 1.
2. Shifts in theory
2.1. Understanding the difference between market and government
The New Public Management revolution in local government promotes market-based management techniques to
increase efficiency and citizen choice, but it fails to consider the subtle and important ways in which markets and
government differ. Markets are based on the principle of utility maximization. Adam Smith articulated the notion of an
invisible hand whereby producers and consumers in a market (motivated by individual utility maximization) would
create competitive price pressure, promote innovation and ensure service quality thus securing socially optimal
production. The key to this happy result was competition. But many services are natural monopolies, and thus do not
benefit from the invisible hand of Adam Smith’s competitive market. Competition erodes, and with it the guarantee of
this market-based socially optimal result.
Key to the challenge of using markets for public goods is recognition of what creates a public good in the first place.
Public goods, by definition, arise frommarket failure as self-interested individuals undersupply critical social goods or
free ride on common resources. Congestion, pollution, and public health are all examples of market failed public
goods which require some collective intervention to address. Typically this intervention is in the form of government
regulation or production. With increased urbanization, externalities become more pronounced (congestion, public
health impacts, etc.), more services experience market failures, and citizen demand for public provision increases.
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Fig. 1. Rebalancing government reform.
This has led to the expansion of local government service delivery over time into new arenas of service delivery – e.g.
garbage collection, water distribution, environmental management, infrastructure provision and human services.
However, market delivery mechanisms still may be possible for some of these goods. The potential of voluntary
bargaining to address externalities, first articulated by Ronald Coase in his article on the Problem of Social Cost
(1960), rests on the notion of a bargaining framework where individuals with full information and clear property rights
pay producers of positive (negative) externalities to increase (reduce) them in a voluntary scheme. When the link
between the supplier and the consumer is close, such payment schemes are easier to arrange. When larger numbers of
actors are involved, these voluntary solutions tend to break down and government organization of production is
preferred (Coase, 1960; Webster, 1998).
Recent scholarship suggests that in dense urban settings, the possibilities of voluntary solutions may be larger than
once thought. For example in squatter settlements where government is unwilling or unable to extend basic services,
individuals come together to provide services – urban transportation, water delivery – that might traditionally be
provided by government (Gilbert, 1998). That people have voluntarily organized to meet collective needs attests to the
power and potential behind voluntary market solutions. In arguing for the ‘spontaneous order’ created by markets,
Webster and Lai (2003) suggest government delivery may hamper such private solutions through regulation and
intervention that raises costs and restricts access, especially for the poor. This has been one of the rationales behind the
promotion of market-delivered services for the poor (Graham, 1998).
While these market approaches show promise, they still require a significant government role. Where these market
solutions are most pronounced (e.g. squatter settlements); property rights of consumers are least secure. This tilts the
bargaining power toward the private producers of public goods and can lead to problems in price and quality due to
inadequate government oversight. It also promotes an economic conception of citizenship where rights to basic
services – even those critical to life such as water – are based on ability to pay. In developing countries, where market
based schemes for water delivery have been promoted by foreign donors, we have seen large increases in consumer
prices which have led to civic protest, most notably thewater riots in Cochabamba, Bolivia (Kohl, 2004). These market
solutions promote a version of citizen choice and empowerment based on market-based bargaining, that has been
challenged as a veil to reduce citizenship rights to basic services (Miraftab, 2004). Even in developed countries, such
as Canada, privatization has been challenged as an assault on both citizenship and democracy (CUPE, 2001).
There is something more fundamental and than cost and service quality in the public goods equation. Citizens
expect involvement, voice and control over government decisions. Deliberation is the key to democracy. But
anonymous and spontaneous markets do not create a space for deliberation. The individual can choose to buy or not,
but deliberation on the nature of the choice is not typically part of a market. Markets, as aggregations of individuals, do
not become social spaces for deliberation unless market governance is designed that way. Recall that the efficiency
benefit of Adam Smith’s invisible hand was that it did not require deliberation. But as market solutions have been
applied to public service delivery, problems with preference alignment have been found (Lowery, 1998). When
individual preferences are substituted for public preferences (e.g. a private provider’s preference for profit vs. the
public interest in access and service quality), we have failure of public goods again. Consumers may substitute
individual preferences for public objectives when they shop as individuals in a privatized market for public goods. This
has been found in voucher schemes for education, child care and job training where socially suboptimal choices are
made by individual consumers who, due to lack of information or time, choose convenience over quality and thus
undermine the intended societal educational benefits (Hipp & Warner, 2007; Lowery, 1998; Meyers & Jordan, 2006).
Recent research has shown that through deliberation, citizens shift their individual preferences more toward
collective well being (Lowery, 2000; Sager, 2002b). Creating the space for such democratic deliberation is a key
function of government. Frug (1999) has argued that such community building is the ultimate public good. Citizens in
a democratic society must develop the capacity to engage difference, see common problems and craft socially optimal
solutions. In planning, this has led to a new subfield of communicative planning which emphasizes how power
imbalances can be altered through a deliberative process which allows more citizen voice and participation (Forester,
1999; Healey, 1996). In public administration attention is shifting back to a focus on citizenship, participation and
public value. The role of government is not simply to steer a market process; it also must serve citizens (Denhardt &
Denhardt, 2003, 2000). Governments must have the capacity to help citizens come together to identify problems and to
debate choices (Nalbandian, 1999, 2005). Citizen engagement is more than the consumer orientation and competition
advocated by New Public Management (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Citizens need more than the exit option of
markets; they need the opportunity to stay, exercise voice, and invest in their community (Frug, 1999). Participation in
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local decision-making is seen as the foundation for a democratic society. Learning to solve collective problems, to
engage the heterogeneous diversity found in the urban landscape, and to practice deliberation – these are the
foundations for a democratic society.
2.2. Recognizing the civic within the market
In order to use markets for public goods, more attention must be given to the civic foundations of markets and the
potential for deliberation within them. The social construction of markets challenges the anonymity of the invisible
hand, and shows the importance of trust and embeddedness in creating the social norms that permit markets to function
(Granovetter, 1985; North, 1990). This line of research has been especially important in the transition literature on
Eastern Europe and China. Market emergence requires a state role in creating the legal framework necessary to support
market functioning (bonding, insurance and property rights). It also requires attention to social networks and changing
social norms (Nee, 2000). Market entrepreneurship requires contestation and competition. Neither was encouraged
under state socialism, and so building the norms for contestation and competition is part of the sociological foundation
both for civic engagement and market emergence (Warner & Daugherty, 2004).
Some have argued that democracy and market economies are mutually reinforcing (Przeworski, 1991), and indeed
this was the philosophy behind most international donor investment in Eastern Europe after the transition. However,
inadequate social foundations for market functioning led to corruption and concentration of privatized assets into the
hands of a few, understood as gangster capitalism or ‘‘the great stealing’’ in much of the region, especially Russia
(Holstrom & Smith, 2000).
Markets naturally concentrate power. A laissez faire market does not naturally emerge. Absent state regulations to
ensure more competitive market functioning, and social norms and networks to ensure broader bargaining power,
concentration is an expected result. Even mathematical models of market systems show that wealth concentrates, and
competition disappears as the models play out over time (Hayes, 2002). This is especially common in many publicly
provided services which are natural monopolies, or tend toward monopoly – water, waste collection, electricity, etc.
Lowery (1998) has warned that public service contracting markets are at best, quasi markets of one buyer
(government) and a few sellers. Thus these markets fail to create competition. This may be why local governments
show more stability in their use of contracting for public goods if they focus on managing monopoly. Warner and Bel
(2008), in their comparative study of water distribution and solid waste disposal contracting in the US and Spain, found
Spanish local governments had both higher levels of contracting and more stable contracts than in the US. They
attributed these differences to the Spanish focus on managing monopoly through mixed public/private firms which
enjoy the benefits of natural monopoly (economies of scale) and private sector management, but retain public values
and accountability. In the US, by contrast, local governments focus on promoting competition between government
and private firms. This resulted in less contracting over all and much higher rates of reversals.
Lack of competition is not the only failure. Market-based solutions also create preference alignment problems as
individuals substitute private preferences (convenience) for public preference (quality) (Hipp and Warner, 2007).
Markets also can lead to preference errors on the part of purchasers due to information asymmetries and transactions
costs (Lowery, 1998). Some of these market failures can be addressed through investments in the social foundation –
public education, regulatory standards or anti-trust laws. The important challenge is to understand the social
foundations of markets. The late 20th century was an experiment to see how far we could push the boundaries of
market into state provision of market-failed public goods. However, if we want to use markets for public goods, then
we must understand what is needed for those markets to work.
Market solutions for public goods promoted in both developing countries and Eastern Europe failed to give
sufficient attention to the failures of quasi markets outlined above or the important social foundations of markets which
help ensure their smooth functioning. Polanyi (1944) argued that human interaction is based on more than market
exchange. Reciprocity and redistribution are key. When markets subordinate other aspects of human life, there will be
a counter movement to moderate them. This may help explain the strong anti-privatization movement in water in
Bolivia and South Africa. It also may explain the growth in reverse privatization we are seeing in the US and the shifts
away from competitive tendering among the early privatizers: the UK, Australia and New Zealand.
Privatization requires government capacity to manage markets and citizen/consumer capacity to effectively engage
them. Privatization is not a reduction in the role of the state as some pro-privatization theorists argue (Savas, 1987), but
rather a shift in state role (Schamis, 2002) toward managing new tools (Salamon, 2002) including a more direct market
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management role. The structuring of contracts, regulation of price and quality, as well as direct action as a supplier or
purchaser in the market are all tools governments have used to engage markets more effectively in public service
delivery. Privatization does not allow government to contract out and walk away, instead government must remain
actively engaged as a market player directly providing services and contracting out in a dynamic process to ensure
competition, efficiency, service quality and broader public objectives (Hefetz & Warner, 2004, 2007; Warner &
Hebdon, 2001; Warner & Hefetz, 2008).
2.3. The promise and failure of market approaches
One of the purported advantages of market approaches to government was that they would give the consumer
citizen more choice and voice in government service delivery. Tiebout (1956) showed that, especially at the local
government level, a public market of competing local governments gave mobile residents choice in the tax/service mix
of their communities, and provided competitive pressure for local governments to remain efficient. At a time of rapid
suburbanization and geographic mobility in the post-WWII US, a public choice model based on mobility seemed
reasonable. Later studies of such Tiebout sorting have challenged the assumption that decisions are based primarily on
efficiency considerations. Sorting by race and class has had a major impact on the landscape of fiscal and service
inequality in metropolitan areas (Frug, 1999; Lowery, 2000; Troutt, 2000; Warner & Pratt, 2005).
A strong sense of localism has led to the notion that public services are private, club goods, available only to
residents within a particular jurisdiction (Frug, 1999). This narrowing of the public view has undermined efforts to
cooperate at the regional scale. While such localism may promote democracy and choice, the need for planning at the
metropolitan regional scale suggests the region may be the appropriate scale for a local focus today (Briffault, 2000).
The challenge is how to create the appropriate forum for a regional democratic conversation (Frug, 2002). Both
technocratic planning ‘‘things regionalism’’ and private market approaches ‘‘privatization’’ have been shown to
exacerbate inequality and narrow voice to growth coalition elites (Bollens, 1997; Logan & Molotch, 1987; Warner,
2006b; Warner & Hefetz, 2002, 2003, 2008). We need a ‘‘people regionalism’’ that incorporates both the technical and
the market but subjects it to social debate.
One of the promises of privatization is that it would give consumer citizens even more voice than voting (which is
infrequent), or changing communities (which requires the means to move). By privatizing government services,
citizen consumers would enjoy market choice and could shop for services on a more regular basis than they can vote or
move between communities. However, empirical analysis of US contracting behavior shows that attention to citizen
voice is lower among municipalities that privatize more (Warner & Hefetz, 2002). Because privatization is typically a
contract between government as purchaser and one or a small group of suppliers, the citizen consumer does not see a
choice of providers.
Similarly, market approaches could allow governments to obtain economies of scale at the regional level.
Privatization and inter-municipal cooperation are popular local government reforms. However, neither promotes intra-
regional equity. Privatization is favored by richer suburbs over rural or core urban communities (Kodrzycki, 1994;
Warner, 2006a; Warner & Hefetz, 2003, 2008), and inter-municipal cooperation, because it is voluntary, does not lead
governments to choose to cooperate with their less well off neighbors (Warner, 2006b).
Efficiency gains, another promise of the market model, have been fleeting. US research shows that only with
monitoring did local governments experience efficiency gains under privatization (Warner & Hefetz, 2002). Meta
analyses of privatization and cost studies show inconsistent results, but the majority of studies do not show cost savings
under privatization (Boyne, 1998; Hirsch, 1995; Hodge, 2000; Bel &Warner, 2008a). Some have attributed this lack of
efficiency gains to the high transactions costs of contracting (Hefetz&Warner, 2004; Sclar, 2000). Contract specification
and monitoring have turned out to be more challenging and costly than first thought (Pack, 1989; Prager, 1994). While
some of these costs can be controlled through a more careful market management role, transactions costs is not a
sufficient framework for understanding the challenges of contracting (Bel & Warner, 2008b; Hefetz & Warner, 2007).
2.4. Combining deliberation and markets
We have seen above that markets do not ensure equity, voice or efficiency. Markets are a tool that can be used in
public service delivery but they must be managed carefully to achieve the desired goals. Local government must have
the capacity to structure markets and engage citizens in a deliberative process.
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While the experiment with market reforms has been proceeding in public administration, in the field of planning
renewed interest has been focused on deliberation and communication. Building fromHabermasian dialogue, a field of
communicative planning has arisen which focuses on the process of public participation and communication in
planning decisions (Forester, 1999; Healey, 1996). Communicative planning sees a special role for the planner in
clarifying options and challenging misinformation (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995). While some critique
communicative planning theory for being too focused on consensus and failing to adequately address power
differences – especially the naı¨ve assumption that the planner can be abstracted from his/her structural position in a
nexus of power and professional expertise (McGuirk, 2001), others argue that planners can facilitate an advocacy
planning process that challenges existing power structures and gives more voice to the poor (Krumholz & Clavel,
1994; Reardon, 1999).
Although market-based reform efforts have fuelled negative views of government among citizens and the media;
local government managers show increasing interest in serving public values (Allmendinger, Tewdwr-Jones, &
Morphet, 2003; Moore, 1995). Public opinion research in the US has found that citizens typically equate government
with self-serving politicians or unresponsive bureaucracy, leading to a negative view (Bresette & Kinsey, 2006). But
when the dialogue is reframed in terms of government creating the public structures that promote economic efficiency
and security, then citizen views become more positive. The challenge is to rebuild the capacity of government to lead;
and of citizens to participate in a collective deliberative process. Local government has a progressive potential
exhibited by leadership at the municipal scale to promote innovation (Clavel, 1986). Nalbandian (1999, 2005) has
articulated government capacity as the capacity to bring a community together to solve problems in a way that does not
rend the social fabric, so they can come together again to solve the next problem. Based on the exciting innovations in
Puerto Alegre, Brazil, city leaders around the world are experimenting with new models of citizen engagement –
citizen budgets, citizen visioning, and encouraging neighbourhood control over service delivery (Abers, 1998;
Osborne & Plastrick, 1997; Potapchuck, Crocker, & Schechter, 1998; Gaventa, 2004).
In this regard, the planner’s role is similar to the local government manager’s role, though the planner is primarily
focused on process and the government manager on direct service delivery. How to incorporate this need for
deliberation in the context of a more market-based system of government service delivery is the challenge.
Public choice theory incorrectly assumed that consumer choice in a competitive market could address public goods
problems. Likewise, democratic alternatives, such as majority voting, have been shown to lead to unstable decision
cycles and manipulation. Social choice theory has documented the impossibility of solutions which are both efficient,
democratic and serve the public interest. Cycle free decisions involve some form of expert sovereignty (Sager, 2001,
2002b).1 So neither voting nor consumer choice alone can yield a stable, democratic and socially optimal solution.
Sager (2002b) suggests that deliberation can be used as a supplement in an iterative process that circumvents these
problems. ‘‘Deliberation brackets preferences and voting brackets the giving of reasons, but shifting between these
decision-making modes can bring both types of information into play. . .which helps to explain why decision cycles do
not occur as frequently in practice as predicted by social choice theory.’’ (Sager, 2002b, p. 376) Through deliberation
individuals can see the need to shift toward more socially beneficial decisions (Frug, 1999; Lowery, 2000). This is the
promise of a deliberative and democratic planning process. However, deliberation alone, can lead to the same kind of
impossibility problems as voting (Sager, 2002b). So the challenge is to use a process that combines planning, markets,
voting and deliberation.
3. Shifts in practice
The first section of this chapter documented a shift in theory from an emphasis on market approaches, to a more
balanced concern with democracy and planning. I argue that local government, in its practice, is moving beyond the
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1 Research on social choice argues the impossibility of decision processes that are both manipulation-free and democratic (the Gibbard–
Satterthwaite theorem), the impossibility of combining individual liberty and respect for unanimous preference rankings (Sen theorem), and the
impossibility of amalgamating individual preference rankings in a way that is both consistent and democratic (Arrow theorem). For more detail on
these theorems see: Arrow, K. J. (1963). Social choice and individual values. New York: John Wiley; Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of voting
schemes: a general result. Econometrica, 41, 587–601; Satterthwaite, M. A. (1975), Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and
correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 187–217; Sen, A. (1970), The
impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Journal of Political Economy, 78, 152–157.
either/or dichotomy of planning or markets, and embracing a more balanced mixed position. Three brief examples will
suffice.
New Zealand and the United Kingdom were early and radical innovators promoting extensive privatization through
compulsory competitive tendering. In New Zealand, we are seeing a shift back with the new 2002 local government
law which recognizes the need to rebuild government capacity to both manage markets and build the local foundation
for democracy. Local government is seen as the forum where a balance between economic development,
environmental and civic interests can be crafted. In the United Kingdom we have seen a shift away from Compulsory
Competitive Tendering toward a ‘best value’ regime which includes a broader range of objectives than just efficiency.
While terms such as ‘contestability’ and ‘scrutiny’ emphasize competition and accountability, there is also emphasis
on citizen engagement. In the US, privatization was never compulsory, but support for market-based government is
strong. However contracting out peaked in 1997 and reverse contracting is now larger than new contracting out.
Concerns with reductions in service quality and lack of cost savings drove this shift. In each of these cases market
approaches are not jettisoned; rather use of market is balanced by recognition of the need for a government
management role – both to structure the market and to ensure a deliberative space for citizens.
3.1. New Zealand
New Zealand was an early leader in implementing market-based approaches to government. They tested the notion
of enterprise units – focused on meeting goals and using a private sector management approach which promoted
competition, outsourcing, privatization and a customer service orientation. Many services were sold off or privatized.
New Zealand’s approach to reform served as an exemplar for other countries, especially the United States (Osborne &
Plastrick, 1997). At the local level private companies emerged to manage roads, which are one of the largest budget
areas for local government. New Zealand local government managers became experts in contract management.
Contracting networks were viewed as more flexible than direct government and considered the wave of the future. As
they moved from market management to partnerships, they recognized that partnerships need management and
accountability.
However, the results of privatization were only partly satisfactory. Regulation alone was not enough; an
accountability framework was needed, along with professional local government management. In the late 1990s New
Zealand made a course correction and reasserted a government role. The election of Prime Minister, Helen Clark, in
1999, reflected in part a desire to rebuild government capacity.
Certainly a not inconsiderable part of my government’s time has been spent in rebuilding public sector capacity
to deliver the results the public demands. . .. The public sector reform which went on in the 1980s and 1990s was
aimed at making government agencies more efficient, but it was undoubtedly also aimed at ensuring that there
was less government. Our reforms have banked the efficiency gains, but have looked to build effectiveness as
well. . ..a high performance and highly skilled public sector is required. (Clark, 2005)
In 2002, a new local government law was passed (Local Government New Zealand, 2003). This law recognized that
local government must balance competing objectives: economic development, social wellbeing, environmental
management and civic engagement. This process is too complex for a simple market mechanism. The law recognized
that citizens are more than market-based service customers. Local government must give more attention to the
importance of a democratic base and citizen consultation.
NewZealand is ahead of the US inmany respects. It has undertakenmore privatization and outsourcing at the local
level. Its performance management systems are more sophisticated, and it has an explicit audit and accountability
framework. It undertook a significant amalgamation of local government in 1989 which created a structural
framework for regionalism based on more sensible urban and ecological boundaries (e.g. regionalism that
encompasses awatershed, or links city and suburb). Although a clearer framework for local government has been laid
out, there are still problems creating effective regional collaboration and crafting the balance between environmental,
social, economic and cultural objectives, especially in areas with development pressures. Consultation is not without
its problems. A deliberative process can lead to more social choices, but too much consultation can lead to
‘‘governance exhaustion.’’ However, the notion of a more balanced position involving markets, democracy and
planning has been articulated. Local government leaders are attempting to balance deliberative process with the
efficiency of markets.
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3.2. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom was another early innovator in privatization. With Margaret Thatcher, emphasis on
competition and breaking the monopoly of government power was paramount. Competitive tendering was made
compulsory from 1988 to 1998. But results suggest the program was not that successful in breaking the monopoly of
local government control as a large percentage of contracts were won by local government teams (Szymanski &
Wilkins, 1993). Nor was the program successful in saving money, as most cost savings eroded over time (Szymanski,
1996). With the election of Tony Blair in 1997, a shift back toward a more balanced position began. The ‘‘best value’’
framework was implemented in 1999 in recognition that local government needed to balance more objectives than
simple cost efficiency. Greater attention was given to accountability and citizen engagement (Martin, 2002). Best
value gave attention to speed, service quality and citizen voice in the service delivery process. Although the national
government was keenly interested in promoting local government innovation and viewed contestability as a core
reform, it also recognized the need to engage local government managers as partners, not rivals, in the reform process
(Entwistle & Martin, 2005). Local government managers’ reluctance to externalize services reflected a public service
ethos, the need for control and market management, and the need to retain core competencies within the public sector
(Entwistle, 2005).
3.3. United States
In the United States public discourse at the national level regarding local service delivery was not as pronounced as
in New Zealand or the United Kingdom. Local government reform is controlled at the state level and this leads to great
diversity and more local government independence.
However, support for privatization was strong in the US. In 1982 the professional association of city managers, the
International City/County Management Association commenced a Survey of Alternative Service Delivery to measure
the level of privatization. That survey has been repeated every five years since. This permits tracking trends over time,
something not possible in other countries. Although trends were relatively flat, there was increasing experimentation
with privatization after 1992. But contracting out peaked in 1997, and in 2002 (the latest data available) we see a return
to public delivery and a dramatic increase in mixed public and private delivery (Warner &Hefetz, 2008). See Fig. 2. As
contracting out has fallen, mixed public/private delivery has grown. This mixed delivery occurs when governments
both provide a service directly and contract out a portion. This creates competition between public and private
providers, maintains government capacity and internal knowledge about the process of service delivery, and ensures
continued citizen involvement in the service delivery process (Warner & Hefetz, 2008). Regression models for 1992,
1997 and 2002 show a priority for market management concerns, but emergence of a balanced concern with market
management and citizen voice in 2002. The challenges of local government service delivery are about more than
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Fig. 2. Trends in local government service delivery, 1992–2002. Percent of provision averaged across all responding governments. Provision is
percent of total number of services provided on average. Provision rates: 66%, 61%, 53% for 1992, 1997, 2002, respectively. Author analysis based
on data from the International City/County Management Association, profile of alternative service delivery approaches, US Municipalities, 1992,
1997, 2002, Washington, DC. Reprinted from Warner and Hefetz (2008).
efficiency. Local government leaders and citizens alike recognize the need to balance multiple objectives: service
quality, citizen participation and economic efficiency. This explains the emergence of a mixed market position.
Reverse privatization also grew dramatically over the decade from 12% of all service delivery in the 1992–1997
period, to 18% of all service delivery from 1997 to 2002 (Hefetz &Warner, 2007). See Fig. 3. ICMA added a question
to its 2002 survey asking why managers brought previously contracted work back in house and the primary reasons
where problems with service quality, lack of cost savings, internal process improvement, and citizen support for
bringing the work back in house (Warner & Hefetz, 2004). A similar survey fielded in Canada the following year,
found exactly the same rank order of reasons for reverse privatization (Hebdon & Jalette, 2008).
Statistical analyses of this shift over the decade 1992–2002 (Hefetz & Warner, 2007) show the increase in reverse
contracting is only partially explained by transactions costs (asset specificity, monitoring). What is more important are
place characteristics and citizen voice. Reverse contracting is part of a market management approach, but also is a
response to increased attention to citizen voice. These results confirm the existence of a new balanced model of local
government reform which gives attention to both markets and citizen voice.
4. Conclusion
The last decades of the 20th century witnessed a profound experiment to increase the role of markets in local
government service delivery. However, that experiment has failed to deliver adequately on efficiency, equity or voice
criteria. This has led to reversals. But this reverse privatization process is not a return to the direct public monopoly
delivery model of old. Instead it heralds the emergence of a new balanced position which combines use of markets,
democracy and planning to reach decisions which may be both efficient and more socially optimal.
Local governments play a key role in community problem solving and this is the fundamental public good. To do so,
they must move beyond market models of government and promote deliberation and public participation. The New
Public Management reforms focused on competition and entrepreneurialism. But competition is ephemeral in public
service markets and provides a poor foundation for equity. Entrepreneurship encourages secrecy and risk taking that
may be inappropriate for critical public services (deLeon&Denhardt, 2000; Kelly, 1998). Government is meant to be a
stabilizing force, designed to reduce risk and ensure security. It is structured around principles of openness and
stewardship where participation and representation are the foundation, not competition.
The privatization experience of the late 20th century has taught us that markets require governance. Managing
markets for public services is both challenging and costly. These market networks limit traditional government
mechanisms to ensure public control, accountability, representation and balance of interests. Using markets alone can
lead to economic conceptions of citizenship (e.g. citizen rights defined by ability to pay, limited sense of public space,
little collective sharing of externalities). Recognizing the democratic deficit in these arrangements has led to greater
emphasis on public planning and democratic engagement. We see this in the reverse privatization trends and the
emergence of a more balanced position that combines market approaches with participation and planning. At the
beginning of the 21st century, this balanced approach is the new reform.
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Fig. 3. Dynamics of local government service delivery, 1992–2002. Author analysis based on data from the International City/County Management
Association, profile of alternative service delivery approaches, survey data 1992, 1997, 2002, Washington, DC. Reprinted from Hefetz and Warner
(2007).
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support Extension publications, 1996. 
  *  "Comparative Approaches to Rural Development in the US and Europe," $750, funds to support 
regional travel, 1993. 
  *  "Community Land Use and Economics Simulation," $4,950, with Paul Eberts and Guy Burns.  Funds 
to support development and testing of simulation, 1992. 
 
Cornell University/Nitra Slovakia Mellon Foundation Project 
  *  "Restructuring of Local Government Services: Privatization, Inter-Governmental Cooperation and 
Public Entrepreneurship" Research collaboration between Dr. Anna Belajova and Dr. Maria 
Fazikova, Dept. of Regional Dev., Slovak  Agriculture University, Nitra, Slovakia and Mildred 
Warner, Cornell University.  Travel funds 1995, 1996, 1999. 
 
Cornell Western Societies Program 
Funds to support European participation at annual international research workshops, U.S. Dept. of 
Education funds, 1992-1995. 
  * "Community Based Approaches to Environmental Management," $2,000. Ithaca, NY, 1992. 
  * "Comparative Approaches to Rural Development in the US and Europe," $2,500, Ithaca, NY, 1993. 
  * "Sustaining Agriculture and Rural Communities: Lessons in Land Use Planning from the US and 
Europe," $2,500, Ithaca, NY, June, 1994. 
  * "Sustaining Rural Landscapes: The Critical Link Between Environment and Community," $1,600,  
 Aurora, NY 1995. 
 
Literacy Volunteers of New York State 
  * "Rural Literacy and Community Development: An Agenda for Change," $3,500. Conference and  
 publication, 1994. 
Cornell Center for the Environment 
  * "Ethics and the Environment," $2,000. Cornell Center for the Environment, for extension workshop,  
 1990. 
  * "Solid Waste Management," $2,000.Cornell Center for the Environment, for extension workshop, 
1989. 
 
Cornell Cooperative Extension 
Funding for satellite teleconferences secured through contributions from Cornell Cooperative Extension 
and Cornell Media Services competitive grant pools.  Teleconferences selected for competitive funding 
and subsequent videotape editing include: 
  *  "Newly Elected Officials Training," 1993 ($2,500), 1994 (Videotape - $500), 1995 ($5,000). 
  *  "State Take Over of Medicaid," 1994 ($2,000). 
  *  "Promoting Economic Vitality: What Local Government Can Do," 1995 ($2,500). 
Other partner agencies contributed $500 to $1000 to each of these teleconferences.  State level 
partners include the Civil Service Employees Assoc., NYS Assoc. of Counties, Co. Leg. and Sup. 
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Assoc. of NYS,  NYS Assoc. of Towns, NYS Dept. of State, NYS Office of Rural Affairs, NYS 
Office of the State Comptroller, NYS Dept. of Econ. Dev., NYS Rural Development Council and 
the NYS Planning Federation. 
 
LANGUAGE 
 Fluent in Spanish (F.S.I. level 4, tested December 1981).   
Intensive refresher course in Ecuador Summer 2005. 
 
COURSES TAUGHT 
 
CRP 4120/6120, ARME 433/633, WOMNS 411/611  Devolution and Privatization: Challenges for Urban 
Public Management  (4 Credits) Offered fall 1998-2009, Spring 2011. 
 
CRP 5850 Food System Planning, 1-2 credits, Spring 2011. 
 
CRP 4160 – Rome Workshop - 6 credits, offered Spring 2010. 
 
CRP 8900 Graduate Seminar, Rome Spring 2010. 
 
CRP 7201, Research Design, (3 Credits) offered 1999, 2007, 2008, 2010. 
 
CRP 8300 PhD ProSeminar, 2008, 2009. 
 
CRP 4180/6180, AEM 434/634, WOMNS 420/620  Government Policy Workshop, (4 Credits). Offered 
Spring 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 
  
CRP 5074 Economic Development Workshop (4 credits) offered Spring 2009. 
 
CRP 639 Decentralization in Developing Countries (2 credits) offered 2001. 
 
CRP 639 Community Development and the Non Profit Sector (1 credit pre semester) offered 2 semesters 
1998-99, (team taught with C. Gunn, P. Clavel, and S. Christopherson). 
 
AWARDS 
 
Economic Development Workshop “Planning for Family Friendly Communities,” (CRP 5074, Spring 
2009), won Upstate NY Chapter of the American Institute of Certified Planners Outstanding Student 
Project Award 2009. 
 
Planning for Social Inclusion, Finalist, American Planning Assoc. Oct. 2006. 
 
Outstanding Program Award, Community Development Society, 2006. for Linking Economic 
Development and Child Care Project. 
 
Excellence in Leadership Award, NYS Child Care Coordinating Council 2004. 
 
Distinguished Professor, Cornell Institute of Public Affairs, 2003. 
 
Government Policy Workshop “Women Work and Welfare,” (CRP 418/618, Spring 2000), won Upstate 
NY Chapter of the American Institute of Certified Planners Outstanding Student Project Award 2001. 
  
Fellow, Kellogg National Leadership Program, 1997-2000. 
  
Warner, Mildred Elaine  10 
Community Development Innovator Award, 1994.  "Teleconferences for Newly Elected Officials." 
Award from CaRDI shared with New York State Dept. of State, NYS Assoc of Counties, County 
Legislators and Supervisors Assoc. of NYS, NYS Office of Rural Affairs, NYS Assoc. of Towns, Cornell 
Media Services and Cornell Cooperative Extension. 
 
George F. Warren Award for outstanding graduate publication (for departmental research paper from MS 
thesis), Cornell University, 1986. 
 
Jerome Davis Social Science Paper Competition (for unpublished research paper on public housing in 
Britain), Oberlin, College, 1979. 
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Care and Education Finance: New Strategies to Invest, Innovate, and Advance Public Policy  
November 12-13, 2009, Washington, DC. 
 
Keynote Speaker, “Assessing the Economic Impact of Child Care During Recessionary Times,” National 
Child Care Administrators Conference, Child Care Bureau, US Dept of Health and Human Services, 
Washington, DC July 2009. 
 
Workshop Organizer and presenter, Preparing for the New Century: Innovative Work and Family 
Strategies, National workshop on Work-Life Policy, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY June 2009. 
 
Workshop Organizer and Presenter, “Revisiting economic impact studies -- how can we use them in tight 
fiscal times?” Linking Economic Development and Child Care Smart Start Preconference Workshop, 
Greensboro, NC, May 2009. 
 
Workshop Organizer and Presenter, Planning for Family Friendly Cities, American Planning Association 
National Conference, Minneapolis, MN, April, 2009. 
 
Invited Speaker. Panel on Expanding Quality Early Care and Education at conference, Achieving Equity 
for Women: Policy Alternatives for the New Administration, sponsored by Institute for Women’s Policy 
Research, Washington, DC. April 2, 2009. 
 
Invited speaker. “Understanding the Child Care Market,” Plenary Panelist on Panel Are Vouchers an 
Effective Strategy for Financing Child Care? National Association of Child Care Resource Agencies, 
Washington, DC, March 2009. 
 
Session Organizer and Presenter, Financing Early Care and Education: Building Links with Economic 
Development Policy and Practice - A Facilitated Conversation, June 17 - 18, 2008, Aspen Institute, 
Washington DC. 
 
Session Organizer and Presenter, Venture Grant Learning Community Meeting, Preconference to 
National Smart Start Conference, May 2008. Greensboro, NC 
 
Session organizer, “Planning for Family Friendly Cities,” American Planning Association annual 
conference, April 2008, Las Vegas, NV. 
 
Invited Speaker, International Perspectives on Child Care: Gender Equality or Economic Development, 
Economic Justice Summit, National Organization of Women, Atlanta, GA, April 11-12, 2008. 
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“Linking Economic Development and Child Care,” Governor’s Summit on Education, Workforce and 
Economic Development: Partnerships and Possibilities, January 2008.  Orlando, Florida. 
 
“Child Care: Policy, Planning and Economic Development,” Venture Grantee Meeting, May 8, 2007, 
Greensboro, NC, preconference to Smart Start 2007 national conference. 
 
“Reframing Childcare as Economic Development: Exploring the Theory, Method, Practice and Strategy 
of Economic Impact Studies.” Child Care Coalition of Manitoba, Canada, April 23-24, 2007. 
 
Session organizer, “Planning for Family Friendly Cities: The Role of Child Care,” American Planning 
Association annual conference, April 2007, Philadelphia, PA. 
 
“The Critical Link Between Child Care and Economic Development,” Keynote presentation, 6th annual 
Policy Breakfast, Sponsored by United Way Success by 6, Greater Syracuse Chamber of Commerce, 
Metropolitan Development Authority, Syracuse, NY Dec. 7, 2006. 
 
Warner, M.E. 2007 “Planning for Inclusion:  The Case of Child Care,” presented at Planning and Social 
Responsibility Symposium, American Planning Association, Ft. Worth, TX November 2006. 
 
“U.S. Trends in US Local Government: From Reinvention to Public Service,” UTS Center for Local 
Government, Sydney, Australia, July 24, 2006 
 
“Linking Economic Development and Child Care,” Presented to New Zealand Treasury, and Departments 
of Labour, Education, Social Development, Women’s Affairs and Maori Affairs, Wellington, New 
Zealand, July 19, 2006 
 
“Local Government: Serving Citizens in a Competitive World,” Keynote speaker, Local Government 
New Zealand Leading Communities Conference, July 17, 2006. 
 
“Linking Child Care and Economic Development,” Keynote presentation at New York Statewide 
conference Cultivating Connections Between Economic Development and Child Care, cosponsored by 
NYS Child Care Coordinating Council and Linking Economic Development and Child Care Project, 
Ithaca, NY, May 2006. 
 
“Using Principles of Economic Development to Shape Business Leaders Agendas,” Early Childhood 
Finance Learning Community conference March 5-6 2006.  Greensboro, NC. 
 
“Early Care and Education: A Regional Economic Framework,” keynote presentation at Strongest Links 
Conference, January 13, 2006, Madison, WI. 
 
Consultative Session on Establishing An Early Care and Education Private Employer Organization, 
Sponsored by the Annie Casey Foundation, Baltimore, MD Dec 12-13, 2005. 
  
“Early Childhood Education and Economic Development,” Economic Action Research Network, 
National Conference, Cleveland, OH Oct 1, 2005. 
 
“Privatization, Free Trade and the Erosion of Government Authority,” National Public Policy Education 
Conference, Farm Foundation, Washington, DC Sept 20, 2005. 
 
“From Reinvention to Public Service: The Potential and Limits of Market Based Government,” and 
“Possible Futures: Competitive City or Cooperative Community?” Invited keynote speaker at The Future 
of Local Government Conference, Melbourne, Australia, June 7-8, 2005. 
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“Economic Development Policy: An Opportunity to Strengthen the Child Care Sector,” National 
Teleconference to State Child Care Administrators and Federal Child Care Bureau Staff, May 2005. 
 
“Regional Economic Modeling and Economic Development as Applied to Child Care,” National 
Technical Assistance Teleconference for National Child Care Information and Referral Staff, May 2005. 
 
“Human Services as Economic Development,” Key note address Human Services Coalition Annual 
Meeting, Feb. 2005, Ithaca, NY. 
 
“Economic Development Strategies to Promote Quality Child Care,” Pre Conference on Early Care and 
Education Finance Reform, Smart Start National Technical Assistance Center, Greensboro, NC Jan 23-4, 
2005. 
 
“The Business of Early Learning:  Linking Child Care & Economic Development,” presented at the Early 
Learning is Good Business Summit for Business and Civic Leaders, Fairfax County, VA June 3, 2004 
 
“Child Care and Economic Development,” Presented to the American Bar Association Forum on 
Affordable Housing and Community Development Law, Feb 28, 2004.  Miami Beach, FL. 
 
“Economic Development Links,” Learning Community on Early Care and Education Finance Reform, 
Smart Start National Technical Assistance Center, Greensboro, NC Jan 25-6, 2004. 
 
“A Regional Economic Analysis of the Child Care Sector in NYS,” Presented to the NYS Child Care 
Coordinating Council, Annual Meeting, Albany, NY, Jan. 14, 2004. 
 
“The Economic Importance of the Early Care and Education Sector” presented to the Iowa Early Care, 
Health and Education Congress, Ames Iowa Nov.18, 2003, and presentation to the Business Council in 
Des Moines. 
 
“Linking Early Care and Education and Economic Development: Four Challenges,” Workshop presented 
at the State Administrator’s Conference, Washington, DC, August 2003. 
 
“The Economic Impact of the Early Care and Education Sector, “ Presented to the Annual Meeting of the 
Child Care Resource and Referral Councils of Nassau and Suffolk Counties, NY, June 2003. 
 
“How can we use economic development strategies to help finance early care and education?” Workshop 
presentation at A Learning Community: Early Care and Education Finance Reform, preconference to 
2003 National Smart Start Conference, Greensboro, North Carolina, January 26-27, 2003.  
 
“The Economic Impact of Child Care in Tompkins County,” Tompkins Co Workforce Development 
Board November 17, 2002.  
 
Workshop Presenter, “Issues to Consider in Conducting an Economic Impact Assessment of the Child 
Care Sector,” Mid-America Regional Council, Kansas City, MO August 2002. 
 
“Child Care as Economic Development,” Plenary Speaker and Workshop Presenter, National State 
Administrator’s Conference, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and 
Families, Child Care Bureau, Washington, D.C., August 2002.  
 
“Building Social Capital Through Economic Development,” CaRDI-USDA Rural Community 
Development Training Institute Ithaca, NY, July 17, 2002 . 
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“Child Care as Economic Development,” Plenary Speaker, New England Workforce Partners for Early 
Care and Education, Stowe, VT. May 2002.  
 
“Child Care as Economic Development” presented at Everything Old is New Again: The New Approach 
to Community Development conference, sponsored by Cornell University, Syracuse, NY May 23, 2002.  
 
“Building Social Capital Through Economic Development,” CaRDI-USDA Rural Community 
Development Training Institute, Orlando, FL, February 2002.  
 
“Child Care as Economic Development,” Plenary Speaker and workshop presenter, Region 1 Early Care 
and Education Conference, Brewster, MA April 2002.  
 
“Building Social Capital Through Economic Development,” CaRDI-USDA Rural Community 
Development Training Institute, Ithaca, NY, November 13, 2001.  
 
“Early Education Partnership: Coming Together for Child Care,” with Sue Dale-Hall, Faculty 
Symposium on Service Learning, Cornell University, January 18, 2001.  
 
“Innovative Economic Development Strategies,” with Martha Armstrong Tompkins County Area 
Development, CaRDI Social Trends and Outlook Conference, Ithaca, NY June 5, 2001.  
 
“Understanding Privatization of Local Government Services,” Plenary speaker (with Elliot Sclar) at 
Federation of Public Employees National Conference, Detroit, MI May 11, 2001.  
  
“Public Values vs. Private Interests: Who Wins and Who Loses under Privatization,” workshop at 
Federation of Public Employees, National Conference, Detroit, MI May 10, 2001.  
 
“Roundtable of Rural Development Banking Issues,” in Helena, AR as part of National Community 
Investment Funds’ Trustee’s Meeting December 4-5, 2001.  
“Dialogue with Urban Executive Directors and CRP Faculty,” Ithaca, NY, March 30, 2000.  
 
“Building Social Capital - Creating a Learning Cluster, “CaRDI Community Development Inservice 
Training: Building Skills for Participatory Community Development, Ithaca, NY, April 11, 2000.  
 
“Transforming Local Banks into Community Development Financial Institutions” with Lisa Richter of 
the National Community Investment Fund, 4th Annual Rural Development Training Conference, USDA 
EC/EZ Initiative, Silver Spring, MD June 7, 2000.  
 
“Building Social Capital” CaRDI/USDA Executive Training Institute for Directors of Empowerment 
Zones and Enterprise Communities, Ithaca, NY, Nov. 18, 1999.  
 
“Local Government Restructuring  - The Need for a Debate about Public Values” Workshop held for 
Extension agents, Ithaca, NY, October 18, 1999.  
“Building Social Capital: The Role of Cooperative Extension,” CaRDI Community Development 
Inservice Training: Building Skills for Participatory Community Development, Ithaca, NY, October 19, 
1999.  
 
“Building Social Capital,” 3rd Annual Rural Development National Training Conference, USDA 
Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Initiative, Memphis TN. Sept 16. 1999.  
 
“Building Social Capital” Workshop for USDA Directors of Empowerment Zones and Enterprise 
Communities, Cornell, May 13, 1999.  
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“Restructuring Local Government Services in New York State.” Paper presented at Local Government 
Workshop, University of Agriculture, Nitra, Slovakia. March 16, 1999.  
 
“Building Social Capital” Workshop for USDA State Directors of Rural Development, Ithaca, NY, 
November 14. 1998.  
 
“Building Social Capital,” Workshop at Association of Cornell Cooperative Extension Educators, 
Waterloo, NY, October 14, 1998.  
 
“Privatization and Restructuring of Local Government Services in New York State,” New York State 
Association of Counties, Statewide conference, Buffalo, NY, September 14, 1998.  
 
President’s Council on Sustainable Development, Metro/Rural Strategies Task Force, national workshop 
on People, Places and Markets: Comprehensive Strategies for Building Sustainable Community.  June 
28-30, 1998.  Invited to serve as discussion leader. 
 
W. K. Kellogg Foundation, Devolution Initiative Networking Meeting, Washington, D.C. June 2-3, 1998.  
Invited participant. 
 
“Confronting the Challenges of Collaboration - Theoretical Concerns and Practical Responses” and 
“Collaboration Tools - Applying Your Understanding to Make it Happen Back Home” two sessions 
organized for the NYS Rural Development Council Annual Conference, Syracuse, NY, April 27-28, 
1998. 
 
OTHER RECENT RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS  
 
“Cost Savings and Privatization: Meta Regression on Water and Waste Services,” with Germà Bel, and 
Xavier Fageda, 2008. presented at Association of Public Policy and Management Conference, Los 
Angeles, CA November 6-8, 2008. 
 
“Planning for Family Friendly Communities,” with Evelyn Israel, paper presented at joint conference of 
American Collegiate Society of Planners and Association of European Schools of Planning, 
July 11, 2008. 
 
“Privatization and Cooperation: Addressing Regionalism through Markets” Presented at special organized 
session on Local Services Privatization: International Perspectives, American Public Policy and 
Management Association conference, Washington, DC, November 2007. 
 
“Regulatory Takings and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for Planners” paper presented at special 
organized session on Property Rights and Compensation Mandates, at the American Collegiate Society of 
Planners, Milwaukee, WI, October 2007. 
 
“Smarter Reform: Moving Beyond Single Program Solutions to an Early Care and Education System,” 
presented at special organized session on Child care at the American Public Policy and Management 
Association conference, Madison, WI November 2006. 
 
 “Child Care and Economic Development: New Frames, New Opportunities and Continuing Challenges,” 
paper presented at special organized session on Planning for Child Care and Economic Development, 
Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning conference in Fort Worth, Texas, November 2006. 
 
“No Room for Simple Solutions: Mixing Markets with Planning in US City Services” with Amir Hefetz, 
Presented at special session, Beyond Efficiency: Challenges in City Service Delivery, Association of 
Collegiate Schools of Planning conference in Kansas City in November 2005. 
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“Planning or Markets? Comparing US and Spanish Privatization,” with Germa Bel, Presented at special 
session, Beyond Efficiency: Challenges in City Service Delivery, Association of Collegiate Schools of 
Planning conference in Kansas City in November 2005. 
 
Warner, M.E. “Economic Development Strategies to Promote Quality Child Care,” poster presentation at 
National Child Care Research Consortium, Baltimore, MD, March 2005. 
 
Warner, M.E. “Competitive Government, Free Trade and the Challenge of Citizenship, “ presented at the 
International Rural Sociology Association meetings, Trondheim, Norway August 2005. 
 
Warner M.E. and Zhilin Liu, “The Importance of Child Care in Economic Development: A Comparative 
Analysis of Regional Economic Linkage,” American Collegiate Society of Planners Conference, October, 
2004. Portland, Oregon. 
 
Warner, M.E. “Pragmatism Over Politics: Local Government Privatization Trends 1992-2002,” presented 
to the Law and Society Conference, Chicago. May 2004.  
 
Warner, M.E. “Privatization and Its Reverse: Explaining the Dynamics of the Government Contracting 
Process,” Presented at the Eight International Research Symposium on Public Management, Budapest, 
Hungary April 2004. 
 
Warner, M.E. 2003, ”The Economic Impact of Child Care,” Presented at the joint annual meetings of the 
Rural Sociological Society and American Association of Agricultural Economics, Montreal, August 
2003. 
 
Warner M.E. and Amir Hefetz 2003, “Privatization: Theoretical Propositions, Empirical Realities,” 
Presented at the joint annual meetings of the Rural Sociological Society and American Association of 
Agricultural Economics, Montreal, August 2003. 
 
Warner, M.E. and Jennifer Gerbasi. 2002. “Privatization, Free Trade and the Erosion of Government 
Authority,” CRP Working Paper #203.  Presented at American Collegiate Society of Planners 
Conference, November 2002. 
 
Hefetz, Amir and M.E. Warner 2001. “Contracting Out and Back-In: The Role of Monitoring,” CRP 
Working Paper #201. Dept. of City and Regional Planning.  Presented to the American Collegiate Society 
of Planners Conference, Baltimore, MD. November 2001. 
 
Warner, M.E. and James Pratt, “A Neural Network Analysis of Spatial Diversity under Devolution,” CRP 
Working Paper #202 presented at the Rural Sociological Society conference, Albuquerque, NM, August 
2001.  
 
Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. “Privatization and the Market Structuring Role of Local Government” 
Planner’s Network Conference, Rochester, NY, June, 2001. 
 
Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2000. “Cities and Service Delivery: Regions or Markets?” Paper presented 
at the American Collegiate Society of Planners conference, Cleveland OH, November 2000. 
 
Warner, M.E. 2000. “Devolution and Inequality: The Importance of State Policy.” American Sociological 
Association, Washington, DC, August, 2000. 
 
Warner, M.E. 2000. “ Devolution and the Emerging Structure of Spatial Inequality,” Rural Sociological 
Society conference, Washington, DC, August 2000. 
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Warner, M. E. 2000. “Resistance, Neoliberalism and Local Government Reform in Central Europe,” 
Rural Sociological Society, Washington, DC, August 2000. 
 
Warner, M.E., Anna Belajova, Maria Fazikova and Andrea Siebenmanova. 2000. “Planning for Rural 
Development: The Critical Role of Local Government,” Association of European Schools of Planning, 
Brno, Czech Republic, July 2000. 
 
Warner, M.E., Anna Belajova and Maria Fazikova. 2000. “Households, Markets and the State: A Gender 
Analysis of the Transition to Capitalism in Slovakia,” Association of European Schools of Planning, 
Brno, Czech Republic, July 2000. 
 
Warner, M.E. 1999. “Devolution and Inequality: The Importance of State Policy.”  Association of 
Collegiate Schools of Planners conference, Chicago, IL, November, 1999. 
 
Warner, M.E. and Amir Hefetz. 1999. "Patterns of Alternative Service Delivery: Is There a Rural 
Dimension?" Rural Sociological Society conference, Chicago, 1999. 
 
Warner, M.E. and R. Hebdon. 1998. “Restructuring Local Government Services: Privatization or 
Government Innovation?” Association of Collegiate Schools of Planners conference, Pasadena, CA, 
November, 1998. 
 
Warner, M.E. 1988. “Devolution and Local Government Capacity for Investment: Historical Trends 
1972-1992.” Presented at the Rural Sociological Society conference, Portland, OR, August 1998. 
 
Warner, M., C. Hinrichs, J. Schneyer, and L. Joyce, 1997. “Collaborative Research Between Extension 
Agents and University Based Researchers: Challenges to the Traditional Research Paradigm,” Paper 
presented at the Cornell Participatory Research Action Network Seminar Series Jan. 29, 1998 and at the 
International Community Development Society Meetings, Athens, GA, July 1997. 
 
Warner, M.E. 1997. “Labor Market Structure, Local Government Investment and County Well-Being: 
U.S. Mid-Atlantic and East North Central States, 1970-1990,” Paper presented at Rural Sociological 
Society meetings, August, 1997, Toronto, Canada. 
 
Belajova, Anna, Maria Fazikova, and Mildred Warner, 1996.  "The Changing Role of the State and the 
Market on Household Welfare and the Position of Women in Slovakia,"  Paper presented at the Feminist 
Economics Conference, American University, Washington, D.C., June 22, 1996. 
 
RESEARCH SYMPOSIA Designed and organized while Associate Director at CaRDI  
 
"Rural Poverty and Community Sustainability,"  February, 1990. 
"Rural Economic Development in the US and Europe,"  June, 1993. 
"Lessons in Rural Land Use Planning from Europe and the US,"  June, 1994. 
"Manufacturing Clusters," July,  1994. 
"Sustaining Rural Landscapes: The Critical Link Between Environment and Community," June, 1995. 
"Innovations in Local Government Service Provision," June, 1996.   
 
EXTENSION WORKSHOPS  Designed and organized while Associate Director at CaRDI 
 
Teleconferences –  
"Newly Elected Officials Training," 1993. 
"State Take Over of Medicaid," 1994. 
"Promoting Economic Vitality: What Local Government Can Do," 1995. 
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"Newly Elected Officials Training," 1995. 
 
County Government Institutes –  
"Budgeting in County Government," 1991. 
"Improving the Management and Productivity of Local Government," 1992. 
"Using Negotiation to Improve the Enterprise of Government," 1993. 
"Total Quality Management in Local Government," 1994. 
"Mutual Gains Negotiation: A Training for Local Governments," 1995. 
"Multi-party Collaboration in Local Government," 1996. 
"Privatization of Local Government Services in New York State," County Legislators and Supervisors 
Assoc. Annual Meeting Poughkeepsie, NY, June 10, 1996. 
 
Other Extension Conferences –  
"Ethics Made Practical: Fairness, Participation and Power in Local Decision Making," 1990. 
"Who Cares About Families and Households: Society or the Individual?" 1991. 
"Valuing Diversity," 1992. 
"Partnerships in Community Development: Linking Social Services and Economic Development," 1993. 
"Small Business Development: Challenges and Opportunities," 1994. 
"Rural Literacy and Community Development: An Agenda for Change," 1994. 
Editor, Community Development Reports: Research Briefs and Case Studies (16 issues 1993-96).  Back 
issues can be found on CaRDI’s web site http://www.cals.cornell.edu/dept/cardi/publications/cdr/ 
 
LEGISLATIVE BRIEFINGS 
 
Warner, M.E. with Yizhao Yang and Martha Wittosch, 1999. “Devolution and Local Government 
Capacity: Prospects for Rising Inequality,” Legislative Briefing for Maurice Hinchey and staff Cornell 
University, March 1999. 
 
Warner, Mildred E., 1991. "Poverty Alleviation and Rural Economic Development: The Need for a New 
Federal Partnership," President's Council on Rural America, Northeast Regional Hearings, Binghamton, 
NY. 
 
Brown, David L. and Mildred Warner, 1989. "Policy Options for Rural America," U.S. House of 
Representatives: Agriculture Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit and Rural Development, Leroy NY. 
 
Legislative Briefings designed and organized while Associate Director at CaRDI 
"Industrial Development Agency Accountability,"  for NYS Dept. of Economic Development and 
Legislative staff, Albany, NY, July, 1994. 
 
"Federalism and Flexibility: Devolution of Responsibility and Opportunity to Local Government," to  
NYS Legislative Commission on Rural Resources, Albany, NY, May, 1991. 
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Economic Development Workshop: Planning for Family Friendly Cities 
CRP 5074    FGSS 420/620   4 credit hours   
 
Friday 9:05 am -12:05 pm, Spring 2009 
208 W. Sibley  
 
Class web site: http://blackboard.cornell.edu 
Other important material can be found at http://economicdevelopment.cce.cornell.edu 
 
Prof. Mildred Warner, City and Regional Planning 
mew15@cornell.edu  255-6816, 204 W. Sibley 
Office Hours: generally 2:00-4:00 Wednesdays and Fridays 
 
Course Description: 
Although much has recently been made of the return of empty nesters and young professionals to 
the centers of our cities, planning that prioritizes these groups often ignores the needs of families 
with young children. At the same time, transportation costs and segregation of uses means the 
suburbs are not meeting family needs to the extent their popular conception suggests. Research 
shows that families are important to a community’s growth, sustainability, and diversity, and 
planning for the full life cycle, from children to the elderly, benefits all. A 2008 APA survey 
(conducted by Cornell University) revealed that the majority of planners believe families are a 
critical element of the community and more careful attention should be given to their needs. 
Zoning ordinances, transportation planning, child care facility siting and funding, and public 
participation are all areas where planners can work to make changes that will attract and support 
families with children.  
 
In this workshop we will probe the 2008 APA survey more deeply and identify cases of 
successful planning practice to profile for the upcoming April 2009, national conference of the 
American Planning Association. 
 
Students will work with representatives from the APA, the American Association of Retired 
Persons and practicing planners at the local level throughout the US to profile best practices.  
Students will learn skills in economic and social policy analysis, planning, design and the 
process of policy change.   
 
Learning Objectives:  
1. Become informed about the current state of family friendly planning across the US.  
2. Become familiar with the many ways planners can work to address the needs of families.  
3. Develop practical suggestions on how to implement family friendly change at the community 
level. 
 
Client:  American Planning Association 
 
We will be developing case material for presentation at two upcoming sessions of the Americna 
Planning Association’s national conference, scheduled for April 27-29 in Minneapolis, MN. 
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APA Sessions 
 
APA Session 1.  Planning for Family Friendly Communities 
Session scheduled for Monday, April 27 4:30-5:45 
 
A recent APA survey showed that the majority of planners believe families are a critical element 
of the community and more careful attention should be given to their needs. The challenge is in 
how to identify and address these needs. This session will present tips on zoning, finance, 
housing, facility siting, and ways to involve families in the planning process. (Sponsored by PAS 
Memo) 
 
Description: This session will bring together experts in planning at the community level who 
have addressed zoning barriers, new approaches to child care facility development, new 
approaches to transportation planning and finance, and new participatory approaches that more 
effectively involve families in the planning process. Economic developers and planners across 
the country are recognizing the need to involve families in community planning decisions. Come 
discuss new ideas on the “what” and “how” of successful family friendly planning with these 
experts.  
 
Participants: 
 
Dr. Mildred Warner, Professor of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY  
607-255-6816 mew15@cornell.edu http://economicdevelopment.cce.cornell.edu 
Co-Director of National Linking Economic Development and Child Care Project.  Expert on the 
economic impact of child care and new roles planners can take in building family friendly 
communities. Co-led APA survey of planners’ role in creating family friendly cities. 
Ellen Dektar, Coordinator, Alameda County Local Investment in Child Care, Oakland, CA    
510.208.9578  ellen.dektar@acgov.org  Website www.lincc-childcare.com  Expert on new ways 
to incorporate family needs in transportation systems in terms of route design and collocating 
child care facilities at transit hubs. 
Dr. Kristen Anderson, Child Care Coordinator and Planner, Redwood City, CA 
650.780.7336  E-mail: planningforchildcare@yahoo.com 
Expert on planning for child care.  Author of Planning for Childcare In California, 2006.  Her 
book covers everything from housing, to industrial park development to transportation and 
zoning codes.  She will also discuss financing options. 
 
Teresa Garcia, Mission Economic Development Agency, 3505 20th Street 
San Francisco, CA 94110, 415-282-3334 x11  mtgarcia@medasf.org  
Expert on involving families in community design processes. Led a comprehensive planning 
process that involved diverse voices  
 
Coordinator: 
Ann F. Dillemuth, Research Associate, Planning Advisory Service,  American Planning 
Association,122 S. Michigan Avenue, Suite 1600, Chicago, IL  60603,(p) 312.786.6352, (f)  
312.431.9985, adillemuth@planning.org 
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APA Session 2. Life-Cycle Housing: How to Keep Children, the Workforce, and Older 
Americans at Home in the City 
 
Session for the 2009 American Planning Association Conference in Minneapolis  
The session will be held Wednesday April 29th from 9:30 a.m. to 10:45 a.m..  
 
Description: Cities are becoming the "smart" choice in the face of rapid changes in 
demographics, consumer preferences, and energy costs. Communities that incorporate residents 
across the entire life course often are more vibrant and sustainable. Learn why few cities are 
adequately prepared to support accessible and affordable lifecycle housing. 
 
Presenters:  
Jennifer M. Raitt, Chief Housing Planner, Metropolitan Area Planning Council 60 Temple Place, 
6th Floor, Boston, MA 02111,  617.451.2770 x2056 JRaitt@mapc.org 
Chair of the APA Housing and Community Development Division.  
 
Nelson Hernandez, Vice Chair of the APA Housing and Community Development Division will 
moderate instead of Jennifer.  "Hernandez, Nelson" nhernandez@ci.ventura.ca.us 
 
Rodney Harrell, Strategic Policy Advisor for Housing, AARP Public Policy Institute, 601 E 
Street NW, Washington, DC 20049  Washington, DC (202) 434-3866 RHarrell@aarp.org 
 
Mildred Warner, Professor of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY  607-
255-6816 mew15@cornell.edu http://economicdevelopment.cce.cornell.edu 
Co-Director of National Linking Economic Development and Child Care Project.  Expert 
on the economic impact of child care and new roles planners can take in building family friendly 
communities. 
Lynn Ross, State and Local Initiatives Director, National Housing Conference and Center for 
Housing Policy, 1801 K Street NW, Suite M-100, Washington, DC 20006, 202.466.2121 x 237 
lross@nhc.org Expert on housing solutions for working families. 
 
Schedule for Class 
 
January 23 – Overview of Class, Project and Client 
 
Jan. 30  - Understanding the Issues 
 
Students will read and present on the following materials on Jan 30th 
Everyone read 
 
Israel, Evelyn and Mildred Warner 2008. “Planning for Family Friendly Communities,” PAS 
Memo, American Planning Association, Chicago, IL. November 2008. 
http://www.planning.org/pas/memo/open/nov2008/index.htm 
 
Warner, M.E., Kristen Anderson and George Haddow, 2007. “Putting Child Care in the Picture: 
Why this service is a critical part of community infrastructure,” Planning, (June 2007): 16-19. 
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http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/Planning%20Jun%202006.pdf 
 
 
Students Select and Present on the one or two of the following 
 
Warner, Mildred E. 2006. “Putting Child Care in the Regional Economy: Empirical and 
Conceptual Challenges and Economic Development Prospects,” Community Development: 
Journal of the Community Development Society 37 (2): 7-22.   
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/7-22%20warner.pdf 
 
Warner, Mildred E 2009.  “(Not)Valuing Care:  A Review of Recent Popular Economic Reports 
on Preschool in the US,” Feminist Economics, 15(2): 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/NotValuingCare.pdf 
 
Warner, M.E. 2007 “Planning for Inclusion:  The Case of Child Care,” Practicing Planner, 5(1) 
March 2007. http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/PracticingPlanning_Warner07.pdf 
 
Warner, Mildred E., 2007.  Child Care and Economic Development: Markets, Households and 
Public Policy, International Journal of Economic Development, 9(3):111-121. 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/warner_1.pdf 
 
Warner, M. E. Child Care and Economic Development: The Role for Planners, PAS Memo, 
American Planning Association. Jan/Feb 2006. 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/pasmemo0106.pdf 
 
LINCC, Linking Investments in Child Care (2008). Building child care into new developments: a 
guide for creating child care facilities in transit-oriented developments. 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/lincc_dev_BR_web.pdf 
 
Anderson, Kristen. (2006). Planning for Child Care in California. Solano Press Books. 
 
February 6  Review and Select Case Studies (from APA survey and other sources) 
  Review Database from APA survey – see excel file on blackboard 
 
Discussion of Case Study Research Method 
Read:  
Yin, Robert K. “An Abridged Version of Case Study Research” in L. Bickman and D.J. Rog, 
eds., Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998: pp. 229-59. 
 
Feb 13  Discussion with Ann Dillemuth and Lynn Ross about what materials would be 
most useful for APA members 
 
Feb 20  Presentation of Initial Outlines for Research and Case Studies 
 
Feb 27  Work Session 
 
March 6 Work Session 
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March 13 Presentation of First Draft of Case Materials  
 
March 20  Spring Break 
 
March 27 Feedback and Review of Materials 
 
April 2  Work Session 
 
April 10 Presentation of Second Draft of Case Materials 
 
April 17  Work Session  
 
April 24  Presentation of Final Draft of Case Materials 
 
April 27-29  Attend APA if you wish 
 
May 1   Evaluate APA presentation and Experience 
  
Additional Resources 
 
Center for Transit-Oriented Development and Center for Neighborhood Technology. 2006. The 
Affordability Index: A New Tool for Measuring the True Affordability of a Housing Choice. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.  
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2006/01_affordability_index.aspx 
 
City of Austin Families and Children Task Force. 2008. Families and Children Task Force 
Report Recommendations. 
http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/housing/downloads/factf_report_08.pdf 
 
Cornell 2006. NYS Survey of Economic Development and Child Care, Issue Brief prepared by 
Cornell University Department of City and Regional Planning: Ithaca, NY.   
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/reports/childcare/research.asp 
 
Fainstein, Susan S. and Lisa J. Servon ed. (2005). Gender and Planning: A Reader.. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.  On reserve for CRP 2010 and CRP 5190. 
Especially chapters by  
Hayden, Dolores. (1981). What Would a Nonsexist City Be Like? Speculations on 
Housing, Urban Design, and Human Work. 
Markusen, Ann R. (1981).  City Spatial Structure, Women’s Household Work, and 
National Urban Policy. 
Rosenbloom, Sandra (1978).  Women’s Travel Issues: the Research and Policy 
Environment. 
Wekerle, Gerda R. (1999). Gender Planning in Public Transit: Institutionalizing Feminist 
Policies, Changing Discourse, and Practices. 
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Florida, Richard (2002). The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, 
Leisure, Community and Everyday Life. New York: Basic Books. 
 
 
Frey, William and Alan Berube. (2002). City Families and Suburban Singles: An Emerging 
Household Story from Census 2000. The Brookings Institution, Center on Urban and 
Metropolitan Policy. 
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2002/02demographics.aspx 
 
Kochera, Andrew, Audrey Straight, and Thomas Guterbock (2005). Beyond 50.05, A Report to 
the Nation on Livable Communities: Creating Environments for Successful Aging. Washington, 
DC: AARP. 
http://www.aarp.org/research/housing-mobility/indliving/beyond_50_communities.html 
 
Low Income Investment Fund, 2006. We Care: A Guide for Developing Child Care Facilities 
with Affordable Housing, Bridge Housing Corporation, San Francisco, CA. 
 
Primerano, Frank, Michael A. P. Taylor, Ladda Pitaksringkarn, and Peter Tisato (2007). 
Defining and understanding trip chaining behaviour. Transportation, Springer 35(1): 55-72. 
 
Silbaugh, Katharine B. (2007). Women’s Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-
Family Balance.  76 Fordham Law Review 1797. 
 
Warner, M.E., Adriance, S., Barai, N., Hallas, J., Markeson, B., Morrissey, T., & Soref, W. 
(2004a). Economic Development Strategies to Promote Quality Child Care. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Department of City and Regional Planning. 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/EconDevStrat.pdf 
 
Expectations 
 
As a workshop, the class must be responsive and flexible.  We must complete objectives 
mutually agreed upon by our clients and ourselves.  Leadership and responsibility are shared 
among students, professor and community partners.  Workshops traditionally take more time 
than other classes.  Work quality must be professional, “A” quality work.  Lower standards will 
not be accepted.  Hence, expect to do many revisions before work is final. 
 
Research - Research projects will be individual and group in nature.  Students will be assessed 
on the rigor and quality of their research. Students are expected to help collect and analyze data, 
review and summarize relevant literature, and identify and profile innovative case studies and 
policy approaches. 
 
Writing - Writing assignments will include research reports as well as shorter, edited and 
published synopses to be used as public education materials for the project.  Students will rewrite 
formal publications until they meet the satisfaction of the partners and Professor Warner.  Web 
page design will also be a part of this process. 
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Process Skills - students will work with community partners in organizing meetings.  Students 
will be assessed on the quality of their group/community participation and facilitation skills. 
  
In recognition of the importance of group collaboration skills to project success, 30% percent of 
each student’s grade will be determined by his/her peers.  The remaining 70% will be determined 
by the professor according to performance in research, writing and process skills. 
 
Roles 
Professor - guide the process, provide research oversight, review and approve quality of all 
materials developed, handle larger political/managerial issues, manage budget. 
 
Partners – serve as resource people, review and guide materials development.   
 
Students - manage logistics, conduct research, do writing and editing and preliminary desktop 
publishing/web page design.  Keep Warner and partners informed of all project developments.   
The following skills need to be covered: logistics (including master calendar), editing, desktop 
publishing and web design, financial and legal analysis, economic analysis, facilitation and 
interview skills.  I recommend you form teams to work on the key project components outlined 
above. 
 
Class Meetings 
The class will meet on Friday mornings.   We will use this time to touch base, check progress 
and work on group activities.  There will be other meeting times during the week in small 
groups. Students who would like to attend the APA conference in Minneapolis are encouraged to 
do so. 
 
General Materials on Economic Development, Planning and Child Care 
Review all of project web site http://economicdevelopment.cce.cornell.edu 
 
Also review web sites for materials developed by the following organizations.  We want to 
supplement but not be redundant to resources already provided by these groups. 
 
National Economic Development and Law Center  (planning and zoning)  
http://www.nedlc.org/summary.pdf 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation (finance); http://www.liscnet.org/  
Coastal Enterprises (economies of scale); http://www.ceimaine.org/ 
Center for Community Self Help (financing and rating); http://www.self-
help.org/aboutus/index.asp 
Annie Casey Foundation (financing and more); http://www.aecf.org/ 
Kaufman Foundation (entrepreneurship); http://www.emkf.org/ 
Local Investment in Child Care www.lincc-childcare.com 
American Planning Association  http://www.planning.org/ 
 
General Information on Child Care 
For background information on child care and a sense of the advocates 
National Child Care Information Center has excellent materials and a thorough bibliography and 
data base;  http://www.nccic.org/  
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Children’s Defense Fund: http://www.childrensdefense.org/  
Center for Law and Social Policy; http://www.clasp.org/ 
Child Trends; http://www.childtrends.com/ 
Annie Casey Foundation; http://www.aecf.org/ 
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CRP 7201: Research Design 
New Room: 261 E Sibley Hall (Fine Arts Library – go all the way to the east end of the 
Library)  
New Time: Tuesdays and Thursdays 10:10-11:25 am  Fall 2008 
3 Credits  
Office Hours: Tues – Thurs 1:00-3:00 pm and by appointment.  
 
Class Web Site:  http://blackboard.cornell.edu/  
 
Professor Mildred Warner, mew15@cornell.edu, 255-6816, 215 W. Sibley Hall 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu 
 
 
This course will help graduate students select appropriate research design and field 
methods for thesis research.  The course provides a comprehensive review of the research 
design process and will result in each student developing his/her project proposal.  The 
first section of the course focuses on articulating the research objectives, choosing a 
research paradigm, preparing the literature review, developing a fundraising strategy and 
ethics.  The second section of the course focuses on managing the research process itself 
and selecting the appropriate data collection strategy.  Case studies, interviews, focus 
groups, surveys and use of census or archival data will be reviewed along with a review 
of major approaches to quantitative or qualitative analysis.   Students will develop a 
clearer idea of their project focus during this course as all assignments will be geared 
toward building a complete project proposal. 
 
This course is strongly recommended for PhD students developing their thesis proposals.  
This course is designed for PhD students as an integrative preparation for researching and 
writing a dissertation and for building a career as a researcher. It assumes that students 
will be exposed to specialized literatures and in-depth research methods in other 
coursework, either before or after this course.  The focus is on understanding the PhD as 
a research degree and the role that a dissertation plays in training you to be an original, 
creative and relevant researcher. The course exposes you to the process of creative 
research by sequentially exploring 1) the relationship between researcher and 
reader/recipient of the results; 2) how to choose researchable topics; 3) moving from 
question to hypothesis; 4) designing a research project; 5) understanding the strengths 
and weaknesses of different types of evidence brought to bear on your hypotheses; 6) 
addressing policy inferences that could be drawn from your results; 6) thinking about 
audience for your work (funders, professors, future employers, future journal articles)  
 
All required books and articles (except web based publications which can be viewed on 
line) are on reserve in the Fine Arts Library.  You may wish to purchase books which go 
into detail on methods you expect to be using.  We will be reading a lot of Creswell, 
Miles and Huberman so you may wish to purchase these.  
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Required or Recommended Books:  
 
Creswell, John W. 2003. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Other Recommended readings:  
 
Yin, Robert K. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods (Applied social 
research methods series (v.5). Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. (or 1994 version) 
 
Gaber, John  and Gaber, Sharon (2007). Qualitative Analysis for Planning and Policy: 
Beyond the Numbers,  Planners Press APA Washington, DC. 
 
Tasshakkori, Abbas, and Teddlie, Charles.  1998. Mixed Methodology: Combining 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 
Lofland, John, & Lofland, Lyn H. (2006). Analyzing social settings: A guide to 
qualitative observation and analysis. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. 
Or 1995 version 
 
Denzin, Norman K. and Lincoln, Yvonna S. (1994 and 2005) (eds). The Sage Handbook 
of Qualitative Research.  Third Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.  Or 1994 
version. 
 
Axinn, William and Lisa Pearce, (2006) Mixed Method Data Collection Strategies, 
Cambridge, Univ Press, NY, NY 
 
Assignments and Grading 
 
Class participation is critical.  Students must be prepared to discuss readings in class.  
Written summaries of readings will be required. Small writing assignments will be due 
almost weekly.  Article summaries and other written assignments must be posted to class 
web site 24 hours in advance of discussion so I and other students can review and give 
you comments in class.  Students will be assessed on the quality of their critiques of each 
other’s work. 
 
Weekly assignments and article reviews  30% 
Quality of Review of Peer’s work   10% 
Concept Paper  10% 
Literature Review 10% 
Methodology Section 10% 
Final Proposal 25% 
Final Presentation 5% 
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Syllabus 
 
August 28 Introduction and Overview of Course 
 
Syllabus and work overview.   
Writing assignment in class – 1 paragraph description of your research project with 
conceptual diagram. 
 
Sept 2 Research Paradigms 
 
Guba, Egon. G. and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 1994. Competing Paradigms in Qualitative 
Research. pp 105-117 in Handbook of Qualitative Research ed. by Norman Denzin and 
Yvonna Lincoln. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
 
Tashakkori, Abbas, and Teddlie, Charles.  1998. Mixed Methodology: Combining 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Chapter 2 Pp. 20-40 “Pragmatism and the Choice of Research Strategy.” 
 
Creswell, John W. 2003. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Chapter 1 “A Framework for 
Design” pp 1-26 
 
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1996). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press. 
-- Required if have not read before.   
 
Sept 4 Qualitative, Quantitative or Mixed Methods? 
 
Gaber, John  and Gaber, Sharon (2007). Qualitative Analysis for Planning and Policy: 
Beyond the Numbers,  Planners Press APA Washington, DC.  Chapters 1 and 8. 
 
Axinn, William and Lisa Pearce, (2006) Mixed Method Data Collection Strategies, 
Cambridge Univ. Press, NY, NY  Chapter 1 “Motivations for Mixed Methods Social 
Research” 
 
Recommended 
 
Morrow, R.A. with D.D. Brown, 1994."Deconstructing the Conventional Discourse of 
Methodology: Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods," Critical Theory and 
Methodology, Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 199-225.  
 
Reason, Peter. 1994 Three Approaches to Participative Inquiry pp 324-229 in Handbook 
of Qualitative Research ed. by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage. 
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Sept 9  Group Discussion 
Assignment due Sept 8 (post to Blackboard): Show how your research topic could be 
studied under the different knowledge claims, strategies of inquiry and methods discussed.  
Use Figure 1.2 in Creswell as your guide. 
 
Sept 11 Article Review and Discussion 3-5 pages (Article review due 
Wednesday Sept 10th) 
 
Read, critique and write a review of a research article from a top journal in your field. 
Discuss paradigm, method of data collection and analysis and its appropriateness to the 
research question. Provide a reflection on the strengths and limitations of the approach 
and how it might inform your own work.  Include a discussion of the following elements 
in your review. 
 Framing the problem and purpose 
 Situating the study in the literature 
 Informed by a conceptual and/or theoretical framework 
 Appropriateness of the methods 
 Researcher's role in the setting 
 Quality of findings 
 Ways researcher analyzed and represented the data  
 
Sept 16 - 18 Defining Your Question  
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
Marshall, Catherine and Rossman, Gretchen B. 1999. Chapter 2 “The ‘what’ of the study: 
Building the conceptual framework” (pp. 21-54).   
 
Creswell, Chapter 7 “Uses of Theory” pp. 119-141 
 
Recommended 
Lofland and Lofland 1995 or 2006, Chapter 1 
 
Defining the Research Question 
 
Miller, Delbert C. and Salkind, Neil J. 2002.  Handbook of Research Design and Social 
Measurement (6th edition).  Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.  Read Part II “Basic 
Research Design”, focusing on pp. 13-23. 
 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Chapter 2 "Focusing and Bounding the 
Collection of Data: The Substantive Start." Pp 16-39 
 
Writing the Concept Paper 
Chapters from Creswell, 2003, 
Chapter 4  Introduction, pp71-86 
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Chapter 5  The purpose statement, pp87-104 
Chapter 6  Research Questions and Hypotheses, pp105-118 
Chapter 8  Definitions, Delimitations, and Significance, pp. 142-152 
 
Sept 23   Situating Your Research: Political Context, Ethical Issues  
Assignment: Take Human Subjects Test, List key ethical questions you will face.  
 
Ethics 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Chapter 11 "Ethical issues 
in analysis.” Pp. 288-297.   
 
Review Creswell 62-66 
 
Review Planner's Code of Ethics  
http://www.planning.org/ethics/conduct.html  and President Farmer’s statement on why 
code was revised.  http://www.planning.org/ethics/pdf/farmeraddress.pdf 
 
Review University Committee on Human Subjects Guidelines.  Take test 
http://www.irb.cornell.edu/training/menu_soc.html 
Here is the link to the test: 
http://www.irb.cornell.edu/training/quizsoc/quiz.cfm 
 
 
Recommended 
Throgmorton, James A. 1996. "Impeaching" Research: Planning as Persuasive and 
Constitutive Discourse. Pp 345-364 in Explorations in Planning Theory ed by S. J. 
Mandelbaum, L. Mazza and R. W. Burchell. New Brunswick, NJ:Center for Urban 
Policy Research. (Skim)  
 
Baum, Howell S. 1996. Practicing Planning Theory in a Political World. Pp 365-382 in 
Explorations in Planning Theory ed by S. J. Mandelbaum, L. Mazza and R. W. Burchell. 
New Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy Research.  
 
Sept 25  Discuss First Drafts of Concept Papers 
Assignment: Concept Papers 2-4 pp due Monday Sept 22nd. 
 
Sept 30  Literature Review 
(1 page lit review outline due Oct 6th) 
Creswell, Chapter 2, Review of the Literature, pp 27-48 
 
Oct 2  Fundraising (Oct 1 funder profile due) 
Assignment: Funder profiles – Identify funders for your work.  Describe goals and 
objectives of funders and how your work might fit.  Outline proposal format and funding 
guidelines (limitations) and time lines for each funding source. 
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Janice Morse, 1994. “Designing Funded Qualitative Research.” pp 220-235 in Handbook 
of Qualitative Research ed. by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications. 
 
Recommended 
Miller and Salkind. 2002. Pp.663-760 “Part 8: Research proposal, funding, budgeting, 
reporting, and career planning.”  Good list of grant sources. 
 
Bowman, Joel and Bernadine Branchaw. 1992. How to Write Proposals That Produce. 
Phoenix, AZ: Oryz Press. (On reserve)  
 
(Some Useful websites) 
 
SSRC:  http://programs.ssrc.org/dpdf/ 
Fulbright:  http://fulbright.state.gov/root/resources-for/students 
Einaudi Center : http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/funding/grad.asp 
Foundations: http://fdncenter.org  
Government: NSF: http://nsf.gov/  
Dept of Ed.: http://ed.gov  
Fedix (Federal funds): http://www.sciencewise.com/fedix/  
SPIN (international) http://www.infoed.org/wConnect/wc.dll?spinwww%7Ejumpspin  
IRIS : http://carousel.lis.uiuc.edu/~iris/search.html  
 
Oct 7 Class Discussion – Literature Review  (Oct 6 1 pg lit review and conceptual 
map due) 
 
Oct. 9  Choosing Strategy of Inquiry  
 
Strategy of Inquiry: Qualitative or Quantitative 
 
Axinn, William and Lisa Pearce, (2006) Mixed Method Data Collection Strategies, 
Cambridge, Univ Press, NY, NY Chapter 2 “Fitting Data Collection Methods to Research 
Aims,” pp 28-53. 
 
Creswell, Chapter 9 A quantitative method pp 153-178 
   Chapter 10 A qualitative procedure pp. 179-207 
  Chapter 11 Combined qualitative and quantitative designs pp. 208-227 
 
Recommended 
Tashakkori, Abbas, and Teddlie, Charles.  1998.   
Chapter 3 Pp. 40-58 “Research design issues for mixed method and mixed model 
studies.”  
Chapter 5 Pp. 95-111 “Data collection strategies and research procedures. 
 
Oct 16  Managing Data, Site Selection and Fieldwork Processes 
Summaries Xin (M and H), Javier (M&R), Sung Won (G &G) 
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Managing Data 
Miles and Huberman, Chapter 3, "Focusing and Bounding the Collection of Data: Further 
Design Issues.", Chapter 4 “Early Steps in Analysis.” 
  
Marshall, Catherine & Rossman, Gretchen B. 1999.  Pp. 105-146 “Data collection 
methods.”  
 
Recommended 
 
Lofland and Lofland, 1995, Chapter 5, "Logging Data." 
 
Tashakkori, Abbas, and Teddlie, Charles.  1998.  Chapters 7-9 Pp. 137-166 “Examples of 
mixed model designs” and “Extended examples of mixed model designs.” – Some 
examples of research designs.  
 
Marshall, Catherine and Rossman, Gretchen B. 1999. Designing Qualitative Research (3rd 
edition).  Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.  Pp. 167-189 “Chapter 6: Planning time and 
Resources”.   
 
Initial Field Reconnaissance 
Gaber and Gaber,  Chapter 2 “Field Research” 
 
Sampling 
 
Miller, Delbert C. and Salkind, Neil J. 2002.  Handbook of Research Design and Social 
Measurement (6th edition).  Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 51-56 (“Sampling”).   
 
Recommended 
Tashakkori, Abbas and Charles Teddlie. 1998.  Pp.61-94 “Sampling, measurement, and 
quality of inference.” 
 
Miller, Delbert C. and Salkind, Neil J. 2002.  Handbook of Research Design and Social 
Measurement (6th edition).  Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 51-56 (“Sampling”).   
 
Bouma, Gary D. and G.B.J. Atkinson, 1995. "Selecting a Sample," A Handbook of Social 
Science Research, Oxford University Press: New York, pp. 137-163. 
 
Managing Overseas Research (Recommended) 
Each student choose a chapter from the following to discuss.   
 
Devereux, Stephen. (1993). Fieldwork in developing countries. Boulder, Colo.: L. 
Rienner. 
 
Recommended 
Site Selection 
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Lofland and Lofland, 1995, Chapter 2 "Evaluating Data Sites." Chapter 3. "Getting In." 
Chapter 4. “Getting along.” 
Oct 21  Group Discussion  
Assignment Due Oct 20:  Beginning Methodology Section 3 pages 
 
Group 1 Xin, Javier, Sung Won, Ji Won 
Group 2 Peter, Doug, Andy, Xiaoling 
Group 3 Isabelle, Leslie, Maite, Myriam, Kate 
 
Oct 23  Data Collection Methods - Archives Published Data 
Discussion Leaders: Myriam (Hill) Andy (Gaber and Gaber), Peter, Kate 
 
Archival Research 
 
Hill, Michael. 1993. Archival Strategies and Techniques. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage 
Publications. Browse. Read pages 58 - 63. Strategies for Organizing Archival Data.  
 
Gaber, John  and Gaber, Sharon (2007). Qualitative Analysis for Planning and Policy: 
Beyond the Numbers,  Planners Press APA Washington, DC. 
Chapter 5. “Content Analysis and Meta-Analysis” 
 
Faculty Resource: Pierre Clavel www.crp.cornell.edu/resources/pcnp  
 
Oct 28  Data Collection Methods - Published Data 
Assignment: Provide list of sources you will use, how you will obtain access, data 
definitions relevant to published data 
Discussion Leaders: Xin, JiWon, Sung Won, Javier, Xiaoling 
Census Data:  
 
Browse:  Miller, Delbert C. and Salkind, Neil J. 2002. Handbook of Research Design and 
Social Measurement.  Pp. 204-284.  – Journal in social research; excellent information 
about sources of published data.   
 
Oct 30-31 Assignment Due in Class or in my box – hard copy: Revised Concept 
Paper and Preliminary Literature Review  (6-10 double spaced pages, 10-20 cites).  
Print this and bring it.  Do not load to Blackboard 
 
Oct 30 Data Collection Methods – Interviews 
 
Assignment: Bring in Interview Guide for Review 
Discussion Leaders Doug (Patton), Maite (Patton), Isabelle, Lesli, Xiaoling 
 
Interviews:  
 
Patton, Michael 1990. Qualitative Interviewing. pp 277-359 in Qualitative Evaluation 
and Research Methods Sage: London. 
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Recommended 
Yow, Valeire Raleigh.  2005.  Recording Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and 
Social Sciences.  Second edition.  New York: Altamira Press.  Chapter 3 “Preparation for 
the interviewing project” (pp. 68-91) and Chapter 4 “Interviewing techniques” (pp. 92-
120).  Also, browse Appendices A – K (pp. 335-381)  for samples of interview guides 
and other tools.   
 
Fontana, Andrea, & Frey, James. 1994. "Interviewing: The Art of Science." Pp361-376 in 
Handbook of Qualitative Research ed. by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
Lofland and Lofland.  1995.  Chapter 7 “Asking Questions” (pp. 123-148).   
 
Weiss, Robert.  1994.  Learning from Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative 
Interview Guides.  New York: Free Press. 
    - Chapter 1-2: Overview;  
    - Chapter 3: Preparing the interview guide;  
    - Chapter 4-5: Interviewing experience 
 
Rubin, H.J. & Rubin, I.S. (1995). Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data.  
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.   
 
Nov 4 Data Collection Methods - Survey 
 
Assignment: Bring in survey instrument for review  
Discussion Leaders: Maite, Javier, Xiaoling 
Summaries: Xiaoling (Dillman), Online Survey Tools (SungWon), Problems (Kate) 
 
Dillman, D. 2000.  Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method (2nd edition). 
NY: John Wiley & Sons.  Chapter 1 “Social Exchange Motivation,” Chapter 2 “Nineteen 
Rules for Question Writing,”  
 
Review: Creswell, John W. 2003.  Chapter 9: pp. 153-162.   
 
Check out internet survey sites: zoomerang, http://info.zoomerang.com/ 
surveymonkey http://www.surveymonkey.com/ 
 
Possible Guest Speaker: Yasamin Miller, Survey Research Facility  
 
Recommended readings 
 
Miller, Delbert C. and Salkind, Neil J. 2002. Handbook of Research Design and Social 
Measurement.  Pp. 297-319 – on Guides for construction of questionnaires, selection and 
uses of personal interview surveys, telephone surveys, and mail questionnaire surveys.   
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Bravermen, Marc T. 1996. “Sources of survey error: Implications for evaluation studies.” 
New directions on Evaluation.  70: 17-28. 
 
Mangione, T. 1998.  “Mail surveys.” Pp 399-427 in the Handbook of Applied Social 
Research.  Edited by L. Bickman and D. Rog.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Lavrakas, P. 1998. “Methods for sampling and interviewing in telephone surveys.” Pp. 
429-472.  in the Handbook of Applied Social Research. 
 
Fowler, F. 1998.  “Design and evaluation of survey questions.” Pp. 343-374 in the 
Handbook of Applied Social Research.   
 
PAM 604 Syllabus 
 
Dillman, Don A., Roberta L. Sangster, John Tarnai, and Todd Rockwood. 1996. 
"Understanding Differences in People's Answers to Telephone and Mail Surveys." In 
Braverman, Marc T. and Jana Kay Slater (eds.), Current Issues in Survey Research, New 
Directions for Program Evaluation Series, Chapter 4:45-62. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco. 
 
Nov 6 Strategies of Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative 
 
Guest Speaker: Ann Forsyth on managing a large scale research process 
  
Focus Groups: No discussion of this topic – read on your own if interested 
 
Discussion Leades: Isabel, Lesli 
 
Assignment: Bring in Focus Group Plan for group discussion 
 
Gaber and Gaber, Chapter 4 “Focus Group Research” 
 or  
Morgan, David, L. 1997.  Focus Groups as Qualitative Research.  Second edition.  
Qualitative Research Methods Series, Vol 16.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.   
 
Recommended 
Krueger, Richard A. & Casey, Mary Anne.  2000.  Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for 
Applied Research.  Third edition.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  – An easy 
reading on designing and conducting focus groups.   
 
Nov 11 and 13  Data Collection Methods - Case Studies 
Discussion Leaders: Everyone.  
Assignment: Bring Case Study Research Plan for Group Discussion 
Summaries: Yin 1 and 6 Maite, Yin 2 Xin, Yin 3 Ji Won, Yin 4 Peter, Yin 5 
SungWon.  This is Yin the book, not the article. 
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Yin, Robert K. “An Abridged Version of Case Study Research” in L. Bickman and D.J. 
Rog, eds., Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998: 
pp. 229-59. 
 
Other Recommended Readings 
 
Yin, Robert K. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods (Applied social 
research methods series (v.5). Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. (or 1994 version) 
 
Stake, Robert E. 2005. “Qualitative case studies.” Pp. 443-466. In The Sage Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (third edition).  Edited by N. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln.  
 
Nov 18  Strategies of Analysis: Quantitative 
Come with your question outlined so Francoise can help with analysis ideas 
Quick Review of Major Alternatives 
Statistical Analysis of Quantitative Data: simultaneity, categorical, data reduction, 
uneven panels, nested data, autocorrelation in space or over time 
 
Guest Speaker: Francoise Vermelyen  Isabelle to bring her over 
  
Nov 20  Strategies of Analysis: Qualitative  
Discussion Leaders: Myriam-coding, Isabelle Q Methodology, Andy Zotero, Lesli Life 
History Analysis 
Summary of M&H Kate 
 
Miles and Huberman. 1994.  Read Chapter 10 p 245-287 and 
Appendix pp 311-317 for software to conduct qualitative analysis. 
 
Guest Speakers: Experienced students to talk about problems managing qualitative data. 
 
Recommended readings 
 
Lofland and Lofland. 1995.   Chapter 9 “Developing analysis” (p. 181-203). 
 
Miles and Huberman.  1994.  Chapters 5-9 on Techniques for qualitative data analysis.  
Strongly recommended for those planning to do qualitative data analysis.  Also review  
 
Huberman, A. Michael and Matthew Miles. 1994. "Data Management and Analysis 
Methods." Pp 428-445 in Handbook of Qualitative Research ed. by Norman Denzin and 
Yvonna Lincoln. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
 
Denzin, Norman. 1994. "The Art and Politics of Interpretation." Pp. 500-515 in 
Handbook of Qualitative Research ed. by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
 
 12 
Tashakkori, Abbas and Charles Teddlie. 1998. "Alternatives to Traditional Data Analytic 
Strategies" Chapter 6 ( pp112-136) in Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
Software for qualitative research, http://www.audiencedialogue.org/soft-qual.html 
 
NUD*IST4 is probably the most used software for qualitative research.  
http://www.qsr.com.au/  
 
CISER supports Atlas-Ti   
http://www.atlasti.com/ 
 
Assignment: Revised Methodology Section Due Nov 24 by 10 am or earlier. 
 
Nov 25 Group Discussion Methodology Plans 
 
 
Writing - Read on your own 
 
Creswell, Chapter 3 “Writing Strategies” pp 49- 70. 
 
Przeworski, Adam and Frank Salomon, 2004. The Art of Writing Proposals: Some 
Candid Suggestions for Applicants to Social Science Research Council Competitions. 
SSRC. http://fellowships.ssrc.org/art_of_writing_proposals/printable.html 
 
Recommended  
Miles and Huberman, Chapter 12, "Producing Reports." 
 
Richardson, Laurel. 1994. "Writing: A Method of Inquiry." Pp 516-529 in Handbook of 
Qualitative Research ed. by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. Thousand Oaks: Sage  
 
Dissertation Proposal Workshop website at Berkeley has some useful information, 
including timelines for the entire dissertation process! 
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/DissPropWorkshop/ 
 
Lofland and Lofland, Chapter 10, "Writing Reports." 
 
Dec 2 and 4 Present Final Proposals 
Assignment: Outline of Proposal or ppt – Present 5 minutes, Discussion 5 minutes 
 
Dec 15     Final Proposals Due by noon 
  Hand in Hard copy to my office or my mail box. 
CRP 649 – Research Methods and Project Design   Article Summaries 
  Part 1 – Choosing Your Paradigm 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Methods and Project Design: 
Article Summaries 
 
 
Compiled by Robert Dean 
 
 
Summaries authored by: 
 
Frederick Addison, Marc Boey, Chih-Hung Chen, 
Mei-Wan Huang, Ching-Fei Hsu, Betty Iroku, 
Yusuke Matsushita, Naomi Penney, Lynn Ross, 
Hallie Salem, Worrasit Tantinipankul, Yizhao Yang 
 
 
 
 
 
CRP 649:  Research Methods and Project Design 
May 2000 
 
 
Professor Mildred Warner 
Department of City and Regional Planning 
 
CRP 649 – Research Methods and Project Design   Article Summaries 
  Part 1 – Choosing Your Paradigm 
 2 
 
 
Part 1 – Choosing Your Paradigm  
  
Guba, Egon G. and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 1994. Competing Paradigms in Qualitative 
Research.  Pp. 105-17 in Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by Norman 
Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
1 
  
Reason, Peter. 1994. Three Approaches to Participative Inquiry. Pp. 324-9 in 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
2 
  
Morrow, R.A. with D.D. Brown. 1994. Deconstructing the Conventional Discourse 
of Methodology: Quantitative versus Qualitative Methods. Pp. 199-225 in Critical 
Theory and Methodology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
4 
  
Part 2 – Ethics  
  
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Quantitative Data Analysis: An 
Expanded Sourcebook. 2
nd
 ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 11: Ethical Issues in Analysis 
7 
  
Part 3 – Managing the Research Process  
  
Tashakkori, Abbas and Charles Teddlie. 1998. Mixed Methodology: Combining 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Pp. 71-6: Sampling Error and Sampling Bias. 
10 
  
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An 
Expanded Sourcebook. 2
nd
 ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 4: Early Steps in Analysis. 
12 
  
Part 4 – Methods: Community Collaboration  
  
Russell, Joel S. with Meyers, Andrew. 1995. Planning Charrettes. PAS Memo, 
Chicago IL: American Planning Association August 1995.   
16 
  
Chrislip, David D. and Carl E. Larson. 1994. Collaborative Leadership: How 
Citizens and Civic Leaders Can Make a Difference. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.  
Pp. 3-14, 52-4. 
20 
  
Martin, Ann and Robert Rich. 1999. Searching and Search Conferences. Mimeo. 
ILR, Cornell University: Ithaca, NY. 
22 
  
1997. ―Building Community and Commitment to the Future: The Search 
Conference.‖ CDS Practice, 6: 1-8. 
24 
  
CRP 649 – Research Methods and Project Design   Article Summaries 
  Part 1 – Choosing Your Paradigm 
 3 
 
 
Part 5 – Methods: Interviews and Focus Groups 
 
  
Fontana, Andrea and James Frey. 1994. Interviewing: The Art of Science. Pp. 361-
376 in Handbook of Qualitative Research. Edited by Norman Denzin and Yvonna 
Lincoln. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
27 
  
Morgan, David L. and Krueger, Richard A. 1993. Pp. 1-24 in Successful Focus 
Groups. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA 
31 
  
Part 6 – Methods: Surveys  
  
Sheatley, Paul. 1983. Questionnaire Construction and Item Writing. Pp. 181-203 in 
Handbook of Survey Research. Edited by P.H. Rossi, J.D. Wright, and A.B. 
Anderson. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
35 
  
Bouma, Gary D. and G.B.J. Atkinson. 1995. Selecting a Sample. Pp. 137-63 in A 
Handbook of Social Science Research. Oxford University Press: New York. 
41 
  
Part 7 – Analysis: Data Reduction, Causal Inference, Theory Building, 
Verification 
 
  
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An 
Expanded Sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 9: Matrix Displays: Some Rules of Thumb 
44 
  
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An 
Expanded Sourcebook, 2
nd
 Edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 10: Making Good Sense: Drawing and Verifying Conclusions (part 1) 
46 
  
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An 
Expanded Sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 10: Making Good Sense: Drawing and Verifying Conclusions (part 2) 
49 
  
Lofland, John and Lyn Lofland. 1995. Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to 
Qualitative Observation and Analysis. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Chapter 7: Asking Questions. 
53 
  
Lofland, John and Lyn Lofland. 1995. Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to 
Qualitative Observation and Analysis. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Chapter 8: Arousing Interest. 
58 
  
Lofland, John and Lyn Lofland. 1995. Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to 
Qualitative Observation and Analysis.  Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Chapter 9: Developing Analysis 
60 
  
CRP 649 – Research Methods and Project Design   Article Summaries 
  Part 1 – Choosing Your Paradigm 
 4 
 
 
Tashakkori, Abbas and Charles Teddlie. 1998. Mixed Methodology: Combining 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Pp. 112-36, Alternatives to Traditional Data Analytic Strategies. 
63 
  
Part 8 – Writing  
  
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An 
Expanded Sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 12: Producing Reports. 
66 
  
Morse, Janice M.. 1994. Designing Funded Qualitative Research. Pp. 220-235 in 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. Edited by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
69 
  
Part 9 – Evaluation  
  
Hollister, Robinson G. and Jennifer Hill. 1999. Problems in the Evaluation of 
Community Wide Initiatives. In New Approaches to Evaluating Community-Wide 
Initiatives Volume 1: Concepts, Methods, and Contexts. Edited by James P. 
Connell, Anne C. Kubisch, Lisbeth B. Schorr, and Carol H. Weiss. 
73 
  
Weiss, Carol Hirschon. 1999. Nothing as Practical as Good Theory: Exploring 
Theory-Based Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children 
and Families.  In New Approaches to Evaluating Community-Wide Initiatives 
Volume 1: Concepts, Methods, and Contexts. Edited by James P. Connell, Anne C. 
Kubisch, Lisbeth B. Schorr, and Carol H. Weiss. 
81 
  
    
 
 
            
CRP 649 – Research Methods and Project Design   Article Summaries 
  Part 1 – Choosing Your Paradigm 
 5 
 
Guba, Egon G. and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 1994. Competing Paradigms in Qualitative 
Research.  Pp. 105-17 in Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by Norman Denzin 
and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Summarized by Hallie Salem. 
 
Within the article, the authors analyze four paradigms in informing and guiding inquiry, 
particularly qualitative inquiry, including the column headings in table 6.1, which I have 
broken down below.  We know that qualitative data is helpful, because it can:  put data 
into context, provide insight into people or places, help determine the source of the 
hypothesis, define the theoretical framework, define facts within a set of values, and 
develop findings through interaction to see how things really are and work.  The table 
below dissects the four paradigms within a framework of three questions. 
 
Four 
Paradigms for 
Guiding 
Inquiry 
 
Three 
Fundamental 
Questions 
Positivism 
Denotes the 
received view.  
Used to verify 
hypotheses usually 
stated as 
mathematical 
propositions. 
Postpositivism 
Criticism of positivism.  
Used to falsify 
hypotheses. 
Critical Theory 
Denotes several 
alternative paradigms in 
which there is a ―value-
determined‖ nature of 
inquiry. 
Constructivisim 
A paradigm which 
assumption 
(ontological) moves 
from realism to 
relativism. 
Ontology 
What is the 
form and 
nature of 
reality? 
Naïve realism:  the 
way things are 
without relation to 
time and context. 
Research examines 
the true state of 
affairs. 
Critical realism:  reality 
is imperfect.  In order to 
understand reality, it 
must be critically 
examined. 
Historical realism: 
virtual reality shaped 
over time by social, 
political, cultural, 
economic, ethnic, and 
gender values  
Relativism:  realities 
are socially and 
experientially based, 
local and specific in 
nature 
Epistemology 
What must the 
posture of the 
―knower‖ be to 
find out what 
can be known? 
Dualist and 
objectivist: The 
investigator and 
investigated are 
assumed to be 
independent 
entities 
Modified dualist and 
objectivist: replicated 
findings are probably 
true 
Transactional and 
subjectivist: value 
mediated findings, 
challenges that one can 
be known is dependent 
on the interaction 
between the knower 
and knowee 
Transactional and 
subjectivist: due to 
link between 
investigator and 
subjects, findings are 
created 
Methodology 
What methods 
fit the 
predetermined 
reality or what 
must be 
known? 
Experimental and 
manipulative: in   
controlled 
conditions 
(quantitative) 
Modified experimental 
and manipulative: 
critical multiplism (?) 
used in falsifying 
hypotheses, increased 
qualitative methods, 
place based 
Dialogic: requires 
dialogue between 
investigator and 
subjects, and 
dialectical: dialogue 
within context of 
historic structures 
Hermeneutical and 
dialectical: individual 
constructions elicited 
and defined through 
investigator and 
respondent 
relationship. 
 
Table 6.2 is more readable and requires less interpretation.  The table examines practical 
issues and the paradigms' positions towards them.  Some key points are that positivism is 
qualitative, while postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism are a combination of 
both qualitative and quantitative.  Values are left out of and ethics are extrinsic to 
positivism and post, while both are included in critical theory and constructivism. 
 
Question:  Which paradigm would best address your research question and why?  
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Reason, Peter. 1994. Three Approaches to Participative Inquiry. Pp. 324-9 in Handbook 
of Qualitative Research, edited by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
Summarized by Betty Iroku 
 
Note: Other methods and approaches do exist. However, Peter Reason chooses to focus 
on the following three: 
 
1. Co-operative inquiry has its roots in humanistic psychology, in the notion that 
individuals can with help choose how they live their lives liberated from the distress of 
early conditioning and restrictive social custom. Working together in a group with norms 
of open genuine communication help facilitate this process. 
Can be described as occurring in four phases of action and reflection: 
1) Propositional knowing 
2) Practical knowing 
3) Experiential knowing 
4) A critical return to propositional knowing 
 
The validity tool in this inquiry is ―critical subjectivity‖. It makes it possible to see more 
clearly and better communicate to others the perspective from which that knowledge is 
derived and shed light on any distortions that may have occurred.  
 
2. Participatory Action Research (PAR) is significant in that it highlights the political 
aspects of knowledge production.  The whole ideology of ―enlightenment and awakening 
of common peoples‖ and confronting the manner in which the established and power-
holding elements of societies are favored because of their monopoly on the definition and 
employment of knowledge are of primary concern. The preferred way to communicate 
the application of PAR would be describing actual cases.  Again the key emphasis here is 
on empowerment and so community meetings and any events that facilitate the process of 
participation and dialogue are important. 
Two primary objectives of PAR 
1) Produce knowledge and action directly useful to a group of people through 
research, adult education and sociopolitical action. 
2) Empower people at a second and deeper level through the process of constructing 
and using their own knowledge. 
Three starting points 
1) Concerns for power and powerlessness 
2) Knowledge and experience of people 
3) Authentic commitment 
 
3. Action science and action inquiry are methods of inquiry into practice and are 
primarily concerned with the progression of useful action that may add to the change of 
organizations and communities toward better efficiency and fairness. 
Essentially both practices aim to engage with one‘s own action and with others in a self-
reflective way making all participants aware of their behaviors and the accompanying 
underlying theories surrounding those behaviors.   
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A key skill in this process is to find ways to avoid one‘s own and others‘ defensive 
responses to the painful process of self-reflection. 
Four dimensions of conversation: 
1) Framing 
2) Advocacy 
3) Illustration 
4) Inquiry 
Each of these conversational dimension correspond to the four territories of experience: 
1) Purpose 
2) Strategy 
3) Behavior 
4) Outside world 
 
For Discussion:  What might be some future implications for orthodox scientific research 
in light of the successes of these approaches? 
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Morrow, R.A. with D.D. Brown. 1994. Deconstructing the Conventional Discourse of 
Methodology: Quantitative versus Qualitative Methods. Pp. 199-225 in Critical Theory 
and Methodology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Summarized by Chih-hung Chen 
 
For sociology, there are various aspects of the contemporary discourse on sociological 
methods that are not adequate.  This article attempts to point out the weaknesses of 
quantitative and qualitative analysis.  It is necessary to make a fundamental distinction 
between these two in terms of methodological implications.  Even so, in this article, the 
author contends that it is hard to assume that a certain type of theorizing automatically 
requires a particular type of method.  
 
Quantitative sociologists often tend to view qualitative research as imprecise, biased by 
researcher subjectivity, and effective for neither prediction nor generalization.  At the 
same time, qualitative sociologists tend to view quantitative research as grounded in a 
naïve objectivity, ineffective for the interpretation of insider actions, generally unable to 
describe the social construction of reality.  However, with debates for many years, the 
main conceptual distinction in the methodological discourse displays the positive 
understanding of quantitative research against the relatively negative understanding of 
qualitative research.  Although quantitative sociology is a more dominant methodology 
than qualitative, the author is attempting to discuss a critical assessment of the overall 
discourse itself in which both terms are implicated.  In other words, the article is 
concerned more with how methods are conceptualized in general, rather than with how 
specific methods are practiced.  The following is the summary of characteristics of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to social research. 
 
Conventional Quantitative Methods: 
1. Aggregation of units.  This is the central idea of quantitative approach.  We do not 
study individuals but rather aggregates of individuals.  By doing so, such set of 
individuals would constitute a legitimate aggregate for the purposes of most 
quantitative analysis in sociology.  However, it would not constitute any level of 
social organization from a theoretical perspective. 
2. Measurement of variables.  Quantitative research needs to collect data efficiently for 
statistical analysis in order to analyze the correlation between variables, rather then 
people.  It is necessary to collect information about relationships between various 
individual attributes (variables).  Such information typically is collected in survey 
research by asking people to respond to a highly structured set of questions.  And the 
questions for asking people during a survey should be standardized and quantified. 
3. Statistical-causal analysis.  Within quantitative sociology, the search for causality 
becomes a matter of searching for authenticity (not imitation).  In a word, it is 
important to understand how antecedent condition necessarily leads to a particular 
outcome.  Moreover, it also is understood that cause is revealed in patterns of 
statistical covariation.  
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Conventional Qualitative Methods: 
1. Case study design.  Qualitative research tends to involve a case study design.  It 
simply means that unlike the large aggregate approach, a single case or a limited set 
of cases is examined during the research.   
2. Interpretation of action.  The central notion of qualitative research in the conventional 
discourse is in favor of using natural language instead of the use of formal 
quantitative representations.  Furthermore, it is accepted in qualitative sociology that 
action and local interpretation are always imbedded within the social world of the 
actors themselves. 
3. Thick description.  Qualitative research is based on a case study, which always has a 
rich complexity of factors.  The social context of action and interpretation, along with 
the emphasis on natural language, leads much qualitative research to be concerned 
with layers of social reality.  Therefore, it requires a depth or thick description of the 
case at hand (Geertz, 1983).    
 
With the brief summary of each method, the author laid out four arguments. 
1. A false dichotomy.  If the distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods is 
just based on the use of formal and natural language modes of representation, the 
dichotomy is false.  It is not necessary for qualitative research to preclude the use of 
quantitative representations or nonquantitative formal methods.  If the analysts want 
to do an appropriate statistical survey for the subject of the research, there is no doubt 
that they need to engage in the language in terms of question design.  The language of 
research is not an adequate criterion for a major differentiation of research forms. 
2. Specific analytic strategies.  Although appearing to reference data language, the 
qualitative-quantitative opposition in practice actually refers to specific analytic 
strategies.  The practices of qualitative and quantitative do represent quite distinct 
analytic strategies.  The main factor here that needs to be made explicit in this regard 
is that for the most part quantitative research in sociology is always in the sense of 
statistical modeling.  And studies referring to as ―statistical‖ may be involved a 
specific form of theoretical analysis.  Under this circumstance, it is necessary to make 
a distinction between statistical modeling and other forms of quantitative analysis in 
sociology.  The former is to model the social world in terms of causal relations 
between an observed system of variables.  The latter, as well qualitative, approaches 
are to comprehend the relations obtaining between social actors and other forms of 
social organization.  
3. Constructing social phenomena.  As mentioned above, these specific analytic 
strategies are not simply different ways of examining the same social phenomena, but 
are the ways of making a set of individuals into two different kinds of phenomena.  
As far as theoretical sociology is concerned, nonstatistical, qualitative or quantitative, 
research attempts to describe a society by referring to the systemic and social 
relations that constitute it.  On the contrary, statistical research has less relations with 
theoretical sociology.  It does not assume that its analysis of variables is based on a 
population of subjects who interact with one another through communities.  It is 
assumed, however, that members of the sample used are independent of one another.  
In summary, statistical analysis constructs a certain kind of subject within 
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sociological discourse.  More theoretically oriented analyses construct the subject as 
the participant in one form of social organization or another. 
4. Theoretical inadequacy.  Theoretical sociology relying on statistical analysis is 
inadequate because statistical analysis is not a sociological method.  It is not an 
approach developed within sociology as a tool for its theoretical inquiries.  It is a tool 
that has been incorporated into the discipline of sociology despite its difference from 
basic sociological concepts.  It can at most say that statistical analyses are statistical 
theoretical models applying general statistical theory.  If the quantitative-qualitative 
distinction is based on statistical analysis, this assumption would be inadequate and 
misleading. 
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Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Quantitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook. 2
nd
 ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 11: Ethical Issues in Analysis 
Summarized by Lynn M. Ross 
 
Ethical Theories 
 
Table 11.1 Ethical Frameworks and Aspects of Research (Flinders, 1992) 
 Utilitarian Deontological Relational Ecological 
Recruitment Informed Consent Reciprocity Collaboration Cultural Sensitivity 
Fieldwork Avoidance of Harm Avoidance of Wrong Avoidance of 
Imposition 
Avoidance of Detachment 
Reporting Fairness Fairness Confirmation Responsive Communication 
 
Principles to Guide Ethical Choices 
 Beneficence-Minimize harm and risk, maximize good outcomes for all involved. 
 Mutual Respect- Do not damage self-esteem, show respect for individuals as persons without 
being condescending.    
 Justice- Carefully considered and fairly administered procedures. Equitable distribution of 
costs and benefits to all parties involved. 
 Noncoercion and Nonmanipulation- Do not force others to cooperate against their will. 
 Support for Democratic Values and Institutions- Committed to equality and working against 
oppression. 
 
Specific Ethical Issues 
1. Worthiness of the Project 
 Will my project significantly contribute to the larger body of knowledge? 
Do not pursue a project for the sole purpose of your personal advancement. If the work does not 
have real meaning and significance it is likely to be pursued in a haphazard manner that will 
produce unreliable data and questionable conclusions.  Rival hypotheses should be pursued. 
 
2. Competence Boundaries 
 Do I have the skills to conduct a quality project? 
Acknowledge your areas of weakness early on and seek help from your colleagues. 
Unacknowledged incompetence will lead to serious problems in your analysis that could have 
otherwise been avoided. 
 
3. Informed Consent 
 Have I fully informed the people I will study and have they freely consented to be studied? 
Truly informed consent is difficult in qualitative studies because your actions and work in the 
field constantly alter the project. It is important to maintain an ongoing dialogue with 
participants to keep them informed of such changes and ensure their continued cooperation. 
 
4. Benefits, Costs, and Reciprocity 
 What will each party have to invest in the project and what will they gain? 
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Study participants rarely benefit from projects in the manner that researchers do. This lack of 
reciprocity may jeopardize your access and damage the quality of your data. Try to understand 
the action implications of your project from the participant‘s point of view. 
 
5. Harm and Risk 
 How might this project harm those involved? 
Consider who is most vulnerable in your study (e.g. the visible, the stigmatized, the powerless, 
the powerful). Remember that when the participants anticipate harm or risk, the quality of access 
and data collection may be compromised. 
 
6. Honesty and Trust 
What is my relationship with project participants? Do we trust each other? 
Dishonesty on the part of the researcher can make the continuation of a specific project and 
future projects by other researchers on the same subject difficult if not impossible. 
 
7. Privacy, Confidentiality, and Anonymity 
How might this project intrude on the people I am studying? How will the information and 
participants be protected? 
Explicit agreements regarding confidentiality increase the trust between researcher and 
participants. When privacy and anonymity are threatened, be prepared to adjust analytic methods 
to avoid disclosure of the information. 
 
8. Invention and Advocacy 
What should I do when I witness illegal or harmful activities during my research? Should 
advocate for anyone’s interest other than my own? 
Understand that withholding ―guilty knowledge‖ may skew your findings; however, disclosure 
might jeopardize your access. 
 
9. Research Integrity and Quality 
Is my work being conducted correctly in accordance with some reasonable set of standards? 
Beware of conducting ―poor science‖: sloppy data recording, misleading findings, inappropriate 
citation, etc. As researchers we must avoid lying to ourselves by ensuring that our methodology 
is credible, defensible, and possibly transferable. 
 
10. Ownership of Data and Conclusions 
Who owns my work and who will control the diffusion of my findings? 
Most researchers consider themselves the ―owners‖ of their data. The researcher then is 
responsible for the protection and dissemination of the materials. Consider who will have access 
to the information and how this might affect the confidentiality of participants. 
 
11. Use and Misuse of Results 
Am I responsible for making sure my work is used appropriately? What if my work is used 
inappropriately? 
At the start of your project make it clear that you will be involved in the use of your findings. 
This early commitment will help focus your data collection and analytic strategies. 
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Conflicts, Dilemmas, and Trade-offs 
Addressing ethical issues inevitably involves making difficult choices. Throughout the research 
process we will have to face a variety of ethical dilemmas: anonymity versus visibility, helping 
versus confidentiality, scientific understanding versus individual rights, validity versus avoiding 
harm. For this reason it is important to keep ethical issues out there as a topic to be both thought 
about and discussed. 
 
Advice 
 
 Awareness – Be aware of the ethical issues surrounding your work. 
 Anticipation – Preparation pays off. You can avoid problems later by thinking ahead during 
the early stages of your project. 
 Preliminary Agreements – Agreements between the research and participants should be made 
early in the process, should be clearly stated, and be committed to paper. 
 Documentation and Reflection – Don‘t lose sight of ethical issues during the data collection 
process. 
 Third Parties – Involving a trusted third party can bring objective insights to the project and 
its ethical issues. 
 Regular Checking and Renegotiation – Make clear from the start that any agreement entered 
into may need to be renegotiated or otherwise modified as the work progresses. 
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Tashakkori, Abbas and Charles Teddlie. 1998. Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative 
and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Pp. 71-6: Sampling Error and Sampling Bias. 
Summarized by Marc Boey 
 
Synopsis 
The assigned section in Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) focuses on the key problems that are 
associated with taking samples and the different strategies for designing the sampling frame.  
Addressing these problems and understanding the benefits and constraints arising from different 
sampling frames have important repercussions on the validity of our research findings. 
 
Key Problems 
Sampling Bias:  It is a nonrandom way of selecting a biased sample that results in findings that 
cannot be considered to be representative of the population i.e. findings become invalid or 
distorted. 
Example: I am testing the following hypothesis - the development of mega infrastructure projects 
(e.g. airport) is nothing more than a ploy used by the state to promote selfish interests by 
providing economic opportunities for corrupt and nepotistic practices.  I intend to conduct in-
depth interviews to verify or debunk this hypothesis.  The sample has a high probability of 
becoming bias if I intentionally select only members of opposition political parties to conduct my 
in-depth interviews. This is because these respondents are more inclined to providing critically 
biased judgments on the state bureaucracy. 
 
Sampling Error: The random inaccuracies that arises from the process of generalizing the 
findings from a narrow selected sample frame to a broader general populace. 
Example: I am testing the following hypothesis – the urban built environment in Malaysia 
reflects a distinct national identity.  I intend to conduct interviews with 1,000 members of the 
general public to seek their views on this.  Does this 1,000-person sampling frame reflect the 
views of the entire population in Malaysia?  The answer is no because some of the respondents 
probably possesses characteristics and offer views that are not typical to the general populace 
(e.g. a religious fanatic who has a very skewed perception of what constitutes the national 
identity).  This discrepancy is the sampling error.  Increasing the size of the sampling frame can 
help reduce the sampling error. If this is not possible, then one can alternatively get more 
credible results by carefully selecting respondents who are more representative of the general 
populace.  
 
Strategies for Designing Sampling Frame 
These can be classified into two broad categories: ―probability‖ and ―nonprobability/purposive‖.  
They are already succinctly summarized in the reading and are thus not reproduced here.  The 
key points that needs to be noted are: 
 
Probability sampling generally involves a more random process of selecting the units for 
observation.   For example, in simple random sampling every individual in a population has an 
equal and independent chance of being selected for the study.  In comparison, purposive 
sampling involves intentional and directed selection of specific individuals based on purpose of 
the study, information about these individuals, etc. The sample of the opposition political parties 
cited above is an example of purposive sampling while the selection of the 1,000 members of the 
general public is a more of a random sampling. 
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The techniques are not mutually exclusive to the schools of quantitative and qualitative analyses 
i.e. they can be employed by either of these approaches.  And one can also employ a combination 
of probability and nonprobability/purposive techniques in a study. For example, I can use a 
purposive technique of targeting only architects as my sample respondents.  But I can then use 
the probability technique of randomly selecting a sample of architects in the group. 
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Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook. 
2
nd
 ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 4: Early Steps in Analysis. 
Summarized by Naomi Penney. 
 
These processes help in organizing data for later analysis. M&H strongly recommend early data 
analysis to help one with finding new areas/strategies to collect data and refinement of your 
research topics and interests. 
 
This chapter looks at 8 main methods for data analysis. This chapter assumes your information is 
coming from your field notes whether they be hand/type written or taped. The focus here is on 
words and that they have been ―cleaned up‖ so they are clear to the reader. 
 
The following are arranged from early to later in the data collection process and from simple to 
more complex. 
 
Contact Summary Sheet 
 
Problem Description Illustration Variations Advice Time 
needed 
What were 
the main 
concepts, 
themes, issues 
and questions 
that I saw 
during this 
contact? 
A single 
sheet that 
briefly 
answers the 
previous 
questions 
What people, events, or 
situations were involved? 
What new hypotheses, 
speculations, or hunches 
about the field situations 
were suggested by the 
contact? 
What kind of information 
should be sought with the 
next contact? 
 Themes sheet 
 
First 
impression 
sheet - not 
recommended 
Keep form simple 
 
Focus on primary 
issues and concepts 
and questions 
 
This form is for quick 
and easy data 
retrieval—so keep it 
that way 
Approx. 1 
½ hours per 
interview 
 
 
The summary sheet should be done fairly soon after the interview. 
Use: (1) guide planning for next contact 
 (2) suggest new or revised codes 
 (3) help coordinate if several field workers are involved 
 (4) reorient self when returning to contact 
 (5) help with further data analysis 
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Codes and Coding 
 
Problem Description Illustration Variations Advice Time needed 
What is your 
conceptual 
framework? 
 
What is your 
research 
question? 
 
What are the 
themes you are 
seeing? 
Codes are tags 
or labels for 
assigning units 
of meaning to 
the descriptive 
or inferential 
information 
compiled 
during a study. 
Types of codes 
-descriptive 
-interpretive  
-pattern 
 
Codes can  be at different 
levels of analysis 
 
Codes can happen at 
different times during 
analysis 
 
Codes help pull together a 
lot of material 
Acts 
 
Activities 
 
Meanings 
 
Participation 
 
Relationships 
 
Settings 
 
  
Make sure all codes fit 
into a structure 
 
Keep codes 
semantically close to 
the terms they represent 
 
Define codes 
operationally 
 
Do not wait until the 
end of data gathering to 
create codes 
Depends—
it‘s a rather 
involved 
process—
count on 1  
day/contact 
 
On creating codes: Use your conceptual framework as a guide or your research 
questions/hypotheses, key variables that you the researcher bring to the study. 
 
A more ―grounded ― approach would have you wait until your data has been collected and 
worked with before coding occurs.  For more information on this approach see Glaser and 
Strauss (1967),  Strauss(1987) Corbin (1990) Bogdan and Biklen (1992). 
 
Pattern Coding 
 
Problem Description Illustration Variations Advice Time needed 
What are the 
patterns you are 
seeing in your 
data? 
Pattern codes are 
explanatory or 
inferential codes, ones 
that identify an 
emergent theme, 
configuration or 
explanation. 
Generating pattern 
codes: What are the 
commonalities/differen
ces in the data? 
 
Do there are appear to 
be causal links? 
You can 
also sub-
code data 
 
 
 
  
Code regularly 
 
Don‘t be afraid 
to recode 
This is 
concurrent with 
other coding and 
will probably 
take up only 5-
10% of your 
coding time 
 
Why use pattern coding? 
1. It reduces large amounts of data into a smaller number of analytic units 
2. It gets the researcher into analysis during data collection, so that later fieldwork can be more 
focused. 
3. It helps the researcher elaborate a cognitive map, an evolving, more integrated schema for 
understanding local incidents and interactions. 
4. For multicase studies, it lays the groundwork for cross-case analysis by surfacing common 
themes and directional processes. 
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Memoing 
 
Problem Description Illustration Variations Advice Time 
needed 
How do 
you 
separate 
and 
remember 
all the 
nuances of 
your data? 
Memos sort 
of tie 
concept 
together. 
 
Use them to 
help you 
ponder your 
data and 
help you 
make sense 
of what you 
are or are 
not seeing. 
See examples 
in book: 
 
On welcoming 
structures 
 
Comparison 
process 
 
Career patterns 
 
Barometric 
events 
What is intensely puzzling or surprising 
about this case? 
 
response to someone else‘s memo 
 
to propose a specific new pattern code 
 
to integrate a set of previous marginal 
notes or reflective remarks 
 
when you are struggling with some 
question 
 
around a general theme or metaphor 
that pulls together other observations 
Always give priority 
to memoing 
 
Start as soon as field 
data starts coming in 
 
Keep memos sortable 
 
Keep them about 
ideas not more notes 
 
Do not standardize 
your memos 
 
It‘s fun! 
Varies 
 
 
Case Analysis Meeting 
 
Problem Description Illustration Variations Advice Time needed 
How do you 
understand 
quickly and 
economically 
what is 
happening in 
your research? 
The case worker most 
familiar with the case 
summarizes where 
the research it at and 
where it might be 
going. Questions are 
used to guide the 
meeting. 
See Book 
pg. 76-77 
Questions to guide meeting: 
 
What is puzzling, strange or 
unexpected about the recent 
case? 
 
What additional analyses do we 
need of existing data to 
understand the case better? 
 
What is definitely not true of the 
case at this point? 
Don‘t become 
complacent 
with the results 
from the 
meetings. 
They can be 
coded too and 
used to help 
guide the 
process. 
Meetings 
should be no 
more than 1 
½ hours 
 
Interim Case Study 
 
Problem Description Illustration Variations Advice Time needed 
How do you know 
your data is valid? 
 
How do you know 
you are making the 
right conclusions? 
 
Where are the gaps? 
10-25 pages that 
provide a synthesis 
of what the 
researcher knows 
about the case and 
what still needs to 
be found out. 
See 
Example on 
pg. 79 
-outlines of 
case 
 
-smaller 
connected 
interim studies 
 
 
Best time to do 
this is about a 
third of the 
way into your 
data collection 
No more than 
two days—1 
for writing 1 
for reporting 
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Vignettes 
 
Problem Description Illustration Variations Advice Time needed 
How do you 
explain a sub-set 
of what is 
happening clearly 
and more quickly 
than a memo or 
report? 
A vignette is a 
focused description 
of a series of events 
taken to be 
representative, 
typical or 
emblematic in the 
case you are doing. 
A description 
of a typical 
day in the life 
of your 
contacts. 
 
See pg. 81-82 
for better 
detail 
Profiles: narrative 
summary using 
informants own 
words 
 
Narrative scene: 
composite narrative 
written at the end of 
data collection  
Be aware of bias in 
what you have 
chosen to put into 
this write-up 
 
Vignettes can be 
helpful when your 
data seems to lack 
meaning 
2 hours from 
participants 
 
4 hours from 
researcher—not 
including 2 hours 
of time for 
transcription 
 
Prestructured Case 
 
Problem Description Illustration Variations Advice Time needed 
Not enough time. 
 
I need to 
streamline my 
data collection!! 
For when you have a 
conceptual framework 
and a firm set of 
research questions—
This is a case outline 
created before any data 
is collected 
Research questions 
guide how the data will 
be collected and what 
data will be collected. 
 
See example pg. 84 
Can also be 
used with fully 
written up data 
 
 
 
  
Not for the 
inexperienced 
researcher. It 
may put 
blinders on 
you or bias 
you. 
After the 
outline is 
complete(hour
s depend on 
you) expect 2-
3 days 
 
This process is iterative and data collection feeds on what it finds until you are no longer seeing 
new information. 
 
Sequential Analysis 
 
Problem Description Illustration Variations Advice Time needed 
The need to 
reorient 
yourself to 
your view of 
the case.  
Interim reports and 
other methods 
already discussed 
See pg. 86 
 
You must keep 
returning to the 
data before you go 
on collecting more 
and continue until 
you are ―done‖—
it‘s a circle. 
Transformations of data: 
 
Individual case synopsis 
 
Illustrative narrative 
 
General condensation 
 
General psychological 
structure    
Process will help 
you look at your 
data from 
different angles 
 
Do not be afraid 
to do this 
Depends 
 
These methods are helpful for early data collection and analysis. 
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Russell, Joel S. with Meyers, Andrew. 1995. Planning Charrettes. PAS Memo, Chicago IL: 
American Planning Association August 1995.   
http://www.e-architect.com/pia/cote/AIA-COTE/edcw/main/index.asp 
Summarized by Marc Boey 
 
Definition of a charrette:  
 ―a short intense collaborative process for designing projects, planning communities and 
building consensus‖, ―a workshop held in a two- to three-day period in which architects and 
other design professionals, community leaders, public officials and citizens work together to 
envision alternatives for a local building program, neighborhood or regional community 
project, with an emphasis upon long-term economic, social and environmental 
sustainability.‖ 
 
Different types of charrettes: 
Type Main Objectives Public Involvement Professional 
Involvement 
Decision-Making 
Professional 
Design 
Product-driven.  
Promote project and get 
initial feedback 
Restricted and focused. 
Minimal short meetings 
with public officials, 
representatives of use 
groups, potential 
financial sources or 
project neighbors. 
Multidisciplinary 
team including 
architects, planners, 
engineers, etc who 
spend several days 
studying the site and 
designing the project  
Confined to 
professionals and key 
stakeholders e.g. 
developers 
Participatory 
Design 
Product-driven. 
 
Structured opportunities 
for input from public. 
Greater involvement 
compared to 
professional design. 
Focused groups as well 
as general public. 
Design team (similar 
to that above) moves 
into community for a 
week and prepares 
plan under the eye of 
the public 
Agenda and product 
controlled by the 
professional design 
team 
It is also controlled by 
the sponsor 
Academic/ 
Competitive 
Design alternatives 
(not for implementation) 
Training students and 
educating public 
 
Not so dependent on 
public participation as it 
is more of a 
pedagogical technique; 
public may be just 
invited to see the 
product 
Professional architect 
assisted by design 
students 
Designs are sometimes 
submitted to jury for 
critique 
Professional 
Planning 
Identify overall planning 
problems in a 
community 
 
Meetings between 
public officials and 
representatives of 
interests groups and 
large public meetings 
Professionals kept at 
a neutral distance 
Mainly advisory and 
facilitator role 
Report only makes 
recommendations. 
Implementation is left 
to local government 
and organizations 
Participatory 
Planning 
Local participation  
Local political support 
Maximum citizen 
participation focusing 
on community 
interaction rather than 
professional 
prescription 
Mainly facilitator 
role 
The community 
through consensus 
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Benefits of charettes: 
 Reduce adversarial tension and gridlock during project review by putting all concerns on the 
table at the beginning of the process without triggering the opposition typical of conventional 
planning and zoning proposals e.g. allow stakeholders the ability to influence projects and 
community plans in a way that satisfies their concern.  
 Give citizens a more meaningful role in planning the future of their communities. Charrettes 
are an effective means to initiate volunteerism and collaboration from all interested parties to 
jump start community revitalization that can involve those most affected by environmental 
quality issues and opportunities. 
 Cost- and time-effective because it is an intense collaborative process e.g. professional team 
members are ―locked out‖ the outside world during the charrette process; reduce costly 
reiterations and coordination problems because all the key players are present at one time and 
in one place. 
 Synergy created because of the involvement of all key players including professionals, 
community leaders and citizens; can lead to stimulating design and planning solutions. 
Charrettes encourage discussion that stretches the envelope of possibilities beyond 
conventional thinking. 
 Charrettes are an effective means of understanding the complex yet vital issues planning and 
the importance of protecting our environmental, economic and cultural resources. 
 
Limitations with charrettes: 
 Conflicting interests and factional bickering. A meeting that brings together a diverse set of 
community representatives, public leaders and outside "experts" is by definition "loaded" 
with conflicting agendas, diverse personalities and cross-purposes. Meetings that are not well 
planned and facilitated can set community discussions back due to miscommunication, 
misunderstanding or misuse of the initial good will that should otherwise prevail. 
 Loses ―steam‖ and ―high‖.   
 Poor response/participation e.g. residents who are suspicious of motives.  It is important to 
choose a topic that will engage both positive and substantive community support. 
 
Tips for planning successful charrettes: 
 Clarity of purpose.  Understand the nature of the group and community and their different 
reasons for being involved in the project. 
 Identifying a significant project. Don't do it unless there is evident local commitment to use 
the charrette as part of a larger and longer range commitment to take action. It is important to 
choose a topic that will engage both positive and substantive community support. The initial 
proposal need not be perfect. It should be open to modification as discussions and planning 
proceeds. It has to be a project that is inspiring and at the same time feasible, that is, it does 
not raise false hopes. Community aspiration is too valuable a quality to squander on false 
starts and dead ends. 
 The charrette workshop should be linked to a larger initiative, before and after the event, that 
builds local community initiative and development. For example, charrette can be used to 
build upon local networking; link local initiatives (bottom-up) to broad (horizontally linked) 
networks, such as citywide collaborations. 
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 Establish Pre-event meetings. Mini pre-charrette meetings in which participants are able to 
express their needs and priorities in their own terms (rather than to be immediately thrown 
into an unfamiliar and professional setting). 
 Should be planned carefully and well in advanced. A minimum of three months (most 
typically six months) is needed to prepare for a successful event, with a longer time frame 
required for more complex events.  Requires an organizational structure defined to a 
sufficient level of detail so that many people can work together, essentially "reading from the 
same page" to create a smooth running event. Decisions that need to be put into place include 
a charrette meeting location, sufficient planning time prior to the event, involvement of key 
stakeholders, and an organizational group or committee. 
 ―Get stakeholders involved early‖ and ―Don't leave anyone out‖. If the charrette project 
involves different groups or communities normally left out of the planning and decision 
process, organizers may find themselves from the outset dealing with a potentially disruptive 
situation. 
 Follow-up must be adequately planned and budgeted. In the best cases, the charrette 
workshop is linked to a larger initiative, before and after the event, that builds local 
community initiative and development. Get early successes but also plan a long-term 
implementation strategy that affects policy. 
 Do not oversell charrette as a solution for all problems.  It has to be a project that is inspiring 
and at the same time feasible, that is, it does not raise false hopes.  Community aspiration is 
too valuable a quality to squander on false starts and dead ends. 
 Hire or invite experienced consultants and leaders. Depending on the objectives charettes 
usually require the assistance of knowledgeable experts, educators and design professionals. 
For example, a community that is concerned with energy and resource conservation would 
require expert advice on ways to reduce energy and resource use and resulting pollution and 
to use renewable energy sources through optimized building design, materials selection, 
envelope and windows, lighting and day lighting, utility loads, heating, cooling and 
ventilation systems. 
 Putting a Funding Strategy in Place. Sources of such funds included local foundations, 
utilities, banks, businesses and chambers of commerce, with "contributions in kind" by 
restaurants, hotels, newspapers, television stations and art materials suppliers. The average 
"lowest reasonable cost" per charrette is in the range of $5,000, to cover costs typical of 
space rental, food for participants, travel, honoraria and lodging for facilitators and group 
leaders and printing and publications. 
 Establish a News and Communication Plan. In most cases, the local press is easily involved 
in public communication and coverage, provided that notice is given (ideally, an informative 
and interesting press release) so that media reporters know about significant meetings and the 
event itself. Both the kick-off and the final public presentation of the charrette work can be 
organized to provide media coverage. Local newspapers are often a readily available means 
by which to publish the results, such as in a special "Sunday Supplement" printed as a 
community service. 
 Logistics: Where to hold the charrette event. There are several recommendations about the 
charrette workshop location itself. One recommendation is to hold the event at or near the 
actual project site, or at least to provide easy access so that site conditions can be visited, 
seen and discussed. An alternative recommendation is to hold the charrette in a publicly 
visible and accessible location. 
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 Evaluating the Event. Most charrette events go quickly with a great degree of intensity and 
focus, so that when it is over, people leave quickly to catch up with things left undone for 
several days. However, without some evaluation process, valuable lessons learned may go 
unheeded. It is therefore recommended that some form of event evaluation be put in place, 
allowing time in the concluding session for evaluation forms to be completed before 
participants leave. This evaluation, whether in questionnaire form or otherwise, should allow 
for commentary to capture creative insights and suggestions for improvement. 
 
How to be good facilitators: 
 Practice active listening by (1) staying engaged, (2) being supportive of the participants 
whether or not there is agreement, (3) searching for the meaning behind participants' 
comments, and (4) being nonjudgmental. 
 Accept conflict as part of the creative process by (1) focusing on the present and issue- 
oriented problem-solving, (2) allowing a limited amount of venting, and (3) agreeing to 
disagree when there in no common ground. 
 Art of nondirective facilitation.  The ability to initiate a group empowerment and leadership 
process without creating dependence on the leader, that is, to make oneself unimportant. 
 Making a checklist to better prepare for a charrette: 
1. Audit existing conditions. Make sure the room will work and that all necessary materials 
and support functions are in place. 
2. Discuss expectations with the organizing group in terms of goals and outcomes. Establish 
ways to measure success and consider an evaluation form to measure participant 
responses at the end of the event to find out what went well and what needs 
improvement. 
3. Understand the nature of the group and community. The organizing group may or may 
not be representative of the community that is most impacted by the project or program 
being envisioned in the charrette.  
4. Organize around goal statements. At any point in a group discussion, people will disagree 
on any and all points. Some think of parts while others think of wholes. Both are needed, 
but the best way to get everyone "reading from the same page" is to list goals and 
outcomes, and then detail how to get there. 
5. Include all stakeholders. A stakeholder can be defined as anyone whose participation, 
energy, agreement and volunteerism will contribute to the success of the effort. This 
creates the "quandary" of trying to get some focus and action while listening to all 
constituents and stakeholders. 
6. Prepare a schedule that anticipates variations in the discussion sequence. An experienced 
facilitator learns how to balance a fixed schedule with time and alternatives "built in" for 
discussions to take their own turn.  
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Chrislip, David D. and Carl E. Larson. 1994. Collaborative Leadership: How Citizens and 
Civic Leaders Can Make a Difference. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.  Pp. 3-14, 52-4. 
Summarized by Worrasit Tantinipankul  
 
What is Collaboration?  
It is a mutually beneficial relationship between two or more parties who work toward goals by 
sharing responsibility, authority and accountability to achieve results. The purpose of 
collaboration is to create a shared vision and joint strategy to address concerns that go beyond 
the purview of any particular party.  
    
Why?  
Because people feel cut out of the process, unheard and unable to see how they can have real 
impact on public affairs. They want to have their involvement make a difference in the public 
interests.  Government is out of the reach of ordinary citizens and does not respond to the needs 
of individuals and communities but to the interest groups and power players. 
 
So?  
When nothing else works, people begin to collaborate. The collaborative endeavors are engaging 
people in new ways, providing the role in public life that citizens want, allowing them to have a 
sense of commitment to their community.  
 
Collaboration in Business  
For more than thirty years, major business corporations in U.S.A – IBM, General Motors, Xerox 
and Kodak – have been losing ground to more efficient, more innovative and more customer-
responsive international competitors. Many of those competitors adopted the ideas of W. Edward 
Deming (Deming, 1986; Walton, 1991) that, instead of relying on hierarchical organizations and 
detailed production methods to control the workers and products quality, shifted the focus to the 
process of how employees work together to produce quality products. If workers were trained in 
working together and trusted each other, they could produce outstanding work.     
 
Collaboration in Education  
A major problem in education reform is the complexity of the system: curriculum, how teachers 
teach, relation of institutes and community, governance and so on.  However, the main problem 
is the failure of implementation and understanding of stakeholders.   Ideas cannot be 
implemented because other reformers and stakeholders block action. The implementation can 
succeed only if teachers, principals, parents, students, institutions and community members are 
involved. For example, Boulder Valley School District created school-based community to serve 
as center for decision making.      
  
Collaboration in Family and Children Services  
The loss of economic stability, provision of food and other necessities, and physical safety in 
families are the current problems in family services.  Together We Can, a joint publication of US 
Department of Education and Department of Health and Human Services, identifies that the 
system divides the problems of families and children into separate categories and fails to link the 
solution together.  In addition, there is a lack of functional communication among public 
organizations and private agencies. The key success is a family-centered, comprehensive, 
integrated and flexible system that tries to solve problems in both children and family system. 
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Collaboration in Community Health Care  
The expert-driven, overly centralized and bureaucratic approach has dominated in the cities‘ 
health policy and it is very costly. Collaboration between health-care providers and the private 
voluntary sectors was minimal and narrow-minded. Heath care is not the sole responsibility of 
providers. The needs of the community have to be revealed and understood. In South Bend, 
Indiana, Memorial Health System, Mihiana Community and Planned Parenthood of North 
Central Indiana has worked together as a partnership and has accomplished more than any one of 
them could working alone.          
 
Collaboration in the “Civic Community” 
In the researched comparative study of the twenty government regions of Italy by Robert 
Putnam, the relative success or failure of each region was not determined by the measures of 
prosperity but by the degree that civic engagement were woven into the social fabric of the 
region. Effective civic engagement ensures political equality. A city is defined by Peirce as a 
region made up of historic center surrounded by cities and towns characterized by social, 
economic and environmental interdependence. Cities in US need to correct the problem of the 
inability to create effective systems of coordinated governance, close the gap between poor and 
rich people and stop the inefficient expansion of wasteful and environmentally damaging 
suburbs.  
 
Key to successful Collaboration 
 Good timing and clear need  
 Strong stakeholder groups  
 Broad-based involvement  
 Credibility and openness of process  
 Commitment and/or involvement of high-level, visible leaders  
 Support or acquiescence of ―established‖ authorities or powers 
 Overcoming mistrust and skepticism 
 Strong leadership of the process  
 Interim successes and a shift to broader concerns     
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Martin, Ann and Robert Rich. 1999. Searching and Search Conferences. Mimeo. ILR, Cornell 
University: Ithaca, NY. 
Summarized by Frederick Addison 
 
The ―search‖ brings people together to search for a desirable future for their common enterprise. 
The process uses a structured, systematic framework for a group to find both common and 
separate ground and, through an iterative series of discussions, discover how to advance their 
interests toward the desirable common future. The search conference is not an end in itself, but a 
catalyst for ongoing planning and implementation. 
 
The Process 
It proceeds through a series of small and whole group sessions.  
 
Stages of a typical search: 
 
Day 1 
 
 
 
 
Day 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Day 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Search Conferences are normally conducted in a socially isolated environment where 
participants are disconnected from their daily concerns and responsibility. Typically, duration of 
search conferences are from two and a half days to a week. 
 
Participation 
Qualification for participation: 
1. Have a genuine interest in advancing the well being of the organization or community on 
which the search is focused. 
2. Be willing to participate in the entire search process. 
 
The conference group should include all of the major functions and interest groups that are 
important to the planning task. The search is most likely to be successful if people with relevant 
experience and knowledge, past interest and commitment to improvement, and those with 
authority and responsibility to act on the outcomes are all represented. It is important that 
 
Introduction 
and Overview 
 
Participant 
Expectations 
 
Shared History 
(evening 
session) 
 
Ideal 
Future 
 
Probable 
Future 
 
Keep, 
Drop, 
create 
 
Areas for 
Change 
Mid-
Search 
Check 
                         ACTION PLANNING  
 
Follow 
up 
Planning 
Search 
Evaluati
on  
Definition 
of Areas 
for Change 
Workflow 
Planning 
Planning 
Templates 
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 23  
everyone is given an equal opportunity to participate and contribute since it is assumed that 
everyone involved has valuable ideas, facts and questions that will help shape the whole. 
 
Conflict and Consensus 
The idea of the search is not to resolve conflicts, but rather for people to work together for 
solutions that will meet their separate interests. The concept of consensus is not an explicit goal, 
although agreement on certain preferred actions is often an outcome. Discovery of points of 
collaboration is the real goal of a search. 
 
Outcomes 
Outcomes are likely to be general agreement among participants on strategies for meeting the 
desired future and a preliminary action plan to achieve those strategies. 
 
Preparation 
1. Planning group, composed of representatives of community planning search and search 
managers, meets to clarify search question, set criteria for participation, and to identify all 
stakeholder groups. Stakeholder groups are asked to select their own representatives to 
the search 
2. Planning group frames question participants will answer when they envision the future. 
3. Prior to conference itself, search managers meet with prospective participants to explain 
the purpose and process of the search and the requirements for participation. 
 
CRP 649 – Research Methods and Project Design   Article Summaries 
  Part 4 – Methods: Community Collaboration 
 
 
 24  
1997. ―Building Community and Commitment to the Future: The Search Conference.‖ CDS 
Practice, 6: 1-8. 
Summarized by Frederick Addison 
 
The search conference is growing in popularity as method for developing community plans and 
to galvanize action to achieve those plans. It has been used in private industry, government, and 
communities to produce participative strategic or plans. It is commonly used in large group 
interventions and is very appropriate for use in community settings. 
 
The structure of search conferences is based on the principles of participative democracy and 
theory concerning how groups form and work together to accomplish tasks. Four features 
characterize the search conference: 
 
1. The search for ―common ground‖ regarding the desired future. 
2. Focus on the desired future, rather than on solving problems. 
3. Group-managed activities including self-management or self-facilitation of small group 
tasks. 
4. Emphasis on action-taking in addition to planning. The intent is for the participants to 
take responsibility for implementation, even if they personally cannot take all the 
necessary actions. 
 
Common ground differs from consensus-building. It assumes that there is a shared desired future 
or some outcomes that a diverse group of people can discover and agree to achieve. Areas of 
disagreement are not the focus of discussion; they are posted on a ―disagree‖ list. Focus is on 
elements on which there is virtual unanimity. 
 
Focus on desired future or vision leads to a different dynamic and different actions than does 
problem-solving. Groups tend to be energized and motivated when they focus on what they want. 
Actions required to create a desired result are often different from those required to get rid of a 
problem. 
 
Break-out group discussions are self-managed since it is believed that people are capable of 
managing themselves and do not need to be guided or managed by others not involved in the 
content discussion. Conflict may arise, but it is assumed that they are capable of working it out 
because of the clear focus on a compelling task. This assumption has a practical purpose too: in 
the future they will not have the luxury of calling in a facilitator whenever they want to have a 
meeting. It is an opportunity to develop the skill needed and experience the power of the working 
mode of small groups. 
 
The structure of the search supports the building of a sense of responsibility for the outcomes and 
commitment. Devoting sufficient time to action planning allows participants to decide what they 
can do as individuals and as a group to affect the choices they make. 
 
The Process 
Criteria to determine whether the search conference is the correct process: 
 
a. Is the desire of the sponsoring group to develop a stronger sense of community? 
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b. Is the desire present that the group or sub-group take responsibility for follow-up, at least on 
some actions? 
c. Will it be beneficial to have a process that will quickly bring a group to a sense of cohesion 
and common ground around some key areas? 
d. Is it possible to convene participants for a 2 1/3 to 3 day period? 
 
Preparing for the Search 
1.  Organize a pre-conference planning group; should include people from various sectors of the 
community for whom the search is being conducted, not as representatives, but as those who 
know about the different sectors. Planning group will make decisions regarding the structure 
of the search, including the focus question itself. 
2.  Planning group selects whom to invite. There are two schools of thought on how to do this: 
First – invitees should be people who have knowledge about the search topic and are willing 
to be responsible for decision making and implementation. Second – when search conference 
is for a community, it needs to be inclusive, accommodating all who wish to come, including 
key people with power to influence and implement.  An effective approach to identifying the 
key invitees is a ―community referencing system‖ – asking people in the community or in 
each sector who should be there. Other approaches include town hall meetings, open forums, 
etc. 
3.  Pre-conference planning group tackles logistical questions regarding time allocation, venue, 
dinning arrangements, funds needed and how to obtain them, how to enroll people attending. 
4.  Identification of conference managers, those who will lead the process. These are usually 
outsiders because trained people in the community often need and want to be in the search as 
active participants. 
 
The Search 
Generally include the following steps: 
a. Brainstorming (the whole group) about global trends, forces, events; and then working (in 
small groups before integrating) on agreement about probable and desired futures for the 
world. 
b. Brainstorming about the ―task environment‖ – those trends, forces, events directly impacting 
the community or search conference topic. 
  (a and b above are designed to help people discover they are psychologically similar to other 
people and develop a “shared psychological field,” both conditions for dialogue.) 
c. History or story telling about personal history in the community. Aimed at bonding people 
through awareness of their common appreciation of what they liked about their community. 
d. Identifying (in large groups) those elements existing in the community that attendees want to 
keep, drop and create. The items are recorded on three different sheets. 
e. Work on desirable future of the search topic in break-out groups. Groups are asked to agree to 
five to seven desired end states that describe what they want in the future. 
f. Integration of the major themes from each group. The themes are clarified and discussed by the 
entire group before accepted. If agreement is not reached on any theme it is placed on the 
―disagree list‖.  
g. Conduct action planning to develop first steps usually in small groups each working on a 
theme or element of their greatest interest. All groups develop a vision statement and then 
identify constraints and strategies to overcome the constraints, then brainstorm and discuss 
actions to lead to the goal. 
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h. All small groups report to the whole search community to discuss next steps, including 
coordination of activities, follow-up meetings, and how to disseminate the information to those 
who did not attend. 
 
Potential Benefits and Pitfalls 
 
Benefits 
1. Development of a cohesive community that is responsible for and committed to its own 
future. 
2. Encourages or creates space for participative democracy to occur both in the planning and in 
the implementation. 
3. Engenders collective burden of responsibility for the outcomes by avoiding the creation of a 
bureaucratic form in which committee chairs bear the primary burden of responsibility for 
the outcomes. 
 
Pitfalls 
1. When composition of planning committee does not have the necessary networks to attract the 
key stakeholders or information sources that need to be there. Only when the appropriate 
people are in the search can significant action occur afterwards. 
2. When the search question does not appeal to the interest or and attract people. 
3. The potential of under representation or over representation of certain segments of the 
community due to lack of diligent effort to broaden the recruitment process. 
4.  The problem of inclusivity when dealing with very large groups and their associated 
logistical and management problems.  
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Fontana, Andrea and James Frey. 1994. Interviewing: The Art of Science. Pp. 361-376 in 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. Edited by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Summarized by Lynn M. Ross 
 
Structured Interviewing 
This type of interview involves a trained interviewer asking each respondent the same set of 
questions in the same sequence. There is little room for variation in response and all information 
is recorded by the interviewer according to an established coding format. In order to maintain the 
structure of the interview it is very important that interviewer adhere to the following guidelines: 
 
 Never get involved in long explanations of the study 
 Never deviate from the study introduction, sequence of questions, or question wording 
 Never let another person interrupt the interview 
 Never suggest an answer or agree or disagree with an answer 
 Never interpret the meaning of a question 
 Never improvise 
 
The interviewer must ―stick to the plan‖ while establishing rapport and engaging in interested 
listening. When errors do occur, they can typically be traced to three sources: 
 
1. A respondent gives a socially desirable answer to please the interviewer, omitting or hiding 
other pertinent information. 
2. Faulty wording in the questions or inappropriate type of questionnaire. 
3. Flawed questioning techniques on the part of the interviewer. 
 
Group Interviews 
A group interview is not necessarily a focus group. There are several different types of group 
interview (see table 22.1). Regardless of the type of group interview selected, the interviewer 
requires a different set of skills than those employed for individual interviews. A group 
interviewer must: 
 
 Prevent an individual or small coalition from dominating the larger group 
 Encourage quiet group members to contribute 
 Elicit full participation to get the best coverage of the topic 
 Balance the role of directive interviewer with the role of moderator 
 
Table 22.1   Type of Group Interviews and Dimensions 
Type Setting Role of Interviewer Question Format Purpose 
Focus group Formal-preset Directive Structured Exploratory pretest 
Brainstorming Formal or Informal Nondirective Very unstructured Exploratory 
Nominal/Delphi Formal Directive Structured Pretest exploratory 
Field, natural Informal, 
spontaneous 
Moderately 
nondirective 
Very unstructured Exploratory 
phenomenological 
Field, formal Preset, but in field Somewhat directive Semistructured phenomenological 
Source: Frey and Fontana (in press) 
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Unstructured Interviewing 
The unstructured interview provides a greater breadth than other interview types because it is 
qualitative in nature. This type of interviewing differs from the structured approach in that it 
attempts to understand complex behavior without any preset categorization. The goal is to 
understand rather than to explain. There are some basic elements of unstructured interviewing.  
 
 Accessing the Site varies according to the group under analysis, which means the researcher 
must be flexible and able to adapt to new and changing situations. 
 Understanding the Language and Culture of the Respondents is critical to understanding the 
information one is receiving. Use of an interpreter can be helpful, but may also add a layer of 
meanings, biases and interpretations that lead to further misunderstanding. 
 Deciding on How to Present Oneself is very important because it leaves an impression on the 
respondents and can influence the success or failure of the study. 
 Locating an Informant can be useful because an insider can help the researcher interpret 
cultural meanings, jargon, and language thus helping the researcher to avoid mistakes and 
save time. 
 Gaining Trust is essential, but fragile. The researcher must always be on guard to avoid any 
faux pas that might jeopardize or destroy established trust. 
 Establishing Rapport is key given that the goal of unstructured interviewing is to understand. 
A close rapport allows for more informed research but may also lead to a loss in objectivity 
on the part of the researcher. 
 Collecting Empirical Materials in the field can be difficult, but the researcher should try to 
following this advice regardless of the circumstance: (a) take notes promptly and regularly, 
(b) write everything down, (c) try to take notes inconspicuously, and (d) analyze your notes 
frequently. 
 
Other Types of Unstructured Interviewing 
Oral History: Similar methodology with unstructured interview, but different purpose. Used as a 
way to capture information about groups and individuals that have been ignored, oppressed, 
and/or forgotten. 
 
Creative Interviewing: Similar to oral history, but the interviewer adapts to ever-changing 
situations and does not use formal ―how-to‖ rules. These reports go beyond the length of 
conventional unstructured interviews and may become ―life histories‖ captured during multiple 
sessions with the respondent. 
 
Postmodern Interviewing: Concerned with minimizing the interviewer‘s influence on the 
methods of collecting data and reporting findings. Methods include: 
 
 Polyphonic: Voices of subjects are recorded with little influence from the researcher. The 
information is presented as multiple perspectives on a variety of subjects rather than as one 
collapsed report which glosses over the differences and problems discussed. 
 Interpretive: Similar to polyphonic and creative interviewing. Attempts to capture 
epiphanies- moments in people‘s lives that are transformational experiences. 
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 Critical ethnography: Relies on critical theory and accounts for the social, economic, and 
historical situations. Attempts to broaden the political dimensions of cultural work while 
undermining the existing oppressive systems. 
 Oralysis: Traditional interview coupled with visual images captured via video recording. 
 
Gendered Interviews 
―Gender filters knowledge‖ 
The traditional interview paradigm (a masculine paradigm) does not account for gender 
differences, but the sex of the interviewer and of the respondent do make a difference. The 
hierarchical nature of the interview process places women in a subordinate position and ignores 
their concerns, personal feeling, and emotions. Traditional problems involving entree and trust 
are only heightened by the sex of the interviewer. Female interviewers often face the added 
burden of sexual overtures, covert sexual advances, or are considered low-status strangers. 
 
Addressing the problem 
There is a growing reluctance to continue interviewing woman as ―objects.‖ New emphasis on 
establishing a relationship between interviewer and respondent that minimizes status differences, 
gets rid of the traditional interview hierarchy, allows for the inclusion of the feelings and 
emotions of both parties by creating a level of reciprocity. Key principles of this new 
methodology include: 
 
 Heightened moral concern for subjects/participants 
 Attempt to redress the male-female hierarchy 
 The paramount importance placed upon membership; effectiveness of men interviewing 
women largely discredited 
 Realization that the ―objective, distanced‖ interview gives us a one-sided, inaccurate picture. 
 
Framing and Interpreting Interviews 
Framing involves the types of interview selected, the techniques used, and the ways of recording 
information. In terms of techniques, consider the following: 
 
 Techniques can and should be varied according to the group being interviewed. The 
researcher must enter the world of the individuals studied to share their concerns and 
outlooks. 
 The use of language is very important in establishing ―sharedness of meaning‖ and 
determining the type of question (broad, narrow, leading, instructive, etc.). 
 Nonverbal communication (looks, body postures, dress, long silences, etc.) both informs and 
sets the tone for the interview. 
 
Interpreting Typically readers are presented with the researcher‘s cleaned up, streamlined 
interpretation of the data in a collapsed, rational format. Many studies using unstructured 
interviews are not reflexive enough about the interpreting process. New emphasis involves a 
―confessional‖ style in which researchers reveal the complexities of their work, problematic 
feelings, and/or sticky situations. Using deconstructionism, the influence of the author is brought 
under scrutiny. Additionally, the postmodern approach reveals the human side of the interviewer 
removing the traditional ―faceless, invisible researcher‖ cover. 
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Ethical Considerations 
It might be useful to take another look at our previous readings on ethical issues and consider 
how they relate to the interview process. Specific issues to consider include: receiving informed 
consent, the right to privacy, protection from harm, the surreptitious use of tape-recording 
devices, degree of involvement on the part of the researcher, and the accuracy of the reporting. 
Many scholars consider most of the traditional in-depth interview techniques to be unethical 
because they basically amount to manipulating (to different degrees) respondents and treating 
them as objects. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
An increasing number of researchers are beginning to realize that pitting one type of 
interviewing against another is counterproductive. A method of triangulation will achieve 
broader and often better results. Finally, we must remember that to learn about people we must 
treat them as people. 
 
CRP 649 – Research Methods and Project Design   Article Summaries 
  Part 5 – Methods: Interviews and Focus Groups 
 
 31 
 
Morgan, David L. and Krueger, Richard A. 1993. Pp. 1-24 in Successful Focus Groups. Sage 
Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Summarized by Yusuke Matsushita 
 
Some Myths About Focus Groups 
 
1. Focus Groups Are Cheap and Quick 
- Focus groups often appear to be done cheaply because the research team donates a large 
amount of labor.  
- Although the group itself may last 1 or 2 hours, it takes time to create an effective set of 
questions, locate the appropriate participants, and make sense of data they provide. 
- The reality is that focus groups require planning, effort, and resources. 
 
2. Focus Groups Require Moderators With Highly Developed Professional Skills 
- The first-order goals should be to define what the purposes of the project are and who the 
participants in the groups should be. 
- The moderator is the instrument in a focus group interview. 
- The key is to find someone who has experience working with groups and who is also 
capable of working with both the research teams and the participants in the particular 
project.  
 
3. Focus Groups Must Consist of Strangers 
- If making groups composed of strangers, it becomes difficult to conduct focus groups in 
organizations, communities, and other ongoing social settings. 
- To deal with this problem, we should rely on a skilled moderator to meet the challenges 
posed by such groups. 
- We can also minimize the problem by selecting and ordering the questions in the interview 
guide. 
 
4. People Will Not Talk About Sensitive Topics in Focus Groups 
- According to the author‘s experience, people readily talk about a wide range of personal 
and emotional topics. 
- The overdisclosure of sensitive information is also a problem. 
- The researchers must make plans both encourage appropriate self-disclosures and 
discourage disclosures that go beyond the legitimate aims of the research. 
 
5. Focus Groups Tend to Produce Conformity 
- The goals of focus groups are not to make decisions or reach consensus but to find out 
about participants‘ experiences and feelings on a given topic. 
- A good moderator will try to create an open and permissive atmosphere in which each 
person feels free to share his/her point of view. 
- If the researchers are genuinely interested in learning as much as possible about their 
participants‘ experiences and feelings, conformity is seldom a problem. 
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6. Focus Groups Are a Natural Means of Collecting Data 
- The goal of focus groups is to collect concentrated discussions on topics of interest to the 
researcher, but the discussion of these topics may or may not feel natural to the 
participants. 
- In assessing the naturalness of a set of focus groups, the match between the researchers‘ 
topics of interest and the participants‘ topics of ordinary conversation is often more 
important than the characteristics of the research setting. 
 
7. Focus Groups Should Not Be Used for Decision Making 
- To determine whether focus groups are adequate for making a decision, the researcher 
should begin by asking how difficult it would be to obtain ―better‖ information. 
- We need to consider the consequences of a wrong decision. 
- We need to replace a knee-jerk rejection of focus groups as a basis for decision making 
with a careful specification of when they can provide useful information in a cost-effective 
manner. 
 
8. Focus Groups Must Be Validated by Other Methods 
- If the goal of the research is specification rather than generalization, focus groups and 
other qualitative methods are likely to be preferred over quantitative methods. 
- If the goal is to generate theories or explanations, focus groups and other qualitative 
methods are appropriate tools. 
 
When Not to Use Focus Groups 
 
1. When the Primary Intent Is Something Other Than Research 
- The primary purpose of projects that rely on focus groups is to collect qualitative data to 
answer research questions. 
- Given the purpose, the fact that they are groups means that they may also serve other 
purposes as secondary functions. 
- The researcher must make the secondary purpose clear from the beginning. 
 
2. When a Group Discussion Is Not an Appropriate Forum 
- Composing groups that make some participants unwilling to express themselves defeats 
the purpose of the research. 
- Research concerning sensitive topics must be extremely careful in regard to ethical issues, 
and insufficient attention to these issues is a sure way to dampen the open discussion that 
is at the very heart of focus groups. 
- The protection of confidentiality from other members within the group is important. 
 
3. When the Topic Is Not Appropriate for the Participants 
- The match between the researchers‘ topics of interest and the participants‘ ability to 
discuss those topics is essential for successful focus groups. 
- A mismatch with the researchers‘ interest occurs most often when participants have too 
little involvement in the topic. 
- A mismatch also occurs when the participants‘ involvement with the topic is too high. 
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- Another problem with inappropriate topic occurs when we assemble the appropriate 
groups, but then ask inappropriate questions. 
- The best match between researchers‘ and participants‘ interests happens when they each 
share the same goals. (working with a variety of question within each groups; working 
with a variety of different groups) 
 
4. When Statistical Data Are Required 
- Focus group samples are usually both unrepresentative and dangerously small. 
- The statistical projections should not be made based solely on focus group results. 
- Some kind of counting may occasionally be useful in either conducting or analyzing focus 
groups, but one must always keep the fundamentally qualitative purposes of focus groups 
firmly in mind. 
 
The Advantages of Focus Groups 
 
1. When There Is a Power Differential Between Participants and Decision Makers 
- The interaction that focus groups bring is useful when normal channels between those who 
hold positions of power and those with no power are sometimes not available, because the 
interaction allows groups of peers to express their perspective. 
- Focus group interviews are especially useful when working with categories of people who 
have historically had limited power and influence. 
 
2. When There Is a Gap Between Professionals and Their Target Audiences 
- Because of the interactions in focus groups, they are a powerful means of exposing 
professionals to the reality of the customer, student, or client. 
- Because the professionals work with the research team to set the questions for the 
discussions, they can get immediate and vivid feedback about how others respond to their 
ideas.  
 
3. When Investigating Complex Behavior and Motivations 
- When the goal is to modify behavior that depends on complex information flow or a mix 
of attitudes, knowledge, and past experiences, the focus groups can provide the researcher 
with a tool that is uniquely suited to the task.  
- The interaction in focus groups often creates a cuing phenomenon that has the potential for 
extracting more information than other methods. 
 
4. To Learn More About the Degree of Consensus on a Topic 
- Focus groups have a strong advantage to learn more about the range of opinions or 
experiences that people have because the interaction in the group can provide an explicit 
basis for exploring this issue. 
- The advantage of focus groups is that the exchanges among the participants help them to 
clarify for themselves just what it is that their opinion or behavior depends on.  
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5. When You Need a Friendly Research Method That Is Respectful and Not Condescending to 
Your Target Audience 
- The friendliness of focus groups extends to both participants and to the end users of the 
research. 
- From the researchers‘ point of view, a successful focus groups project can help to forge a 
human connection between those who commission a project and those who serve as the 
subjects of their investigations. 
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Sheatley, Paul. 1983. Questionnaire Construction and Item Writing. Pp. 181-203 in 
Handbook of Survey Research. Edited by P.H. Rossi, J.D. Wright, and A.B. Anderson. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Summarized by Mei-Wen Huang 
 
It is important to realize that the questionnaire is simply an instrument, a tool, to be employed 
in the study of a research problem.  It may or may not be the most suitable instrument for the 
task. 
 
Other methods than the questionnaire in survey research are as follows: 
 Direct observation / measurement: ―counting traffic‖ / ―the Nielsen television ratings‖  
 Field experiments: the investigator devises a scenario and then records people‘s 
responses to the contrived situation 
 Content analysis of newspaper / magazine articles and advertisements 
Of course, all these methods have their own weaknesses as does using questionnaires; we 
should not automatically assume that a brand new questionnaire is the only way to provide 
the answer to the research problem. 
 
Before deciding to use a questionnaire, we should consider two problems: 
 Asking ourselves: ―do people have the information?‖ - A questionnaire can bring out 
only what is in the mind of the respondent, and this is task enough. 
 The willingness or readiness of the respondent to reply - Especially on some topics: 
drinking, drugs, sexual behavior, income, cancer … 
 
Standardized questionnaires 
 
A formal questionnaire may not be required when the collected data are not to be handled 
statistically.  For example: in interviewing community leaders about some topic of local 
concern, standardized questionnaire may inappropriately narrow the discussion and prevent a 
full exploration of each respondent‘s views.   
On the contrary, if the researcher requires a large sample, if the services of many 
interviewers will be employed or if the data will be subject to statistical analysis, the task of 
designing a standardized instrument cannot be avoided. 
 
In this kind of questionnaire, we should notice:  
 There must be a prescribed wording for each question, so that each respondent receives 
the same stimulus. 
 There must be a prescribed order for asking the questions / for the same reasons. 
 There must be prescribed definitions or explanations to ensure that the questions are 
handled consistently. 
 
There are some obvious disadvantages:  
 People understand the questions differently 
 Respondents are forced into what may seem to them an unnatural reply 
 Respondents have no opportunity to qualify their answers or to explain their opinions 
more precisely 
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 Respondents may feel they have already answered the question when the interviewer asks 
other prescribed questions on the same topic. 
 
An important consequence of the use of a standardized questionnaire is that, once it is 
printed, the researcher is committed to it and can do little or nothing to improve it.  For 
example: when we conduct a standardized questionnaire, administered by dozens of 
interviewers working simultaneously in many different locations, the researchers may not 
even be aware of any problem with the instrument until the field work is largely completed.  
If they suddenly have some great new thought and now see that an important question has 
been omitted, they cannot suddenly stop 50 or 100 interviewers and tell them to add the item.   
 
Mode of administration 
 
Many issues of questionnaire design hinge upon the mode of its administration.  There are 
two basic modes: self-administration by the respondent and administration by an interviewer 
who asks the questions.  Each of these can be subdivided or combined in various ways.   
 
Features \ Modes Self-administration Administration by an 
interviewer 
Example Mail survey Telephone interview 
Interviewer no interviewer is present Interviewers present 
Advantages Its low cost 
Collecting data from very specialized and highly 
motivated groups (ex: opera-goers; members of a 
professional organization) 
A high completion rate 
Interviewers can be used to 
reassure respondents, to 
answer their questions and 
even to edit their completed 
questionnaires 
Disadvantages Response rates are generally low with resultant large 
biases 
Less-educated persons may have trouble following 
the instructions 
Inadequate answers cannot be probed for a more 
specific or relevant response 
If respondents are puzzled by an item, there is no 
interviewer to explain it to them 
Question order biases may also occur because the 
respondent can study the whole questionnaire 
before answering the first question 
Cost are high 
There is also potential bias 
Such samples are usually 
inefficient for large-scale 
research because members 
of the groups are not 
independently selected 
 
One obvious 
distinction 
An untrained respondent will fill out the 
questionnaire; thus, the questions should be kept 
as simple, short and self-explanatory as possible / 
the instructions should be brief and clear. 
The interviewer will be a 
trained individual or can 
use the survey it 
proficiently under all 
circumstances. 
 
Type of sample to be interviewed 
 
A second major variable affecting questionnaire design is the type of sample from which data 
are to be sought.  It might be noted that because questionnaires are usually written by 
educated persons who have a special interest in and understanding of the topic of their 
inquiries, it is much more common for questionnaires to be overwritten, overcomplicated, 
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and too demanding of the respondent than they are to be simpleminded, superficial, and not 
demanding enough.   
 
Qualities of a good questionnaire 
 
A well-designed questionnaire should: (a) meet the objectives of the research; (b) obtain the 
most complete and accurate information possible; and (c) do this within the limits of 
available time and resources. 
 
Deciding on content 
 
The following five steps are generally applicable: 
(1) Decide what information is required. 
(2) Draft some questions to elicit that information. 
(3) Put them into a meaningful order and format. 
(4) Pretest the result. 
(5) Go back to 1. 
 
Note that one does not start by writing down questions.  The first task, and the hardest, is to 
figure out which factors are relevant to the problem.  Most research begins with at least a 
vague notion of the kinds of information required.   
A checklist of variables: Researchers have long sought to codify the various dimensions of 
public opinion that should normally be covered in survey research.  One of the earliest of 
these was Gallup‘s ―quintamensional‖ technique. 
(1) the respondent‘s knowledge or awareness of the issue 
(2) the respondent‘s interest in the problem or concern about it 
(3) respondents‘ attitudes toward the issue, the direction of their opinions 
(4) why do respondents feel the way they do? (what are the reasons?) 
(5) how strongly is the opinion held? (what is the intensity of the attitude?) 
These five dimensions may seem most applicable to Gallup-type inquiries.  Most experts 
have agreed on these five, but have suggested various others that may also be important in 
particular cases, such as ―respondents‘ readiness to act‖ and ―perception of others‘ beliefs.‖  
Also, demographic variables such as age, race, or length of residence may be important.  
 
Writing the questions 
 
The accuracy and validity of our data depend entirely on the questions we ask and the ways 
in which our respondents perceive and respond to them. 
 
Open versus closed questions  
Survey questions can be classified broadly into two forms: open and closed.  Sometimes, 
researchers make efforts to combine the open and closed forms of question, but this is rarely 
successful.   
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Features \ Forms Open Questions (Open Ended) Closed Questions (Multiple Choice) 
Difference Ask for a reply in the respondent‘s own 
words 
Ask respondents to choose one of two or 
more categories that have been 
suggested to them 
Advantages allow respondents to answer in their own 
frames of reference, entirely 
uninfluenced by any specific alternatives 
suggested by the interviewer 
respondents can attach qualifications to their 
answers or emphasize the strength of 
their opinions 
take less time and cost less money 
makes coding afterwards easier 
Disadvantages open questions inevitable elicit a great     
deal of repetitious, irrelevant material 
respondents will often miss the point of the 
question 
the interviewer must then do some      
sensitive probing to bring respondents 
back to the subject, to clarify their 
answers, or encourage them to elaborate 
takes more time and costs more money 
they suggest answers that respondents 
may not have thought of before 
they force respondents into what may be 
an unnatural frame of reference 
they do not permit respondents to 
express the exact shade of their 
meaning 
Be usually 
employed in such 
cases: 
when there are too many categories to be 
listed or foreseen 
when one wants the respondent‘s 
spontaneous, uninfluenced reply 
to build rapport during the interview, 
(following a long series of closed 
questions that may make respondents 
feel they have no chance to express 
themselves) 
in exploratory interviewing and pretesting, 
(when the researcher wants to get some 
idea of the parameters of an issue, with a 
view to closing up the questions later) 
(others than left cases) 
 
Response Categories: closed questions permit researchers to specify the answer categories 
most suitable to their purposes.  Many questions form natural dichotomies and often the 
researcher will just want to sort the sample into two groups: those who approve versus 
those who disapprove, or those who have knowledge of a particular issue versus those who 
are ignorant of it.  But this provides a poor response distribution.  It is worth noting some 
common response categories that appear on professional surveys ~ 
(1) excellent – good – fair – poor: useful for state of health / housing / transportation 
(2) approve – disapprove; favor – oppose; are you for or against; good idea – bad 
idea: opinion  
(3) agree – disagree: used with a wide variety of statements or propositions 
(4) too many – not enough – about right; too much – too little – about right amount: 
for measuring people‘s satisfaction with amounts 
(5) better – worse – about the same: for comparisons with past or expectations for 
future 
(6) very – fairly – not at all  
(7) regularly – often – seldom – never: frequency of many kinds of activity 
(8) always – most of the time – some of the time – rarely or never: another measure 
of frequency 
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(9) more likely – less likely – no difference: A measure of probability of the 
respondent‘s action 
 
Some common errors in question writing:  
(1) Double-barreled questions  (2) The false premise 
(3) Vague, ambiguous words  (4) Overlapping alternatives 
(5) Double negatives   (6) Intentions to act 
Some principles of question writing: ―Keep it simple‖ is the most important.  Also, be sure to 
include demographic questions, and make questions comparable to data available in census 
and other surveys 
 
Question order and format 
 
After deciding on the content of the questionnaire – the variables to be measured – and 
after drafting specific items designed to elicit that content, the researcher‘s next task is to 
group these questions into some reasonable order and put them into questionnaire format.   
The first part is an ―introduction‖ explaining the purpose of the survey and requesting an 
appointment for an interview.  (If the introduction prepared by the researcher leads 30 or 
40% of the respondents to refuse, it is a bad survey, no matter how well designed the 
questionnaire is.)  Two important facts should be revealed in a standardized introduction: (a) 
who the survey is for; and (b) what it is about.   
 Ordering the question:  
 Length of the questionnaire:   
 Questionnaire format:   
 
Pretesting 
 
The fourth stage of questionnaire design is to try out the questionnaire on a pretest sample.  It 
is recommended that researchers themselves conduct two or more pretest interviews, and not 
with their colleagues or family, but with strangers, because the best way to learn how to 
write a good questionnaire is to interview with a poor one.   
Pretesting reveals the major difficulties and weaknesses in a questionnaire.  Usually 12-25 
cases will reveal weaknesses.   
 
Back to the drawing board 
 
After the pretest, the researcher can return to Stage 1 of the questionnaire design process 
and think through again the kind of information necessary to answer the problem that the 
survey is intended to illuminate.  The researcher can then look at the wording, order, and 
format of the questions used on the pretest.  Timely consideration will enable the 
researcher to sharpen and refine the instrument to make it ever more efficient in fulfilling 
its task.  (If the survey is using many new questions or techniques invented solely for this 
purpose, a second pretest is strongly recommended.)  
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Data-base considerations 
 
At this point, it is essential that one give some attention to the management of the data base 
that the questionnaire will produce.  A set of completed interview schedules is , after all, not 
the end-product of the survey; those completed schedules have to be coded, keypunched, and 
rendered into computer-analyzable form.   
 
Other types of instruments and materials 
 
Data collection instruments do not necessarily take the form of questionnaires.  Sometimes 
they are report forms, record sheets, or rating forms that may not ask any specific questions 
but that provide categories for either the interviewer or the respondent to fill by entering a 
code, a number, or a written response.  For example: miles traveled, purpose of trip, expenses 
(parking, tolls, gasoline, etc.) … 
 
All such forms and materials require the same careful design as the questionnaire: 
consideration of the kind of information needed, clarity and brevity in the wording of the 
various categories or items and in the instructions for their use, logical ordering of the items, 
an easy format to follow, and actual testing before they are put into final use.   
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Bouma, Gary D. and G.B.J. Atkinson. 1995. Selecting a Sample. Pp. 137-63 in A 
Handbook of Social Science Research. Oxford University Press: New York. 
Summarized by Ching-Fei Hsu 
 
How to Select A Sample 
Given that it is impossible to know everything about everyone or all groups, selections 
must be made. 
1. Decide what you want to know.  Form a hypothesis  Focus it  Make it operational 
2. Whom do you want to know?  What is it you want to know?  Identify the population 
about which you want to know something. (See example in p.140) 
 
Types of Sampling Procedure 
Non-random Sampling Procedure 
If a non-random sampling procedure is used, one can only hope that those selected for 
study bear some likeness to the larger group.  The conclusions drawn from a study of a 
non-random sample are limited to that sample and cannot be used for further 
generalizations. 
 
1. Accidental Sampling 
Using what is immediately available. 
Advantages: accidental samples are handy, and require little effort; particularly useful for 
pre-testing. 
Disadvantages: The findings of a study are strictly limited to those studied, and the 
researcher does not know in what ways the sample is biased.  There is no way of 
checking this without doing a study of everyone, or a study of a properly drawn random 
sample. 
 
2. Accidental Quota Sampling 
It partially overcomes the difficulty of an accidental sampling that it is uncertain which 
aspects of the total population are included and which are not.  In an accidental quota 
sampling, the researcher selects individuals or groups on the basis of set criteria. 
Advantages: it is useful when a particular group or characteristic is relatively rare in the 
population.  By setting a quota, and selecting people until the quota is filled, the group or 
characteristics you want in the sample are there.  Also, it is often used due to the 
pressures of time and budget. 
Disadvantages: Although the researcher is assured of the presence of certain categories in 
the sample, the representativeness of the sample is still not ensured.  It is due to that the 
individuals, or groups, are not selected randomly. 
 
3. Purposive Sampling 
Researchers use their own judgement or intuition to select the best people or groups to be 
studied.  Carefully qualify any tentative conclusions you might wish to draw on the basis 
of a study of a purposive sample. 
 
4. Systematic Matching Sampling 
When a researcher wants to compare two groups of very different sizes. 
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Example: a study comparing female and male headteachers of secondary schools in an 
area in terms of career satisfaction.  There are few female secondary heads in the area, so 
the researcher would study the entire population.  However, the researcher might select a 
sample of male heads who matched a female head in certain features deemed to be 
important to the consideration of career satisfaction. Disadvantages: representativeness is 
weak. 
 
Random Sampling Procedure 
A random sampling procedure provides the greatest assurance that those selected are a 
representative sample of the larger group. 
 
1. Simple Random Sampling 
Ideal method of drawing a sample; however, very difficult to do.  It guarantees that each 
element (person, group, class, school, etc.) in the population has an equal chance of being 
selected and that every possible combination of the specified number of elements has an 
equal chance of selection. 
To do this, identify the population from which the sample is to be drawn.  Then 
enumerate and list each element (pr persons, households, car owners, etc.) in the 
population.  Finally, devise a method of selection which ensures that each element has the 
same probability of selection and that each combination of the total number of elements 
has the same probability of selection. 
Acceptable Compromise: given the virtual impossibility of meeting all these criteria, a 
number of acceptable compromises have been devised. 
Example: you want to study a simple random sample of the 250 first-year English 
students in a particular university.  First, identify the population (i.e. the 250 first-year 
English students in a particular university).  Then, identify and enumerate each element 
in the population.  Finally, select the sample. 
The most acceptable form of selecting a sample from an enumerated population involves 
the use of a table of random numbers.  Another acceptable form of selection is to put all 
the names or numbers in a hat and draw out the number required. 
 
2. Systematic Sampling 
The selection of every n
th
 case in a list. 
Example: you have a list of 400 students in a school and you want a sample of 80. Select 
the starting-point, then select each fifth element. 
Advantages: it provides an acceptable approximation of the ideals of the simple random 
sampling procedure. 
 
3. Stratified Random Sampling 
Identify and enumerate each sub-section or stratum of the population to be studied and 
draw elements from it by a random sampling procedure. (divide a large group into 
smaller more finely defined groups) 
Criteria used to stratify populations: age, stage in the life cycle, gender, occupation, 
location (rural vs. urban), size (large school vs. small school).  The criterion for 
stratification will be suggested by your hypothesis. 
 
4.Cluster Sampling 
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It is developed to deal with large and scattered populations (national samples). 
First, divide the population into segments.  Then, randomly select elements within each 
segment following identification and enumeration (only the elements in the selected 
segment need to be identified and enumerated). 
 
Conclusion 
Selecting a procedure for your research depends largely on the population about which 
you wish to draw conclusions.  Example: if you are happy to limit your conclusion to the 
students in your class, that accidental sample will do perfectly well. 
Random sampling procedures are particularly important in research which aims to assess 
the attitudes, values, or beliefs of a population. 
 
Determining Sample Size 
 
Several basic issues need to be considered in determining sample size. 
1. If statistics are going to be used in the analysis and interpretation of data, there are 
usually requirements for sample size. 
2. The more accurately the data must reflect the total population, the larger will be the 
sample. 
3. The more questions asked, the more controls introduced, the greater the detail of the 
analysis of the data, the larger the sample will have to be in order to provide sufficient 
data for the analysis. 
 
Suggestions for student projects. 
1. Thirty individuals are required in order to provide a pool large enough for even the 
simple kinds of analyses. 
2. You need a sample large enough to ensure that it is theoretically possible for each cell 
in your analytical table to have five cases fall in it. 
Example: student snack selections (see p.153) 
*A dummy table is a table prepared before the collection of data to help to focus the 
issues of the research, to guide data collection, and to help determine sample size. 
 
Sweet Fruit Other 
   
Figure 7.2 A dummy table for the categorization of student snack selection 
 
The minimum sample size would be 3 5=15; but it would still be preferable to have 30 
because of the first basic rule. 
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Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 9: Matrix Displays: Some Rules of Thumb 
Summarized by Worrasit Tantinipankul 
 
Matrices and networks are systems for using data. Matrices essentially involve the 
crossing of two or more main dimensions or variables to see how they interact. They lend 
themselves to a variable-oriented analysis style and can be expanded to more case-
oriented styles. Networks involve a series of nodes connected by links. They lend 
themselves to a case-oriented, syntagmatic approach that re-creates the ―plot‖ of events 
over time, as well as showing the complex interaction of variables. 
 
Matrix Elements 
We can construct a matrix by considering the character of data to lay out in two 
dimensions. 
  
1. Descriptive v. explanatory intent. There are two purposes of data. The first one is data 
to describe what‘s there and the second is data to explain why it‘s there. The second 
may be more complex in form of ordering.  
2. Partially ordered v. well-ordered. We should look at the order of data in each row and 
column to see the continuity and relationship of data in the same group. 
3. Time-ordered v. not time ordered. Ordering matrix by time can help for analysis of 
flow, sequences and chronology and create cause and effects. 
4. Categories of variables. How you categorize the data. For instance, in groups of 
doctors, are we sorting doctors by specialty or status? For patients, by age or by 
symptom? 
5. Two-way, three-way. We can subdivide data in each column or row to have clearer 
display in detail of data.  
6. Cell entries.  
7. Single-case v. multiple case data. The single case explaining phenomena in an 
individual or group may be need only a simple row and column arrangement, but in 
multiple cases, row and column need to serve the cases to provide more data in matrix 
display. 
 
Entering Matrix Data 
The quality of conclusions derived from a matrix cannot be better than the quality of data. 
A complete matrix cannot be good even though it looks good, if the data were collected 
poorly. 
 
Rules of Thumb for Data Entry 
1. Be clear about the level of data. Higher density and more categories of data make the 
data display more useful. 
2. Remain aware of what you have done. There is always a great deal of selection 
condensation from the mass of field notes.        
3. Use code to locate material. It is important to know where the data came from. 
4. Keep an explicit record of the decision rules that we can follow in selection of data.   
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5. The decision rule must display clearly its association with the matrix. 
6. Show the data in matrix even if some are missing. 
7. The basic strength of qualitative matrices is the inclusion of the text. 
 
Drawing Conclusions from Matrix data 
The matrix can help the analyst understand the data better in situation of research. 
 
1. The matrix is helpful for a quick scan of data, and the researcher can notice what is 
jumping out from the rows and columns. 
2. The matrix can help to draw the first conclusion by noting patterns, themes, contrasts 
and comparison. 
3. Make sure the conclusion is explicit.  
4. Check back with the matrix to make sure that conclusions are not oversimplified. 
5. First conclusion needs to check back to the written-up field notes.    
6. The matrix is useful when we can seek confirmation through the feedback from 
informants. 
7. Researchers need to understand a single case before they go through the cross-cased 
pattern. 
8. In writing conclusions, look for genuinely representative exemples of the conclusions. 
9. Clarify the conceptual import of the conclusion that may tie into other theories of 
social behavior. 
10. Document conclusion-drawing procedure and ask for an occasional review from 
colleagues. 
11. Be careful about the data that readers will read along with the text  
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Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook, 2
nd
 Edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 10: Making Good Sense: Drawing and Verifying Conclusions. 
Summarized by Marc Boey 
 
I am covering two sections in my review: 
 
Tactics for generating meaning: These are the strategies for sifting, ordering and 
organizing ‗chaotic‘ data so that they make sense to us.  These tactics help us arrange raw 
data to facilitate better analysis and interpretation.  
 
Tactics for testing or confirming findings: These are the strategies that can verify whether 
your findings are correct or wrong. 
 
A. Tactics for generating meaning 
Miles and Huberman listed 13 specific tactics for sifting, ordering and organizing of data.   
 
No Tactic Explanation 
1 Noting Patterns Identifying themes from a seemingly senseless/abstract collection 
of empirical data. 
E.g. Noting that many of the MSC buildings uses wood for interior 
decoration, has ikat or batik prints for decoration, has dome-like 
structures for their roofs, arches in their structural forms, engages 
foreign architects, composed of glass and steel, have high-tech 
gadgets, etc. 
2 Seeing Plausibility Taking leads or pointers that can help you organize your data more 
effectively.  It is a preliminary and exploratory method and needs 
to be verified by the other tactics listed below. 
E.g. is there a connection between buildings, which uses lots of 
wood with those that use has ikat, or batik prints for decoration. 
3 Clustering Grouping and conceptualizing the data; bundling the variables or 
themes which you have identified earlier. 
E.g. buildings that uses wood for interior decoration, has ikat or 
batik prints for decoration can be grouped together because they 
bear strong local architectural characteristics; those with domes 
and arches can be grouped separately because they are very 
similar to those in the Middle East or India; those of glass and 
steel and with high-tech gadgets in another group. 
4 Making Metaphors Labeling the different clusters of data in meaningful ways that can 
better integrate the clusters. 
E.g. traditional architecture; Islamic architecture; modern 
architecture. 
5 Counting Simply quantifying the data that have been collated above. It is a 
good way of testing for possible bias, and seeing how robust our 
insights are. 
E.g. How many building in the MSC uses dome structures? 
6 Making Contrasts/ 
Comparisons 
It is a technique that provides yet another layer of meaning to the 
data. 
E.g. Comparing and contrasting buildings designed by local and 
foreign architects.  Are they similar or different? 
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7 Partitioning Variables It is another way of clustering data and can occur in the early 
stages of the process.  It depends on your needs.  
E.g. traditional architecture can be further broken down into  
Traditional-local such as ikat and batik art forms or tradition-
foreign such as Islamic architectural forms. 
8 Subsuming Particulars into the 
General 
A more sophisticated level of clustering that entails a deeper 
analysis or investigation into the often intuitive clustering that 
occurred earlier on.  It is often a theoretical and conceptual 
activity. 
E.g. I can take two broad groups of architectural traits - traditional 
and power (eg mammoth size of buildings) architecture – and 
regroup them under hegemonic architectural forms. In this case 
size of buildings and their forms seem to be unconnected at an 
intuitive level. But deeper analysis finds that they are connected in 
that both attempt to exert a form of hegemonic control. 
9 Factoring 
 
Finding communalities in clusters of data. 
Almost similar to Tactic No.8.  
10 Noting Relations Between 
Variables 
 
Trying to decipher the relationship between different variables.  
E.g. Does a foreign architect increases the level of modernity in a 
building? Does traditional building forms necessary mean 
traditional building materials? 
11 Finding Intervening Variables Similar to Tactic No.8. 
12 Building a Logical Chain of 
Evidence 
 
This tactic essentially involves linking up the earlier ordered 
groups of data to reach some supposition. The causal links must 
make sense in order for them to be viable. 
E.g. use of wood is a local architectural trait; it is affiliated with 
Malay cultural tradition rather than those of the other ethnic 
group; the projects that utilizes wood are government-linked; the 
government is dominated by Malays; the dominance in the use of 
wood in the MSC projects is used by the government to assert 
cultural hegemony over the other ethnic groups. 
13 Making Conceptual/ 
Theoretical Coherence 
Building theory by connecting the organized data with theoretical 
constructs from sources outside the primary research. The theories 
may be from your literature review and may conflict as well as 
support the findings from your data. 
E.g. Existing theories of architectural hegemony suggest that ‗size 
does matter‘ and gargantuan structures are symbols of hegemonic 
control (e.g. the architecture in Nazi Germany). 
 
B. Tactics for testing or confirming findings 
Miles and Huberman also listed 13 specific tactics for increasing our confidence in the 
data.   
 
No Tactic Explanation 
 
1 Checking for 
Representativeness 
To take a broad enough sample that can accurately portray a trend. 
This can be done by increasing the number of case studies, 
looking for contrasting cases (discussed below), and careful 
selection of the sampling frame. 
2 Checking for Researcher 
Effects 
Two different types of effects: the distorting effect an ‗outsider‘ 
interviewer has on the ‗insider‘ interviewee; and the distorting 
effect an ‗insider‘ interviewee has on the ‗outsider‘ interviewer. 
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3 Triangulating Different type of triangulation: by data source (Which can include 
places, times, persons, etc); by method (observation, interview 
document) by researcher (different investigators), by data type 
(qualitative and quantitative). Using more than one source helps to 
verify the findings. The aim is to pick triangulation sources that 
have different biases, different strengths, so they can complement 
each other.  
4 Weighting the Evidence Understanding that different some data sources are stronger or 
weaker than others. The objective is to maximize the use of the 
strong ones and minimize reliance on those that are weak.  E.g. 
data collected later and after repeated contact is stronger than 
those collected early during entry. The strategy is to keep a good 
log of data quality issues. 
5 Checking the Meaning of 
Outliers 
Investigating deeper into outliers.  These cases usually provide 
evidence that strengthens an original conclusion. 
6 Using Extreme Cases Questioning informants that may have a strong bias.   
E.g. Soliciting opposition political parties for their views on the 
MSC landscape. Or policy-makers involved directly in the MSC 
projects. If the latter criticizes the project then the answer may be 
very persuasive because you would not expect this administrator 
to make such a statement at all.  
7 Following-Up Surprises Findings that deviate from your suppositions but offer new 
perspectives on your research. These ‗surprises‘ should be 
followed up by looking at how they could lead to a new theory or 
a revised theory. 
E.g. My initial supposition is that MSC landscape is used to 
promote culture hegemony.  But an informant may reveal 
information that suggests that the MSC landscape also sustains 
economic hegemony. 
8 Looking for Negative 
Evidence 
Looking for data that opposes your conclusions. 
9 Making If-Then Tests Trying to draw causal relationship between findings and 
suppositions (?). 
10 Ruling out Spurious Relations 
 
Revaluate and reexamine seemingly causal relationships to verify 
if it is spurious. 
E.g. Intuitive assumption that traditional architecture is for 
preserving national identity.  But a deeper investigation may 
reveal that promoting national identity is not the main goal; 
promoting cultural hegemony is the real objective. 
11 Replicating a Finding Testing out the findings at other sites/with other case studies.  
E.g. Are the reasons for the hybrid landscape in Malaysia similar 
to those in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Jakarta? Will conducting a 
similar study in these other cities replicate the findings? 
12 Checking Out Rival 
Explanations 
Comparing rival explanations on the same subject matter.  This 
helps to eliminate biases if any. 
E.g. The hybrid MSC landscape results from meeting the 
conflicting needs of hegemony and economic development. Are 
there any other explanations for hybrid landscapes?  
13 Getting Feedback from 
Informants 
Feeding back findings to informants for verification. This allows 
informants to confirm the accuracy of the information that is being 
collected/recorded.  May be carried out at the end or during the 
data collection process itself.  
E.g. sending a interview summary to the informant. 
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Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 10: Making Good Sense: Drawing and Verifying Conclusions 
Summarized by Worrasit Tantinipankul 
 
C. Standard for the quality of Conclusions 
 
This section is about the question of the liability of conclusions mostly in qualitative 
method. How can we know that the final findings are good? The basic question of the 
goodness can be approached from a ―Justificatory‖ point of view. However, many 
researchers have pointed out that the problem of quality in qualitative studies needs to be 
understood in its own terms not the justification devices. Many interpretivist researchers 
suggest that it is not really possible to specify criteria for good qualitative work. 
Moreover, the effort to do was viewed as expert–centered and exclusionary, and not 
responsive to contingent, contextual interpretative nature of any case study.  
 
The view of Miles and Huberman is that quantitative studies take place in a real social 
world and can have real consequences in people‘s lives; that is reasonable view of ― what 
happened‖ in particular situation. The researchers should not consider the work is 
unjudgable. The authors suggest the five main criteria for goodness. 
  
1. objectivity/ confirmability of qualitative work  
2. reliability/dependability/auditability 
3. internal validity/creditability/authenticity 
4. external validity/ transferability/fittingness  
5. utilization/application/action orientation 
 
Objectivity/ Confirmability  
The basic issues are relevant queries of neutrality and unbiased conclusion 
 
1. Do we feel that we have a complete picture including ―backstage‖ information? 
2. Can we follow the process that transforms data to specific conclusion drawn? 
3. Are the conclusions linked with the exhibit data? 
4. Is there a record of study methods and procedures, detailed enough to be followed as 
an ―audit trail‖? 
5. Has the researcher been explicit and as self-aware as possible about personal 
assumptions, values and biases? 
6. Were competing hypotheses or rival conclusions really considered? At what point of 
study?  
7. Are study data available for reanalysis by another researcher? 
 
Reliability/Dependability/Auditability 
The issues are the consistency, reasonability and stability of the study process and 
method over the time. 
 
1. Are research questions clear, and are the features of the study design congruent with 
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them? 
2. Is the researcher‘s role and status within the site explicitly described? 
3. Do findings show meaningful parallelism across data sources? 
4. Are basic paradigms and analytic constructs clearly specified? 
5. Were data collected across the full range of appropriate settings, times, respondents, 
and so on suggested by the research questions? 
6. If multiple field-workers are involved, do they have comparable data collection 
protocols? 
7. Were coding checks made, and did they show adequate agreement? 
8. Were data quality checks made (for bias or deceit)? 
9. Do multiple observers‘ accounts converge, in instances, settings or times when they 
might be expected to? 
10. Were any forms of peer or colleague review in place? 
 
Internal Validity/Credibility/Authenticity 
Do the findings make sense and provide the real picture of story?  
 
1. How context-rich and meaningful are the descriptions? 
2. Does the account ―ring true,‖ make sense, seem convincing or plausible, enable a 
―vicarious presence‖ for the reader? 
3. Does the account render a comprehensive arrangement of local context?   
4. Did triangulation among complementary methods and data produce generally 
converging conclusions? 
5. Are the presented data well linked to the categories of prior or emerging theory?  
6. Are the findings internally coherent?  
7. Were rules used for confirmation of propositions, hypotheses? 
8. Are areas of uncertainty identified? 
9. Was negative evidence sought for?  
10. Have rival explanations been actively considered?  
11. Have findings been replicated in other parts of the database than the one they arose 
from? 
12. Were the conclusions considered to be accurate by original informants? 
13. Were any predictions made in the study, and how accurate were they? 
 
External Validity/ Transferability 
The issue is the transferability of conclusion of a study. Can it be applied to other 
contexts? 
 
1. Are the descriptions of sample data displayed fully enough to compare with other 
samples? 
2. Does the report examine possible threats to generalizability? What is the limitation 
that affects sample selection? 
3. Is sampling theoretically diverse enough to encourage broader applicability? 
4. Does the researcher define the scope and boundaries of reasonable generalization 
from the study?  
5. Do findings include enough ―thick description‖ for readers to assess the potential 
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transferability, appropriateness for their own settings? 
6. Does a range of readers report the findings to be consistent with their own 
experience? 
7. Are the finding congruent with, connected to or confirmatory of prior theory? 
8. Are the processes and outcomes described in conclusions generic enough to be 
applicable  in other settings? 
9. Is the transferable theory study explicit? 
10. Have narrative sequences been preserved unobscured? 
11. Does the report suggest settings where the findings could fruitfully be tested further? 
12. Have the findings been replicated in other studies to assess their robustness? 
 
Utilization/Application/Action Orientation 
The study needs to provide its goodness to researchers and participants as well as 
consumers. Are there ethical issues that researchers should consider about consequence 
of the study?  Real people will be affected from research. Who will benefit from the 
research, and who may be harmed? 
 
1. Are the findings intellectually and physically accessible to potential users?  
2. Do the findings stimulate ― working hypotheses‖ on the part of the reader as guidance 
for future action? 
3. What is the level of usable knowledge offered?  
4. Do the finding have a catalyzing effect leading to specific actions? 
5. Do the actions taken actually help solve the local problem? 
6. Have users of the findings experienced any sense of empowerment, of increase 
control over their lives? 
7. Have users of findings learned, or developed new capacities? 
8. Are value-based or ethical concerns raised explicitly in the report? 
 
D. Documentation  
 
The problem  
This issue is about the report of qualitative research. The researchers in qualitative 
research should have audiences for process of their research. There are three steps in this.  
 
1. The first audience is researchers to keep track what they had done along the way. 
2. The second is the people who are the readers of the report and need to know the result 
of report. They need to know the reason of analysis.  
3. The third is other researchers who may interested in doing a subsequent analysis of 
data. 
  
Why do we need the report and documentation of qualitative research?  Lofland argued 
that qualitative research seem to lack a public, shared and codified conception of how 
what they is done and how they report should be formulated. Qualitative studies are rich 
in description of settling, people, events and processes but often indicate little about the 
way to get information and almost nothing about how conclusion were drawn. It is 
difficult to verify that the information is correct. The researchers need to verify their 
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methodology by the report. Presently, many journals require authors of empirical studies 
to report their procedures so researchers and readers can track down and use the research 
data for other analysis. 
Suggestion  
Lofland and Lofland suggest the explaining the study inception, relation with informants, 
private feeling and data gathering, data focusing and analysis.  
   
Illustration 
The documentation form that Miles and Huberman developed is focused on a single 
research question issue in first item and asks for the explanation of analysis design to and 
complete description of procedure as follow. 
 
Qualitative Analysis Documentation Form 
   
In this analysis task, what, specifically, were you aiming to do? (Give context and a short 
rationale; say whether focus is exploratory or confirmatory; make the connection with 
earlier analyses.) 
Description of procedures. Work sequentially, keeping a log or diary of steps as you go 
through the analysis. Use a second sheet if needed. If the analysis task changes 
substantially, use a new form, redoing items 1 and 2 above. 
 
Specific 
data  
set in use  
Procedural Steps(number each 
one, explain what was done, and 
exactly how it was done) 
Analysis Operations (enter codes) Conclusions 
Drawn 
Research 
Comments 
Readying 
data 
for analysis 
Drawing  
conclusion  
Confirming  
conclusions 
From these specific   
analysis operations;  
give substance in 
brief. 
reflections, 
remarks  
on any of the  
preceding. 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
The procedure includes the data sets which analysis was conducted, procedural steps , the 
decision rule used to manage data, the analysis operations involved, the primary 
conclusions to which the analysis led, and any concluding comments.  
 
Advice  
1. Be clear what is our objective in doing documentation: for study steering and 
revision, for personal learning, for getting feedback, for actual credit. 
2. Remember that audits always have a political dimension. 
3. Documentation detail depends on different study focus.  
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Lofland, John and Lyn Lofland. 1995. Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to 
Qualitative Observation and Analysis. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Chapter 7: Asking Questions.  
Summarized by Frederick Addison 
 
Social analysts commonly pose eight basic questions about social topics. The following 
figure summarizes the eight types of questions and their relationships: 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are the topic’s types? 
The Loflands see the definition of the case under study as fundamental and important in 
any social study. That is, ―What is this thing (or things) I see before me?‖ or ―What type 
of some already identified unit or aspect is it?‖ Topic types can be Single or Multiple.   
 
Single Types: Social analysis based on, for instance, a single type of practice, 
relationship, meaning, hierarchy, etc.  
 
Multiple Types: Where for instance one is observing more than one concrete setting, or 
multi-dimensional case. Example, types of cliques in organizations, associations in a 
community etc. 
 
Rules of Typing: two basic rules of procedure and outcome guide classification or type 
schemes. 
1. Rule of mutual exclusiveness of categories.  Each case must fall in only one category. 
2. Rule of exhaustiveness. Classification should allow for categorization of all relevant 
cases. (Make room for a mixed or other classification) 
 
Typologizing: Where topics under study possess some complex but systematic 
1. 
Type(s)? 
8. Agency? 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
1. Type(s)? 
6. Causes? 
3. Magnitudes? 2. Frequencies? 
7.Consequences? 4.Structures? 5.Processes? 
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interrelation, one can discover what that interrelation is by specifying a small number of 
relevant variables whose conjoint variations accurately incorporate the patterns you have 
already discerned (and point out others you have not). This process is called typologizing, 
dimensionalizing, cross-classifying, or substructing. 
 
What are the topic’s frequencies? 
That is counting how often something occurs. 
 
What are the topic’s magnitudes? 
That is the strength, intensity, or size of instances of an occurrence. 
 
What are the topic’s structures? 
The question of structures can be viewed as a more elaborated and detailed version of the 
question of types. That is, what are its more intricate and precise characteristics? Of what 
more complicated and exhaustive properties and traits is it comprised? Ideal typing is 
both a prominent procedure for answering and a form of answer to the question of 
structures. Ideal typing involves the analyst‘s identification of the components of the 
structure of the case and some logical structural patterns then using that partial construct 
to define a potential ―pure‖ or ―ideal‖ type or types. The units and aspects under study 
present themselves as an incoherent aggregation of infinite aspects and the task of the 
analyst is to ―disaggregate‖ them to achieve a coherent identification and ordering. For 
example see Fig. 7.3, page 130.  
 
What are the topic’s processes? 
Researchers seek to observe and analyze three basic forms of processes: 
1. Cycles: ―recurrent sequence of events which occur in such order that the last precedes 
the recurrence of the first in a new series.‖ ―Course of operations or events returning 
upon itself and restoring the original state.‖ Or ―A series of changes leading back to 
the starting point.‖ Social settings tend to be organized in terms of cycles based on the 
calender: seasons, months, days and so forth. In addition, there are revolving 
regularities of a less planned, recognized, and scheduled nature. 
2.   Spirals: ―Continuously spreading and accelerating increase or decrease.‖ Some 
processes do not show the degree of relative stability seen in cycles, they display a 
spiral pattern. E.g., tension or conflict between social units that are hostile to one 
another. 
3.   Sequences: The most common rendering of process is as a time-ordered series of 
steps or phases, which is different from cycles or spirals. In sequences the first and 
last steps are not connected as in cycles, nor is there an accelerated movement to a 
―stronger‖ or ―weaker‖ level of operation as in spirals. Investigators tend to trace 
sequence processes from one of three different starting points. 
 Tracing Back: Perhaps the most common starting point is an outcome. E.g., a 
person has embezzled money, used a drug; an organization has disbanded. In a 
tracing-back analysis, the researcher attempts to discern any typical stages 
through which the actors or action pass in a process that culminates (or does not 
culminate) in a particular outcome. 
 Tracing Forward: Concern with what happens after a decisive event, e.g. veterans 
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returning from war, newlyweds adapting to marriage, or communities being hit by 
a disaster. 
 Tracing through: Starting point is to consider the history of the process as a 
whole. Advantageous in situations lacking a dramatic episode from which to trace 
forward or backward, e.g. stages of development in adulthood. 
 
What are the topic’s causes? 
―What are the causes of X?‖ is perhaps the most frequently asked question in social 
science. Very elaborate procedures, though often quite difficult to implement in field 
situations, have been developed to meet the requirements of establishing causality. 
 
Requirements of Causal Inference 
Five things are required to say ―A causes B‖ with any reasonable degree of confidence: 
1.   For whatever you want to find the causes of, you must have instances not only of its 
occurrence but also of its nonoccurrence (or absence or attenuation). That is, you 
must begin with a variation in the ―dependent variable‖, even if not a strong variation. 
2.   You must have some reliable and consistent way to determine or measure presence or 
absence, stronger versus weaker, over a set of units that display the variation. 
3.   You must consider this measured variation in the dependent variable conjointly with 
some other measured variation that you provisionally think causes it in some sense.  
4.   The presumed cause precedes the effect in time. 
5.   The question of whether despite covariation and proper time order, you can ever be 
really certain a particular independent variable is the cause (or among the causes) of 
the dependent variable. That is, the problem of ―correlation not proving causation.‖ 
 
The Moral 
The techniques and technology of qualitative studies are not the same as those of 
quantitative studies. Using qualitative guide alone, you will not acquire measured and 
controlled variations in dependent and independent variables and will therefore not have 
the systematic data necessary to determine causation. A combination of both qualitative 
and quantitative procedures is desirable to produce a better causal analysis. 
 
Causation and Conjecture 
Given the difficulty in ascertaining causal relations, it is important to recognize that 
whatever account or explanation you devise is conjecture (hypothesis or theory). It is 
therefore important to phrase such conjectures in a qualified way. E.g. ―It is possible 
that…..‖ ―It seems to be the case that….‖ Etc. 
 
The Importance of Auxiliary Causal Accounts 
Three reasons why Auxiliary conjectures are not only permissible but also play important 
and indispensable roles in social science: 
1. Quantitative researchers and theorists rely on the conjectures raised by the variations 
and patterns recorded as a foundation for quantitative research. 
2. Members of social settings also make variations and puzzle over their causes. They 
develop their own hypotheses or theories to account for variations. Researchers who 
do not comprehend participants‘ own causal theories are likely to make profound 
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errors not only in ascribing causes but also in characterization. 
3. Under many circumstances of limited time, money, and topic importance, the causal 
theories that the qualitative analyst presents may be sufficient to the task. Elaborate 
quantitative research may contribute only marginal precision. 
 
Forms of Causal Accounts 
1.   Single Cause: A single factor or cause as explaining some variation, which is hardly 
the case. 
2.   List of Causes: Greater accuracy achieved by developing a series of independent 
variables that account for a variation. 
3.   Cumulating Causes: Attempt to specify the manner in which factors must accumulate 
through time and in what certain sequence in order to cause a particular variation. The 
concern is with successions of dependencies through time or ways in which prior 
conditions may or may not develop into succeeding conditions of a given outcome. 
 
Situational vs. Dispositional Causes 
To a social analyst, the appropriate content of variables to stress in a causal account is 
situational or social organizational. That is, the social researcher seeks the explanation of 
variations in behavior in situations and social organization rather than in physics, biology, 
psychology, or other nonsocial realms. E.g. ―Disoriented behavior and heavy drinking, 
rather than being precipitants of homelessness, are responses to homelessness.‖ 
 
What are the Topic’s Consequences? 
Consequences can be seen as the second half of the causal question. Here the dependent 
variable becomes an independent variable and we attempt to look at its dependent 
variable consequences. 
 
Requirements of Inferring Consequences 
Similar to requirements of causal inference: (1) a variation that you can (2) measure (3) 
in covariation with another relevant variable, and in (4) the appropriate time order, and 
(5) you must control for spurious associations. 
 
Consequences of What, for What? 
Consequential accounts typically depict relationships between a given central topic and 
one or several affected topics. A procedure  for tracing consequences is to decide on a 
specific topic and then survey other topics (units and aspects) in terms of the effects the 
central topic has on them. However, your actual analysis of consequences must take into 
account such constraints as the amount of relevant data you have and how interesting the 
things you have to say about them are. 
 
Consequences and Systems Needs: Functionalism 
One special form of consequential analysis assumes that the unit of analysis is a social 
system, an integral whole that is striving to maintain itself in its current state. Analysts, 
therefore, look for the contribution that various parts of the system make to maintaining 
the larger whole. However, analyses can be done without positing the existence of a 
social system with functional needs. Moreover, consequences analysis need not focus 
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only on effects that maintain a social arrangement. It could focus on consequences that 
bring change in the arrangement. 
 
Consequences Distinguished from Intentions 
Consequences and functions of social activity are not necessarily direct results of 
intentions of participants. 
 
What is Human Agency? 
 
Passivist vs. Activist Images 
The seven foregoing questions illustrate the passivist conception of humans and social 
life. In this view humans are treated as more or less neutral media through which social 
forces operate and out of which social forms and organizations are composed. In the 
activist view, the focus is on how people construct their actions in various situations, on 
how their activity is pieced together, thought about, tried out, and worked out. 
 
Activist Questions 
Once you understand this activist-passivist contrast, the procedural question for doing 
actual research then becomes how to develop an analysis that implements the activist 
image. In the activist approach the central question used to focus data is ―What is human 
agency?‖ or ―What are people‘s strategies?‖ This can be divided into two questions, 
namely 
1. What is the situation being dealt with? 
2. What strategies are being employed in dealing with that situation? 
 
People do not just act blindly, they often construct their actions to deal with situations. 
The activist analyst is therefore concerned with deciphering and depicting exactly what 
sort of situation the participants are facing. Reports answering the agency question tend 
to be organized into two sections, one of which analyzes the situation and the other the 
strategies. 
 
Humans devise strategic social arrangements but then lose sight of that fact over time 
because the ―structure‖ presents itself as an ―object‖ (objectivation). The human agency 
question is one way to ―deobjectify‖ social arrangements. In deobjectivation we come to 
realize that no social arrangement simply ―is.‖ Rather, arrangements are incessantly 
fabricated and this can be seen by decomposing them into their strategic components. By 
asking the ―strategy question‖ you can achieve a better causal understanding of many 
social events. 
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Lofland, John and Lyn Lofland. 1995. Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to 
Qualitative Observation and Analysis. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Chapter 8: Arousing Interest.  
Summarized by Hallie Salem 
 
Chapter 8 examines features of a report that make it more interesting.  There are three 
classic features of a report that arouse interest: 
 the report is true or accurate, 
 the report is new, and 
 the report is important. 
 
Social Science Framing 
A. True:  the report must give the reader confidence that the material is accurate 
Three validating criteria: 
1.  Theoretical Candor – candid exposition of when and why the author came  
to employ the particular form of analysis that organizes the facts 
2. The Ethnographer‘s Path – the author reports with whom he or she 
interacted, in what sequence, and how 
3. Fieldnote Evidence –  the author reports procedures for assembling and 
processing data and the practices of presenting the data 
B. New:  the author does not waste the readers time by repeating already 
established ideas 
1. Relating to Existing Work – the approach differs in some way from 
existing work 
2. First Report – the report documents a new formation or practice 
3. Unusual Setting – the social situation or setting is different, strange, etc. 
C. Important:  there are five framing practices that tend to prompt the response 
―that‘s important‖ 
1. Questioning Mindset – There is no final word, there is nothing that should 
not be doubted, and everything must be examined… 
2. Propositional Framing – The purpose of asking questions about topics is to 
develop social science answers or propositions 
3. Generic Concepts – seeks to specify abstract propositions of which the 
historical particulars are instances (rather than reported as chronological 
activities).  The historical uniqueness of the context is not denied, but 
other patterns are emphasized.  To develop generic conceptualizations, 
authors may use metaphors, irony, or new forms: 
a. metaphor – ex.  The Catholic Church is the General Motors of religion. 
b. irony – a state of affairs or events that is the reverse of what was or 
was to be expected: a result opposite to and as if in mockery of the 
appropriate result 
c. new forms – new variations on established types of social units or 
aspects, but don‘t rediscover what is already well understood. 
4. Developed Treatment – developed along three dimensions 
a. conceptual elaboration – the author presents evidence of having given 
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detailed thought to one or more propositions used to structure and 
analyze the data.  One must be sure not to underelaborate or 
overelaborate 
b. balance between conceptual theme and presentation of data – 
suggestion: somewhat more than half of the pages of an article should 
consist of qualitative data, and less than one half of the pages of 
analysis 
c. interpenetration – the continuing and intimate alternation of data and 
analysis within the text.  It is the logical consequence of a thorough 
working through of the data in analytic terms 
5. Resonating Content – the degree to which the content reverberates with 
and evokes existential concerns.  The audience asks:  does it strike a 
responsive cord?  Does it inform understanding of events and experiences 
within our world?  Consider: is it important to you?  Is it more than a fad? 
Social Science Value Commitments – the social science approach embraces a number 
of moral and value positions: 
A. Humanism and Liberal Science are the value perspectives in which social 
science is rooted 
B. New Perception – strengthens our ability to recognize general patterns.  The 
process of inquiry is never final 
C. Demystification and Reform – ―unshrouds‖ the special knowledge and powers 
of social scientists, and widens people‘s perceptions 
D. Human and Moral Complexity – appreciates human complexity rather than 
designating people as the good guy or bad guy based on their situation. 
E. Larger, Dispassionate Understanding – tries to be reasonably dispassionate or 
judicious and calm in examining and reexamining all data and concepts 
patiently and carefully.  Field studies and their appearance in generic 
consolidations can enlarge and deepen how larger audiences understand their 
experiences and those of others. 
Other Framings: 
A. Mainstream Improving – Large, mainstream audience – policy research, posed 
by authorities  
B. Radical Liberating – the researchers adopt a vantage point of the 
disadvantaged or oppressed, as in participatory research 
C. Villain Pillorying – utilize public records (mainly) to identify and harm a 
reprehensible person or group 
D. Expressive Voicing – tries to give a voice to those being studied 
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Lofland, John and Lyn Lofland. 1995. Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to 
Qualitative Observation and Analysis.  Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Chapter 9: Developing Analysis 
Summarized by Lynn Ross 
 
Analysis is viewed as an inductive and emergent process. That is, the researcher is the 
central agent guided by data, topics, and questions to an analysis that answers questions 
by ordering the data. Chapter 9 presents six overall categories of strategies aimed at 
helping the researcher achieve analysis. The authors stress that there is no single way to 
achieve analysis, and therefore any approach taken should be flexible. 
 
Strategy One: Social Science Framing 
The researcher should have the goal of presenting their data within a social science 
framework, that is devising an analysis that is empirically true. Propositions can be used 
to ―sum up and provide order‖ to the data. There are eight formal kinds of propositions 
(detailed in Chapters 7 and 8): type, frequencies, magnitudes, structures, processes, 
causes, consequences, and agency.  
 
In keeping within a social science framework, the researcher should remember when 
writing that they are not preparing a traditional term paper. A term paper focuses on a 
―review-summary‖ approach, whereas a fieldwork report is based on an ―analysis-report‖ 
approach.  
 
Finally, the research must decide how many propositions to develop during the course of 
the project. This decision depends on several factors: 
 
(1) how long one is in the field and how much data one collects; 
(2) the stage of the project we are talking about; and 
(3) the number and the scale of the reports one plans and completes. 
 
Strategy Two: Socializing Anxiety 
―Formulating potential major propositions from your data is an emergently inductive 
activity.‖ The open-ended nature of this activity is likely to produce some amount of 
anxiety or frustration in the researcher. There are, however, ways to manage this anxiety. 
First, accept that this type of work is neither mechanical nor easy to do. Second, 
persistently work at data collection. ―The sheer accumulation of information is itself 
anxiety-reducing because it ensures that you will, at minimum be able to say something.‖  
Finally, have faith that you will be able to generate a proposition to answer one or more 
of your research questions. Participating in a seminar of peers can aid in this process. 
 
Strategy Three: Coding 
The word (or short set of words) you apply to an item of data in answering questions is a 
code. ―Coding and memoing (discussed in the next section) are the core physical 
activities of developing analysis.‖ The point is to group the raw data items into ―packages 
of items that are related to one another.‖  
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Physical Methods 
1. Filing: Prior to the use of computers, the researcher employed an expanding set of file 
folders with code names to analyze data. 
2. PC Databasing: Uses the same logic as file folders, but increases the speed and 
efficiency with which data can be coded. The authors warn that the technology does 
not necessarily lead to better analysis. 
 
Types of Coding 
1. Housekeeping: this type of coding supports the analytic process by recording the facts 
necessary for later analysis. Although somewhat mundane, this type of coding is 
critical in locating information, maintaining chronology, and providing the basis for 
further analysis. 
2. Analytic: this is the central coding task. The goal is to generate as many separate 
codes and files as one is prompted to which may include multiple codes for a single 
item. This process involves engaging regularly in the activity of coding. The sheer 
number of codes may lead to category saturation (a code requiring no further 
analysis) or subdivision (further elaboration of a code). 
3. Fieldwork and Analysis: this type of coding documents the process of the fieldwork 
itself because the final report should contain an ―account of the pertinent aspects‖ of 
the field experience. 
4. Maintaining a Chronological Record: a chronological set of materials is useful for 
locating information not readily available in another file, providing historical context, 
and providing a stimulus to thinking about larger patterns and units of analysis. 
 
Stages of Analytic Coding 
1. Initial Coding: the researcher determines what can be defined and discovered from 
the data. These observations are numerous and varied. 
2. Focused Coding: in this process, less productive codes are weeded out in order to 
focus on the most useful codes. The selected codes are then applied to an increasing 
array of data. The weeding out and refocusing process is repeated until some codes 
become overarching ideas or propositions that will be central to the analysis. 
 
Strategy Four: Memoing 
Memos are the written ―explanations and elaborations of the coding categories.‖ The 
eventual goal of memoing is to aid the researcher in developing a coherent analysis. 
There are three kinds of memos that aid in achieving this goal: 
 
1. Elemental: a detailed, but succinct, analysis of a very specific subject matter. A 
researcher may write one to several dozen memos of this type. 
2. Sorting: analyzes several or all of the elemental memos to achieve a higher level of 
―abstraction or generalization.‖ 
3. Integrating: used to explain the connections between the sorting memos. There may 
be several possible modes of integration, however is may not be feasible to develop 
and write up more than a few of them. 
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Strategy Five: Diagramming 
―The word diagram is both a noun and a verb. A diagram is an object or a product of 
analysis and to diagram is an activity or process in analysis.‖ The diagram should be a 
succinct visual display of the relationship between concepts. There are four techniques 
that may be used to accomplish this: 
 
1. Typologizing: the central feature is the cross-classification of two or more ideas, 
concepts, or variables. Typologies can be tools of production as well as a product or 
end result. 
2. Matrix Making: detailed in Chapter 6, a matrix is a more complicated typology or 
cross-classification. 
3. Concept Charting: although these charts often do not appear in the final report, this 
charting strategy can be useful for visualizing relationships between concepts. This 
technique can be accomplished on a single sheet of paper, by using classroom 
blackboards, or even by tacking notes to the wall. 
4. Flow Charting: same basic features of concept charting, but illustrate an ―order of 
elements through time or in a process.‖  
 
Strategy Six: Thinking Flexibly 
The computer can be an excellent resource for data collection and storage, but is 
generally not appropriate for data analysis. Data analysis involves a level of flexibility 
and creativity not allowed for in computer applications. The authors suggest several 
devices that may help the researcher to ―think flexibly.‖ 
 
 Rephrase your question using synonyms and antonyms. 
 Change your diagram design. 
 Constantly compare the items under analysis. 
 Think in extremes and opposites to make better comparisons. 
 Talk and listen to your peers. 
 Remember to draw back and look at the big picture. 
 Withhold judgment about the final shape of the analysis for as long as possible. 
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Tashakkori, Abbas and Charles Teddlie. 1998. Mixed Methodology: Combining 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Pp. 112-36, Alternatives to Traditional Data Analytic Strategies.  
Summarized by Chih-hung Chen 
 
This chapter has discussed three types of data analysis: traditional quantitative data 
analysis, traditional qualitative data analysis, and strategies for mixed QUAL-QUAN.   
 
Traditional quantitative data analysis 
Descriptive methods: the most commonly used methods of descriptive data analysis and 
presentation are  
 Measures of central tendency  
 Measures of relative standing  
 Measures of association/relationship between variables 
 
Inferential method is to estimate the degree of variation.  In addition, the methods of data 
analysis provide information regarding the magnitude of the effect, or the relationship.  A 
brief summary of this method is as follows. 
 Testing differences between group means:  
(a) comparing the mean of a sample with the mean of a population: z-test 
(b) comparing the means of two samples: t-test 
(c) comparing the means of two or more samples or comparing means in factorial 
designs: analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
(d) comparing the means of two or more samples while controlling for the variation 
due to an extraneous variable: analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
 Determining if correlation coefficients are truly different from zero: 
(a) t-test for the significance of Pearson r from zero 
(b) F-test for the significance of multiple correlation 
(c) t- or F-test for the significance of slopes in multiple regression analysis. 
 
Traditional qualitative data analysis 
A priori themes analyses.  Three examples of a priori themes analyses: simple variance 
analysis, manifest content analysis, and the effects matrices of Miles and Huberman. 
 
Simple variance analysis: the researchers used a coding scheme in which two raters 
analyzed a sample of the responses and coded each response into three predetermined 
categories. 
 
Manifest content analysis: a research technique for the objective, systematic, and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.  Examples include the 
analysis and comparison of textbooks, popular magazines and newspapers, writings of 
the classic authors, and political speeches.  Once the content has been selected using 
appropriate sampling techniques, a coding or classification system needs to be developed 
for analyzing the content.   
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The effects matrices of Miles and Huberman: Miles and Huberman (1994) presented 
qualitative data analysis as having three parts. 
 Data reduction, or taking the raw data and simplifying and transforming them using 
the aforementioned codes. 
 Data display, which is displaying the data in an organized assembly of information 
that permits the drawing of conclusions. 
 Conclusion drawing and verification, or deciding what everything means and 
determining the validity of those conclusions. 
 
An emerging themes analysis   
 
Three examples of emerging themes analyses: latent content analysis, constant 
comparative analysis, and the developmental research sequence. 
 
Latent content analysis: the latent content of a text is determined by a subjective 
evaluation of the overall content of the narrative. 
 
Constant comparative analysis: this analytical scheme involves two general processes.  
(a) unitizing, or breaking the text into units of information that will serve as the basis for 
defining categories, and (b) categorizing, or bringing together into provisional categories 
those units that relate to the same content, devising rules that describe category 
properties, and rendering each category set internally consistent and the entire set 
mutually exclusive. 
 
The developmental research sequence: there are three stages of data gathering and three 
stages of data analysis. 
1. Broad descriptive questions are asked. 
2. Data based on responses to these descriptive questions are analyzed using domain 
analysis. 
3. Structural questions are then asked. 
4. Data based on responses to structural questions are analyzed using taxonomic 
analysis, which shows the relationships among all included terms in a domain. 
5. Contrast questions allow the ethnographer to discover the dimensions of meaning that 
informants employ to distinguish events and objects in their world. 
6. Data based on responses to these contrast questions are analyzed using componential 
analysis, which involves the systematic search for the attributes or components of 
meaning associated with cultural scenes.  
 
Strategies for mixed QUAL-QUAN data analysis 
 
Summary of mixed data analysis strategies: 
1. Data transformation: the conversion or transformation of one data type into another so 
that both can be analyzed together. 
2. Typology development: the analysis of one data type yields a typology that is then 
used as a framework applied in analyzing the contrasting data type. 
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3. Extreme case analysis: extreme cases identified from the analysis of one data type 
and pursues via analysis of data of the other type, with the intent of testing and 
refining the initial explanation for the extreme cases. 
4. Data consolidation/emerging: the joint review of both data types to create new or 
consolidated variables or data sets, which can be expressed in either quantitative or 
qualitative form.  These consolidated variables or data sets are then typically used in 
further analysis. 
 
Summary of alternative mixed method data analysis strategies: 
1. Concurrent mixed analysis: simultaneous analysis of QUAL and QUAN data. 
(a) Concurrent analysis of different data: parallel mixed analysis 
(b) Concurrent analysis of the same data: quantitizing 
(c) Concurrent analysis of the same data: qualitizing 
2. Sequential QUAL-QUAN analysis: Qualitative data analysis followed by 
confirmatory quantitative data collection and analysis. 
(a) Forming groups of people/settings on the basis of qualitative data, comparing the 
groups on QUAN data. 
(b) Forming groups of attributes/themes through QUAL analysis, followed by 
confirmatory QUAN analysis. 
(c) Establishing a theoretical order of relationship/causality through exploratory 
QUAL analysis, confirming the obtained sequence through QUAN data and 
analysis. 
3. Sequential QUAN-QUAL analysis: Quantitative data analysis followed by qualitative 
data collection and analysis. 
(a) Forming groups of people/settings on the basis of QUAN data, comparing the 
groups on QUAL data. 
(b) Forming groups of attributes/themes through exploratory QUAN analysis, 
confirming with available/new QUAL data and analysis. 
(c) Establishing a theoretical order of relationship/causality through exploratory 
QUAN analysis, confirming the obtained sequence through QUAL data and 
analysis 
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Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chapter 12: Producing Reports.  
Summarized by Worrasit Tantinipankul 
 
Form of reporting  
 
The conventional formats of quantitative research such as those displayed below are too 
structurally constraining.  
 Statement of the problem  
 Conceptual framework  
 Research questions 
 Methodology  
 Data Analysis  
 Conclusions 
 Discussion 
 
Many researchers may not follow the format above and may reorganize these items to 
match the research character. We cannot have a fixed set of reports but may provide 
choices for reporting.  
 The qualitative studies do not report data but rather describe scenes.  
 The reports are not the compilation of accurate data but rather outline forms of 
analysis of the materials.  
 The reports may deal with the form of analytical processes and the results because 
the data analysis includes selecting, condensing and transforming data.  
   
Audiences and Effects  
 
The responses of a specific audience group can be a part of report process because they 
observe the original setting, see the evidence, weigh the writer‘s interpretation and note 
the way they change. So by this way we can separate the types of reader as below. 
 Local respondents who give data  
 Program operators who evaluate and run the study   
 Practitioners who have the same type of work but different settings  
 Other researchers who are in committee or academic field 
 Policy makers  
 General readers who purchase the trade book  
 Mass readers who see the article in magazine  
Effects will differ depending on type of readers: Aesthetic, Scientific, Moral, and 
Activist. What effect the researchers intend for which type of readers must be considered. 
For dissertation committee, the stance will be effects of the theoretical and 
methodological advancement. For policy makers and readers, the moral clarification and 
illumination may be better.       
 
Voices, Genres, and Stances (Perspective toward reader) 
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We can detect the tone and standpoint of research that defines the relationship between 
writer and reader. The data is the same but the report will describe the story in a different 
tone. It is your choice to report. 
 Realist: portray the fact  
 Confessional: write from field worker‘s view point with personalized authority 
 Impressionist: personalized aiming to link reality and the field-worker to reliving the 
experience.   
 
Style – Formats and Structures  
 
Analytic mix. Good qualitative research needs to be a mixture of two interactive views  
 Analytical view: matrix form  
 Synthetic view : network display  
Conventional data analysis can be viewed in these two ways  
 Propositional thinking: formal and theoretical interpretation.  
 Figural  thinking: holistic reasoning  
The structure of qualitative research is composed by two thoughts and depends on their 
composition to make the research interesting   
 Descriptive idea: story setting, events, scene and episode. 
 Analysis idea: conceptual framework, determination of the factors that construct 
themes 
 
Structure outline: each researcher must use a specific structure that fits into the local and 
intellectual context of particular study such as choosing climax first or last. However, the 
basic is the following:  
  What? Introduction, background   
For my project, it is Preservation Planning for Rattankosin island, the inner historic 
District of Bangkok.     
   Why? Rational, concept, framework, core and theme of the report     
For my project, it is a question that why preservation effort did not work 
successfully in this area? or  What happen in the past make preservation of national 
identity is so weak in Thailand? or What is the social factor that makes it weak? 
What is the current condition of the place? How can preservation be fit in the 
context of Thai culture and Buddhism in modernity? 
   How? Methodology 
For my project, it is a question that how can I know all information of Thai political 
and social history? How can I know the attitude of governmental agencies, 
Buddhist monks, local communities toward historic preservation and national 
identity? Who I must interview and what will the case studies take place? What is 
the attitude of monk for preservation of temple and the modern use of temples in 
community? Do they agree to preserve the old building or build the new one 
instead? Why? If they don’t.  What are the attitudes of the major supporters of 
temple for the role of monks in their everyday lives? both local and non-local.  
What is the attitude of different governmental agencies in practice of preservation?   
   Analysis 
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My analysis will determine what is the factor that shape historic place and affect the 
historic preservation in Buddhist culture? What is the mechanism that can facilitate 
historic preservation planning in  present time and what the attitude in all parties in 
preservation should be? What is the proper attitude for preservation and national 
identity that should be considered?  
 Meaning, conclusion 
The historic preservation planning of Buddhist heritage in Rattanakosin Island that 
sustainable and suitable for promoting national identity in modern society. 
 
Advice to guide report structure is as follows: 
 The report should describe what the research is about 
 The report should communicate a clear context of setting and data  
 The report should tell history of inquiry and key concept that emerge from the 
inquiry  
 The report should provide the data in focused form  
 The report should describe the conclusions clearly and show the broader idea that 
conclusion can apply and affect  
 
Using Reports 
 
The report should be effective to the real audiences at various levels of consciousness and 
should vary with different kind of audiences.  
 
Level of diffusion  Innovator with 
special interest 
Key players or 
leader of opinion 
Majority of 
audience 
Everyone who might be 
affected 
Awareness      
Reception of message      
understanding      
acceptance      
adoption      
utilization      
integration      
routinization      
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Morse, Janice M.. 1994. Designing Funded Qualitative Research. Pp. 220-235 in 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. Edited by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Summarized by Yizhao Yang 
 
In this chapter, Morse identifies and describes some major design issues in the process of 
qualitative research, including six stages, from identifying a research topic to the write-up 
of final reports. Some techniques and advice are provided in a sequence that one would 
use when planning to conduct a qualitative project, and they are summarized as follows: 
 
The stage of reflection 
 
Identifying the topic  
The key to selecting a qualitative research topic is to identify something that will hold 
one‘s interest over time. The research questions (topics) can be a) real personal interests, 
b) problems noted in the course of practice or experience in every day life, c) research 
topics suggested at the end of a published article, as well as d) those derived from 
literature reading. 
What should the researcher do at this stage -- Having identifying a topic, the researcher‘s 
next step is to go to the library to read in the general area of the research topic. The 
researchers should let him/herself become familiar with the literature, with what has been 
done generally in the area and with the ―state of the art‖. Some advice provided in this 
Chapter includes a) it is inappropriate to spend too much time in the library at this point, 
b) it is wise to avoid chasing obscure references. 
 
Identifying Paradigmatic Perspective 
Three ―postures‖ underlying qualitative research: theory-driven, concept-driven, and 
―reform-focused‖ or ―problem-focused‖. 
―Theory-driven‖ or ―concept-driven‖ should be understood in the light that the theory is 
used to focus the inquiry and give it boundaries for comparison in facilitating the 
development of the theoretical or conceptual outcomes, rather than to guide data 
collection and analysis. ―Reform-focused‖ or ―problem-focused‖ ideas are typical in 
critical theory research, in which the underlying purpose of the research is political, with 
predetermined goals. 
What should the researcher do at this stage – Examine the research questions in light of 
the expected results, considering the potential audience and aims of the research. Place 
the study in the broader picture, which will help refine the question and the focus of data 
collection and analysis, and guide the style of presentation of the final report. 
 
The stage of planning 
 
Work at this stage involves many elements, including selection of a site and a research 
strategy, the investigator‘s preparation, creation and refinement of the research question, 
the writing of the proposal, and if necessary, obtaining clearance from an institutional 
review. 
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Selecting a site 
When selecting a site, the researcher should consider the tolerance from administrators on 
the site, the possible participation of the staff, the amount of time needed for negotiation 
for entry, as well as the availability of resources. Selecting of more than one site is 
suggested for purpose of comparison. One warning is provided in this chapter that it is 
not wise for an investigator to conduct a qualitative study in a setting in which he or she 
is already employed and has a work role. 
 
Selecting a strategy 
The research strategy is determined by the nature of the research question. Morse has 
tabulated five major qualitative research methods (p224); each of them offers a particular 
and unique perspective that illuminates certain aspects of reality and produces a type of 
results suited for certain applications.  
 
Methodological Triangulation 
To use more than one method within a project is preferred because by doing so the 
researcher can gain a more holistic view of the setting. The triangulation in 
methodologies can be the simultaneous or sequential use of two or more qualitative 
methods, as well as the incorporation of quantitative methods into qualitative research. 
 
Investigator preparation 
The competence of an investigator determines the quality of the result of a qualitative 
study. Traits that make a good researcher include (a) flexibility and patience in obtaining 
trust from informants on the site, (b) versatility in research methods, data collection and 
analysis, (c) sensitivity in finding clues and interpreting data, as well as (d) good working 
habits. To build up the wisdom, patience and skills needed for the success of a qualitative 
research requires practice and experience. 
 
Creating and refining the research questions 
The wording of the research question determines the focus and scope of the study. The 
researcher should make the question as broad as possible rather than prematurely delimit 
the study with a narrow question. Sometimes it is necessary to refine or even discard 
original questions when the researcher gets to know the setting and becomes to realize 
that there is a poor fit between the original questions and the real situation.  
 
Writing the proposal 
The proposal should be clear, interesting to read, technically neat, and professional in 
appearance. Writing a good proposal requires a skill to balance persuasiveness and 
realism. Before starting to write, one should, with an interesting topic in mind, mentally 
go through all the steps listed above, including site selection, strategy selection, 
methodology design, refinement of research questions, and etc. The actual writing of the 
proposal can begin as soon as decisions regarding the research design and the setting 
have been made. Morse summarizes basic components of a qualitative proposal (p228). 
Special attention and suggestion is given to the description of qualitative research 
methods and budgeting.  
 
The stage of entry 
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The stage begins after the funding is received. At the beginning, data collection is 
necessarily unfocused. Researchers need to give themselves some time to get used to and 
familiar with the setting. 
 
Sampling 
Technique that can be employed at this stage to help researchers identify appropriate 
informants:  
1. Primary selection by the criteria that a good informant is one who has the knowledge 
and experience the researcher requires, has the ability to reflect, is articulate, has the 
time to be interviewed, and willing to participate in the study.  
2. Secondary selection taking place when the primary selection failed and participants 
are obtained by some other means. 
 
Guidelines for sampling (Patton, 1990, quoted) 
The logic and power behind purposeful selection of informants is that the sample should 
be information rich. The selection methods include extreme or deviant case sampling 
(participants exemplifying the characteristics of interest are selected), intensity sampling 
(experts or authorities about a particular experience are selected), maximum variety 
sampling (a heterogeneous group are selected, and then the commonalties in their 
experience are observed), and critical case sampling (examples that are significant for the 
identification of critical incidents are selected). 
 
Bottom-line of all these methods is that the situation of the sample is determined 
according to the needs of the study not according to external criteria, such as random 
selection. 
 
Interview techniques 
The researchers should start with broad interviews, letting the participants tell their 
stories, and then use subsequent interviews to get more targeted information.  
 
The stage of productive data collection 
 
This stage begins when the researcher no longer feels uncomfortable in the setting and 
can relax and focus on what is happening, instead of on him- or herself. This is the stage 
when the pieces of puzzles are connected and patterns of relationships are uncovered.  
 
Data collection and analysis should be conducted concurrently in order to allow the 
analysis to guide data collection. Data management methods and tools are necessary 
during this stage to assure the efficiency of the research. The reliability and validity of 
data analysis need to be checked. Methods that can be used to ensure rigor in qualitative 
work include:  
1. Criteria of adequacy and appropriateness of data (adequacy refers to the amount of 
data, appropriateness refers to selection of information according to the theoretical 
needs of the study), 
2. The audit trail (six type of documentation that leave an adequate amount of evidence 
that can help reconstruct the research process),  
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3. Verification of the study with secondary informants (confirmation of the findings by 
informants ), and  
4. Multiple raters (asking a secondary investigator or someone else to check the validity 
of a category.  This is not recommended by the author*.) 
 
The stage of withdrawal 
 
When the time that the researcher becomes part of the setting comes, the researcher has 
reached the point of withdrawal. During this stage, the data collection is saturated while 
data analysis is intense. The model or theory should become more refined.  
 
The stage of writing 
 
The qualitative report must be a convincing argument systematically presenting data to 
support the researcher‘s case and to refute alternative explanations. Two main approaches 
to qualitative articles: 
1. To write the article as though the reader is solving the puzzle with the researcher 
2. To present a summary of the major findings and then present the findings that 
supports the conclusion. 
 
When writing, the researcher should consider issues of privacy (revealing identity) and 
honesty (editing quotations). And finally, the researcher should show some reciprocal 
gesture to the participants and organizations involved in the research by presenting the 
results, preparing a summary of the study, or providing a copy of the completed study 
and final report to relevant agents. 
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Hollister, Robinson G. and Jennifer Hill. 1999. Problems in the Evaluation of 
Community Wide Initiatives. In New Approaches to Evaluating Community-Wide 
Initiatives Volume 1: Concepts, Methods, and Contexts. Edited by James P. Connell, 
Anne C. Kubisch, Lisbeth B. Schorr, and Carol H. Weiss. 
Online at http://www.aspenroundtable.org/vol1/hollister.htm 
Summarized by Mei-Wen Huang and Yusuke Matshushita 
 
The authors outline the types of problems that can arise when an attempt is made to 
evaluate the effects of community-wide programs, or comprehensive community 
initiatives (CCIs). 
 
Key Problems in the Evaluation of Community-Wide Initiatives 
 
The Counterfactual 
The basic question an evaluation seeks to address is whether the activities generated a 
change in the outcomes of interest.  The problem in this case is to establish what would 
have happened in the absence of the program initiative.  This is often referred to as the 
counterfactual.  Indeed, most of our discussion turns around a review of alternative 
methods used to establish a counterfactual for a given type of program intervention. 
To those who have not steeped themselves in this type of evaluation, it often appears that 
this is a trivial problem, and simple solutions are usually proposed.  However, these 
simple solutions are not adequate to the problem – primarily because individuals and 
communities are changing all the time with respect to the measured outcome even in the 
absence of any intentional intervention.  Therefore, measures of the situation before the 
initiative or with comparison communities are not secure counterfactuals – they may not 
represent well what the community would have looked like in the absence of the 
program.  
 
The Unit of Analysis 
For most of the programs that have been rigorously analyzed by quantitative methods to 
date, the principal subject of program intervention has been the individual.  When we turn 
to community-wide initiatives, however, the target of the program and the unit of analysis 
usually shift away from just individuals to one of several possible alternatives.   
1. Still the individual, but individuals within geographically bounded areas – a defining 
factor that remains important. 
2. The family: many of the recent community-wide interventions seem to have this type 
of focus. 
3. The institutions: e.g. the schools, the police, or the health providers.  
The unit of analysis becomes critical because, when using statistical theory, the ability to 
make statements about the effects of interventions will depend on the size of the samples.   
 
The Problem of Boundaries 
For the purposes of evaluation, these boundary problems introduce a number of complex 
issues:  
1. Where the evaluation uses a before-and-after design – that is, a counterfactual based 
on measures of the outcome variables in a community in a period before the 
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intervention is compared with such measures in the same area after the intervention – 
the problem of changes in boundaries may arise.  Such changes could occur either 
because some major change in the physical landscape takes place or because the data 
collection method is based on boundaries that are shifted.  Similar problems would 
arise where a comparison community design is used for the evaluation, and boundary 
changes occur either in the treatment community or the comparison community.   
2. An evaluation must account for inflow and outflow of people across the boundaries 
of the community.   
3. The limited availability of regularly collected small-area data causes serious 
problems for evaluations of community-wide initiatives.  
 
Problems with Outcome Measures 
In many past evaluations in the social policy arena, the major outcome variables have 
been relatively straightforward and agreed-upon.  EX: the level of employment, the rate 
of earnings.  For community-wide initiatives, these traditional types of outcomes may not 
be the primary outcomes sought, or, even if they are, they may not show detectable 
effects in the short term.   
Therefore, we need to (1) distinguish intermediate outcomes and final outcomes.  (2) In 
addition, there may be types of outcome measures that have not been used traditionally 
but are regarded as outcomes of sufficient interest in and of themselves, regardless of 
whether they eventually link to more traditional outcome measures.  That might be 
particularly relevant where the object of the community initiative is a change in 
institutional behavior.  (3) Finally, we would want to make a careful distinction among 
input measures, process measures, and outcome measures.   
The criteria for determining the important outcomes to be measured and evaluated are 
likely to vary with the audience. 
Another dimension of this problem is the degree to which the audience is concerned with 
the outcomes for individuals versus the outcomes for place.   
 
Establishing the Counterfactual Using Comparison Groups: Selection Bias and 
Other Problems 
 
Random Assignment as the Standard for Judgment 
For quantitative evaluators random assignment designs are a bit like the nectar of the 
gods.  The key benefit of a random assignment design is that, as soon as the number of 
subjects gets reasonably large, there is a very low probability that any given characteristic 
of the subjects will be more concentrated in the treatment group than in the control group.  
Most important, this holds for unmeasured characteristics as well as measured 
characteristics.   
 
Experiences with Creating Comparison Groups: We now turn to assessing the utility of 
more feasible alternatives for establishing comparison groups.  We compare impact 
results from studies in which random assignment of individuals was used to create 
comparison groups with impact results when alternative methods were used to create the 
comparison groups.  (Experiences: 1~11) 
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1. Constructed Groups of Individuals.  Constructed comparison groups of individuals 
were the most-often used method of evaluation prior to the use of random assignment in 
large-scale social policy studies and other programs in the 1970s and 1980s.   
 The earliest type of constructed group was a before-and-after, or "pre–post," design.  
Measurements were made on the individuals before they entered the treatment, during 
the treatment, and following the conclusion of the treatment.  Impacts were measured 
as the change from before program to after program.  This strategy for establishing 
counterfactuals is recognized as highly vulnerable to naturally occurring changes in 
individuals.   
 Another strategy for constructing comparison groups is to compare non-participants 
with participants in a program.  This type of design is recognized as producing bias 
due to selection on unobserved variables.  Usually there is a reason why an individual 
does participate or does not participate in the program--for example, an individual's 
motivation, or subtle selection procedures followed by the program administrators.  
 A third strategy for creating comparison groups is to use existing survey data to 
sample individuals for the comparison group.  The most commonly used source of 
information is the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS), which has 
large national samples of individuals.   
 
2. Constructed Comparisons: Institutions.  In a few cases, where the primary unit of 
intervention and analysis has been an institution, attempts have been made to construct 
comparison groups of institutions.  Those procedures come closer to the problems 
encountered in community-wide initiative evaluations.  
 
3. Comparison Communities.  In most cases, the treatment site has been selected before 
the constructed comparison site is selected.  The most common method for selecting 
comparison communities is to attempt to match areas on the basis of selected 
characteristics that are believed, or have been shown, to affect the outcome variables of 
interest.  Usually, a mixture of statistical weighting and judgmental elements enters into 
the selection.  
 Often a first criterion is geographic proximity – same city, same metropolitan area, 
same state, and same region – on the grounds that this will minimize differences in 
economic or social structures and changes in area-wide exogenous forces.   
 Sometimes an attempt is made to match communities based on service structure 
components in the pre-treatment period.  
 Most important is the statistical matching on demographic characteristics.  (e.g. the 
decennial Census, because this provides characteristic information)  Of course, the 
further the time period of the intervention from the year in which the Census was 
taken, the weaker this matching information will be.  
 
4. Treatment and Comparison Sites Randomly Assigned.  There is an example where 
the treatment sites were not predetermined but rather were selected simultaneously with 
the comparison sites.   
Example: The largest such evaluation is that of the State of Washington's Family 
Independence Program (FIP), an evaluation of a major change in the welfare system of 
the State.  The evaluators created east/west and urban/rural stratification within the state 
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in order to obtain a geographically representative sample.  Within five of these 
subgroups, pairs of welfare offices, matched on local labor market and welfare caseload 
characteristics, were chosen and randomly allocated to either treatment (FIP) or control 
(AFDC) status.  This project's initial results surprised the researchers: utilization of 
welfare increased and employment decreased, whereas the intent of the reform was to 
reduce welfare use and increase employment.  The researchers do not attribute these 
counterintuitive findings to flaws in the comparison site method, but that possibility 
exists.  Again, it is doubtful that random assignment of just five matched pairs is 
sufficient to assure a balance between the treatment group office and comparison office 
in unmeasured variables affecting outcomes, even though the pairs were matched on 
several characteristics.  
 
5. Pre-Post Design, Using Communities.  Contrasting measurements before and after 
exposure to the treatment has often been advocated.  The attraction of this approach is 
that the structural and historical conditions that might affect the outcome variables that 
are unique to this location are controlled for directly.   
Often a pre-post design simply compares a single pre-period measurement with the post-
treatment measure of the same variables.  However, multiple measures of the outcome 
variable (especially in the pre-treatment period) allow for more reliable estimates of 
change in the variable.  This procedure is often referred to as an "interrupted time-series," 
with the treatment taken to be the cause of the interruption. 
The better the researcher's ability to model the process of change in a given community 
over time, the stronger is this approach.  
 
6. Problems of Spillovers, Crossovers, and In- and Out-migration.  Where comparison 
communities are used, potential problems arise because of the community's geographic 
location relative to the treatment site and/or the movement of individuals in and out of the 
treatment sites and comparison sites.  
 Often investigators have chosen communities in close physical proximity to the 
treatment community on the grounds that it helps to equalize regional influences.  
However, proximity can cause problems.  (1) Economic, political, and social forces 
often create specialized functions within a region.  (2) Spillover of services and 
people can occur from the treatment community to the comparison community, so the 
comparison community is "contaminated" either positively or negatively. 
 In-migration and out-migration of individuals occur constantly in communities.  At 
the treatment site, these migrations might be considered "dilutions of the treatment."  
Focusing data collection only on those who stay in the community creates a selection 
bias arising from both migration processes.  Also, it is not clear whether the program 
treatment itself influenced the extent and character of in- and out-migration.  
 
7. Dose-response Models of Treatment versus Comparison Communities.  Sites can 
vary in the types and/or intensity of treatment, and this variation in dosage can be 
examined as part of the evaluation.  (e.g. teen pregnancy prevention program – three 
different treatment groups.  The absolute changes in numbers in these three treatment 
groups seem to confirm the ―dosage‖ effect.) 
A type of selection bias.  Most important, this procedure does not get around the 
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underlying problem of comparison communities – the questionable validity of the 
assumption that once matched on a set of characteristics, the communities would have 
evolved over time in essentially the same fashion with respect to the outcome variables of 
interest.  If this assumption does not hold, then the "dose of treatment" will be 
confounded in unknown ways with underlying differences among the communities.  
 
8. The Magnitude of Problems with Comparison Communities Methods:  
A Case Study: This recent study allows us to get a fix on the magnitude of bias that can 
arise when comparison community designs of the several types just reviewed are used.   
 Data: from the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation's (MDRC) 
Work/Welfare studies in several states.  
 Comparison communities: In this case, the investigators used the treatment group 
from the Work/Welfare experiments and constructed comparison groups by using 
control groups from other program locations or other time periods to construct 
alternative comparison groups.  
 Importance of this study: The study showed substantial differences between the 
estimated impacts from the true experimental results and the constructed comparison 
groups.  It clarifies the problem of bias arising when comparison groups are 
constructed by methods other than random assignment, and it points to the severity of 
the problem.  It shows that statistical controls using measured characteristics are in 
most cases inadequate to overcome this problem.  
It has long been recognized that counterfactuals obtained by using constructed 
comparison groups may yield biased estimates of the true impact of a program.  What is 
important about this study is that it demonstrates that various types of constructed 
comparison groups yield substantially biased estimates.  These real-life experiments 
demonstrate that investigators could have been seriously misled in their conclusions 
about the effectiveness of these programs had they used methods other than random 
assignment to construct their comparison groups.  Moreover, we must keep in mind that 
these studies created comparison groups after the fact, with the luxury of making 
adjustments to potential comparison groups using all the data from the study.   
 
9. Statistical Modeling of Community-Level Outcomes.  Another approach to creating 
counterfactuals for the evaluation of community-level interventions is statistical 
modeling.  This approach develops a statistical model of what would have happened to a 
particular outcome or set of outcomes at the community level had an intervention not 
been instituted.  The predictions from the model are then used as the counterfactual and 
are compared with what happens in the community following the intervention.  The 
difference is the estimated impact of the intervention.  
 
10. Time-series Modeling.  Time-series models of community-level outcomes have long 
been advocated as a means of assessing the effects of program innovations or reforms.  In 
the simplest form, the time-series on the past values of the outcome variable for the 
community is linearly extrapolated to provide a predicted value for the outcome during 
and after the period of the program intervention (e.g. the pre–post designs).  It has been 
recognized for a long time that the simple extrapolation design is quite vulnerable to error 
because community variables rarely evolve in a simple linear fashion. 
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11. Multivariate Statistical Modeling.  These multivariate models would attempt to 
specify, measure, and estimate the effects of the variables that determine the community-
level outcome that are not themselves affected by the treatment.  Then, with these 
variables "controlled," the effect of treatment would be estimated.  Most analysts 
consider the results of these models to be unreliable for program evaluation purposes.  
Statistical modeling at the community level also runs up against the persistent lack of 
small-area data, particularly data available on a consistent basis, over several periods of 
time or across different communities.  Such data are necessary both to estimate the 
statistical model of the community-level outcome and to project the counterfactual value 
of the outcome for the program period.  
 
Research Questions to Address in the Context of Community-Wide Initiatives  
This section discusses the types of research questions which are particularly relevant to 
community-wide initiatives. Especially, this section focuses on several types of multiple 
effects, which help explain how the participants' characteristics might influence treatment 
outcomes, how various dimensions of one treatment or multiple types of treatments may 
interactively affect treatment outcomes, and how different configurations of participant or 
institutional characteristics may produce different outcomes.  
 
Networks and Group Learning  
The importance of associational networks has been increasingly emphasized in the 
literature on communities and families. Group learning about the intervention is likely to 
be faster and greater than learning by isolated individuals. The evaluation problems will 
differ depending on how the associational and institutional networks are considered.  
 
Effects of Formal and Informal Institutions  
Most interventions take the form of an attempt to alter some type of formal institution 
that affects individuals (e.g., a day care center, a welfare payment, an education course). 
Most of those concerned with community-wide initiatives appear to be more interested in 
either the way the formal institutional structure in a given community conditions the 
individuals' responses or with the behavior of the formal institutions themselves as 
outcomes of the intervention.  Informal institutions (e.g., associational contacts) are also 
subjects of interest.  
 
Interactions with External Conditions  
Some attempts have been made to see how changes in conditions external to an 
intervention have conditioned the response to the treatment.  
Example:  In a study which investigated whether the response to the treatment 
(supported work) varied systematically with the level of local unemployment, 
there were no statistically significant differences in response, but researchers felt 
it may well have been due to the weakness of statistics on the city-by-city 
unemployment rate.  
 
Dynamics  
An intriguing and largely unaddressed question for evaluation of community-wide 
initiatives is how to represent the dynamics of interventions as they change over time--in 
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response to lessons learned from implementation and where the alterations are largely 
idiosyncratic. Although some evaluators of programs might prefer to delay their initial 
measures of outcomes until the program has stabilized and matured, many community-
level initiatives are not expected to achieve a "steady state" but rather to evolve 
constantly in response to incoming results. 
 
Steps in the Development of Better Methods  
Following steps might improve our understanding of how communities evolve over time 
and help us create methods of evaluation that are less vulnerable to the types of bias.  
 
Improve small-area data. 
Detailed small-area demographic data are very hard to get except at the time of the 
decennial census. But increasingly records data are being developed by a wide variety of 
entities that can be tied to specific geographic areas (geo-coded data). One type of work 
that might be fruitfully pursued would combine various types of agency records data with 
data taken from two or more censuses.  
 
Enhance community capability to do systematic data collection. 
It is possible to pull together records data to create community data bases that could be 
continuously maintained and updated. These data would provide communities with some 
means to keep monitoring.  
Going a step beyond this aggregation of records, attempts could be made to enhance the 
capability of communities to gather new data of their own. 
e.g., simple surveys of physical structures based on externally observed characteristics 
 
Create a panel study of communities. 
In the absence of common formats to put together local records data, it might be possible 
to imitate the several nationally representative panel studies of individuals, which have 
been created and maintained in some cases since the late 1960s. They would provide us 
with important information on what the cross-section and time-series frequency 
distributions of community level variables look like--important ingredients for an 
evaluation sample design effort with communities as units of observation.  
 
Model community-level variables. 
Statistical modeling might provide the basis for generating more reliable counterfactuals 
for community initiatives. A good model would generate predicted values for endogenous 
outcome variables for a given community in the absence of the intervention by using an 
historical time-series for that community and such contemporaneous variables as are 
judged to be exogenous to the intervention.  
 
Develop better measures of social networks and formal and informal community 
institutions. 
Considerably more information on and experience with various measures of associational 
networks are needed, given their central role in most theories relating to community-wide 
processes.  
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Tighten relationships between short-term (intermediate) outcome measures and long term 
outcome measures. 
The inability or unwillingness to wait for the measurement of long-term outcomes is a 
problem that many studies (esp. children and youth) face. Systematic compilations of 
information about short-term and long-term correlations for outcome variables would be 
very helpful and could set an agenda for more data-gathering on these relationships 
where necessary.  
 
Conduct more studies to determine the reliability of constructed comparison group 
designs. 
It should be possible to find more situations in which a type of study (that uses random 
assignment data as a base and then constructed comparison groups to test the degree of 
error in the comparison group estimates) could be carried out.  First, the replication of 
such studies should look at variables other than employment or earnings as outcomes to 
determine whether any difference in degrees of vulnerability exist according to the type 
of outcome variable and/or a different type of intervention.  Second, more studies of this 
type would give us a far better sense of whether the degree of vulnerability of the 
nonexperimental methods is persistent and widely found in a variety of data sets and 
settings. 
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Weiss, Carol Hirschon. 1999. Nothing as Practical as Good Theory: Exploring Theory-
Based Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children and Families. 
In New Approaches to Evaluating Community-Wide Initiatives Volume 1: Concepts, 
Methods, and Contexts. Edited by James P. Connell, Anne C. Kubisch, Lisbeth B. Schorr, 
and Carol H. Weiss. 
Online at http://www.aspenroundtable.org/vol1/weiss.htm  
Summarized by Yizhao Yang 
 
In this paper Weiss suggested an alternative mode of evaluation, theory-based evaluation, 
as in contrast to those using appropriate outcome measures (quantitative indicators) to 
measure the degree of success--or at least progress--in attaining desirable results.  
 
Weiss began by describing this evaluative approach and discussing its advantages. As 
proposed by Weiss, the theory-based evaluation starts by examining the theories 
underlying the program, which are important assumptions or hypotheses implied in a 
series of ―micro-steps‖ of the program. (Weiss gave an example in this paper). By 
examining and testing the theories or hypotheses (assumptions), problematic linkages 
between those steps can be identified.  There are four advantages of taking this theory-
based evaluative approach: 
 
1.   It concentrates evaluation attention and resources on key aspects of the 
program.  
2.   It facilitates aggregation of evaluation results into a broader base of theoretical 
and program knowledge.  
3.   It asks program practitioners to make their assumptions explicit and to reach 
consensus with their colleagues about what they are trying to do and why.  
4.   Evaluations that address the theoretical assumptions embedded in programs 
may have more influence on both policy and popular opinion. 
 
Weiss also made a preliminary attempt to elucidate the theories, or assumptions, on 
which current initiatives are based. The case she used is community-based 
comprehensive cross-sector Initiatives for children, youth, and families. The purpose of 
giving this example is to suggest the kinds of questions that evaluation might address in 
the current case. Weiss identified seven assumptions that are implied in the rationality of 
the Initiatives, and discussed each assumption in detail by breaking them into further 
specific hypotheses.   
 
After the creation of this hypothesis list, the next step of the theory-based evaluation is to 
test those theories. Weiss specified that by ―test‖ she means asking questions that bear on 
the viability of the hypotheses in the particular cases, through whatever methods of 
inquiry are chosen. The resources that can help test theories include evidence from 
previous research and evaluation, as well as experience, which can be either supportive or 
contradictory. It is important to subject those theories or assumptions to the test of 
available evidence and have practitioners and residents engaged in the initiatives think 
through the implicit hypotheses as they go about their practice.  
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Not restricting herself to the simple presentation of this theory-based approach, Weiss 
also compared this approach with the one based on outcome indicators. She suggested 
that examination of theories underlying the program or initiatives provide a variegated 
and detailed accounting of the why‘s and how‘s of obtaining the outcomes that are 
observed. Hence program theories serve as guidance for collecting appropriate data to 
measure (evaluate) the expected outcome of the program in a coherent and logical way. 
Several shortcomings of only relying on indicator data make this exclusively indicator-
based approach problematic.  
 
Finally, she discussed some problems existing in implementation of this approach, which 
include problems of theorizing, measurement, testing, and interpretation.  
Weiss explained each of these problems in detail.  
1. Problems of theorizing result from a) the inherent complexity of the effort, b) the 
difficulty to reach agreement among participants about the theory of the whole 
initiatives, c) the potential political risks incurred when making the assumptions 
explicit to the public, and d) political barriers. 
2. Problems of measurement result from a) some of the theories of change may not lend 
themselves to quantitative measurement and b) whether exclusively quantitative 
measurement is desirable is not yet clear. 
3. Problems of testing theories result from a) the possibility that theories of change are 
too general and loosely constructed to allow for clear-cut testing and b) data collected 
may be susceptible to alternative interpretations. 
4. Problems of interpretation result from the generalizability of the theories to explain 
the success of particular initiatives in particular places. 
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Government Policy Workshop: Economic Development and Child Care 
CRP 418/618, ARME 434/634,  FGSS 420/620 4 credit hours   
 
Wednesday and Friday 10:10 am -12:00 pm 
301 W. Sibley  
 
Class web site: http://blackboard.cornell.edu 
Other important material can be found at http://economicdevelopment.cce.cornell.edu 
 
Prof. Mildred Warner, City and Regional Planning 
mew15@cornell.edu  255-6816, 204 W. Sibley 
Office Hours: generally 2:00-4:00 Wednesdays and Fridays 
 
Course Description: 
Economic development has traditionally been thought of in terms of industrial recruitment and 
physical infrastructure investment.  Recently, economic development theorists have been looking 
at the importance of quality of life and social infrastructure investments to promote and sustain 
economic growth. Feminist economists are pointing to a crisis of care as women’s formal labor 
market participation increases and government support for social welfare contracts.  This crisis is  
due in part to our traditional failure to adequately value care work in economic development 
terms.  This workshop will help address that gap by working with teams at the state and local 
levels to promote new economic development approaches to child care policy. 
 
State and local governments now bear increased responsibility to provide job training and day 
care to enable poor women to enter the labor force. Employers feel the crunch of family-work 
conflicts and respond with work/life policies.  Economic developers now recognize child care is 
part of the social infrastructure for economic development.  But parents are still left with the 
primary burden.  Quality child care is costly and scarce.  This workshop will help teams identify 
economic development policies to address these problems. 
 
Students will work with representatives from counties in New York State that have conducted 
economic impact analyses of the child care sector and experienced community economic 
development practitioners to identify new economic development approaches to child care 
policy.  Students will learn skills in economic and social policy analysis, multi-party 
collaboration and program design, and the process of policy change.   
 
Students will develop a workshop for child care and economic development leaders from around 
the state, and then work in small groups with several county teams to help them move their 
reports to action.  
 
Client:  NYS Child Care Coordinating Council 
Executive Director Carol Saginaw  will help us identify county teams ready to work with student 
teams on issue identification and project design.  We will help her with design of an economic 
development workshop, to be held in Albany with economic development partners in April. 
 
Possible issues to cover include: 
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a.  “Traditonal” economic development isues uch as: tax abatements, tax credits, 
impact fees, business mgmt. training, revolving loan funds, public infrastructures, 
land use planning, industrial recruitment, etc.  and how these can be applied to 
child care. 
 
b. “Contemporay” strategies: unionization, workforce development, business 
retention and expansion (small business visitations, business training), public 
private economic development partnerships, market research, workforce 
development, work/life policies and how these can be applied to child care. 
 
c. “Inovative” economic development polices uch as: sectoral strategies, clusters 
(cooperative competition), economic renewal, capacity development, quality of 
life initiatives and how these can be applied to child care 
 
Some of the issues which may be desired by county teams include: 
 
Assessing Market Demand – Providing Critical Social Infrastructure 
 Understanding your customer base.   
 Address affordability (program design and outreach to parents) 
 Strategies to match supply and demand 
 Link changes in labor force demands of broader economy to child care – projecting social 
infrastructure requirements.   
 Improving consumer information in the market place.   
 
Improving Child Care Business Management and Retention 
 Cooperative management from other fields characterized by many small providers.   
 Strategies to address provider and labor turnover.  
 Strategies to improve wages and provider quality. 
 Finance for cash flow and infrastructure. 
 Policy design and outreach to providers. 
 
Linking Quality to Economic Development 
 Policy design: subsidies, grants, loans, tax credits - to meet multiple (conflicting policy 
goals) 
 Improving parent and provider information 
 
Building Business Sector Interest and Support 
 Promoting family friendly workplace policies,  
 Projecting labor demand and child care requirements 
 Showing parent labor productivity or labor mobilization results from quality child care 
   
Expectations 
 
As a workshop, the class must be responsive and flexible.  We must complete objectives 
mutually agreed upon by our clients and ourselves.  Leadership and responsibility are shared 
among students, professor and community partners.  Workshops traditionally take more time 
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than other clases. Work quality must be profesional, “A” quality work. Lower standards wil 
not be accepted.  Hence, expect to do many revisions before work is final. 
 
Research - Research projects will be individual and group in nature.  Students will be assessed 
on the rigor and quality of their research. Students are expected to help collect and analyze data, 
review and summarize relevant literature, and identify and profile innovative case studies and 
policy approaches. 
 
Writing - Writing assignments will include research reports as well as shorter, edited and 
published synopses to be used as public education materials for the project.  Students will rewrite 
formal publications until they meet the satisfaction of the partners and Professor Warner.  Web 
page design will also be a part of this process. 
 
Process Skills - students will work with community partners in organizing meetings.  Students 
will be assessed on the quality of their group/community participation and facilitation skills. 
  
In recognition of the importance of group collaboration skills to project success, 30% percent of 
each student’s grade wil be detrmined by his/her pers. The remaing 70% wil be detrmined 
by the professor according to performance in research, writing and process skills. 
 
Roles 
Professor - guide the process, provide research oversight, review and approve quality of all 
materials developed, handle larger political/managerial issues, manage budget. 
 
Partners – serve as resource people, review and guide materials development.   
 
Students - manage logistics, conduct research, do writing and editing and preliminary desktop 
publishing/web page design.  Keep Warner and partners informed of all project developments.   
The following skills need to be covered: logistics (including master calendar), editing, desktop 
publishing and web design, financial and legal analysis, economic analysis, facilitation and 
interview skills.  I recommend you form teams to work on the key project components outlined 
above. 
 
Class Meetings 
The class will meet on Wednesday and Friday mornings.   We will use this time to touch base, 
check progress and work on group activities.  There will be many other meeting times during the 
week in small groups and with community leaders. Expect out of town travel as well. 
 
Schedule 
 
The course is divided into three sections.  In the first section of the course (3 weeks) we will do 
background theoretical and policy readings to get everyone focused.  During this time we will 
finalize teams and work plans. 
 
In the second section of the course (1 week) you will develop a thorough work plan proposal and 
form subgroups. 
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In the third section of the course you will conduct research with your client teams– literature 
searches as well as case studies, interviews etc. and develop annotated bibliographies, case 
studies, and implementation strategies and organize the Albany workshop.  All materials 
developed will go through an extensive editorial review and revision process with external 
clients. 
 
Jan 25-Feb 15  
 
Review theoretical background on care work, child care policy and economic development 
policy. 
 
Feb 15 -  24  Outline work plan, determine project components, create subgroups.   
 
March – Begin work with teams, conduct research, First drafts due March 17 
 
April – Revisions and review with project partners, conduct additional research to fill holes, 
prepare final materials, web site and presentation to partners. Extensive revisions.  Hold Albany 
workshop 
 
Detailed Schedule 
 
Wed. Jane 25 Course Overview, Projects, Roles, Expectations 
 
Review Linking Economic Development and Child Care Project web site 
http://economicdevelopment.cce.cornell.edu 
 
 
Fri Jan 27    Background on the Child Care Sector 
 
Helburn, Suzanne and Barbara Bergmann, (2002). America’s Childcare Problem: The Way Out. 
New York: Palgrave, St. Martin’s Pres. 
 
Recommended 
Harrington, Mona. 1999.  Care and Equality: Inventing a New Family Politics, Knopf: New 
York. 
 
Wednesday  Feb 1 -3  A New Economic Development Frame for Child Care 
 
Read Ribeiro, Rose and Mildred Warner 2004. Measuring the Economic Importance of the Child 
Care Sector: The Cornell Methodology Guide.  Available at 
http:/economicdevelopment.cce.cornell.edu 
 
Warner, M., Adriance, S., Barai, N., Hallas, J., Markeson, B. & Soref, W. 2005. Economic 
Development Strategies to Promote Quality Child Care, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Department of City and Regional Planning. 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/EconDevStrat.pdf 
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Shellenback, K. 2004. Child Care and Parent Productivity: Making the Business Case,   Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Department of City and Regional Planning. 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/ChildCareParentProductivity.pdf 
 
Warner, M. E. Child Care and Economic Development: The Role for Planners, PAS Memo, 
American Planning Association. Jan/Feb 2006. 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/pasmemo0106.pdf 
 
Stoney, L. 2005. Beyond the Comfort Zone: New Ideas for the Early Care and Education 
Industry. Ithaca, NY and Raleigh, NC : Cornell Univ. Dept of City and Regional Planning and 
National Smart Start Technical Assistance Center. 
HTTP://GOVERNMENT.CCE.CORNELL.EDU/DOC/PDF/BEYONDTHECOMFORTZONE.PDF 
 
Recommended 
Stoney, Louise. 1998.  LOOKING INTO NEW MIRRORS: Lessons for Early Childhood 
Finance and System-Building, Horizons Initiative: 
http://nccic.org/pubs/mirrors.html 
 
Smith and Ribiero, 2002. Changing the Terms of the Debate: Child Care as a Public Concern 
On the web at http://www.cce.cornell.edu/restructuring/doc/reports/childcare/ 
 
Mitchell, Anne, Louise Stoney, Harriet Dichter. 2001.  Financing Child Care in the United 
States: An Expanded Catalog of Current Strategies, 2001 Edition E.M. Kaufman Foundation: 
Kansas City. Available at: 
http://www.emkf.org/youth_development/childcare2001/index.cfm 
 
Friday Feb 10  Understanding Standard Economic Development Policy 
 
Bartik, Timothy J. 2003. Local economic development policies  Kalamazoo, MI : W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research.  
 
Lynch, Robert G. 2004 Rethinking growth strategies : how state and local taxes and services 
affect economic development / Robert G. Lynch. Published: Washington, D.C. : Economic 
Policy Institute. 
 
 Philp Langdon. “The coming of the creative clas” Planning. Chicago: Jul 2002. Vol. 68, Iss. 7; 
p. 10  
          
Porter, Michael 195 “The Competive Advantage of the Iner City.” Harvard Business 
Review.55-71. 
 
Meril Gozner. 198 “The Porter prescription,” The American Prospect. Princeton: May/Jun 
1998. p. 56-65 
 
Recommended 
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LeRoy, Greg. The great American jobs scam : corporate tax dodging and the myth of job 
creation  San Francisco, CA : Berrett-Koehler, c2005. 
 
LeRoy, Greg. 1997  No More Candy Store: States and Cities Making Job Subsidies Accountable, 
Inst. On Taxation and Economic Policy: Washington, DC. 
 
*Florida, Richard L. 2002. The rise of the creative class : and how it's transforming work, 
leisure, community and everyday life New York, NY : Basic Books.  Check out his web site for 
critiques and his responses at http://www.creativeclass.org/ 
 
Interesting critique articles of Florida 
 
Ben Walker. Open door to a creative economy. Regeneration & Renewal. London: May 23, 
2003.  pg. 15 
 
Chris Lehman. “Clas acts” Raritan. New Brunswick: Spring 2003. Vol. 22, Iss. 4; p. 147 
 
Interesting Critique Articles of Porter 
 
Porter, Michael E. “An economic strategy for America's iner cites: Adresing the 
controversy” Review of Black Political Economy. New Brunswick: Fall 1995/Winter 1996. Vol. 
24, Iss. 2/3; p. 303 
 
Harison, Benet. “Why busines alone won't fix the cites,” Technology Review. Cambridge: 
Oct 1995. Vol. 98, Iss. 7; p. 71 
 
Wednesday Feb 15  Review Progress of County Teams 
 
Read studies from NYS teams: 
New York City New York 
December, 
2004 http://www.childcareinc.org 
Chemung County New York 
November, 
2004 http://www.chemchildcare.com 
Long Island  New York Spring 2004 http://www.childcaresuffolk.org//pdf/news90.pdf 
State of New York July, 2003 http://www.nyscccc.org/FinalReport4-22-2004.pdf 
Tompkins County New York Spring 2000 http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/viewpage_e.asp?ID=Tompkins_County 
Monroe Co New York Summer, 2005 www.racf.org 
 
 
Feb 17-22  Develop Work Plan Proposal including plans for Conference in Albany  
 
Fri Feb 24 Present Detailed Work Plan Proposal 
 
Month of  March 
Work in project Teams 
 
 7 
March 17 First drafts of materials due 
Present work to Prof Warner and county teams for review. 
 
March 22 and 24 Spring Break 
 
March 29  
Discuss reviews with Warner, begin additional research and revisions 
 
March 31 Special Debriefing with Caren Grown, Bard College (if desired) 
 
Month of April 
Additional Research, Revision, Revision and Publication  and Conference Preparation 
 
April  24-26  Child Care Bureau Research Conference in Washington, DC (Warner out 
of town) 
 
April 19   Second Draft of Reports Due - Circulate to External Reviewers 
   
May 5 (last class) Third Draft of Reports due  
 
Final Exam Date All Final Materials Due, Web Site Developed, Final Presentation 
 
Present final reports in paper and on CD rom to Professor Warner and conduct a group 
evaluation. 
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Additional Resources 
 
Completed Economic Impact Studies 
 
See matrix of completed studies on project web site. http://economicdevelopment.cce.cornell.edu 
Read several to get an idea of the focus and themes for each state.  These state teams are the 
audience for the Economic Development primer. 
 
General Materials on Economic Development and Child Care 
 
Review all of project web site http://economicdevelopment.cce.cornell.edu 
 
Also review web sites for materials developed by the following organizations.  We want to 
supplement but not be redundant to resources already provided by these groups. 
 
National Economic Development and Law Center  (planning and zoning)  
http://www.nedlc.org/summary.pdf 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation (finance); http://www.liscnet.org/  
Coastal Enterprises (economies of scale); http://www.ceimaine.org/ 
Center for Community Self Help (financing and rating); http://www.self-
help.org/aboutus/index.asp 
Annie Casey Foundation (financing and more); http://www.aecf.org/ 
Kaufman Foundation (entrepreneurship); http://www.emkf.org/ 
 
General Materials on Economic Development 
 
Review web sites for economic development groups get a flavor for their style, interests. 
 
Chamber of Commerce; http://www.uschamber.com/default 
Committee for Economic Development; http://www.ced.org/ 
Corporation for Enterprise Development; http://www.cfed.org/ 
National Congress of Community Development Corporations; http://www.ncced.org/ 
 
General Information on Child Care 
 
For background information on child care and a sense of the advocates 
 
National Child Care Information Center has excellent materials and a thorough bibliography and 
data base;  http://www.nccic.org/  
Children’s Defnse Fund: http://www.childrensdefense.org/  
Center for Law and Social Policy; http://www.clasp.org/ 
Child Trends; http://www.childtrends.com/ 
Annie Casey Foundation; http://www.aecf.org/ 
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Seminar: Devolution, Privatization, and the New Public Management 
 CRP 4120/6120, AEM 4330/6330, FGSS 4110/6110 
 Fall 2009, 4 credit hours 
 
 
Class meeting location: 211 W. Sibley Hall, Wednesday/Friday 10:10 am – 11:40 am 
  
Professor: Mildred Warner, 215 W. Sibley Hall, 5-6816, mew15@cornell.edu 
 
Office hours: Wednesday 2:30 – 4:30 and Friday 2:00 – 3:00 or by appointment 
 
Teaching Assistant: Chris List, list.chris@gmail.com 
 
Class Website: http://blackboard.cornell.edu 
 
Restructuring Local Government Website: http://government.cce.cornell.edu/ 
 
Course Description 
 
Devolution, decentralization and privatization of government services are international 
trends.  This seminar will review these trends in a national and international context and 
focus on the local public sector response, primarily in the United States.  Concerns for 
efficiency as well as changing notions of the appropriate role for the public sector drive 
these shifts.  Privatization is perhaps the most controversial form of restructuring.  We 
will review the theoretical rationale for privatization and the legal, political and practical 
concerns that have arisen with its implementation.  Special attention will be given to the 
implications of these shifts for citizenship, governance and accountability.  
 
Decentralization and devolution reflect efforts to promote government responsiveness to 
citizens – by bringing decisions closer to the community, and to promote economic 
competitiveness by encouraging developmental over redistributive investments.  We will 
explore the potential and challenges of decentralization in both developing countries and 
the United States.  While decentralization of service delivery is presented as a means to 
enhance citizen access and involvement, it also helps justify the shrinking of the social 
welfare state.  Current policies promote network governance involving coalitions of 
government, private and non profit sector actors.  Planners are often key architects of 
these initiatives and need to be aware of their potential and their limitations.  Many cities 
face deteriorating infrastructure, and as commitment to social welfare erodes, cities are 
left with increasing responsibilities.  New solutions, discussed in this course, will be 
critical for planners to help cities address the challenge of linking investments in 
infrastructure, economic and human development with more participatory forms of 
governance. 
 
Assignments 
As a discussion based seminar, class participation is essential.  Students will have read 
materials prior to class and be prepared to discuss them.  In addition, students will be 
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expected to prepare short written summaries of readings during the semester.  These must 
be posted to the class website 24 hours before class or students will be docked a letter 
grade.  Some of these summaries may be selected later for editing and posting to the 
Restructuring Local Government Website.  Discussion between classes will occur on the 
class website discussion board.  Students will be evaluated on the basis of their 
participation (both questions raised and insights offered). 
 
All students will write three papers for the course.   
 
First Paper: Theory Paper Due October 7 – Select a theoretical issue and discuss its 
implications based on the readings in the first third of the course (5 pages).  
 
Second Paper: Group Paper Due November 13 (topic due October 9) – Practical policy 
analysis.  Work in groups and develop a short 10-15 page summary (suitable for a 
professional practitioner audience on the web) of the pros and cons of contracting or new 
mixed public/private management techniques in public works or infrastructure provision 
(water, roads, etc).  Identify the key issues and discuss them in depth.  Bring in practical 
case material.  Conduct original research (secondary and primary sources).  Develop a 
presentation for the class (presentations Nov 11 and 13).   
 
Third Paper (for Undergraduates): Synthesis Paper Due December 7 – Analyze one of the 
following themes – decentralization/devolution, regionalism, citizenship – from the last 
third of the course.  Give particular emphasis to discussing the implications for 
governance and citizenship (5-7 pages).  Presentations will occur the last two class 
periods (December 2 and 4).   
 
Third Paper (for Graduates): Original Research Paper Due December 11 (topic due 
November 20) – Graduate students will complete a major research paper (maximum 15 
pages) on a topic of their own choosing.  A research proposal with a preliminary 
bibliography is due by November 20 or sooner.  Presentations will occur during last week 
of class December 2-4.  Students can use these presentations to get feedback on their 
ideas before finalizing the papers.  Presentation (including visual aids) will form part of 
the grade.   
 
There will be no incompletes. 
 
Grading 
 
All Students 
Class Participation 30% 
 Discussion in Class and on Website 15% 
 Article Summaries 15% 
Undergraduates  
Theory Paper   20%   Due October 7 
Case Study  30%   Due November 13 (topic due October 9) 
Final Synthesis Paper  20%   Due December 7 
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Graduate Students 
Theory Paper   20%   Due October 7 
Case Study  20%   Due November 13 (topic due October 9) 
Final Research Paper  30%   Due December 11 (proposal and preliminary 
bibliography due November 20) 
 
For the group project paper, include a list of each team member and what they 
contributed.  Peer grading will form half the group paper grade. 
 
Ethics 
 
Collaborative learning is the goal of this class.  Group projects and class discussion 
depend on full participation of all students.  Thus, failure to deliver your component of 
the work on time undermines the learning experience of others and therefore constitutes 
an ethics violation of the class code (and will result in a grade reduction).  If you find that 
you cannot complete an assignment for which you volunteered, then post a request to 
switch with someone to the class list and most likely someone will pick up for you.  If 
not, you are still responsible.  Grades for class participation and peer grading for the 
group project reflect this collaborative learning framework. 
 
Individual work also forms part of the grade and students caught plagiarizing will be 
given an F.  Citation of sources is fundamental to the academy – when in doubt, cite.  
Each student in this course is expected to abide by the Cornell University Code of 
Academic Integrity.   
 
Note: In compliance with the Cornell University policy and equal access laws, I am 
available to discuss appropriate academic accommodations that may be required for 
students with disabilities.  Requests for academic accommodations are to be made during 
the first three weeks of the semester, except for unusual circumstances, so arrangements 
can be made. 
 
Readings 
 
Most of the readings for class are articles available on line through the Cornell Library 
System.  We will use several books.  These are available at the Campus Store and on 
reserve in the Fine Arts Library.   
 
Webster, Christopher J. and Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai. 2003. Property Rights, Planning 
and Markets: Managing Spontaneous Cities. Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar. The full class will discuss and everyone should try to purchase 
 
The following readings will be selected – each by a portion of the class.  So only one of 
these books needs to be purchased. 
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Frug, Gerald E. and David Barron 2008. City Bound: How States Stifle Urban 
Innovation. Cornell Univ Press. Ithaca NY. 
 
Frug, Gerald E. 1999. City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Purchase Book) 
 
Pastor, Manuel, Chris Benner and Martha Matsuoka 2009. This could be the start of 
something big: How social movements for regional equity are reshaping 
metropolitan America, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 
 
Davis, Michael 2006. Planet of slums, New York: Verso. 
 
All readings are on reserve in the Fine Arts Library. 
 
Aug. 28 Introduction: Overview of Course 
 
Sept. 2  Privatization Trends 
 
Ramesh, M. 2008 Introduction: Reasserting the state in public services, Policy and 
Society 27: 99–101. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2008.09.006 
 
Warner, Mildred E. 2008. Reversing privatization, rebalancing government reform: 
Markets, deliberation and planning, Policy and Society 27: 163–174. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2008.09.001 
 
 
Sept 4.  Infrastructure Challenges: Energy, Transit, Water and Waste 
 
Clark, Woodrow W. and Ted Bradshaw. 2004. Agile energy systems : global lessons from 
the California energy crisis.  San Diego: Elsevier. CHAPTER 14, Conclusions: 
implementing Agile Energy Infrastructures pp 443-460 
 
Barter, Paul A. 2008. Public planning with business delivery of excellent urban public 
transport, Policy and Society 27: 103–114 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2008.09.007 
 
 
Warner, Mildred E. 2009. Local Government Infrastructure – and the False Promise of 
Privatization. A Century Foundation Report. New York: Century Foundation. 
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/mediapolitics/warner.pdf 
 
Theoretical Underpinnings of Privatization and Decentralization 
 
Sept. 9  Public Choice Theory and Bargaining Solutions 
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Tiebout, Charles M. 1956. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” The Journal of 
Political Economy, 64(5): 416-424. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1826343 
 
Warner, Mildred E. and Amir Hefetz. 2002. “Applying Market Solutions to Public 
Services: An Assessment of Efficiency, Equity, and Voice,” Urban Affairs 
Review, 38(1): 70-89. http://uar.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/1/70 
 
Coase, R.H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 3: 1-
44. http://www.jstor.org/stable/724810 
 
Warner, Mildred E. “Regulatory Takings and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for 
Planners,” forthcoming, Urban Lawyer, 41(3). (Posted on Blackboard) 
 
Recommended 
Williamson, O.E. (1999). Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost 
Economics Perspective. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 15 (1), 306-342. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=8&did=373969291&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=
10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1250872401&clie
ntId=8424&aid=1 
 
Boyne, George A. 1998. “Bureaucratic Theory Meets Reality: Public Choice and Service 
Contracting in U.S. Local Government,” Public Administration Review, 58(6): 
474-483. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&did=36339483&SrchMode=3&sid=2&Fmt=2
&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1187197458&clientId=
8424&aid=3 
 
Lowery, David. 2000. “A Transactions Costs Model of Metropolitan Governance: 
Allocation versus Redistribution in Urban America,” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 10(1): 49-78. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=3&did=52634951&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=2
&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1187197098&clientId=
8424&aid=1 
 
Gerbasi, Jennifer and Mildred E. Warner. 2007. “Privatization, Public Goods, and the 
Ironic Challenge of Free Trade Agreements,” Administration & Society, 39(2): 
127-149. http://aas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/39/2/127 
 
Sept. 11  Theoretical Critiques 
 
Lowery, David. 1998. “Consumer Sovereignty and Quasi-Market Failure,” Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, 8(2): 137-172. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=29426160&SrchMode=3&sid=4&Fmt=2
&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1187198853&clientId=
8424&aid=5 
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Feigenbaum, Harvey B. and Jeffrey R. Henig. 1994. “The Political Underpinnings of 
Privatization: A Typology,” World Politics, 46(2): 185-208. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950672 
 
DeLeon, Linda and Robert B. Denhardt. 2000. “The Political Theory of Reinvention,” 
Public Administration Review, 60(2): 89-97. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=11&did=55241197&SrchMode=3&sid=6&Fmt=
2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1187200363&clientId
=8424&aid=7 
 
Schick, Alan. 1998. “Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand’s 
Reforms,” The World Bank Research Observer, 13(1): 123-131. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=10&did=28582440&SrchMode=3&sid=7&Fmt=
2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1187200472&clientId
=8424&aid=8 
 
Recommended 
Moe, Ronald C. 1994. “The ‘Reinventing Government’ Exercise: Misinterpreting the 
Problem, Misjudging the Consequences,” Public Administration Review, 54(2): 
111-122.  
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=37&did=709222&SrchMode=3&sid=8&Fmt=2
&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1187200565&clientId=
8424&aid=9 
 
Blanchard, Lloyd A., Charles C. Hinnant and Wilson Wong. 1998. “Market-Based 
Reforms in Government: Toward a Social Subcontract?” Administration & 
Society, 30(5): 483-512.  
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&did=35514668&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=2
&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1187213135&clientId=
8424&aid=1 
 
Rosenbloom, David H. and Suzanne J. Piotrowski. 2005. “Outsourcing the Constitution 
and Administrative Law Norms,” The American Review of Public Administration, 
35(2): 103-121. http://arp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/2/103 
 
Schamis, Hector E. 2002. Re-forming the State: The Politics of Privatization in Latin 
America and Europe. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
 
 
Sept. 16 and 18 Markets and Property Rights or Planning? 
 
Webster, Christopher J. and Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai. 2003. Property Rights, Planning 
and Markets: Managing Spontaneous Cities. Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, 
MA: Edward Elgar. (Purchase book) 
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Sept 23 Practical Applications of Market Based Approaches: CIDs, BIDs, TDRs 
Nelson, Robert H. 2004. “The Private Neighborhood,” Regulation, Summer 2004, 40-46. 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv27n2/v27n2-5.pdf 
 
Fischel, William A. 2004. “Revolution or Evolution?” Regulation, Summer 2004, 48-53. 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv27n2/v27n2-6.pdf 
 
Staley, Samuel and Lynn Scarlett. 1997. “Market Oriented Planning: Principles and 
Tools,” Working Paper. Los Angeles, CA: The Reason Foundation.  
http://www.reason.org/ps236.html 
 
Mitchell, J. (1999), Business Improvement Districts and Innovative Service Delivery, 
Grant Report for the PriceWaterhouse Coopers Endowment for Government 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/Mitchell.pdf.  Focus on pp 6-13. 
 
Transfer of Development Rights Programs: Using the Market for Compensation and 
Preservation 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/html/Transfer%20of%20Development%20Rights
%20Programs.htm 
 
Recommended 
Ben-Joseph, Eran. 2003. “Subdivision Regulations: Practices & Attitudes, A Survey of 
Public Officials and Developers in the Nation’s Fastest Growing Single Family 
Housing Markets,” Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy. http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/PubDetail.aspx?pubid=846 
 
Business Improvement Districts: Issues in Alternative Local Public Service Provision 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/reports/econdev/bids.asp 
 
Sept 25 International Approaches and Critiques 
 
Graham, Carol. 1998. Private Markets for Public Goods: Raising the Stakes in Economic 
Reform. Washington, DC: The Brooking Institution Press. Chapter 1 (Book on 
Reserve). 
 
Miraftab, Faranak. 2004. “Neoliberalism and Casualization of Public Sector Services: 
The Case of Waste Collection Services in Cape Town, South Africa,” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28(4): 874-892. 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118779134/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY
=0 
 
Ramamurti, Ravi. 1999. “Why Haven’t Developing Countries Privatized Deeper and 
Faster?” World Development, 27(1): 137-155.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(98)00131-4 
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Sept 30 The Promise and Challenge of Network Governance 
Salamon, Lester. 2002. “The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction” pp 1-47 in The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. (Book on Reserve) 
 
Benjamin, Solomon. 2005. Analogue to Digital: Re-Living Big Business's Nightmare in 
New Hydras. In World-Information Special IP CITY EDITION. Tunis. Open Access: 
http://world-information.org/wio/wsis/2005/texts/1154317929 
 
Khanolkar, Prasad 2009. Towards a New Urban Governance: The Contested Domain of 
Waste Management, Mumbai ,Unpublished Masters Thesis City and Regional Planning, 
Cornell University. Abstract and Literature Review. Posted to Blackboard 
 
Recommended 
Miraftab, Faranak. 2004. “Public-Private Partnerships: The Trojan Horse of Neoliberal 
Development?” Journal of Planning Education and Research, 24(1): 89-101. 
http://jpe.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/24/1/89 
 
Rhodes, R.A. W. 1996. “New Governance: Governing Without Government,” Political 
Studies XLIV:652-667. 
 
Oct. 2   Guest Lecture – John Foote, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School 
Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government 
 
Roads, Transit, Parking - Public Goods or Financial Assets" including a case study on the 
privatization of the Pittsburgh (PA) Parking Authority    
 
See blackboard for the following documents: 
Lecture Notes 
Penn Turnpike Case Study 
Pittsburgh Parking Authority Case 
 
Recommended 
 
Foote, John H. 2006 Analysis of the Public Policy Aspects of the Chicago Skyway 
Concession, Harvard Univ. Kennedy School Working Paper – posted to Blackboard 
 
Williams, Trefor P. 2003. “Moving to Public-Private Partnerships: Learning from 
Experience around the World,” Washington, DC: The Center for the Business of 
Government. http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/WilliamsReport.pdf 
 
Oct. 7  Group Working Session 
 
This year’s focus is on infrastructure – water, roads, and new mixed techniques for 
management or private interest neighborhoods as an alternative to zoning and public 
infrastructure. 
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Work with teams on project ideas.  Review examples of previous class projects 
posted to website: 
 
Transfer of Development Rights Programs: Using the Market for Compensation and 
Preservation 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/html/Transfer%20of%20Development%20Rights
%20Programs.htm 
 
Business Improvement Districts: Issues in Alternative Local Public Service Provision 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/reports/econdev/bids.asp 
 
Mitigating Corruption in New Public Management 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/html/MitigatingCorruption.htm  
 
Prisons, Privatization, and Public Values 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/html/PrisonsPrivatization.htm  
 
Oct. 7  Theory Paper Due 
 
Oct. 9  Group Topic and Plan Due 
 
October 9 Decentralization and Devolution (International) Guest Lecture- Ben Kohl 
 
Kohl, Benjamin. 2004. “Privatization Bolivian Style: A Cautionary Tale,” International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28(4): 893-908. 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0309-1317.2004.00558.x 
 
Recommended 
Kohl, Benjamin and Linda Farthing, 2009. Less Than “Fully Satisfactory Development 
Outcomes": International Financial Institutions and Social Unrest in Bolivia 
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 166, Vol. 36 No. 3, May 2009 59-78  
 
Oct. 14 -16 Decentralization, Devolution and Deconcentration  
 
Developing Countries 
Litvak, Jennie, Junaid Ahmad and Richard M. Bird. 1998. “Rethinking Decentralization 
in Developing Countries,” Washington, DC: The World Bank.  
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/01/06/00009494
6_00121605341030/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf 
 
Tendler, Judith. 1997. Good Government in the Tropics. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. Chapter 1 “Introduction” pp 1-20. (Book on Reserve) 
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Prud homme, Remy. 1995. “The Dangers of Decentralization,” The World Bank 
Research Observer, 10(2): 201-220.  
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&sid=1&srchmode=3&vinst=PROD&fmt=2&s
tartpage=-
1&clientid=8424&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=6866262&scaling=FULL&ts=1187207
071&vtype=PQD&aid=3&rqt=309&TS=1187207134&clientId=8424 
 
Developed Countries 
Brenner, Neil. 2004. “Urban Governance and the Production of New State Spaces in 
Western Europe, 1960-2000,” Review of International Political Economy, 11(3): 
447-488. 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/rrip/2004/00000011/00000003/art0000
1;jsessionid=4if2odd5i7t6.victoria 
 
Katz, Michael B. 2001. The Price of Citizenship: Redefining America’s Welfare State. 
New York, NY: Metropolitan Books. Read Introduction and Chapters 1, 2, pp 1-
56. (Book on Reserve) 
 
Rodríguez -Pose, A. and Bwire, A. 2004. “The economic (in)efficiency of devolution.” 
Environment and Planning A, 36, 11, 1907-1928. 
http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=a36228 
 
Recommended 
Shah, Anwar and Theresa Thompson. 2004. “Implementing Decentralized Local 
Governance: A Treacherous Road with Potholes, Detours, and Road Closures,” 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3353, Washington, DC: The World 
Bank.  
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/07/29/00009034
1_20040729134144/Rendered/PDF/wps3353.pdf 
 
Warner, Mildred E. and James E. Pratt. 2005. “Spatial Diversity in Local Government 
Revenue Effort Under Decentralization: A Neural-Network Approach,” 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 23(5): 657-677.  
http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=c16r 
 
Oct. 21 Regionalism  - Guest Lecturer: Susan Christopherson 
 
Wheeler, Stephen M., 2002, “The New Regionalism - Key Characteristics of an 
Emerging Movement” Journal of the American Planning Association, 68 (3): 
267-278 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=08-20-
2014&FMT=7&DID=128776231&RQT=309 
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Imbroscio, David L. 2006. Shaming the Inside Game: A Critique of the Liberal 
Expansionist Approach to Addressing Urban Problems, Urban Affairs Review  42: 224-
248.  
http://uar.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/42/2/224 
 
Clark, Jennifer and Susan Christopherson, 2009. Integrating Investment and Equity: A 
Critical Regionalist Agenda for a Progressive Regionalism, Journal of Planning 
Education and Research 28:341-354 
http://jpe.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/28/3/341 
 
Recommended 
Bollens, Scott. 2003. In through the back door: Social Equity and Regional Governance. 
Housing Policy Debate 13 (4): 631–57. 
http://www.mi.vt.edu/data/files/hpd%2013%284%29/hpd%2013%284%29_bollens.pdf 
 
Swanstrom, Todd. 2006. Regionalism, Equality, and Democracy, Urban Affairs Review  
42: 249-257. 
http://uar.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/42/2/249.pdf 
 
Orfield, Myron. 2002. American Metropolitics: The New Suburban Reality. Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press.   
 
Rusk, David. 1999. Inside Game/Outside Game: Winning Strategies for Saving Urban 
America. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Oct. 23 Guest Lectures: Health Care Reform & Metropolitan Service Segregation 
 
Health Care Reform 
 
US Experience: Taryn Morrissey, SRCD/AAAS Congressional Fellow 
Italian Experience: Gabriella D’Amore Visiting Scholar, Italy 
 
Recommended 
Health Reform Proposals before Congress.  Kaiser Family Foundation 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/healthreform_tri_full.pdf 
 
Gawande, Atul, 2009.  The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas town can teach us about 
health care, The New Yorker, June 1 2009. 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?currentPage=
all 
 
Ramesh, M. 2008. Reasserting the role of the state in the healthcare sector: Lessons from 
Asia, Policy and Society, 27:129–136 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2008.09.004 
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Oct 23.  12:30 pm  Colloquium Speaker : Ann Joyner Moss 
 
Metropolitan Service Segregation: Ann Moss Joyner, Colloquium Speaker 
 
 
Oct 28, 30 and Nov 4  Regionalism: Constraints and Prospects 
Class divides into groups and each reads one book and leads class discussion.  Everyone 
try to read indicated chapters 
 
Frug, Gerald E. and David Barron 2008. City Bound: How States Stifle Urban 
Innovation. Cornell Univ Press. Ithaca NY. Esp Introduction and Chapters 1 and 2 
 
Frug, Gerald E. 1999. City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. See article summaries on website 
 
Pastor, Manuel, Chris Benner and Martha Matsuoka 2009. This could be the start of 
something big: How social movements for regional equity are reshaping 
metropolitan America, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. Esp. Chapter 2. 
 
Davis, Michael 2006. Planet of slums, New York: Verso. Esp Chapters 3, 4, 8 
Or article version 
Davis, Michael 2004. Planet of slums, New Left Review 26, March-April 2004 pp 5-34 
http://www.newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=2496 
 
Nov. 6  Group Work Session 
 
Nov. 11 and 13  Presentation of Group Projects 
 
Nov 13  Group Project Papers Due 
 
Nov 13 12:30 pm Colloquium Speaker: Nik Theodore 
 
Nov. 18 Privatization and Citizen Participation 
 
Abers, Rebecca. 1998. “From Clientelism to Cooperation: Local Government, 
Participatory Policy, and Civic Organizing in Porto Alegre, Brazil,” Politics and 
Society, 26(4): 511-537. http://pas.sagepub.com/content/vol26/issue4/ 
 
Miraftab, Faranak and Shana Wills. 2005. “Insurgency and Spaces of Active Citizenship: 
The Story of Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign in South Africa,” Journal of 
Planning Education and Research, 25(2): 200-217.  
http://jpe.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/25/2/200 
 
Mohan, Giles. 2002. The disappointments of civil society: the politics of NGO 
intervention in northern Ghana. Political Geography 21 (1): 125-154.   
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298(01)00072-5 
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Recommended 
Moore, Henry and Deborah Puntenney. 1999. “Leading by Stepping Back: A Guide for 
City Officials on Building Neighborhood Capacity,” Evanston, IL: Asset-Based 
Community Development Institute. (Not electronic) 
http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/community/stepback.html 
 
Lukensmeyer, Carolyn J. and Lars Hasselblad Torres. 2006. “Public Deliberation: A 
Manager’s Guide to Citizen Engagement,” Washington, DC: The Center for the 
Business of Government.  
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/LukensmeyerReport.pdf 
 
Bresette, Patrick and Marcia Kinsey. 2006. “Public Structures: A Constructive Model for 
Government,” Public Briefing No. 6. New York, NY: Dēmos: A Network for 
Ideas and Action.  
http://www.demos.org/publication.cfm?currentpublicationID=0E23549B-3FF4-6C82-
521EE468A7FE57E0 
 
Nov 20  Outlines for Final Paper Due (Graduate Students) 
 
Nov. 20 and 23 (note shift to Monday) Citizenship and the State  
(Nov. 25 No Class – Thanksgiving) 
 
Katz, Michael B. 2001. “Work, Democracy and Citizenship” pp 341-360 in The Price of 
Citizenship: Redefining America’s Welfare State. New York, NY: Metropolitan 
Books. (Book on Reserve) 
  
Marshall, T.H. 1950. “Citizenship and Social Class” in The Citizenship Debates: A 
Reader, ed by Gershon Shafir, 1998, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press. (Book on Reserve) 
 
Purcell, Mark (2003). Citizenship and the Right to the Global City: Reimagining the 
Capitalist World Order, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27(3): 
564-90. 
http://faculty.washington.edu/mpurcell/ijurr.pdf 
 
Holston, James and Arjun Appadurai. 1999. “Introduction” in Cities and Citizenship, ed 
by James Holston, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. (Book on Reserve) 
 
Recommended 
Turner, Bryan S. 1990. “Outline of a Theory of Citizenship,” Sociology, 24(2): 189-217.  
 
Cerny, Philip. 1999. Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy, European Journal of 
Political Research 36: 1-26. 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/b5a3tp9l0w9n8d6j/ 
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Harvey, David 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. (for more on concept of accumulation by dispossession). 
Dec. 2 and 4  Class Presentations – Final Paper Outlines 
 
Short presentations of your paper outline for group review and critique 
 
Dec. 7   Final Papers Due at Noon (Undergraduates) 
 
Dec. 11  Final Papers Due at Noon (Graduates) 
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
National Trends
The International City County Management Association conducts a survey of Alternative Service Delivery by
local governments every five years. The comprehensive nature of restructuring options studied and the broad
range of services covered make this the best source for tracking changes in local government service delivery.
The data cover the period 1982-1997.
Privatization and the Market Structuring Role of Local Government
Mildred Warner and Amir Hefetz
Read Paper (PDF)
Abstract:
National data on local government service delivery (collected by the International City County Management
Association) shows privatization has not increased dramatically since 1982. This paper seeks to understand
why there has been so little growth in privatization. Theory offers two possible answers: government failure
or quasi-market failure. While government failure (bureaucratic concerns over loss of control by local officials
and employee resistance) may explain the failure to privatize more, our data provide limited support for this
view. We argue that failure in contract markets themselves may explain the continued primacy of publicly
provided public services.
Using longitudinal data from 1982 to 1997, we show that the local decision to provide public services is
complex and dynamic. Local governments use a range of service restructuring alternatives including
privatization, mixed public/private provision and cooperation between governments. Service delivery is a
dynamic process reflecting changing citizen demand for services and new privatization. The data also show
significant instability in contracts, including contracting in - the reverting back to public provision of previously
privatized services. This "reverse privatization" may reflect problems with the contracting process itself,
limited efficiency gains, erosion in service quality or concern over the loss of broader community values
associated with public service delivery.
Privatization does not imply a retreat of government but rather a more active engagement with the market.
Whether as regulator, contractor or direct service provider, local governments manage markets to create
competition and ensure service quality and stability. This pragmatic market structuring role is critical to
ensure that both efficiency and the broader public benefits of service delivery are achieved.
Presentation to the Economic Policy Institute's Conference on Privatization: Trends, Issues and
Alternatives, January 11, 2001
View Overhead Slides | Listen to Presentation (requires RealNetworks' free RealPlayer software)
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Search Cornell
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Book Summary
Savas, E. S. 1987. Privatization: The Key to Better Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Savas is a proponent of privatization and this book provides a theoretical basis and a positive review of
strategies to achieve privatization. Savas views privatization as a strategy to bring about lasting
improvements in the management and performance of government. The nature of public goods and services
limits the ability to privatize delivery, but Savas provides evidence of when this is possible (Chapter 3).
The author then reviews alternative service arrangements for providing goods and services. Distinctive
attributes of goods and of the market of potential service providers are used to demonstrate conditions under
which each privatization alternative works best (Chapter 4, 5).
In the second half of the book, Savas provides an extensive literature review (as of 1987) of empirical studies
that compare different service delivery arrangements and describe particularly interesting or thought-
provoking examples of privatization (Chapter 6, 7). For a conscientious public official, four broad strategies
are suggested to implement privatization; load shedding, adopting arrangements that have minimal
government involvement, instituting user charges, and introducing competition (Chapter 8, 9, 10).
The book is divided into four parts; the background, theory, and practice of privatization, and steps toward
successful privatization. The problems with privatization are not given major attention since Savas is an
advocate.
Part One: The Background for Privatization
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter defines privatization and discusses several major forces leading to privatization
 Chapter 2: The Growth of Government 
The size and growth of government in the U.S. are discussed in this chapter along with reasons why
governments grow.
Part Two: The Theory of Privatization
 Chapter 3: Basic Characteristics of Goods and Services 
Good and services can be classified by two important concepts, exclusion (exclusion or nonexclusion) and
consumption (joint or individual). Understanding the type of good (private, toll, common-pool, collective
goods) helps to determine the proper roles of government and private sector. While private and toll goods
can be supplied by the market, common-pool and collective goods require collective action more appropriate
to the public sector.
 Chapter 4: Alternative Arrangements for Providing Goods and Services 
Ten different arrangements of service delivery are analyzed; direct government provision, intergovernmental
provision, franchising, contracting, vouchers, grants, self-service, marketplace, government vending.
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 Chapter 5: An Analysis and Comparison of Alternative Arrangements 
Advantages and disadvantages of each arrangement are pointed out, and the question of which arrangement
to use when there is a choice is decreased.
Part Three: Privatization in Practice
 Chapter 6: Applications in Physical and Commercial Services 
Privatized arrangements like contracts are more efficient in solid waste collection, transportation, and street
services, as these are private or toll goods. Water supply, communication, or state owned property, even
though historically public goods, may be provided efficiently through private provision.
 Chapter 7: Applications in Protective and Human Services 
Although government is interested in the fundamental safety of citizens, privatization has been successfully
applied to protective and human services, such as public safety, national defense, health care, education, and
social services. Vouchers, market arrangements, and contracting have been used. Contracting is the most
common.
Part Four: Toward Successful Privatization
 Chapter 8: How to Privatize 
Four broad strategies are introduced to implement privatization: load shedding, adopting arrangements that
have minimal government involvement, instituting user charges, and introducing competition.
 Chapter 9: Problems with Privatization 
Each privatized arrangement requires certain conditions in order to be successful and fully effective. Many of
the problems reported for human service contracts result from the difficulty of specifying the desired results
of the services and from faulty implementation. Political, bureaucratic, and employee resistance must be
overcome. There may be legal impediments to novel arrangements and problems with long term contracts.
 Chapter 10: Conclusion
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Sclar, Elliot, 2000.  You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca,
NY:  Cornell University Press.
Today, nearly all public services – schools, hospitals, prisons, fire departments, sanitation – are considered
fair game for privatization. Proponents of privatization argue that private firms will respond to competitive
market pressures and provide better service at lower cost. While this assertion has caused much controversy,
the debate between both sides has consisted mainly of impassioned defenses of entrenched positions.
In You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For, Elliot D. Sclar offers a balanced look at the pitfalls and promises
of public sector privatization in the United States. By describing the underlying economic dynamics of how
public agencies and private organizations actually work together, he provides a rigorous analysis of the
assumptions behind the case for privatization.
The competitive-market model may see appealing, but Sclar warns that it does not address the complex
reality of contracting for government services. Using specific examples, such as mail service and urban
transportation, he shows that privatization ironically does not shrink government – the broader goal of many
of its own champions. He also demonstrates that there is more to consider in providing public services than
trying to achieve efficiency; there are issues of equity that cannot be ignored.
Sclar believes that public officials and voters will soon realize the limitations of “contracting out” just as
private corporations have come to understand the drawbacks of outsourcing. After examining the
effectiveness of alternatives to privatization, he offers suggestions for improving public sector performance –
advice he hopes will be heeded before it is too late.
 
Chapter 1:  The Urge to Privatize:  Sclar gives us a comprehensive overview of the history of privatization, the
standard market model and the connections between competition and privatization.
 
Chapter 2:  What is the Public Buying?  Identifying the Contracted Public Good:  Sclar addresses the
fundamental choice between the public supply of private goods versus the private supply of public goods.
 
Chapter 3:  Public vs. Private Production:  Is One Better and How Would You Know? 
This chapter analyzes the cost structure of public and private production using empirical data from Canada,
California and Ohio to dispell the myth that private production is more efficient and cost-effective than public
production.
 
Chapter 4:  What's Competition Got to Do With It?  Market Structures and Public Contracting:  Sclar illustrates
aspects of the real-world play of markets and politics that confront efforts to privatize services with examples that
show the complexity of the marketplace in which privatization contracts must be written.
 
Chapter 5:  All in the System:  Organizational Theories and Public Contracting: 
Sclar addresses three key topics: transaction-cost economics, the new institutional economics and contract
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theory and practice to suggest a more robust and practical approach to contracting.
Chapter 6:  Restructuring Work:  The Relational Contract:  Sclar uses the Indianapolis Fleet Service example
to demonstrate that a clearer understanding of the problems of public work can lead to reform strategies
other than privatization. 
Chapter 7:  The Privatization of Public Service:  Economic Limits of the Contract State:  Sclar brings all of his
points together in an attempt to summarize all of the problems with privatization.
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Tiebout, Charles 1956. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy 64:416-424.
Public goods are non-rival and non-exclusive. Therefore, determining the optimal amount
of expenditure on public goods presents an interesting problem. In this article, Charles
Tiebout employs the theory of public choice. He argues that residents of localities are
similar to consumers, because they are essentially “shopping” between different
municipalities to find the one that has the right mix of taxes and public services.  Their
ability to choose leads towns to compete against one another, and that competition
means that the towns are better able to discover and serve the needs of their citizens. 
This theory ensures that municipalities do not overproduce public goods, thereby wasting
valuable local resources. 
 
Tiebout assumes that there are n local public goods and there are m communities.  Each
community would go to the national market and bid for appropriate units of each public
good. The demand for each public good would then be the sum of demands of all the m
communities for each of the n goods. This total demand is the revealed preference of the
community.
 
The model also assumes that there is an optimal level of population for each community,
depending on some fixed resource, the beach space for example. Beyond this optimum
number, an individual would have to look for the next best community that fits his or her
preferences. Economic forces would automatically push people out of a city that has
exceeded its optimum size and pull people in when the optimum population has not been
reached. Hence spatial mobility provides a way to determine the level of public goods.
 
In his explanation of how potential residents choose communities, Tiebout assumes there
are no restrictions on job locations, and all residents have full mobility and access to
information about services in all communities.  In order to provide a perfectly competitive
market, each town would have a fixed revenue scheme and the number of towns would
be limitless in order to provide a full range of choice for all desired combinations of taxes
and public goods.
 
Tiebout also makes several suggestions for policy implication at the end of the article.  He
suggests that integration of municipal services between neighboring metropolitan areas is
justified under certain conditions: if services are not reduced and costs remain the same. 
In addition, he advocates policies that increase knowledge of residents and encourage
their mobility.   
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Boyne, George A. 1996. “Competition and Local Government: A Public Choice Perspective.” Urban
Studies 33 (4-5): 703-721.
Three types of competition can be recognized in local government:
1)      Traditional: between local authorities for power and resources.
2)      New: between a council and other organizations for service production.
3)      Neglected: between councils themselves.
Traditional competition involves interparty competition.  It is often ineffective at the local level because:
1)       Local parties enjoy large majorities and thus have no reason to compete.
2)       Local parties lack incentive to compete because they are controlled by national political issues.
3)       Local politicians lack the freedom to compete.  
Boyne gives the example of the Conservatives in the UK government establishing the compulsory competitive
tendering (CCT) program. They forced councils to request tenders from outside private suppliers (ex.
construction, maintenance of highways).  CCT was ineffective because it potentially decreased quality of
service and reduced variety, and though it led to greater technical efficiency, it did not attain greater
allocative efficiency, for it was concerned with production rather than provision.
Competition between councils (defined as new competition) competes on a geographic as well as on a tier-
level basis.  Three major variables which affect competition between councils are:
1)      Structure
-         There are two types of structure: consolidated, where all services are provided by a single unit
serving a large area; or fragmented, where local government is divided into tiers based on services.
-         Public choice espouses the use of fragmented structure to allow for choice in different neighborhoods
(Tiebout model) and take advantage of scale economies.
-         The Tiebout model is said to only apply to a handful of metropolitan areas in the UK.
-         The advantages of a fragmented structure are:
1. It allows competition for a finite local tax base, improving services.   
2. It leads to more flexibility in switching services and creating new ones.
3. Horizontal fragmentation leads to new household and business tax base, and vertical fragmentation
leads to a more efficient rather than prodigal tier of local government
2)      Autonomy
-         Local governments should have flexibility to innovate, experiment, and create needs-driven distinctive
policies.
-         This will lead to competition which will encourage individuals to move into clusters and develop
homogeneous communities around preferences for public policy.
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3)      Finance
-         There exists an inverse relationship between central funding and local competition; as central funding
increases, local competition decreases.
-         Every community will emphasize a redistribution in their favor and de-emphasize any resulting
inefficiencies because the gain of more funds will offset any inefficiencies in the grand scheme of
things.
-         The higher the level of central funding, the lower the incentive for fiscal movement between areas;
fiscal migration will increase only as horizontal equity (people with same taxes receive same services) 
increases.
-         Some central funding is necessary for equalization grants to neutralize variations between income
discrepancies in different areas.
-         Other public choice theory posits that grants lead to collusion rather than political competition, as
local bureaucrats form cartels in order to limit price variation.
UK example  
Structurally, all-purpose authorities were created as the Greater London Council and six Metropolitan
Counties were abolished.
This has contradictory effects: it removes vertical competition as upper-tier. councils are abolished and
remaining tiers have monopoly control on the tax base, but it introduces horizontal fragmentation in to
former upper-tier services which are now more geographically fragmented.
Local autonomy has declined because councils have created more compulsory obligations and less
discretionary power.
Central funding has risen because of policy changes and political fiasco relating to a poll tax.
As a result, competition has been reduced in local government in the UK over the past decade.
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Bennett, Robert. 1990. "Decentralization, Intergovernmental Relations and Markets: Towards a Post-
Welfare Agenda?" Pp. 1-26 in Decentralization, Local Government and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare
Agenda, ed. Robert Bennett. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
In this Introduction to his edited volume, Bennett describes briefly the worldwide movement from "welfarist"
policy to "post-welfare" policy. During the post-World War II era, a system of entitlements was developed in
many Western nations and the state became a major provider of education, health services, land-use
planning, and housing. In recent years, however, there has been a shift in thinking, and in the U.S., the idea
of "new federalism" has gained great currency. New federalist philosophy advocates more state and local
power, and less intrusion and regulation by the federal government. Enormous global economic changes have
also prompted a critical examination in many countries of how the government provides services and its
ability to respond the needs, demands, and preferences of citizens. Bennett discusses two main types of
decentralization: intergovernmental decentralization, the shifting of power and responsibility for certain
government activities from one level to another (for example, from federal to state, or state to local), and
decentralization from government to the market or nongovernmental organizations. In the U.S., two forces
are at work: intergovernmental decentralization from the federal government to the states, and market
decentralization at the state and local levels. According to Bennett, the U.S. has been a leader in innovation
within the post-welfare era in our use of market approaches to service delivery. Bennett identifies six
perceptions motivating the shift to the new post-welfare paradigm. He sums them up as follows: 1)
government programs are political pork barrels; 2) government administrators and politicians are poor service
providers; 3) government intervention encourages dependency; 4) federal government control suppresses
local initiative; 5) costs for services have and will continue to escalate out of control; and 6) public support
for government programs is low. The shift itself consists of radical changes in thinking about service delivery,
including a move to thinking of citizens as "customers" to be served based on their needs and preferences
but also with a consideration of the costs involved. Within this framework, services can be provided by the
private, voluntary, and nonprofit sectors, and people do not necessarily receive services "as of right."
Managerial accountability, flexibility, and cost-efficiency are stressed, and resource allocation is made more
efficient through funding mechanisms such as user fees, which will lessen the need for large-scale,
progressive taxation. Bennett acknowledges that these transformations may have implications for equity and
for the role of private sector businesses.
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David Lowery, 1998. “Consumer Sovereignty and Quasi-Market Failure” Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, pp.137-172.
Contract or quasi-markets bring market like forces into the provision of public goods.  These quasi-markets
may be more efficient and responsive to the preferences of citizens/consumers.  However, Lowery argues that
we should also consider opportunities for market failure. The standard of evaluation, used by Lowery, to
determine success or failure, is by the concept of consumer sovereignty.  A central assumption of the
market is that consumers will generate changes in supply and demand by their preferences.  It follows that
the performance of a market should be evaluated by how well the wants and needs of consumers are met.
Lowery outlines three areas of potential quasi-market failure.
Failure in Market Formation:
The main reason quasi markets fail to form is due to their monopolistic nature.  For consumer sovereignty to
exist, there must be competition, and that is what quasi-markets should provide.  But evidence points to little
real competition in quasi-markets, especially contracted services.  Often contracts are not competitively bid
and once created they tend to get routinely renewed because of political clout and lack of new competitors. 
Also, there is evidence that contracting does not net significant reduction in spending, which undermines the
presumed efficiency of contract production.
The second area of failure in market formation is the creation of barriers to entry which may exclude
competitive suppliers or the full range of consumers (especially those who are more expensive and harder to
serve).
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Sclar, Elliot, 2000.  “What’s Competition Got to Do with It? Market Structures and Public Contracting,”
Chapter 4 of You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.
In the fourth chapter, Sclar examines three case studies to explore the misconception of competition in the
privatization of public services.  Fundamental to the argument for the privatization of public services is the
belief that the competitive pressures of the market forces private service providers to behave more
efficiently.  Public contracting, however, the author notes, usually takes place in monopolistic or oligopolistic
economies, characterized by little to no competition.  Private contracting can shift a competitive market to a
monopolistic or oligopolistic market through long-term contracts.  Public officials should be aware of the
significance not only of how the market for a particular service is structured prior to privatization, but also of
how privatization may shape the state and the dynamics of that market in the future. 
First Sclar examines contracting in a monopoly market, analyzing the case of fire fighting in Scottsdale,
Arizona.  Sclar chooses this example because “nearly every important study advocating . . . privatization of
municipal services refers to Scottsdale, but few have followed its example” (72).  Since its incorporation in
1951, Scottsdale has contracted its fire services to Rural/Metro.  The contract is renewed annually on a cost
plus profit basis; it is not open for public bidding.  Sclar points out that while Rural/Metro may be as efficient
as other providers – it is not the competitive nature of the private market that stimulates that efficiency.  Not
only is it a closed contract, there are no alternative suppliers and there are legitimate barriers to entry as a
result of Scottsdale’s long term relationship with Rural/Metro.  Furthermore, Rural/Metro relied on labor cost
savings, such as volunteer and on-call firefighters, to keep down costs.  Compared to equivalent public fire
service providers, Sclar notes, Rural/Metro has lower cost but also lower quality.  Sclar foreshadows that
Rural/Metro will not be able to maintain its competitive edge as population density increases because its cost
savings strategy would become infeasible.  Sclar also suggests that existing publicly provided services could
achieve the same levels of efficiency if they restructure. 
Sclar explores the following two examples of contracting in an oligopoly market:
1. In the first example, Denver policy makers attempted to keep the contracting of existing public transit
competitive by privatizing in phases and limiting the market share of individual providers to fifty percent. 
Three national bus companies won the contracts by offering exceedingly low prices for the first contract term
and then rapidly inflating charges to the actual costs after being awarded the contract.  Quickly the five
providers who were not awarded contracts were squeezed out of the market, and future competition
foreclosed.  The Regional Transit Authority was distracted by the debate over privatizing the remaining
portions of the public transit and therefore unable to devote time to internal restructuring. 
2. The second oligopoly example examines school busing in New York City.  The nature of the business of
transporting children requires consistent reliable service.  In the name of consistency the private contracts
are awarded to the same companies every year; there is no competition.  While Mayor Guiliani tried to reform
this market and instill competition, the size and complexity of the business and the public value of ensuring
safe reliable transportation to school aged children, eliminated the entry of new competitors.  Sclar notes that
Search Cornell
one way to insert competition into this market might be for the public sector to develop its own fleet of
school buses that could compete with the private contractors.
Sclar concludes that benefits derived from competition in the contracting of public services are often imagined
ones rather than real ones.  Public decision makers must shoulder two costly burdens: costs associated with
establishing an ongoing competitive market and costs associated with being participants and guarantors of
that market.  Sclar concludes that public decision makers should not work towards privatization in the name
of competition when they could be considering restructuring or reorganizing their own management.  As the
three case studies illustrate the market solution has limited practical applications; competition does not
always result from privatization. 
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Kodras, Janet. 1997. "Restructuring the State: Devolution, Privatization, and the Geographic
Redistribution of Power and Capacity in Governance." Pp. 79-96 in State Devolution in America:
Implications for a Diverse Society. Ed. Lynn Staeheli, Janet Kodras, and Colin Flint. Urban Affairs Annual
Reviews 48. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Kodras addresses the three ways in which government can change public service provision: 1) privatization,
2) dismantling, and 3) devolution. Pulling from the topical literature, Kodras summarizes arguments and
counter-arguments for a change in service provision responsibility. From the larger quantity of arguments
against, I surmise that Kodras is concerned about the impacts of government service provision change.
The major thread running through the arguments against change in government services is the inadequate
capacity of local and state governments, not-for-profit institutions, and individuals to provide goods and
services. The national government has access to fiscal resources that other entities do not, as well as to
technical expertise that may not be available to a small community in upstate New York.
Privatization - transfers the functions of government to commercial firms and
nonprofit organizations
Pro: Market competition increases efficiency and service quality.
Con: Competition in service provision is often absent, resulting in monopoly rather than greater
efficiency.
Dismantling - eliminates government responsibility for the goods or services
Pro: Nonprofit organizations are more highly attuned to community needs than is government, and
instill a sense of civic pride.
Con: Nonprofit organizations are generally very localized and geographically fragmented. They are
an insufficient substitute for the local state in terms of both capacity and scope. Responsibility for
services no longer provided by government often falls to individuals without the resources to
provide them.
Devolution - transfers responsibility from higher to lower levels of government
Pro: Government closer to the people is more flexible.
Con: Creates inequities in service provision due to geographic differences in expertise, material and
financial resources, infrastructure, and political will. State or local governments often do not have
the capacity to provide services that a higher level of government does.
Local governments are less capable of competing in the world market than is a national government which
can provide uniform standards and regulations, and fiscal redistribution for inequities created by competition.
Devolution creates competition between state and local governments which, in the case of basic government
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services and economic development, sometimes promotes efficiency. To a certain extent, devolution allows for
the most locally applicable provision of certain services, and the best locations for industry and retail
economic development. But local governments compete for manufacturing with tax abatement incentives, free
land, cheap labor, and infrastructure investment that can end up costing local government more per job than
is yielded by the investment, and is a zero sum game for the state and nation.
In the case of social welfare services competition can spur a race to the bottom. When social services are not
uniform across space, citizens perceive that recipients move to the areas with the highest benefits. Citizens in
areas with relatively high benefits do not wish to subsidize outsiders, and urge government to reduce
benefits.
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Warner, M.E., 2003. “Competition, Cooperation and Local Governance,” chapter 19 pp 252-262 in
Challenges for Rural America in the Twenty First Century, edited by David Brown and Louis Swanson,
University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
Privatization, decentralization and civic participation are common themes characterizing the changing
structure and organization of local governments. Privatization and decentralization are based on the positive
power of competition to ensure governmental efficiency and responsiveness to citizen voice. 
 These trends represent important innovations but they also bring new challenges. Successful decentralization
requires administrative and financial capacity and effective citizen participation, but many rural governments
lack an adequate revenue base or sufficient professional management capacity. Rural residents have relied
more on private markets than government for many services; however, rural areas have also suffered from
under development due in part to uneven markets. 
As we move into the 21st century, government innovation based on competition may give way to innovations
based on cooperation. Cooperation between levels of government and with private sector and civil society
actors may offer greater potential for efficiency and equity than competitive markets. However, cooperation
will also bring challenges. The governance of cooperative networks will require new mechanisms for
accountability and voice. Ensuring equity and participation in these new governance structures will be
especially important for rural communities. 
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Webster, Christopher J., (1998). "Public Choice, Pigouvian and Coasian Planning Theory," Urban Studies
35(1):53-75
This article suggests there may be market solutions to problem of public goods in the form of local collective
action outside of government. However, these solutions are likely to work only in settings where there are a
small number of participants and high liquidity of property rights. Webster illustrates this by comparing
Pigouvian and Coasian economic theory using an example based on land use planning and pollution. 
Pigouvian theory begins with the assumption that without any sort of intervention, land and property markets
fail in a number of ways because the market will not regulate itself.  Therefore, if the social costs of economic
activities are not taken into account by suppliers of goods, negative externalities (such as pollution) will be
overproduced.  Pigouvian theorists propose the internalization of the externalities.  Pigouvian analysis calls for
intervention, arguing that only government has the authority to force a firm to restrict output, by forcing
producers to recognize the social costs of production. 
Webster uses the Coasian argument to question the presuppositions of Pigouvian economics and to raise the
idea that government intervention may not be the only solutions to the externality problem.  The foundation
of Coasian economics lies on the belief that voluntary solutions can be found by means of voluntary market
agreements. 
·         The polluter can pay the polluted. In this case, the polluter will pay the polluted up till the point at which
the revenue she will make is equal to the social cost of pollution.
·         The polluted can pay the polluter to reduce polluting. The polluter will accept payment as long as the
amount offered is less than the (potential) revenue earned.
·         Externalities are technically eliminated or internalized through a pricing mechanism. Payment from one
party to another ensures the socially optimal amount of pollution.
·         It does not matter who holds property rights (polluter/polluted), the socially optimal outcome will always
ensue.  Practically, this means that government intervention cannot produce a more efficient allocation of
resources than is provided for by voluntary, unrestricted market agreements, regardless of who has rights
over land use.
There are a number of assumptions Webster glosses over in his example.  A number of assumptions of
classical economics need to hold if this voluntary market agreement is going to work, most notably perfect
information and zero transaction costs.  What Webster terms ‘fungibility’, or the liquidity of property rights,
becomes important in that property rights may not be that easily transferred.  His example assumes that
both the source and the effects of the pollution are localized, which may not be the case.  Although the
outcomes, regardless of who retains property rights, may be quantitatively equivalent, there are qualitative
differences that arise.  Webster does allow that ‘with the exception of usual circumstances more likely to be
found in small settlements, Coasian and public choice analyses of developmental control retain the Pigouvian
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proposition that government is generally in the best position to organize and deliver collective goods.’ (16).
Government, however, should not act as an agent analogous to the market, as Webster contends.  Rather
the state (ideally) should act in a way that allows the market to operate freely and produce a socially optimal
result.
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Staley, Samuel and Lynn Scarlett. 1997. "Market Oriented Planning: Principles and Tools." Los Angeles:
Reason Public Policy Institute. http://www.rppi.org/ps236.html  
The Reason Public Policy Institute promotes market solutions over government regulation.
In this article, Staley and Scarlett propose a system of market-oriented planning that would be more
conducive to rapid land development and would use a common law, nuisance-based standard in those
instances in which regulation was needed. They argue that traditional land-use planning slows down the land
development process with unnecessary bureaucratic delays, that it favors special interests, and is incapable of
adapting sufficiently rapidly to society’s changing land use needs.
Current planning and zoning practices include the present the following obstacles:
Development approval processes often involve some combination of bargaining, legislative action,
appeals, and litigation, and can be time-consuming, inefficient, and costly both for the private developer
and for the municipality. 
Planning processes sometimes result precisely in those conditions planners had hoped to avoid, such as
unaffordable housing and traffic congestion. 
Problems often extend beyond jurisdictional boundaries, making it difficult to find comprehensive
solutions. 
Planners’ visions of future land use needs have, in the past, proven woefully incorrect; (e.g. planners did
not anticipate societal changes that have spatial effects, two-income households, the digital revolution
and just-in-time inventory strategies)
Politicization of land use decision-making impinges on private property rights and nuisance protections
through the power of legislatures and special interest groups.
Staley and Scarlett offer the following prescriptions for local land use policy.
Land use decisions should be made at the local level and should be protected from state or federal
interference.
Development should not be impeded unless the government or an individual directly and tangibly
affected requests a hearing based on potential negative impacts, which must be tangible and
measurable.
The government should be given a time limit within which to take action or to review an application.
Site plan review should be rapid and efficient, and should have clearly defined criteria.
Zoning districts should be mixed-use or should have broadly defined use categories to give greater
latitude to developers.
The developer should pay for all infrastructure associated with the development, but should be able to
choose what type of infrastructure is appropriate.
Land use planning should not attempt to achieve a substantive end goal, but rather should establish an
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efficient process to guide market development.
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Article Summary
Zerbe, Richard O. and Howard E. McCurdy. 1999. “The Failure of Market Failure,” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 18(4):558-578.
This article addresses the limitations of the market failure approach to discussions of public goods. The
authors'' argument draws specifically from transaction cost economics, which they feel contributes to a better
understanding of issue for/against government intervention in the market. Zerbe and McCurdy argue that the
case for eliminating market failure through the internalization of externalities is flawed, and that governments
should intervene in the marketplace only when they have the ability to lower transaction costs.
Zerbe and McCurdy begin by giving a brief history of the market failure concept, from the traditions of Pigou
and Samuelson. Included in this summary is a working definition of market failure from a welfare economics
position that is: ‘a circumstance where the pursuit of private interest does not lead to an efficient use of
society''s resources or a fair distribution of society''s goods’ (p.559). This definition refers to the free
market''s inability to supply a sufficient amount of public goods, which then necessitates government-led
solutions. Accordingly, market failures represent a necessary, but not sufficient condition for government
intervention.
Zerbe and McCurdy then explain why market failure analysis is conceptually flawed. The failure of market
failure is in fact both the inability of the concept of market failure to address transaction costs and the
reliance on consumer preference as an explanatory mechanism. The authors attribute the causes of ‘market
failures’ to externalities, which arise entirely from transaction cost, or the cost of choosing, organizing,
negotiating, and entering into contracts. Moreover, ‘since unpriced transaction costs are ubiquitous, this gives
rise to a situation in which externalities and hence market failures can be found wherever transactions occur’
(p. 563). Hence, eliminating transaction cost, in their mind, should be the goal of policy analysts. The
transaction cost associated with internalizing the cost of negative externalities ‘will never be lower than the
net monetary impact of the externality’ (p 562). That is, the transaction cost associated with the reduction of
a producer''s supply will always be greater than the social/environmental cost of the offending externality and
therefore such a remedy would not be efficient. Secondly, Zerrbe nad McCurdy address the difficulty welfare
economics has in revealing consumer preference. "The market failure concept is not inherently empirical and
as such cannot provide answers to empirical questions" (p. 571). The article then goes on to describe several
examples when markets can successfully handle potential externality problems. These examples include
lighthouse; land tenancy; bees and crops; and common property.
So when should government intervene in the market place? Efficient and optimal government intervention in
the marketplace must begin by examining transaction costs and net benefits, not market failures per se.
Since externalities are ubiquitous, using externalities as a basis for intervention can at best be arbitrary- and
is in no way guaranteed to be an efficient means of addressing the externality. ‘Anytime government can
reduce private transaction costs or its own cost of provision, it should do so regardless of whether or not an
externality exists. It need not wait for an appearance of an externality to effect a justification’ (p. 565). The
approach Zerbe and McCUrdy take aims to provide solutions for traditional market failures and takes
advantage of government''s ability to lower transaction costs, usuallyl through its power of coercion.
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Sclar, Elliot 2000.  “All in the System: Organizational Theories and Public Contracting,” Chapter 5 of You
Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University
Press. 
In the fifth chapter, Elliot Sclar argues that given the ideological and political pressures to privatize, we must
examine under what conditions contracting and in what form contracting might be successful.  Sclar begins
with a critique of the standard economic model, which assumes that actors have equal access to information
regarding the contract, a static documented agreement.  Sclar argues for a form of relational contracting as
an alternative.  Sclar bases his arguments in the following theoretical assumptions: 1) a notion of bounded
rationality, which concedes the inability of actors to have access to all relevant information, and 2) and the
notion that context matters, a concept derived from new institutional economics, which incorporates the
institutional constraints of ideology and politics, as well as economic rationality.
Sclar dismisses as unrealistic the classic or complete contract form because it assumes that the terms of the
contract can “captur[e] all present and future rights and obligations between the parties.”  Sclar also critiques
incomplete contracts, which are more common to public service contracting.  He argues that it is nearly
impossible to specify all future situations and contingencies in a contract.  Furthermore, the notion of
incomplete contracts is still rooted in the theoretical assumption of market competition.  Incomplete
contracting, he demonstrates, produces the following three problems: 1) principal-agent problems; 2)
adverse selection; and 3) moral hazards.
Principal-agent problems typically occur when one party (the principal) hires another (the agent) to carry
out an assignment, but the agent serves its own interest at the expense of the principal because of
information asymmetry (a situation in which existing information is not uniformly distributed therefore those
with access to superior information act opportunistically and at the expense of the others).  To offset
information asymmetry, public agencies or private firms that find themselves less privileged in incomplete
contracting situations often hire third-party consultants.  This, however, adds extra costs.
Adverse selection refers to a situation in which one party, in this case the public sector, chooses a
seemingly attractive provider based on criteria such as the best price.  But, because the public administrator
does not have complete information regarding the competing bidders the choice results in a mistake.  The
contractor may turn out to be less qualified and risk-tolerant, to have chronic cash-flow problems and/or high
rates of labor turnover.  In all of these cases, the price signaled a choice that over the long-term may be
more costly than if the administer had been aware of these other factors and criteria.
The problem of moral hazards in public contracting may arise when there is a discrepancy between the
public objectives and the incentives of the private provider to meet those objectives. 
Sclar argues that in practice any instance of privatization typically includes manifestations of all three
problems.
As a way to overcome the pitfalls of traditional contracting situations (i.e., complete and incomplete
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contracting forms), Sclar suggests relational contracting, which he notes is already practiced in the human
services where the government has established long-term relationships with often non-profit third sector
providers.  Relational contracting is not market-based competition but in inter-organizational trust aimed at
building long-term relationships and capacity.  Sclar invokes terms, such as bilateral governance, networked
governance and hybrid organizations (123).  In relational contracting, the formal contract or agreement is
less critical than the quality of trust that develops between the parties. 
Sclar further argues that relational contracting offers a basis for improving both the internal workings of
public agencies and their external relationships.  This contracting form, in the author’s view, also avoids high
transaction costs (time and resources spent obtaining the information necessary to chose among competitors
and to ensure that terms of the contract are comprehensive), by supplanting them with trust and cooperative
long-term relationship (i.e. a stable network).  Such cooperative long-term relationships, Sclar, are both
constrained and supported by the formal and informal social, political and economic rules in which they are
embedded.
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Feigenbaum, Harvey and Jeffrey Henig.  1994.  “The Political Underpinnings of Privatization: A Typology”.
World Politics 46 (Jan. 1994): 185-208.
Privatization is traditionally seen through the lens of Administrative analysis, which views the process as a
series of choices available to public officials that would allow them to make government work more efficiently,
or Economic analysis, which presents privatization as the result of modern tendencies to restrict the role of
government intervention in the market.  The authors introduce a political perspective to this process and
emphasize pragmatic privatization as a means of cost-cutting, tactical privatization as a way of rewarding
allies, and systemic privatization to change institutional structures and societal ideologies.  Systemic
privatization is the primary focus of the three.
            There are three limitations to the administrative and economic views of privatization.  First, these
theories have differing views of the public sector.  The administrative view sees the government as “good”
with a desire to provide proper services to its citizens while the economic view sees government as an
economic player and motivated by self-interest.  Second, “The choice of a particular form of privatization can
be less significant than how privatization is actually formulated and implemented”(189).  What this means is
that the goal of the privatization effort is what should be important and will be affected by implementation. 
In some cases it may be to create a greater organizational structure, or to shed expenses from the budget. 
Each case will require a different process to achieve the stated goals once a form of privatization is chosen,. 
Third, both views pay little attention to the political dimensions present and the different interests of
particular groups or classes in society.  There will always be differing opinions on the shifts of power created
by privatization.
 
                                                      Administrative                    Economic                            Political
Emphasized Goal Achievement of
socially defined
goals
Maximization of
individual’s utilities
Redistribution of
power and control
Unit of Analysis Discrete societal
problem
Individual/firm Group/class
Concept of
Privatization
Tool box Preferred mechanism Weapon
 
p. 191
 
            The argument of Feigenbaum and Henig “is that the broad privatization movement is, in many of its
manifestations, better understood as a political phenomenon”(190).  First is pragmatic privatization which is a
short-term solution to immediate problems.  Many times this involves contracting out public services in order
to save money.  Second is tactical privatization which is aimed at short term political interests.  The goal is to
attract allies and reward supporters.  This method is a form of political opportunism. 
The final type of privatization is Systemic and is aimed at reshaping entire societal expectations of
what government should do and should be responsible for.  Pursuing systemic privatization is often contrary
to political rationality because outcomes are long-term and difficult to foresee.  The hope is that individuals
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will have to seek a new means of problem solving outside of the public sector.  The best example of this
would be in Eastern Europe where changes in government structure have created changes in social
ideologies.  Many goods and services that were once considered public have been shifted to the private sector
and perspectives of the role of government are changing significantly.
 
                       Pragmatic                                  Tactical                              Systemic
Key
Motives
Public sector “triage”,
Reduction of budget
drain,
Adjust to changing
circumstance
Short-term shift in
party   or interest
group clout,
Attract voters,
Reward supporters
Long-term shift in
balance of power,
Lower expectations of
government,
Reduce government
capacity,
Transform political
stakes,
p. 203
 
Systemic privatization may take three forms.  First, there could be a change in the way that organized
interests would pursue their goals.  A withdrawal of government would cause groups to interact with each
other rather than with government and change the political features of the lobbying process.  An example
may be contracting out a previously public service and undermining the strength of labor unions. This creates
a “power shift”(200) and may apply to many other groups.  The second form is to change the values and
culture of society by changing their expectations of what the public sector would be responsible for
providing.  This form deals strictly with perceptions of what government should be expected to provide and to
cultivate an understanding of what should be private or public. It is not a concrete shift in responsibilities, but
rather of mindsets. Eastern Europe has seen this form of “perceptual shift”(201) while governments continue
to sell previously public enterprises in an attempt to create markets and shift reliance to the private sector. 
The third form is an “institutional shift”(201) which would move legal, political, and economic responsibilities
into the private sector.  It is meant to shift social control from bureaucracies and politicians to the market. 
The goal is to find market solutions for previously public matters.
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Henig, Jeffrey 1989-90. “Privatization in the United States: Theory and Practice.” Political Science
Quarterly. 104(4):649-670.
Henig’s article is an analysis of how privatization has become part of current public policy
debates.  He begins by discussing the theory of privatization, then moves to development and
legitimation of the idea.  He discusses how theory appropriates practice, and then how the
practice became a partisan program.  Finally, the article discusses a possible backlash to
privatization and looks to the future.  
·         Theory and Practice  A theory of privatization, with its origins possibly as far back as
Adam Smith, has played a key role in the emergence of it into current political debate. He
points out that the privatization theory has indirectly helped the cause, but has not been
married with actual implementation. Henig explains that the privatization movement has
pointed to many local and state level measures, undertaken as managerial responses to fiscal
constraints rather than pro-privatization experiments. The theory, as opposed to the practical
implementation through government measures, has helped to both revive economic, laissez
faire principles to explain government behavior, and to redefine preexisting local government
practices.
·         Establishing the theoretical infrastructure Henig explains that privatization remained
a fringe idea until recent decades because Americans had come to accept the welfare state
and the necessity of government to protect groups such as the elderly, handicapped,
orphans, and to protect the rights of racial minorities.  Economist Milton Friedman helped
push the idea that the government is a part of the economy (acting like a private monopoly)
rather than a separate entity.  He characterized government regulation as anti-consumer and
helped create the distinction between government responsibility and government provision. 
Public-choice theorists helped to solidify the theory. 
·         Becoming a Partisan Issue One of the results of the emergence of privatization theory
to classify preexisting efforts by local governments to privatize was a new partisan nature to
the issue.  “As privatization was brought to the national agenda in the 1980’s, it was invested
with a partisan content that undermined the atmosphere of pragmatic adjustment in which
the practice initially took root”.
·         Deregulation and Privatization  The middle to late 1970’s brought a deregulation
movement that foreshadowed the privatization policies of the Reagan Administration.  The
decade was also a time that “the strain of pragmatic skepticism at the core of American
culture had to be assuaged.”  Studies by Savas and Roger Ahlbrandt tried to prove that
privatization really works.  Reagan turned “privatization as economic theory into privatization
as political strategy.” 
·         Reagan’s Agenda  Reagan’s election allowed privatization advocates to get support at the
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national level:
1) Aggressive proposals for the sale of a wide range of government assets (federally owned parks,
National Weather Service satellites, Conrail and Amtrak.)
2) Adoption of the term privatization and it’s definition as “allowing the government to
provide services without producing them”.
3) Helped define the role of privatization by identifying contracting out, grants and
subsidies, tax incentives, deregulation, vouchers, franchises and divestitures as
elements of privatization that had already been used successfully at the state and local
level.
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Frug, Gerald E. “Alternative Conceptions of City Services,” in City Making: Building Communities without
Building Walls. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Frug begins his examination of city service provision by reviewing recent attempts to modify Charles Tiebout’s
(1956) public choice model into a more realistic version. He also discusses the problems inherent in this
model. Frug first describes Hamilton’s conservation of Tiebout’s basic “vote with your feet” model, appended
with the caveat that the rich will move to escape the poor, while the poor will follow the rich to reap the
benefits of a stronger tax base. Buchanan’s alternate modification permits bribery (in the form of better
services) of wealthy residents in order to keep them as local residents and underwriters of services for the
local poor. However, as Frug points out, Tiebout’s model leads to cities which resemble self-segregated
voluntary associations of consumers who want privatized services. These consumers view services as “objects
of consumption” for those who can afford to pay.
Frug illustrates his concerns over privatization with two models of cities. The voluntary association model
discussed above reduces citizens’ involvement and investment to that of consumers, with no principles of
democratic equality and no collective civic collaboration or responsibility. “Freedom of choice” in the voluntary
association model is defined in terms of choices to consume, but neglects the reality that without sufficient
resources to exercise preferences, choices to consume are severely limited. A second model of cities which
also minimizes group interactivity and defines choice in terms of consumption is the public choice model.
This model depicts cities as merely the sum of the individual residents and promotes fragmented services as
offering more choice to consumers. In both cases, the individual consumer focus promotes exclusivity and
erosion of consideration for others.
As an alternative to these individualistic and consumer-oriented models, Frug promotes the fortuitous
association model as his vision for the future of cities. This model likens a city to a group of individuals who
happen to live together and must learn to tolerate as well as work with each other. In addition, it expands
the concept of freedom of choice, which Tiebout conceived as ability to move, to encompass freedom to stay
in a neighborhood. Building community by working together empowers residents to use this interconnection
and social capital to address problems and make the neighborhood a place residents want to call home. The
fortuitous association model views residents as citizens instead of consumers. Frug sees this model as a
modern and more respectful reincarnation of the early American city services, which served the poor in part
to control them and socialize them to act more like middle-income people, but also because those in power
realized that providing basic city services to all, including the poor, increased all residents’ quality of life.
Through the interdependent relationships and community-building inherent in the fortuitous association
model, Frug hopes to fundamentally reform the current idea of the autonomy of cities. His vision would move
funding and eligibility for services to a regional level, promoting equity by, in effect, legislating that all
citizens have to consider the welfare of a greater number and diversity of people when making decisions
about community services. The modern city in Frug’s vision would celebrate and socialize respect for
diversity.
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Starr, Paul. 1987. "The Limits of Privatization." Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute.
In this article, Starr responds to those who would claim that privatization is the answer to all of our nation's
problems. He first notes that private markets are not natural creations; rather they are legally and politically
structured. Because these public functions are present even in the private sphere, it is not an "either-or"
question of public or private, but rather what form of public-private partnership is "best"; a determination not
based simply what is the cheapest or most efficient, but one that should include concerns about justice,
security, and citizenship.
Starr points out that ideally privatization opens up public monopolies to competition from a number of private
firms, but often it merely transforms public monopolies into private ones. It is difficult to sustain competition
within the private sector, as successful contractors build local knowledge that gives them an advantage over
other bidders. Also, many public services are performed by nonprofit organizations, which are less competitive
by nature. However, it is possible to introduce competition into the public sector.
Starr believes that some exponents of privatization, while they talk about vouchers and contracting, have the
ulterior motive of gaining support for wholesale government disengagement from providing many services.
These advocates tend to view the economy in zero-sum terms, where more government spending means less
economic growth in the private sector. This picture is not accurate, however. Many Western countries that
have high government spending have also had high growth rates. In addition, public spending often
represents investment in human capital and other intangible capital that is not quantified in any budget. As
much as private markets are touted, we still rely on government for economic stability and for intervention
when necessary.
While a strong argument for privatization comes in the form of promoting "public choice," Starr believes that
this economic theory inappropriately envisions the public arena as a political marketplace in which everyone's
goal is to maximize his or her benefit. Privatization advocates claim that support for expansive government
spending is based on politicians' collaboration with narrow special-interest groups. Actually, the general public
has supported most programs and services that government provides.
Starr disputes the notion that contracting services out to private producers will lead to cost savings. In fact,
he states, it will merely create new groups with a strong interest in seeing government spending rise. He cites
defense production, construction projects, and health care as three areas that have historically been produced
privately for government but at tremendous costs. A greater level of private contracting is likely to change
the nature of public-private relationships, as private firms come to depend on government dollars. The public
will also require a greater level of accountability from private firms if they are receiving tax dollars, so they
will be subjected to more regulation and oversight, making them resemble the public institutions they are
replacing.
While he acknowledges that government services often provide little choice, Starr does not believe, as
privatization advocates claim, that providing more choices through market mechanisms will lead to greater
equity. Political participation allows democratic choice, where each person gets one vote, while in the
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marketplace, those with more money essentially have more say. The political arena creates space for debate,
not just the impersonal registering of preferences. Through privatization, decisions are moved from one realm
to another, where there are different rules, less disclosure, and very likely less access than in the public
sphere. In some areas, such as the provision of public TV and radio, government actually expands choice.
Another conservative complaint is that broad (and therefore expensive) government programs benefit many
who are not necessarily in need of assistance. Even public education falls into this category for some
privatization advocates. Starr points out that targeting services narrowly to certain groups would be much
worse, creating resentment between classes of citizens and stigmatizing poorer groups.
Finally, the symbolic effect of privatization is not to be overlooked. The government is the steward of many of
our important national legacies, such as parks and monuments, that have meaning to us as a nation. To
privatize these things would deny our citizens a common ownership of them.
Starr believes there is a role for privatization, but its various forms must be carefully considered, as there is
no single remedy for government's problems. We face not a choice between public or private, but an
extensive variety of options in organizational forms and modes of ownership, control, and finance.
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Folbre, Nancy 2001. “ Measuring Success,” in The Invisible Heart. New York: The New Press. Pp 53-82.
Folbre’s central point in this article is that economic pressure can reduce quality and we need to re-evaluate,
and substantially revise, the ways we use to measure and reward success in the economy. Singular reliance
on dollars as a measure and financial profit as a motive can undermine intrinsic motives like civic
responsibility – an unforeseen long-term cost.
Discussing issues of quality in ‘care industries’ – health, child care, elder care, education and social services -
she illustrates that competitive pressures can have perverse effects, particularly in areas of the economy that
have to do with intangibles. Since personal and emotional inputs are difficult to measure and monitor –and
therefore add to a bill - they are usually left out when there are incentives to minimize costs. But they are
important components of the service that add to, or even define, quality. The ways in which these care
industries are structured under competitive pressures to reduce costs therefore have significant implications
for the welfare of those being cared for, and obviously, for the women workers who constitute a significantly
larger proportion of workers in these sectors.
Cheapening Care
Costs of health care have risen sharply and need to be brought down, but privatization may not be the
answer. The notion of competition in care industries is problematic as non-profit/public providers often have
to play by different rules (e.g., private hospitals must provide emergency care to indigents, provide learning
opportunities for interns and residents; public schools cannot refuse admission to any student, etc). A study
found that several indicators of care quality are significantly lower in for-profits than non-profit HMOs. The
pressure to cut costs has
in hospitals, squeezed out empathy, emotional support and a personal relationship with the health-care
provider, which have significant therapeutic effects. Reduced hospital stays shifts costs to family and
friends (without pay) with potential negative health impact. 
In health management organizations (HMOs), negative incentives have been created - limited amount of
treatment for mental illness, encouragement for doctors to reduce diagnostic procedures and
hospitalization, exclusion of unhealthy people from membership, elimination of coverage for seniors on
Medicare, less time spent on clinical examination and patient education.
Elder and Child Care
Private nursing homes and child-care institutions also provide cause for anxiety about quality –
Nursing-home residents – almost two-thirds are indigent and rely on Medicaid to pay expenses – have
no choice about where or how they will be cared for; their complaints about abusive behavior are often
ignored. About 40% of nursing homes repeatedly fail to pass the most basic health and safety
inspections. In the cost-cutting effort, wages of workers are low, working conditions difficult with
understaffing, there are high turnover rates, high rates of injuries and high levels of stress and burnout.
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Regulation of staffing ratios exists in only eighteen states. - Child care is somewhat better – though
wages are very low, workers relatively unskilled (few states require training qualifications) and turnover
rates high. High quality care can improve children’s development, but ‘physical and emotional
environments in many child care centers remains inadequate’ due to poor regulation.
Doug and Dow Jones
We need to rethink what ‘the economy’ really means. The Dow Jones index reveals little of the fluctuations in
wages, unemployment or costs of essential services for the ordinary people. An overall average of what
people are earning – she suggests naming it the Doug Jones index- would better serve the purpose of
describing what was happening to ordinary people.
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – supposed to represent the market value of all goods and services
bought and sold within a country – is seriously distorted.
Doesn’t take depreciation of buildings and equipment into account 
‘Imputes’ values when some services do not fit into the accounting framework used, e.g., owner-
occupied housing for which no rent is paid.
It is too low as no attempt is made to include even the imputed value of domestic work – preparing
meals, washing dishes or caring for children. The usual reasons proffered for not including these are that
its just too difficult to estimate their value, or putting a price on such would demean its essential
character, they are a ‘moral responsibility rather than a calculated exchange. Without advocating that
everything should be reduced to a dollar value, Folbre says its important to have even a lower-bound
estimate for this, as it represents socially important activities; and constitutes much of the work that
takes place outside the labor market- this amounts to about half of all work. By imputing values, some
estimate that non-market work amount to between 30-60% of the value of all goods and services sold.
It is therefore not only too low, but inaccurately reflects changes in the economy over time. For e.g., as
married women moved into market work, they reduced the time spent on not-counted work – making
economic growth seem more rapid than was what it actually has been. The proportion of time spent by
men and women in different kinds of work over time, their shifts from and into the market. Folbre
suggests systematic time-use data would help reflect this (and can be used to calculate the Dolly Jones
index!).
GDP vs. MEWs
There is also the need to reevaluate the meaning of all these measures. The GDP is cannot effectively show
up relative development across countries as it does not include the value of the natural resources, so no
account is taken of their loss or depreciation due to pollution. The value of timber logged is included, but no
deduction is made for loss of natural capital and the value of all other species ecologically dependent on the
trees. More accurate measures – measures of economic welfare (MEWs) - are necessary. The success story of
Indonesia’s 7% GDP growth in the 1970s looks different when depreciation of ‘natural’ stock is factored in –
closer to 4%. The picture of our rising standards of living also look very different if we consider Sustainable
Economic Welfare (SEW), which adds the value of non-market services and subtracts the costs of pollution,
resource depletion, and long-term environmental damage – it turns out per capita SEW was lower in 1990
than 1966.
Investing in Human Capital
Though human capital – defined in terms of levels of education and experience – is considered an important
factor of production, the GDP calculations take no account of how and where it is produced and nurtured – in
families and communities. Contributions both to the quantity and quality of human stock are ignored. Though
emotional skills have been shown to have a significant impact on economic success, contributions of families
and communities in maintenance and development of emotional skills are ignored.
Also, investments in health and education as counted as ‘expenditure’ rather than ‘investments’. Even though
such investments have been acknowledged to have a high rate of return, increased spending on health and
education often is viewed as slowing down growth ! Better ways of measuring the hidden time and effort of
families and communities in nurturing and developing human capabilities are necessary, in addition to
changing the ways that economists include them in the calculations.
The Human Development Index
However, there are limits to thinking in terms of costs and benefits – economic development is only valuable
to the extent it helps us pursue human development. A list of ‘conditions for happiness’ could include ‘to
receive from birth the best cultivation of our natural powers – physical, mental, moral and practical – and to
know how to give this training and education to others.’ Rise in incomes is often argued to be a reasonable
indicator of our ability to develop our capabilities, but health, education, etc can be very unevenly distributed.
(E.g., life expectancy of black men in Harlem, NYC, is lower than that of inhabitants of Kerala, India.) The
HDI is an average of life expectancy at birth, child enrollment ratios and adult literacy rates and is adjusted
to per capita income. Comparision of countries over time using this indicator reveals that higher GDP does not
necessary imply a better performance in other aspects of human development, especially for developing
countries. Other indices, which measure quality of life, are the Gender Development Index, Gender
Empowerment Index and Human Poverty Index.
Social Concern
The social context in which markets operate is also important, as the way that individuals work together can
make a group more or less than the sum of its parts. Love, trust and reciprocity are important variables in
this, and pursuit of short-term self-interest can lead to opportunistic behavior that undermines long-term
relationships. These aspects of our social and moral environment, which contribute to positive economic
outcomes, need to be measured. Efforts have been made to measure the degree of ‘civic participation’, for
example – but more research is required. . The term social capital is often used to refer to the productive
elements of a social environment, but Folbre finds the term misleading, as different people use it differently –
to denote extent of social networks, ‘good’ cultural values or other aspects. Also, it is rarely defined to include
feelings or emotions, though feelings like empathy and concern for others are critical to developing trust,
cooperation and a fund of goodwill.
The Dow of Wa
Whatever it is called, this feeling is important to productivity particularly where work is difficult or expensive
to monitor such as in care-giving. The Japanese notion of Total Quality Management based on a culture of
cooperation, which has enabled global dominance in some industries, is similar to their traditional cultural
emphasis on ‘wa’ or harmony – wa builds on amae, a familial affection between associates. Though recent
Japanese economic problems have been much discussed, it is important to remember that if we redefine our
conventional notions of success, the picture changes – crime rates in Japan are only about 1/4th that in the
US. The concept of social concern, similar to old-fashioned notions of solidarity may be a more
representative term.
Folbre concludes with a reiteration that we can’t continue to visualise the economy in terms of things that can
be easily counted and weighed – we need to devise measures for the kinds of things and successes we really
care about. Without this there will be no reward for the behaviors we value most and which are important for
a better life and economic success.
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Kabeer, Nalia.  “’Rational Fools’ or ‘Cultural Dopes’? Stories of structure and agency in the social
sciences.”. Chapter 2 pp16 – 48 in The Power to Chose; Bangladeshi Women and Labor Market Decisions
in London & Dhaka, New York: Verso, 2000.
Kabeer reviews two prevailing ‘pure’ models used to describe decision-making behavior in women, primarily
within the family. The two models are mainstream neo-classical economics and a sociological model, each
emphasizes fundamentally different motives for decision-making behavior. However, through her interviews
with women, Kabeer sees these two pure models as over deterministic, poor predictors of individual behavior,
and do not permit the construction of researchable hypotheses. What she concludes is that both models
represent end-points of a behavioral spectrum. For women (and the world at-large), actual decision making
rules exist in a middle ground where each end-point informs and modifies the other. Kabeer continues by
remarking that the methodological choices proposed by each model predispose the research towards static,
non-transformative accounts of individual behavior. A more rigorous method must involve directly the
researcher and the subject.
 
At one end is the ‘rational fool.’ The neo-classical model of decision-making views individual ‘rational choice’
within the family unit as a composite of utility between paid labor, unpaid domestic work, and leisure. The
problem with this view is two-fold: first, it assumes every individual in the family derives the same utility
from one family choice; second, the complexity of making a completely informed decision is impossible.
Interviews show that individual choice is distorted from the neo-classical ideal by individual identity,
household identity, and larger collective identities. Individual identity is presumed to be more ‘value-laden,’
therefore making choice more resistant to market shifts. At the household level, individual choices are defined
by an ‘implicit contract,’ a contract crafted for unequal, gender based roles with the family. In such
arrangements the range of choices typically favor the male, while the compliant wife secures her own self-
interest. The field of choice is constrained further when viewed in the context of society. Though inequitable,
options are spelled out according to cultural rankings such as gender, race, and class. Trade unions, feminist
organizations, and political parties also contribute to the possible range of individual choice.
 
At the other end is the ‘cultural dope.’ In this framework, individual choice is merely an automatic re-
enactment of cultural norms, allowing no freedom for individual choice. This framework evolved largely out of
two bodies of research. The first is the visible and empirical association of female inequality in Islamic
societies where ‘Purdah’ values severely circumscribe possible choices. The second is the role of the ‘detached’
social scientist generally permitting two sweeping interpretations for individual choice: choices constrained by
cultural norms or choice as an expression of independence (appealing to expatriate researchers). Though,
neither option “acknowledged the wisdom, the tongue-in-cheek sarcasm of village women.” A more
sophisticated approach to understanding choice is grounded, again, in the idea of the ‘implicit contract.’ While
family role may be culturally defined, there are rights and responsibilities that permit the negotiation of some
choices within the family unit. The work of Bourdieu creates an even greater range of choice with his idea of
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‘habitus.’ Here, cultural norms create space for choice by delineating the possible actions from the impossible,
and allows the individual to strategically use available resources to improve their own self-interest within
those bounds. Here, agency is not the ‘mechanical execution’ of culture; rather it is the ‘creative
interpretation of rules.’
 
In the end, Kabeer builds out the idea of the middle-ground, a place where choices are less determined and
that provides a theoretical basis for considering the ‘transformative potential’ of human choice. She suggests
this potential for women (and other oppressed classes) can be realized in two levels. First, the availability of
paid employment for women so that they can better negotiate their positions within the family. Second, the
development of a ‘more finely grained knowledge’ that provides an accurate portrayal of individual choice.
This requires a methodology that is sensitive to the pitfalls of personal testimonials and forces the researcher
into a more involved role with the participants.
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Warner, M.E. and Amir Hefetz 2004.  “Pragmatism over Politics: Alternative Service Delivery in Local
Government, 1992-2002,” chapter in The Municipal Year Book 2004. Washington, DC: International City
County Management Association.
In response to increased interest in privatization, ICMA has been tracking local
governments’ use of alternative service delivery approaches since 1982.  What is
interesting about the trends is how little they have changed over these years.  Almost all
governments responding to the ICMA surveys use at least one form of alternative service
delivery.  However, despite strong political support for privatization and a reduction in
opposition, direct public delivery is still the most common form of service delivery. For
profit privatization and inter-governmental contracting are the most common alternatives
and their usage has ranged from 15-20 percent of services over the period with a slight
drop from 1997 to 2002.  Use of non-profit contracting has been stable at less than half
the rate of for profit privatization.  What has risen most dramatically over the 1992-2002
time period is the use of mixed public/private provision.  These data suggest local
governments are mature and experienced in their use of alternative service delivery.  The
2002 survey results show lack of competitive markets and problems with contractor
performance as explanations for the relative flatness of the trends.  
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Search Cornell
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Article Summary
Warner, M.E. and Amir Hefetz, 2001.  “Privatization and the Market Role of Government,” Briefing Paper,
Economic Policy Institute, Washington, DC.  Available at epinet.org. 
Using longitudinal data from 1982 to 1997, we show that the local decision to provide public services is
complex and dynamic.  Local governments use a range of service restructuring alternatives including
privatization, mixed public/private provision and cooperation between governments.  Service delivery is a
dynamic process reflecting changing citizen demand for services and new privatization.  The data also show
significant instability in contracts, including contracting in - the reverting back to public provision of previously
privatized services.   This “reverse privatization” may reflect problems with the contracting process itself,
limited efficiency gains, erosion in service quality or concern over the loss of broader community values
associated with public service delivery.  Privatization does not imply a retreat of government but rather a
more active engagement with the market.  Whether as regulator, contractor or direct service provider, local
governments manage markets to create competition and ensure service quality and stability.   This pragmatic
market structuring role is critical to ensure that both efficiency and the broader public benefits of service
delivery are achieved.
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Greene, Jeffrey D. 1996. "How Much Privatization: A Research Note Examining the Use of Privatization by
Cities in 1982 and 1992." Policy Studies Journal 24 (Winter): 632-640.
Greene's article relates to an inquiry done by the International City Management Association for 596 cities,
between 1982 and 1992, that gauged how much municipalities had privatized and their reasons for
privatization. The ICMA surveys recorded the incidence of privatization in 59 municipal services across five
broad functional areas. The study used two indicators of privatization, privatization levels and privatization
diversity. Privatization levels represent the breadth of privatization among services. Privatization diversity
levels represent the amount of privatization a city uses within services. The findings suggest privatization
increased significantly in this ten-year period, mainly as a remedy for fiscal pressures. It is believed that
private firms have lower costs attributed to better efficiency.
Overall privatization is occurring in all regions of the country, but some regions faster than others. Between
1982 and 1992, Southern cities experienced the highest increase of proportional growth at 158%. Midwestern
cities were second with 131% proportional growth. Western cities had the highest levels of privatization in
1992 (29.9% of ICMA - surveyed services) and experienced the third largest increase at 102% of proportional
growth. Finally, Northern cities had the lowest increase at 64% proportional growth.
Between 1982 and 1992, average privatization diversity levels for all cities increased proportionally by 40%
(from 13.9% to 19.4%). The South's proportional increase was highest (56%) of privatization within services.
The Midwest was second with 52%. The West came in third with 26% of privatization within services. Finally,
Northern cities were last with 6% of privatization within services.
The leading area where privatization occurs most was in support functions with an average increase of 508%.
Public safety functions were second with an average increase of 355%. Public works had an average increase
of 218% coming in third. Finally, Parks and Rec. was fourth with and average increase of 218%.
Privatization appears to be increasing dramatically in all sectors throughout the nation. It appears that private
firms are able to do jobs better at lower costs, which is most likely due to competition forcing innovations
among the various industries.
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Boyne, George A. (1998). “Bureaucratic Theory Meets Reality: Public Choice and Service Contracting in
U.S. Local Government.” Public Administration Review. 58(6): 474-483.
Boyne posits that statistical methods used in studies cited by public choice theorists lack critical control
variables and a reliable measure of competition and therefore lead to invalid conclusions. Boyne aims to
reevaluate the empirical evidence on the effects of service contracting by United States local governments. 
Despite the deficiencies in the statistical methods of these studies, Boyne notes that public choice supporters
have tremendous confidence in their results.  Boyne’s critique begins by identifying three public choice
hypotheses regarding the impact of service contracting on efficiency and cost:
Hypothesis 1:  Service contracting is associated with lower spending on those services that are produced by
an external agency.
The crux of this hypothesis rests on the notion that if monopolies tend to render higher costs, then the
consequence of competition should be a lower level of expenditure. Boyne cites an analysis by Niskanen who
implied that because monopolies produce twice the level of service required, expenditure under competition
would be reduced.
ü      Boyne’s rebuttal to these notions is that service contracting does not necessarily entail a decline in the
level of service output, thus reduced expenditures cannot be assumed.  In fact many service contracts
explicitly require external agencies to provide the same level of output.  Cost savings are proportional to
improvements in technical efficiencies.
Hypothesis 2: Competitive tendering is associated with an improvement in the technical efficiency of service
production.
Under service contracting, rival agencies submit bids for a specific service.  Given a feasible proposal, the
lowest bid is likely to win.  The cost per unit of a service is expected to fall.   In short, the bidding process
itself generates alternative unit costs.
ü      Boyne notes that although service contracting may improve technical efficiency, it has no necessary
impact on “allocative efficiency.”  Decision-making for the type of services to be provided and their
distribution rest with politicians and other officials. Service contracting thus may not enhance the power of
taxpayers, consumers, or the public.
Hypothesis 3: A substantial part of any “efficiency gain” from service contracting will be retained by local
government.
Some part of the money saved by service contracting is likely to be returned to the taxpayers—lower taxes
or high services.
ü      Boyne questions how much of the savings from contracting is returned to local government budgets.  One
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hypothesis is that the retention rate for efficiency savings will be at least as great as for “grants-in-aid.” 
Another hypothesis is that if expenditure on services that are contracted out decreases, expenditure on
the remaining local government responsibilities will increase, thus the locally supplied services may be
oversupplied to the point where they become less efficient.  It is possible the service contracting does not
eliminate inefficiency; rather, it relocates the inefficiency in local service production.
Boyne then presents an examination of empirical evidence used by public choice theorists.  He notes that in
some studies authors draw conclusions that are a) not substantiated by their own evidence, b) weakened by
the failure to control for quality, local preferences, and competition levels.  He does not blame the theory but
notes that some of the empirical evidence it leans on is weakened by its own findings.  
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Boyne, George A (1998).  “The Determinants of Variations in Local Service Contracting: Garbage in
Garbage Out?” Urban Affairs Review, Vol.  34, No. 1, pg. 150-163.
Boyne offers an overview of various empirical studies that focus on the determinants that encourage some
local governments to transfer the production of municipal services to external agencies.  Boyne stated aim is
to answer two questions: 1) To what extent do empirical studies provide an explanation of variations in
service contracting? 2) Does the evidence improve our understanding of why different local governments
adopt different policies?  Boyne limits his examination to those studies examine the following four factors in
local government decisions to contract out services: 1) Fiscal Stress, 2) Scale and Market Structure, 3) Public
Preferences and 4) Power of Public Employees.
Brief Summary of Boyne’s Findings
Boyne points out that only three predictor variables used by the studies he examined show any
statistically significant singular (positive or negative) impact on the decision to contract out services:
·         Tax Limits - positive impact on privatization
·         Income of Population - positive impact on privatization
·         Public Employees Per Capita - negative impact on privatization
In many other cases variables are shown to have contradictory positive and negative (i.e. tax burden,
grants, and population size).   Furthermore, R2 results for the models are extremely low, usually below .20
and sometimes as low at .05.  This creates additional suspicion of a causal effect of these variables on the
likelihood of contracting services.
Boyne notes two general problems with these studies:
·         These variables are not independent from one another and their combined effect should be
examined. 
·         Rather than simply looking whether a service is currently provided by a local government or by a
private contractor, it may be more worthwhile to examine whether there as been a recent decision to
switch from one to the other.  By looking at service provision in a historical context where conscious
decisions have obviously been made, a better understanding of the impetus for that decision might be
derived.  
Summaries of the Studies Boyne Examined
Firstly, Boyne examines ten studies that attempt to determine whether municipalities who are
experiencing severe financial pressures are more likely to contract out services.  He uses four measures to
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assess this: 1) Ratio of Local Taxes to Local Incomes because high tax rates are often thought to spur
outsourcing to relieve the tax burden; 2) Limits on Local Tax Levels by State Governments because these
constraints are thought to force municipalities to better use existing resources; 3) Share of Local Spending
funded by Intergovernmental Revenues because increased funding might lessen overall financial pressures,
thereby reducing outsourcing.  Boyne concludes there is little support for the view that financial stress
impacts the decision to contract out services. 
Secondly, Boyne examines twelve studies that attempt to determine whether local governments privatize
to reap potential benefits of economies of scale and/or by their ability to create a competitive market. 
They use the following measures: 1) Citizen Population of Municipality a larger cities may have greater
purchasing power when negotiating contracts with external venders, 2) Metropolitan Status as the potential
for the development of a competitive service market may be different for a local government inside a
metropolitan area versus one that is outside.  Boyne sees little in the way of a direct effect on the propensity
to contract out services coming from either of these two measures and argues that the measures themselves
are flawed. 
Thirdly, Boyne looks at ten studies that examine the connection between the population characteristics
and the levels of contracting out.  The variables are: 1) Average Income based on the assumption that high-
income groups support contracting out, 2) Percentage of the population that is poor, black, or elderly as these
demographic groups are assumed to pressure local governments to maintain direct municipal production of
services.  There is support for the link between income level and poverty level and the likelihood to outsource
services.  However, no such connection exists between the proportion of black and elderly populations and
the likelihood of outsourcing.  Boyne warns that the measure may not necessarily reflect public preference,
but simply the ability to pay.  He points out flaws in the measures, arguing, that socioeconomic
characteristics are not a valid substitute for personal preference.
Lastly, Boyne looks at twelve studies that attempt to link the self-interests of local government
managers and their workforces with the likelihood of contracting out services.  The hypothesis here is that
public employees resist outsourcing in order to protect their positions within the community at the expense of
the public''''s best interests.  The variables examine include 1) Ratio of Public Staff to Local Population, 2)
Level of Unionization, 3) Level of Wages and 4) Structure of Municipal Government - some believe that
whether a municipal government is council-manager or mayor-council plays a role in whether services are
contracted out.  There is some evidence that a large public employee base will in fact reduce contracting of
services.  Results for local unionization effects are mixed but that too may have a negative effect.   High
labor cost is seen as potentially having a positive effect on outsourcing, while mayor-council governments are
shown to embrace privatization over council-manager structures.  Boyne remains skeptical of these results
due to what he sees as possibly erroneous interpretation of the causal effects of the variables used.  Once
again, he points out that additional extraneous effects of other variables associated with the predictor
variables used in the studies may lead to false conclusions. 
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Hefetz, Amir and M. Warner, 2004. “Privatization and Its Reverse: Explaining the Dynamics of the
Government Contracting Process” Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory, 14(2):171-190.
Available at http://jpart.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/14/2/171?
ijkey=156SEfUPE3BE2&keytype=ref
Empirical evidence shows local government contracting is a dynamic process that includes movements from
public delivery to markets, and from market contracts back to in-house delivery. This "reverse contracting"
reflects the complexity of public service provision in a world where market alternatives are used along with
public delivery.  We develop a methodology to link responses to national surveys and create a longitudinal
data set that captures the dynamics of the contracting process.  We present a framework that incorporates
principal agent problems, government management, monitoring and citizen concerns, and market structure. 
Our statistical analysis finds government management, monitoring and principal agent problems to be most
important in explaining both new contracting out and contracting back-in.  Professional managers recognize
the importance of monitoring and the need for public engagement in the service delivery process.  The results
support the new public service that argues public managers do more than steer a market process, they
balance technical and political concerns to secure public value.
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Warner, M.E. with Mike Ballard and Amir Hefetz 2003.  “Contracting Back In – When Privatization Fails,”
chapter 4 pp 30-36 in The Municipal Year Book 2003. Washington, DC: International City County
Management Association.
Between 1992 and 1997, the most common forms of alternative service delivery
(privatization to for profits and non profits and inter-municipal cooperation) increased
only slightly. Service delivery by public employees remained dominant.  The stability in
these trends belies a more dynamic process of contracting out and back in which reflects
the key market structuring role played by local governments.  During this period, 96% of
responding governments newly contracted out at least one service and 88% brought at
least one contracted-out service back in house. The reasons for contracting back in
include lack of a competitive market of alternative suppliers, difficulties with contract
specification, and the high costs of monitoring.
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Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2002  “Applying Market Solutions to Public Services: An Assessment of
Efficiency, Equity and Voice,” Urban Affairs Review, 38(1):70-89.
Political fragmentation in metropolitan regions makes equitable and efficient delivery of public services
difficult.  Regionalism, although promoted as more equitable and rational, has found limited political support. 
Public choice theory argues, against regionalism, that political fragmentation can promote competition and
efficiency by creating markets for public services.   We assess the efficacy of market solutions for
metropolitan public service provision by comparing privatization with inter-municipal cooperation and
evaluating each on efficiency, equity and democracy grounds.  Using probit regression analysis of a national
survey of local government service delivery from 1992 and 1997, we find both alternatives promote efficiency,
but equity and voice are more associated with inter-municipal cooperation than privatization.
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Ballard, Michael J. and M.E. Warner 2000. “Taking the High Road: Local Government Restructuring and
the Quest for Quality.”  Pp 6/1 - 6/53 in Power Tools for Fighting Privatization, American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees: Washington DC.  Available at
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/reports/highroad/
All local governments face challenges to improve service delivery.  This report outlines two alternative
strategies—the "high road” which uses new management innovations to increase internal productivity, and
the “low road” which focuses on downsizing and contracting out.  While other studies have focused on
contracting out, this study provides a longitudinal look at contracting and presents detailed case studies of
municipalities, which have brought back in house previously privatized services.  These case studies provide
empirical evidence on the problems associated with contracting and the potential for internal restructuring as
an alternative. 
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Executive Summary
All local governments face challenges to improve service delivery.  This report outlines two alternative
strategies—the "high road” which uses new management innovations to increase internal productivity, and the “low
road” which focuses on downsizing and contracting out.  While other studies have focused on contracting out, this
study provides a longitudinal look at contracting and presents detailed case studies of municipalities, which have
brought back in house previously privatized services.  These case studies provide empirical evidence on the problems
associated with contracting and the potential for internal restructuring as an alternative. 
Contracting is costly.  Research on problems with contracting out in the for-profit sector is shown to have
parallels in governmental contacting.  Difficulty of contract specification (especially for complex services), the cost
and difficulty of monitoring contract performance, and limited cost savings are some of the problems that cause
governments to bring previously privatized work back in house.  Broader public values—responsiveness to changing
citizen demands, maintaining high standards of public service delivery among the workforce—also can be
compromised with privatization.
             While competitive bidding is associated with some cases of contracting back in, for many governments’
dissatisfaction with privatization was so strong that no effort was made to rebid the contract. In many of these cases
new patterns of labor management cooperation within the public sector resulted in improved efficiency and service
quality at lower costs than private contracts.  Taking the “high road” of restructuring through improved labor-
management cooperation can provide better quality service with fewer risks and greater social rewards.  For those
public officials who truly wish to “reinvent government” internal management reforms deserve a closer look.
Taking the High Road: Local Government Restructuring and the Quest for Quality
Rapid changes in the economy on the one hand and the unrelenting demand for public services on the other
have placed new pressures on all levels of government to "banish bureaucracy" and "reinvent" the public sector. 
Reinventing government is a noble and desirable goal, but many reform efforts have failed by focusing too heavily on
downsizing the public workforce through the privatization of government services.  While privatization can take many
forms, the most common practice is for governments to "contract out" services to private organizations.  In these
situations the government continues to use public funds to pay for services, but the responsibility for production of the
service is shifted to a private firm.
In some instances, privatization through contracting out is part of a larger ideological crusade to reduce the
absolute size of government.[i]  In other cases, contracting out is driven by management fads imported from the private
sector, where the practice is commonly used but remains poorly understood.[ii]  A third influence is the general shift
in American society towards greater mistrust of government coupled with a renewed faith in the textbook model of
free markets.[iii]  When combined with advice from popular management books and magazines to become more
"businesslike" in their operations, many public managers find the lure of contracting out to be irresistible.
Are the proponents of contracting out right?  To what extent have the economic and organizational benefits
actually followed?  This study attempts to answer these questions by looking at local governments' experiences with
contracting in the United States.  The report begins with a review of several academic studies that assess the impact of
contracting out on individuals, organizations, and communities.  Unfortunately, many of these studies show
disappointing results with contracting out in both the public and private sectors.  To better understand why contracting
out often has not lived up to its promise, this report looks at several case studies from across the country where public
officials have chosen to bring work back in house following a period of privately produced service.  Finally, the report
looks at one important but underutilized alternative to privatization, namely, the refashioning of labor-management
relations through innovative "partnership" programs.  These programs demonstrate that the efficiency of public
services can be improved significantly through the use of internal management reforms.  Given the risks involved in
privatization, labor-management partnerships should be given priority over contracting out when public managers see
the need to restructure local government services. 
Contracting out imposes high costs on individuals
Proponents of contracting out argue that both public and private organizations need to "cut the fat" and get
"lean and mean" in order to survive.[iv]  Given that most government services are labor-intensive, contracting out
services provides government with an indirect method of reducing the number of individuals it employs directly. 
When hiring decisions are no longer in public hands, privatization allows contractors to use lower priced labor without
having to adhere to civil service wage scales.  Government-by-contract also permits greater flexibility in determining
employment levels, work rules, and health and safety standards since private firms are often subject to less restrictive
regulations than public entities.[v] 
Increased flexibility, however, comes at a price.  To begin with, contracting out imposes high costs on
individual workers.  The overwhelming majority of government employees are individuals who have performed well
Box 1.  Taking the Low Road: Privatized Trash
Collection in New Orleans
In the mid-1980s, the City of New Orleans,
Louisiana paid sanitation workers about $9 an hour and
provided health insurance and other benefits.  Ten years
later, after privatization, those same workers are hired on
a daily basis, paid the minimum wage, and have no
benefits. 
Waste Management, Inc., the firm responsible for
trash collection in New Orleans, uses a subcontractor to
fill its daily need for "hoppers," sanitation workers that
dump trash into the back of garbage trucks.  Hoppers
receive no training from the company, and are
responsible for providing their own safety equipment
such as lifting belts, face masks, and safety vests. 
Some hoppers meet their drivers in the truck
yard, but most are picked up under a nearby freeway
each day at six o'clock in the morning.  A full day's pay
is not guaranteed, and a truck breakdown can leave a
hopper stranded and unpaid.  
Waste management's treatment of its employees
had gotten so bad that in one month the company missed
pickups at 8,800 locations because it didn't have enough
hoppers to collect the trash.  In response, the city
threatened to fine Waste Management $280,000 for the
uncollected garbage.  
and played by the rules, but often pay dearly in the form of increased job insecurity and lower wages and benefits
when work is contracted out to the lowest bidder.[vi]  Furthermore, because of the specialized nature of many private
contractors, workers' opportunities for advancement and training may decline as well.  The janitor who works for local
government may, over time, work her way up in the system via a series of vertical and horizontal moves through
different departments.  In organizations that specialize in just one service, however, those ladders of opportunity
disappear for all but the most skilled employees.
Contracting out has society-wide consequences
Contracting out also imposes high costs on society.  It is no secret that America's urban areas suffer from a host
of serious social and economic problems, ranging from crime and unemployment to racial segregation and increasing
class inequality.  In a provocative and insightful essay published in the Boston Review, Daniel Luria, Vice President of
the Michigan Manufacturing Technology Center, and Professor Joel Rogers of the University of Wisconsin contend
that these unfortunate outcomes are the direct result of public policy choices that favor "low road" development
strategies in response to new competitive pressures.[vii]  Low road employers compete by keeping costs, and therefore
wages, as low as possible.  When low road strategies dominate the local economy, economic insecurity, rising
inequality, and poisonous labor relations often follow.
In contrast, "high road" organizations rely on better quality products and superior service to stay ahead of the
competition.  Management experts contend that emphasizing quality and service requires a well-trained and highly
committed workforce in order to be successful.  These organizational demands, in turn, translate into higher wages,
cooperative labor relations, and more innovative and productive workplaces.  In addition, high road employers attract
superior quality workers and typically serve as better corporate citizens in the communities in which they operate.
  While Luria and Rogers' research primarily looks
at the business strategies of private companies, the same
lessons apply to public sector employers as well. 
Governments, like private firms, also consciously choose
to follow the high road or the low road when making
employment and contracting decisions.  Local
governments can walk down either path, but the potential
benefits to both the city and the community are vastly
greater on the high road.  Public officials who choose to
follow the high
road not only benefit directly from the efficiency gains
that flow from high-performance workplaces, but they
also benefit indirectly from the important social benefits
that such a strategy produces.  In general, high-road
strategies are strongly associated with healthy and stable
local communities.  Strong communities, in turn, help to
attract and keep the brightest people and the most
dynamic businesses in the region.
        Examples of how high road and low road strategies
play out at the local level are presented in Boxes 1 and 2. 
In these cases, both New Orleans and Portland saved
money by restructuring traditional service delivery
methods.  Portland's high road strategy, however,
accomplished much more than simple cost savings. 
Building upon Portland's success in constructing a new
baseball stadium, the city and its unionized workforce
have been able to create a new level of trust and
cooperation across a wide range of public services.  In
The hoppers' performance has come under strong
criticism as well.  According to city officials, it is not
uncommon for hoppers to demand tips or beer in
exchange for picking up a resident's trash.  Even the
city's sanitation chief says she and her family were
threatened after refusing a hopper's demand for cash.  
Source:  "Two-Edged Sword: More Public Workers Lose Well-
Paying Jobs as Outsourcing Grows", The Wall Street Journal.  August
6, 1996. p. A1. 
Box 2.  Taking the High Road: Investing in Employees in
Portland, Maine 
In 1992 public officials in Portland, Maine succeeded
in attracting a minor league baseball team to the city.  At the
time, however, the city faced a major league problem: it had
no adequate facility for the new team to play, and lacked the
funds necessary to hire a private contractor to do the job.  
In response to this opportunity, the City Manager's
office and union leaders jointly developed an innovative plan
to construct the new stadium using Public Works employees
and equipment.  The plan involved 10-hour work days and an
incentive program that rewarded employees based on
productivity levels.  Similar agreements were negotiated for
employees not assigned to work on the new stadium since
they were now required to provide the same level of service
with fewer employees during the seven months it took to
construct Hadlock Field. 
            The Hadlock Field construction project was so
successful that the city created its own in-house construction
company.  The construction company is guided by the same
principles that made the stadium so successful: teamwork,
cross-training, labor-management cooperation, flexible work
schedules, and employee bonuses for meeting project cost
and quality objectives.  
            Projects tackled by the construction company
addition to reducing expenses, the introduction of
innovative management reforms has produced major
service improvements, has strengthened both management
and the union, and has resulted in a far less adversarial
bargaining relationship than had existed previously.  In
contrast, the New Orleans case vividly illustrates the dark
side of low road management strategies.  While New
Orleans' strategy may have saved the city money, the
negative impact of such a strategy on residents' quality of
life far outweighs any cost savings that resulted from
privatization. 
 
The benefits of contracting out have not materialized
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the individual and social costs of contracting out can only be justified
if such efforts lead to better quality and lower priced government services.  Yet evidence from a broad range of studies
suggests that public services do not substantively improve after contracting out.[viii]  In an extensive review of
empirical studies of privatization in the United States, for example, Professor George Boyne of Cardiff University
finds that "only around half" of all studies are associated with lower spending and greater efficiency.[ix]  Furthermore,
Dr. Boyne finds that "many of the studies contain specific methodological flaws that cast doubt on the validity of the
evidence on the impact of service contracts, and in some studies, the authors draw conclusions that are not
substantiated by their own evidence."[x] 
Professor Boyne's claims are substantiated by
Professor Janet Rothenberg Pack of the Wharton
School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania.
[xi]   In her research on fifteen cities and counties
that had experimented with contracting out, about
half of the places she studied had encountered
"disruptive experiences" which included quality
problems, attempts by firms to renegotiate or renege
on contracts, and costly monitoring activities. 
Equally important, only half of the public officials
she interviewed could continue to claim any cost
savings from contracting out after just four years of
privately provided service.
Researchers at Washington State University
draw similar conclusions in their 1998 study of
privatization by Oregon county governments.[xii] 
Looking at county governments' experiences with
road maintenance and construction contractors,
Professors Brent Steel and Carolyn Long find that 42
percent of counties experienced contracting
problems.  The most commonly cited problem in
their study was the failure of contractors to perform
work in a timely manner (100 percent of cases),
followed by work not performed to specifications (50
percent), contractors' failure to communicate
effectively with affected citizens (36 percent), change
order problems (36 percent), and work area security
and safety problems (29 percent).  In addition to the
included rebuilding sidewalks, street construction and
maintenance, and sewers.  The city is in the process of
expanding the range of work projects tackled by city crews,
and expects to take on more projects each season in the
future.
Source:  Patricia Peightal, et al., "Labor-Management Cooperation—City of
Portland, Maine".  Public Personnel Management 27(1)  Spring 1998.  pp.
85-91.
problems associated with contracting out, the authors
estimate that the cost of contract administration was
in the 10 to 15 percent range, and that "savings, if
any, from contracting out may be partially or fully
offset by substantial agency costs associated with the
contracting process, including the expense of
preparing plans and specifications to a greater level
of detail, the cost of advertising and processing bids,
and the cost of monitoring, inspecting, and conflict
resolution."[xiii]
 
Private firms also disappointed with contracting results
A common defense of privatization is that errors in implementation, not the concept itself, are to blame for
failed privatization programs.[xiv]  These kinds of arguments make it easy to claim that the blame for failed contracts
still rests with government, and that the solution lies with increasing, not decreasing, the role of the private sector in
government service provision.  Has the private sector's experience with contracting out been any better?  Because
private firms also rely on outside contractors for a wide range of goods and services, their experience with contracting
out deserves a closer look by public officials than it has received.
Large-scale studies of the private sector's experience with contracting out are rare, in part because private firms
are not subject to the same disclosure requirements as public entities.  A recent survey of over one thousand senior
business executives conducted by the global consulting group PA Consulting, however, is telling: In that survey, only
five percent of firms reported "high" levels of benefit from contracting out while suffering "low" drawbacks.  The most
common response, representing thirty-nine percent of the cases, had been 'mediocre'."[xv]
            Academic studies of organizational performance provide some clues as to why contracting out in the business
world has failed to live up to its promises.  Because contracting out is a form of restructuring that often leads to
reductions in personnel, its impact on organizations is similar to downsizing.  Few would disagree with the proposition
that both contracting out and downsizing result in shattered careers, broken friendships, and significant losses in
investments in employee training and development.  For these reasons and others, academic studies of downsizing hold
valuable lessons for public sector managers considering contracting out.
            The strong negative effect that downsizing through contracting out has on the morale of employees should not
be underestimated.  In a recent study published by The Academy of Management Review, Professor Wayne Cascio of
the University of Colorado reviewed over five hundred articles on downsizing and interviewed twenty-five senior
executives from business about their experiences.[xvi]  A principal finding from this research, says Professor Cascio,
is that "study after study shows that following a downsizing surviving employees become narrow-minded, self-
absorbed, and risk averse.  Morale sinks, productivity drops, and survivors distrust management.  In fact, this
constellation of symptoms is so common that it has taken on a name of its own: survivors' syndrome."[xvii]  Given the
impact of downsizing on employee morale, it should be expected that performance rarely meets the company's
expectations.  According to 1998 survey results from the American Management Association, only 41 percent of
downsizing companies reported productivity increases, and only 37 percent have realized any long-term gains in
shareholder value.[xviii]
According to Professors Susan Reynolds Fisher and Margaret White, such disappointing results can be
explained by the damage caused to an organization's "learning capacity" when an individual leaves the firm.[xix] 
Fisher and White believe that an organization's capacity for innovation and development is derived from the day-to-
day interaction between employees working on common problems.  The contribution of these informal networks to the
health and vitality of the organization is significantly greater than that implied by a simple head count, the authors
warn, and hence managers should be wary of any restructuring effort, including contracting out, that threatens these
crucial networks.
This issue is well illustrated by recent research by Dr. Chris Lonsdale and Professor Andrew Cox of the Center
for Strategy and Procurement Management at the University of Birmingham, England.[xx]  Lonsdale and Cox believe
that contracting out invariably leads to a loss of cross-functional contact between departments.  "When a contract
company is operating away from the firm's site there can be a loss of profitable contact between that function and
others which relate to it," they argue.  "While this can be addressed, many firms report that contract employees are
rarely as prepared as in-house colleagues to go beyond their immediate remit and take the time to work out ideas
which may be of benefit to the firm as a whole."
A further issue that Lonsdale and Cox raise is the effect that the limitations of a manager's own knowledge and
competence can have on an outsourcing deal.  For example, when a service is provided in-house certain aspects
frequently are provided by employees in other parts of the organization, and consequently often are not recognized
explicitly in the contract agreement.  This oversight commonly leads to a host of additional charges not built into the
original cost estimates.  In one example, the authors tell the tale of a petroleum firm that was charged nearly $500,000
in excess fees in the first month of its information technology contract because the company had wrongly assumed that
these services were included in the original contract price.[xxi]  Stories such as these should not be surprising, the
authors caution, because contracting is the core competency of many of the vendors that organizations must deal with. 
Since contracting is a primary focus of their business, these companies have learned to write contracts that shift most
of the risk onto the purchaser of the service.
In summary, contracting out government services imposes high costs on individuals, local governments, and
communities.  In spite of these high social costs, the efficiency gains from contracting materialize only about half of
the time.  Furthermore, the private sector's poor record with contracting suggests that such lackluster results are
unlikely to improve as public managers gain experience with administering private contracts. 
In contrast, using high road strategies to reform public bureaucracies often results in improved governmental
efficiency, but does so without the negative consequences that result from contracting out.  Across the country, high
road strategies are becoming more common as public bureaucracies borrow from new management models such as
Total Quality Management (TQM) and labor-management cooperation programs in order to improve organizational
performance.  According to Working Together for Public Service, a major report published by the U.S. Department of
Labor, labor-management cooperation programs typically result in higher quality service, greater cost effectiveness,
better quality of work life for employees, and improved relations between workers and management.[xxii]  Similar
positive results have been reported by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) in its study of
TQM programs in local government.  In that study, the overwhelming majority of governments surveyed reported
strong positive results from quality improvement programs, as Table 1 shows.[xxiii] 
Table 1.  Impact of Quality Improvement Efforts on Municipal Performance
Performance Indicator % reporting positive experiences
Quality of service 89%
Productivity 85%
Customer satisfaction 83%
Amount of service to customer 82%
Timeliness 79%
Cost reduction 75%
Increased communication 84%
Improved group decision making 78%
Stimulated high-quality performance 61%
Ability to improve in spite of constraints on resources 70%
Improved decision making due to availability of information 70%
Improved timeliness of internal processes 63%
Movement of decision making to lower level 68%
Commitment to stakeholders 72%
Morale 70%
Goal assessment 57%
New performance measures 72%
*Sample size varies from 168-191 cities and counties.
Source:  Jonathan West et al, “Total Quality Management in Local Government", The Municipal Yearbook 1994.  Washington, DC: International
City/County Management Association.  p. 24.
"Contracting back in" an important trend in public service provision
            New survey evidence shows that public officials are starting to learn that privatization has its limits.  While
contracting out continues to be widely used by many local governments, the practice of "contracting back in"—where
governments choose to resume in-house production following a period of privately produced service—is becoming
increasingly common. 
            The most complete source of data on contracting arrangements of local governments is provided by the
International City/County Management Association (ICMA).  Every five years, the ICMA surveys all counties with
more that 25,000 residents and all cities with populations greater than 10,000.  In addition a sample is drawn from one
in eight cities and counties with fewer than 10,000 residents.  On average, 1,500 municipalities respond to the survey. 
This survey provides a very comprehensive view of the complex mix of services offered by local governments, with
questions asked for sixty-four different public services. 
            By matching responses from different survey years, our research team has been able to determine the degree to
which local governments both contract out services to private providers as well as the frequency of contracting back
in.[xxiv]  Using ICMA data we found that on average across all responding municipalities, eight services were newly
contracted out between 1992 and 1997.  The more interesting finding, however, was that on average five services were
brought back in house during this same period.  Hence while these data show that contracting out is still a common
practice across the country, dissatisfaction with contracting out is widespread and causes local governments to bring
services back in house. 
Why do local governments choose to bring work back in house?
That so many local governments bring work back in house implies that contracting out as a model of public
service provision has its own set of problems that its proponents have either underestimated or ignored.  Yet the survey
data alone do not tell us why governments choose to resume public production of services.  To better understand the
nature of contracting back in and the factors associated with it, a series of telephone interviews was conducted with
public officials from across the country between June and August 1999.  The case studies from those interviews are
reprinted here as Appendix A. 
Methodology
Using the ICMA data as a guide, local governments were selected for interviews based on a population of
greater than 30,000 residents, six or more cases of contracting back in, and at least one case of contracting back in for
service areas where union membership is strong.  A small number of additional cases were chosen based on leads from
union members or newspaper clippings. 
Most of the interviews were with the city or county manager for that municipality.  On several occasions
follow-up interviews were conducted with department heads or directors of specific programs in order to develop a
more detailed understanding of a particular program or service.  Local union officials also were interviewed in a
handful of cases.  Interview times varied from ten minutes to about one hour. 
In total, public officials from fifty-eight places were interviewed.  Those interviews produced twenty-six cases
of contracting back in from twenty-two different places (see Table 2).  While these cases do not provide a large
enough data set to generalize the findings to the larger population, the cases can help us to understand the rationale
behind contracting back in, as well as provide clues on the efficacy of privatization as an alternative form of public
service delivery.
The bulk of the cases of reverse privatization represent the typical kinds of blue-collar work most often cited as
good candidates for contracting out.  With the exception of public works, wastewater treatment, and fire services, the
remaining cases consist of the types of services for which private sources of production are relatively common.  In
most areas these services can easily pass the "yellow pages" test in which a number of local private firms can be found
that offer similar services.[xxv]  It should not be surprising that the cases here represent services that are typically
thought of as prime targets for privatization.  Since these are the kinds of services that are most often contracted out, it
follows that they have a higher probability of being brought back in as well.
            A useful way of classifying the cases is to divide them according to the process by which local government
resumed public service production.  In nine cases contracting back in was the result of public employees submitting the
winning proposal in a competitive bidding process.  On twenty occasions work was brought back in house due to
problems with the private contractor.  Often the two categories overlap.  For example, it is not uncommon for public
agencies to win competitive service contracts following a failed privatization attempt.  The more typical scenario,
however, is for government officials to take over the service without initiating a new round of competitive bidding.  In
fourteen cases, it was clear to local government managers that the service could be produced more efficiently in house,
thereby making competitive bidding unnecessary.
Table 2.  Case Studies of Contracting Back In
Place Service(s) Competitive
Bidding
Failed
Contract
Akron, Ohio Road Repairs n/a n/a
Ardmore, Oklahoma Waste Water Treatment Plant  X
Campbell, California Buildings and Grounds Maintenance  X
Charlotte, North Carolina Paratransit Service X X
Cincinnati, Ohio Yard Waste X  
Columbus, Ohio School Grounds Maintenance  X
Fort Collins, Colorado Paratransit Service  X
Fort Lauderdale, Florida Infrastructure Pipe Installation X  
Independence, Iowa Grass Mowing,
Laundry Services
X X
X
Irvine, California Seniors’ Meal Program,
Seniors’ Care Management
X
X
X
X
Lakewood, Colorado Winter Street Sweeping  X
Lubbock, Texas Residential Trash Collection X X
Marshalltown, Iowa Veterans’ Home Food Service  X
Moore, Oklahoma Public Works  X
Northbrook, Illinois Water Meter Reading  X
Pinellas County, Florida Grounds Maintenance  X
Rialto, California Water Meter Reading,
Grounds Maintenance
 
n/a
X
n/a
Sanford, Florida Ambulance Service,
Utility Meter Reading
 X
X
Savannah, Georgia Fire Services  X
Sioux City, Iowa Residential Trash Collection X  
Warwick, Rhode Island Residential Trash Collection X  
Whittier, California Public Bus Service  X
N = 22 N = 26 S = 9 S = 20
n/a = don’t know/no answer
Contracting Back in Due to Failed Privatization
In the cases presented here, failed privatization was the most important reason for contracting back in.   In these
instances the work is brought back in house due to problems associated with the service provider or with the
contracting process.  Rather than return to the market and initiate a new round of competitive bidding, public managers
caught in these situations feel that problems with service delivery are rooted in the contracting process itself.  Because
these kinds of problems can not be solved by private means, public officials choose to rule out privatization as a viable
alternative and resume public production of the service. 
Every case that chose to bring the service back in house without resorting to competitive bidding reported
significant contracting problems.  Yet even for those places where competitive bidding was used (and the contract
awarded to public employees) problems with private contracts still played a role in five of nine cases.  While it is
difficult to generalize from such a small sample, there appear to be serious problems with contracting out.  The
analysis below looks at a number of the case studies to better understand how and why contract problems arise and,
more importantly, why public production is chosen over competitive bidding for specific services. 
Contracting Issues
Private sector models of contracting out provide a useful framework for understanding governments’ decisions
to produce services in house.  For businesses, the choice of whether to produce in house or to contract out is often
referred to as the “make or buy” decision.  While cost minimization is important, this approach also recognizes that
cost estimates include more than just the monetary value placed on a good or service.  In particular, this model
employs the notion of “asset specificity” to incorporate the many non-tangibles that go into the decision to contract in
or out.[xxvi]  Asset specificity refers to the degree to which the investments associated with production are unique to
the parties involved in the transaction.  Investments with a high degree of asset specificity are highly specialized and
normally have few alternative uses.  Examples include “hard” goods such as complex machine parts or custom-made
computer programs, but “soft” goods like industry-specific knowledge and relationships with customers and clients fall
into this category as well. 
A high level of asset specificity decreases the probability that an external supplier will be able to produce a
particular good or service in a cost-effective manner.  Because of the inability of both the buyer and the seller to
accurately specify what, when, and how certain functions are to be carried out, costs associated with monitoring
quality often outweigh any savings that accrue from external production. 
These problems are magnified in the public sector because of the multiple purposes and goals associated with
public services. While it is relatively easy for a buyer to recognize a high quality pencil or machine part, judging
quality becomes much more subjective when complex services are involved.  Even for the cases presented in this
study, where most of the services are simple, ubiquitous, and relatively easy to specify, numerous examples exist
where conflicts arose because of the difficulties associated with specifying the service. 
While evidence from some of the cases suggests outright abuse by the private contractor—such as the Iowa
laundry service that charged its public sector customer based on the weight of the laundry when it was wet, not dry—
other cases highlight the importance of clearly defined contracts.  In Lubbock, Texas, for example, a private trash
hauler attempted to renegotiate its contract because the weight of the trash it collected was greater than the company
anticipated.  Heavier loads meant that the company had to pay higher than expected landfill fees, and the firm
attempted (unsuccessfully) to shift those costs to local government. 
The care management program for the Senior Services Department of Irvine, California serves as a more
complex example of the difficulties involved in specifying contracts.  In Irvine, public officials attempted to privatize
its care management program in 1995.  With about one hundred active cases at any given time, the city offers
assistance to seniors in need of help with health care, transportation, housing, and other social services.  In spite of a
competitive bidding process, the request for proposals attracted only one bidder that the city felt was sufficiently
qualified to run the complex program.  After reviewing the technical responsibilities contained in the contract,
however, the lone qualified bidder chose to withdraw from the competition.  The perception was that many of the
contract services were hard to measure, difficult to administer, and that performance would be judged largely on
community perceptions rather than tangible results.  This created a sense that the cost to administer the program would
grow far beyond the ability of the contractor to manage the program within the available budget.  Unable to attract
qualified contractors, department administrators instead chose to keep the service in house. 
A related problem is that the contract language may be over-specified.  Under these circumstances, contract
language may be too specific to allow government to satisfy the changing needs of citizens.  When Moore, Oklahoma
contracted out its public works department in 1993, it made sure that minimum service levels were included in the
contract.  When citizens began demanding more than the minimum from their government in the mid 1990s, however,
the city was unable to accommodate citizens’ preferences because it was still bound by the strict terms of the contract it
had signed three years earlier. 
            Another issue that is well illustrated by the Moore, Oklahoma case is the problems that occur when a single
contractor is responsible for a complex basket of services.  In Moore, one company was responsible for streets, drains,
parks, cemeteries, building maintenance, sanitation, fleet maintenance, animal control, wastewater treatment, water and
sewer line maintenance, and water meter reading.  The sheer size of this contract made it exceedingly difficult for
public officials to monitor service levels and quality.
            Given the complexity involved in specifying contract arrangements it should not be surprising that the costs
associated with monitoring contracts has been shown to be quite high.[xxvii]  The more typical scenario, however, is
for governments not to do any monitoring at all.  In our research team's analysis of ICMA survey data on the subject,
we found that more than half of the governments that contract out do not have any formal procedures for monitoring
contract arrangements.[xxviii]  Not monitoring contracts significantly increases the chances that either costs increase or
quality suffers—or in some cases, both problems may surface.  On the other hand, places that do take monitoring
seriously may find that the cost of monitoring contracts equals or surpasses any anticipated savings from private
service delivery. 
            More than one respondent from the case studies indicated that in house production was resumed because of the
high costs of monitoring private contracts.  In Pinellas County, Florida, for example, the county terminated its contract
for grass mowing at 360 water pumping stations because of its inability to control service quality.  "Servicing so many
remote locations made it very difficult to monitor service quality, says the County Administrator, "so for this service it
made more sense for the county to do the job." 
City officials in Campbell, California report similar problems.  In Campbell, the city contracted out its park
maintenance functions in the early 1990s as a way to cut costs.  After two years with the private contractor, however,
the city chose to bring the work back in house following numerous complaints from city residents about service
quality.  Having residents complain to the city rather than the contractor resulted in significant time and resources
being wasted by city employees.  Not only were city employees required to handle residents' complaints, they then had
to visit the park in question to check up on the contractor's work, contact the contractor to inform him of the problem,
and finally revisit the park to ensure that the work had been re-done properly.  Given that the number of complaints
was significantly higher than when public employees did the job, city supervisors quickly grew tired of the extra
burden created by the contracting process and brought the work back in house. 
Park maintenance has remained a publicly provided service in Campbell since 1996.  According to City
Manager Bernie Strojny, city workers provide better service because they possess a sense of ownership that is unique
to public employees.  "City employees invest more," he says, "because they genuinely care about the place they work
at."  In contrast, city properties are just one of many locations that the private contractor serves, which Strojny believes
contributes to the contractor having less of an interest in service quality. 
In both Pinellas County and the City of Campbell monitoring costs were high because public officials found
themselves constantly "putting out fires" that had been "lit" by the contractor.   Both places were lucky, however, in
that the service in question was relatively easy to monitor by area residents.  In these cases, citizens are able to serve as
reasonable substitutes for direct monitoring by government.  The public sector is not so fortunate, however, when
service quality cannot be observed directly and citizens are unable to play the watchdog role.  This was the case in
Savannah, Georgia, where fire services had traditionally been provided by both the City of Savannah and South Side
Fire Protection, Inc., a non-profit fire department that provided firefighting services to about one third of the city. 
South Side Fire consisted of a mix of volunteer and professional staff and had served Savannah's southern
neighborhoods for decades.  When the city annexed South Side Fire's service area in the 1970s, the company continued
to provide fire services to this part of the city.  As Savannah continued to grow, concerns were raised about the
differences in service quality between the City of Savannah Fire Department and South Side Fire.  Whereas previously
the South Side consisted mainly of single family housing, over the years the South Side grew to include a number of
large retail and office complexes.  Responding effectively to these types of calls required a different method of
firefighting than what South Side could offer.  The number of city firefighters responding to calls was always the
same, for example, whereas the number of South Side volunteers that responded to calls varied at each event.  Over
time the city increasingly became concerned with service quality and response times on the South Side.  Tellingly, one
of the most vocal proponents for change was the city council representative from the South Side, who argued that the
quality of service was inferior to that offered by the city. 
Conflicts over what should be considered quality service were only half of the problem.  Just as important, the
cost of the service had risen significantly over time.  The city found itself paying for equipment and stations "over and
over again," and the company would increase its charges to the city on a yearly basis.  The extent to which South Side
fire was overpriced relative to the city was made clear when City Council decided to bring the service in house in early
1998.  In a last-ditch effort to save its business, the company offered to provide the service at a significantly lower
price than what it was currently charging.  This sudden drop in price only angered city officials, who wondered how
much, and for how long, this "non-profit" organization was overcharging them. 
In sum, the Savannah case makes clear the difficulties associated with contract arrangements where service
quality is hard to monitor and the true costs of the service are difficult to quantify.  But even in other service areas
where quality and price considerations are easier to measure, the time and resources spent on monitoring can still be
significant.  The degree to which these additional costs outweigh the potential efficiency gains of private production is
an empirical question that can only be answered on a case-by-case basis.  The evidence presented here, however,
suggests that these costs are often considerably higher than most governments anticipate. 
Economic and Market Issues
            Much of the preceding analysis presumes that, contracting costs aside, privately produced services are cheaper. 
Indeed, lower costs were the primary reason most governments in this study choose to contract out in the first place. 
Lower costs, however, usually resulted in lower quality services as well.  Research by Harvard University Professor
John Donahue suggests that much of the cost savings from privatization come from local governments choosing to
follow low road economic strategies that rely on the lower priced labor of private firms.[xxix]  If we make the
reasonable assumption that lower priced inputs result in lower quality outputs, then it should not be surprising that
service quality was a major problem in a majority of the case studies. 
            In both Charlotte, North Carolina and Fort Collins, Colorado local governments ended private contracts for
paratransit service for the elderly and disabled because of service quality problems.  In Charlotte, the taxi company
responsible for the service was not accustomed to working with disabled clients, and drivers viewed city charges as
less desirable passengers compared to other customers.  The program was plagued by similar problems in Fort Collins,
where users of the service often complained about the lack of courtesy on the part of drivers.  Additionally, the private
contractor had numerous problems attracting and retaining quality employees, resulting in unreliable service. 
            The City of Whittier, California, attempted to privatize its public bus service in the early 1990s.  At the end of
the five-year contract, however, the city chose in house production over a new round of competitive bidding, citing
poor service quality as the primary reason for the switch.  The city received numerous complaints about dirty buses
and unqualified drivers.  Equally important, the expected cost savings from privatization quickly disappeared because
of significantly higher accident rates and greater than expected costs for vehicle repairs.
The above examples of privatized transit service all relied on lower priced labor to minimize costs.  Yet, in
every case the low cost option proved to be unsustainable over the long run.  Either quality levels slipped to such
unacceptable levels that the service was no longer a benefit to citizens, or else the problems resulting from low cost
provision (e.g., higher accident rates and increased liability claims) effectively erased any financial benefits from
private service delivery. 
An important related issue is the degree to which local governments can accurately judge when private service
delivery is cheaper.  Anecdotal evidence from the case studies suggests that pricing contracts is more art than science. 
This should not be surprising given the uncertainty that surrounds contracting, but what is surprising is the degree to
which contract bids vary.  In Charlotte, North Carolina, for example, bids on paratransit service ranged from $12.60 to
$20.49 per trip.  In Lubbock, Texas, bids for a portion of the city’s residential trash routes varied from $3.6 million to
$7.3 million—a difference of nearly 103 percent. 
            Figures like these suggest three things.  First, sufficient competition is critical to cost savings when competitive
bidding is used.  Second, it is imperative that local governments who use competitive bidding allow public departments
to participate in the bidding process so that costs can be properly benchmarked.  Finally, if a public service is privately
provided, it is crucial that public officials pay close attention to monitoring the price, quality, and quantity of the
contractor's work throughout the term of the contract.  The following section examines more closely the cases that
involved competitive bidding. 
Contracting Back in Due to Successful Competitive Bidding
            A key variable for explaining the likelihood of contracting back in is whether or not public employees are
allowed to bid against private providers. Quantitative analysis of US Census data from 1987-1992 shows that the
presence of unionized employees increases the probability of contracting back in.[xxx]  This finding suggests that
unionized workplaces are more likely to have the right to submit contract proposals, but bidding rights for public
employees are increasingly common in non-unionized settings as well. [xxxi]
The rules governing the public sector’s ability to bid on contracts vary considerably from place to place.  In
Pinellas County, Florida, for example, public employees are allowed to compete with private providers when a service
is first put out to bid.  Once that contract is “lost” to the private sector, however, only private firms have the
opportunity to bid on future contracts.  The county sees the start up costs associated with bringing a service back in as
too expensive to be worth the effort.  Not only would the county have to hire new employees to provide the service,
but new equipment and buildings may be required as well. 
Other places view the bidding process differently.  In Charlotte, North Carolina, it is the norm for public
employees to bid on contracts, and the city expects its departments to be competitive in the bidding process.  Making
city departments competitive means providing them with the resources necessary to assemble quality bids.  In many
cases, this includes allowing managers to hire outside consultants to help develop the department’s proposal. Cases
where services are kept in house are viewed as “victories” for the city, and are a source of pride for public employees.
A third example of how the bidding process works can be found in Lubbock, Texas.  In Lubbock residential
trash collection is subject to competitive bidding, and public employees are encouraged to bid for the service.  What
makes Lubbock different than most places, however, is that only one third of the service is put out to bid at any given
time, and the City would never choose to privatize the whole service.  "We would always keep at least one third of the
service in house," says Mildred Cox, the Director of Public Works.  "This way we never lose the ability to keep the
private firms on their toes.  Just as important, having competitive bids provides the city with important information
about what constitutes efficient service."
Taking the High Road Through Public Sector Innovation
The fact that government departments often win competitive contracts highlights the ability of the public sector
to improve efficiency through the use of high road management practices.  There is ample room for increased
efficiency in public provision so long as employees are empowered to make decisions on how the service should be
delivered.  By drawing on the expertise of front line workers, innovation in the design of work leads to significant cost
savings.  Theories of organization development concur that line employees often know how to do their jobs best, and
will excel at what they do if given the chance by management.[xxxii]  For public employees dealing with complex
services and the need to keep a wide array of constituents satisfied, this is even truer.
Many of the cases of contracting back in were tied to process improvements in public management.  As such,
they demonstrate public innovation is a viable alternative to private provision.  Often small changes can lead to
significant savings.  In Warwick, Rhode Island, for example, management and the union worked together to redesign
the way residential trash is collected, resulting in savings of over $1.1 million over five years.  In Akron, Ohio, city
workers developed a plan to combine water and sewer line repairs with road repairs.  "Why do the same work twice?"
asks union president Leo Armstrong.  "If we're already there repairing the hole, we might as well finish the job.  Not
only can we get the job done faster, but it saves the city money, too."
In other cases, efficiency gains were the result of specific management practices being brought in from the
private sector.  In Charlotte, North Carolina, managers of the city's paratransit service instituted a gainsharing program
for its employees that resulted in savings of over $160,000 in 1998.  Half of this money will be divided equally among
the department's employees, which amounts to an annual bonus of $1,600 per employee, or about seven percent of an
employee's total pay. 
Labor-management cooperation programs can have a significant impact on improving efficiency in unionized
settings.  In Fort Lauderdale, Florida, "partnership" programs between labor and management have resulted in a
number of competitive bids being awarded to public employees.  Fort Lauderdale's partnership programs are a product
of the Cooperative Association of Labor and Management (CALM), an innovative program that employs the concepts
of total quality management to increase productivity and promote cooperation and understanding between the union
and city administrators. 
One example of CALM's impact comes from the city's attempt to privatize infrastructure pipe construction in
early 1997.  When the Request for Proposals was issued, a labor-management committee quickly formed to prepare its
bid for the competition.  The committee was co-chaired by the union president and the director of labor relations for
the city, who together co-chair all partnership committees.  Having these two established veterans on the committee
"helps to create a safe environment for our people," says union president Cathy Dunn.  This way we can establish trust
among all parties early on, and get to the real work of developing our proposal."  In addition to the co-chairs, the
committee consisted of a supervisor, division manager, and four crew members.  Each committee member is
encouraged to participate fully in the development of the proposal, and any member has the right to veto elements of
the plan that they don’t like.  "All it takes is one 'no' vote and the project stops," says Dunn. 
The CALM committee won the contract by submitting the lowest cost bid.  Public employees were able to beat
the competition by restructuring how the service was delivered.  Work schedules were changed to reduce travel and set
up time, and the size of the pipe crews doubled, following the example of successful private firms that do the same
work.  The results of these changes have been dramatic: In the first year alone, city crews laid over three and a half
miles of pipe, compared to an average of just one mile of pipe for privately-run crews. 
The above examples clearly demonstrate that the public sector can be as effective if not more effective than
firms in the private sector doing similar work.  In every case, the key to public sector success is empowerment.  When
workers are provided the tools and the resources necessary to bring about change, innovative policies and programs
often follow.  Privatization and empowerment, however, are rarely compatible.  When employees are mistrustful of
management, when job security is uncertain, and when departments see their colleagues’ jobs sold to the lowest bidder,
convincing workers to “buy in” to any new program is a daunting task. 
Conclusion
The evidence presented here indicates that the contracting process is rarely as smooth as its proponents claim. 
Often poor results were due to the inability of either governments or private contractors to clearly communicate their
expectations to each other.  On other occasions, disappointing results were the outcome of one party or the other
underestimating costs or overestimating savings from privatization.  For a third group of cases, contracting back in was
not the result of failure on the part of private firms, but rather successful innovation by public employees.
The latter findings suggest that taking the high road, in the form of TQM or labor-management cooperation, can
provide equal or better quality service as the best private firms, but do so with fewer risks and greater social rewards. 
For those public officials that truly wish to “reinvent government,” internal management reforms deserve a closer look
than they have been getting.
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Sclar, Elliott. 1997. "The Privatization of Public Service: Lessons from Case Studies."Washington, D.C:
Economic Policy Institute.
This article presents arguments against privatization and the contracting of public services. Three case
studies are used to portray the deficiencies of contracting along with a discussion of some general economic
principles that support case findings. Sclar concludes that monitoring and contract transaction costs more
than outweigh the benefits of privatization in the cases he examined.
Spot vs. Contract Markets
For Sclar, contracting government services is likely to result in cost savings when the price of the service is
determined in a "spot market." A spot market is similar to the economic abstraction of a perfectly competitive
market: the price of a good or service is kept low because there are many producers of the same or similar
products. Thus, competition maintains downward pressure on prices.
Contract markets are different because there are generally few producers of the good or service. This not
only leads to difficulties in determining prices but the product itself is not easily quantified. In this market a
decision to contract involves:
specification of the product
negotiation of prices
close monitoring of quality
anticipation of contingencies
an assessment of the typical production costs
a determination of the transaction costs of contract design and monitoring
Transaction costs are often underestimated or neglected all together. Governments ignore the transaction and
monitoring costs when they treat the goods and services that have contract market characteristics as if they
were suitable for purchase in the spot market.
Moral Hazard
In terms of private goods, consumers have an economic incentive to protect their investments. Sclar suggests
that this is not the case when considering public goods, especially those with contract market characteristics.
Public contracting, by contrast, always involves "moral hazard," which arises in any situation in which the best
economic interest of at least one of the parties to a transaction can be better served by dereliction of duty or
outright dishonesty.
In order to establish accountability, governments need to create bureaucracies and audit systems for their
contracts. These are the transaction and monitoring costs that are often ignored.
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Three Case Studies
These cases were selected based on two criteria. First, each case had to have been in existence long enough
to rule out problems associated with startup difficulties. Second, a significant amount of material in the form
of public documents, newspaper accounts, and interviews could be gathered to provide an adequate reflection
of the cases being examined. These cases were considered good candidates for privatization because the
"blue collar" nature of the work involved made it easy to administer via private contractor. In addition, the
services being conducted are typical of those found in spot markets.
The Albany Department of Public Works
The Albany case study reveals the impact of transaction costs in a privatization contract. The entire vehicle
maintenance operation of the Department of Public Works was contracted out in January of 1992. The
premise was to replace the salaried public employees with hourly work at outside garages. The City would
then pay only for the time that the vehicles were actually being serviced which was expected to result in
between $100,000 and $200,000 in savings. Indeed, in 1995 the City of Albany reported in their budget that
they had reduced their costs by 18% during 1994. However, the comptroller's office pointed out that this
"savings had occurred because of the aggressive supervision of contractor's bills" which resulted in an
increase in contract spending. In addition to the discussion of monitoring costs, Sclar cites testimonials that
highlight the extent to which contractors had over billed.
MassHighway
In Massachusetts, highway maintenance was one of the first public services to be contracted out as part of an
aggressive campaign to privatize government services. MassHighway distributed its highway maintenance on a
50-50 basis; 50 percent to its own public employees and the remaining 50 percent to outside contractors. In
this arrangement, the contractors had an incentive to perform only the work that was most profitable to
them because the State obligated the contractors to keep the maintenance costs below the contract price. In
addition, much of the work was either done poorly or not at all upon inspection.
Sclar indicates that the public sector employees consistently provided a better service at a lower cost.
However, the State of Massachusetts has made it clear that over time and through attrition the unionized
employees will be replaced by contract workers.
Indianapolis Fleet Services
The Indianapolis example differs from the two studies above in that it is a case study where privatization did
not take place. The decision to privatize Indianapolis' vehicle maintenance operations was successfully
challenged by the facility's unionized employees. Instead of contracting out the fleet services, the operations
were restructured through collaborative labor/management relations with the effect of reducing costs by eight
percent. The restructuring has also led to an improved work environment, fewer employees, and continued
service quality.
Lessons from Experience
The case studies discussed above are neither typical nor representative of the entire experience with
privatization. They do, however, point out several pitfalls for governments seeking to contract with the private
sector. Sclar's point here is that each case must be examined carefully and governments should be wary of
adopting privatization as "routine and widespread policy". Below, six of these pitfalls are summarized:
1. Governments should avoid making a decision to privatize based on the experience in the private sector
with service delivery. Personal car repair is vastly different from maintaining a fleet of vehicles.
2. Governments should investigate the manner and extent of the bureaucracy required to monitor contracts.
3. A careful assessment of costs and savings should be undertaken. This endeavor is more difficult than it
seems and governments should be wary of simplified 'bottomline' comparisons.
4. Some attention should be paid to the nature of the service being considered for privatization. Some
services are best provided by the public sector and privatization represents a solution to problems that
may be better addressed from within the public sector. Labor and management collaboration is just one
example of this point.
5. Again, the nature of the service being privatized is an important consideration. Contracting out services
to providers that require highly specialized equipment leaves governments at the mercy of the contractor
in future negotiations. This is mainly due to the difficulty a government has in procuring the 'critical
assets' necessary to provide the service themselves.
6. Once a contract has been awarded, despite the fact that the process may have been competitive, the
market structure for that service may undergo a transformation. The act of bestowing a contract may
change the market into a bilateral negotiation between government and the winning bidder, creating an
arrangement similar to a monopoly.
Guidelines for Public Contracting
Four factor emerge from the privatization debate that "are crucial in determining whether contracting can
provide an economic alternative to improving internal organization". First, the importance of the task to the
mission of the agency. The routine nature of the service does not necessarily imply that it will be easy to
privatize. Second, the frequency with which transactions occur is not an indication of the ability of the service
to be privatized. Third, the more complex the task and the more uncertain the environment the more likely it
is that privatization will not produce cost-effective results. Lastly, highly specialized equipment requires highly
skilled laborers who will perform their duties regardless of who pays them. Introducing a third-party
arrangement creates a layer of management that weakens the ability of governments to control the output.
Conclusion
The Sclar paper details some of the shortcomings of privatization and contracting government services. The
three case studies support his contention that contracting results in serious contract abuses and increased
costs associated with monitoring and accountability; costs that are often ignored in the privatization
negotiations.
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Lehmann, Scott. Privatizing Public Lands. 1995. New York: Oxford University Press.
In 1983, officials in the Reagan Administration proposed privatizing federal public lands. In this one act, the
federal lands could be put to their "highest" and "best use," consistent with consumer demands expressed
through the market, or so argued these officials. While quickly scuttled at the time as politically unpopular,
similar proposals are likely to resurface. In this book, Lehmann begins by anticipating such free marketeers’
arguments in favor of privatizing public lands.
Culling from many sources, Lehmann assembles what might be a "case for privatization". He finds inherent
contradictions and circularity in marketeers’ arguments that the market is the best mechanism for ensuring
"productivity" and greater "social welfare". Finding many potential instances of spillovers from one set of
"consumers" to another, he finds any land privatization would need to establish a system of convenants and
easements to "contain spillovers". He argues that the regulated use of public lands, the status quo,
approximates exactly this kind of complex of covenants, and in so doing, ensures long-term multiple uses of
land. While federal land managers do not appear to manage lands on the principle of maximizing profit from
resource-release, these officials do make accessible all land resources to a variety of users, from hikers to
sheep-herders.
In the last several chapters, he builds a critique of marketization. He contrasts a privatist marketplace with its
ideal of consumer sovereignty with experiences of nature that would create a different ethic. While in the
marketplace, decision-making bows to the "universal pander" of ability and willingness to pay, in the realm of
the public, Lehmann finds participation to be a critical mechanism for preserving cultural and natural values.
Resources on which we depend cannot be treated as commodities without jeopardy of cultural values, argues
Lehmann. Finally, public lands, in making possible different relationships to the land and its uses than the
market themselves, are vital spaces for exploring an alternative ethic.
In sum, while the first sections of the book likely appeal to academics in the dogged exploration and critique
of claims made by free-marketeers, local government officials will find a strong articulation of why some
resources might best be managed by the public sector.
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Miranda, Rowan and Allan Lerner. (1995). "Bureaucracy, Organizational Redundancy and the Privatization
of Public Services." Public Administration Review 55(2): 193-200.
In this article Miranda and Lerner draw on redundancy theory and empirical evidence to further the debate
on privatization of public services. The authors discuss the possible advantages of an intermediate form of
privatization, which they refer to as “benchmarking,” where “controlled competition” is used to minimize the
“dysfunction of monopoly bureaucracy”(194).
The introduction of redundancy in public service delivery allows for the same service to be provided by more
than one organization. The article presents several ways of introducing redundancy 1) intra-government
redundancy, 2) private/ private redundancy, and 3) a mixture of public and private provision where the
government would contract portions of the service to outside providers. Redundancy helps establish
competition and allows for measurements of comparative benefits between different providers of the same
service. In this case benchmarking “represents an informed pragmatism in the search for improved
organizational forms for the delivery of public services” (194).
This article expands on the current theoretical framework for privatization of public services and provides a
possible alternative that would enhance competition.  Miranda and Lerner delineate evidence from past
studies to suggest that privatization alone does not lead to better quality or cost reduction in public service
delivery. Without competition, service delivery moves from public to private monopolies.  They argue that
“organizational redundancies in service delivery are perhaps a means for averting monopoly outcomes”(p.
197). 
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Sclar, Elliot D., K. H. Schaeffer, and Robert Brandwein. 1989. "The Emperor's New Clothes: Transit
Privatization and Public Policy." Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute.
Sclar, Schaeffer and Brandwein's paper is an examination of the impact of the five-year-old effort of the
Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) to mandate state and local transit authorities to privatize
their operations. Traditionally, transportation policy was regarded by the government as an integral part of
economic development policy; in other words, public subsidy of infrastructure represents an investment in the
overall productivity of the American Economy. However, political officials have begun to evaluate
transportation policy and operations in terms of cost only instead of program outcome. The primary purpose
of public transportation is to ensure the quick, safe, and efficient movement of people and goods around
metropolitan areas, while promoting industry standards that take into account widespread traffic congestion,
environmental quality, energy conservation, infrastructure investment and equal access to transportation for
all citizens. A system which meets these criteria can only be achieved through comprehensive planning,
design and operation -- not through disjointed operation by many private suppliers.
Until the1950's auto and truck transportation federal policy was aimed primarily at rural areas. Not until the
1940's did transportation policy begin to include urban roads and bridges. As the population in cities grew, so
did the complication of safely and efficiently ensuring the continuous motion of people, goods and services.
Federal policy mandated greater coordination and planning of transportation systems in cities. Transit
operations were badly undercapitalized and barely able to remain in business. The Urban Mass Transportation
Act of 1964 mandated the creation of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) which lead to the creation of
public transportation planning authorities across the nation. Federal funding was directed toward the capital
needs of transportation, and the taking over of aged and failing private local providers. Substantial funding to
improve and set up better public transportation infrastructure continued through the 1970's.
With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1981, federal transportation policy took a different direction -- toward
that of privatization. Two main goals were placed at the top of the transportation policy agenda: to reduce
federal spending on transportation programs, and to establish a more central role in public transport for the
private sector. Congress, however, disagreed completely with these objectives and the mandating of state and
local sectors to privatize. In 1987 it passed a bill that extended federal subsidization of the transportation
systems for another four years. This deadlock over transportation policy between Congress and the
Administration continues.
Theory says that competition will force prices closer to the actual level of production cost under conditions of
efficient operation. However, and examination of studies done for UMTA shows that the data does not support
this theory. The authors cite two firms, which carelessly ignored complex conceptual and measurement
problems in their studies. UMTA, then selectively used this research to support their pro-privatization
programs.
Other problems with contracting that are identified are:
Lack of competition stability over the long-run: competition assumes that there will be a steady stream of
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many suppliers competing to provide service. However, sellers are always looking for ways to eliminate
their competition, and in reality they often succeed. Eventually, one or two major players will dominate
the market, and the industry will be back to a monopoly situation where the provider has greater
leverage in charging a higher price. Westchester County serves as an example of this situation.
Politics does often interfere with the competitive bidding process: i.e. the contract does not always go to
the lowest bidder.
Can little fish EVER eat big fish? Contrary to the intentions of privatization advocates, the majority of
successful players winning transit contracts are large national multi-product firms, as opposed to small,
efficient, entrepreneurial operators.
Contractors work for the transit agency, not the rider: The claim that service quality will increase with
privatization because private providers will be more responsive to riders is not necessarily true. Vendors
do not necessarily see their long-term interests tied to the rider's well-being as much as public transit
agencies do. Private operators feel insulated from the direct contact with and responsibility to the rider.
The relationship between the public agency and contractor can often be adversarial and difficult to
manage: The need to monitor and make decisions about sometimes necessary expansion of services in
an area where service is contracted is challenging and can cause tension between the two entities.
The way in which cost is measured in the bidding process gives advantage to private sector contractors.
When evaluating the cost of service provided by public sector or non-profit bidders, public agencies use the
method of fully allocated cost, which includes the direct costs of service plus overhead for administration,
facilities, etc. However, for private sector bidders, any legitimate bid (showing only incremental costs) is taken
as a fair basis for comparison. Therefore, public providers are at a disadvantage in the bidding process.
Additionally, private contractors are able to cover a loss through cash flow from other operations until they
are able to obtain more power in the market and then raise their costs.
Lower labor costs is one of the most dominant arguments used by privatization advocates. They allege that
transportation drivers and mechanics are overcompensated for jobs that require little skill. However, driving a
bus should not be considered a low-skill job that has little effect on people's lives. If bus drivers fail to report
to work, riders do not get to work, to the store, or to the doctor. Sporadically provided bus routing hurts the
economy and people's quality of life.
Additionally, when examining the increase in costs in the transit industry, it can be shown that only 43% of
the increase in costs is due to increase in wages and productivity. Further examination of these causes shows
that there have been no technological advances in the transit industry since the 1920s. Additionally, another
reason for the decrease in labor productivity can be attributed to the fact that peak ridership has increased
and therefore the number of transit workers increase by more than the number of transit miles.
Urban transport policy with the goal of fast, safe and efficient movement of people and goods must
incorporate three elements: the importance of local OPTION in contracting, the need for subsidy, and the
breadth of proper transportation policy goals.
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Moulder, Evelina. 1994. "Privatization: involving citizens and local government employees." Baseline Data
Report 26 (1): 1-7.
This article summarizes the results of a survey conducted by the International City/County Management
Association (ICMA) in 1992 on local area alternative service delivery. The survey was mailed nationwide to
chief administrative officers in all cities with populations of 10,000 or more, and to counties with populations
of 25,000 or more.1
According to the results of this survey, whether or not local governments do actually privatize, 69.5% have
gone so far as to conduct a feasibility study on the subject. Privatization usually occurs because a local
government or its citizens believe services can be provided more efficienty and at a lower cost when
contracted out. Also, many localities are privatizing in response to an increase in population size (with the
exception of jurisdictions that have a population of 1,000,000 or greater). This study showed that
privatization efforts were initiated more often from within the government sector (90.3% of the time) as
opposed to by the citizens.
Manager and department heads are most often involved in evaluating the feasibility of private service
delivery, followed, in descending order, by elected officials, assistant mangers, and finally, line employees.
Moulder suggests that involving line employees in the feasibility study from the beginning would be beneficial
to the process. Line employees have critical insight into the methods of service delivery and they would feel
respected as participants. For employees, it would also be an opportunity to voice concerns and might serve
as an exercise for them to explore how they can improve efficiency and operations in general. It has been
shown that larger jurisdictions are more likely to involve line employees in the feasibility study, as are areas
on the Pacific coast and in the Mountain division. Other outside groups, such as citizen advisory committees,
were also reported by localities to be involved in the feasibility study process.
Obstacles to implementation of private service delivery can come from employees and consumers (citizens).
Of the respondents to the survey that reported obstacles to privatization, 31% identified citizens as the
source of opposition. Even though service evaluation can serve to bolster citizen confidence and is important
to efficiency, only 47% of the jurisdictions reported the use of systematic evaluation of service delivery.
Fifty four percent of the opposition to privatization experienced was reported as coming from line employees.
Of those jurisdictions that do privatize and experience opposition from line employees, less than half had
involved line employees in the feasibility study. Even fewer allowed public employees to compete for the
contracted service, or made an effort to develop programs to mitigate effects on public employees displaced
by privatization. Larger jurisdictions with a population of 100,000 or greater did show more of a tendency to
allow public sector employees to compete for providing services.
Privatization of public service delivery impacts both public sector employees and consumers. Both groups
should be an integral part of the decisionmaking process over changes, such as privatization, that effect the
quality of life in their community.
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Notes:
1. One thousand five hundred and four responses were received, accounting for an overall response rate of
31%.
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Pack, Janet Rothenberg. 1989. "Privatization and Cost Reduction." Policy Sciences 22: 1-25.
Pack evaluates the success and sustainability of service cost reduction from the perspective of the economic
model of cost minimization through competitive bidding. In brief, the model asserts that costs will be
minimized when bidding is competitive. Wrapped into the concept of competitive bidding are two additional
assumptions required for competitive bids: 1) that government can clearly define and describe output
requirements and has enough understanding of the good’s cost and value that the level of output chosen
maximizes the value to cost ratio, and 2) that firms know production costs.
Using information published in a 1984 publication of the International City Management Association and
gathered in 1987 follow-up interviews, Pack examines the experiences of fifteen municipalities which
contracted for service provision. She emphasizes that from this small and not-randomly-selected sample we
cannot infer anything about the overall frequency of success or failure of contract privatization or the
applicability of the model. Instead, she uses the information as qualitative case study data to examine the
common factors of success and failure of contract privatization.
Pack identifies evaluative standards for contract privatization: 1) was the bidding competitive, and did the
government agency actively encourage competitive bidding?; 2) was the initial cost reduction sustained and
what are the common factors of the cases in which it was?; and 3) was the contract disrupted due to
unexpected costs; and 4) was the mechanism for contract monitoring a formalized structure or constant
interaction between the government agency and the provider?
In the case studies, cost reduction was generally greater when the contracts were competitively bid, and cost
reduction was sustained when contracts, when expired, were re-bid rather than renegotiated. Further,
agencies that actively encouraged competitive bidding received more bids, and more substantially reduced
service costs than those which did not encourage competitive bidding. The article gives three methods utilized
by governments to encourage bidding: advertising and widely distributed requests for proposal (RFPs),
dividing the contract into smaller pieces to enable small providers to compete, and incentive provisions
(contract clauses dividing the financial risk between government and the service provider).
The type of service provided also appeared important to cost reduction and sustainability. Among these cases,
competitively bid labor intensive services were likely to achieve great initial savings and to sustain reduced
costs. More capital intensive production processes were less able to sustain cost savings.
Contract disruption generally occurs when a firm does not know production costs at the time of the bid and
costs exceed those estimated. When costs are much higher than those estimated, the firm can absorb the
cost, renegotiate the contract, or renege entirely. When the private firm reneges on a contract, the
government agency remains responsible for providing the service by either returning to direct government
provision or by re-letting the contract. Contract disruption can incur large, unanticipated financial and political
costs, and is a risk of private contracting not often calculated into the privatization decision. In the cases
where contract disruption occurred, Pack finds that the majority of them used relatively expensive formal
monitoring systems which discerned the problem after it was serious. Agreements of constant interaction
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between government and service provider appeared to be a more successful monitoring tool.
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Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2003. “Rural-Urban Differences in Privatization: Limits to the Competitive
State,” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 21(5): 703-718.
Despite two decades of experience with privatization, U.S. local government use of
contracting in public service delivery remains relatively flat.  Market approaches to public
goods provision emphasize the competitive state, and attribute limited privatization to
bureaucratic resistance. Rural development theory emphasizes the uneven impact of
market solutions in rural communities.  Using national data on U.S. local government
service delivery from 1992 and 1997, the authors analyze differences in local government
service delivery patterns by metropolitan status. Discriminant analysis shows that
structural features of markets are more important than managerial capacity of
government leaders in explaining lower rates of privatization among rural governments. 
These structural constraints limit the applicability of competitive approaches to local
government service delivery.  Warner and Hefetz’ results suggest cooperation, as an
alternative to privatization at the local level and as a source of redistributive aid at the
state level, may provide a more equitable alternative for disadvantaged rural
communities.
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Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2002. “The Uneven Distribution of Market Solutions for Public Goods,”
Journal of Urban Affairs, 24(4): 445-459.
Using national data on local government service delivery from 1992 and 1997, this article assesses the
distribution of privatization and inter-municipal cooperation across localities in the metropolitan region and
finds them most common among suburbs. Coasian economics argues market solutions may offer an
alternative to regional government in the fragmented metropolitan area. However, our discriminate analysis
shows the use of market solutions is highest in suburban communities that also exhibit high income and low
poverty.  Thus, market solutions appear to reflect the inequality among municipalities in the metropolitan
region. Some system of regional market governance is still needed to internalize the costs arising from
regional inequality in public service delivery.
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Warner, M.E. and Robert Hebdon. 2001 "Local Government Restructuring: Privatization and Its
Alternatives," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 20(2):315-336.
Local government restructuring should no longer be viewed as a simple dichotomy between private and public
provision. A 1997 survey of chief elected township and county officials in New York shows local governments
use both private and public sector mechanisms to structure the market, create competition and attain
economies of scale.  In addition to privatization and inter-municipal cooperation, two alternative forms of
service delivery not previously researched, reverse privatization and governmental entrepreneurship, are
analyzed. Logistic regression on the 201 responding governments differentiates the decision to restructure
from the level and complexity of restructuring.  Results confirm that local governments are guided primarily
by pragmatic concerns with information, monitoring and service quality.  Political factors are not significant in
the restructuring process and unionization is only significant in cases of simple restructuring (privatization or
cooperation used alone).   Fiscal stress is not a primary motivator, but debt limits do encourage more
complex forms of restructuring. Restructuring service delivery requires capacity to take risks and is more
common among experienced local officials in larger, higher income communities.  Restructuring should be
viewed as a complex, pragmatic process where governments combine public and private provision with an
active role as service provider and market player.
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Warner, M.E. 2000. “Structuring the Market for Service Delivery: A New Role for Local Government.” pp
85-104 in Local Government Innovation: Issues and Trends in Privatization and Managed Competition,
Robin Johnson and Norman Walzer eds.  Westport, CT: Quorum Books.
Case study analysis of reverse privatization among New York State towns and counties shows how
governments engage the market to ensure competition, control and attention to community values.  The
nature and relative importance of three alternatives to privatization – inter-municipal cooperation, reverse
privatization and governmental entrepreneurship are described. 
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Warner, M.E. and R. Hebdon “Local Government Restructuring in New York State: Summary of Survey
Results”
Surveys on restructuring of service delivery were distributed to the chief elected officials in all town (932) and
upstate county (57) governments in New York State from November 1996 to March 1997. A total of 26
counties and 196 towns responded for an overall response rate of 22%. This research, undertaken in
collaboration with the County Legislators and Supervisors Association (now the New York State Association of
Counties) in 1996 and 1997, found that half of responding governments had implemented some form of
restructuring since 1990.
Restructuring in New York State primarily involves public sector innovation rather than privatization.
Intermunicipal cooperation was the predominant form of restructuring, while privatization was the second
most common form of restructuring. Significant levels of reverse privatization and governmental
entrepreneurship were also found. Incidence of restructuring was highest among counties, and in the
following service areas: public works, public safety, and general governmental support functions.
Impact on local budget and economic efficiency were the most important factors in the decision to restructure
services. Concerns with service quality and community values were also important. Labor and management
concerns were also significant but unionization was not considered a major factor. Legal and political
concerns, availability of information and experience with past restructuring were also important. Local
governments in New York State critically assess their restructuring options to enhance efficiency while
maintaining service quality and reflecting community values. Economies of scale and competition are keys to
efficiency, not privatization per se. Thus, local governments employ a variety of restructuring options. They
achieve economies of scale by cooperating with other governments, and they promote competition by
encouraging public sector units to compete with private sector providers.
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Hebdon, Robert, and Hazel Dayton Gunn. 1995. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization at the Local
Level in New York State." Community Development Report. Ithaca, NY: Community and Rural
Development Institute, Cornell University
(http://www.cardi.cornell.edu/local_government/community_governance/000244.php)
Local governments seeking to reduce costs are giving serious consideration to privatization. By subjecting
service provision to the rigors of market competition proponents believe efficiency will be increased.
Opponents are concerned that service quality, social equity and labor conditions may be diminished. With
privatization the role of government shifts to contractor rather than direct provider. Special care must be
taken to ensure adequate oversight as government remains ultimately responsible for service delivery.
Privatization is a worldwide phenomenon. In recent years Eastern European countries have been turning to
privatization as a way to dispose of state-owned, out-of-date, and inefficient firms as well as to provide an
influx of foreign capital. In the United States arguments for and against public sector provision of goods and
services reflect current political ideology on the role of government and the role of markets. Because no
comprehensive studies on the costs and benefits of privatization have been carried out, the debate continues
based on largely untested assumptions.
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Savas, E. S., ed. 1992. Privatization for New York: Competing for a Better Future. The Lauder Report; A
report of the NYS Senate Advisory Commission on Privatization. New York.
The report provides a review of privatization experience in New York State, from a proponent's perspective.
The report argues privatization leads to greater productivity that enables governments to provide the same
level of services at lower cost, or to improve services without raising taxes. The report addresses the biggest
budget services in NYS including New York City. It also introduces the experience of other states and cities,
and the special experiences gained in Britain. The report has an excellent executive summary.
Chapter 1: Introduction (E. S. Savas)
Privatization is a proven, successful approach being adopted throughout the world. However, New York is
lagging badly. Forms of privatization are discussed, evidence presented, and recommendations drawn.
Chapter 2: What Other States are Doing (Keon S. Chi)
More and more states are privatizing their services; health, human services, prison, transportation, etc. NYS
has a lot of legal and administrative impediments to privatization.
Chapter 3: Medicaid (Edwin S. Rubenstein)
Medicaid is NY's premier "budget buster." Less regulation, co-payment, competitive contracting, and
prevention of fraud, are recommended.
Chapter 4: Airports (Robert W. Poole, Jr)
Airports are undervalued assets of state and local governments. Passengers and taxpayers would benefit from
privatization.
Chapter 5: Education (John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe)
Despite high education expenditure, NY's public schools are performing poorly. The authors recommend school
choice.
Chapter 6: Bus Services (Wendell Cox and Jean Love)
The cost of local public bus services in NY has been increasing. Mandatory competitive contracting is
recommended costs savings.
Chapter 7: Infrastructure (Steve Steckler and Lavinia Payson)
Privatization in infrastructure is appealing because it provides new capital, can be built more rapidly and
efficiently, and brings in new sources of tax revenue.
Chapter 8: Solid Waste Management (Barbara J.Stevens)
Compared with other communities, NY uses contracts or franchises much less in solid waste collection.
Competitive bidding is necessary to ensure gains from privatization.
Chapter 9: Housing in New York City (Jack Richman)
New Yorkers are suffering from a shortage of decent, affordable housing. Housing vouchers are recommended
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as the most cost-effective form of housing subsidy.
Chapter 10: Off-Track Betting in New York City (Ann E. Kaplan)
NY is the only state with government-operated betting parlors. It is best handled by private business. Off-
tract betting should be sold at auction to the highest bidder.
Chapter 11: The Privatization Experience in Britain (Peter Young)
Mandatory competitive bidding for local services in Britain went into effect in 1988, even though the political
and ideological climate was hostile. Bus service, airport, and infrastructure were privatized to save costs.
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Chandler, Timothy, and Peter Feuille. 1994. "Cities , Unions, and the Privatization of Sanitation Services."
Journal of Labor Research 15 (1): 53-71.
Using extensive municipal survey data, Chandler and Feuille analyze the relationship between unionization
and government decisions to contract for sanitation services within the conceptual framework of industrial
relations. The authors conclude that the existence of a union neither increases nor decreases the probability
of privatization with any statistical certainty.
Chandler and Feuille bring three theoretical assumptions to their study: 1) that political and economic
environmental forces lead to choices by management, labor, and government which affect the industrial
relations system; 2) that management must lead in the effort to change the system because unions and
government have been slow to respond to economic and political changes; 3) that the values and beliefs of
key decision-makers play a crucial role in determining decisions.
The authors are particularly interested in discerning the impact of privatization on votes, which are of course
a primary concern to politicians and a constraint in municipal decision-making. They assume that the decision
to contract sanitation services is directly related to gains or losses in votes, and develop a function which
relates votes with changes in the cost to consumers (C), political rents received by various interest groups,
such as political patronage jobs (P), and the change in the quality or effectiveness of government services
(E). The authors conclude that the existence of a union neither increases nor decreases the probability of
privatization. However, the nature of the relationship between municipal management and any union has a
great impact on the decision-making process regarding privatization.
Chandler and Feuille theorize that the municipality will decide to contract the service if the political support
for contracting exceeds that for retaining public production. They further separate the decision making
process into two steps: 1) considering the impact on votes of contracting the service, and 2) making the
decision to contract the service. City officials may wish to publicly contemplate privatization to indicate to
voters a desire to cut costs, but the decision may be more driven by interest groups such as public sanitation
unions or private sanitation contractors. The authors thus separate the decision-making process to evaluate
the determinants of privatization of the service reaching the public agenda versus the determinants of the
policy decision to privatize. Chandler and Feuille develop two additional functions for these two steps.
Consideration of the option (CONSIDER) is a function of the perceived political popularity as measured by
votes, whereas deciding to contract (CONTOUT) is a separate function of considering the option in relation to
C, P, and E.
The authors use this model to test the impacts on taxpayer and voter support of privatization in light of three
hypotheses drawn from the literature regarding the impacts of privatization on costs, labor, and quality. First,
contracting results in cost savings (Savas, Stevens). Second, contracting is perceived to adversely impact
public employees. Third, there is no evidence that contracting either increases or decreases the quality of
service (Morley, Stevens). The authors model municipal fiscal health and union/management relations into the
CONSIDER and CONTOUT functions by introducing additional variables such as per capita municipal debt, local
tax revenues, the maximum hourly wage of public sanitation workers minus the local average wage in
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manufacturing, and a measure of the nature of the relationship between the sanitation union and public
management.
To test this model, Chandler and Feuille have reduced their data sample size to 740 municipalities from the
1,541 respondents to their 1989 survey analyzed in their article "Municipal Unions and Privatization"
published in the January/February 1991 issue of the Public Administration Review. It appears that they have
drawn this sample of 740 from the larger data group to better reflect regional and city size categories of the
population.
The data thus modeled indicate that municipal officials respond to both financial pressures and the interests
of unions when making privatization decisions. Cities experiencing financial stress are more likely to contract
for the service, since there is more voter political support of that decision in those cases. Unions alone do not
increase or decrease the likelihood that a service will be contracted to a private firm. Rather, the relations
between the union and management are the significant factor in the decision-making process. Cities in which
there is a cooperative relationship are less likely to implement privatization than are non-union cities.
However, cities with an adversarial relationship with the union are more likely to privatize sanitation service.
The data do not indicate that municipal decisions to contract are simply a managerial response to difficult
union relationships, but are the result of a number of complex political and fiscal variables.
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Chandler, Timothy, and Peter Feuille. 1991. "Municipal Unions and Privatization." Public Administration
Review 51 (1): 15-22.
This article examines the effect of municipal unions on cities’ decision to privatize a particular service. The
authors surveyed public works directors around the country to understand city decisions to privatize
sanitation collection. Sanitation services typify government services most often privatized: they are prosaic,
not uniquely public, delivered through low-skilled jobs and have easily monitored outputs.
The primary rationale for privatization appears to be cost savings (average 29-37% savings for sanitation
collection.) Unionization has traditionally has led to increased labor costs.
Privatization displaces these employees, which has been a major rallying point for union opposition, especially
among women and minorities who benefit significantly from public sector employment. Unions possess an
organizational advantage in opposing privatization, since they may be able to overcome individual interests in
tax savings.
Authors surveyed 1,256 cities for the union status of their sanitation employees. They found that cities which
had seriously considered contracting out services were more likely to have adversarial relations with the
sanitation union or had experienced a strike. Employee opposition to contracting was significantly higher in
unionized cities than non-unionized. The presence of a sanitation union significantly reduced the likelihood of
a final decision to contract out, even when no language in the union contract forbid doing so. Most cities that
privatized contracted out the entire service (as opposed to just portions of it). Almost one-third of the private
sanitation employees were reported to be unionized (as opposed to an average of 40% for municipal
sanitation workers). A significant number of these cities also experienced strikes by the private union, and a
small percentage of these actually reverted to public service provision.
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Hebdon, Robert. 1995. "Contracting Out in New York State: The Story the Lauder Report Chose Not to
Tell." Labor Studies Journal (Spring): 3-29.
The article analyzes critically the claimed benefits of contracting out as detailed in the Lauder Report on
privatization in New York State. According to the Lauder Report, privatization not only contributes to
efficiency, effectiveness, and equity, but also lessens the threat of strikes. However, the Lauder Report has
serious flaws, described below:
Flaws in scientific research
The report's analysis of solid waste management, which is important because it provides the grounds
on which privatization is deemed superior to public sector in terms of efficiency, is flawed. For each
of the services, the sample size is too small to produce reliable statistical results.
It is not clear that the ten cities analyzed were selected by random sampling.
Savas's review, which was conducted from 1965 to 1977, is also not statistically significant based on
accepted standards. Accordingly, the study's results cannot be trusted, and do not provide empirical
evidence that privatization is more efficient than public sector.
Overlooking privatization failures
The report overlooked effects on employees: it did not look at pay, benefits, or working conditions of
those producing good or service.
It ignored the fundamental difference between the public sector and private sector: the public sector
is based on public law while the private sector is motivated by economics and behavior theory.
It overlooked the impact of privatization on the employment of women and minorities and the
possibility of corruption.
Implications of contracting out for unions and collective bargaining
The Taylor Law prescribes strong penalties against public workers for all strikes and requires a
formal bargaining process including union recognition and certification. It contributes to low numbers
of strikes, social stability, and economic progress.
Contracting out is treated as mandatory subject of bargaining by the Taylor Law. After contracting
out, there may be more strikes and social unrest because unionized employees of private contractors
will acquire the right to strike.
In conclusion, the author believes that privatization is not a panacea. Rather, it may prove to be a disruptive,
socially destabilizing, and ultimately harmful method of cost saving. The practical answer can be found in
public sector reform through dialogue, discussion, and negotiation. The productivity improvements that
government needs can be acquired by workplace innovations that combine substantial employees participation
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in decision making with the sharing of economic gains.
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Pendleton, Andrew. 1997. "What Impact Has Privatization Had on Pay and Employment:A Review of the
UK Experience." Industrial Relations 52 (3): 554-579.
Since 1979, the United Kingdom has reduced employment in public sector from 7.3 million to 5.3 million, by
transferring public services to private ownership and contracting out and competitive bidding. The former, the
transfer of public ownership to private ownership, was achieved at the state level by the sale of public
corporations and utilities such as British Telecom and British Gas and Water Supply Company. The latter,
contracting out and competitive bidding, was accomplished in local governments and parts of central
government.
The objectives of the privatization in UK are as below:
An ideological concern: to reduce the role of the state and to promote consumer choice.
A set of economic reasons: embracing a change in the structure of the economy, and promoting
efficiency and enterprise.
Managerial concern: rationalizing the internal structures of state-owned organizations.
Financial benefit.
There have been two steps in privatization in the UK:
Phase 1(1979-1984): The sale of firms already operating in competitive market and ancillary firms of
nationalized industry. This was propelled by ideological hostility to the public sector.
Phase 2 (1984-present): The sale by public flotation of utilities and other key nationalized industries. The
characteristic of this phase is securing wide public participation in the share offers rather than promoting
competition and maximizing receipts. Phase 2 was driven by questions of political advantage aimed at the
increasing the proportion of the electorate likely to vote conservative rather than promoting economic
efficiency.
Expected impact of privatization on industrial relationships
Privatization could be expected to make pay determinations more responsive to markets and
performance than to political factors through elimination of public sector trade unions, which had
immense power in pay determination. Therefore pay and benefits would be harmed.
Economists argued that the pursuit of profits would lead to internal efficiencies. From the viewpoint of
agency theory, privatization would reduce the difficulty in monitoring due to asymmetric information
between firms and government, and would provide incentives to improve firm performance. Accordingly,
privatization would modify traditional patterns of labor, management, and industrial relationships.
In contrast to monopolies, which can secure higher levels of profitability by adjustments to prices rather
than costs, competition between firms would result in lower labor costs and improved productivity.
In summary, a convergence of pay trends between privatized firms and other private firms and reduction of
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employment were expected as a result of privatization.
Realized impact of privatization on industrial relationship
The actual experience in the UK provides little clear-cut evidence in favor of the arguments above:
Pay
Haskel and Szymansky’s study compared 14 public sector firms and the economy as whole, and
found that change of ownership did not affect pay levels. That is, there were no clear differences
between the privatized and public sector firms.
Contracting out and competitive bidding resulted in reducing cost. However, there were little
reduction of pay and benefits. That is, the reduction in the cost may be secured primarily by
improvements in labor productivity and reductions in employment rather than adjustments to pay
and benefits.
Employment
There is evidence of a fall in employment around the time of privatization in some firms, but also
there is counter-evidence of increases in employment in others. However, in local authority service,
most organizations securing contract reformed work practices and reduced employment levels.
Lack of reduction in employment levels can be attributed to monopolies (where competition is
limited, pressure for greater profitability may well be secured by raising price rather than reducing
cost), governmental control on the quality of service (resulting in difficulty in reducing staffing), or
low tolerance of private firms for adverse public reactions to staffing reductions.
Conclusion
Deregulation and exposure to product market competition have a more powerful impact on firm behavior
than transfer of ownership; the clearest indication of the power of competition comes from the local
authority sector, where employment levels have fallen among both private and public sector service
providers.
Continuity in pay and employment among some monopoly privatized utilities with industry-specific
technology could be partly explained by the lack of an alternative source of labor supply.
Some of the most dramatic changes in labor management in privatized firms was due to deregulation of
labor market rather than privatization.
Therefore, the impact of privatization on labor relationship depends on labor market, product market
competition, and transfers of ownership.
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Donovan, Ronald, and Marsha J. Orr. 1982. "Subcontracting in the Public Sector: The New York State
Experience." Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
According to Donovan and Orr, subcontracting brings into conflict two fundamental rights or interests:
The employer''s right to manage the enterprise, to determine what services shall be rendered to the
public, and to decide how those services can be rendered most effectively and efficiently.
The employee''s right to share in the determination of the terms and conditions of employement.
Orr and Donovan review several case studies of privatization of school transportation services. During recent
years, intensified contracting has occurred in New York State due to a 1981 state law which created a
subsidization formula for the industry that made it more cost-effective to contract. Additional reasons cited
for contracting included many of those regularly identified in other industries, including economic savings,
greater efficiency fueled by the profit incentive, and the reduced need to negotiate with employees.
Opposition to contracting of school transportation services comes from employees who feel threatened by loss
of benefits (especially those who have been within the system for a long period of time) and unions.
Instances of involuntary layoff were actually reported to be infrequent.
The response of unions to subcontracting varies in intensity and the methods used -- from running an
emotional campaign against it, to treating it as a negotiating problem in trying to secure a delay to better
organize. The authors feel unions risk a loss of power if they lose the battle, and that ironically, they may be
better off dealing with a private contractor.
Although there has been general satisfaction in the three school districts utilizing subcontracting, it still
remains unknown whether or not economic returns have been achieved. However, the authors conclude that
the structure of the state aid formula is reason enough to conclude that districts do save money at least in
the short run. What happens financially in the long run depends upon the state aid formula and whether a
high level of competition can be maintained within the industry.
The Taylor Law categorizes subjects of negotiation between employer and labor as mandatory, non-
mandatory, or prohibited. A mandatory term or condition of employement is one that, if raised by either
party, must be negotiated in good faith even to the point of deadlock. A non-mandatory subject may not be
pressed to impasse except by mutual agreement. Although the Taylor Law states that private sector labor law
shall not be regarded as a binding or controlling precedent, the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB) and
New York State Courts are still watching closely what the National Labor Relations Board (NRLB) says and
does. The NLRB regards subcontracting as a non-mandatory subject of negotiations if it meets the following
criteria:
it is motivated by economic considerations
the activity comports with the employer''s customary business operations
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the activity does not vary significantly in kind or degree from past practice
the subcontracting has has no adverse affects on employees in the unit subcontracting follows an
opportunity by the union to bargain about changes in existing subcontrating practices at previous general
bargaining sessions
In general, there must be a clear link of causation between subcontracting and a substantial adverse,
immediate adverse, or significant detrimental effect on employees, and this is difficult to formulate.
There are many different forums in the public sector for challenging decisions by public entities to
subcontract. The variety of ways in which people have challenged these decisions, and the rulings on the
cases have shown that subcontracting is an extremely complex issue.
The Taylor Law poses a problem of interpretation in determining whether a subject of negotiation is a term or
condition of employment, or one which directly affects the terms and conditions of employment. The Saratoga
Springs case serves as an example where an employer wanted to subcontract and, in the process, did not
plan to change the nature or amount of service, and was to retain ownership over capital and management of
employees. Therefore, the only effect of subcontracting was on the employees themselves. In this case,
subcontracting was ruled as a mandatory subject of negotiation. In another case in New Rochelle, the
employer was actually changing the amount of service to be provided and therefore subcontracting was ruled
a non-mandatory subject of negotiation.
If the public employer''s only objective in subcontracting is to save costs while not changing the nature or
amount of service, subcontracting is ruled as a mandatory subject of negotiations. Assignment of work to
non-unit employees, provided it does not have an effect on or alter the terms of employment, and is
considered a redetermination of job qualifications, is deemed a non-mandatory subject of negotiation. Finally,
if there exists evidence that subcontracting would result in a departure from past practices, then it is
considered a mandatory subject.
The duty to bargain can be waived by employers if there exists either explicit language in
the contract giving the employer the right to bargain, or if the employees fail to request a
negotiation. Employers also have the right to act unilaterally in a time of compelling
urgency. Donovan and Orr believe that identifying a time of urgency poses interpretive
problems. The Triborough Doctrine states that negotiating parties are obliged to maintain
the status quo during the hiatus between the expiration of the old agreement and the
negotiation of its successor.
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Moe, Ronald C. 1987. "Exploring the Limits of Privatization." Public Administration Review 47 (Nov/Dec):
453-460.
This article speaks to the much-ignored subject of legality and privatization. Moe's essay suggests the
passivity of public administration in raising critical questions, respecting the limits of privatization, originated
in the reality that public administration has largely forsaken its intellectual roots which are embedded in
public law, not economics or the social sciences.
Moe argues that privatization proponents see public and private sectors as being alike. They are concerned
with which sector can do the work most efficiently and don't bother with legal or organizational structure
questions. Public and private sectors are alike in the nonessentials, but differ in the essentials. A line must be
drawn between public and private and public law provides that line.
In 1819 the Supreme Courts decision on McCulloch v. Maryland taught us that a sovereign cannot be taxed
by a subordinate unit since to do so would permit another body to determine the fate of the sovereign. The
court reasoned if the government owned any part of an entity, the entire body became an instrumentality of
the government. This ruling is significant because political actors, both executive and legislative, are assigning
functions with a public character largely without criteria and with consequences that are expensive to both
the public and private sectors. Such was the case with the Federal Assets Disposition Association who seeks
to be private in its direction and interests but public in its rights and privileges.
The most important characteristic that separates public and private is sovereignty. Sovereign attributes
include:
Legitimate right to use coercion to enforce its will.
Legitimate right to got to war with another sovereign.
Sovereigns are immune from suit except by their permission.
Sovereigns are indivisible.
Sovereign state may disavow debts but can't go bankrupt.
Sovereigns have the right to establish rules for protection and transference of property, both public and
private (eminent domain).
This issue of sovereignty is important, because private firms that contracted by the government may fall into
a legal limbo. Many questions arise, for example:
If "private" can a corporation declare bankruptcy if providing a public good or service?
Are employees, offices, and record protected by the privacy rulings based on the 4th amendment or are
they considered "public."
There are additional factors to be considered. Issue of accountability, public safety, national security, and
corruption in privatization need to be discussed.
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Sullivan, Harold J. 1987. "Privatization of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights."
Public Administration Review 47 (Nov/Dec): 461-467.
According to Harold Sullivan, the U.S. Constitution provides many protections to citizens against arbitrary
action of the government that may infringe upon their rights and privileges, however, the Constitution does
not provide these same types of protections to individuals against actions of the private sector. This article
reviews the judicial decisions concerning the scope and applicability of national constitutional protections on
privatization. It also examines and identifies a number of arrangements between the government and private
service providers that immunize both the government and private entities from constitutional restraints. In
Sullivan’s opinion, privatization threatensconstitutional rights.
Sullivan identifies the distinction between privatization of service provision (deciding whether a service will be
provided at all, and if so, who shall have it and how much of it), and privatization of production (operating,
running, doing, selling, delivering and administering). If production were the only service privatized, the main
issue of concern would be loss of jobs. However, the distinction between provision and production is often
blurred. Sullivan believes that the determination of the merits of privatization must be informed by a real
understanding of the different legal positions of the public and private sectors.
The State Action Doctrine mandates that protection afforded by the Constitution can only be invoked against
laws or actions of the state. Before the Civil Rights laws were the courts were more willing to acknowledge
the direct involvement of the state in private abuses. But Civil Rights laws have reversed this trend, and it is
now harder to hold the state accountable for infringement upon rights by the private sector. In a time when
privatization is increasing, this threatens the civil rights of individuals who are receiving more and more
services from the private sector.
Court cases such as Burton v. Wilmington and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison serve as examples of instances
where a private owner or operator that was regulated in some way by the state, was not bound in its actions
by the Constitution. Rendel Baker v. Kohn and Blum v. Yaretsky are both cases where private owners and
operators that were funded by the state but were not bound in their actions by the Constitution. These cases
provide evidence that by turning public services over to private agencies, the state evades Constitutional
restraints.
The Public Functions Doctrine states that when a private entity a "public" or state function, that it is subject
to constitutional restraints. However, examples of cases show that this law is limited only to those cases
where the actions of the private entity consist of powers that were traditionally and exclusively reserved to
the state. In Flagg Brothers v. Brooks it was established that before a function is labeled a public function, it
must be shown that:
1. the power in question is one which has been traditionally exercised by the government alone; and
2. the government must have abdicated total and unreviewable control over the exercise of the exclusive
governmental function to a private party (i.e. only if the government no longer has any role at all in
provision or production of the good or service).
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The set of exclusive functions recognized by the government is actually quite (e.g. elections, management of
town, eminent domain, education, fire and police, tax collection, etc.)
Any successful challenge to an action of a private agency hinges upon showing that the specific decision or
action under attack was a direct product of state initiative and compulsion and/or was implemented by state
officials.
The government could, through legislation, require private goods and service providers to extend to their
clients constitutional protections, but the most needed services are most often the least politically influential.
Government must restrict the discretion permitted private agencies.
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Gerbasi, Jennifer and M.E. Warner, June 2003.  “The Impact of International Trade on State and Local
Government Authority, “ Dept. of City and Regional Planning Working Papers #204.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University. Available at  http://government.cce.cornell.edu/?/doc/reports/freetrade/#book1 / 
 The WTO, NAFTA, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the upcoming Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) have been formulated to limit government participation in a number of ways in the
name of free market competition.  Government measures such as subsidies, taxes, health and environmental
regulations, administrative rules, and government provision of goods and services are viewed as potentially
interfering with the free market disciplines of competition based on price and quality.
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Warner, Mildred and Jennifer Gerbasi. “Rescaling and Reforming the State under NAFTA: Implications for
Subnational Authority.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research December 2004 Vol 28(4):
853-73.
The new free trade agreements are rescaling governance in ways that have critical implications for
subnational governments.  The nation state is not simply being hollowed out, rather a new governance nexus
is forming—of nation states, multinational corporations and international agreements—which explicitly
excludes subnational and local government voice.  This paper describes the new governance features of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and illustrates how they work out at the national, subnational,
and local scales using cases from the United States and Mexico.  NAFTA provides the template for other free
trade agreements including the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and a growing number of bilateral
agreements.  The authors show how NAFTA’s governance structure is undermining subnational and local
government authority in legislative and judicial arenas. Designed to advance privatization of public services,
these agreements undermine the very ability of local governments to use markets for public goods by
defining traditional state and local governance mechanisms has ‘non-tariff barriers to trade.” Contradictions
between private profit and public interest appear at the subnational level but their resolution is engaged at
the global level between private investors and the nation state. Recognition of this rescaling requires
attention to the reforming state and its implications for subnational authority and democratic representation
and voice.
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Jennifer Gerbasi, Jennifer and Mildred Warner. 2004, "Is There a Democratic Deficit in the Free Trade
Agreements? What Local Governments Should Know," Public Management 86:2 (16-21).
When state and local governments use market solutions for the provision of public goods they still play an
active role in structuring the market in order to ensure efficiency gains and the preservation of public values.
Government action defines clear property rights, a predictable adjudication process and open contracting to
provide competitive market opportunities. However, the ability of state and local governments to play this role
may be undermined by new restrictions on government action found in free trade agreements. These
agreements undermine state and local government sovereignty by privileging foreign over domestic investors,
replacing public courts with private arbitration, and supplanting traditional standards for legislation by
requirements to be "least trade restrictive." Government regulations are being reinterpreted as barriers to
trade, and a new definition of "takings" requires governmental compensation for lost potential profits from
regulatory action. Ironically, the singular attention to market goals in the new trade agreements is
undermining the potential for market solutions by altering the ability of government to serve the traditional
role of balancing market growth with serving broader public values.
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Kohl, Benjamin, 2004. “Privatization and Regulation: A cautionary tale from Bolivia,” submitted to
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, forthcoming 28(4) 2004.
The author, Ben Kohl, uses Privatization in Bolivian experience to illustrate that there are limitations of
privatization in poor market regulations. On one hand, Kohl points out several advantages of privatization
from both economic and political terms. They are increases in market operation efficiency as well as individual
freedom, decreases in occurrences of corruption in state-owned-enterprises (SOEs), and liberalized market
environment that promotes economic growth. On the other hand, however, Kohl also warns the
disadvantages that accompany with privatization, which are the decreases of governmental services and
revenues (p. 1-2).
 Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America. The main revenue of the country depends on the
export of raw materials. Since 1980, Bolivia has experienced two major economic breakdowns. In 1985, its
inflation rate also rose to 20,000 % (p. 4). One of the idiosyncrasies of Bolivia is its informal economy, which
includes the contraband and remittance of cocoa-cocaine. Scholars estimate that these underground economic
activities count nearly as much as half of the whole nation’s economic activities, which are employed around
2/3 of all Bolivians (p. 7).
The path of Bolivian privatization began in 1985, when the New Economic Plan succeeded in bringing
hyperinflation under control. The privatization became aggressive after Sanchez de Lozada won the election in
1994. The Law of Capitalization allowed the six largest state-owned firms to be privatized. These firms
included businesses in oil, gas, telecommunications, airlines, power generation, and railroad (p. 10). The
Bolivia government sold out 50% of its SOE shares and kept 49% of remaining shares into pension fund
administrators (AFPs). The reason behind holding the remaining SOE shares was to pay a universal old age
pension called Bonosol. The government administration believed that foreign investments would not only
enable increase in economic development from 4% to 11%, but also create 500,0000 new job opportunities
over a four- year period. Sanchez had three goals in capitalization. They were
                (1)   To create a privatization program with a social content
      (2)   To increase rates of economic growth over the medium and long term
      (3)   To change the government’s role as the primary economic actor (p.3).
 
However, Sanchez’s administration could not achieve his goals after all for six main reasons. Firstly, policy
makers failed to consider that the quality of economic growth counts as much as the quantity in job creation.
Secondly, the capitalization led to massive firings of unionized workers. Thirdly, the pension fund did not
work. The AFPs had to borrow 44 million dollars with the interest rate at 11%. The AFPs could not raise the
cash by selling its stocks due to the difficulties in establishing the Bolivian stock market. Fourthly, poor
market regulatory and high social risk led investors to look to the short term and expect to earn risk
premiums. Fifthly, the government was short of revenues because of the selling of its SOEs. The government
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also had difficulty to tax its citizens, as the most accepted business practice to most Bolivians was to avoid
taxes. Lastly, the unhealthy ownerships of privatized companies allowed certain personals to obtain internal
business information, and therefore, easily to anticipate changes in stock prices (p. 14-17).
 
In conclusion, the Bolivian government failed to capitalize state-owned companies as a whole, although the
capitalization succeeded in both attracting foreign investment and reducing the governmental interference in
economics. The Bolivian economy failed to respond as predicted to the influx of foreign investment capital.
Thousands of anticipated jobs never materialized, which instead caused the outflow of talent. The foreign
investors reinvested and transferred the profits out of the country instead of distributing their earnings to the
local government and paying taxes in Bolivia. Facing the sharp drop in revenue, the only option that the
government had was to reduce its expenditures on health and education. Bolivian privatization failed in the
absence of appropriate regulatory and market infrastructure (p.27-28).
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Shughart, William F. II 1999. “Interest Group Theory of Government in Developing Economy
Perspective,” in Institutions and Collective Choice in Developing Countries ed by Mwangi Kimenyi and
John Mbuku. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co. pp 169-198.
This paper outlines the interest group or the ‘capture’ theory of the government. This
theory rests on two fundamental premises:
The first is that the same behavioral assumptions of maximization of self-interest that
explain decision-making of the market should be used to explain the behavior of the
public policy makers as well. While firms maximize profits; consumers maximize utility,
public policy makers also maximize their interest (i.e. political support)
The second premise is that policy outcomes should not be explained away as ‘errors’ or
ignorance but should be seen as actual effects.
 
Government Failure
Goods that have positive or negative externalities are not produced at the optimum price
or at the optimum amount if left to the market. The Pigouvian solution to this problem of
market failure was government intervention. This assumes that the government benignly
pursues the objective of maximizing social welfare. If this were true developing countries
would have long solved their problems. Interest group theory looks at the wide
divergence between the actual and intended effects of government intervention to
understand why public regulation policies rarely benefit the consumers.
 
Market for Wealth Transfers
Interest-group theory explains how the monopoly power of the state can be mobilized
selectively to benefit one group at the expense of the other. George Stigler (1971)
formalized this notion by explaining that typically producer groups are smaller than
consumer groups. Therefore they find it profitable to organize themselves into coalitions
to lobby the public regulators for gain. On the other hand, consumers are a larger and
more diverse group, and hence the cost of organizing themselves to lobby would be
larger than the resulting gains.
 
The paper then explains the dynamics of the market for wealth transfers and the point of
intersection P* is the political equilibrium. The demand and supply curves could be
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interpreted as the follows:
Demand: Assuming n individuals in the economy and 2n-1 possible groups, each group’s
bid price is the price that it would be prepared to pay to receive a transfer of $1. This
price would be $1 minus the costs of organizing/lobbying/collecting
information/overcoming the free-rider problem. This gives a downward sloping demand
curve, which shows that groups that have lower costs of organizing demand more wealth
transfers.
 
Supply: The net supply curve S-f is upward sloping and shows the price that each group
would pay to avoid expropriation of $1 after netting the costs of organizing. The curve
shows that it is cheaper to expropriate $1 from groups that have high costs of organizing.
 
Social Waste
The distance between the S curve and the S-f curve is ‘f’, which is the political broker’s
fee. These resources used for fee are a waste for the economy, as they do not create
new wealth. The crucial point here is that there are information or transaction costs to
collective action. The existence of a market for wealth transfers is due to the cost
differentials of organizing where the political representatives effect redistribution. Hence
they have an incentive to seek out issues on which prospective winners are better
informed and well organized while losers remain ignorant about the transfers. Thus
smaller groups have a comparative advantage in transfer-seeking activity, as their rate of
return to information is higher.
 
Economic Regulation
Research shows that government intervention rarely achieves its announced goals.
Interest group theory suggests that in the ‘market’ for regulation, smaller, well-organized
groups stand to gain from the controls imposed by regulation, which creates incentive for
them to use the regulatory mechanism. This is good for the regulators as well as it
increases ‘f’.
 
The paper then explains Sam Peltzman’s model showing how ‘private’ and not public
interest drives regulatory policies. The model looks at a vote-maximizing regulator. The
analytic used is similar to that of a utility-maximizing consumer trying to attain the
highest indifference curve of utility subject to a budget constraint. Here the regulator is
trying to reach the highest iso-majority curve showing political support, subject to a
price-profit trade off. (Higher prices bring on more consumer resentment and lower prices
bring more producer resentment). The regulator seeks the price that maximizes political
support subject to profit constraint. Stronger producer coalitions would shift the price
higher towards Pm.
 
Extensions of the Interest Group model
Rent extraction: All human action is motivated by a rent-seeking behavior. Regulators
could allow themselves to be ‘captured’ by producer groups they are regulating. They
could also threaten to impose costs on that group in order to extract more rent.
Heterogeneous firms: Interest groups need not be monolithic and each sub-group could
further try to use the regulatory agencies to further its limited interests.
Economic Development: Trade protectionism and state ownership of enterprises also
arises from the same regulatory motivation of maximizing rents, in spite of their obvious
inefficiency.
Population growth: Child bearing and higher value of a male offspring could also be
explained by interest group theory as a rational effort to expand in order to control the
wealth-distribution levers.
Political successions: The theory explains how autocratic governments initially expand the
government while trying to build a coalition to dilute the powers of those loyal to the
previous ruler.
 
Conclusion
Interest group theory is an effort to understand why social welfare is not maximized when
governments step in to deal with market failure by regulating. The theory is positive and
not normative, in seeking to only explain why regulation ‘fails’. The key step forward
would be to frame regulations in such a way that there is synergy between the vote-
maximizing objective of the politician and the utility-maximization of society. The question
however would be: who if not the politician would frame that regulation?
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Graham, Carol. 1998. Private Markets for Public Goods: Raising the Stakes in Economic Reform.
Washington DC: Brooking Institute Press.
            Carol Graham’s book consists of case studies of attempts by national governments to use markets to
increase the efficiency of the public sector.  Although market forces may redistribute resources more
equitably than political institutions, many countries find it difficult to sustain market reforms politically due to
the initial costs to citizens at the onset of the reforms.  Graham focuses on the stakeholder approach as a
means to sustain reform.  The stakeholders approach assumes that active citizen involvement in reform will
increase its political sustainability. Governments may attempt to sustain reforms by building coalitions
between various citizen groups. Equity may be increased by widening services to the poor who use
government services proportionally more than the wealthy.  One danger in the stakeholder approach is the
notion of citizen as consumer, so that only citizens with the resources to participate can influence government
and institutional structure.
            An individuals’ stake in new market reforms can occur through exit and voice.  Exit involves
removing one’s stake in a particular institution and placing it in another. The exit option, although
theoretically open to all citizens, is realistically open only to those who can afford alternatives. Exit can
discourage the development of voice, because those who would have the strongest voices are usually the
ones who can afford to exit.  Voice is the more activist option and calls for the improvement of an existing
institutional structure.  Governments may enhance voice by establishing user fees for certain public goods.
Voice also may be used by workers who feel loyalty to a bureaucracy and are willing to work within it to
change the system internally.
Graham uses case studies to illustrate several aspects of market reform:
Chile—By shifting some services to the private sector, government gave
wealthier citizens alternatives while shifting public sector emphasis to poorer
population.
Peru—Government chose to address social welfare outside of government
institutions instead of reforming existing government    ministries.
Bolivia—Increased popular participation in an attempt to gain more stakeholder
support for reforms.
Czech Republic—Government altered the incentive structure in reforms by using
the voucher program; resulted in short-term success.
Zambia—Illustrated the pitfalls of decentralization for a very poor country and
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the need for capable infrastructure to sustain reforms.
Conclusion—Efficiency Gains and Equity Tradeoffs
Political success of market reforms depends largely on economic success of the reforms.  While citizens can elect candidates into office who
run on reform platforms, it is difficult to measure exactly how much influence voters have, for they are usually voting on reforms already
initiated instead of deciding on the content of the reforms themselves. Leadership of policymakers and the creation of a broad set of
stakeholders are keys to the sustainability of market reforms
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Schick, Alan (1998). “Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand’s Reforms.”  World
Bank Research Observer 13(1):123-131.
During the past decade, New Zealand has introduced far-reaching reforms in the structure and operation of
government departments and agencies. Developing countries have become very interested in this model
because it promises significant gains in operational efficiency. However, these countries, which are dominated
by informal markets, are risky candidates for applying this model. Basic reforms to strengthen rule-based
government and pave the way for robust markets should be undertaken first.
 New Zealand’s government agencies are run by independent public managers who contract out all services
and are monitored for accountability. Schick’s article looks at New Zealand’s system, both the benefits and
cost, and finds reason that this system would not work for developing countries with large informal
economies. Schick begins by describing New Zealand’s government contracting system; he continues with a
description of the informal markets often found in developing nations, followed by an explanation of why New
Zealand’s system would not work for developing nations and ending in a list of steps developing nations might
follow to promote public sector reform. Schick’s central argument is that there are important steps developing
nations need to take before they follow the path of New Zealand.
New Zealand’s System
There are two reasons that the New Zealand example is important. First, New Zealand has rapidly improved
the quality of its government through institutional change. Second, because of the rapid change many
countries look to New Zealand as an example of what to do to promote public sector reform. New Zealand
has restructured its government to make individual departments more accountable and more efficient. To
meet these goals, each department manager has greater flexibility in running the department. The goal is to
create competition within government either by allowing departments to contract for services with other
government departments, or for departments to contract with the private market. A civil service of
accountability replaces one of trust and responsibility. Contracting extends even into the sector of policy
advice. Department managers are allowed to choose between hiring private consultants or contracting with
other government agencies for policy advice.
 There are, however, problems with the New Zealand system in applying a business model to the public
sector. First, contracting puts the focus on outputs, but many of the government interests are difficult to put
in terms of outputs. How do you measure if national defense is provided? Second, the contract system is
dependent on self-interested action, but self-interested action can go against the government’s collective
interest. Third, because of the importance of accountability managers tend to have the approach, “if it is not
specified in the contract, it’s not my responsibility.” Fourth, what happens in the case of one agency providing
a service to another agency? The agency expecting service has no means of exiting the contract, and taking
recourse against the contracted agency, because in the end they are both the government. Because of this
lack of recourse, the markets created by public contracting with other agencies are not real contracts in real
agencies. Schick suggest that because of this failure of contracts to mimic the real market, New Zealand
needs to take further steps in creating independent agencies that can compete. By doing this New Zealand
will receive, “the full benefits of vigorous competition.”
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 In Schick’s analysis, the increased benefits of this system outweigh the costs listed above. However, many
managers argue that the improvement in government performance is from the independent managers and not
contracting. If this is true, relying on independent managers, but deemphasizing contracts would decrease the
massive transaction cost of monitoring contracts.
  
The Informal System
New Zealand’s system is heavily dependent on a strong system of regulating contract enforcement. In many
developing nations such a system does not exist. Informal economies exist because the cost of obeying the
law outweighs the benefits. Informal economies are at the opposite end of the spectrum compared to New
Zealand’s contract economy. Informal markets work through bribes, exchange of government favors, and
hiring based on nepotism. In an informal system, there are two government budgets: one presented as the
official budget, and another that is the official one and which determines what is spent and by how much.
The public never knows what is in the second budget, which does not have to exist on paper, but prevents
government transparency and promotes corruption, because no one can be held accountable.
Changing the Informal System
What would happen if a developing country with a large informal market adopted New Zealand’s system?
Giving independent power to corrupt bureaucrats would only increase corruption. Schick’s final assessment is
that there is an important step in moving toward a contract run government, and that step is creating a
formal public sector, where employees get paid for their work. Schick describes three steps in making a
formal system.
Progress in the public sector requires parallel progress in the market sector.
Economies operating under informal norms cannot happen at the same time as a formal public sector,
because one sector will invariably affect the other. The exception to this is under a colonial system where a
formal public sector existed, but the market remained largely informal. Schick cites China and Singapore as
examples of economic modernization happening in tandem with government modernization.
  Reliable external controls need to be established.
Working under a government that has control over corruption allows managers to build trust between each
other and the citizens to whom they are providing services to. Once controls are in place, a public ethic in the
public interest will be internalized, and the government can trust managers to act properly.
 Politicians must first concentrate on basic public management.
Politicians must first be able to account for money coming into the government before they can be asked to
account for money going out of the government. In an informal system money is hemorrhaging. Politicians
must be able to stop the money leaking out of the system, before they can learn how to spend it.
Conclusion 
While the New Zealand system has benefits and cost, it is important to understand where New Zealand was
before it adopted its changes. New Zealand had a formal public sector first. With an established public sector
New Zealand was able to develop and try new forms of public management. Developing countries must first
take the step of formalizing their public sectors and their markets before they can try new forms of public
administration.
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Clifford Wirth, "Transportation Policy in Mexico City: The Politics and Impacts of Privatization" Urban
Affairs Review, Vol. 33, No. 2, November 1997, pp. 155-181.
For many years, and even more so recently, Mexico City policy makers have implicitly chosen to emphasize
private and semi-private forms of transportation. By tracking subsidies to private forms of transportation and
measuring the lack of public investment in public transportation infrastructure, Wirth finds de facto
privatization of transportation policy highly costly from a social and ecological perspective.
Wirth challenges the idea that "privatization" occurs only when public sector responsibilities are shifted to
private providers. A decision by a government not to take an active public investment role in one arena (e.g.
the city’s metro system) may lead to a very privatized landscape of delivery (as in Mexico City’s resulting
dominance of cars and mini-buses). Second, Wirth also advocates a cost-benefit analysis that includes social
and environmental externality costs. He found 80% of the notorious air pollution imposed on Mexico City to
be the result of private and semi-private modes of transport. In contrast, the bus and metro systems
together, beyond disproportionately serving the poorer segments of the population, account for only 2.7% of
air pollution.
In sum, Wirth wants local government officials to acknowledge their critical role in shaping the landscape of
service delivery, as much by decisions they choose not to make as the decisions they do make.
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Gratto, Andre, Bryan Preston, and Thor Snilsberg. Mitigating Corruption in New Public Management. 
Ithaca NY:  Cornell University Department of City and Regional Planning.
Corruption has been identified as a major barrier to economic and social development in developing countries,
and considerable research as been done into the causes of and the solutions to corruption in these countries.
Several factors that lead to or mitigate corruption in developing countries have been clearly identified:
Revenue Proximity, Accountability, Information Transparency, Participation, Equality of Power/Wealth and
Culture.  In contrast, virtually no research as been directed at corruption in the context of the trends toward
what is known as the New Public Management, or NPM.  NPM is a new pattern of governance associated with
the use of a wide range of different “tools” and with a reliance on third parties to manage and deliver
government services.  However, the factors of corruption identified by international research can be used to
provide an environmental design framework to advise planners and public officials about the potential for
corruption and how it can be mitigated with the NPM.
View the full paper
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McFarland, Stephen, Chris McGowan and Tom O’Toole (2002).  “Prisons, Privatization and Public Values.”
Ithaca NY:  Cornell University Department of City and Regional Planning.
The movement towards the privatization of corrections in the United States is a result of the convergence of
two factors: the unprecedented growth of the US prison population since 1970 and the emergence out of the
Reagan era of  a political environment favorable to free-market solutions. Since the first private prison facility
was opened in 1984, the industry has grown rapidly; gross revenues exceeded $1 billion in 1997. This paper
examines the industry''s growth in the US in recent decades, and its current scope. The evidence for and
against claims that private prisons can realize gains in efficiency are weighed, and implications of privatization
for other public values including safety, justice, and legitimacy are examined.
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Warner, Mildred, James Quazi, Brooks More, Ezra Cattan, Scott Bellen and Kerim Odekon (2002)
 Business Improvement Districts:  Issues in Alternative Local Public Service Provision.  Ithaca NY, Cornell
University Department of City and Regional Planning.
Throughout the country and in cities such as New York, San Francisco, Cleveland and Philadelphia, Business
Improvement Districts (BIDs) have been able to maintain cleaner and safer streets, decrease storefront vacancy
rates, and address social welfare issues. BIDs levy assessments on real property for specific improvements beyond
which local governments can reasonably provide. They have been effective in reversing decline and promoting
commercial development in urban areas.
In general, BIDs are formed following a proposal by a group of property owners in a geographically defined area
to fund supplemental governmental services (e.g. cleaning and maintenance), non-governmental services (e.g.
landscaping, marketing and promotion), and capital investments (e.g. sidewalk widening). The municipality in
which a BID is located collects the BID’s supplemental property tax assessments through its general taxation
powers and distributes them to the BID. A board of directors composed of property owners, merchants, residents
and public sector representatives is then given authority by the government to undertake projects and programs
within the district.
While the ability of BIDs to achieve their goals is rarely questioned, concerns have been raised over whether the
success of BIDs has come at a cost. This website profiles the issues raised by both proponents and critics in a
number of areas and provides case studies focussed on material from New York State to illustrate these points. 
Link to full text:  http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/reports/econdev/bids.htm
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Transfer of Development Rights Programs
Using the Market for Compensation and Preservation
Jason Hanly-Forde, George Homsy, Katherine Lieberknecht, Remington Stone
Local governments undertake transfer of development rights (TDR) programs to use the market to implement and pay
for development density and location decisions. TDR programs allow landowners to sever development rights from
properties in government-designated low-density areas, and sell them to purchasers who want to increase the density
of development in areas that local governments have selected as higher density areas.
TDR programs appear to offer many advantages to local governments that want to control land use but also
compensate landowners for restrictions on the development potential of their properties. TDR programs can be easier
to implement than typical zoning programs; they make development more predictable and use the market to
compensate landowners for lost property value. TDR programs are also more permanent than traditional zoning
regulations.
Although TDR programs appears to be a potentially powerful land use tool, few communities have had success in
using these programs because of the associated challenges . TDR programs do not reduce the need for zoning and can
actually be more complex to administer. Communities may not support TDR programs, and local governments may
have to invest in community education programs to explain them to the public. Lastly, although the permanency of
TDR programs can be an advantage, it may also be a liability, since a community’s land use needs change over time.
Local governments that are interested in TDR programs should consider both how to create a strong market for
development rights in their communities and how TDR programs interact with the ‘takings’ issue. The final part of this
paper presents advice and information on both these topics and ends with an evaluation of TDR programs as a
governing tool.
What is the history of transfer of development rights programs?
What is a TDR program?
How does a TDR Program Work?
What are the advantages of TDR programs?
What are the challenges of TDR programs?
How can local governments build a market for a TDR program?
Should local governments worry about TDR and ‘takings’ law?
Is a TDR program a good governing tool?
Conclusions
Landownership was one of the first measures of citizenship in the United States. The passion to protect the right of
property owners to reap economic gain from their land still burns strongly today. Because of this, local governments
often encounter citizen resistance to land use controls that attempt to provide for a public good. As a result, zoning can
be very difficult to implement.
Many planners tout transfer of development right (TDR) programs as a way to take the politics out of zoning. With
TDR programs, the market makes land use and density allocations and compensates property owners whose
development rights have been limited in order to preserve some societal good, such as open space, farmland or historic
preservation. It is a potentially powerful tool, but in its thirty year history, it seems to have made little headway in
communities across the country. This paper examines TDR programs, their benefits and their costs and suggests why
the adoption of this tool has been limited.
What is the history of transfer of development rights programs?
Zoning was the first widespread attempt to balance individual property rights against the good of society. Early
advocates also suggested that zoning would enhance property values (Karkainen, 1994).
In 1916, New York City enacted the nation's first comprehensive zoning ordinance after a spate of skyscrapers blocked
sunlight from neighboring properties. At the same time, warehouses and factories were encroaching on fashionable
retail areas of Fifth Avenue. The new zoning ordinance set both height and setback requirements and separated
incompatible uses, such as factories and residences (City of New York Department of Planning, 2002).
From the beginning, critics complained about the unfairness of zoning since it benefits some landowners and limits
others. In 1926 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty that the
legal system recognizes many kinds of unequal burdens (Karkainen, 1994). The Euclid case required two hearings
before the high court narrowly affirmed a community's ability to zone. (Callies, Freilich and Roberts, 1999)
The idea of transferring development rights between properties was first introduced in New York City with the passage
of that first American zoning ordinance in 1916. It allowed landowners to sell their unused air rights to adjacent lots,
which could then exceed the new height and setback requirements. In 1968, the city Planning Commission changed the
rules to allow transfers between lots several blocks apart (Johnston and Madison, 1997).
In the early 1980s, the command and control nature of many regulations came under fire as an inefficient. Policy
makers searched for ways to govern using the market (Henig, 1989-90). In 1986, Australia created a system of tradable
fishing permits to stabilize lobster populations. During the first half of the 1990s, a system of tradable pollution credits
in the U.S. cut emissions of sulfur dioxide (which causes acid rain) in half (Brown, 2001). With these successes,
market advocates found the world moving in their direction—toward answering all kinds of societal questions with
economics. Land uses proved to be no exception.
What is a TDR program?
Most people have a very two dimensional view of their property
—just a piece of land on which to build a house or commercial
building. But the bundle of rights that comes with a piece of
property is much more complex. Some physical rights, depicted in
Figure 1, include the rights to build, exploit natural resources,
restrict access and farm. Other legally enforceable rights include
the right to sell the land, subdivide it, rent it out or grant
easements across it.
TDR programs allow landowners to sever the building (aka
development) rights from a particular piece of property and sell
them. Purchasers are usually other landowners who want to
increase the density of their developments. Local governments
may also buy development rights in order to control price, design
details or restrict growth.
TDR programs strive for two main goals. First, communities can use TDR programs to preserve open space,
agriculture, historic buildings or housing. And TDR programs make such preservation more equitable and politically
palatable by compensating landowners who lose the right to develop their property.
How does a TDR Program Work?
To demonstrate the operation of a TDR program, we have created a fictional farming community called Circle County.
At first, Circle County is completely devoted to agriculture (Figure 2). However, its
farms face development pressure from a growing urban area not depicted on the
Housing in Seattle
Seattle, Washington created a
TDR program for affordable
housing in 1985. The TDR
program has created or preserved
559 units of affordable housing. It
was recently reconfigured to
create another 900 units.
(Walker, 2002)
illustration.
At some point that pressure makes it economically
less likely the land would remain in agriculture
(Heikkila, 2000). Indeed many  farmers call the
option to develop their land their "retirement
plan." When left to traditional zoning, market
pressure often causes low density development,
that is, suburban sprawl (Figure 3).
 
 
 
However, Circle County government leaders decided to preserve  their rural character.
Under traditional zoning the only option would have been to tell some farmers that
they could not sell their land for development. Instead the government instituted a
TDR program. Farmers in the northern and western parts of the county could sell their
development rights to builders in the southern and eastern areas designated for more
density (Figure 4).
What are the advantages of TDR programs?
TDR programs compensate property owners.
Local governments use TDR programs to mitigate the economic impact of land
use regulations, specifically to compensate landowners for perceived partial
takings (Johnston and Madison, 1997). This planning tool offers landowners a
way to recapture some lost economic value when a property is downzoned[1]
from residential use to agricultural use for preservation purposes.
TDR programs are an easier way to implement zoning.
TDR programs do not replace zoning, but make strong land use regulations more
politically feasible and easier to implement (Barrese, 1983). Local officials feel
less political pressure if landowners are compensated for their “lost” rights. And a
well-constructed TDR program reduces the demand for zoning variances, since
developers will use the market, not their connections to the local zoning commission, to secure additional development
rights.
TDR programs provide private funding for protection.
Finding public funds to protect open space and historic buildings is increasingly difficult as governments carefully
watch their bottom lines. One reason local governments created TDR programs was to leverage market monies to
achieve such goals. (Wolfram, 1981).
TDR programs make development more predictable.
Developers benefit from the clarity and consistency that TDR programs offer (Pruetz, 1997). Instead of incurring the
costs and risks of negotiating for variances, developers can exceed certain zoning regulations simply by purchasing
“Zoning is just two public
hearings and one vote away from
changing.”
Jim Lively, Planner
Michigan Land Use Institute
"[The process of creating] a
valuable receiving area involves
the kind of higher density zoning
that many conservation-minded
suburbanites want to prevent in
the first place."
(Haar and Kayden, 1989, p. 151)
A Model TDR Program:
Montgomery County, MD
The Montgomery County,
Maryland is touted as having one
of the most successful TDR
programs in the nation. Since its
inception in 1980, the county has
protected over 50,000 acres of
farmland and open space.
Montgomery County’s
development rights from other property owners.
TDR programs are more permanent than zoning.
Since TDR uses deed restrictions or conservation easements to sever and
extinguish development rights, public values such as open space and historic
buildings are permanently protected. In contrast, zoning rules can change over
time and with new administrations.
What are the challenges of TDR programs?
TDR programs do not reduce the need for planning.
TDR programs only work in conjunction with strong zoning ordinances and good comprehensive planning. However,
building political consensus on zoning issues is always a challenge. As a result, successful TDR programs require the
commitment and political will of the community (Lane, 1997).
TDR programs can require increased administration.
In reality, TDR programs may be more complicated and expensive to implement than traditional zoning. Local
governments must oversee (or contract out oversight of) the market; track and defend deed restrictions; and assist in
proper preparation of easement documents. In many cases, the local government may regulate the market through TDR
banks[2] or other tools.
TDR programs require increased public education.
Citizens, real estate professionals, lawyers, assessors, and planners all need to be educated in the TDR process. Since
successful programs require community buy-in, local governments must market the program, using mailings, public
meetings, and advertisements. For example, efforts to institute a TDR plan in Santa Fe, New Mexico started with an
all-day workshop (Pruetz, 2002).
Communities may not support TDR programs.
Despite public education efforts, it may be difficult to find areas willing to accept
higher density development (receiving areas), since many people perceive that
high density development decreases property values and quality of life.
TDR protects preservation values permanently.
Although some consider the permanence of a TDR transfer to be a benefit, it also
limits the future options of a community as societal values and community
characteristics shift.
How can local governments build a market for a TDR
program?
Comprehensive land use and fiscal planning
Successful TDR programs start with strong comprehensive plans. Communities
must encompass a enough land to have sufficient sending and receiving areas.
Otherwise some kind of regional government or inter-municipal pact is needed to
carry out the program and ensure the fair distribution of development and tax
revenues. The planning process must also accurately gauge the desires of the
achievement is due in large part to
its success in forming a market
for development rights.
(Montgomery County Planning
Board, 2002)
Grand Central Terminal, New York City
Grand Central Terminal, constructed in 1913,
is one of the city’s architectural masterpieces.
In the late 1960s, the Penn Central
Transportation Company wanted to construct
a 53-story ‘addition’ over the protected
landmark. The city decided the tower would
destroy the character of the Terminal, so they
allowed Penn Central to transfer the
development rights to adjacent properties.
(Figure 5)
community for development and preservation.
The supply side: sending areas
In the areas where land will be preserved, property owners must be motivated to
sell their development rights rather than fully develop the land themselves.
Commonly this is done by downzoning their land to a lesser density. Other
factors may constrain development, such as environmental regulations, site problems or adequate public facility
ordinances[3]. These factors can compel property owners to sell their development rights. In addition, a favorable
transfer ratio from the sending area to the receiving may make the transfer lucrative enough to entice sellers. For
example, in Montgomery County five times as many TDR credits  could be transferred out as could be used on site.
The demand side: receiving areas
Designating the receiving areas can be the trickiest part of setting up a TDR
program (Canavan, 1990). A working market requires that receiving areas face a
demand for denser development than is currently allowed. For example, in
Montgomery County developers used TDR credits to build, attractive transit-
oriented-neighborhoods around the Bethesda and Silver Spring Metro transit
stations.
Requirements that development projects use TDRs are an effective, if coercive,
means of forming a market. And if communities eliminate alternative ways of
achieving higher densities, such as variances, then the purchase of development
rights becomes a necessity. This can have mixed results. The variance process is
often viewed as flawed and tilted towards property interests. However, it can be
much more responsive to changing community needs than a TDR program.
Other possible incentives for developers to buy building rights include maximum
density bonuses, exemptions from some development impact fees, or even
exemption from certain development standards like setback, open space, and
parking requirements. (Pruetz, 1997)
Community participation in the comprehensive planning processes is particularly
vital in receiving areas since many residents might believe that high density
development lowers property values and diminishes quality of life.
Rights as currency
In communities with TDR
programs, the rights become the
currency of development. The
development value (not price) of
a TDR credit is set so that one
equals another. Credits can be
bought and sold at any time, not
just when a particular
development in the receiving
site is pending. Also, a TDR
should be a general investment
available to anyone, not just possible developers. Local citizens, land trusts and
investors may all have an interest in the market for other reasons aside from
development.
Sometimes a municipality may step in and act as a broker, buying TDR credits
for later sale. This idea of a TDR bank is increasingly popular. Municipalities can
act essentially as a federal reserve bank influencing the price of the development rights. Some communities also put
conditions on the sale of rights from their bank in order to influence other aspects of development, such as design
details or affordable housing requirements. Finally, if the government buys TDR credits without eventually transferring
them to a developer, the program can be a tool for restricting growth, similar to the more common ‘purchase of
development rights’ program.
Brokers often step in to facilitate transactions, charging a fee of six to seven percent of the total price just as in regular
real estate transactions. In some cases brokers may wind up advertising their TDR services, possibly taking over the
marketing function from the government (Pruetz, 1997).
Administration
TDR and Land Trusts
Since the land trust community has
experience in the facilitation and
administration of purchase of development
right programs, local governments may want
to explore the possibility of partnerships with
private land trusts.
Local land trusts may be able to assist with
education of the community, the marketing of
the program and the facilitation of the
conservation easements or deed restrictions.
Clear and comprehensive contracts between
the local government and the land trust are an
essential element of any partnership.
So far, private land trusts haven’t had much
participation in local government TDR
programs (Land Trust Alliance, 2002). One
notable exception is that many municipalities
donate the conservation easements that
extinguish transferred development rights to a
local land trust.
Public education is essential so that everyone remembers the program
goals and learns the operation of the market. Mailings to and public
meetings for landowners in sending areas, potential developers and 
residents of receiving areas are an integral part of the education
effort. TDR program staff can also assist people with the legal
aspects of the program.
When deciding on the number of TDR credits to make available,
most literature recommends setting the ratio of sending credits to
potential receiving credits to at least 2:1. This leaves room for
receiving sites to be developed without fully using TDR credits to
increase density to the maximum allowable. Montgomery County has
used more than half of the sending TDRs but found that the ratio is
down to about 1:1. (Montgomery County Planning Board, 2002) As a
result, the price of development rights has dramatically decreased, so
the county is in the process of looking for more receiving sites.
Communities must monitor the progress of the program to ensure that
goals are met. If local governments do not have the expertise or
interest in administering a program, they can consider hiring a local
land trust or other service provider.
Should local governments worry about TDR
and ‘takings’ law?
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, in part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation." Traditionally, a taking was defined as a physical seizure of property by the state.
However, in 1922 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that governmental interference in the form of excessive regulation
may be so burdensome to a landowner as to have the same effect as an actual physical invasion thus establishing the
regulatory taking. (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon). Land use zoning falls under this broad legally-murky category
of regulatory takings.
To complicate matters, the High Court has ruled that a landowner must lose total use of the property before the
government pays compensation. A partial taking need not be compensated at all. Consequently, the state has every
incentive to have its actions deemed partial rather than full takings. Some municipalities view TDR programs as a way
to achieve this goal.
In Penn Central v. City of New York, the Supreme Court seemed to indicate that TDR credits have a value that could
prevent a total taking of property - and thus require compensation. However, in the more recent Suitum v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, this attitude seemed to change. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that “TDRs…
have nothing to do with the use … of the land to which they are attached. The right to use and develop one's own land
is quite distinct from the right to confer upon someone else an increased power to use and develop his land.” However,
Scalia goes on to praise TDR programs as a  valuable land use tool, but not as a way for the government to avoid a
takings claim.  
It must be noted that the Suitum case concerned only the legal outer bounds of the issue - situations in which parcels
in a given sending area are stripped of all rights to build. So long as a bare minimum of development is permitted on a
particular set of landholdings, there may be no ‘takings’ issue. Montgomery County cleverly kept within the bounds of
this loophole because it rarely zones land as zero-growth. It implemented a baseline minimum of one dwelling per 25
acres in its sending areas. (The result has been a proliferation of overpriced rural ‘estates’, which may be less desirable
than maintaining agricultural land, but may be more attractive than the sprawling alternative.) (Pruetz, 1998)
Also, the Suitum case heard by the Supreme Court might have been deemed a ‘just compensation’ if Lake Tahoe had
some sort of TDR bank in place, whereby the owner could have quickly and easily sold TDRs at a fair minimum price
without having to enter the marketplace. A TDR bank ensures liquidity and bridges the time gap between when an
owner wishes to sell rights and when a developer needs to purchase them.
Is a TDR program a good governing tool?
Salamon (2002) cites five criteria on which we can judge the quality of a particular governing tool: effectiveness,
efficiency, equity, manageability and legitimacy. How do TDR programs measure up?
Effectiveness
Does the governing tool achieve its intended objectives? This is the most fundamental question that must be asked. As
previously mentioned, there are essentially two goals for TDR programs: preservation and compensation. The most
highly touted programs do well at preserving land and the preservation is, by and large, permanent. However, even the
model program in Montgomery County, Maryland has hit a few snags in terms of compensation. Due to a lack of
receiving area demand, farmers in the sending areas that still hold development rights find them worth a lot less than
when the program started.
Efficiency
Are the results achieved at a reasonable cost? Again there are two ways to examine the efficiency of TDR programs.
One is administrative costs. The other is the cost of preservation. Administrative costs can be somewhat higher than
under traditional zoning. Markets must be formed and monitored. TDR credits must be created and administered. Also,
there are no savings over traditional planning techniques since a comprehensive plan and complete set of zoning rules
must already be in place for TDR programs to work.
On the other hand, sometimes the only way to preserve land or historic places is by buying property or development
rights. That is impossible for many cash-strapped local governments to do with public funds. TDR programs allow
private money to be used to achieve those goals.
Equity
Are TDR programs basically fair and do they redistribute resources to people who need them? TDR programs try to
spread the wealth of development by allowing landowners, especially farmers who equate their ability to develop their
land with their retirement, to recoup their investment. To achieve this, the sending and receiving areas must be built
properly to make sure that TDRs remain valuable. Otherwise, landowners in sending areas will find their TDR credits
worthless and their land still unable to be developed.
However, creating value for landowners in the sending areas creates another equity problem for those in receiving
areas.  Residents of the receiving areas may not want the higher density development. This problem is particularly
severe when the receiving area is an already existing suburb.
Manageability
Creating TDR markets can be a complex task. Decisions must be made to set up sending and receiving districts,
underlying zoning, density planning and credit ratios. Some programs also require government-run TDR banks. Every
choice affects the demand for TDR credits, their price and the success of the program. As the number of successful
models increase, manageability should become easier, but it remains a complex task.
Legitimacy and political feasibility
A TDR program, with its inherent goal of compensating landowners, is naturally more politically palatable than typical
command and control zoning regulations. However, any kind of land use restriction generates controversy.
Municipalities must build community support for the projects (Johnston and Madison, 1997). Successful TDR
programs cannot be created by the will of an agency. Political legitimacy must be built over time.
For example, successful TDR programs typically have a pre-existing constituency built around the need for land use
controls. In Montgomery County Maryland, the Planning Commission had extensively studied farmland economics. In
Lake Tahoe, local residents faced an indisputable decline in water quality. In New Jersey's Pinelands program, the
TDR program was the latest effort in a longtime farmland protection program (Johnston and Madison, 1997). Public
education and buy-in are vital.
Conclusions
As policy makers continue to search for ways to use the market as a governing tool, local governments will continue to
consider transfer of development rights programs. TDR programs can be effective, equitable governing tools that make
zoning more politically feasible. These programs offer two key benefits to local governments: they compensate
landowners for lost property value due to zoning, and they use the market to pay for the preservation of public goods.
However, these programs can be costly and difficult to administer compared to typical zoning. Local governments
must oversee (or contract out) regulation of the market, complex operation for such an unusual good. Even with
education and program marketing efforts, communities may not support TDR programs, especially when they are on
the receiving end of increased density. Lastly, TDR programs usually protect land or buildings on a permanent basis.
This is both an advantage and a disadvantage of this tool.
Communities should be aware that a TDR program is not a substitute for planning and zoning, rather TDR programs
require strong zoning. Therefore, they may not provide a sure-fire way to avoid friction over property rights issues,
although some innovative communities have designed their programs to lessen the likelihood of takings conflicts.
TDR programs will be most effective in communities facing strong development pressure, where officials believe it
would be difficult to successfully implement traditional zoning restrictions to achieve preservation goals or where
financial resources are not available for municipalities to buy land or development rights on their own. Montgomery
County, MD offers the best example of how a community with these characteristics has formed and implemented a
successful TDR program.
Despite its potential as a land use tool, transfer of development rights programs have been slow to catch on in
communities. While there have been some visible successes, there have been many places where the schemes fail for
one reason or another. So while policy advocates push transfer of development rights programs, it is likely that
pragmatic local government officials are still reluctant to take the lead.
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Briffault, Richard 2000. "Localism and Regionalism." Buffalo Law Review 48(1):1-30.
In the context of current metropolitan areas, it is the region that represents the most complete unit of
economic, social and ecological structure. This fact points to the logic of establishing regional governance.
However, resistance to regionalism is widespread. Briffault argues that this resistance is due to political
reasons rather than theoretical ones. People do not disagree with the notion of the region as a socio-
economic and ecological entity, but they do tend to see regionalism as a step toward centralization and a
shift of power from local governments. Therefore, resistance to regionalism usually stems from the self-
interests of local officials, firms, and other interest groups who benefit from strong local autonomy and
regional fragmentation.
 
The primary challenge for regionalism is the establishment of legal and political structures to represent
metropolitan areas. Certain special purpose bodies, such as watershed corporations, exist now but are unlikely
to be able to integrate different public concerns, and also cannot keep up with the rapid changes that take
place in metropolitan regions. As a first step, regionalists “call for new regional processes, structures, or
institutions that can identify regional problems, formulate regional solutions, implement those solutions, and
coordinate regional actions” (6).
 
Briffault also points out that regionalism has experienced resurgence since the 1990s. There are three
reasons for this: exacerbating urban sprawl, concentration of poverty in inner-cities, and increasing
competition in the new global economy. The global market sees a region as a competitive actor. Also,
regionalism can be seen as a democratic tool in areas that have uneven distribution of wealth and a high
degree of urban sprawl—the economic and social groups that have been separated by these forces have equal
representation in a regional government.
 
On the other hand, advocates of localism argue that decentralization of power enhances efficiency, democracy
and self-determination. They argue that decentralization allows municipalities to customize their public
services to specific local needs, which gives citizens more opportunity to choose municipalities based on their
preferences. Also, localism is said to promote democracy by making citizen participation more accessible and
increasing the sense of community and ownership.
 
The reality of contemporary metropolitan areas, however, undermines most of these arguments. First, local
actions often produce external economies and diseconomies, the significance of which increases in
metropolitan areas where borders between municipalities are less relevant. Tiebout’s efficiency model, one
basis of the argument for localism, depends on the assumption that consumers are mobile and will shop
around different municipalities.  This is not realistic when you consider that zoning and availability of jobs
greatly limits the mobility of people. “In metropolitan areas externalities can be avoided, mobility protected
and the opportunity of poorer localities to make choices among public services secured only at the regional
level” (20).
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Frug, Gerald. 2000. “Against Centralization,” Buffalo Law Review. Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 31-38 
Many professionals concerned with the decline of the center city advocate for the centralization of
government services and targeted programs for the poor. Gerald Frug argues that these tools are no longer
politically feasible and cannot be used to solve the problems of the inner city. He believes that the current
definition of decentralization is the problem, not the structure itself, and that decentralization can in fact work
at solving the problems of the inner city.
 
Since the 1960s, popular support for programs that centralize government’s power has declined as
enthusiasm for local control has grown. Americans now often view centralized power as a means of coercion.
Frug believes that to argue against this current feeling would be useless, and that centralization is not the
only possibility for saving inner cities.
 
Frug’s strategy is to create an alternative to centralization that is better than the status quo. In order to do
this, decentralization must be redefined to allow for the exercise of freedom while not allowing the
inequalities that the current form produces. The current definition of decentralization includes two important
components. First, local communities have the right of exclusion through zoning power. They also have the
ability to treat community resources like private property, so that richer communities can increase the
amount of services if they choose and restrict the benefits to those who live in their community. Both of
these powers encourage a conception of local power that is akin to the ideas of public choice theory, where
people “shop for cities.”
 
To change the current definition of decentralization we need to change the discussion from “what we want,”
to “what we don''t want.” For this to happen, Frug suggests that regional institutions facilitate conversations
between metropolitan residents about how they are affected by the decline of the inner city and resulting
sprawl, in order to identify and selectively combat the results of sprawl.
 
It is clear that decentralization is creating many externalities in the metropolitan area that affect a much
broader range of people than just those in the center city. Frug argues that the solution for metropolitan
residents with different interests is to begin to dialogue with one another about how sprawl affects them all
and begin to collaborate on solutions. He advocates for regional institutions that would bring together
representatives from different cities to make decisions about their region.
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Lowery, David 2000. "A Transactions Costs Model of Metropolitan Governance: Allocation versus
Redistribution in Urban America," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
10(1)(January):49-78.
In this article, Lowery structures a critique of the public-choice approach that has dominated the debate on
metropolitan governance in the last years by organizing the arguments used by the proponents of
consolidated government. In order to accomplish this he first examines the model of individual decision
making implicit within the new case for consolidation and compares it to public choice. Second, he studies the
consolidationists’ core institutional propositions on boundaries, and lastly, he evaluates the key hypotheses of
the advocates for consolidation.
 
I. Individual decision making
Self-interest: According to Lowery, the public-choice model narrowly focuses on tax and services packages
“assuming that variations in preference guide Tiebout sorting within a fragmented governmental setting” (52).
However, preferences have been shown to be relatively homogenous. Also, location choice is guided by a
“search for ‘lifestyle maintaining conditions,’” which leads to segregation (52).
 
Conflict resolution: The public-choice case for fragmentation relies on bargaining as the way to deal with
conflict. The case for consolidation emphasizes ‘the use of modest coercive capacities via majoritarian
politics’, but within an institutional framework that legitimizes this (p.56).
 
Perfect/Imperfect Information: According to Lowery, both schools have relaxed their positions on the
assumption of perfect information, primarily because of empirical findings about the less than complete
information that citizens of metropolitan areas have about taxes and service packages, but also because
further theoretical developments have emphasized different determining factors in location choice in conditions
of less than full information.
 
II. Assessment of the role of boundaries
Boundaries are important to both sides of the debate in three aspects: first, they are the definers of inclusion
and exclusion. For proponents of consolidation they create, modify and facilitate the articulation of citizens’
self-interest and structure their conflict resolution. For public-choice proponents, boundaries are the reflection
and consequent protection of separation.
 
The second function of boundaries is that they facilitate sorting. To public choice proponents, boundaries help
by showing clearly distinguishable tax and service packages. To consolidationists, boundaries are founded on a
wider array of criteria, including race and class.
 
The third function of boundaries is to define political property rights: the rules, venues for participation, who
is enfranchised and who is not. In consolidated arrangements, funding for basic services is an allocative
decision, while in fragmented ones it will require inter-jurisdiction subsidies, which makes the transaction
redistributive. The case for fragmentation supports the notion that boundaries should be designed allocating
Search Cornell
property rights in a way that near-Pareto conditions are satisfied. Consolidation supporters argue that this is a
scheme to minimize opportunities for redistribution. It should be considered that individual preference is
structured, and can be shifted to achieve broader community goals, through an interactive democratic
process.
 
Lowery concludes with a transaction cost model that pays attention to how boundaries ‘define political
property rights that then interact with the perception and articulation of interests to enhance or impede the
adoption of metropolitan-wide urban policies’ (p. 73). It makes the distinction between allocative (in
consolidated settings) and redistributive (in fragmented ones) choice. In consolidated settings, transaction
costs are reduced by relying on democratic choice rather than intergovernmental arrangements. The model
also addresses the interaction between the character and content of self-interest and boundaries. He offers
three hypotheses in support of consolidation that provide a strong theoretical foundation for regional
government structures:
 
·       racial and income segregation will be greater in fragmented than in consolidated arrangements;
·       in fragmented areas, the poor and minorities are isolated in jurisdictions with limited fiscal capacity and
significant demand for expenditures, while wealthy whites go to enclaves with limited needs and a
generous fiscal capacity;
·       metropolitan-wide public policies designed to enhance equity in social opportunities and promote economic
growth are supplied at higher rates in consolidated settings than in fragmented settings.
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Bollens, Scott 1997. "Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity Strategies." Stanford Law and Policy
Review 8(2):11-23.
Scott Bollens argues that regional governance can be a useful tool for combating metropolitan poverty.
However, it is currently unworkable because the focus is on “things” regionalism, when “people” regionalism
is actually what is needed. Things regionalism is based on systems maintenance, while people regionalism is
based on lifestyle.
 
The current model of  regional governance (things regionalism) is limited in its ability to combat urban
poverty because it does not adequately address social equity, and fragments the collective regional interest,
turning it away from anti-poverty concerns. Often, regional entities are established for the purpose of
economic competitiveness and are biased toward single-purpose goals.
 
In order for regional governance to be effective in addressing metropolitan poverty, it must have
comprehensive power to make tradeoffs across policy areas and political borders, rather than being restricted
to narrow policy fields and single constituencies. It must take into account, as a whole, the lifestyles of the
communities within the region, and the interactions between communities.
 
Regionalism and Metropolitan Equity Strategies
A hugely disproportionate number of people in poor neighborhoods are minorities, especially African-
Americans, and this segregation leads to a perpetuation of poverty and a deterioration of inner-city
neighborhoods. The methods he presents for combating this racial polarization can be classified under “in-
place” (targeted community development) or “mobility” (movement of the poor out of inner-city
neighborhoods).
 
Regional governance, because of its geographic reach and close ties to local sentiment, is in an ideal position
to use both in-place and mobility strategies for combating the deterioration of poor neighborhoods.  To do
this, regional governance must rise above the traditional focus on “things” regionalism and instead focus on
“people” regionalism.
 
With this as background, the article discusses ten regional planning strategies for metropolitan equity,
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designed to achieve integrated inner-city and suburban communities. Each strategy depends on an ability to
transcend the historical limitations of regional governance. (Strategies listed below.)
 
It is important to understand the connection between Bollens’ theories on effective regionalism and his
approaches to metropolitan equity. To counter the growing poverty of central city neighborhoods, in-place
community development is necessary but insufficient. Deconcentration also must be employed in order to
balance the distribution of jobs and housing across a metropolitan region. The best way to achieve this is
through equity strategies advanced by regional policy-makers who have the power and inclination to launch a
comprehensive, multi-tiered attack on concentrated poverty.
 
Bollens’ Metropolitan Equity Strategies:
1.     Channel federally-assisted housing expenditures to lessen racial concentration
2.     Establish a regional government campaign against residential segregation
3.     Limit regional suburban sprawl
4.     Require fair-share affordable housing obligations
5.     Encourage balanced distribution of jobs and housing
6.     Target regional transportation and redevelopment strategies
7.     Modify development review to advantage distressed areas
8.     Site LULUs (locally unwanted land uses) based on equity criteria
9.     Develop guidelines for local integration maintenance programs
10.  Attack root fiscal reasons behind ineffective municipal planning
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MacLeod, G., 2001. “New Regionalism Reconsidered: Globalization and the Remaking of Political
Economic Space.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25.4 (December): 804-829(26).
This article, focused on the current debate over regional development, gives a guarded assessment of “New
Regionalist” research.  The goal is to examine how and why some areas have experienced sustainable
economic growth and an increased political capacity, and why one scheme for growth may not work for every
region.
 “New Regionalism” describes the writings of scholars who highlight the region as an effective arena for
placing the institutions of economic governance (807).  New Regionalism is the study of how economic
institutions are no longer managed best at the national level, due to globalization.  It also includes the study
of why some areas, such as Silicon Valley, have experienced such high levels of sustainable growth while
other regions have undergone similar steps toward development and have not been as successful. 
 The greatest difficulty in studying the region is defining it.  There is a “fairly widespread conceptual
vagueness in terms,” making the region an elusive concept (811).  MacLeod hopes that creating a new
regional geography could “insulate researchers from reifying the region and encourage them to highlight the
wider network of political, economic and cultural processes out of which cities and regions are constituted and
governed” (812-813).
 MacLeod presents a re-conceptualization of regional development and governance.  Three key themes are
emphasized.  First, in most current academic inquiries, the region is seen as independent of social factors and
politically neutral.  MacLeod views this perception as “clearly unsatisfactory.”  There needs to be an
understanding of the “complex processes out of which regions are historically constructed, culturally
contested and politically charged” (823).  The reality is that the region is often a product of the social and
political factors present.
 Second, Jessop’s institutional-relational view of the state is an attempt at disentangling the political nature of
the emerging regional world and the relationships between regions.  Jessop maintains that it is the makeup of
the region that determines the state political structure.
Third, there is a growing concern that globalization has reduced the centrality of the nation.  MacLeod
believes the state should be seen as the coordinator of globalization.  States have a difficult time regulating
international economies, but the region has continued to grow stronger.  Therefore, the state should be there
to help orchestrate regional entry into global markets.
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Brenner, Neil (1999).“Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-scaling of Urban Governance in the
European Union,” Urban Studies 369(3):431-451.
Brenner examines globalization as a process of merging and reconfiguring territories.  Brenner recognizes that
while capital is flowing faster and further, globalizing forces cannot change the fact that much of a territory’s
organization is fixed in place geographically.  Building on the fixed nature of urban, regional, state, and
national agglomerations, Brenner investigates the re-scaling of territories as “intrinsic to this round of
globalization.”  Building a competitive global position, ie. capturing global capital flows, relies heavily on re-
scaling cities, states, and politics across all levels.
 Central to Brenner’s analysis is the historic nature of capitalism as a geographic force.  In short, he
summarizes capital as a relentless re-shaper of territories that has recently undergone a shift from a
predominately state scale to the competitive global scale.  Brenner argues that this change in “geographical
scaffolding” forces states and cities to act on two distinct fronts simultaneously.  Brenner calls the ability to
act locally as well as globally “glocalization.”
 As a force, glocalization primarily acts on the state.  It requires states to build local capacities that benefit a
broader supranational structure.  Brenner interprets glocalization as a re-scaling of state power.  Upward re-
scaling involves transferring many tasks to the supranational level.  Downward re-scaling devolves many
state programs to the regional and local institutions.  While this seemingly is a hollowing-out of the state,
Brenner finds that at the urban-regional level, state power is actually created.  Regulating new economic
space and managing the disjuncture between ‘world cities” and the urban areas that host them essentially re-
scales state government into state governance.
 As states use larger supranational structures to gain the industrial and administrative efficiency necessary to
attract and generate capital in a global environment, they must also understand the role of their “world
cities.”  A world city is a “space of global accumulation” (Friedmann 1995) that no state can fully control. 
Through their key role in global capital flows, world cities are re-scaling beyond the power of the state.  In
many ways global cities compete against one another and coexist as nodes in a global network outside the
control of the state.   
 The cost for gaining global competitiveness is often the state’s autonomy.  This
“precondition for contemporary capital accumulation” is creating an “economic disjuncture
between the world city and the territorial economy of its host state.”  In the European
Union, it is becoming clear that geo-economic power is moving away from the state level
and to the world cities.  While Brenner recognizes that politics is becoming problematic
between cities and states, his conception of the state as a platform of economic growth
allows for this and calls for new concepts of scale that account for reterritorialisation and
the social relations in glocalized areas.
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Jessop, Bob 1997. “The Entrepreneurial City: Re-imaging localities, redesigning economic governance or
restructuring capital,” pp 28-41 in Transforming Cities: Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions
ed. by Nick Jewson and Susanne MacGregor. Routledge: London.
Jessop considers the transformation of the contemporary city within the context of
globalization. Focusing primarily on British cities, the author analyzes four trends in the
drive toward a more entrepreneurial urban political economy: 1) the redefinition of local
economies as entrepreneurial units; 2) the link between this redefinition and new forms
of governance; 3) the transformation of modern urban economics within global
economics; 4) the political economy of globalization within which this transformation is
occurring.
 
Post-war macroeconomic and microeconomic policies designed to facilitate full employment, price stability,
economic growth, and the distribution of social welfare are no longer feasible through the national-state.
Cities must increasingly use new, entrepreneurial modes of production and governance to secure
competitiveness. Likewise, the state must exploit the competitive advantages created by successful
entrepreneurial cities, to secure an advantage internationally. This strategy can only be carried out through
long-term organizational coordination coupled with effective performance assessment and accountability
standards. 
           
Several general trends are pivotal to the contextualization of the entrepreneurial city: 1)
the de-nationalization of statehood, including the abdication of de jure sovereignty to
supranational institutions and the devolution of authority to the city/regional level; 2) the
transformation from government to governance in the form of partnerships between state
agencies and non-governmental organizations; 3) the internationalization of the national
state and a subsequent magnification of the transnational implications of domestic
behavior.
 
All of these processes contribute to the rise of the entrepreneurial city. Jessop concludes
that the transformation of urban economics toward entrepreneurialism is driven by
globalization, resulting in local activities such as new governance methods of
public/private networking. 
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Orfield, Myron.1997. "Metropolitics: Coalitions for Regional Reforms," Brookings Review. 15(1):6-
9.http://www.brookings.edu/press/review/winter97/morfield.htm
Using Minneapolis-Saint Paul as an example, Myron Orfield discusses the urban decline, inner-suburban
decay, and urban sprawl that has blighted so many American cities over the last several decades. He then
presents regional solutions for deconcentrating poverty, which Orfield sees as the key to solving the myriad
of urban problems that stem from poverty and segregation.
 
Throughout the 1980s and 90s, Minneapolis-Saint Paul experienced the “push” of concentrated need in the
inner city, along with the “pull” of concentrated resources in the outer suburbs. These forces combined to
create intense white flight from the inner core of the Twin Cities, resulting in rapid segregation and the
concentration of poverty. Crime and joblessness in these areas soared. At the edge of the Twin Cities
metropolitan region, the most prosperous developing communities used restrictive zoning to exclude
"undesirables" and build a broad, rich tax base to keep services high and taxes low.
 
The traditional approach to solving the problems of America’s inner cities has been to try to turn their
disadvantaged residents into middle-class people. This has proven to be nearly impossible; the solution
remaining is to end the unnatural concentration of poverty. Deconcentration helps solve the problems of
poverty on two levels. For individuals, it opens access to opportunity in the form of jobs, unstressed schools,
and adequate local services. For a community, it breaks poverty down into more manageable pieces and
creates community and metropolitan stability.
 
Orfield gives two steps, to be implemented on a regional level, toward the deconcentration of poverty. The
first is regional reform in fair housing, including the destruction of regulatory barriers to affordable housing in
the suburbs. Orfield contends that once affordable housing is built at the metropolitan periphery, the
expansion of the urban and suburban distressed areas will slow and ultimately stop.
 
The second reform is tax-base sharing. The most prosperous areas of the metropolitan region will share a
certain portion of commercial, industrial, or residential property taxes on high valued homes region-wide.
Orfield argues that property tax-base sharing: (1) creates equity in the provision of public services, (2)
breaks the intensifying metropolitan mismatch between social needs and property tax-based resources, (3)
undermines local fiscal incentives supporting exclusive zoning, (4) undermines local fiscal incentives
supporting sprawl, and (5) ends intra-metropolitan competition for tax base.
 
In Minneapolis-Saint Paul, working class suburbs have joined forces with the inner city to create regional
reform. The first step was the metro-majority coalition in the state legislature, followed by the Alliance for
Metropolitan Stability. These local coalitions that are beginning to take action in the Twin Cities provide an
example to cities everywhere facing polarization.
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Rusk, David. 1993. Cities without Suburbs. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Cities without Suburbs is based on David Rusk’s experience as mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico and
member of the New Mexico state legislature. In this book, he uses detailed census analysis to show that the
most economically robust cities are “elastic.” That is, cities that can capture their suburbs in a regional
government, and with that, their tax base, have lower poverty and crime, better education systems and a
better fiscal outlook. Cities that are "inelastic" lose their population growth to the suburbs and tend to be less
fiscally stable and more racially segregated, as well as more impoverished than elastic cities. Examples
include Detroit, Cleveland, Louisville and Milwaukee. Rusk argues that elastic cities are more successful
because they practice some form of regionalism.
 
In addressing the practical side of implementing regionalism, Rusk contends that restructuring local
governments is not a task for the federal government. Rather, it is a responsibility of citizens and political
leaders at the local and state levels. He examines the mechanisms and politics of creating what he calls
metro governments, and presents three specific options for the creation of metro governments:
 
1.  Empowering Urban Counties
The most direct and efficient way to create metropolitan government in the majority of metro areas is to
empower urban county government. In this scenario, the county government assumes the functions and
responsibilities of the municipal governments within its boundaries, and municipalities are abolished.
 
2. Consolidating Cities and Counties
This involves creating area-wide governmental units, focusing on consolidating municipal governments with
their surrounding county governments. Consolidation brings unification of the tax base and centralization of
planning and zoning.
 
3. Combining Counties into Regional Governments
This involves combining several counties in the same metropolitan area into one regional government.
 
Challenges to these regional approaches include potential loss of power at the local level.  Minority
constituencies may have less voice in the issues affecting them directly. Also, different municipalities may
have different problems depending on their history, geographic location and economic capacities.
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Rusk, David, 1999. Journeying Through Urban America. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.
Chapter 1: Inside Game, Outside Game
In the first chapter of his book, Journeying Through Urban America, David Rusk, accomplished organizer,
mayor, and multi-positioned civil servant turned urban scholar, introduces his observations of contemporary
urban trends. He focuses on the dynamics of population, regional integration and fragmentation across
different cities in the U.S. Basing claims on his analysis of census data, Rusk highlights the fact that sprawl
positively correlates with economic, racial and social segregation. 
 
Rusk introduces the concept of city elasticity (initial density times rate of boundary expansions) as a way to
think about the decreasing population densities in U.S. cities.  “Elastic” cities are able to absorb would-be
suburban growth and maintain authority over the metropolitan area despite a fast growing population. These
cities witness benefits including fiscal health, spatial integration of social and economic groups, and economic
growth.  The larger the market share of new development subsumed in a single government’s jurisdiction, the
stronger its defense against the negative effects of suburban sprawl.  “Inelastic cities,” losing their share of
population growth to suburbs, suffer the loss of the white middle class and their commercial facilities and tax
base. Inelastic cities are left with mainly poor blacks and Hispanics with desperate service needs but no tax
base.
 
Cities can achieve metropolitan integration and become more elastic in two ways: annexation or city-county
consolidation.  Inelastic cities have many fragmented “little box” governments, with each suburb functioning
as an independent governing unit.  Elastic cities are central cities that are able to expand their jurisdiction to
include population growth, either by annexing or consolidating at the county level, aggregating into one
cohesive “big box” government. 
 
Rusk is quick to note, however, the political difficulties of consolidation.  If regions cannot “become one
governmentally,” Rusk comments, they can employ quasi-regional governmental structures in as many areas
as possible, including regional tax-base sharing, fair-share low and moderate income housing policies, and
sprawl-limiting regional land use policies.
 
Rusk next moves to describing how cities became the way they are and attempts thus far at combating
decline, which he describes as an “inside game”.  The “inside game,” he warns, is not enough; the “outside
game,” or regional strategies outlined in this article, must be a complementary strategy.  He highlights best
practices for these regional strategies by examining the sprawl-controlling policies of Oregon, the mixed
income housing laws in Montgomery County, Maryland, and revenue sharing legislation in Dayton, Ohio and
Minneapolis, Minnesota.  In his opinion, the impetus for these policies must take place at the state level. 
Finally, he acknowledges the tremendous difficulty of implementing these policies faced by city, county and
state leaders, but points out that it has happened in other areas, with great results.
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Foster, Kathryn 1996. “Specialization in Government: The Uneven Use of Special Districts in Metropolitan
Areas.” Urban Affairs Review 31(3): 283-313.
The use of special districts has grown remarkably over the past few decades: 7% from 1987 to 1992 (to
31,555 units). Municipalities grew 0.7% over the same time period to 19,000 units. Explains Foster, “Districts
enjoy the financial support, tax exempt status and quasi-monopolistic service-delivery advantage of public
governments, together with the limited political visibility, internal management flexibility, and financial
discretion of private corporations” (284).
 
Foster assesses four alternative theoretical perspectives on the uneven use of districts.
 
Institutional Reform Perspective
·       Privileges the welfare of the community over individuals
·       Integrated metro service delivery is most efficient for equity and efficiency (Rusk 1993)
·       Smaller governments lack scale or administrative capacity. Special districts still fragment geographically
and service-wise, but can instill rationality on a polycentric government structure.
·       Regional government is best. Variables of regional districts are: number of governments, population size.
 
Public Choice Perspective
·       Privileges the individual over community
·       Response to service demands—special districts are a rational response to differentiated service demand.
·       Sub-county or municipal districts allow services to meet the growing needs of the population when growth
outpaces government capacity.
·       Districts allow residents to mix levels of services (a la carte). Multi-functional regional government would
not allow such variation. Accommodates diversity of preference.
·       Especially appropriate for unincorporated areas in a metro region.
·       Variables: growth in population, percent population in unincorporated areas, income diversity.
 
Metropolitan Ecology Perspective
·       A complex response – especially determined by legal and political factors.
·       Legal factors on finance and boundary change are especially important. The more constrained the
municipalities – the greater use of districts (Bollens 1986).  
·       State level variables: restrictions on boundary change, annexation, incorporation and annexation
constraints, debt constraints, home-rule powers.
 
Critical-Political Economy Perspective
·       Development interests, logic of capitalism, power relations.
·       Government action reinforces the growth-driven capitalist system.
·       Property development is key (Piven and Friedland 1984).
·       Special districts are politically isolated and financially powerful—can be manipulated to control the
development process. Easier access to capital via bond markets. This makes them more favorably
Search Cornell
disposed to growth than general purpose government (Heiman 1989).
 
Results
Legal and institutional factors are of primary importance in the use of special districts. Use of special districts
is also determined by population size (demand) and number of district types legally enabled (supply).
 
Institutional reform:
Small localities have less of a tendency to form districts than large ones. More region-wide districts appear in
regions with more governments, but also more municipally coterminous districts. So there is as much
rationalization of fragmentation via districts as you see additional fragmentation via more municipally
coterminous districts.
 
Public choice:
Population growth is not significant. Heterogeneous service demands are not significant. Property taxing
districts are more common, other district types are not. There are more region-wide districts than sub county
ones, which contradicts public choice expectations.
 
Metro ecology:
More consistent with expectations. Districts are less common when annexation or incorporation limits operate
alone. Districts are a second-best option to annexation and incorporation. When they operate together, then
you see more districts. When debt restriction is present, there is more use of tax financial districts. When tax
constraints are present, you see fewer special districts. This is opposite of the expectations and may be due
to historical reason. Under home rule, you see more regional and sub county districts.
 
Critical Political Economy:
No empirical support. The author thinks her proxy variable is bad—government may support growth directly.
Increase in population leads to an increase in districts of all types. Functional breadth of districts allowed by
state legislature is the most important.
 
Conclusion: Special district use is based on structure, legal and demand factors. It is useful to think about
special districts in their variety of types. Legal state rules are important and geography may also matter.
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Parks, Roger, and Ronald Oakerson. 1993. "Comparative Metropolitan Organization: Service Production
and Governance Structures in St. Louis, MO, and Allegheny County, PA." Publius 23: 19-39.
In this article, the authors identify and measure key structural characteristics of "fragmented" metro areas,
employing a comparative study of two metropolitan city - counties: St. Louis City and County, MO, and
Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), PA. The authors argue that these areas "work" by means of an integrating
structure built by local governments together with county and state governments. This study was limited to
structures created around four local services: Police, fire, streets, and education. The study of governance
structures focused principally on those relevant to the provision units responsible for these services.
Many people consider a large number of local governments to be fragmented, which, in turn, is thought to
produce ineffective organization and poor performance. For others, a large number of local governments
means competition and consequent pressures for efficiency.
Metro areas are best viewed as "local public economies," in which local governments function primarily as
"provision units." Metropolitan production structures can be understood by means of an industrial organization
framework. The production structure of an industry is measured along horizontal and vertical dimensions form
integration to differentiation. Integration combines production in fewer firms while differentiation distributes
production across more firms. Horizontal differentiation/integration refers to the number of firms that produce
a specific good or service for a market. While vertical differentiation/integration refers to the number of firms
that produce intermediate products used in producing the final goods or services delivered to consumers.
Although highly fragmented by conventional measures, St. Louis and Allegheny County areas have developed
sophisticated structures that integrate the production of numerous service components an facilitate
metropolitan governance while accommodating the strong preferences of local communities for a large
measure of self-governing autonomy. Both areas have developed similar service - industry structures for the
production of basic service - structures that are both vertically differentiated among a variety of service
components and highly integrated in the production of key support services. In the midst of this diversity, the
two central cities, Pittsburgh and St. Louis, operate vertically integrated service structures that impose the
same scale of organization on nearly all service components. There are some differences however.
Allegheny County fosters more productive relationships between county and municipal governments due to its
full incorporation. Therefore Pittsburgh benefits from strong county government support for its economic
development efforts. St. Louis County, on the other hand, uses its ability to obtain special state legislation
and is therefore better situated than Allegheny County to reach binding settlements across all local
governments that address problems unique to the county.
The idea is a sense of regionalism. Both areas have created governance structures that promote collective
consideration and action across local government boundaries. This is evidence that overlapping jurisdictions
can assist inter-local problem solving when joined into governance structures that include voluntary
associations of local government and/or public private fellowship.
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Cigler, Beverly A. 1994. "Pre-Conditions for Multicommunity Collaboration." Pp. 39-58 in Toward an
Understanding of Multicommunity Collaboration. AGES Staff Report 9403. Washington, DC: USDA, ERS.
Cigler argues that intergovernmental collaboration can build the capacity of rural local governments, which
often lack the necessary resources and expertise to adequately provide government services or conduct policy
decision-making activities. However, "truly collaborative ventures are system changing," (p. 41) and thus
potentially threatening to existing government entities. Further, if one partner has an organizational or
political weakness, it jeopardizes the success of the collaborative effort. Hence, though the results of
collaboration can be positive, the conditions necessary to achieve it can be extensive. Cigler is careful to
emphasize that there is a continuum of possible cooperative relationships between governments ranging from
loose, flexible links often developed to share information or to begin moving toward a common purpose
(networks and cooperation) to more formal links forged to perform a specific often complex task (coordinating
and collaborating). Some intergovernmental partnerships begin as networks and evolve to a more formal,
lasting, and essential relationship in response to increased needs or as trust between the partners grows.
Cigler examines three cases of rural intergovernmental collaboration through the framework of previously-
observed pre-conditions to collaboration which she derived from previous case studies. The preconditions are:
a disaster occurrence,
a political constituency of cooperation,
supportive capacity building or incentives provided by external sources,
early and continued support by elected officials,
visible advantages of cooperation for participating governments,
existence of a policy entrepreneur,
early focus on visible, effective strategies, and
an emphasis on collaborative skills-building.
While none of the three cases presented in this text exhibited all of these pre-conditions, three did appear to
be particularly important in all cases studied. These were: a disaster occurrence - either a recent or
anticipated natural or economic disaster, visible advantages of cooperation for participating governments, and
the existence of a policy entrepreneur.
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Oakerson, Ronald. 1987. "Local Public Economies: Provision, Production and Governance."
Intergovernmental Perspective13:3/4, pp. 20-25.
Provision refers to collective choices that determine (1) what goods and services to provide, (2) what private
activities to regulate, (3) the amount of revenue to raise, (4) the quantity and quality standards of goods,
and (5) how to arrange for productions. Production refers to the more technical processes of transforming
inputs into outputs.
Organizing the provision side falls into three main classes: preference revelation, fiscal equivalence, and
accountability. On the other hand, organizing the production side is based on economies of scale and co-
production. The options linking provision with production are self- production, coordinated production, joint
production, intergovernmental contracting, private contracting, franchising, and voucher. Governance has to
do with the choice of rules, which is separable from both production and provision.
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Jansen, Annica. 1994. "Multi-Community Collaboration and Linkages: A Framework for Analysis." pp. 59-
76 in Toward an Understanding of Multicommunity Collaboration. AGES Staff Report 9403. Washington,
DC: USDA, ERS.
Jansen, drawing extensively on the work of Pierre Clavel (Opposition Planning in Wales and Appalachia, 1983)
provides a theoretical framework for analyzing relationships between different levels of government. She
defines the tension between levels of centrality of government and local government capacity as the essential
indicator for types of intergovernmental relationships. Local capacity is defined as "having the institutions
necessary to deal with information" (60). Centrality is defined as "having physical and/or organizational
linkages with the economic and political centers of decision-making, or the economic or political ‘core’" (60).
Using a matrix of low and high centrality and local capacity, Jansen defines four types of intergovernmental
relationships.:
 Local capacity  
Centrality Low High
High Hegemony Polyarchy
Low Isolationism Separatism
Jansen argues that when both centrality and local capacity are present or both are absent, as in the cases of
isolationism and polyarchy, the relationships are stable. When there is a disparity between levels of centrality
and local capacity, however, as in cases of hegemony or separatism, a region will seek to equalize the forces.
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Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). 1974. "Local Government Reorganizational
Issues." The Challenge of Local Government Reorganization. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
The report chronicles the rise of multi-county regional government councils since the 1960s, in response to
requirements for federal program funding. There is little agreement about the role of these new forms of
government in the American political system, but few consider them to be forerunners of true metropolitan
governments (such as Portland, OR). This report attempts to evaluate their role in the context of other
government reorganization efforts.
Four factors should be considered when evaluating the service delivery of these new government units:
authority, efficiency, equity and accountability. Areawide cooperation takes many forms, including:
Intergovernmental service agreements to meet area needs
Transfer of functions between higher and lower governmental units
The growth of the urban county (as opposed to the traditional city government)
Areawide special districts to deliver key services
Multifunctional areawide special districts
Annexation
City-county consolidation
Federation (eg, systematically dividing functions between upper and lower tier governments)
Because of the various problems inherent in these solutions, it appears the best approach may be
comprehensive reforms to existing local governments. Unfortunately these changes may be the most difficult
to achieve. State and federal governments can play a role in overcoming these obstacles by creating
incentives for reform and by being flexible and supportive, but not authoritative.
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Perlman, Ellen. 1993. "Secretive Governing: Authorities proliferate; So Does Possible Misconduct." City
and State. March 1, pp. 9-11.
This article notes the sudden 12% increase between 1987 and 1992 in special quasi-governmental or
intergovernmental districts (often called authorities, as in the Metropolitan Transportation Authority). Perlman
cites several reasons why legislative bodies choose to create special districts:
1. they are a way of skirting state constitutional limits on taxation, spending, and borrowing
2. they enable state and local governments to appear to be cutting their budgets while continuing to ensure
service provision;
3. they are a tool of intergovernmental collaboration cutting across political boundaries to meet regional
needs.
Though special districts are sometimes necessary to accomplish a particular task or achieve economies of
scale in providing a specific service, they are vulnerable to abuses difficult to curb due to the lack of direct
public accountability and even accountability to the governments which created them. Abuses include
nepotism, overpriced service rates, and mismanagement.
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Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). 1974. "Alternative Government Structures."
Government Functions and Processes: Local and Areawide. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Modern federalism is a cooperative and consequently difficult endeavor. The debate over the assignment of
urban functions is one of both means and ends, questioning both the how and the why of government service
provision. The sharing of power contributes to the dynamism of the federal system, where the subject is
constantly debated.
Theorists have developed various models for government service assignment, which include:
Polycentricity/Decentralization
Federation (eg, systematically dividing functions between upper and lower tier governments
Consolidation
These models all have supporters who claim their various merits based on the criteria of efficiency, equity,
public satisfaction with service, and so on. Empirical findings show that no model appears to be completely
effective or without deficiencies.
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Carpinello, George F., and Patricia E. Salkin. 1990. "Legal Processes for Facilitating Consolidation and
Cooperation Among Local Government: Models from Other States." Albany, NY: Nelson A. Rockefeller
Institute of Government.
This report introduces the legal structure and processes used to facilitate cooperation, consolidation, and
coordination among local government entities in other states and in several foreign countries. Many other
states, especially in the South and West, have been more active in making changes that can serve as
instructive examples for New York. They have applied a number of methods and strategies for implementing
territorial and functional changes including annexation, consolidation, functional transfer.
Annexation, in particular, has been one of major methods for local boundary changes in the western and
southern regions. Not only has population grown and shifted, but unincorporated land also existed in their
territories. These states illustrate various methods for annexation: unilateral annexation by municipality or
voter approval, by judicial approval, by boundary commissions, or by special state legislation. In contrast to
many southern and western states, however, all counties in New York are divided into towns and cities.
Another means for changing municipal boundaries is consolidation. It has been applied mainly in city-county
consolidations. The vast majority of attempts and successful consolidations are in the South and West. Some
states allowed the affected government bodies to form consolidation commissions or allowed the voters to
initiate the process by petition. Not every attempt was successful. Voters tended to disapprove it because of
fear of higher taxes and an unwillingness to assume responsibility for major problems of cities. Consolidation
in New York is more unlikely due to the absence of general laws or procedures and the requirement of an
affirmative vote in each affected jurisdiction.
Many states also attempted to transfer the governmental function to a higher metropolitan-wide entity. Some
states like Ontario, Canada, and Florida were successful, because they not only have constitutional or
statutory provisions, but also because they allow for transfers without voter approval. Other states, including
New York, however, were not successful because of voter disapproval and other procedural barriers. Instead,
some states have instituted cooperative agreements or contracts among municipalities to provide services.
There are some limitations on the formation of new governmental units. "Defensive incorporation" by
communities has created fragmentation and reduced the incentives for consolidation and more comprehensive
cooperation. Moreover, this issue tends to be treated as a problem restricted to the local entities. Though in
many cases annexation or consolidation efforts are defeated, there is still considerable pressure to reduce
duplication of services and to make the most of economies of service.
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Coon, James A. n.d. "Intergovernmental Cooperation." Local Government Technical Series. Albany, NY:
Department of State.
This article discusses possible reasons for considering formal intergovernmental cooperation and examines
practical and legal considerations. The author points out that the desirability of cooperative efforts among
governments depends on economies of scale, convenience of performing the task, distribution of natural
resources, surplus physical facilities, and the need for duplication of services.
Decreasing unit costs of services such as water and sewage treatment and incineration encourage
municipalities to enter into intergovernmental cooperative agreements to achieve economies of scale. When
one government can more easily perform a task, cooperation may also be sought. For example, town highway
departments may perform work for other jurisdictions when it is more convenient. In the case of natural
resources that are not equally available in every jurisdiction, such as water and sand, intergovernmental
cooperation may be required to fulfill the needs of their communities. When municipalities have surplus
physical facilities due to population decline or shifting local priorities, intermunicipal cooperation for sharing
facilities such as office space often yield savings. Municipalities may also reduce duplication of services by
sharing police services or fire and ambulance dispatching services.
In addition, the author addresses legal information needed for two types of formal cooperative agreements,
service agreements and joint agreements. Under service agreements, one local government contracts with
another to provide service at a stated price. The contract will contain basic elements: the nature of the
agreement (type of service, reason for contract, statutory authority for the arrangement); scope of service
(performance standards, limitations on the service’s availability); service charges (amount, times, and manner
of payments); liabilities of the parties (specific provisions to cover responsibility for damage to persons or
properties); and contract term (duration of the agreement).
Under a joint agreement, governments agree to share the performance of a function or the construction and
operation of a facility. In New York State, all counties outside the City of New York and all cities, villages,
towns, and school districts are allowed to enter joint operating agreements. Unlike a service agreement, a
joint agreement requires a majority vote of the governing body of each locality, and any referendum or
special consent required by law for an additional government to provide a service. In addition to the "service
contract" elements, joint agreements should clearly define the composition of the governing body, the method
of selection of its members, selection and duties of its officers, the staffing arrangements for the workforce of
joint agency, financial considerations such as the method of apportioning costs among jurisdictions, and
property considerations, including defining ownership of property and termination of the agreement.
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New York State Office of the State Comptroller. 1994. "Local Government Cooperative Service Provision."
Albany, NY.
Abstract
In much of the privatization debate the idea of alternative government service provision usually leads to a
question of whether to privatize or not. Little attention is paid to the idea of collaboration between
municipalities. In this study of intermunicipal cooperation, the Office of the New York State Comptroller has
provided a wealth of information, ranging from guiding legal principles to general agreement guidelines, that
could facilitate a practical solution for governments seeking to improve the delivery of their services.
Programs for Intermunicipal Cooperation
The study's conclusion indicates there are six programs where intermunicipal cooperation results in outcomes
that have a wide applicability in New York State. These are: 1) Recreation, 2) Sewage and Wastewater
Treatment, 3) Multi-employer Collective Bargaining Research and Support, 4) Highway Transportation, 5)
Purchasing and, 6) Police Services. These are by no means the only areas where municipalities may benefit
from cooperation. Indeed, outlined in the document are several other cases, unrelated to the above
mentioned programs, where municipalities have shown gains. Day care, emergency management, health care,
general administration, cultural activities, and air transportation are some that are mentioned. The
possibilities for intermunicipal cooperation abound.
Criteria for Analysis
The Office of the Comptroller, in considering cases for inclusion in this study, selected those programs based
on three main criteria: 1) Their ease of implementation, 2) Cost/benefit justification and, 3) Applicability to
large numbers of municipalities. The primary objective of the study was to develop specific program initiatives
most suited to the needs of New York State local governments. Essentially, a Ôhow to' guide is provided.
Intermunicipal Cooperation and State Law
Under Article 5-G of the General Municipal Law, any municipal corporation or district may participate in a
cooperative agreement. While other laws exist that enable municipalities to act in concert with each other,
Article 5-G provides overriding statutory authority for cooperative agreements. This is important because the
law does not preside over the underlying activity or service, just the agreement. In terms of who may
actually engage in such activities, any combination of cities, towns, villages, boards of cooperative educational
services, fire districts or school districts are eligible to participate. A provision to include public libraries is
discussed. Two types of agreements are identified in relation to this law. The first is an agreement where
municipalities jointly provide an activity while the other is a contractual arrangement between participants.
Within Article 5-G are legal requirements that each participant must consider. For instance, municipal
corporations may only enter into an intermunicipal agreement to provide a function which they are
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empowered to provide individually. Also, municipalities may not circumvent other legal requirements, such as
public hearings or mandatory referenda, by virtue of the agreement. Most importantly, the governing body of
each municipality involved must approve the agreement by a majority vote.
Issues to Consider in Intermunicipal Cooperation
Aside from legal issues, there are several "Best Practices" that emerged from the study worth mentioning.
While this may seem obvious, it is not a legal requirement to have a written agreement. Other ideas to
consider are:
a method or formula for equitably allocating resources
a mechanism for compensating employees and personnel
some provision for equipment and/or facilities
an agreement for handling liabilities
In addition to the above list, municipalities may want to consider incorporating some mechanism for handling
fiscal arrangements, as well as monitoring and evaluation, into the agreement.
General Guidelines for Cooperation
This section of the study is perhaps the most useful because it offers advice on how best to determine
whether a particular activity is suitable for intermunicipal cooperation. The guidelines proposed address issues
related to conducting feasibility studies, performing needs assessments, and negotiating contracts. Several
pieces of advice are conveyed during this discussion. For instance, a cost determination and comparison is
suggested to determine if intermunicipal cooperation could improve an activity's efficiency and effectiveness.
If a service results in reduced costs, increased efficiency, and/or fulfills a perceived need then it should be
undertaken. With regard to preparing the agreement, the study concluded that, in addition to the above
mentioned issues to consider, the agreement should be reviewed by the municipality's respective legal
counsels. Some method for mediating disputes should also be incorporated into the agreement.
Conclusion
This study is extremely useful because several fundamental elements regarding intermunicipal cooperation are
discussed. Some of these issues may seem obvious but clearly they are essential to ensuring a stable
arrangement.
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Liebschutz, Sarah F. 1990. "The New York Experience with Cooperation, Coordinating Structures, and
Consolidation: Selected Case Studies."
In 1963, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) reached the conclusion that
"political realities preclude shattering the [system] in order that it might be remodeled in conformity with an
updated model" (ACIR as quoted in Liebschutz, p. 1). Taking this 30-year old statement as a jumping-off
point, Liebschutz presents six case studies of intergovernmental cooperation in New York State including
studies of regional waste management and regional policing. Her objective is to determine if it is possible to
gain the advantages claimed by advocates of restructuring ("improved and more cost-efficient public service,
coordination, equality in financial burdens, and responsibility for area-wide policy" p. 2) while preserving the
identity and autonomy of cooperating local governments.
Though Liebschutz does not herself draw any conclusions from the case studies, I believe that the six
examples she has chosen confirm that it is indeed possible for governments to cooperate and gain the
associated benefits without losing autonomy. Furthermore, the cases, particularly the examples of failure,
illustrate that efforts at cooperation which do not maintain local government and citizen autonomy will fail.
This could be the result of a bias in case study selection. The examples of successful intergovernmental
cooperation have the common element of emphasizing a participatory process and cooperative problem
solving rather than immediately solving a concrete problem.
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Benjamin, Gerald. 1990. "The Evolution of New York State's Local Government System." Albany, NY:
Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government.
This article explains the evolutionary development of four categories of local governments in New York State:
counties, towns, cities, and villages. These local entities differ in their origins and have undergone changes
throughout the state's history, particularly in their governmental structure and functions. In response to the
growth and diversity of population, direct democracy in rural areas gave way to representative system and
the executive power in urban areas tended to separate from legislative or judicial functions.
New York's 62 counties were originally created by the state for its own administrative convenience. They were
just agents of state rather than municipal corporations. As the population grew, uniform state law was
increasingly inadequate to meet the needs of burgeoning suburban areas. The legislature in 1935 made
significant changes to extend counties' powers as municipal corporations. Since then, counties have gone
more rapidly toward greater power and autonomy. As a result, The Municipal Home Rule Law was adopted in
1963. By the law, most counties generally came to adopt charters and to have an elected executive or
appointed manager, separately from the state.
Towns, like counties, were also involuntary in their birth. All territories in a county are divided into towns.
Towns, therefore, exercised little self-rule and were controlled by counties. As population grew, particularly in
suburban towns, pressure continued for extending the powers of town government. The town meeting
diminished and town boards and supervisors grew in importance. The more populated towns were often
changed into villages. Since the 1920s, the powers of first-class towns were as extensive those of villages.
Town governments regulated land use, built highways, provided police, and regulated all sorts of public
behaviors by town laws. In 1976, general provision was made for towns to adopt a manager system of
government. There are 932 towns in New York.
Cities, differently from counties and towns, were created as public corporations to meet special local needs.
The power of each city derives from a unique statute. Cities are not organs of the state. Generalization about
cities, however, becomes more difficult than other entities, because of their unique charter and special needs.
Moreover, their substantial powers and structures even among the current 41 cities vary considerably, even
though most of them have mayor-council systems.
Village governments have far more powers than towns, as extensive as those of early cities. The growth of
the autonomy and power seems to be like those of cities. There are currently 556 villages in New York State.
Most villages were chartered before the early twentieth century.
The four types of local governments have been converging incrementally in their structure and powers since
the Civil War, increasing their similarities while diminishing their differences.
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State Commission on the Capital Region. May 1996. "Growing Together Within the Capital Region," Draft
Report. Albany, N.Y.: Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government.
This report, which runs about 150 pages including appendices, outlines ways in which the six-county Capital
Region of New York State (so named because its main city is Albany, the state capital) can work as a region
to strengthen its economy, become more competitive, attract visitors, and generally function more efficiently.
The four priority areas highlighted in the report are:
economic development
regional planning
solid waste management
roadmap for cost reduction
In the area of solid waste management, the report advocates the development of "cooperative regional
approaches to solid waste management, working in partnership with businesses and nonprofit organizations
and enlisting the support of citizens." The authors recommend the creation of a nonprofit regional consortium
to serve as the umbrella agency for improved waste management coordination efforts.
The "roadmap for cost reduction" refers to an effort to examine government functions and expenditures to
find ways to reduce the local property tax, which is currently 73% higher than the national average. The
report suggests beginning this comprehensive process by looking at two counties.
The capital region has 131 general-purpose governments (counties, cities, towns, and villages) and 60 school
districts. Intergovernmental cooperation is already occurring in some areas, such as highway systems, where
some equipment and services are shared, but other opportunities exist. The report proposes creating a
regional clearinghouse for information on equipment and storage facilities owned by each local government. It
also recommends creating a regional consortium of local governments to pool resources, share equipment and
expertise, jointly administer common services, and achieve economies of scale where possible. Training
programs and information and records management are mentioned as two areas where local governments
could collaborate.
This report focuses on ways local governments can work together to solve common problems, by sharing
information and identifying areas where cooperation would be beneficial. The authors view intermunicipal
cooperation as the key to improving efficiency.
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Desfosses, Helen. 1994. "Regionalization-Who Needs It?" Regional Report 1, no. 1. Key Bank Center for
Regional Studies (March).
In the Capital Region people are discovering that they need regional solutions to problems that spill over
political boundaries. The Key Bank Center for Regional Studies was established to explore and promote these
Regional solutions.
Regionalization refers to the growing interest among local government and non-government organization to
join forces to tackle problems that defy solution within established political boundaries. Government officials
and citizen are interested in finding an alternative to the dilemma of either cutting service or increasing
taxes. Regionalization may offer that alternative.
Other places have been instituting regionalization with success. In Indianapolis, Senator Richard Lugar (then
Mayor of Indianapolis) was able to merge county and city governments in 1970, into a new regional
government know as Unigov. In Toronto, a two-tier system means that some functions are regional and other
are addressed by local government. In Charlotte/Mecklenburg, NC, only the police and fire departments
remain separated into city and county departments. Finally, in Portland, Oregon, the METRO government
represents the only elected regional government in the U.S.
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Nathan, Richard P. "Keynote Address: Reinventing Regionalism." Regional Plan Association, April 26,
1994.
The new frontier for the reinvention of government is regionalism. There are too many governments - 83,327
by the last Census count. Regionalism, however, is nothing new. The list of city-county combination
governments dates back to New York City in 1898. In Louisiana , the Baton Rouge merger plan occurred in
1947. Miami and Dade County, Florida, merged in 1957. Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, linked up
in 1963, as did Jacksonville and Duval County, Florida, in 1968. Also, in 1970 Indianapolis and Marion County
formed Univgov.
These types of consolidations have dried up over the years for two main reasons. The first is political. People
like local units, because it gives them a sense of identification and community. The second reason is race.
Metro government consolidation often led to demands for school district integration on a greater scale than
people thought would have been the case if consolidation hadn't occurred. This is ironic because race was the
reason for regionalism in the first place. As minorities began to dominate central cities, regionalizing was a
way to dilute their strength politically.
The focus now of regionalism isn't structural but functional. We are seeking the right scale of diversity while
placing great emphasis on public and private cooperation. One reason for regionalism is to tackle the
problems that defy solution within established political boundaries, like solid waste management, water purity,
transportation, and delivery of social services. A second reason is to save money by shifting the delivery of
services from local to the more efficient regional level. A third reason for regionalization is to strengthen a
region's economy by involving the business community in the process, while fostering a spirit of public-private
cooperation.
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Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is
Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
The authors, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, argue that American governmental bureaucracy, which was
appropriate to the industrial era and times of economic and military crisis during which it was created, is not
the best system of governance for the post-industrial information age.
Since the 1960s, the American public increasingly wants quality and choice of goods and services, and
efficiency of producers. However, quality and choice are not what bureaucratic systems are designed to
provide, nor is efficiency possible in a system of complex rules and drawn-out decision-making. Moreover,
since 1982, reductions in federal funds has made it more difficult for state and local governments to meet the
continued citizen demand for services and increasing expectations for quality.
The authors' prescription is entrepreneurial government, which focuses on results, decentralizes authority,
reduces bureaucracy, and promotes competition both inside and outside government. Government's clients
are redefined as customers who are empowered by being able to choose among providers of various services,
including schools, health plans, and housing options.
The authors discuss the various options for delivering public services, utilizing the public, private, and
nonprofit sectors. And they provide 10 principles, based on numerous case studies, that guide the
fundamental transformation of our industrial era public systems:
Catalytic Government
Community-Owned Government
Competitive Government
Mission-Driven Government
Result-Oriented Government
Customer-Driven Government
Enterprising Government
Anticipatory Government
Decentralized Government
Market-Oriented Government
This book offers a vision and a road map, and it will intrigue and enlighten anyone interested in government.
Introduction: An American Perestroika
The authors argue the American public sector bureaucracy is no longer an appropriate system of governance
for the post-industrial information age. To meet continued citizen demand for services -- and increasing
expectations of quality, choice, and efficiency -- governments should change the ways they provide services
from the bureaucratic model to a more entrepreneurial one characterized by flexibility and creativity as well
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as conscious efforts to improve public sector incentive systems.
 Chapter 1: Catalytic Government: Steering Rather Than Rowing
Catalytic governments separate steering, or providing guidance and direction, from rowing, or producing
goods and services. Osborne and Gaebler give numerous examples such as contracts, vouchers, grants, and
tax incentives.
 Chapter 2: Community-Owned Government: Empowering Rather Than Serving
Community-owned governments push control of services out of the bureaucracy, into the community.
Examples show how bringing communities into the picture empowers the people who are the intended
recipients of services and results in better performance.
 Chapter 3: Competitive Government: Injecting Competition into Service Delivery
Osborne and Gaebler believe that improving both the quality and cost-effectiveness of government services
can be achieved through competition rather than regulation. Introducing competition does not necessarily
mean that a service will be turned over to the private sector, rather the crucial function of competition is
ending government monopolies.
 Chapter 4: Mission-Driven Government: Transforming Rule-Driven Organization
Mission-driven governments deregulate internally, eliminating many of their internal rules and radically
simplifying their administrative systems such as budget, personnel, and procurement. They require each
agency to get clear on its mission, then free managers to find the best way to accomplish that mission,
within legal bounds.
Chapter 5: Result-Oriented Government: Funding Outcomes, Not Inputs
Result-oriented governments shift accountability from inputs to outputs, or results. They measure the
performance and reward agencies, so they often exceed their goals.
 Chapter 6: Customer-Driven Government: Meeting the Needs of the Customer, Not the Bureaucracy
Customer-driven governments are those that make an effort to perceive the needs of customers and to give
customers a choice of producers. They use surveys and focus groups to listen to their customers, and put
resources in the customers' hands.
 Chapter 7: Enterprising Government: Earning Rather Than Spending
Enterprising governments stress earning rather than spending money. They charge user fees and impact fees,
and use incentives such as enterprise funds, shared earnings, and innovation funds to encourage managers to
earn money.
 Chapter 8: Anticipatory Government: Prevention Rather Than Cure
Anticipatory governments seek to prevent problems rather than delivering services to correct them. They
redesign budget systems, accounting systems, and reward systems to create the appropriate incentives.
 Chapter 9: Decentralized Government: From Hierarchy to Participation and Teamwork
Decentralized governments transfer decision-making authority to those individuals and organizations at the
bottom of the organizational hierarchy. They restructure organizations and empower employees and create
labor-management partnerships.
 Chapter 10: Market-Oriented Government: Leveraging Change through the Market
Market-oriented governments utilize a market mechanism instead of an administrative program to provide
goods and services to the public. They reinvent themselves through the application of market-oriented
incentives.
Chapter 11: Putting It All Together
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Osborne, David, and Peter Plastrik. 1997. Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for Reinventing
Government. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
This book provides reinventors with practical know-how that can be applied. Osborne's early book,
Reinventing Government, primarily described the characteristics of entrepreneurial governments. Banishing
Bureaucracy sees a step further and provides a detailed description of the strategies used to create
entrepreneurial governments.
The authors view reinvention as a fundamental transformation of public systems and organizations to create
dramatic increases in their effectiveness, efficiency, adaptability, and capacity to innovate. They believe
reinvention of public systems is accomplished by changing their DNA—their purpose, incentives,
accountabilities, power structure, and culture. Bureaucratic systems are replaced with entrepreneurial systems
and self-renewing systems.
For changing government's DNA, the authors lay out five strategies (five C's) and introduce more than 900
tools. The five C's are:
1. The Core Strategy for Creating Clarity of Purpose
The first critical piece of DNA determines the purpose of public systems and organizations. The core
strategy is to clarify the purpose of government. It uncouples steering, or providing guidance and
direction, from rowing, or producing goods and services, so that each organization can concentrate on
achieving one clear purpose.
Tools for the core strategy include sunset rules (require that programs be
reauthorized periodically), devolution (transfer activities to a lower level of
government), competitive bidding (uncouple steering from rowing by requiring
the rowing function be competitively bid out), performance budgeting (define the
outcomes and outputs policy makers desire), and others.
2. The Consequences Strategy of Incentives
The second key piece of DNA determines the incentives built into public systems. The consequence
strategy changes the incentives by creating consequences for performance.
Tools for the consequence strategy include performance awards (providing
employees with nonfinancial recognition for their achievement), bonuses (one-
time cash awards), and performance budgeting (inserting required performance
levels into budget documents).
3. The Customer Strategy for Accountability to Their Customers
The next fundamental piece of system DNA focuses primarily on accountability. The customer strategy
gives customers a choice of service delivery organizations and sets customer service standards public
Search Cornell
organizations must meet.
Tools for the customer strategy enhance public choice by allowing recipients of
public services to choose between different providers—all public or both public or
private. This can be achieved through vouchers and reimbursement programs
(give those eligible for certain services the resources to purchase them
themselves, or reimburse providers when they do) or customer complaint
systems (track and analyze customer complaints, ensure prompt response).
Chapter 6, "The Customer Strategy: Putting the Customer in the Driver's Seat"
describes Minnesota's experience with public school choice.
4. The Control Strategy for Shifting Control Away from the Top and Center
The fourth critical element of DNA determines where decision-making power lies. The control strategy
pushes significant decision-making power down through the hierarchy and at times out to the
community. There are three approaches in application of the control strategy: Organizational
Empowerment (eliminating many of the rules or other controls imposed by higher levels of the
organization), Employee Empowerment (reducing hierarchical management control and pushing down
authority to front-line employees) and Community Empowerment (shifting bureaucracy's power out into
community).
Tools for the control strategy include decentralizing administrative controls, labor-
management partnerships (agreements between managers and unions to
cooperate on improving organizational performance and working conditions), and
community-based regulation and compliance (shifts control over regulatory and
compliance functions to communities, such as business or neighborhood
associations).
5. The Cultural Strategy for Creating an Entrepreneurial Culture
The last critical piece of DNA determines the culture of public organizations. The culture strategy
attempts to change the organization's habits, hearts, and minds.
The tools for the cultural strategy are, for example, meeting the customers
(expose employees to the customers through focus groups, conversation, or
front-line work), redesigning the workplace (reinforces the emotional
commitments leaders want, such as a sense of teamwork or a commitment to
customer service), and benchmarking performance (comparing the performance
of different organizations to dislodge outdated mental models by undermining
faith in the old ways of doing business).
The authors acknowledge these strategies sometimes overlap, and some strategies are best used together.
Thus, to optimize implementation of the strategies, reinventors must anticipate how these strategies will
affect each other, and how they will work together most powerfully. In addition, they stress that the courage
to reinvent is needed to use the five C's successfully.
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Tendler, Judith (1997).  Good Governance in the Tropics. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
The purpose of  “Good Government in the Tropics” is to highlight examples of good government in developing
countries, especially Latin America. The literature on government in developing countries is full of examples of
self-interested government servants, clientelism, and bloated and inefficient bureaucracies. This has led most
think tanks and donor institutions to advise developing countries to trim their government size, privatize,
contract out and subject public agencies to market-like pressures and incentives.
Tendler’s work is grounded in observations of “good government.” She critiques mainstream development thinking, as perpetuated by the
mainstream donor communities, because it is most often based on observations of bad government practices. Tendler lists seven flaws that
taint the advice of mainstream development thinking:
1. Advice arises from looking at poor performance
2. Advice suggests importing ideas from industrialized countries
3. Entire country is considered an example of good or bad government – local successes and failures are
overlooked
4. Advice is often based on a strong belief of market superiority
5. Advice ignores Industrial Performance and Workplace Transformation (IPWT) literature
6. Advice is grounded in excessive faith in actions of the user or client of public services 
7. Advice does not acknowledge the need to develop a good labor-management relations system.
Tendler's book looks at what makes public sector workers dedicated. She examines four cases of good
performance by a reformist state government in Ceara, Brazil in the late 1980s under Governor Tasso
Jereissati. She focuses on four programs: rural preventative health care, business extension and public
procurement from small firms, employment – creating public works construction and energy relief, and
agricultural extension and small farmers. 
 Tendler identifies five central themes behind the successes:
1. Government workers demonstrated an unusual dedication to their jobs. 
2. The government made efforts to instill a sense of mission in the workers.
3. Workers were more flexible and responded to the perceived demands of the clients.
4. Both workmanship pride and increased community pressures limited corruption and malfeasance.
A three way dynamic between the state government (central government), local government and civil society
that did not fit the stereotypical roles in terms of building civil society.
Chapter 1:  Introduction
Chapter 2:  Preventative Health: The Case of Unskilled Meritocracy
Chapter 3: The Emergency Employment Program and Its Unlikely Heroes
Chapter 4: Frontline Workers and Agricultural Productivity
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Chapter 6: Civil Servants and Civil Society
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Article Summary
Feldman, Barry, M.  1999.  “Reinventing Local Government:  Beyond Rhetoric to Action.”  The Municipal
Yearbook.  Washington, DC, ICMA.
Since Osborne and Gaebler wrote Reinventing Government, there has been much debate
over the need to change the way government  provides services to the public.  The
Reinvention movement calls for empowering citizens by getting the results they value. 
Supporters of reinventing government want to impose private market incentives on
governmental activities and encourage competition in government decision making. Much
of the pressure of reinventing government has fallen on local governments, especially city
managers who are called upon by city councils and citizens to create policies that reduce
the cost of government.  Barry Feldman, a town manager, initiated a study to find out
how much the rhetoric of reinventing government has gone from academic debate to
actual implementation.  A survey by the ICMA was mailed nationwide to all cities with a
city-manager form of government and population of 10,000 or more and the response
rate was 45% or 1,276 city managers returning surveys. 
On the whole, city managers support the principles of reinventing government.  However,
according to the survey, city managers also make distinctions between the principles of
reinventing government and their actions. Feldman tried to discover if managers
implemented specific programs and included money in their executive budgets for these
programs.  The most common actions were to institute user fees, to contract out to a
third party, offer employee training on customer service and use enterprise budgets.
Performance based budgeting, or shifting decision making to neighborhood groups were
least common.  While managers supported the principle of empowering citizens, they did
not request funds to train neighborhood groups. While managers may support making
government more competitive and entrepreneurial, they continue to have concerns over
whether this type of system can ensure fair, competent, and honest government.  The
conclusion drawn from this survey is that city managers are using the principles of
reinventing government by blending them into principles of traditional government. 
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Labor-Management Cooperation
As local governments nationwide struggle with demands for quality service delivery and fiscal constraints,
they are employing a number of strategies. While these include privatization and intermunicipal
cooperation, another technique that can lead to greater efficiency and cost savings is labor-management
cooperation. The following background articles and special report examine some of the critical issues
surrounding effective implementation of cooperative labor-management practices.
Industrial Relations Theory
Transforming Work
Cooperative Workplace Structures
Incorporating Multiple Stakeholders
Mutual-Gains Bargaining
Aspiring to Excellence: Comparative Case Studies of Public Sector Labor-Management Cooperation in
New York State
Full Text
Executive Summary
Conclusions
Resources
Tools for Cooperation:
Labor-Management Committees
Mutual-Gains Bargaining
Total Quality Management
Case Studies of Three New York State Counties:
Genesee County
Ontario County
Tompkins County
Background: New York State Civil Service Law
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Denhardt, Janet and Robert Denhardt. The New Public Service: Serving, not Steering. M.E. Sharpe,
Armonk 2003.
In Janet and Robert Denhardt’s 2003 book The New Public Service, the authors offer a synthesis of the ideas
that are opposed to the New Public Management presented by Osborne and Gaebler. Their model for
governance builds upon and expands the traditional role of the public administrator, which they call the Old
Public Administration, and contrasts with the New Public Management. Following the structure of Reinventing
Government, the Denhardts divide their argument into seven principles. These are:
1.  Serve citizens, not customers
2.  Seek the public interest
3. Value citizenship over entrepreneurship
4. Think strategically, act democratically (In comparison to Osborne and Gaebler, Denhardt and Denhardt
assert that there is a difference between “thinking strategically” and “entrepreneurial government.”)
5. Recognize that accountability is not simple
6. Serve rather than steer (This involves listening to the real needs of the people and the community, not
just responding in the manner that a business would to a customer.)
7. Value people, not just productivity
 Here, the role of the public administrator is much more complex. He or she cannot simply act as a manager
in the business sense by performing cost-benefit analysis. As Denhardt and Denhardt explain, “In the NPS,
the public administrator is not the lone arbiter of the public interest. Rather, the public administrator is seen
as a key actor within a larger system of governance including citizens, groups, elected representatives, as
well as other institutions…the role of government becomes one of assuring that the public interest
predominates” (p.81). They go on to further articulate this point with a quote:
The public manager’s job is not only, or simply, to make policy choices and
implement them. It is also to participate in a system of democratic governance in
which public values are continuously rearticulated and recreated (Reich 1988, 123-
24, quoted in D&D 96).
 
 Denhardt and Denhardt assign quite a bit of responsibility to the public administrator, and at the same time
stress the importance of public participation and community decision-making. The exact allocation of
responsibility and power is unclear. Osborne and Gaebler are much more explicit on the relationship between
government administration and its citizens, because they use the customer service model from business. The
administrative role is further streamlined by moving as many choices as possible out of the political arena by
converting those policy alternatives into market choices.
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Denhardt , Robert B. and Janet Vinzant Denhardt (2000).  “The New Public Service: Serving Rather than
Steering.”  Public Administration Review 60(6):549-559.
Linda deLeon and Robert Denhardt deconstruct the central arguments of the reinventing government movement
which emerged in 1992 after the release of David Osborne and Ted Gaebler’s book, Reinventing Government. 
For deLeon and Denhardt, there are several damaging effects this political theory has on public administration.
The authors critique three of the central arguments of reinvention—its use of a market model within government,
its emphasis on customers rather than citizens, and its adoration of entrepreneurial management.  They conclude
by reflecting on the impacts these three elements have on democratic citizenship, civic engagement and public
interest.
Underlying the three elements of the reinvention movement is the belief that the narrowly defined self-interests of
many individuals (public administrators) can adequately approximate the public interest, and can do so without
burdensome civic discourse.  The political theory of reinvention places in the hands of public administrators,
decisions that are typically derived through citizen participation and the democratic process.  The authors argue
that the reinvention movement “denigrates the role of collaborative action, produces an impoverished vision of
the public interest, tends to exclude some persons from the public arena, and reduces trust among citizens and
between their government (p.93).”
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Blanchard, Lloyd A., Charles C. Hinman, and Wilson Wong, 1997. “Market-Based Reforms in Government:
Toward a Social Subcontract?” Administration and Society 30(56) 483-512.
This article argues that market-based reforms reduce traditional conceptualizations of the social
contract between citizens and government to a “social subcontract” between citizens, government, and
private sector interests. Market based reforms include changes that reduce the scope and influence of
governmental agencies (e.g. privatization and downsizing) or improve agency administration itself with the
creation of market-like incentives.[1] 
A social contract framework is used as a heuristic device to examine the historical development of
public administration, the role of government in society, and the citizen-government relationship of the past
century. 
This analysis demonstrated three significant trends:
1)      a growing government obligations sphere relative to the private market sphere
2)      a growing administrative sphere
3)      the movement of the administrative sphere into the market sphere.
 
The authors conclude that although reforms of earlier periods affected the size and
the scope of the administrative apparatus, these changes did not fundamentally change
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the relationship between citizens and government. However, they did find that the
relationship is considerably changed under market-based reforms. 
Considering these trends, they posit three fundamental implications for the citizen-
government relationship and the social contract, which form the conditions that convert
the traditional social contract into a social subcontract:
1)      Accountability arrangements are altered.  
            The legal contracts between the government and the private sector entity will, to
some degree, provide the accountability linkages to the citizens.  Moreover, with the
“blurring” of the government and market obligations, the citizen-government relationship
is also “blurred”. The social subcontract (characterized by the intrusion of the
administrative apparatus into the market) makes it more difficult for citizens to monitor
their government or even know where responsibility lies.  Citizens will only have power as
consumers.
2)      The government paradoxically co-opts the market by extending its
administrative apparatus, and thus its scope, into the private sphere.  
            While the formal institutions of government may remain constant or decrease in size, the increased
number of informal institutions involved with public service delivery will only extend the scope of government
oversight of the market.
3)   The legitimacy of public administration in particular, and government in  
general, may be threatened because of these changes. 
            Without the extension of the administrative apparatus the accountability linkages would be
completely diminished and the social contract and citizen-government relationship would undoubtedly suffer.
Are the gains from economic efficiency worth the potential costs of lost government accountability and
legitimacy?
Social contract model terminology:
Government obligations sphere: Based on the social contract, the government provides
services and goods for people that would otherwise be difficult for people, acting as
individuals, to provide for themselves. Ethical obligations include upholding less formal
societal rules, which are largely determined by citizens’ moral standards, common law,
and historical precedent.
Private market sphere: A system where “the allocation of resources [is] determined by
individual decisions between consumers and producers, without any central direction”.
Administrative obligations sphere: Carries out government obligations through the
execution and implementation of laws and rules.
Citizen obligations: Legal obligations of citizenship are the rights and obligations that are
bestowed on citizens through legal statues and constitutions. Ethical obligations derive
from broader political, social, and economic obligations to community, which are
influenced by community norms, values, and culture.
Accountability linkages:  Basic political process, checks and balances, public interest
groups, adherence to rules and ethical codes, etc.
Market transactions: Private contract-based provision of goods and services that
emphasizes the role of the citizen as a consumer.
[1] The social contract is an agreement that establishes authority and obligations whereby individuals
concede certain freedoms and accept certain obligations in exchange for the provision of specific goods that
they would have difficulty attaining as individuals and through other mechanisms.
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 Warner, M.E. 1999. "Social Capital Construction and the Role of the Local State." Rural Sociology.
64(3):373-393.
With globalization weakening the role of the nation state, increased theoretical and
practical attention is being focused on community level action, especially on the role of
social capital.  Proponents of social capital have given primary emphasis to voluntary
associations.  This paper looks at the role the state can play in building social capital. 
The historical nature of social capital in the community, the organizational structure of
governmental intermediaries, and the design of specific program interventions condition
social capital building.   Hierarchical governmental intermediaries are contrasted with
participatory community based initiatives.  Three key factors: autonomy, linkage and
returns on investment for both intermediaries and participating residents, are shown to
affect social capital construction.
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Feldman, Martha & Anne Khademian (2001). “Principles for Public Management Practice from
Dichotomies to Interdependence.”  Governance and International Journal of Policy and Administration
14(3):339-361.
 Feldman and Khademian believe that it is possible to create more flexible and responsive
local administrations.  They stress responsiveness to the demands of the taxpayers and
accountability for administrators.  Management has to make every effort to seek out
citizen opinion and act on it. 
The idea of flexibly bureaucracy is an old one, but it has never been implemented on a
broad scale, perhaps because simply understanding the system doesn''''t lend itself to
leading it flexibly and openly.  The authors argue that first, managers should not
separate the demand for accountability from smooth operations. They should satisfy the
need for flexible decision making processes by allowing more direct input from citizens.
Secondly, by changing teaching and policy, there is a way to link flexibility in decision
making and accountability for services into a new organizational system by which they
support each other.
One current theory on public management has three basic principles: The first is that
managers need to create “public value.”  The manager gains insight into the public’s
opinion by way of an election.  Second, the manager must have a set of clear goals in
mind, and manage this mission.  Lastly, managers should hold the concept of “continuous
self improvement” close to heart.  In sum, if you know what the people want, and
constantly work towards it, your mind should be open to ways to do it better. 
 
In contrast, Peter Aucoin proposes specific structural changes to promote the goals of
accountability & flexibility.  His reforms have three basic principles: first, the separation
of policy making from the operations that implement services.  Second, the bottom line
should be critical in evaluating organizations, making it very obvious what is working
financially and what is not.  Lastly, Aucoin suggests that smaller groups form within
organizations to achieve short term, easily measurable tasks.  These ideas come together
into Performance Based Organizations (PBOs).
 
In practice, Feldman & Khademian push managers to be more inclusive not only when
planning out how to accomplish goals, but also when they attempt to piece together
problems and missions.  This allows them to get ideas from those outside of the box, and
better understand the problems of the area they are dealing with.  The authors also
emphasize primacy of process.  It might be necessary for the process or administration
to be redesigned to better accomplish the mission.  Taking a step back and seeking input
on the goals of the government is also important.  The inclusiveness of a modern
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administration causes the public to be more appreciated, and this in turn, means that
they will hold those in charge that much more accountable. 
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Crocker, Jarle, William Potapchuck and William Schechter 1998. Systems Reform and Local Government:
Improving Outcomes for Children, Families and Neighborhoods.  Washington DC:  Center for Community
Problem Solving.
Local government reform can help communities achieve positive change in the lives of children and families.
This paper offers ideas for local governments to spur citizen involvement in communities and neighborhoods.
Change will come about for families only through community participation in local initiatives. They believe
that government reform must not strive only to improve current services, but must also work to create
linkages between services, as well as support systems.
Successful government reform can be achieved only through involving community stakeholders in defining
neighborhood problems, listing goals and deriving and implementing solutions. The need for community
participation requires the government to change its role in the community from that of a regulator and
service provider to a partner and facilitator. Six types of government reform are essential to support families
and create social capital: systems reform in human services, community development, community organizing,
collaboration, reinventing government and community building. They believe that by instituting changes in
these areas, government reform can strengthen democracy, redefine citizenship, strengthen the role of
government and ultimately produce better outcomes for families, especially those in lower-income brackets.
A true reform of local government will affect all levels of government, be comprehensive, induce stakeholders
through collaboration, and transform the nature of relationships within and throughout the community. At the
broadest level, reform will promote community-wide change all the way down to inter-agency change. The
authors suggest seven elements necessary in reaching the goal of transforming the structure of governments
and the way they relate to their communities:
· Seek comprehensiveness by addressing the whole set of problems and drawing on resources from multiple
community groups
· Synthesize and decentralize services by locating service delivery in neighborhood centers, encouraging
citizen participation and capacity to make decisions
· Employ results based tools by emphasizing results, accountability and performance
· Streamline institutions to encourage efficient, flexible and flattened structures systems
· Establish participatory and collaborative decision making by involving stakeholders in decision making,
implementation, management and evaluation
· Build institutional forums by creating new relationships among public, private and nonprofit partners
· Create structures to support civic engagement with links to neighborhoods at all levels
While all of these elements are important, they stress how local governments can successfully reform by
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selecting and combining those initiatives that will work best for their case.
There are challenges to local governments seeking to reform. One difficulty with engaging a multiplicity of
citizens is that they will have very different perspectives on problems and how to solve them. This requires
the need for community building – bringing citizens together, and while acknowledging their differences,
building consensus about how to resolve public problems. Reforming local government in the setting of
changing state and federal policy can be difficult. This requires constant dialogue not only with state and
federal agencies, but also within the local government structure, assuring that employees understand reforms
and are actively involved in the ever-changing process. Addressing taxpayer’s worries about where their
money is going and what projects take precedence with scarce resources requires creativity and doing more
with less.
Above all, local governments wishing to pursue systems reform must have a plan. They must start with
research, analyzing what has worked (and failed) for cities similar to themselves. They need to assess what
resources they have, what resources they need, and how to utilize them. Finally, it is most important to
establish a network of links to other governments and agencies, for monetary and moral support.
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Abers, Rebecca, 1998. “From Clientelism to Cooperation: Local Government, Participatory Policy and Civic
Organizing in Porto Alegre, Brazil,” Politics and Society 26(4): 511-537.
In this article Rebecca Abers shows how “state actors can actually promote the
empowerment rather than the weakening of civic organizations” (1) by examining the
case study of Porto Alegre, Brazil. The “participatory budget” created by the local
government in Porto Alegre in 1989 gave power and tools to neighborhood-based forums
to make decisions about the distribution of municipal funds for capital improvements. She
examines how this budget policy mobilized neighborhood groups, promoted participation
and discouraged clientelism.
 The focus of this paper is the “participatory budget,” created by the Partido dos  Trabalhadores (PT), a
democratic-socialist party, who wanted to create a system of “popular councils” in neighborhoods, to take
over much of the work of local government decision-making. The PT wanted to create allies in poor
neighborhoods and govern “democratically.” The administration created an institutional structure to encourage
the creation of neighborhood associations and participation within the budget process. All adult residents
could participate and in order to reduce the costs of participation, government officials were sent to the
neighborhoods. The city was divided into “budget districts” following the lines of neighborhood coalitions and
geographic features. General assemblies were held in each district, where government officials presented
information about the city budget and participants elected their representatives and delegates to year-round
forums and the Municipal Budget Council. Residents also met in neighborhood associations to discuss
priorities for investment. District Administrative Centers were created to bring officials and city services closer
to the residents. Community organizers hired by the government visited un-mobilized neighborhoods to help
find new leaders, give out information and encourage participation. Abers believes that it was this direct
contact with government organizers that drew new participants into the process. 
 Abers examines the Extremo Sul District and how the budget policy succeeded in mobilizing neighborhoods
that were previously controlled by clientelism. Dozens of impoverished settlements lacking basic infrastructure
existed in this district and most neighborhoods either had no association or residents were excluded from
participation. Community organizers and high level officials visited the impoverished neighborhoods to collect
information on the district’s needs. It took four or five years after the budget policy was initiated, but
organizing was successful and neighborhood leaders were able to break traditional associations that prohibited
participation. The state was genuinely responsive to participant demands and participants were aware of this
responsiveness.
 The participatory budget policy created an arena in which it was rewarding and easy to participate.  Abers
found that the people most historically disempowered in Brazil, with lower income levels than the municipal
average, were the most involved with the budget policy and civic organizations.  Through this process,
individuals began to see themselves as part of larger groups and created networks of trust and reciprocity.
The policy was successful and residents learned how to organize, mobilize, cooperate and engage in debate
about government policy.
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Litvack, Jennie, Junaid Ahmad and Richard Bird 1998. “Rethinking Decentralization in Developing
Countries,” Washington, DC: The World Bank.  
http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/urban/cds/mf/rethinking.html.
This article deals primarily with the complexity of the decentralization problem, outlining what needs to be
taken into account if decentralization is to be accomplished successfully in developing countries. With
decentralization currently occurring by deliberate design, political necessity or default, the range of possible
outcomes has neither been realized nor envisioned.
 The distinction between decentralization in developing countries and their developed counterparts is taken as
twofold. First, many of the assumptions made in literature on decentralization (in industrialized nations) such
as the presence of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ do not hold in developing countries. In developing countries, ‘exit’ is often
constrained by lack of mobility (poor information, weak markets for land, labor and capital and risk aversion
due to the absence/inadequacy of social safety nets). ‘Voice’ is constrained by problematic electoral systems.
Both lead to a lack of accountability on the part of the government.  
 The second chapter goes to great length to point out that decentralization as a concept/ideology is neither
inherently good nor bad, but is one of many tools for institutional restructuring. There is no decisive
consensus on what the effects of decentralization will be. At its best, decentralization can affect equity
(through allocation) and efficiency increases, as well as macroeconomic stability. At its worst it can fail to
improve service delivery, promote the risk of national destabilization and induce undesirable second and third
tier effects.
 The debate on whether decentralization is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is simply unproductive: decentralization is a political
reality in many developing countries, as opposed to an option for deliberation. Thus, it is equally important to
realize that the complexity of the problem does not lend itself to a simple, unified solution but calls for
appraisal on a case by case basis. The search for solutions is limited by the lack of empirical evidence.
 How then to proceed? Chapter 3 deals with the specific institutional design framework needed to address the
problems of exit, voice and accountability. Fiscal federalism provides such a framework. Fiscal federalism is
the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to each tier of government, often facilitated by
intergovernmental transfer of funds. It is premised on the idea that ‘decisionmaking should occur at the
lowest level of government consistent with allocative efficiency’ (chpt 3, p.10). This would dictate the optimal
size for the jurisdiction of each service and service component. The authors provide examples of services,
such as water supply and sewerage, for which there are roles and implications for different tiers of
government.
 To assign the appropriate tier of government, it first must be determined what outcomes are deemed
desirable for the central government and how they are to be accomplished (e.g. direct provision, delegation,
etc). Control of those issues that are determined to be of less importance to the central government should
be relinquished to local authorities. Although detailed control over local use of funds is not desirable, some
sort of monitoring is necessary to ensure the quality of service provided meets standards.
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 Raising revenue is part of this equation in that lower-tier governments are often unable to finance the
expenditures for which they are responsible with own-source revenues. Three methods to bridge the gap
between revenue and expenditure are: intergovernmental transfers, provision of taxation power for
subnational governments, and subnational borrowing.
 Allowing subnational governments to levy taxes is aimed at burdening local residents for the benefits they
receive and can take two forms: a retail sales tax or a personal income tax. Litvak et al rule out a retail sales
tax, citing administrative difficulties. The personal income tax is given more weight and is considered effective
only when local authorities retain the ability to set the rate.
 Intergovernmental transfers provide a more economically acceptable if logistically more difficult option.
Transfers can be broadly divided into non-matching (lump sum) and matching transfers, the former further
divided into selective (conditional) and general (unconditional) categories. Matching transfers require that
funds be spent on specific purposes and that the recipient to some extent matches the grant. These transfers
have the potential to distort local priorities and favor more affluent jurisdictions. Non-matching conditional
transfers require the recipient spend at least the full amount received on the designated function. Problems of
substitution (fungibility) come up when money that would have been spent on the designated function is
diverted once the grant has been received, making the impact of the grant itself unclear. Unconditional non-
matching grants do not have a specific use and therefore their impact varies. Subnational borrowing is
considered a last resort due to the chance of increasing the pressures of cyclical borrowing.
 If key services are provided through decentralized governments, there must be methods of ensuring that (1)
the price facing service providers is ‘right,’ (2) the targeted groups are receiving the desired services at an
acceptable level of quality and (3) non-compliance is dealt with in an equitable way. This will undoubtedly
necessitate different tiers of government having common goals.
 Chapter 4 addresses how institutions –organizations, the rules they follow and the means of enforcement –
determine the success of decentralization. The authors focus on the regulatory framework and decentralized
borrowing, the organization of service delivery, and the establishment of information systems and competitive
governments. 
 The regulatory framework and decentralized borrowing are critical parts of decentralization. There are good
reasons for allowing sub-national governments to finance their own investments by borrowing, but without
the proper rules such borrowing can get out of hand. Hence, local governments should be allowed to raise
their own
revenue and be forced to pay back any loans by raising local taxes. Borrowing should be done only for capital
investments, and should require national approval. They also argue that the banking system must be kept
separate from direct political intervention, but that the central government must ensure transparency and
monitor the level and nature of the banking system’s liabilities.
 The organization of service delivery is another important factor. The question of who pays for a service is
independent of how it is delivered. Each type of service has a different optimal way for funding and delivering
it, so each service should be examined individually.  
 It is very important to establish information systems and competitive governments.  One of the major
arguments for decentralization is that local governments have better information about local wants and
needs.  Decentralization and open information allow citizens to compare the level of taxes they pay and the
level of services they get with other municipalities. The central government can facilitate this by requiring
uniform and complete budget and financial reports and by encouraging open budget hearings. 
 Not all sub-national governments are equally able to manage the challenges of decentralization. It is
important that decentralization be synchronized across the fiscal, administrative, and political realms. 
 In the final chapter, the authors re-emphasize the need to enhance local accountability,
and point out that this can be done through decentralization. Decentralization can
increase community participation and transparency, allow citizens to compare government
performance across municipalities, and create incentives for fiscal responsibility on the
local level. Some local governments do not have the capacity to manage the greater
responsibility that decentralization brings. However, the authors suggest that local
governments can increase their capacity or work with private corporations and NGOs to
meet the greater responsibility.
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Prud’homme, Remy (1995).  “The Dangers of Decentralization,” World Bank Research Observer
10(2):201.
This article is a critique of fiscal federalism theory, which is a form of decentralization. Fiscal Federalism refers
to a system in which local governments act autonomously in taxation and expenditure activities. There are no
transfers between local governments. The central government, in general, “retreats” on all fronts.
Prud’homme, in his study, highlights the dangers of such a system. He points to several major issues:
Redistribution (of any sort) cannot be undertaken at the local level. Centralization is a necessary prerequisite
for redistribution, otherwise, a “capital flight” will occur wherever redistribution occurs. Ultimately, the
generous local governments will be punished for enacting generous redistribution standards. A race to the
bottom will occur. Prud’homme terms this “destructive competition.”
Economic Stability is much more difficult to attain with a high degree of decentralization, because the central
government has lost power over fiscal policy. Even if the national government does have power over fiscal
policy, its policies will have no authority unless they are backed up by actual recourses, such as the holding
of a significant share of total taxation and expenditures. Otherwise, “fiscal perversity” can occur: the local
governments may distort the national government’s ability to use fiscal mechanisms as a tool for
stabilization. In the developing world, this will be particularly devastating.
Allocative Efficiency may be jeopardized under fiscal federalism. The focus on “demand efficiency” is
inappropriate, particularly for the developing world: here, the problems are not “Tiebout model”-type
mismatches in preferences and tastes, but a great want for basic needs (which are the same everywhere).
Consequently, decentralization will bring negligible benefits, if any, to the 3rd world.
Corruption – or “informal taxation,” will be decentralized along with everything else. In general, central
government officials tend to be of higher rank, of higher status, and more mobile, therefore less tied to a
particular locale. There are indications that this makes them more difficult to corrupt than local officials. If
this is the case, corruption will rise with greater decentralization.
Beyond the Centralization-Decentralization Dichotomy. In general, some activities, cultures, regions, and
services are more suitable to decentralization than others. Decentralization is certainly useful in some
circumstances, but it is certainly not a universal cure-all. There is a critical mass beyond which smaller units
of government will lack the capacity and/or incentive to engage in the task at hand. Units of government
must be set up in such a scale that it is responsive to the needs of its citizens.
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Stohr, Walter (2001).  “Introduction” in New Regional Development Paradigms:  Decentralization,
Governance and the New Planning for Local-Level Development. Eds. Stohr, Walter and Josefas Edralin
and Devyani Mani.  Published in cooperation with the United Nations and the United Nations Centre for
Regional Development: “Contributions in Economic History Series,” Number 225.  Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press.
Globalization has two sides. On one hand, it has brought significant advances in economic, technological and
democratic terms to many countries; on the other hand, in spite of these advances, poverty, hunger, health
hazards, technological gaps and disparities in human welfare have also increased.   Essentially, there has and
continues to be a widening rift between the “haves” and the “have-nots”.  To address this increasing
inequality, development efforts need to focus on and empower those who are being left behind.  This requires
a greater focus on and empowerment of local communities, which in turn requires the decentralization of
administrative and political decision-making processes.  In this introductory chapter, Stohr lays out the main
themes of the book: 1) decentralization, 2) governance and the need to consider subsidiarity, equity and
sustainability, and 3) the importance of civil society.  Stohr also proffers a warning, namely that globalization
and decentralization in tandem may harbinger the further fragmentation of civil society and undermine local
power.  However, the author concludes with recommendation to stave of this disintegration of social cohesion.
Decentralization
 
Inherent in the idea of decentralization is that different problems (and hence different communities) require
different solutions.  Traditional centralized governments are not able to address the myriad different
situations that occur at the local level and new systems are needed.  To solve local problems, new systems of
government must be more decentralized and make increasing use of civil society and the private sector.
There are four major forms of decentralization through which responsibility may be transferred from a
centralized body to lower levels of government: 
·         Devolution, which transfers governing responsibilities, such as planning and budgetary decisions to the
local and regional levels and largely removes from the purview of the central government.
·         Deconcentration, which connotes a spatial decentralization of the central government through the
creation of local or regional line ministry offices.
·         Delegation
·         Divestment
Decentralization, the author writes, has the societal function to “allow society to achieve at the subnational
and local levels the goals of poverty reduction, sustainable livelihood, environmental regeneration and gender
equity” (2).  The book, as Stohr notes, deals primarily with deconcentration and devolution and compares and
contrasts their strengths and weaknesses through various case studies.  The preliminary findings, which he
outlines in the introduction, suggest that deconcentration, while maintaining a higher degree of centralized
control over decision-making through line ministries, results in better resource allocation than devolution;
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devolution, however, seems to encourage innovation in the creation of public/private partnerships and
alternative financing strategies.  At the same time, coordination between the various government departments
and ministries may break down in the case of devolution.  
Stohr notes, that despite the global discourse of decentralization and local empowerment, decentralization,
particularly in the form of devolution, is not yet a widespread phenomenon.  What passes for decentralization
in the name of local control, looks more like deconcentration and can be viewed as a strategy to increase the
presence of the central government in order to further its policy goals. 
In addition, the authors of the book caution that decentralization is not a “panacea” to solve the problems of
development, such as lack of participation, poverty and inequality.  On the contrary, the institutionalization of
decentralized decision-making whether fiscal, administrative and/or political should be adapted to the specific
needs of each context.  Decentralization, Stohr notes, in some national contexts with multiethnic populations
engaged in power struggles may result in the fragmentation and breakdown of the national polity and civil
society.  In the worse case scenario this may lead to violence and chaos.
Governance, Subsidiarity, Equity and Sustainability
 
Governance is a governing structure in which the public sector, private sector and civil society cooperate to
solve problems of a public socio-economic nature and to construct a more equitable society.  Stohr introduces
the concept of subsidiarity in order to reassert the importance of multilevel public decision-making power that
begins at the local level and delegates power upward to higher levels of government.  Because one of the
main tenets of globalization is competition, Stohr notes, besides economic growth in some arenas, it has also
fostered “individualization, atomization and a loss of solidarity” consequently contributing to the erosion of
civil society (7).
While the expressed goal of decentralized governance is equity or at least improved equity, the key may be
to strike the right balance of decentralized and centralized authority ensure redistribution both of resources
and power in order to prevent that decentralization does not reinforce skewed local power relations and
therefore preexisting inequalities.
Re-energizing and empowering civil society, Stohr argues, represents an important strategy in order to arrest
the process of “inequalization” and reconstruct more equitable societies.  “Changing public attitudes...from
one of dependency to one of broad participation, initiatives and self-empowerment” represents an important
first step toward development of an active civil society.  Four types of barriers, however, impede the
development of an engaged civil society:  psychological barriers, economic barriers, social barriers and
technical barriers.  These “barriers” are rooted in a sense of helplessness and a psychological abrogation of
local power to government authority.  Overcoming this sense of disempowerment requires more than
institutional decentralization.  It also takes time (at least 10-15 years) and the cooperation not only of local
agencies, NGOs and volunteer groups, but also the genuine involvement of national and supranational
agencies in order to build an empowered sense of solidarity and common purpose.  This may lead to long-
term sustainability. 
Stohr offers another definition of sustainability, which seems to contradict the direction of
the arguments being made in this introduction, particularly when viewed in relation to
subsidiarity.  On the one hand, he seems define sustainability in local terms as ”the
ability to regenerate in a self-supporting way not only for environmental but also in
human and social systems” (6); on the other, the concept of subsidiarity recognizes the
necessity for redistribution and intervention from national and supranational institutions
(6).
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Cerny, Philip G. 1999. “Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy.” European Journal of Political
Research, 26:2.
Philip Cerny analyzes the form and function of democracy in today’s globalized world. He asserts that liberal
democracy is being eroded through increased globalization and internationalism, and therefore factors such as
public accountability, responsiveness, policy capacity, and legitimacy are all in decline. The result is the
emergence of ad hoc public and private governance structures that undermine the democratic state from
above and below, leading to a “durable disorder” of overlapping and competing institutions.
 
Cerny asks two questions: 
1. To what extent is democracy ‘as we know it’ so embedded in the nation-state that we cannot transplant it
into the kind of governance structures and processes characteristic of a complex ‘globalizing’ world?
2. To what extent is globalization itself essentially undemocratic?
The answers to these questions are very disturbing: “The kind of world which is crystallizing through
globalization is not only inherently less permeable to democratically-grounded values and conceptions of the
public interest or collective good, but also less capable of generating the policy outcomes that people want
(p.6).”
 Today’s globalizing world is set on a somewhat shaky framework. A single world marketplace is emerging,
resulting in the loss of state capacity to make effective economic policy decisions. This is a threat to
democracy, as shown by a look at the history of political institutions throughout the world. Democratic
transitions arise from the public demand for democracy when the state demands war taxes, manpower,
loyalty, etc. If the state is unable to control economic policy, this natural system breaks down.
 “The nation-state can in some ways be said to be both a product of the ‘global’ system of its era and the
source of the dynamic drive for globalization (10).”  Regardless, it is necessary to question how globalization
affects the economic, social and political environment within which states operate. This includes the
internationalization of markets, the effect of new production techniques that are more flexible and tailored to
a range of different market structural conditions, and the development of new information and
communications technology. These advances may affect the sovereignty of the state, in that they corrode and
transform specific tasks, roles and activities. 
Currently there is a ‘fiscal crisis of the state’: the costs of simply maintaining state functions and structures
outstrip the sources of taxation and other income. Further, the expansion of international trade and financial
flows, while at first supporting domestic economic management and social democratic functions of the
industrial welfare state, now makes states vulnerable to political and market pressures of financial
liberalization and increased international capital mobility. This change compounds with the delegitimation of
the national and industrial welfare state, a call for lower taxes and balancing budgets, and loss of regulatory
policy throughout the world. 
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 State legal systems- the core framework of national sovereignty- are increasingly being bypassed, especially
by the most internationally-linked firms and market actors. Democratic public law is being replaced with
negotiated private law, due to the changing nature of the public/private relationship, and private sector
interconnections across borders.
 Cerny concludes with a number of predictions about the evolution of government
structures and the role of democracy in the future. He presents three possible scenarios:
global hierarchy, global chaotic anarchy, and the emergence of a relatively stable, quasi-
pluralistic system that he calls “plurilateralism.” Existing democracy, as we have known
it, will no longer function effectively in a world of fragmented globalization.
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Donahue, John D. 1997. “Tiebout? or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s Devolution
Debate.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4) 73-82.
In this article, J. Donahue examines the Tiebout model of interjurisdictional competition
at the state level.  He agrees that competition of service provision and taxation at the
local level can “wring out waste and tighten management by forcing officials to respond
to citizens’ priorities and deliver more value for taxpayers’ money”.
Donahue also argues that the market has real life conditions for competition that are not
given at the government level.  For example, new governments do not have free and
easy entry.  He questions solutions for government competition by saying that there are
cases when decentralization can yield higher disadvantages than advantages to the well
being of the local government. To support his view, he presented three cases in which
interstate competition benefits are questionable:
 ·        The Case for Collusion.  This involves states working together instead of competing
with one another to reach better outcomes. Interstate competitive bidding attracts “jobs”
(investment incentives) but turns hazardous to the locality if it starts offering more than
the new “job” is going to provide. For example, in the case of the states allowing
gambling casinos, certain sates that have not legalized casino gambling may suffer from
its side effects such as crime and psychological illnesses, in addition to the money outflow
of the residents who gamble elsewhere. In these cases governments would be better off
if they collaborated and set common standards. 
 ·        Heterogeneous mobility and “Citizen’s Surplus”.  Changes in state policy have
made citizens feel that they are expected to “vote with their feet.” Donahue says
that only a low 3% of the US population moved to different states in 1990 (1990
US census results).  He explains this with the “citizens surplus” concept that says
that most citizens have other ties (extra value) to their locality (i.e., family,
friends and economic connections) in addition to the services they receive or
taxes they pay. Furthermore, although businesses do not have locational ties,
they have other kinds such as strong investments or location access to inputs or
markets. There are an increasing number of businesses that base their location
decisions on state policies being made. Interstate competition can be expected to
evolve to favor and attract businesses that are more mobile and desirable.
 ·        Distribution, Income Inequality and Welfare Reform.  Notorious gains have
resulted from the transfer of distribution responsibilities to state governments
(wage increases, targeting areas with distributional issues. However, Donahue
says that the effects of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities
Reconciliation Act of 1996 will remain a matter of conjecture until the results can
be observed.  Donahue also suggests the possibility of a “race-to-the-bottom”
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triggered by the future cut of federal welfare transfers to the states that would
increase their welfare benefit cuts so that they do not become “welfare
magnets,” or attract the poor in search of better benefits.
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Donahue, John D. 1997. Disunited States. New York: Basic Books.
John Donahue is critical of devolving the role of the public sector from the level of the federal government to
that of the states. Donahue does not believe that states can relieve us of the need to confront our problems
as a nation. He examines the rationale for devolution, including the notion that by allowing states to compete
with one another they can become more efficient. He debunks this argument by offering examples of
destructive competition in which states pursue the lure of capital through incentives such as location subsidies
and tax exemptions, which do not serve to aid the state/local economy in the long run.
 Donahue argues there is little evidence that the public sector will be more efficient at the state level than it
is the federal level. He says that the challenges facing America today include mitigating cynicism in
government on the public’s part and narrowing the gap between the benefits expected from government and
the citizen’s willingness to endure taxation. As states take on more responsibilities they open themselves up
to more criticism.
 Donahue refers to devolution as “the endless argument” over the equilibrium between
nation and state. From early on in U. S. history the balance between national and state
authority has been one of contention. Donahue offers the prescription that devolution
should occur in situations where states vary greatly in goals and where competition
increases efficiency and is not destructive. He does not think that antipoverty policy
should be devolved to the states. Donahue believes that a major focus of reform efforts
on the part of policymakers should be fixing government as opposed to devolving its
responsibilities down to the state level. For Donahue, devolution does not offer an easy
alternative to changes on a national level.
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Katz, Michael 2001. The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State. New York:
Metropolitan Books.
In this book, Michael Katz explores the history of the American welfare state and offers his projections for its
future. He reviews the major welfare policy overhauls of the twentieth century, paying attention to the
ideological underpinnings of each one. This serves to chronicle the change in national mindset from welfare as
a safety net for all, to a set of programs designed to force people into the workforce. As a result, welfare no
longer serves to protect Americans from the unpredictability of the market, but rather makes them more
subject to it.
 Katz focuses on the increasing ties between welfare and employment. In the quest to distinguish the
deserving from the undeserving poor, policy makers have gradually changed the definition of citizenship in
America toward including only those with jobs. Katz discusses the magnitude of this shift, pointing out the
negative effect that it has had on the nation’s neediest citizens. Katz views the history of welfare through the
lens of what it means to be an American citizen, giving an eye-opening view of the consequences of altering
this definition.
Chapter 1:  The American Welfare State.  Katz unpacks the "American welfare state" to reveal an elaborate
framework of public and private systems.
Chapter 2:  Poverty and Inequality in the New American City.  The author looks at the economic,
demographic, and spatial forces that have created the modern American city.
Chapter 4:  Governors as Welfare Reformers.  Governors became the most prominent welfare reform agents
during the 1990s by cutting benefits, changing regulations, and experimenting with new welfare programs.
Chapter 5:  Urban Social Welfare in an Age of Austerity.  Katz chronicles funding changes that have affected
America's largest urban areas.
Chapter 6:  The Independent Sector, the Market and the State.  American charity and social services have
traditionally been provided by a complex blend of private organizations and public agencies.
Chapter 7:  The Private Welfare State and the End of Paternalism.  The author describes the private welfare
state in the United States, which consists of work-related benefits, mainly those offered by employers to their
workers.
Chapter 9:  New Models for Social Security.  Katz examines Social Security in the U.S. and the question of
whether or not the government should privatize this system.
Chapter 10:  The Assimilation of Healthcare to the Market.  Katz recounts the development of the U.S.
healthcare system and notes its chronic inability to provide reasonable coverage at reasonable costs to those
most in need of public assistance.
Chapter 12:  The End of Welfare.  An overview of the pre-1996 welfare system, or Aid to Families with
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Dependent Children (AFDC), and its overhaul under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).
Epilogue:  Work, Democracy and Citizenship.  Katz analyses the contemporary concept of citizenship in U.S.
society to discuss the viability of welfare in the current context of the three forces that are redefining the
welfare state: 1) the war on dependence, 2) devolution, and 3) markets.
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Peterson, Paul 1995. “Who Should Do What? Divided Responsibility in the Federal System,” The
Brookings Review 13(2): 6-11.   
Peterson discusses the roles of local, state and federal government in the provision of two
types of public policies, developmental and redistributive. He points to recent history to
argue that state and local governments should fund the development necessary to
sustain economic growth, but that federal government should provide redistribution
necessary to compensate those that do not benefit from the growth.
Developmental policies provide physical or social goods necessary for sustained economic
growth (e.g., transportation, education, sanitation, police, and fire, etc.). They are best
handled at the state and local level. Localities have incentive to provide more efficient
goods and services because of the  threat of people voting with their feet, especially
locally. State and local government can share ideas and therefore promote a variety of
good programs and also avoid bad ones throughout states and the country. 
 Developmental policies are not appropriate at the national level because they result in
“pork,” not growth. Programs and grants for developmental goods and services often do
not help the economy but tend to be irresponsible expenditures by Washington
politicians. In the past, this “pork” was made possible because inflation automatically
pushed people into higher income-tax brackets causing tax increases that were disguised
and politically feasible. This ended in 1981 with a sharp income tax reduction. Fiscal
deficits, anti-tax pressures and senior citizen entitlements combined to push for more
state developmental spending.
 Redistributive policies transfer funds from those who have gained the most from
economic development to those who have gained the least. This includes pensions,
welfare, health care, unemployment, etc. Redistributive policies are best implemented at
the national level because it is difficult for those who pay to move away. They don’t work
as well at the state and local level because those governments must be concerned with
economic development and will therefore almost always provide less redistribution in
exchange for a higher tax base.
 A state that provides higher benefits than its neighboring state will see an inflow of
applicants. Therefore, states try to match or provide lower benefits than their neighbors,
resulting in a race to the bottom. This trend is supported by the very minimal increases
in redistributive spending at the state and local levels since 1962, despite the greater
awareness of the country to the problems of poverty. The new TANF block grants do not
increase funding with an increase in applicants.
 In an effort to cut federal spending in 1995, the Republican Congress and Clinton teamed
up to give states responsibility for more of both types of spending, developmental and
redistributive. Peterson feels comfortable with the shift of developmental policies to the
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states, but not redistributive policies. State and local governments are becoming
increasingly competitive and the tendency for them to provide redistributive services is
decreasing.
 Peterson predicts that shifts to states and cities will be “unworkable and short-lived”
because they are “at odds with the underlying structure of the federal system.” He further
predicts that if he is wrong, the well-being of those that depend on the programs will be
dramatically compromised. Many examples can be seen of states cutting welfare
programs when given the flexibility to do so.
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Powers, Elizabeth. 1999. “Block Granting Welfare: Fiscal Impact on the States,” Occasional Paper 23.
Washington DC: The Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=309040
The mechanism for federal funding of welfare experienced a serious transformation under
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996.
 Funding for state-run welfare programs switched from open-ended match grants to fixed
block grants.  The switch had a number of significant implications.  The withdrawal of
federal grants that matched state spending placed the burden of marginal costs of
welfare programs on states.  The implementation of fixed block grants from the federal
government simultaneously increased the discretion of states to make decisions regarding
their own welfare expenditures.  Concerns over possible drastic cuts in benefit levels,
tightened eligibility requirements, or the elimination of citizen entitlements to meet the
new fiscal constraints have stimulated major discussions about the effectiveness of this
switch.  Some important questions are: What are the impacts on state fiscal
environments by switching to block grants?  How much of  the burden of welfare finance
does PRWORA effectively transfer to the states?  How efficiently are the federal block
grants and the additional "stabilizing funds" used in states?
Powers’ study uses a simulation method to analyze the period since PRWORA was
enacted.  She finds that the total cost to the federal government under the new system
of block grants (in the form of TANF - Temporary Aid to Needy Families) is just 1.4
percent less than the prior cost of AFDC - Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 
Therefore, while the nature of federal funding changed immensely under the new block
grant system, the quantity changed very little.  Also, the distribution of federal funding
among states is uneven and arbitrary.  As a result, some states have been forced to
spend far more than others under TANF, while a number of other states spend much
less. 
 The Contingency Fund is the stabilizing federal fund which is divided among those states
with demonstrable needs.   Due to unfair requirements, the distribution of this $2 billion
fund is also fairly arbitrary.  In order for states to be eligible to receive contingency
funding, they must demonstrate a significant increase in their unemployment rates and
food stamp caseloads, as well as a 20 percent increase in their welfare spending.  Under
these conditions, states experiencing substantial and ongoing financial difficulties may still
fail to meet the exact criteria for accessing the fund, while mostly larger states with
higher concentrations of poor can qualify easily without significantly increasing their
welfare spending.   
 This study argues for the need to adjust block grants during the funding cycle in
response to the varied fiscal scenarios of the states.  The current block grant system is
not responsive to the evolving needs of individual states.  The distribution of federal
funds is based on illogical  standards, and the fixed nature of these grants keeps states
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from spending as much as they need.  States exhaust themselves financially to qualify for
use of the Contingency Fund.  States now view welfare spending as more of a monetary
risk than a positive social investment.  If the federal government continues to devolve
the fiscal responsibility of social welfare to the states in this way, state policymakers will
continuously seek ways to make larger cuts in programs in order to survive financially
and politically, and have less regard for the welfare of individuals left in need.      
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Conlan, Timothy 1998. From New Federalism to Devolution: Twenty Five Years of Intergovernmental
Reform. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. Press. Chapter 14: “Intergovernmental Reform and the Future
of Federalism.” 
Conlan chronicles the changing trends of devolution and federalism reform over the past 25 years, through
the tenures of Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich. Shifts are examined in terms of the
differences in the men’s ideology, methods employed and the outcomes of reform.
Conlan describes Nixon as an ‘activist conservative.’ Nixon’s managerial approach, based
on theories of public administration and finance, aimed to improve the management of
intergovernmental programs by making government more efficient and responsive at all
levels. Nixon emphasized devolution of power to the states by the ‘sorting out’ of the
functional responsibilities of various governmental levels. In his view, the federal
government was responsible for levying taxes while the states were responsible for
administering local spending. To this end, capacity-building programs were included in
block grants. Uniform national benefits for welfare were proposed, entitlement spending
and intergovernmental regulations expanded. Nixon’s policies were consistent with the
theories of public finance.
Ronald Reagan, on the other hand, was highly skeptical of domestic governmental
activism. He felt that Nixon’s model of mere managerial restructuring constituted
insufficient reform. Reagan advocated reduction in governmental activism at all levels,
encouraging private initiative and volunteerism. Breaking from Nixon’s approach of
‘sorting out,’ he aimed at bringing taxation and spending functions together under the
federal government to reduce uncontrolled spending by states. Reagan proposed a $90
billion plan to eliminate all federal aid programs and a corresponding 23% tax cut. The
administration’s domestic spending program deeply cut federal grants for state and local
governments. Paradoxically, Reagan did maintain a safety net of programs for the poor,
which grew during most of his presidency.
Gingrich attacked the redistributionist model of Reagan. He took special aim at cutting
poverty programs, which had been supported during Reagan’s reign. He wanted to
remake the welfare state into an “opportunity society.” By decentralizing power and
decision making, he sought to reduce the size and reach of the federal government. The
devolution of power to state and local governments was only a partial step. The
bestowing of power to its origins, the citizens, represented true dispersal.
The intellectual basis of reform shifted across the past 25 years. Nixon’s reform agenda
was guided by theories of public administration and finance, which aimed at restructuring
intergovernmental relations on the basis of executive leadership, clear lines of authority
and improved coordination. During the eras of Reagan and Gingrich, diminishing federal
responsibility in redistributive programs indicated the shift from theories of public finance.
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The reforms of Gingrich show an increasing proclivity to the public choice theory, which
emphasizes controlling public sector growth and non-interference in the market.
The decreasing difference between federal and state shares of total government
revenues, modernization of state governments (in terms of strengthened institutional
capacity), well balanced fiscal systems and increased representation of minorities support
devolution. The move toward decentralization can be viewed as the decline of the nation
state as a result of the interplay of political and economic factors.  The decline of the
nation state and the increasing demands of citizens from local governments has led to
the creation of sub-national entities that are required to take on more responsibility for
provision of goods and services than before, and hence demand greater local autonomy
and policy devolution.
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Gold, Steven D. 1996.  “Issues Raised by the New Federalism.” National Tax Journal 49(2) 273-87.
http://ntj.tax.org
Two years after the Republican congressional victory marked by the “Contract with
America,” Steven Gold examines the effects of New Federalism and what he calls the
“devolution revolution” on local and state governments.  Gold points out that devolution
is not an amorphous concept, but is varied in both content and application.
Three main components of the devolution program are stated:
 1.       Aid reduction to state governments
 Federal aid represents between a quarter and a third of state government resources.  As
most states have structural deficits in future payments, there is the possibility of a
looming fiscal crisis.  Several factors could ameliorate the crisis, including gradual phasing
of federal aid reduction, economic growth (and tax receipts) from a balanced budget, and
the possibility of smaller cuts over time. 
2.   Shift from matching to non-matching grants
 This policy shifts the burden of federal programs such as welfare programs and Medicaid
onto state governments.  The shift means that there would be less federal aid to offset
the contraction of state revenues in the event of a recession; hence, the state budget
would be severely stressed in a recession.
3.    Enhanced flexibility for state governments
 The efficiency gains from allowing state governments greater autonomy would not
necessarily be offset by the negative effects on the budget.  These efficiency gains rely on
the ability and creativity of the individual state governments, and it is likely that these
governments will exploit their newfound freedom through fiscal manipulation rather than
increasing efficiency.
The second part of the article describes five trends in state policy that necessitate further
research.  These five areas are:
1. Structural balance of state budgets
2. Discretionary tax changes
3. Determinants of state spending
4. Interactions between state and local governments
5. Effects of federal aid
Finally, the devolution program involves powerful structural changes that require further
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research.  He worries that squeezing the system from the top will result in instabilities
elsewhere.  Unless there is less structural rigidity, and increased research, the devolution
program is unlikely to reach its full potential.
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Salamon, Lester M. (2002).  The Tools of Governance: A Guide to the New Governance.  “The New
Governance and the Tools of Public Action:  An Introduction.”  Oxford: Oxford University Press.
“New governance” is a new way of thinking about how government and public administration meet the
diverse needs of society.  New governance is a movement away from public agencies and programs to a
collaborative, tools-based system of public action. While earlier government activity focused on direct delivery
of goods and services, new governance leverages third parties and seeks to network their capabilities to
create solutions to an increasing array of public problems.  Loans, loan guarantees, grants, contracts, social
regulation, economic regulation, insurance, tax expenditures, vouchers, and more serve as tools that
contribute to an increasingly decentralized government structure. 
In new governance, picking the combination of tools to use involves political decisions.  Salamon notes, “a
strong pro-market bias underlies tool choices in the U.S.”  Under new governance, public administrators
become network managers, and “activation,” “orchestration” and “modulation” skills become essential. New
governance is more than contracting or decentralization.  It is the replacement of “command and control”
with a network of managed third parties.
Tools for public action are required to build the knowledge base the “new governance” requires. Salamon
evaluates tools for public action using four dimensions (coerciveness, directness, automaticity, and visibility)
and five criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, equity, manageability and political legitimacy). Governments are
increasingly likely to adopt less coercive, indirect, automatic and invisible tools, which are typically delivered
by private actors in the form of a loan or liability. Although these appear effective and efficient, they have
significant accountability and legitimacy challenges as well as management difficulties.
A tool for public action is defined as “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to
address a public problem”. (p.19) Tools differ from programs in that a single tool can be applied to different
programs. Tools structure action by defining the participants of public programs, their roles and the
relationships amongst them. The entities that exercise tools for public action are not only governmental but
also private. A tool is a package of different elements, such as a type of good or activity (a cash or in-kind
payment or a restriction), a delivery vehicle for this good or activity (through a loan, a grant, voucher, the
direct provision of service), a delivery system (a government agency, a nonprofit organization), and a set of
rules defining the relationships among the entities that comprise the delivery system.  
Tools can be evaluated through five criteria: Effectiveness, efficiency, equity, manageability and legitimacy.
Salamon also examines each tool by four dimensions. First is the degree of coerciveness, which measures the
extent to which a tool restricts individual or group behavior. Directness measures the extent to which the
authorizing body of public activity is involved in its execution. Automaticity measures the extent to which a
tool utilizes an existing administrative structure. Visibility measures the extent to which the resources
devoted to a tool show up in the normal government budgeting and policy review processes.
With the growing tendency toward decentralization, public skepticism of government, and
efficiency as a criterion of public action, indirect, invisible and automatic tools are
increasingly popular. However, policymakers are under increasing political pressure to
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select tools which are the most difficult to manage and the most likely to diverge from
public objectives. This leads to more management accountability and legitimacy
challenges.
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Rhodes, R.A.W., (1996).  “The New Governance: Governing without Government,” Political Studies
XLIV:652-667.
In this article Rhodes grapples with the significance and definitions of “governance” as a way to explicate the
trends and form of British government reform since the 1980’s.  Rhodes reviews and critiques various
definitions of ‘governance.’ And find these inadequate in explaining the new governing structure that had
developed in Britain by 1995.  Rhodes begins by identifying two generally accepted and understood governing
structures 1) hierarchies, namely government bureaucracies, and 2) markets, the rallying cry of privatization
advocates in the 1980’s.  Rhodes, however, finds these lacking in explanatory power and adds a third one,
networks, which he recasts as “governance,” and posits as an alternative conception of contemporary
governing structure in Britain.  Before arriving at his definition of governance as “self-organizing networks,”
Rhodes evaluates different strands of literature assessing government reform and governance in order to
arrive at a critical assessment of how the term “governance” may contribute to our understanding of the
current working of governments as they become increasingly embedded in network relationships in order to
provide services to the public.
·         Governance as Minimal State, Rhodes argues, embodies the ideological and political call for downsizing
the state. 
·         Governance as Corporate Governance focuses our attention on the policy-making, goal-setting role of
government and sets the requirement for transparency and public accountability.
·         Governance as New Public Management (NPM), Rhodes argues follows closely from the above criteria
and develops a notion of government directing or “steering” action by structuring the market, which takes
over the actual service provision or the “rowing” function.
·         Governance as Good Governance, as advanced by the World Bank “marries new public management to
the advocacy of liberal democracy” (657).
·         Governance as a Socio-cybernetic System can be conceptualized as the effects of the interactions
among government, social, political and economic actors wherein no one actor has a monopoly over
information or expertise.  In other words, the public may set broad goals and create a regulatory
framework but as actors interact within this institutional environment, they work in and reshape the
network of relations to solve problems. 
·         Governance as Self-organizing Networks is related to the above form of governance in that it focuses
on governance as referring to networks in which private, non-profit, and public individuals and
organizations interact to provide public services.  However, the focus here is on the autonomous character
of these networks as deregulation and alternative service provision mechanisms increasingly debilitate the
ability of government to steer. 
In order to distance his conception of governance from NPM and refute its applicability to inter-organizational
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networks, Rhodes highlights four ways in which it fails to capture the characteristics of contemporary
government structure: 1) NPM’s focus is within the organization instead of managing outside linkages; 2) NPM
concentrates on objectives instead of on the importance of maintaining relationships and trust; 3) NPM
highlights results while Rhodes’ model reveals a possible breakdown in public accountability; 4) NPM’s
emphasis on competition does not fit with the imperatives of steering inherent to a network model.
Definitions of governance as a socio-cybernetic system, or as self-organizing networks then are closest to
Rhodes conception of governance.  In this model no single actor, including government, has all the
knowledge, tools, or power to either dominate or to make policy work.  “The task of government is to enable
socio-political interactions” and to manage relationships of trust and cooperation within a network (659). 
Government becomes something broader – ‘governance’ – when it provides services through outside
organizational patterns.  Finally, he suggests that networks to provide services are self-organizing, and that
these “integrated networks resist government steering, develop their own policies and mold their
environments” (659). 
This emerging governing structure, however, Rhodes postulates, poses serious challenges to accountability
and governability, particularly within the context of representative democracies.  The fragmentation and
decentralization of service delivery reduces the government’s control over implementation and its ability to
co-ordinate and steer the networks.  Worryingly, the complexity of these relationships also erodes
responsibility and accountability since outcomes are the product of multiple actors.  To address some of these
concerns Rhodes suggests tools of intergovernmental management to strengthen communication and facilitate
problem solving between different branches of government.  At best these efforts may help the problems of
co-ordination and steering but cannot address issues of democratic accountability.  Rhodes cautions that the
policy networks he has identified may both shut out the public and be resistant to central guidance,
“becoming the prime example of governing without Government” 667).
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Turner, Bryan S. 1990. “Outline of the Theory of Citizenship,” Sociology 24(2) (May): 189-217.
Bryan Turner critiques T.H. Marshall’s conceptual framework of citizenship and offers his own concept, both in response to common
critiques of Marshall’s framework and in recognition of the change from a national to global perspective.
T.H. Marshall argued that there are three basic manifestations of citizenship - the civil, the political, and the social. He stated that 18th
Century Britain saw the development of the civil rights of individuals; the 19th Century saw the development of political rights in the
increased access of workers to the parliamentary process; and the 20th Century saw the development of social rights, which became the basis
of claims to welfare and entitlements. Marshall further argued that a contradiction exists between formalized political equality, and ongoing
social/economic equality, rooted in capitalist society and the existence of private property. 
Turner summarizes the many critiques of Marshall’s concept, but ultimately criticizes him most strongly for his anglocentric analysis, which
explores the concept of citizenship solely as it developed within the British experience. Marshall’s concept of the capitalist state fits uneasily
into today’s notion of global capitalism, or “disorganized capitalism” (p. 195), in which the state has less control.  A more thorough analysis
of the development of citizenship across various nations can lead to the recognition that several forms of citizenship exist.  
Turner ends his analysis by commenting on globalization and changing concepts of citizenship. He mentions both
an increasing regional autonomy and localism, and the move toward global notions of political responsibility. We
must develop a new conceptual framework in order to express new ideas of citizenship in the global world. The
concept of citizenship can also be further investigated as it has evolved in ethnically complex countries and in
developing countries.
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Marshall, T.H. (1950).  “Citizenship and Social Class” in Citizenship Debates: A Reader ed. by Gershon
Shafir, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
In this essay on citizenship, T.H. Marshall asks how our modern idea of citizenship, built on equality, can
coexist with the competitive market, based on inequality.
He first outlines the history of citizenship over the past 250 years by dividing it into three threads: 1)civil:
rights necessary for freedom; 2) political: equal rights under the law and the right to participate politically
and 3) social: the right to a measure of economic welfare and security.
The civil rights aspect of citizenship developed in Britain in the 18th century, with the rise of individual
liberty, the right to work in the occupation of one''s choice, and the end of servile status for peasants.  The
political rights aspect developed in the early 19th century, with the disconnection of the right to vote from
economic status.  Social rights of citizenship formed in the 20th century, starting with the introduction of free
and compulsory elementary education.
Our egalitarian society has been able to reconcile itself to the inequalities of capitalism by
holding out a supposed equality of opportunity. All are capable of enjoying certain rights
(such as property ownership) in that all are allowed to strive for them without hindrance
or special protection. At the end of 19th century, this conception of citizenship created a
sense of common membership in and loyalty to the nation.
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Holston, James and Arjun Appadurai (1999).  “Introduction” in Cities and Citizenship ed. by James
Holston.
Citizenship is more than the right to participate in politics. It includes cultural, civil and
socioeconomic rights. Since the 18th century citizenship and nationality have been linked
to establish full membership in society. What it means to be a member in society has
been a historical development that has been conservative, exclusionary, democratic and
revolutionary. Nations established citizenship as an identity which coordinates all other
identities. Cities are the main arena for the development of citizenship and signify the
enormity of citizen rights and all of its liberties. Today transformations have created
many uncertainties about aspects of citizenship that in the past seemed secure. These
transformations are a result of an increasing dichotomy between the global and national
arenas.
One of the problems with citizenship is that in theory, full access to rights depends on
citizenship but in practice, formal membership is not a sufficient condition for citizenship.
An example is that poor citizens may have formal rights but are excluded from
participation and the rights of citizenship. Similarly, legally resident non-citizens often
have the same civil and socioeconomic rights as citizens.
Some people believe that citizenship should be made more exclusive by denying social
services to non-citizens or by enacting zoning regulations that keep the undesired out.
Others argue for a more inclusive citizenship by addressing it in non-local and
supranational terms. Holston believes that both forms of citizenship can have negative
outcomes. Localism can result in violence and racism and the elimination of local
community prevents active participation.
The Liberal Compact claims that individuals must pursue their own ends with a similar
liberty for all.  Critics argue that people do not have the moral depth that liberalism
requires and that it produces passive citizens. The most vocal critics affirm the right of
difference as an important part of citizenship. There is a growing rejection of citizenship
as a homogenizing force that impoverishes and reduces. The politics of difference
indicates a basic change in the historical role of citizenship.  There are arguments that all
people have a right to a minimum standard of living, because of their right as citizens.
Social movements of the urban poor have expanded citizenship rights.
Trans-nationalization creates new forms of inequality, reduces loyalty and commitments
to place and generates a new global network of cities. Nations must change their
structure to attract global resources and accept legal authority of transnational regulatory
bodies. This gives power to managers of social capital and takes away privileges from
labor. The international market has its own laws that de-legitimatize national laws and
Search Cornell
citizenship. With the break down of nationality, until trans-nations become stronger, cities
are important sites for rethinking citizenship.
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Chapter Summary
Katz, Michael (2001). “Work, Democracy, and Citizenship,” epilogue of The Price of Citizenship:
Redefining the American Welfare State. New York: Metropolitan Books.  
In his epilogue, Katz analyses the contemporary concept of citizenship in U.S. society to discuss the viability
of welfare in the current context of the three forces that are redefining the welfare state: 1) the war on
dependence, 2) devolution, and 3) markets. Within the welfare state ideas about citizenship revolve about
whether people born or nationalised are entitled to citizen rights (pre-existing status) or whether people
deserve to be citizens (achieved status).  By linking the citizenship to a welfare state rooted in the notion of
earned benefits and family values, Katz argues, the deserving citizens become defined as those who have
jobs and form families.  Thus those who do not work, or are single parents, become marginalized as the
undeserving poor and consequently second class citizens, disproportionally represented by women and people
of colour.
The War on Dependence:
Katz describes how the discourse of dependence the Welfare reforms in the 1990s has “encouraged tightening
the links between benefits and employment, which makes health insurance, retirement pay, or income
support more difficult to claim outside of a regular job” (353).  At the same time, the increase in jobs is
largely in the lower income sector where competition is high due to flex-work and an increased labor supply
of former welfare recipients.  Katz notes a distinction between ‘work’ and ‘a job,’ where work is that which
reproduces society, (e.g. domestic labour, community organising, promoting culture), and a job is only that
aspect of work that brings you into a relationship with an employer.  In contemporary U.S. society, Katz
illustrates, good citizens are those who focus on the job instead of work, thereby undermining the social
reproduction of society:  “There is something bizarre about a rich society that assigns so many of its
important tasks to a voluntarism that is defined as different from work and that carries no entitlement to the
social benefits of citizenship” (354).
Devolution
Katz argues that allowing states to run their own public
benefit systems has created vast state by state differences
between eligibility for public assistance. As a result it
becomes perfectly acceptable that citizens in identical
situations experience hardship only due to “an accident of
geography” (355).
Markets
Search Cornell
Katz argues that the privatisation debate has not sufficiently
engaged 1) the question of power in market relations and 2)
where markets are appropriate and where they are not. 
Markets, Katz asserts, reduce societal complexity to mere
material incentives and preferences resulting in a process of
individualisation that turns relations into commodities and
erodes social responsibility.  Because markets recast
democracy as consumer choice, they redefine not only the
welfare state but also American democracy. He concludes
that neither the inflow of immigrants nor the challenges of
multiculturalism undermine national cohesion, but rather
unchecked markets.  To contest this process, Katz identifies
three points of action: 1) loosen the link between public
benefits and employment 2) establish health care as a
citizenship entitlement and 3) focus less on caseload quantity
and make public assistance accessible to the poorest in
society.
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Why Should Local and State Governments Pay Attention to the New International Treaties?
Jennifer Gerbasi and Mildred Warner
June 2002
International trade arena is gaining a new audience. Traditionally a matter reserved exclusively for the federal
government, state, county and municipal governments are taking a closer look at how the new generation of trade
treaties may place greater demands on all levels of government.   Governments are trying to understand the best way to
enjoy the benefits from the markets and protections provided by the treaties while retaining local governmental
authority. The Western Governors Association, the National Council of State Legislators, and the National League of
Cities are a few entities that have made public requests to the US negotiating body, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) for clarification of or protection from the treaty obligations.   Why are they concerned? 
International Trade Treaties Impact Local And State Laws
As currently formulated, the new treaties may significantly restrain the authority of state and local governments. 
Though the treaties do not directly require changes to existing laws, they do lay a foundation for challenging
democratically created laws and customary domestic practices.  A broad range of state and local powers may be
impacted including, but not limited to zoning, water management, land use planning, the finality of the court system,
and public service provision[i].  Regional cooperation, business subsidies, regional environmental plans and
precautionary health regulations are common tools planners and legislators use to encourage growth and protect human
health as well as property values. These mechanisms may be impractical or non-compliant with treaty obligations.
New international standards stemming from free trade treaties (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
waive government immunity, forbid the use of many planning tools like those listed above, and supercede local
preference and democratically established legislation.  Other areas that may be affected by the treaties include pesticide
residue laws, recycled content laws, pollution control, licensing requirements and labeling. Customary public policy
considerations may not be legitimate in the international trade arena.
Deference to State Laws Supplanted by International Standards
States and localities are currently able to customize legislation to meet local needs and concerns. The treaties obligate
federal, state and local laws to comply with international standards.   If there is a conflict, international arbitration
tribunals are authorized to interpret the law and levy heavy financial fines for non-compliance. Historically, when
federal and state laws have differed, US courts have given deference to state laws as long as they did not contradict
the federal law.   The government closest to the citizens is assumed to be most able to represent local preferences and
priorities.   Public policy and economic conditions are criteria for selecting what is appropriate in the context of each
geographical area. These new international trade tribunals are not obligated or encouraged to follow or consider US
customs or law.  State and federal governments have historically enjoyed some protections from frivolous lawsuits
because they cannot be sued without consenting to the case.   Under the NAFTA, immunity is waived.  Foreign
nationals with financial investments in the United States can challenge laws they perceive as limiting expected profits. 
Investors challenge the national government directly, not the specific state or local government.  State and local
governments have no seat at the negotiating table or arbitration panel hearings.  It is unclear whether the government
body that passed the offending measure or the nation will pay if the challenge is successful. 
New Rights Bring Investors on Par with Nations
An "investor" is any person, company or lender with a financial venture that sells goods or services in a participating
country where the investor is considered foreign (i.e. US investor in Mexico)[ii].  These investors have a right to sue
for "government measures" that affect their investments negatively.  The rights are based on the legal principle that
commercial entities have a right to be ruled by the least burdensome laws necessary to achieve the stated objective. 
Laws must pass a three-part test that proves that:
1. the objective is considered legitimate under the WTO;
2. it is the least trade restrictive alternative available; and
3. the measure does not constitute a disguised restriction on trade.
These new investor rights may exceed the rights given to citizens under the Constitution. Foreign investors may be
paid for partial regulatory takings that are considered non-compensable, reasonable losses for the privilege of
citizenship in the domestic context[iii].  This change is the basis of much of the concern voiced by state and local
governments.
Devolution and Preemption: Concurrent and Competing Trends
In contrast to "devolution" which is increasing the authority of state and local government, international trade
agreements appear to encroach on state sovereignty.  State and local government associations have made public
statements to Congress outlining their concerns that State rights to self-governance under the 10th amendment are
being eroded.  The National Association of Counties (NACo) has long been on guard against federal preemption in the
domestic context.  NACo has only recently voiced concerns about international trade treaties prompted by investor
provisions in the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Enforcement Treaty.  California has created the Senate Select
Committee on International Trade Policy and drafted legislation specifically to identify the potential threats to public
health, the environment and the legislative process. Local governments from Oregon to Massachusetts have written
resolutions requesting a more meaningful presence in the negotiations, or the ability to opt out of these treaties
entirely.  Academics, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the international community are also studying
international treaties and attempting to join the debate at the negotiating table.
The concerns of the government groups are similar, and the resolutions to Congress and requests for information from
the USTR have common themes.  State and local governments are seeking to participate fully in the negotiations to try
to preserve the traditional powers of state and local governments.  In case of failure in that pursuit, they are requesting
that the USTR protect these rights in the negotiations.  Specifically, they are asking the USTR or Congress to:
Provide open and transparent proceedings including negotiations, submissions and arbitrations and a mechanism
for meaningful participation in those proceedings.
Reserve equal rights to the people, and apply constitutional restrictions equally to foreign investors.
Preserve police powers that are the basis for protecting human health, environmental resource conservation and
fair competition.
Make states and localities immune from the investor challenges.
Require the investor's national government to consent to the claim being brought against the defending
government to avoid frivolous claims or those that do not serve the greater public interest. 
Preserve the concept of federalism in practice in the United States by ensuring that States continue to be the
dominant policy makers in traditional areas such as land use planning, education, and public services.
Financial Claims May Stall Legitimate Regulations
In theory, governments can continue to manage in the usual fashion even under the treaties.  However, the taxpayer
would have to pay millions of dollars for the federal government to defend the measure and pay the fines if defeated.
The current potential liability to the United States from NAFTA claims is $1.8 billion USD.    The number of claims is
expected to expand proportionally with the addition of 31 more countries under the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA).   There is no indication at this point if the Federal government will pass the cost of fines on to the state and
local governments or continue to pay out of general funds.
The challenges span the gamut of local legislative efforts[iv]. 
Methanex v. United States: A Canadian company is challenging a California resolution to ban a ground water
pollutant.  Potential  cost: $970 million
Ethyl v. Canada: $13 million was paid as a settlement in a case parallel to Methanex.  Canada also apologized
and lost the right to ban the chemical (banned already in some US states).
Loewen v. United States: Challenges the Illinois standard court of appeals process, which requires a bond equal
to 150% of damages. Potential cost: $725 million
Sun Belt Water, Inc. v. Canada: Questions the right to refuse to export a natural resource. 
Potential cost: $220 million
Metalclad v. Mexico: $17 million paid to stop water pollution from a hazardous waste facility.
Ohio Democrat Congressman Sherrod Brown stated that “in NAFTA and in every public health challenge under the
WTO, 33 straight times, public health laws, environmental laws, and food safety laws, every single time they have
been struck down”.  Given the potential implications of these challenges, it is surprising that there are not more
governments actively involved in this debate. In early 2002, Bill Moyers broadcast the issue to the public over PBS in
the program “Trading Democracy”.  The media has given a glimpse of the increasingly popular protests against "free
trade", the WTO and the FTAA.  However, these protests have not focused on state and local government concerns. 
NGOs have been effective in getting their agenda heard, but state and local governments have not been very active in
the public debate.
More State and Local Governments Should Join the Debate
States and local governments rely on history and future demands to formulate current but predictable legislation that
meets the needs of the communities they serve.  State representatives have not convinced the treaty negotiators of the
dangers of loss of this stability due to trade obligations.  Treaty negotiators believe free trade treaties should focus on
economic issues and some state and national sovereignty must be lost in the give and take of treaty formation.[v]
Neither the framers (including government and commercial interests) nor the public are focused on the implications for
everyday governance of our states and cities.  Planners and elected representatives of this country need to educate
themselves about the issues that affect their constituents and regions.  A balance must be struck between the benefits
of free trade and the preservation of state and local sovereignty.
[i] Keuhl, Senator S., Senate Joint Resolution No. 40 – Relative to international investment agreements submitted to
the legislature March 20, 2002. 
[ii] The North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 11, Article 1101. 
[iii]  Dalton, Robert, E., 1999.  National Treatment Law and Practice.  M. Leigh and L.B. Ederington, Eds.  Chapter 6,
"United States".  American Society of International Law, Washington, DC.
[iv] International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2001.  Public Rights, Public Problems: A guide to NAFTA's
controversial chapter on investor rights.  World Wildlife Fund, Canada.
[v] Record of statement to the Subcommittee on Ways and Means Hearing on Free Trade Deals: Is the United States
Losing Ground as its Trading Partners Move Ahead?  March 29, 2001.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
All local governments face challenges to improve service delivery.  This report 
outlines two alternative strategies—the "high road” which uses new management 
innovations to increase internal productivity, and the “low road” which focuses on 
downsizing and contracting out.  While other studies have focused on contracting out, 
this study provides a longitudinal look at contracting and presents detailed case studies of 
municipalities, which have brought back in house previously privatized services.  These 
case studies provide empirical evidence on the problems associated with contracting and 
the potential for internal restructuring as an alternative.   
 
Contracting is costly.  Research on problems with contracting out in the for-profit 
sector is shown to have parallels in governmental contacting.  Difficulty of contract 
specification (especially for complex services), the cost and difficulty of monitoring 
contract performance, and limited cost savings are some of the problems that cause 
governments to bring previously privatized work back in house.  Broader public values—
responsiveness to changing citizen demands, maintaining high standards of public service 
delivery among the workforce—also can be compromised with privatization. 
 
While competitive bidding is associated with some cases of contracting back in, 
for many governments’ dissatisfaction with privatization was so strong that no effort was 
made to rebid the contract. In many of these cases new patterns of labor management 
cooperation within the public sector resulted in improved efficiency and service quality at 
lower costs than private contracts.  Taking the “high road” of restructuring through 
improved labor-management cooperation can provide better quality service with fewer 
risks and greater social rewards.  For those public officials who truly wish to “reinvent 
government” internal management reforms deserve a closer look. 
 
 
 iv
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rapid changes in the economy 
on the one hand and the unrelenting 
demand for public services on the other 
have placed new pressures on all levels 
of government to "banish bureaucracy" 
and "reinvent" the public sector.  
Reinventing government is a noble and 
desirable goal, but many reform efforts 
have failed by focusing too heavily on 
downsizing the public workforce 
through the privatization of government 
services.  While privatization can take 
many forms, the most common practice 
is for governments to "contract out" 
services to private organizations.  In 
these situations the government 
continues to use public funds to pay for 
services, but the responsibility for 
production of the service is shifted to a 
private firm. 
In some instances, privatization 
through contracting out is part of a larger 
ideological crusade to reduce the 
absolute size of government.1  In other 
cases, contracting out is driven by 
management fads imported from the 
private sector, where the practice is 
commonly used but remains poorly 
understood.2  A third influence is the 
general shift in American society 
towards greater mistrust of government 
coupled with a renewed faith in the 
textbook model of free markets.3  When 
combined with advice from popular 
management books and magazines to 
become more "businesslike" in their 
operations, many public managers find 
the lure of contracting out to be 
irresistible. 
Are the proponents of contracting 
out right?  To what extent have the 
economic and organizational benefits 
actually followed?  This study attempts 
to answer these questions by looking at 
local governments' experiences with 
contracting in the United States.  The 
report begins with a review of several 
academic studies that assess the impact 
of contracting out on individuals, 
organizations, and communities.  
Unfortunately, many of these studies 
show disappointing results with 
contracting out in both the public and 
private sectors.  To better understand 
why contracting out often has not lived 
up to its promise, this report looks at 
several case studies from across the 
country where public officials have 
chosen to bring work back in house 
following a period of privately produced 
service.  Finally, the report looks at one 
important but underutilized alternative to 
privatization, namely, the refashioning 
of labor-management relations through 
innovative "partnership" programs.  
These programs demonstrate that the 
efficiency of public services can be 
improved significantly through the use 
of internal management reforms.  Given 
the risks involved in privatization, labor-
management partnerships should be 
given priority over contracting out when 
public managers see the need to 
restructure local government services.   
 
Contracting out imposes high costs on 
individuals 
Proponents of contracting out 
argue that both public and private 
organizations need to "cut the fat" and 
get "lean and mean" in order to survive.4  
Given that most government services are 
labor-intensive, contracting out services 
provides government with an indirect 
method of reducing the number of 
individuals it employs directly.  When 
hiring decisions are no longer in public 
hands, privatization allows contractors to 
use lower priced labor without having to 
adhere to civil service wage scales.  
Government-by-contract also permits 
greater flexibility in determining 
employment levels, work rules, and 
health and safety standards since private 
firms are often subject to less restrictive 
regulations than public entities.5   
Increased flexibility, however, 
comes at a price.  To begin with, 
contracting out imposes high costs on 
individual workers.  The overwhelming 
majority of government employees are 
individuals who have performed well 
and played by the rules, but often pay 
dearly in the form of increased job 
insecurity and lower wages and benefits 
when work is contracted out to the 
lowest bidder.6  Furthermore, because of 
the specialized nature of many private 
contractors, workers' opportunities for 
advancement and training may decline 
as well.  The janitor who works for local 
government may, over time, work her 
way up in the system via a series of 
vertical and horizontal moves through 
different departments.  In organizations 
that specialize in just one service, 
however, those ladders of opportunity 
disappear for all but the most skilled 
employees. 
 
Contracting out has society-wide 
consequences 
Contracting out also imposes 
high costs on society.  It is no secret that 
America's urban areas suffer from a host 
of serious social and economic 
problems, ranging from crime and 
unemployment to racial segregation and 
increasing class inequality.  In a 
provocative and insightful essay 
published in the Boston Review, Daniel 
Luria, Vice President of the Michigan 
Manufacturing Technology Center, and 
Professor Joel Rogers of the University 
of Wisconsin contend that these 
unfortunate outcomes are the direct 
result of public policy choices that favor 
"low road" development strategies in 
response to new competitive pressures.7  
Low road employers compete by 
keeping costs, and therefore wages, as 
low as possible.  When low road 
strategies dominate the local economy, 
economic insecurity, rising inequality, 
and poisonous labor relations often 
follow. 
In contrast, "high road" 
organizations rely on better quality 
products and superior service to stay 
ahead of the competition.  Management 
experts contend that emphasizing quality 
and service requires a well-trained and 
highly committed workforce in order to 
be successful.  These organizational 
demands, in turn, translate into higher 
wages, cooperative labor relations, and 
more innovative and productive 
workplaces.  In addition, high road 
employers attract superior quality 
workers and typically serve as better 
corporate citizens in the communities in 
which they operate. 
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Box 1.  Taking the Low Road: Privatized Trash Collection in New Orleans 
 
In the mid-1980s, the City of New Orleans, Louisiana paid sanitation workers about 
$9 an hour and provided health insurance and other benefits.  Ten years later, after 
privatization, those same workers are hired on a daily basis, paid the minimum wage, and 
have no benefits. 
 
Waste Management, Inc., the firm responsible for trash collection in New Orleans, 
uses a subcontractor to fill its daily need for "hoppers," sanitation workers that dump trash 
into the back of garbage trucks.  Hoppers receive no training from the company, and are 
responsible for providing their own safety equipment such as lifting belts, face masks, and 
safety vests. 
 
Some hoppers meet their drivers in the truck yard, but most are picked up under a 
nearby freeway each day at six o'clock in the morning.  A full day's pay is not guaranteed, and 
a truck breakdown can leave a hopper stranded and unpaid.   
 
Waste management's treatment of its employees had gotten so bad that in one month 
the company missed pickups at 8,800 locations because it didn't have enough hoppers to 
collect the trash.  In response, the city threatened to fine Waste Management $280,000 for the 
uncollected garbage.   
 
The hoppers' performance has come under strong criticism as well.  According to city 
officials, it is not uncommon for hoppers to demand tips or beer in exchange for picking up a 
resident's trash.  Even the city's sanitation chief says she and her family were threatened after 
refusing a hopper's demand for cash.   
 
Source:  "Two-Edged Sword: More Public Workers Lose Well-Paying Jobs as Outsourcing Grows", The Wall 
Street Journal.  August 6, 1996. p. A1.  
 
While Luria and Rogers' research 
primarily looks at the business strategies 
of private companies, the same lessons 
apply to public sector employers as well.  
Governments, like private firms, also 
consciously choose to follow the high 
road or the low road when making 
employment and contracting decisions.  
Local governments can walk down 
either path, but the potential benefits to 
both the city and the community are 
vastly greater on the high road.  Public 
officials who choose to follow the high  
road not only benefit directly from the 
efficiency gains that flow from high-
performance workplaces, but they also 
benefit indirectly from the important 
social benefits that such a strategy 
produces.  In general, high-road 
strategies are strongly associated with 
healthy and stable local communities.  
Strong communities, in turn, help to 
attract and keep the brightest people and 
the most dynamic businesses in the 
region. 
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Examples of how high road and 
low road strategies play out at the local 
level are presented in Boxes 1 and 2.  In 
these cases, both New Orleans and 
Portland saved money by restructuring 
traditional service delivery methods.  
Portland's high road strategy, however, 
accomplished much more than simple 
cost savings.  Building upon Portland's 
success in constructing a new baseball 
stadium, the city and its unionized 
workforce have been able to create a 
new level of trust and cooperation across 
a wide range of public services.  In 
addition to reducing expenses, the 
introduction of innovative management 
reforms has produced major service 
improvements, has strengthened both 
management and the union, and has 
resulted in a far less adversarial 
bargaining relationship than had existed 
previously.  In contrast, the New Orleans 
case vividly illustrates the dark side of 
low road management strategies.  While 
New Orleans' strategy may have saved 
the city money, the negative impact of 
such a strategy on residents' quality of 
life far outweighs any cost savings that 
resulted from privatization.   
 
 
Box 2.  Taking the High Road: Investing in Employees in Portland, Maine 
 
In 1992 public officials in Portland, Maine succeeded in attracting a minor league 
baseball team to the city.  At the time, however, the city faced a major league problem: it 
had no adequate facility for the new team to play, and lacked the funds necessary to hire a 
private contractor to do the job.   
 
In response to this opportunity, the City Manager's office and union leaders 
jointly developed an innovative plan to construct the new stadium using Public Works 
employees and equipment.  The plan involved 10-hour work days and an incentive 
program that rewarded employees based on productivity levels.  Similar agreements were 
negotiated for employees not assigned to work on the new stadium since they were now 
required to provide the same level of service with fewer employees during the seven 
months it took to construct Hadlock Field.  
 
 The Hadlock Field construction project was so successful that the city created its 
own in-house construction company.  The construction company is guided by the same 
principles that made the stadium so successful: teamwork, cross-training, labor-
management cooperation, flexible work schedules, and employee bonuses for meeting 
project cost and quality objectives.   
 
 Projects tackled by the construction company included rebuilding sidewalks, 
street construction and maintenance, and sewers.  The city is in the process of expanding 
the range of work projects tackled by city crews, and expects to take on more projects 
each season in the future. 
 
Source:  Patricia Peightal, et al., "Labor-Management Cooperation—City of Portland, Maine".  Public 
Personnel Management 27(1)  Spring 1998.  pp. 85-91. 
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The benefits of contracting out have 
not materialized 
As the preceding discussion 
makes clear, the individual and social 
costs of contracting out can only be 
justified if such efforts lead to better 
quality and lower priced government 
services.  Yet evidence from a broad 
range of studies suggests that public 
services do not substantively improve 
after contracting out.8  In an extensive 
review of empirical studies of 
privatization in the United States, for 
example, Professor George Boyne of 
Cardiff University finds that "only 
around half" of all studies are associated 
with lower spending and greater 
efficiency.9  Furthermore, Dr. Boyne 
finds that "many of the studies contain 
specific methodological flaws that cast 
doubt on the validity of the evidence on 
the impact of service contracts, and in 
some studies, the authors draw 
conclusions that are not substantiated by 
their own evidence."10   
Professor Boyne's claims are 
substantiated by Professor Janet 
Rothenberg Pack of the Wharton School 
of Business at the University of 
Pennsylvania. 11   In her research on 
fifteen cities and counties that had 
experimented with contracting out, about 
half of the places she studied had 
encountered "disruptive experiences" 
which included quality problems, 
attempts by firms to renegotiate or 
renege on contracts, and costly 
monitoring activities.  Equally 
important, only half of the public 
officials she interviewed could continue 
to claim any cost savings from 
contracting out after just four years of 
privately provided service.  
Researchers at Washington State 
University draw similar conclusions in 
their 1998 study of privatization by 
Oregon county governments.12  Looking 
at county governments' experiences with 
road maintenance and construction 
contractors, Professors Brent Steel and 
Carolyn Long find that 42 percent of 
counties experienced contracting 
problems.  The most commonly cited 
problem in their study was the failure of 
contractors to perform work in a timely 
manner (100 percent of cases), followed 
by work not performed to specifications 
(50 percent), contractors' failure to 
communicate effectively with affected 
citizens (36 percent), change order 
problems (36 percent), and work area 
security and safety problems (29 
percent).  In addition to the problems 
associated with contracting out, the 
authors estimate that the cost of contract 
administration was in the 10 to 15 
percent range, and that "savings, if any, 
from contracting out may be partially or 
fully offset by substantial agency costs 
associated with the contracting process, 
including the expense of preparing plans 
and specifications to a greater level of 
detail, the cost of advertising and 
processing bids, and the cost of 
monitoring, inspecting, and conflict 
resolution."13
 
Private firms also disappointed with 
contracting results 
A common defense of 
privatization is that errors in 
implementation, not the concept itself, 
are to blame for failed privatization 
programs.14  These kinds of arguments 
make it easy to claim that the blame for 
failed contracts still rests with 
government, and that the solution lies 
with increasing, not decreasing, the role 
of the private sector in government 
service provision.  Has the private 
sector's experience with contracting out 
been any better?  Because private firms 
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also rely on outside contractors for a 
wide range of goods and services, their 
experience with contracting out deserves 
a closer look by public officials than it 
has received. 
…only five percent of firms 
reported "high" levels of 
benefit from contracting 
out while suffering "low" 
drawbacks.  The most 
common response, 
representing thirty-nine 
percent of the cases, had 
been "mediocre".
Large-scale studies of the private 
sector's experience with contracting out 
are rare, in part because private firms are 
not subject to the same disclosure 
requirements as public entities.  A recent 
survey of over one thousand senior 
business executives 
conducted by the global 
consulting group PA 
Consulting, however, is 
telling: In that survey, 
only five percent of 
firms reported "high" 
levels of benefit from 
contracting out while 
suffering "low" 
drawbacks.  The most 
common response, 
representing thirty-nine percent of the 
cases, had been 'mediocre'."15
 Academic studies of 
organizational performance provide 
some clues as to why contracting out in 
the business world has failed to live up 
to its promises.  Because contracting out 
is a form of restructuring that often leads 
to reductions in personnel, its impact on 
organizations is similar to downsizing.  
Few would disagree with the proposition 
that both contracting out and downsizing 
result in shattered careers, broken 
friendships, and significant losses in 
investments in employee training and 
development.  For these reasons and 
others, academic studies of downsizing 
hold valuable lessons for public sector 
managers considering contracting out. 
 The strong negative effect that 
downsizing through contracting out has 
on the morale of employees should not 
be underestimated.  In a recent study 
published by The Academy of 
Management Review, Professor Wayne 
Cascio of the University of Colorado 
reviewed over five hundred articles on 
downsizing and interviewed twenty-five 
senior executives from business about 
their experiences.16  A principal finding 
from this research, says Professor 
Cascio, is that "study after study shows 
that following a downsizing surviving 
employees become narrow-minded, self-
absorbed, and risk 
averse.  Morale sinks, 
productivity drops, and 
survivors distrust 
management.  In fact, 
this constellation of 
symptoms is so 
common that it has 
taken on a name of its 
own: survivors' 
syndrome."17  Given 
the impact of 
downsizing on employee morale, it 
should be expected that performance 
rarely meets the company's expectations.  
According to 1998 survey results from 
the American Management Association, 
only 41 percent of downsizing 
companies reported productivity 
increases, and only 37 percent have 
realized any long-term gains in 
shareholder value.18
According to Professors Susan 
Reynolds Fisher and Margaret White, 
such disappointing results can be 
explained by the damage caused to an 
organization's "learning capacity" when 
an individual leaves the firm.19  Fisher 
and White believe that an organization's 
capacity for innovation and development 
is derived from the day-to-day 
interaction between employees working 
on common problems.  The contribution 
of these informal networks to the health 
and vitality of the organization is 
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significantly greater than that implied by 
a simple head count, the authors warn, 
and hence managers should be wary of 
any restructuring effort, including 
contracting out, that threatens these 
crucial networks. 
…many firms report that contract 
employees are rarely as prepared 
as in-house colleagues to go 
beyond their immediate remit and 
take the time to work out ideas 
which may be of benefit to the 
firm as a whole. 
This issue is well illustrated by 
recent research by Dr. Chris Lonsdale 
and Professor Andrew Cox of the Center 
for Strategy and Procurement 
Management at the University of 
Birmingham, England.20  Lonsdale and 
Cox believe that contracting out 
invariably leads to a loss of cross-
functional contact between departments.  
"When a contract company is operating 
away from the firm's site there can be a 
loss of profitable 
contact between 
that function and 
others which relate 
to it," they argue.  
"While this can be 
addressed, many 
firms report that 
contract employees 
are rarely as 
prepared as in-house colleagues to go 
beyond their immediate remit and take 
the time to work out ideas which may be 
of benefit to the firm as a whole." 
A further issue that Lonsdale and 
Cox raise is the effect that the limitations 
of a manager's own knowledge and 
competence can have on an outsourcing 
deal.  For example, when a service is 
provided in-house certain aspects 
frequently are provided by employees in 
other parts of the organization, and 
consequently often are not recognized 
explicitly in the contract agreement.  
This oversight commonly leads to a host 
of additional charges not built into the 
original cost estimates.  In one example, 
the authors tell the tale of a petroleum 
firm that was charged nearly $500,000 in 
excess fees in the first month of its 
information technology contract because 
the company had wrongly assumed that 
these services were included in the 
original contract price.21  Stories such as 
these should not be surprising, the 
authors caution, because contracting is 
the core competency of many of the 
vendors that organizations must deal 
with.  Since contracting is a primary 
focus of their business, these companies 
have learned to write contracts that shift 
most of the risk onto the purchaser of the 
service. 
In summary, contracting out 
government services imposes high costs 
on individuals, local governments, and 
communities.  In 
spite of these high 
social costs, the 
efficiency gains 
from contracting 
materialize only 
about half of the 
time.  Furthermore, 
the private sector's 
poor record with 
contracting suggests that such lackluster 
results are unlikely to improve as public 
managers gain experience with 
administering private contracts.   
In contrast, using high road 
strategies to reform public bureaucracies 
often results in improved governmental 
efficiency, but does so without the 
negative consequences that result from 
contracting out.  Across the country, 
high road strategies are becoming more 
common as public bureaucracies borrow 
from new management models such as 
Total Quality Management (TQM) and 
labor-management cooperation programs 
in order to improve organizational 
performance.  According to Working 
Together for Public Service, a major 
report published by the U.S. Department 
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of Labor, labor-management cooperation 
programs typically result in higher 
quality service, greater cost 
effectiveness, better quality of work life 
for employees, and improved relations 
between workers and management.22  
Similar positive results have been 
reported by the International 
City/County Management Association 
(ICMA) in its study of TQM programs 
in local government.  In that study, the 
overwhelming majority of governments 
surveyed reported strong positive results 
from quality improvement programs, as 
Table 1 shows.23   
 
"Contracting back in" an important 
trend in public service provision 
 New survey evidence shows that 
public officials are starting to learn that 
privatization has its limits.  While 
contracting out continues to be widely 
used by many local governments, the 
practice of "contracting back in"—where 
governments choose to resume in-house 
production following a period of 
privately produced service—is becoming 
increasingly common.   
 The most complete source of 
data on contracting arrangements of 
local governments is provided by the 
International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA).  Every five years, 
the ICMA surveys all counties with 
more that 25,000 residents and all cities 
with populations greater than 10,000.  In 
addition a sample is drawn from one in 
eight cities and counties with fewer than 
10,000 residents.  On average, 1,500 
municipalities respond to the survey.  
 
Table 1.  Impact of Quality Improvement Efforts on Municipal Performance 
Performance indicator % reporting positive 
experiences* 
Quality of service 89% 
Productivity 85% 
Customer satisfaction 83% 
Amount of service to customer 82% 
Timeliness 79% 
Cost reduction 75% 
Increased communication 84% 
Improved group decision making 78% 
Stimulated high-quality performance 61% 
Ability to improve in spite of constraints on resources 70% 
Improved decision making due to availability of information 70% 
Improved timeliness of internal processes 63% 
Movement of decision making to lower level 68% 
Commitment to stakeholders 72% 
Morale 70% 
Goal assessment 57% 
New performance measures 72% 
 
*Sample size varies from 168-191 cities and counties. 
Source:  Jonathan West et al, “Total Quality Management in Local Government", The Municipal  
Yearbook 1994.  Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.  p. 24. 
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This survey provides a very 
comprehensive view of the complex mix 
of services offered by local 
governments, with questions asked for 
sixty-four different public services.   
 By matching responses from 
different survey years, our research team 
has been able to determine the degree to 
which local governments both contract 
out services to private providers as well 
as the frequency of contracting back 
in.24  Using ICMA data we found that on 
average across all responding 
municipalities, eight services were 
newly contracted out between 1992 and 
1997.  The more interesting finding, 
however, was that on average five 
services were brought back in house 
during this same period.  Hence while 
these data show that contracting out is 
still a common practice across the 
country, dissatisfaction with contracting 
out is widespread and causes local 
governments to bring services back in 
house.   
 
Why do local governments choose to 
bring work back in house? 
That so many local governments 
bring work back in house implies that 
contracting out as a model of public 
service provision has its own set of 
problems that its proponents have either 
underestimated or ignored.  Yet the 
survey data alone do not tell us why 
governments choose to resume public 
production of services.  To better 
understand the nature of contracting 
back in and the factors associated with it, 
a series of telephone interviews was 
conducted with public officials from 
across the country between June and 
August 1999.  The case studies from 
those interviews are reprinted here as 
Appendix A.   
 
Methodology 
Using the ICMA data as a guide, 
local governments were selected for 
interviews based on a population of 
greater than 30,000 residents, six or 
more cases of contracting back in, and at 
least one case of contracting back in for 
service areas where union membership is 
strong.  A small number of additional 
cases were chosen based on leads from 
union members or newspaper clippings.   
Most of the interviews were with 
the city or county manager for that 
municipality.  On several occasions 
follow-up interviews were conducted 
with department heads or directors of 
specific programs in order to develop a 
more detailed understanding of a 
particular program or service.  Local 
union officials also were interviewed in 
a handful of cases.  Interview times 
varied from ten minutes to about one 
hour.   
In total, public officials from 
fifty-eight places were interviewed.  
Those interviews produced twenty-six 
cases of contracting back in from 
twenty-two different places (see Table 
2).  While these cases do not provide a 
large enough data set to generalize the 
findings to the larger population, the 
cases can help us to understand the 
rationale behind contracting back in, as 
well as provide clues on the efficacy of 
privatization as an alternative form of 
public service delivery. 
The bulk of the cases of reverse 
privatization represent the typical kinds 
of blue-collar work most often cited as 
good candidates for contracting out.  
With the exception of public works, 
wastewater treatment, and fire services, 
the remaining cases consist of the types 
of services for which private sources of 
production are relatively common.  In 
most areas these services can easily pass 
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Table 2.  Case Studies of Contracting Back In 
Place Service(s) Competitive 
Bidding 
Failed 
Contract 
Akron, Ohio Road Repairs n/a n/a 
Ardmore, Oklahoma Waste Water Treatment Plant  8 
Campbell, California Buildings and Grounds Maintenance  8 
Charlotte, North Carolina Paratransit Service 8 8 
Cincinnati, Ohio Yard Waste 8  
Columbus, Ohio School Grounds Maintenance  8 
Fort Collins, Colorado Paratransit Service  8 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida Infrastructure Pipe Installation 8  
Independence, Iowa Grass Mowing,  
Laundry Services 
8 8 
8 
the "yellow pages" test in which a 
number of local private firms can be 
found that offer similar services.25  It 
should not be surprising that the cases 
here represent services that are typically 
thought of as prime targets for 
privatization.  Since these are the kinds 
of services that are most often contracted 
out, it follows that they have a higher 
probability of being brought back in as 
well. 
 A useful way of classifying the 
cases is to divide them according to the 
process by which local government 
resumed public service production.  In 
nine cases contracting back in was the 
result of public employees submitting 
the winning proposal in a competitive 
bidding process.  On twenty occasions 
work was brought back in house due to 
problems with the private contractor.  
Often the two categories overlap.  For 
example, it is not uncommon for public 
agencies to win competitive service 
contracts following a failed privatization 
attempt.  The more typical scenario, 
however, is for government officials to 
take over the service without initiating a 
new round of competitive bidding.  In 
fourteen cases, it was clear to local 
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government managers that the service 
could be produced more efficiently in 
house, thereby making competitive 
bidding unnecessary.  
 
Contracting Back in Due to Failed 
Privatization 
In the cases presented here, failed 
privatization was the most important 
reason for contracting back in.   In these 
instances the work is brought back in 
house due to problems associated with 
the service provider or with the 
contracting process.  Rather than return 
to the market and initiate a new round of 
competitive bidding, public managers 
caught in these situations feel that 
problems with service delivery are 
rooted in the contracting process itself.  
Because these kinds of problems can not 
be solved by private means, public 
officials choose to rule out privatization 
as a viable alternative and resume public 
production of the service.   
Every case that chose to bring the 
service back in house without resorting 
to competitive bidding reported 
significant contracting problems.  Yet 
even for those places where competitive 
bidding was used (and the contract 
awarded to public employees) problems 
with private contracts still played a role 
in five of nine cases.  While it is difficult 
to generalize from such a small sample, 
there appear to be serious problems with 
contracting out.  The analysis below 
looks at a number of the case studies to 
better understand how and why contract 
problems arise and, more importantly, 
why public production is chosen over 
competitive bidding for specific 
services.   
 
Contracting Issues 
Private sector models of 
contracting out provide a useful 
framework for understanding 
governments’ decisions to produce 
services in house.  For businesses, the 
choice of whether to produce in house or 
to contract out is often referred to as the 
“make or buy” decision.  While cost 
minimization is important, this approach 
also recognizes that cost estimates 
include more than just the monetary 
value placed on a good or service.  In 
particular, this model employs the notion 
of “asset specificity” to incorporate the 
many non-tangibles that go into the 
decision to contract in or out.26  Asset 
specificity refers to the degree to which 
the investments associated with 
production are unique to the parties 
involved in the transaction.  Investments 
with a high degree of asset specificity 
are highly specialized and normally have 
few alternative uses.  Examples include 
“hard” goods such as complex machine 
parts or custom-made computer 
programs, but “soft” goods like industry-
specific knowledge and relationships 
with customers and clients fall into this 
category as well.   
A high level of asset specificity 
decreases the probability that an external 
supplier will be able to produce a 
particular good or service in a cost-
effective manner.  Because of the 
inability of both the buyer and the seller 
to accurately specify what, when, and 
how certain functions are to be carried 
out, costs associated with monitoring 
quality often outweigh any savings that 
accrue from external production.   
These problems are magnified in 
the public sector because of the multiple 
purposes and goals associated with 
public services. While it is relatively 
easy for a buyer to recognize a high 
quality pencil or machine part, judging 
quality becomes much more subjective 
when complex services are involved.  
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Even for the cases presented in this 
study, where most of the services are 
simple, ubiquitous, and relatively easy to 
specify, numerous examples exist where 
conflicts arose because of the difficulties 
associated with specifying the service.   
While evidence from some of the 
cases suggests outright abuse by the 
private contractor—such as the Iowa 
laundry service that charged its public 
sector customer based on the weight of 
the laundry when it was wet, not dry—
other cases highlight the importance of 
clearly defined contracts.  In Lubbock, 
Texas, for example, a private trash 
hauler attempted to renegotiate its 
contract because the weight of the trash 
it collected was greater than the 
company anticipated.  Heavier loads 
meant that the company had to pay 
higher than expected landfill fees, and 
the firm attempted (unsuccessfully) to 
shift those costs to local government.   
Professor Pack of the 
Wharton School estimates 
that monitoring costs can be 
as high as 15 percent of total 
contract costs. 
The care management program 
for the Senior Services Department of 
Irvine, California serves 
as a more complex 
example of the 
difficulties involved in 
specifying contracts.  In 
Irvine, public officials 
attempted to privatize its 
care management program in 1995.  
With about one hundred active cases at 
any given time, the city offers assistance 
to seniors in need of help with health 
care, transportation, housing, and other 
social services.  In spite of a competitive 
bidding process, the request for 
proposals attracted only one bidder that 
the city felt was sufficiently qualified to 
run the complex program.  After 
reviewing the technical responsibilities 
contained in the contract, however, the 
lone qualified bidder chose to withdraw 
from the competition.  The perception 
was that many of the contract services 
were hard to measure, difficult to 
administer, and that performance would 
be judged largely on community 
perceptions rather than tangible results.  
This created a sense that the cost to 
administer the program would grow far 
beyond the ability of the contractor to 
manage the program within the available 
budget.  Unable to attract qualified 
contractors, department administrators 
instead chose to keep the service in 
house.   
A related problem is that the 
contract language may be over-specified.  
Under these circumstances, contract 
language may be too specific to allow 
government to satisfy the changing 
needs of citizens.  When Moore, 
Oklahoma contracted out its public 
works department in 1993, it made sure 
that minimum service levels were 
included in the contract.  When citizens 
began demanding more than the 
minimum from their government in the 
mid 1990s, however, 
the city was unable 
to accommodate 
citizens’ preferences 
because it was still 
bound by the strict 
terms of the contract 
it had signed three years earlier.   
 Another issue that is well 
illustrated by the Moore, Oklahoma case 
is the problems that occur when a single 
contractor is responsible for a complex 
basket of services.  In Moore, one 
company was responsible for streets, 
drains, parks, cemeteries, building 
maintenance, sanitation, fleet 
maintenance, animal control, wastewater 
treatment, water and sewer line 
maintenance, and water meter reading.  
The sheer size of this contract made it 
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exceedingly difficult for public officials 
to monitor service levels and quality. 
 Given the complexity involved in 
specifying contract arrangements it 
should not be surprising that the costs 
associated with monitoring contracts has 
been shown to be quite high.27  The 
more typical scenario, however, is for 
governments not to do any monitoring at 
all.  In our research team's analysis of 
ICMA survey data on the subject, we 
found that more than half of the 
governments that contract out do not 
have any formal procedures for 
monitoring contract arrangements.28  
Not monitoring contracts significantly 
increases the chances that either costs 
increase or quality suffers—or in some 
cases, both problems may surface.  On 
the other hand, places that do take 
monitoring seriously may find that the 
cost of monitoring contracts equals or 
surpasses any anticipated savings from 
private service delivery.   
 More than one respondent from 
the case studies indicated that in house 
production was resumed because of the 
high costs of monitoring private 
contracts.  In Pinellas County, Florida, 
for example, the county terminated its 
contract for grass mowing at 360 water 
pumping stations because of its inability 
to control service quality.  "Servicing so 
many remote locations made it very 
difficult to monitor service quality, says 
the County Administrator, "so for this 
service it made more sense for the 
county to do the job."   
City officials in Campbell, 
California report similar problems.  In 
Campbell, the city contracted out its 
park maintenance functions in the early 
1990s as a way to cut costs.  After two 
years with the private contractor, 
however, the city chose to bring the 
work back in house following numerous 
complaints from city residents about 
service quality.  Having residents 
complain to the city rather than the 
contractor resulted in significant time 
and resources being wasted by city 
employees.  Not only were city 
employees required to handle residents' 
complaints, they then had to visit the 
park in question to check up on the 
contractor's work, contact the contractor 
to inform him of the problem, and finally 
revisit the park to ensure that the work 
had been re-done properly.  Given that 
the number of complaints was 
significantly higher than when public 
employees did the job, city supervisors 
quickly grew tired of the extra burden 
created by the contracting process and 
brought the work back in house.   
Park maintenance has remained a 
publicly provided service in Campbell 
since 1996.  According to City Manager 
Bernie Strojny, city workers provide 
better service because they possess a 
sense of ownership that is unique to 
public employees.  "City employees 
invest more," he says, "because they 
genuinely care about the place they work 
at."  In contrast, city properties are just 
one of many locations that the private 
contractor serves, which Strojny believes 
contributes to the contractor having less 
of an interest in service quality.   
In both Pinellas County and the 
City of Campbell monitoring costs were 
high because public officials found 
themselves constantly "putting out fires" 
that had been "lit" by the contractor.   
Both places were lucky, however, in that 
the service in question was relatively 
easy to monitor by area residents.  In 
these cases, citizens are able to serve as 
reasonable substitutes for direct 
monitoring by government.  The public 
sector is not so fortunate, however, when 
service quality cannot be observed 
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directly and citizens are unable to play 
the watchdog role.  This was the case in 
Savannah, Georgia, where fire services 
had traditionally been provided by both 
the City of Savannah and South Side 
Fire Protection, Inc., a non-profit fire 
department that provided firefighting 
services to about one third of the city.   
South Side Fire consisted of a 
mix of volunteer and professional staff 
and had served Savannah's southern 
neighborhoods for decades.  When the 
city annexed South Side Fire's service 
area in the 1970s, the company 
continued to provide fire services to this 
part of the city.  As Savannah continued 
to grow, concerns were raised about the 
differences in service quality between 
the City of Savannah Fire Department 
and South Side Fire.  Whereas 
previously the South Side consisted 
mainly of single family housing, over 
the years the South Side grew to include 
a number of large retail and office 
complexes.  Responding effectively to 
these types of calls required a different 
method of firefighting than what South 
Side could offer.  The number of city 
firefighters responding to calls was 
always the same, for example, whereas 
the number of South Side volunteers that 
responded to calls varied at each event.  
Over time the city increasingly became 
concerned with service quality and 
response times on the South Side.  
Tellingly, one of the most vocal 
proponents for change was the city 
council representative from the South 
Side, who argued that the quality of 
service was inferior to that offered by 
the city.   
Conflicts over what should be 
considered quality service were only half 
of the problem.  Just as important, the 
cost of the service had risen significantly 
over time.  The city found itself paying 
for equipment and stations "over and 
over again," and the company would 
increase its charges to the city on a 
yearly basis.  The extent to which South 
Side fire was overpriced relative to the 
city was made clear when City Council 
decided to bring the service in house in 
early 1998.  In a last-ditch effort to save 
its business, the company offered to 
provide the service at a significantly 
lower price than what it was currently 
charging.  This sudden drop in price only 
angered city officials, who wondered 
how much, and for how long, this "non-
profit" organization was overcharging 
them.   
In sum, the Savannah case makes 
clear the difficulties associated with 
contract arrangements where service 
quality is hard to monitor and the true 
costs of the service are difficult to 
quantify.  But even in other service areas 
where quality and price considerations 
are easier to measure, the time and 
resources spent on monitoring can still 
be significant.  The degree to which 
these additional costs outweigh the 
potential efficiency gains of private 
production is an empirical question that 
can only be answered on a case-by-case 
basis.  The evidence presented here, 
however, suggests that these costs are 
often considerably higher than most 
governments anticipate.   
 
Economic and Market Issues 
 Much of the preceding analysis 
presumes that, contracting costs aside, 
privately produced services are cheaper.  
Indeed, lower costs were the primary 
reason most governments in this study 
choose to contract out in the first place.  
Lower costs, however, usually resulted 
in lower quality services as well.  
Research by Harvard University 
Professor John Donahue suggests that 
 14
Anecdotal evidence from the 
case studies suggests that 
pricing contracts is more art 
than science.
much of the cost savings from 
privatization come from local 
governments choosing to follow low 
road economic strategies that rely on the 
lower priced labor of private firms.29  If 
we make the reasonable 
assumption that lower 
priced inputs result in 
lower quality outputs, 
then it should not be 
surprising that service 
quality was a major 
problem in a majority of the case studies.   
In both Charlotte, North Carolina 
and Fort Collins, Colorado local 
governments ended private contracts for 
paratransit service for the elderly and 
disabled because of service quality 
problems.  In Charlotte, the taxi 
company responsible for the service was 
not accustomed to working with disabled 
clients, and drivers viewed city charges 
as less desirable passengers compared to 
other customers.  The program was 
plagued by similar problems in Fort 
Collins, where users of the service often 
complained about the lack of courtesy on 
the part of drivers.  Additionally, the 
private contractor had numerous 
problems attracting and retaining quality 
employees, resulting in unreliable 
service.   
 The City of Whittier, California, 
attempted to privatize its public bus 
service in the early 1990s.  At the end of 
the five-year contract, however, the city 
chose in house production over a new 
round of competitive bidding, citing 
poor service quality as the primary 
reason for the switch.  The city received 
numerous complaints about dirty buses 
and unqualified drivers.  Equally 
important, the expected cost savings 
from privatization quickly disappeared 
because of significantly higher accident 
rates and greater than expected costs for 
vehicle repairs.  
The above examples of 
privatized transit service all relied on 
lower priced labor to minimize costs.  
Yet, in every case 
the low cost option 
proved to be 
unsustainable over 
the long run.  
Either quality 
levels slipped to 
such unacceptable levels that the service 
was no longer a benefit to citizens, or 
else the problems resulting from low 
cost provision (e.g., higher accident rates 
and increased liability claims) 
effectively erased any financial benefits 
from private service delivery.   
An important related issue is the 
degree to which local governments can 
accurately judge when private service 
delivery is cheaper.  Anecdotal evidence 
from the case studies suggests that 
pricing contracts is more art than 
science.  This should not be surprising 
given the uncertainty that surrounds 
contracting, but what is surprising is the 
degree to which contract bids vary.  In 
Charlotte, North Carolina, for example, 
bids on paratransit service ranged from 
$12.60 to $20.49 per trip.  In Lubbock, 
Texas, bids for a portion of the city’s 
residential trash routes varied from $3.6 
million to $7.3 million—a difference of 
nearly 103 percent.   
 Figures like these suggest three 
things.  First, sufficient competition is 
critical to cost savings when competitive 
bidding is used.  Second, it is imperative 
that local governments who use 
competitive bidding allow public 
departments to participate in the bidding 
process so that costs can be properly 
benchmarked.  Finally, if a public 
service is privately provided, it is crucial 
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that public officials pay close attention 
to monitoring the price, quality, and 
quantity of the contractor's work 
throughout the term of the contract.  The 
following section examines more closely 
the cases that involved competitive 
bidding.   
 
Contracting Back in Due to Successful 
Competitive Bidding  
Making city 
departments competitive 
means providing them 
with the resources 
necessary to assemble 
quality bids. 
A key variable for explaining the 
likelihood of contracting back in is 
whether or not public employees are 
allowed to bid against private providers. 
Quantitative analysis of US Census data 
from 1987-1992 shows that the presence 
of unionized employees increases the 
probability of contracting back in.30  
This finding suggests that unionized 
workplaces are more 
likely to have the right 
to submit contract 
proposals, but bidding 
rights for public 
employees are 
increasingly common in 
non-unionized settings 
as well. 31  
The rules governing the public 
sector’s ability to bid on contracts vary 
considerably from place to place.  In 
Pinellas County, Florida, for example, 
public employees are allowed to 
compete with private providers when a 
service is first put out to bid.  Once that 
contract is “lost” to the private sector, 
however, only private firms have the 
opportunity to bid on future contracts.  
The county sees the start up costs 
associated with bringing a service back 
in as too expensive to be worth the 
effort.  Not only would the county have 
to hire new employees to provide the 
service, but new equipment and 
buildings may be required as well.   
Other places view the bidding 
process differently.  In Charlotte, North 
Carolina, it is the norm for public 
employees to bid on contracts, and the 
city expects its departments to be 
competitive in the bidding process.  
Making city departments competitive 
means providing them with the resources 
necessary to assemble quality bids.  In 
many cases, this includes allowing 
managers to hire outside consultants to 
help develop the department’s proposal. 
Cases where services are kept in house 
are viewed as “victories” for the city, 
and are a source of pride for public 
employees. 
A third example of how the 
bidding process works can be found in 
Lubbock, Texas.  In Lubbock residential 
trash collection is subject 
to competitive bidding, 
and public employees are 
encouraged to bid for the 
service.  What makes 
Lubbock different than 
most places, however, is 
that only one third of the 
service is put out to bid at 
any given time, and the City would 
never choose to privatize the whole 
service.  "We would always keep at least 
one third of the service in house," says 
Mildred Cox, the Director of Public 
Works.  "This way we never lose the 
ability to keep the private firms on their 
toes.  Just as important, having 
competitive bids provides the city with 
important information about what 
constitutes efficient service." 
 
Taking the High Road Through 
Public Sector Innovation 
The fact that government 
departments often win competitive 
contracts highlights the ability of the 
public sector to improve efficiency 
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The fact that government 
departments often win 
competitive contracts 
highlights the ability of 
the public sector to 
improve efficiency 
through the use of "high 
road" management 
practices. 
through the use of high road 
management practices.  There is ample 
room for increased efficiency in public 
provision so long as 
employees are empowered 
to make decisions on how 
the service should be 
delivered.  By drawing on 
the expertise of front line 
workers, innovation in the 
design of work leads to 
significant cost savings.  
Theories of organization 
development concur that 
line employees often know 
how to do their jobs best, 
and will excel at what they do if given 
the chance by management.32  For 
public employees dealing with complex 
services and the need to keep a wide 
array of constituents satisfied, this is 
even truer. 
Many of the cases of contracting 
back in were tied to process 
improvements in public management.  
As such, they demonstrate public 
innovation is a viable alternative to 
private provision.  Often small changes 
can lead to significant savings.  In 
Warwick, Rhode Island, for example, 
management and the union worked 
together to redesign the way residential 
trash is collected, resulting in savings of 
over $1.1 million over five years.  In 
Akron, Ohio, city workers developed a 
plan to combine water and sewer line 
repairs with road repairs.  "Why do the 
same work twice?" asks union president 
Leo Armstrong.  "If we're already there 
repairing the hole, we might as well 
finish the job.  Not only can we get the 
job done faster, but it saves the city 
money, too." 
In other cases, efficiency gains 
were the result of specific management 
practices being brought in from the 
private sector.  In Charlotte, North 
Carolina, managers of the city's 
paratransit service instituted a 
gainsharing program 
for its employees that 
resulted in savings of 
over $160,000 in 
1998.  Half of this 
money will be divided 
equally among the 
department's 
employees, which 
amounts to an annual 
bonus of $1,600 per 
employee, or about 
seven percent of an 
employee's total pay.   
Labor-management cooperation 
programs can have a significant impact 
on improving efficiency in unionized 
settings.  In Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
"partnership" programs between labor 
and management have resulted in a 
number of competitive bids being 
awarded to public employees.  Fort 
Lauderdale's partnership programs are a 
product of the Cooperative Association 
of Labor and Management (CALM), an 
innovative program that employs the 
concepts of total quality management to 
increase productivity and promote 
cooperation and understanding between 
the union and city administrators.   
One example of CALM's impact 
comes from the city's attempt to 
privatize infrastructure pipe construction 
in early 1997.  When the Request for 
Proposals was issued, a labor-
management committee quickly formed 
to prepare its bid for the competition.  
The committee was co-chaired by the 
union president and the director of labor 
relations for the city, who together co-
chair all partnership committees.  
Having these two established veterans 
on the committee "helps to create a safe 
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environment for our people," says union 
president Cathy Dunn.  This way we can 
establish trust among all parties early on, 
and get to the real work of developing 
our proposal."  In addition to the co-
chairs, the committee consisted of a 
supervisor, division manager, and four 
crew members.  Each committee 
member is encouraged to participate 
fully in the development of the proposal, 
and any member has the right to veto 
elements of the plan that they don’t like.  
"All it takes is one 'no' vote and the 
project stops," says Dunn.   
The CALM committee won the 
contract by submitting the lowest cost 
bid.  Public employees were able to beat 
the competition by restructuring how the 
service was delivered.  Work schedules 
were changed to reduce travel and set up 
time, and the size of the pipe crews 
doubled, following the example of 
successful private firms that do the same 
work.  The results of these changes have 
been dramatic: In the first year alone, 
city crews laid over three and a half 
miles of pipe, compared to an average of 
just one mile of pipe for privately-run 
crews.   
The above examples clearly 
demonstrate that the public sector can be 
as effective if not more effective than 
firms in the private sector doing similar 
work.  In every case, the key to public 
sector success is empowerment.  When 
workers are provided the tools and the 
resources necessary to bring about 
change, innovative policies and 
programs often follow.  Privatization and 
empowerment, however, are rarely 
compatible.  When employees are 
mistrustful of management, when job 
security is uncertain, and when 
departments see their colleagues’ jobs 
sold to the lowest bidder, convincing 
workers to “buy in” to any new program 
is a daunting task.   
 
Conclusion 
The evidence presented here 
indicates that the contracting process is 
rarely as smooth as its proponents claim.  
Often poor results were due to the 
inability of either governments or private 
contractors to clearly communicate their 
expectations to each other.  On other 
occasions, disappointing results were the 
outcome of one party or the other 
underestimating costs or overestimating 
savings from privatization.  For a third 
group of cases, contracting back in was 
not the result of failure on the part of 
private firms, but rather successful 
innovation by public employees. 
The latter findings suggest that 
taking the high road, in the form of 
TQM or labor-management cooperation, 
can provide equal or better quality 
service as the best private firms, but do 
so with fewer risks and greater social 
rewards.  For those public officials that 
truly wish to “reinvent government,” 
internal management reforms deserve a 
closer look than they have been getting. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
CASE STUDIES OF CONTRACTING BACK IN*
 
 
Akron, Ohio 
Road Repairs    20 
 
Ardmore, Oklahoma 
Wastewater Treatment  20 
 
Campbell, California 
Buildings/Grounds Maintenance 20 
 
Charlotte, North Carolina 
Paratransit Service   21 
 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
Yard Waste     22 
 
Columbus, Ohio 
Grounds Maintenance   23 
 
Fort Collins, Colorado 
Paratransit Service   23 
 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 
Infrastructure Pipe Installation 24 
 
Independence, Iowa 
Laundry Services   25 
Grounds Maintenance   26 
 
Irvine, California 
Seniors' Care Management  27 
Food Service    27 
 
Lakewood, Colorado 
Street Sweeping   29 
 
 
 
 
Lubbock, Texas 
Residential Trash Collection  29 
 
Marshalltown, Iowa 
Food Service    31 
 
Moore, Oklahoma 
Public Works    32 
 
Northbrook, Illinois 
Meter Reading   33 
 
Pinellas County, Florida 
Grounds Maintenance   34 
 
Rialto, California 
Meter Reading   34 
Grounds Maintenance   35 
 
Sanford, Florida 
Ambulance Service   35 
Meter Reading   36 
 
Savannah, Georgia 
Fire Service    36 
 
Sioux City, Iowa 
Residential Trash Collection  37 
 
Warwick, Rhode Island 
Residential Trash Collection  38 
 
Whittier, California 
Public Bus Service   39 
 
*A searchable data base of these case studies can be found at Professor Warner’s Local 
Government Restructuring web site:  http://www.cce.cornell.edu/community/govt/restructuring
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City of Akron, Ohio  
 
Keywords:  Public Works 
 
Road Repairs 
 
 In Akron, Ohio city workers dig 
up the pavement at over 1,200 locations 
each year to make water and sewer line 
repairs.  When the repairs are finished, 
workers put a temporary patch over the 
damaged pavement.  In the past, private 
contractors would then move in to 
resurface the road. 
 For the past two years public 
employees have done the resurfacing 
work, and saved the city over $500,000 
in the process. “Why pay to do the same 
work twice?” asks AFSCME Local 1060 
President Leo Armstrong. “If we’re 
already there repairing the hole, we 
might as well finish the job.  Not only 
can we get the job done faster, it saves 
the city money, too.” 
 The city used to spend about 
$800,000 a year for the service, and 
when the money ran out, the resurfacing 
stopped.  This often meant that many of 
the repairs were never completed.  
Today, all the city’s road resurfacing 
jobs get done, and at a significantly 
lower cost than what the city used to 
pay.   
 “We’ve become a trend-setter in 
the area,” says Armstrong.  “Other city 
departments are looking at what they can 
bring back house since what we’ve done 
here has been so successful.” 
 Now even other local 
government workers are looking at 
taking on new jobs.  In nearby Summit 
County, for example, road crews there 
just took back road striping after several 
years of privately provided service. 
 “It’s truly a win-win situation,” 
Armstrong says.  “The payoff for our 
members is greater job security, and 
citizens get the best service at the lowest 
cost.” 
 
Case based on interview with Leo 
Armstrong, AFSCME Local 1360, August 
19, 1999.  See also “Akron Workers Pave 
the Way," AFSCME OC8 News  July/August 
1998.  p. 15.  
 
 
City of Ardmore, Oklahoma 
 
Keywords: water, failed contract 
 
Wastewater treatment plant 
 
 Ten or fifteen years ago the 
wastewater treatment plant in Ardmore, 
Oklahoma was privately run.  The 
service was brought back in-house after 
about two years because the private 
facility repeatedly failed to meet federal 
and state effluent limits.  Since that time, 
service quality has improved 
significantly.  Because the service was 
brought back in house long before Mr. 
Hines worked for the city, he did not 
know any other details about the service.   
 
Case based on interview with Blaine Hines, 
City Manager, June 21, 1999. 
 
 
City of Campbell, California  
 
Keywords: Grounds Maintenance, Failed 
Contract 
 
Buildings and Grounds Maintenance 
 
 During a major recession in 
California about six years ago, the City 
of Campbell decided to contract out its 
 20
buildings and grounds maintenance 
services to a local contractor.  At the 
time the city was under pressure to cut 
costs, and the private contractor offered 
to provide the service at a rate 
significantly lower than what the city 
was paying its own employees to do the 
job.  In addition, the department had a 
number of job vacancies, which made it 
easy to transfer the remaining one or two 
employees to other city departments 
following privatization.   
 The contract was brought back in 
house after two years with the private 
contractor.  Poor quality service was the 
primary reason for the transition.  The 
city received numerous complaints from 
area residents about the quality of 
maintenance at city parks, and city 
supervisors were growing tired of 
constantly having to monitor the 
contractor’s work.   
 The city’s decision to take over 
the service was also facilitated by the 
healthy economy in Silicon Valley.  A 
growing tax base enabled the city to be 
less concerned with cutting costs and 
focus its attention on improving service 
quality.  The city briefly considered 
hiring another private contractor, but an 
internal review by the Public Works 
department showed that public 
employees could provide better quality 
service for about the same cost.    
 Buildings and grounds 
maintenance has remained a publicly 
provided service in Campbell since 
1996.  The city had no problems 
bringing the service back in house, in 
part because the city makes a conscious 
decision to never sign long-term 
contracts with private providers.  In this 
case, the contract was written so that the 
city could terminate the contract at any 
time. 
 Service quality has improved 
tremendously now that public employees 
are back on the job.  According to City 
Manager Bernie Strojny, city workers 
provide better service because they 
possess a sense of ownership that the 
private contractor does not.  “City 
employees invest more,” he says, 
“because they genuinely care about the 
places they work at.”  In contrast, city 
properties are just one of many locations 
that the private contractor serves, 
something that Strojny believes 
contributes to the contractor having less 
of an interest in service quality. The city 
program currently employs three or four 
people.  
 
Case based on interview with Bernie 
Strojny, June 18, 1999. 
 
 
City of Charlotte, North Carolina 
 
Keywords:  Transit, Competitive 
Bidding, Failed Contract 
 
Paratransit Service 
 
 The City of Charlotte, North 
Carolina operates a transit service for the 
elderly and disabled that employs about 
fifty workers.  Around 1993-1994, the 
city decided to privatize night and 
weekend service as a way to cut costs.  
The number of passengers served during 
these periods was low, yet the city still 
required a dispatcher, supervisor, and 
drivers to be on staff at all times.  To 
avoid these expenses, the city contracted 
out with several local taxi companies to 
provide the service.  Taxis were paid 
between $18 and $20 for each trip.  
Since these companies needed to have 
supervisors and dispatchers on duty full- 
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time anyway, it was thought, the city 
should save money by having the service 
privately provided.  In addition, at the 
time the city was having problems 
getting enough drivers to work these 
less-desirable shifts.  For these reasons 
and others, the city did not submit its 
own bid to provide the service in 1993-
1994, an otherwise common practice in 
Charlotte. 
 The service was brought back in 
house in 1995 following several 
complaints from paratransit riders.  The 
taxi drivers were not accustomed to 
working with disabled clients, and 
viewed them as less desirable passengers 
compared to their other customers.  In 
contrast, city drivers worked with 
disabled clients every day, and often 
knew their regular passengers by name.   
 As part of the city’s efforts to 
increase efficiency, the entire service 
(days, nights, and weekends) was put out 
to bid in 1996.  Public employees won 
the contract because their bid was 
significantly lower than their two 
competitors, Davey Transportation and 
Laidlaw.  The city won the contract with 
a bid of $12.60 per trip, compared to the 
competitors’ bids of $16.95 and $20.49 
respectively.  The successful city bid 
was assembled by Charlotte DOT staff 
with the assistance of KFH, a private 
consulting firm.  The taxi companies that 
had provided the service previously did 
not bid on the contract, in part because 
the did not have the number of vehicles 
necessary to run the service full-time.  
The new three-year contract went into 
effect in July 1997. 
 This year the city expects to 
provide the service for $160,000 below 
the bid price.  Most of these savings 
have come from reductions in overtime 
pay, which has declined significantly 
since the city instituted automated shift 
scheduling.  Half of this money will be 
divided equally among the employees, 
which amounts to an annual bonus of 
$1,600 per full-time employee, paid 
quarterly.  Part-time employees also 
receive the bonus, based on the number 
of hours worked.  On average, the gain-
sharing program amounts to about 7 
percent of an employee's total pay, 
which averages between $25,000 and 
$30,000 per year.   
 
Case based on interviews with Mr. Lynn 
Purnell, July 2, 1999 and August 6, 1999. 
 
 
City of Cincinnati, Ohio  
 
Keywords: Residential Trash Collection, 
Competitive Bidding 
 
Yard Waste 
 
 In 1996 the City of Cincinnati, 
Ohio expanded its recycling program to 
include curbside pick up of yard waste.  
The program began after a local firm, 
Rumpke, approached a city council 
member with the idea, and offered to 
perform the service for $1.5 million 
annually.  Upon hearing the news, a 
second city council member approached 
the union and said the city would be 
willing to offer AFSCME the contract if 
it could beat Rumpke’s price. 
 A labor-management committee 
soon formed to research the program. 
The committee determined that city 
employees could perform the same 
service for less than $1 million--fully 
one third less that what the private 
contractor was asking.  The labor-
management committee continues to 
meet annually to review the past year’s 
performance and set the contract terms 
for the upcoming year.   
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 The successful program is now in 
its third year of operation. About twenty-
five full-time and seasonal jobs have 
been created as a result of the program. 
 
Case based on interview with Renita Jones 
Street, AFSCME Rep from the Cincinnati 
Regional Office, July 1, 1999. 
 
 
City of Columbus, Ohio Public 
Schools 
 
Keywords:  Grounds Maintenance, 
Failed Contract 
 
Grounds Maintenance 
 
 For as long as anyone can 
remember, public schools in Columbus, 
Ohio, had used a private contractor to 
maintain the district’s fifteen athletic 
facilities and eight large open fields.   
Public school employees had never bid 
on the contract because they lacked the 
special equipment necessary to do the 
job. 
 Around 1993 employees in the 
school landscaping and vehicle 
maintenance departments devised their 
own plan to bring the work in-house.  
The plan involved purchasing a new 
fifteen-foot wide bat-wing mower and 
repairing an aerator and a seeder that had 
been in storage for over fifteen years. 
 Following two years of lobbying 
school administrators, the school district 
accepted the employees’ proposal and 
canceled their existing agreement with a 
private contractor. Public employees 
took over the service beginning with the 
1995-6 school year.   
 
 Savings from the public program 
totaled $105,000 during the first year of 
the contract (more recent data is not 
available).  The public crew has also 
expanded its services beyond what the 
private contractor provided.  For 
example, now all fields are aerated twice 
yearly, a service that would cost over 
$27,000 if a private contractor were 
hired to do the job.  
 Service quality also has 
improved since bringing the service back 
in-house.  For example, the private 
contractor paid little attention to 
accommodating game schedules or to 
the quality of service beyond mowing.  
In contrast, public workers have even 
gone so far as to take soil samples to 
Ohio State University for analysis, so 
that the appropriate fertilizers can be 
applied in the spring.  “They’ve done a 
great job,” according to Greg Van Horn, 
Athletic Director at Walnut Ridge High 
School, “which makes us want to do a 
great job.  They’ve made us all really 
happy.” 
 "The value of the commitment 
demonstrated by OAPSE members, who 
took the initiative to improve services 
for our kids and to save money for the 
Columbus Public Schools, cannot be 
overestimated,” said School board 
President Mark Hatch.  “We appreciate 
and can always count on this kind of 
loyalty and devotion from our OAPSE 
members.”   
 
Case based on OAPSE News, volume 56, 
number 3  December 1996/January 1997.  
pp. 1-2. 
 
 
Fort Collins, Colorado 
 
Keywords:  Transit, Failed Contract 
 
Paratransit Service 
 
 In an effort to cut costs, the City 
of Fort Collins, Colorado privatized its 
paratransit service for senior citizens and 
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persons with disabilities in 1996.  For 
two years Shamrock Taxi ran the 
program, but several complaints of poor 
service quality resulted in the city 
bringing the program back in-house.  
While under private contract, the service 
had numerous problems hiring and 
retaining employees, resulting in 
unreliable service.  In addition, users of 
the program often complained about the 
lack of courtesy on the part of van 
drivers. 
 The owners of Shamrock Taxi 
were upset when the city decided to take 
back the service in 1998.  They tried to 
generate community support for their 
cause, arguing that the city’s claims of 
poor service were unfounded.  The taxi 
company failed to sway public opinion, 
however, which was firmly on the side 
of city government.   
 The service currently employs 
about 25 part-time employees.  Costs for 
the program are similar to what the taxi 
company charged, but service quality 
has improved significantly. 
 
Case based on interview with John 
Fischbach, City Manager, June 24, 1999. 
 
 
City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida 
 
Keywords:  Public Works, Competitive 
Bidding 
 
Infrastructure Pipe Crews 
 
 For several years the City of Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, relied on private 
contractors to provide two thirds of the 
city’s water pipe infrastructure, with the 
remaining third of the work being done 
by city crews.  In January 1997, the city 
announced plans to put the final third of 
the service out to competitive bid. 
 A Request for Proposals was 
issued for the service and several private 
firms expressed interest in the contract.  
The city’s own crews were interested in 
the work as well, and a labor-
management “partnership” committee 
quickly formed to prepare a bid. 
 Fort Lauderdale’s “partnership” 
programs are a product of CALM, the 
Cooperative Association of Labor and 
Management, an innovative program 
that employs the concepts of Total 
Quality Management to promote 
cooperation and understanding between 
labor and management and boost 
productivity for the city.  The successful 
program has been in place since 1994 
and includes sixteen sub-committees and 
over 200 employees. 
 The city’s Public Services Water 
Pipe Committee prepared its proposal in 
less than three months.  The committee 
was co-chaired by the union president 
and the director of labor relations for the 
city, who co-chair all partnership 
committees.  Having these two 
established veterans on every committee 
“helps to create a safe environment for 
our people,” says Local President Cathy 
Dunn.  “This way we can establish trust 
among all parties early on, and get to the 
real work of developing our proposal.”  
In addition to the co-chairs, the 
committee consisted of a supervisor, 
division manager, and four crew 
members.  Each committee member is 
encouraged to participate fully in the 
development of the proposal, and any 
member of the team has the right to veto 
elements of the plan that they have 
problems with.  “All it takes is one ‘no’ 
vote and the project stops,” says Dunn.   
 Once the committee completed 
its proposal, it was then sent to an 
internal auditor to ensure that the 
committee's budget estimates were 
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correct.  Having this extra check in place 
added credibility to the employees’ 
proposal in the eyes of City Council and 
guaranteed that all project expenses were 
included in the bid.   
 Private sector bids for the job 
varied from $110 to $127 per linear foot.  
In contrast, the city crews won the 
contract with a bid of just $70 per foot.  
Public employees were able to provide 
the service at such a low cost by 
restructuring how the work was done.  
Work schedules were changed from five 
eight-hour days to four ten-hour days to 
reduce set up and travel time.  Equally 
important, pipe crews doubled in size 
from six to twelve workers, following 
the example of successful private firms 
that do the same work.  
 Productivity has increased 
dramatically since the work was brought 
back in-house.  In the first year alone, 
city crews managed to lay over three and 
a half miles of pipe.  In comparison, 
private crews delivered an average of 
only one mile of pipe per year. 
 City officials were so impressed 
by the public employees’ work that the 
pipe contract was recently doubled to 
include two thirds of city pipe jobs.  
Since bringing the work back in, 
employment in the department has 
increased from one crew of six workers 
to two crews that employ over thirty 
people. 
 
Case based on interview with Cathy Dunn, 
AFSCME Local 532, August 3, 1999.  See 
also “Florida City Workers Find New Ways 
of Improving Services,” AFSCME Public 
Employee.  Sept/Oct 1995.  pp. 20-21; and 
“AFSCME Local 532 and the City of Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida Cooperative 
Association of Labor and Management 
(CALM)”.  AFSCME Partners for Change 
Series. <http://www.afscme.org/wrkplace/p-
ftlaud.htm>  2 pp.  1998. 
Independence Mental Health Institute, 
Independence, Iowa  
 
Keywords:  Laundry Service, Failed 
Contract  
 
Laundry Services 
 
 Laundry services at the 
Independence Mental Health Institute in 
Independence, Iowa, were brought back 
in-house earlier this year following three 
to four years with City Laundry of Oline, 
Iowa, a large regional laundry service. 
 Managers at the facility thought 
that the private contract could save the 
state money, since continuing to provide 
the service in-house would have required 
the institute to replace its aging washers 
and dryers.  The substantial savings 
promised by the private contractor were 
never realized, however.   
 The Mental Health Institute paid 
for the laundry service based on the 
weight of each load.  Yet the private 
contractor charged the facility based on 
the weight of the load when the laundry 
was wet, not dry, as the Institute had 
expected.  In addition, slow turn-around 
times resulted in the facility having to 
purchase an additional set of linens in 
order to have sufficient stock on hand to 
cover the laundry rotation.   
 The facility had to purchase new 
equipment in order to bring the service 
back in-house.  Managers were reluctant 
to buy new machines because of the high 
cost of industrial washers and dryers, but 
knew that the one-time expense would 
be worth it over the long run.   
 Since bringing the service back 
in, service quality has improved 
tremendously.  The facility has hired 
three new employees to run the service.   
 
Case based on interviews with Larry 
Bathen, Independence, IA Local President, 
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June 28, 1999, and Tom Anthony, Council 
61 in Des Moines, IA, June 29, 1999. 
 
 
 
Independence Mental Health Institute, 
Independence, Iowa 
 
Keywords: Grounds Maintenance, 
Competitive Bidding, Failed Contract 
 
Grass Mowing 
 
 The Independence Mental Health 
Institute, a state-run hospital for the 
mentally ill in Independence, Iowa, has 
had as many as forty-one services 
contracted out at any given time.  Grass 
mowing services were no exception, and 
a mid-sized, regional contractor was 
responsible for the service between 1990 
and 1998. 
 When the contract for the 
mowing service went out to bid in the 
spring of 1998, AFSCME state workers 
put in their own bid against 
approximately twelve other service 
providers.  AFSCME won the 
competition with a bid of $65,000, 
compared to the lowest private bid of 
$80,000. 
 Cost savings of nearly twenty 
percent were only one of many reasons 
why AFSCME workers were awarded 
the contract.  The AFSCME proposal 
was attractive to state officials because 
bringing the service back in-house meant 
that the hospital had better control over 
how services were delivered.  Cutting 
times could be coordinated with the 
needs of the facility, whereas the 
hospital had no control over when the 
private crews would come to mow the 
facility’s extensive lawns and recreation 
areas.  For example, it was difficult for 
hospital staff to schedule outdoor 
activities for the residents because the 
ball fields and play areas were mowed at 
different times every week.  The 
irregular schedule of the cutting crews 
meant that planned activities often had to 
be postponed or canceled. 
 Poor service from the private 
contractor was another reason why the 
service was brought back in-house.  
Operated largely by teenagers, the 
contractor’s machines had taken down 
trees, burned the grass, and bumped into 
buildings on several occasions.   
 This poor quality service was the 
main reason why the private contractor 
did not challenge AFSCME’s successful 
bid.  If anything, the firm worried that 
the state would impose performance 
penalties for property damage they 
caused at the facility.   
 In order to win the contract, state 
employees had to re-engineer the way 
the mowing service was provided at the 
facility.  Whereas before the facility 
employed three full-time employees 
year-round, the service is now provided 
by one full-time employee and three 
seasonal staff.  “More employees would 
certainly allow us to improve service 
quality,” says Council 61 Representative 
Tom Anthony, “but even with our 
limited staff the service has improved 
significantly since being brought back 
in-house.” 
 
Case based on interviews with Larry 
Bathen, Independence, IA Local President, 
June 28, 1999, and Tom Anthony, Council 
61 in Des Moines, IA, June 29, 1999. 
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City of Irvine, California 
 
Keywords: Food Service, Competitive 
Bidding, Failed Contract 
 
Care Management 
 
 The City of Irvine operates two 
seniors’ centers that provide a wide 
variety of services to the local elderly 
population.  Among their many 
programs, the centers offer care 
management services for individuals in 
need of assistance with health care, 
transportation, housing, and other social 
services.  At any given time there are 
about 100 active cases in the system. 
 The lead staff person for this 
service was charged with administering 
a community-based care management 
program.  In addition to direct service, 
this person also coordinated a variety of 
volunteer programs and maintained 
linkages with local, state, and federal 
agencies.  Unfortunately, many of the 
technical aspects of managing a geriatric 
social work program had been 
overlooked by the city when it first 
budgeted for the position several years 
earlier.  As a result, the city often had 
problems retaining the lead staff person 
for this service.  In evaluating its options 
for stabilizing the program, rather than 
upgrade the lead staff position, the city 
chose to privatize the entire program in 
1994. 
 The Request for Proposals 
attracted few qualified bidders. In spite 
of a competitive bidding process, the 
city felt that only one contractor had the 
qualifications necessary to run the 
complex program.  After reviewing the 
technical responsibilities contained in 
the service contract, however, the lone 
qualified bidder chose to withdraw from 
the competition.  The perception was 
that many of the contract services were 
hard to measure, difficult to administer, 
and that performance would be based 
largely on community perceptions rather 
than tangible results.  This created a 
sense that the cost to administer the 
program would grow far beyond the 
ability of the vendor to manage the 
program within the available budget. 
 Unable to attract qualified 
contractors, in 1995 city administrators 
went back to City Council and asked that 
the lead staff position for the program be 
upgraded.  This time they were 
successful in their request, and the 
program has remained in public hands 
ever since. 
 
Case based on interviews with George 
Searcy, Superintendent of Senior Services, 
City of Irvine, California, June 24, 1999 and 
August 3, 1999. 
 
 
City of Irvine, California  
 
Keywords:  Social Services, Competitive 
Bidding, Failed Contract 
 
Senior Citizens’ Meal Program 
 
 Across the country, federal law 
dictates that local Agencies on Aging 
provide a meal program for senior 
citizens.  For the City of Irvine, 
responsibility for this task lies with 
Orange County, a large urban county 
that includes more than thirty different 
municipal governments.  
 Rather than allow each 
municipality design its own meal 
program, the county used to be divided 
into three service districts, with a single 
meal service provider for each district.  
In Irvine’s case, the service district 
included eighteen different 
municipalities.  Each district contract 
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was administered by a non-profit 
agency, who then hired a private food 
service company to prepare and deliver 
the meals to city-run seniors’ centers. 
 The complexity of the service 
arrangement resulted in the city having 
no control over the program, even 
though it was the final “consumer” of 
the service.  Because it was the county 
that paid for the service (with federal 
dollars), all decisions regarding service 
delivery and program design were made 
at the county level.  Yet the two levels of 
government had different ideas of what 
constituted quality service.  For county 
officials, service quality was measured 
in program efficiency; distributing the 
largest number of meals at the lowest 
cost was their primary goal.  In contrast, 
the city’s primary concern was to deliver 
high quality meals, since its employees 
had to interact with the senior citizens 
that used the service on a daily basis. 
 The meal program was brought 
back in house in June 1998 after 10 
years with the private contractor.  “It 
took the city five years to recognize the 
problem,” says the Superintendent of 
Senior Services, “and another five to fix 
it.”  Poor service quality was the 
principal reason for bringing the service 
back in house.  Lunch-time meals were 
prepared at a location eighteen miles 
away, and put on delivery trucks at 4:00 
am.  By the time the food was served at 
noon, few seniors were interested in 
eating it.   
 Slow delivery times were one 
reason for poor quality food, but cost 
considerations were another.  The 
federal dollars used to pay for the 
program were insufficient to pay for the 
service as it was being administered by 
the county.  Not only did the county 
have to pay its own administrative and 
overhead costs, it also had to pay the 
regional non-profit agency responsible 
for administering the program, who then 
had to pay the private contractor, who 
needed to make a profit off each meal. 
 Irvine was able to bring the 
service back in by bidding on its own 
contract when the most recent Request 
for Proposals (RFP) was issued.  Its bid 
was similar to those put in by private 
contractors, but the city promised higher 
quality service.  Simply getting the 
opportunity to bid involved months of 
lobbying the Orange County Board of 
Supervisors, who were wary of allowing 
a government agency to bid on a 
competitive contract.  Opposition to the 
plan centered on the city’s lack of 
experience in the food service industry.  
After considerable debate, however, city 
officials, with the backing of two local 
seniors’ groups, were able to convince 
the county that they had the 
qualifications necessary to run the 
program. 
 Facilities for the new service 
already existed in one of the city’s two 
senior centers.  Built just five years ago, 
the developers of the center had the 
foresight to include kitchen facilities in 
the new building, in anticipation for a 
growing elderly population in the area.  
Administration of the program was 
folded into the routine activities of 
center management.  Between four and 
six new food service jobs were added to 
the center’s payroll.   
 Since returning to public hands, 
satisfaction with the service has 
increased dramatically.  In the year since 
the city took over the meal plan, use of 
the service has increased by over 100 
percent. 
 
Case based on interviews with George 
Searcy, Superintendent of Senior Services, 
City of Irvine, California, June 24, 1999 and 
August 3, 1999. 
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City of Lakewood, Colorado  
 
Keywords:  Public Works, Failed 
Contract 
 
Winter Street Sweeping 
 
Prior to 1997, the City of 
Lakewood, Colorado used private 
sweeping contractors to supplement city 
sweeping forces in the winter months.  
The additional sweeping effort in the 
winter was needed to remove sanding 
material from the roadways in a more 
expeditious manner, in order to address 
PM-10 air quality concerns and overall 
city aesthetics. 
 In 1997 the decision was made to 
eliminate the contracted winter sweeping 
services and use the funds budgeted to 
lease three additional sweepers and hire 
four seasonal employees to supplement 
city employees in the winter months.  
This decision was made due to quality 
and reliability problems with private 
sweeping contractors. 
 Service quality has improved 
considerably since bringing the service 
back in-house.  The quality and 
reliability problems have been solved, 
and there has also been an increase in 
sweeping quantity of approximately 25 
percent.   
 
Case based on interviews with Jim Zelinski, 
Deputy City Manager, and Chris Jacobsen, 
Maintenance Operations Manager, July 1, 
1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
City of Lubbock, Texas  
 
Keywords: Residential Trash Collection, 
Competitive Bidding, Failed Contract 
 
Residential Trash Collection 
 
 In May 1995 the City of 
Lubbock, Texas began its first 
experiment with private service delivery 
when it hired Browning-Ferris Industries 
(BFI) to provide one third of its 
residential trash collection services.  BFI 
won the three-year contract with the city 
following a competitive bidding process 
that included two other private firms.   
 The BFI contract was the city’s 
first experiment with private service 
delivery, and as such the city approached 
privatization cautiously.  Rather than 
contract out the entire service, city 
officials instead chose to put just one 
third of city routes out to bid.  Keeping a 
majority of the service in-house gave the 
city the option to return trash collection 
to public hands if the private contractor 
failed to deliver high quality service.   
 Cost savings with the private 
contractor averaged about $150,000 
annually, according to City Manager 
Bob Cass.  However, service quality was 
lower with the private contractor.  The 
city maintains detailed records on the 
number of complaints received for both 
publicly- and privately provided 
services, and the number of complaints 
per 100 households was significantly 
higher with the private firm. 
 About two years into the contract 
BFI attempted to renegotiate its 
agreement with the city, citing 
unexpected costs.  The original contract 
was negotiated such that BFI would be 
paid on a per-household basis.  Yet the 
weight of trash collected per household 
was higher than the company expected, 
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which meant that the company had to 
pay more than it had anticipated to 
dispose of the trash at the local landfill.  
The city refused to renegotiate its 
contract, however, and the contractor 
finished out its three-year term at the 
agreed-upon price. 
 BFI’s contract ended in May 
1998, and the service was again put out 
to competitive bid early that year.  This 
time the service contract was for a 
period of five years rather than three, 
and the contract was for the right to 
serve forty percent of the city’s 
households instead of thirty-three 
percent.  In addition, the contract was 
rewritten so that the service provider 
would be charged based on the number 
of cubic yards “tipped” rather than the 
number of households served.  By 
charging for service according to the 
number of cubic yards tipped the city 
hoped to avoid the unanticipated costs 
faced by the private provider during the 
previous contract. 
 The Spring 1998 Request for 
Proposals attracted bids from three 
private providers as well as the city.  
Public employees won the contract with 
a bid of $3.6 million over five years, 
compared to private bids of $7.3 million 
(BFI), $6.6 million (El Paso Disposal), 
and $6 million from Duncan Disposal. 
 The city’s bid of $3.6 million 
represented savings of forty percent 
compared to the lowest private bidder.  
The city was able to lower its costs by 
restructuring the way the service was 
provided.  Rather than pick up trash 
twice weekly year-round, the city 
changed its service to once a week 
during the winter (November to 
February) and twice weekly during 
warmer periods (March to October).  
Equally important, the work week for 
city employees was extended from forty 
to fifty-three hours per week.  While 
overtime pay was significantly higher 
under the new system, total costs were 
still lower than if the city were to hire 
additional full-time employees to deliver 
the service. 
 The city’s bid was carefully 
assembled by an interdepartmental team.  
Members of the team included staff 
persons from the city’s fleet department, 
budget office, and public works, as well 
as solid waste employees. In addition, 
the city’s internal auditor and an 
independent certified public accountant 
reviewed all bids received, including the 
city’s cost estimates.  The auditor and 
accountant’s thorough evaluation of all 
cost items ensured that the total costs of 
providing the service were included in 
each proposal, and added credibility to 
the city’s plan in the eyes of City 
Council. 
 The city had no problems taking 
back the service.  Because city officials 
knew that they might take back trash 
collection services at any time, the city 
kept its seven best trucks that were 
scheduled for retirement in storage 
during the three years of private service 
provision.  Consequently the city did not 
need to purchase any expensive new 
equipment when it took over trash 
collection in 1998.   
 Between seven and nine new 
drivers were hired to provide the service.  
The city’s fully automated system uses 
large (3 cubic yard) containers to collect 
residential trash. As a result laborers in 
addition to the driver are not required to 
provide the service.  These dumpsters 
are located in alleys and are shared by 
three to four families, on average. 
 The city’s five-year contract for 
trash collection will be put out to 
competitive bid again in 2003.  Like the 
two previous rounds of competitive 
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bidding, only one third of city routes will 
be considered for privatization.  
According to the Director of Public 
Works, Mildred Cox, the city would 
never consider wholesale privatization of 
the service.  “We would always keep at 
least one third of the service in house,” 
says Cox.  “This way we would never 
lose the ability to keep the private firms 
on their toes.  Just as important, having 
competitive bids provides the city with 
important information about what 
constitutes efficient service.”   
 
Case based on interviews with Bob Cass, 
City Manager, and Mildred Cox, Director of 
Public Works, July 26, 1999 and August 3, 
1999. 
 
 
Iowa Veterans Home, Marshalltown, 
Iowa  
 
Keywords:  Food Service, Failed 
Contract 
 
Food Service 
 
 In an effort to cut costs, food 
service and housekeeping services at the 
Iowa Veteran’s Home in Marshalltown, 
Iowa were contracted out in March 
1993.  For five years these services were 
provided by J.A. Jones, but the company 
lost its contract when the services were 
put out to competitive bids in March 
1998.  Morrison Health Care won the 
food service contract, while ABM was 
granted the housekeeping contract at the 
Home. 
 It was not long before residents 
and family members complained about 
the new food service.  Morrison Health 
Care was not used to serving such a 
large number of senior citizens on a 
daily basis, and this lack of experience 
was reflected in the low quality meals 
that residents were served.  
 After only a few weeks with the 
new food service contractor, news of the 
poor service reached State 
Representative Teresa Garman (R) of 
Ames, Iowa, who took it upon herself to 
terminate the Morrison contract.  
Researchers at her office determined that 
state employees were best equipped to 
handle the job, and that public staff 
could run the program for $90,000 less 
than what the contractor was currently 
charging.  
 The state had no problems 
getting out of the five-year food service 
contract, and was only required to give 
Morrison Food Service 90 days notice.  
For its part, Morrison argued that it 
could have done a better job, but was 
overburdened by government regulations 
which limited its ability to provide 
quality service.   
 The new public contract is 
scheduled to go into effect on October 1, 
1999.  AFSCME expects that between 
76 and 88 new public positions will be 
created as a result of the transition.  The 
Home plans to hire most of Morrison’s 
current workforce, which should 
facilitate the transition.  As state 
employees, food service workers are 
expected to make a dollar more per hour, 
on average.   
 State Representative Garman’s 
next project is to return housekeeping 
services to state control as well.  ABM 
employees who currently provide the 
service are working under highly 
stressful conditions, says AFSCME rep 
Pete Peterson, and the firm is having 
problems keeping qualified staff.  Mr. 
Peterson expects negotiations for 
housekeeping staff to begin sometime 
later this year.   
 
Case based on interview with Pete Peterson, 
AFSCME Representative, June 30, 1999. 
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City of Moore, Oklahoma  
 
Keywords: Public Works, Failed 
Contract 
 
Public Works 
 
 In response to fiscal stress, the 
City of Moore, Oklahoma decided to 
contract out its public utilities and public 
works departments in December 1993.  
Services in the contract included streets, 
drains, parks, cemeteries, building 
maintenance, sanitation, fleet 
maintenance, and animal control.  
Following a competitive bidding process 
that included three different companies, 
the five-year contract was awarded to 
Professional Services Group (PSG), a 
large multinational firm. 
 When PSG took over public 
works, nine employees chose not to take 
jobs with the private firm.  Four months 
later PSG terminated eleven additional 
employees, bringing the total reduction 
in staff for the department to twenty. 
Following the layoffs PSG employed 
about forty-five workers.  In spite of the 
staff reductions, PSG still managed to 
meet its contract obligations to the city.  
“For the first three years, everything was 
working well,” said Richard Sandefur, 
Director of Public Works.  “PSG had 
demonstrated that it could do more with 
less manpower than the city.” 
 After about three years with the 
private contractor the local economy 
improved considerably, and citizens 
were demanding a higher level of service 
that what PSG was required to provide 
under the terms of the contract.  Moore 
City Council felt that PSG should 
provide this higher level of service at no 
extra cost to the city, and that the 
company should hire back some of the 
employees they terminated to provide 
the additional service.   
 PSG rejected the city’s request, 
arguing that since they were fulfilling 
the terms of the contract they were under 
no obligation to hire additional staff 
without an operating budget increase 
from the city.  For the extra money that 
PSG was going to charge to expand 
services, the city decided that it made 
more sense to cancel the contract and 
bring the work back in-house.   
 In addition to cost 
considerations, the city chose to take 
over public works functions to improve 
service quality. “The city has a better 
idea of what the city wants,” said Mr. 
Sandefur, “and therefore it made sense 
to bring the contract back in-house.”  
Making public works a city department 
again has allowed the city to adjust its 
level of service on a case by case basis. 
In contrast, the PSG contract did not 
have the flexibility required to meet 
changes in citizen demand for services.   
 In September 1997 a new service 
agreement was signed by the city and 
PSG.  Under the new contract, most 
public works functions would return to 
the city, effective immediately.  PSG 
would retain the operation of the waste 
water treatment plant, water and sewer 
line maintenance, and the reading of 
water meters for an additional five-year 
term. 
 After taking over public works, 
the city increased the number of 
employees in the department by ten, 
bringing the total to thirty-nine.  PSG 
currently employs sixteen workers to 
provide water service.  Combined, the 
two parties employ fifty-five people.  
This figure is about ten less than what 
the city employed prior to privatization, 
but ten more than what PSG used when 
it ran both programs. 
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 The new service arrangement 
between PSG and the city has been in 
effect for about two years, and both sides 
have been pleased with the results.  
“Management and employees are 
working together to give the citizens the 
increased level of service they deserve,” 
Sandefur said. 
 
Case based on interviews with Michael 
Drea, City Manager, and Richard Sandefur, 
Director of Public Works, August 16, 1999 
and August 17, 1999. 
 
 
Village of Northbrook, Illinois 
 
Keywords:  Meter Reading, Failed 
Contract 
 
Water Meter Reading 
 
 About six years ago, the 
Northern Illinois Gas Company 
approached the Village of Northbrook, 
Illinois, with a proposal to take over the 
village’s water meter reading service.  
Attracted by the company’s promise of 
significant cost savings, the village 
accepted the gas company’s offer.   
 The village quickly discovered 
that any cost savings from the program 
were offset by poor quality service.   
Problems with the service centered on 
the transfer of billing information 
between the two organizations.  While 
the gas company was responsible for 
reading the meters, it was the village that 
sent out bills and collected fees from its 
customers.  However, the billing 
information supplied by the gas 
company on magnetic tape had high 
error rates, which meant that the village 
often had to double-check the 
information sent by the company.  This 
situation was further complicated by the 
fact that the two organizations used 
different billing software programs.  
Contrary to the agreement, information 
sent by the gas company could not be 
easily transferred to the village’s 
computer system, which resulted in 
significant delays in billing customers 
and valuable time wasted by village 
employees.   
 About a year into the contract the 
village informed Northern Illinois Gas 
that it would cancel its contract if the 
billing problems were not corrected 
within 90 days.  The company failed to 
improve its quality of service during this 
time, resulting in the service being 
brought back in-house. Four new part-
time positions with the village were 
restored as a result of the transition.   
 
Case based on interview with John 
Novinson, Village Manager, July 8, 1999.  
 
 
Pinellas County, Florida 
 
Keywords: grounds maintenance, failed 
contract 
 
Buildings and Grounds Maintenance 
 
 Private contractors maintain over 
80 percent of all buildings and grounds 
in Pinellas County. The one exception to 
this rule is grass cutting at the county’s 
360 water pumping stations, a service 
that was brought back in-house 
following 18 months of privately 
provided service. 
 The pumping stations are on 
small lots (50’ by 50’) surrounded by 
chain-link fences.  Most stations are 
located at remote spots in residential 
neighborhoods, and are rarely visited by 
county employees.  In 1996 county 
officials contracted out grass cutting at 
these facilities in order to cut costs.  
While the private contractor was willing 
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to provide the service at significantly 
lower rates than what it would cost for 
the county to do the job, the contractor 
quickly found that he and his crews were 
unable to maintain such a large number 
of small lots in a timely fashion.   
 Following a number of 
complaints from residents living near the 
pumping stations, the county chose to 
end its contract with the private 
contractor half-way through its three-
year contract.  The contractor admitted 
he was in over his head, and was 
relieved to see the contract terminated.  
County employees have provided the 
service for over two years now, and 
service quality has improved 
tremendously.   
 The decision to bring the work 
back in house was a joint effort of the 
County Administrator and other 
managerial staff.  No additional 
employees were required to provide the 
service.  Rather, the work was 
incorporated into the daily routine of 
county maintenance workers.   
 Bringing services back in is rare 
in Pinellas County, where a large 
number of services are contracted out.  
“Grass cutting at the pumping stations 
was a unique case,” says County 
Administrator Fred Marquis.  “Servicing 
so many remote locations made it very 
difficult to monitor service quality, so 
for this particular service it made more 
sense for the county to do the job.”  The 
county has contracted out a number of 
services to private providers over the 
past decade, and generally has been 
pleased with the services of its 
contractors.  However, satisfaction with 
services is only one reason why the 
county rarely takes services back in-
house; equally important are the rules 
governing the competitive bidding 
process.  When a service is first put out 
to bid, county employees are allowed to 
compete with private firms for the 
contract.  Once that contract is “lost” to 
a private contractor, however, only 
private providers have the opportunity to 
bid on future contracts.  The county sees 
the costs associated with bringing a 
service back in as too costly to be worth 
the effort.  Not only would the county 
have to hire new employees to take over 
the service, but new equipment and 
buildings may be required as well.  In 
short, the start up costs associated with 
bringing a service back in house make 
public bids on competitive contracts 
prohibitively expensive for the county.   
 
Case based on interview with Fred Marquis, 
County Administrator, July 6, 1999. 
 
 
City of Rialto, California 
 
Keywords:  Meter Reading, Failed 
Contract 
 
Meter Reading 
 
Three years ago, the City of Rialto 
contracted out its water meter reading to 
a private contractor.  The three 
employees that had performed the work 
previously had all recently retired, which 
meant that the transition would have no 
effect on city employees.  The program 
cost about the same as with city workers, 
but the city saw contracting out as a way 
to lower the number of workers it had to 
supervise directly.   
 Following several complaints 
from consumers, the city chose to bring 
the service back in house about a year 
ago.   The employees hired by the 
private contractor were not reading the 
meters directly, but rather estimating 
households’ water usage.  These 
estimates were often way out of line 
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with actual usage, which angered many 
consumers.    
 Service quality has improved 
since returning the service to public 
employees.  Costs are about the same 
compared to the private contractor.   
 
Case based on interview with Joe Guzzetta, 
City Administrator, June 28, 1999. 
 
 
City of Rialto, California 
 
Keywords: Grounds Maintenance 
 
Park Maintenance 
 
 Park maintenance services 
(mainly grass mowing) for two larger 
parks in Rialto were brought back in-
house three years ago after being 
contracted out for “several years.”  The 
purchase of a gang mower by the city 
made it financially feasible to take over 
the private contract.  No new jobs were 
created as a result of the change in 
service delivery.   
 
Case based on interview with Joe Guzzetta, 
City Administrator, June 28, 1999. 
 
 
City of Sanford, Florida 
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Contract 
 
Ambulance Service 
 
 Like many places around the 
country, emergency medical service in 
Seminole County, Florida used to be 
provided by two teams of emergency 
technicians.   The first team, usually 
employed by the municipal fire 
department, was responsible for the 
initial emergency response.  Their job 
was to provide paramedic services to 
those in need as quickly as possible.  
The second team, a privately provided 
ambulance service, was responsible for 
transporting patients to area hospitals 
after the first team had stabilized the 
patient. 
 The rationale behind the two 
team approach was that patients could be 
served more efficiently since paramedics 
could spend more of their time on 
emergency calls and less time 
transporting patients.  Rather than 
improve quality of care, however, 
having two teams provide the service 
resulted in duplication of services and 
slower response times.  Often the 
ambulance service was slow to arrive on 
the scene, which meant that valuable 
time was wasted for both the paramedics 
and the patient.  When the ambulance 
crews did arrive, they were then required 
to perform the same treatments and ask 
the patients the same questions that the 
paramedic team had done only minutes 
before.    
 About three years ago, the City 
of Sanford, along with a majority of 
municipalities in Seminole County, 
chose to eliminate the second team 
altogether and have only one team 
responsible for both initial treatment and 
transportation of the patient. This way 
one team would be responsible for the 
care of the patient from the time of 
arrival at the scene of the call to the time 
the patient entered the hospital 
emergency room.   
 In order to keep response times 
low, the city had to hire eight additional 
paramedics and purchase some new 
equipment.  These additional expenses 
are paid for by revenues generated from 
ambulance service fees.  The new 
system costs about the same as the 
previous two-team system (if not slightly 
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more), but quality of care for patients 
has improved significantly.   
 The city did not have a long-term 
contract with the private ambulance 
provider, which meant that there were no 
major barriers to bringing the service in-
house.  It is also worth noting that the 
ambulance service was never publicly 
provided until the program was 
redesigned three years ago.  
 
Case based on interview with Anthony 
Vanderworp, Chief Administrative Officer, 
July 7, 1999.  
 
 
City of Sanford, Florida  
 
Keywords:  Meter Reading, Failed 
Contract 
 
Utility Meter Reading 
 
 “Around 5 years ago” the City of 
Sanford contracted out its water meter 
reading service to FDL.  The service was 
taken back in-house after one year with 
the private contractor.  After performing 
the service for one year, FDL 
determined that they could not provide 
the service at the price they had said they 
could.  The company went to the city 
and asked for more money, but the city 
decided that the amount they were 
asking would cost more than if the city 
provided the service with public 
employees.  Mr. Vanderworp could not 
recall the finer details of the transition, 
since the change occurred prior to his 
arrival in Sanford.  He did note, 
however, that the change affected just 
one or two employees.   
 
Case based on interview with Anthony 
Vanderworp, Chief Administrative Officer, 
July 7, 1999. 
 
City of Savannah, Georgia  
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Contract 
 
Fire Services 
 
 On the south side of Savannah, 
Georgia, fire protection services had 
historically been provided by South Side 
Fire Protection, Inc., a non-profit fire 
department with a mix of full-time 
professional staff and local volunteers.  
The city of Savannah annexed the South 
Side in the late 1970s, but South Side 
Fire continued to provide fire service to 
this part of the city.  The rest of the 
Savannah metropolitan area was served 
by the city’s own professional fire 
crews.  By the late 1990s South Side 
Fire was responsible for about a third of 
the city’s fire service.   
 As the South Side continued to 
grow, concerns were raised about the 
differences in service quality between 
the City of Savannah Fire Department 
and South Side Fire.  Whereas 
previously the area consisted of mainly 
single family housing, over the years the 
South Side grew to include two major 
shopping malls, a number of multi-story 
office buildings, several car dealerships, 
and a variety of other commercial 
developments.  Responding effectively 
to these types of calls required a 
different method of firefighting than 
what South Side Fire could offer.  In 
addition, the number of city firefighters 
responding to each call was always the 
same, whereas the number of South Side 
volunteers responding to calls varied at 
each event.   
 Following two and a half years of 
planning and debate, the city terminated 
its contract with the private company in 
early 1998. The decision to take over the 
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service was made by city staff and 
elected officials.  One of the most vocal 
proponents of the change was the city 
council representative from the South 
Side, who argued that the quality of 
service from the private company was 
inferior to that offered by the city.   
 South Side Fire Protection fought 
hard to protect their business.  However, 
the owners of the company lacked 
credibility in the eyes of most city 
council members, and failed to reverse 
the city’s decision to take over the 
service.  The city was increasingly 
concerned with service quality and 
response times on the South Side.  More 
importantly, the cost of service had risen 
during the life of the contract.  The city 
found itself paying the company for 
equipment and stations “over and over 
again,” and the company would increase 
its charges to the city on a yearly basis. 
 The extent to which South Side 
Fire was overpriced relative to the city 
was made clear during the final round of 
negotiations with City Council.  In a 
last-ditch effort to save its business, the 
company offered to provide the service 
at a significantly lower price than what it 
was currently charging.  This sudden 
drop in price only angered city officials, 
who wondered how much, and for how 
long, this supposed “non-profit” 
organization was overcharging them.   
 The decision to take over fire 
protection in the South Side was 
facilitated by the fire fighters’ union.  
Several years ago the union “realized it 
needed to get competitive,” and worked 
with city administrators to reorganize the 
department and make it more efficient.  
This strong relationship with the union 
made it easy for city officials to support 
the takeover. 
 Between forty and fifty new 
union jobs have been created with the 
expansion of the city department.  
Around twenty-five of the new hires 
came directly from South Side Fire 
Protection.  City wages and benefits 
were only slightly higher than their non-
union counterparts at South Side.   
 Since the City took over fire 
services fifteen months ago, service 
quality has improved dramatically.  
During its first year of operation the city 
estimates that the new arrangement has 
saved taxpayers over $200,000, and 
expects savings to increase as the 
program matures.   
 
Case based on interview with Michael 
Brown, City Manager, June 25, 1999. 
 
 
Sioux City, Iowa  
 
Keywords:  Residential Trash, 
Competitive Bidding 
 
Residential Trash Collection 
 
 In Sioux City, Iowa, residential 
trash collection had been privately 
provided for over 20 years.  At one time 
there were as many as seven small trash 
holders providing the service to different 
parts of the city, but for the past several 
years trash had been collected by a 
single company called Solid Waste, Inc., 
owned by the video rental giant 
Blockbuster. 
 When the service was put out to 
bid in the fall of 1996, the director of the 
Sioux City Utilities Department 
approached union leaders with a 
proposal to put together a bid for the 
project.  Their hard work resulted in 
public employees winning the contract 
with the lowest of three bids for the 
service.   
 The cost difference between the 
city’s bid and its competitors’ was 
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minimal, says AFSCME member 
Garland Treloar.  What made the 
difference, he said, was the joint 
proposal by Treloar and the Director of 
Public Utilities in front of City Council.  
“We have two choices.” Treloar told the 
Council. “We can make these workers 
part of the community.  We can offer 
them a decent wage to support their 
families.  And we can be sure that the 
money the city spends stays here in 
Sioux City.  Or, we can continue with 
business as usual and send half of what 
we spend on trash collection off to some 
corporate headquarters in New Jersey.” 
 The city had no problems taking 
over the service.  Private contractors 
who had collected trash in the past had 
always used city-owned trucks and 
maintenance facilities, so there was no 
need to purchase new equipment to do 
the job.  In fact, the trash trucks and 
uniforms worn by the private contractor 
had always been branded with the Sioux 
City logo, even though the service was 
provided by a private firm.   
 Approximately 10-12 drivers and 
10-15 “hoppers” (trash collectors) were 
hired to provide the new service.  
Service quality has improved 
tremendously, and accident rates with 
the city are way down compared to the 
private contractor.   
 The service will go out to bid 
again in February 2000.   
 
Case based on interview with Garland 
Treloar, AFSCME Local President, August 
18, 1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The City of Warwick, Rhode Island  
 
Keywords: Residential Trash Collection, 
Competitive Bidding 
 
Residential Trash Collection 
 
 In the spring of 1992 the Mayor 
of Warwick, Rhode Island, decided to 
privatize sanitation and recycling 
services.  In spite of strong union 
opposition, the plan was approved by 
City Council and a Request for 
Proposals (RFP) for trash collection and 
recycling was issued. The winning bid 
came from Truk-Away of Rhode Island 
(later known as United Waste Services) 
who was awarded a five-year contract 
for the service. 
 Truk-Away’s contract ended in 
early 1997, and the city again solicited 
bids for the trash service.  The RFP 
attracted bids from five private firms and 
a sixth bid from the city’s public works 
department.  The city won the five-year 
contract with a bid price $1.1 million 
lower than its closest private competitor.   
 The winning proposal was a joint 
effort of the mayor and city council, the 
finance director, the city solicitor, the 
public works department, and AFSCME 
Local 1651.  Under the new plan, all 
trash collectors work together as a team, 
with drivers collecting trash in addition 
to driving the trucks.  When a truck is 
full, only one person drives it to the 
landfill; the other worker is taken to a 
different route to help the two workers 
on that truck collect trash faster.   
 Twenty-two new full-time 
employees were hired to provide the 
service.  The city also acquired 14 new 
trucks, since its old equipment was sold 
to Truk-Away when the service was 
privatized in 1992. 
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 The city’s contract with public 
employees is similar to the previous 
private contract in that the city can 
terminate the agreement at any time.  “If 
it doesn’t work we have a fall-back 
position, and that’s important to the 
taxpayers,” said Councilman Al 
Ferruolo.  In addition, the service will 
again be put out to competitive bid again 
in 2002.  “Our own workers, they’re 
going to be accountable,” said Council 
Member Richard DeGregorio, “because 
they don’t want to lose the business in 
five years.”   
 
Case based on correspondence and 
newspaper clippings from Joseph R. 
Peckham, Business Agent for RI Council 94, 
AFSCME. 
 
 
City of Whittier, California  
 
Keywords:  Transit, Failed Contract 
 
Public Bus Service 
 
 Like most cities in California, the 
City of Whittier faced serious budget 
constraints in the early 1990s.  In an 
effort to cut costs, the city decided to 
privatize its public bus service.  
Following a competitive bidding process 
that included three private firms, the city 
awarded a five year contract for the 
service to a local bus company about 
seven years ago. 
 At the end of the private contract, 
the city decided to bring the bus service 
back in-house.  Poor service quality was 
the primary reason for the switch.  The 
city received many complaints about 
dirty busses and underqualified drivers.  
The accident rate for the private service 
was significantly higher than when the 
city did the job, which meant that much 
of the cost savings from privatization 
were lost due to the sharp increase in 
liability claims.  Equally important, the 
bus company cut corners on routine bus 
maintenance and safety checks, resulting 
in higher than expected costs for vehicle 
repairs.   
 The city’s bus fleet is small, with 
about six buses providing the service.   
 
Case based on interview with Thomas Mauk, 
City Manger, August 6, 1999. 
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Introductions to Selected Cases
Methanex Corp. v. USA is the only reported direct challenge to a United States law. Methanex, a
Canadian Corporation and maker of a component of MTBE, is challenging California's decision to ban
MTBE in order to protect public health and prevent water pollution. Under NAFTA, Methanex is claiming
that California is expropriating their market in favor of domestic providers of substitute products. NAFTA
grants foreign investors rights to be treated at least as well as domestic companies (national treatment),
have access to domestic markets, and be regulated by the least burdensome method. The claim suggests
that California should focus on stronger enforcement of environmental regulations rather than phase out
the pollutant. [1] The case is being heard in an international tribunal that will determine whether the
United States will have to pay for the lost profits due to the ban. Part of the claim is based on the
mention of MTBE by name in federal mandates to lower air pollution. Since the federal government
suggested the chemical is an acceptable additive, some suppliers argue that they acted in reliance on
traditional US law and should not lose the market they relied on. This case may have been avoided had
the legislators focused on the clean air goals the benefit the additives might confer rather than
specifically listing a particular chemical compound in the legislation.
Sun Belt Water, Inc. v. Canada challenges the right of a government to restrict access to natural
resources by limiting the number of license holders. Canada made a decision to limit the water that can
be shipped from Canada by not awarding new business licenses in Canada to foreign or domestic water-
exporters. Sun Belt a US company unlicensed in Canada, made a contract to bring Canadian water to
California. Sun Belt claims that government agents refused to grant the license to ensure that a
Canadian firm would receive the contract. That unfairly prefers Canadian firms to US investors, and
therefore breaches the investor's right to national treatment. The claim is based primarily on the fact
that most of the license holders are Canadian at this point, so the law is a barrier to new (foreign)
investment in what Sun Belt considers a competitive market. (No water has been shipped from Canada to
the US at this time). This case is pending (hasn't been accepted as a claim), but an award to Sun Belt
would establish that government can not limit the number of companies in an industry even if the
commodity is a scarce natural resource. Sun Belt lawyers have also stated that they are stakeholders and
as such should be involved in setting Canadian water policy.
Ethyl Corporation v. Canada was the first case settled under NAFTA. Similar to the Methanex case,
Canada settled a challenge to an environmental protection based decision to ban imports of the gasoline
additive MMT. Ethyl claimed that the ban was put in place to give preference to Canadian suppliers even
though there are none. The only supplier is a US company. Canada made a surprising decision to settle,
and paid Ethyl $13 M USD. Municipalities and public unions in Canada stepped up efforts to limit the
effects of NAFTA and FTAA soon after the decision.
MetalClad v. Mexico cost Mexico $16M USD. This case shows how important it is to have federal and
local cooperation, communication and solidarity. A local environmental impact statement that showed
that a hazardous waste handling site would pollute the ground water was preempted by prior federal and
state approvals. A conflict between federal and local authority was the deciding factor rather than the
uncontested pollution of the ground water under the site. The lesson for states and localities is two-fold.
First, it is important to have regulations in place and available to those who do business in the
community. These should be followed as a standard procedure to set the tone of working with that
community and put newcomers on notice. As soon as the government notices investment in the
community, an effort should be made to educate the investor. Secondly, the city in Mexico tried to turn
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the area into an environmental preserve to save it from the land use. This reactionary legislation is not
acceptable under NAFTA. Laws should be in place before investment and building begins.
Mondev International v. the United States is another case that illustrates the need for neutrality in
documents and laws. Mondev claimed that Boston was discriminating due to their foreign status as
evidenced by repeated references to Mondev as a Canadian company. Mondev had developed a portion of
land and substantially improved the property values in the area. They tried to exercise an option to buy
other adjacent land and Boston defaulted claiming that the option was not valid any longer. The court
sided with Boston, and Mondev is challenging under NAFTA claiming that the treatment was due to
foreign status. This case is clearly based on contracts, but gets into the international arena and beyond
the US court system due to the foreign status of one party. This case, when decided, may give foreign
companies better negotiating power than domestic companies in hopes that challenges can be avoided.
For a complete list of cases involving all NAFTA parties, see www.naftalaw.org.
For all WTO disputes see www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.
[1] Lazar, Linda. Dispute Resolution: Secret Corporate Weapon? Journal of Global Financial Markets. Winter 2000.
http://www.sachnoff.com/publications/articles/nafta.htm.
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Resolutions Submitted by State and Local Governments Regarding Trade
Promotion Authority, Chapter 11 and International Trade Agreements
Some cities, counties, state legislatures associations and individual government actors are concerned with
different facets of the international trade arena. Some like Senator Kuehl of California, one the states that is
facing a NAFTA challenge, are concerned that state and local regulations may be threatened by trade
obligations. Associations like the National League of Cities are concerned that the obligations may change
land use and property laws that have been formulated at the local level traditionally. Most of those concerned
with the local impacts of trade have requested that:
current laws and traditional roles be protected;
that the negotiation process be transparent;
to participate in dispute resolutions that target laws in their jurisdiction;
and often that Congress should prepare a list of the federal and local laws that would be affected by
each obligation.
The following letters and resolutions are regarding many facets of the trade debate. Many request that NAFTA
Chapter 11 on Investment not be used as a template for the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Others request
modifications of the Trade Promotion Authority. Though TPA has been approved, the documents reflect the
broader concerns of the localities. Several of the communities have rejected the free trade agreements and
request to be exempted from any participation. This collection is not exhaustive and does not include
testimony before Congress or the USTR. Please see Legislative Briefings for official testimony.
Author Date
1. State and local organizations letter to all United States Senators May 20, 2002
2. State Legislatures  
 National Conference of State Legislators  
 Letter to Senators Baucus and Charles E. Grassley re: TPA March 1, 2002
 Policy on Free Trade and Federalism July 2000
 Policy Position on NAFTA  
 Presidential Trade Promotion Authority Policy  
 Letter to Gloria Blue of the U.S. Trade Representative August 22, 2001
 Letter from members of California Legislature to California Congressional Delegation April 25, 2002
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 Letter from members of Oregon Legislature to Senators Gordon Smith and Ron Wyden May 17, 2002
 Senate Select Committee on International trade Policy and State Legislation  
 Efforts by Cities and States to Examine their Role in International Trade Agreements July 11, 2002
 Senate Joint Resolution No. 40 - Relative to international investment agreements* March 20, 2002
 Minnesota State Senate Resolution May 7, 2002
 Oklahoma State Senate Concurrent Resolution May 9, 2002
 Letter from Governor Gary Locke, Governor of Washington November 7, 2001
 Washington State Democratic Party "Resolution to Oppose "Fast Track""  
 Legislative Assembly of the State of Oregon Senate Joint memorial #2-2 May 10, 2001
3. State Attorneys General  
 National Association of Attorneys General Resolution In Support of State Sovereignty and
Regulatory Authority
March 22, 2002
 HR 3005 Summary of Concerns  
 Letter from Bill Lockyer, California April 3, 2002
 Letter from William Correll, Vermont April 17, 2002
 Letter from Eliot Spitzer May 9, 2002
 Letter from G. Steven Rowe, Maine April 25, 2002
 Letter from Mike McGrath, Montana May 14, 2002
 Letter from Thomas Reilly, Massachusetts May 17, 2002
 Letter from Robert A. Butterworth, Florida May 13, 2002
4. State Court Chief Justices  
 Conference of Chief Justices Letter to Senator Daschle and Senator Lott May 15, 2002
5. Counties  
 National Association of Counties (NACo) Resolution on trade Agreements May 4, 2002
6. Cities, Towns and Townships  
 United States Conference of Mayors letter to Senator Daschle March 21, 2002
 United States Conference of Mayors Resolution June 18, 2002
 National League of Cities letter to all United States Senators March 13, 2002
 National Association of Towns and Townships letter to all United States Senators April 4, 2002
 League of California Cities letter to Senator Boxer May 20, 2002
 Oklahoma Municipal League Board Resolution No. 02-01 May 1, 2002
 Oklahoma Municipal League letter to Senator Nickles  
 Glendale, CA City Council Resolution June 26, 2001
 Salem, Oregon City Council Resolution "Oppose Fast trace and FTAA" May 10, 2001
 City Council of Philadelphia Resolution on Fast Track and the FTAA May 2, 2002
 International Municipal Lawyers Association letter to all United States Senators March 12, 2002
 American Public Health Association letter to all united States Senators May 3, 2002
* Vetoed by the Governor
If you have any letter or resolutions from a government association, actor, city, county or state, please
submit to jcg28@cornell.edu.
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Relevant Presentations
For these presentations, click view to open them in the browser window (works well only in Internet
Explorer), or click download to download the PowerPoint file (best for Netscape users). If you do not have
PowerPoint and you want to view PowerPoint files, download the Microsoft PowerPoint Viewer.
Privatization, Free Trade and the Role of State and Local Governments
Presented by Mildred Warner and Jennifer Gerbasi to the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning
Conference, Baltimore, MD.  November 2002.  Based on Cornell Department of City and Regional Planning
Working Paper #203. 
Privatization, Free Trade and the Erosion of Government Authority (view or download)
Presented by Jennifer Gerbasi at the Economic Policy Institute Conference on Privatization, Washington, D.C.
April 4, 2003. (A summary introduction and citations and abstract are also available.)
Free Trade and the Potential Conflicts with Domestic Water Policy (view or download)
Presented at Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.  May 5, 2002.  Overview of potential conflicts with water
conservation, exports, and international trade obligations.
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Jennifer Gerbasi
607/255-6647
jcg28@cornell.edu
Contacts
To submit content, send hard copies to Cornell University, 215 West Sibley Hall, Ithaca, NY 14850-6701, or
contact via e-mail or phone:
Mildred Warner
607/255-6816
mew15@cornell.edu
Senate Select Committee on International Trade Policy
and State Legislation
Senator Sheila James Kuehl
Legislative Office Building
1020 N Street, Room 248
Sacramento, CA 95814
916/322-8616
F-916/324-3036
 
The Honorable Senator Baucus (D)
Senate Finance Committee (Fast Track - Trade Promotion
Authority)
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 
511 Hart Senate Office Bldg. 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
(202) 224-2651 
(202) 224-4700 (Fax) 
(800) 332-6106 (from MT) 
(202) 224-1998 (TDD)
National Conference of State Legislatures
1560 Broadway, Suite 700
Denver, CO 80202
303/830-2200
F-303/863-8003
http://www.ncsl.org 
Attorney General Scott Harshbarger
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
1 Ashburton Place
Boston, MA 02108
617/727-22--
F617/727-5778
 
Dr. Robert Stumberg
111 F StreetNW, Room 102
Harrison Institute of Public Policy
Washington, D.C. 20003
202/662-9603
 
The Honorable Representative Levin (D)
United States House of Representatives
House Ways and Means Committee (Trade)
Michigan-12th, Democrat
2300 Rayburn HOB
Washington, DC 20515-2212
Phone: (202) 225-4961
 
State Representative Byron Rushing
Room 544 State House
Boston, MA 02133
617/722-2637
Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch
215 Pennsylvania Avenue SE
Washington, D.C. 20003
202/546-4996
Canadian Union of Public Employees
Jane Stinson
21, rue Florence Street
Ottawa, ON K2P 0W6
613/237-1590
International Institute for Sustainable Development
161 Portage Avenue East, 6th Floor
Winnipeg, Manitoba Canada R3B 0Y4
204/958-7700
F-204/958-7710
Search Cornell
jstinson@cupe.ca
http://www.cupe.ca
 
http://iisd.ca 
Western Governors' Association 
1515 Cleveland Place, Suite 200
Denver, CO 80202-5114 
Phone: (303) 623-9378
http://www.westgov.org/ 
National League of Cities 
Veronique Pluviose-Fenton 
Principal Legislative Counsel 
1301 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 550
Washington, DC 20004
Phone:(202) 626-3000
http://www.nlc.org  
Links
FTAA Official Website
FTAA Second Draft Text
General Agreement on Trade in Services
NAFTA claims repository (Site created by Todd Weiler, a Canadian lawyer.  This is a repository for the
NAFTA claims, and has the official text and papers that analyze some early investor-state disputes and
their broader implications.)
Official listing of GATS services listed by the US
Official World Trade Organization (This site has information on the World Trade Organization, the
Uruguay Round and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.)
United States Constitution
United States State Department (Provides NAFTA claims in which the US is a party.  Use the search
button to look for the cases by name.) 
World Trade Organization Disputes (This site lists chronologically 290 nation-to-nation disputes.  The US
is a party in 142 of these cases.)
Official NAFTA web site (Also see to the USTR summaries of the agreement.)
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Jennifer Gerbasi 
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The Impact of International Trade on State and Local 
Government Authority   
Jennifer Gerbasi and Mildred Warner  
 Since the 1990's, the United States has vigorously pursued and 
become a party to international trade agreements such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).  Traditional trade treaties are intended to open new 
commercial opportunities and technology sharing avenues which promote economic 
development by leveling the playing field .   
The new trade agreements have the potential to open unprecedented service and goods 
markets bringing economic growth to U.S. investors.  However, this new generation of trade 
agreements reaches beyond the traditional agreements that limit excessive tariffs, import 
limitations, or customs practices and may change substantively domestic governance at all levels.  
Benefits to state and local government will depend in large part on the interpretation of the 
agreement regarding state and local government authority.  
The WTO, NAFTA, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the upcoming 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) have been formulated to limit government 
participation in a number of ways in the name of free market competition.  Government 
measures such as subsidies, taxes, health and environmental regulations, administrative rules, 
and government provision of goods and services are viewed as potentially interfering with the 
free market disciplines of competition based on price and quality.   
New Generation Trade Agreements  
Name Signatories Highlighted Impacts on Government 
North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
1994 
United States  
Canada  
Mexico 
 Individual foreign investors can sue nations 
 Dispute resolution in secret tribunals 
 Removes state court jurisdiction over cases 
 Property redefined for foreign investors 
The  World Trade 
Organization (WTO) 
1995 
144 countries   Trade-legal test for all government action 
 Binding obligations  
 Financial penalties for government actions 
The General 
Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) 
1995 
The 144 WTO 
Countries 
 Liberalizes services listed in the agreement 
 Government provision exception limited to those 
services not offered privately 
 Water delivery and treatment, schools, and 
prisons may be open to competition 
The Free Trade Area 
of the Americas 
(FTAA) 
In draft form 
Expected 2003 
34 North, Central and 
South American 
countries and the 
Caribbean but not 
Cuba.   
 Liberalizes all service sectors not specifically 
excluded 
 Draft includes NAFTA investor rights chapter 
 May extend foreign investor protection from 
performance requirements to domestic investors 
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State and local laws may be affected 
because the trade agreements extend to all 
levels of government including 
administrative agencies or businesses 
contracted to implement programs 
legitimized by government authority.  The 
United States is a federalist government in 
which the federal government shares powers 
with the states.  Federal law preempts state 
law where they conflict.i Trade agreements 
become federal law when congress ratifies them and, therefore, trump state and local law.  There 
is a shift in power from the state to the federal government whenever the federal government 
agrees to international obligations that bind the states.  States are duty bound to govern for the 
benefit of the people of that state, which is a discriminatory standard by its nature.  The federal 
government, through the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the states from 
inhibiting interstate commerce in pursuit of local advantage.  Federal district courts hear disputes 
between foreign parties and the states.  The federal courts interpret state law in this process and 
are used to avoid state bias, not to supplant federal law.  Under NAFTA, foreign investors can 
bring these claims to binding international arbitration panels.  This avoids both the state and 
federal domestic court systems, and any obligation to use U.S. laws.  This process lacks the 
predictability of the U.S. court system and the framework in which local and state governments 
function.   
Proponents of free trade consider the loss of sovereignty, and growth of international 
influence to be a step in the right direction for international cooperation. By extending U.S. 
investor protections to other countries the agreements help safeguard investments abroad.   Some 
state and local government associations believe that the benefits can be attained without limiting 
the dynamic, flexible and community-based leadership role of local and state government actors. 
Other analysts believe that the trade agreements shift powers away from the state toward the 
federal government, international arbitration panels, and individual foreign investors. NAFTA 
Article 105 and the NAFTA implementation language specifically assert that the federal 
government must take measures to ensure that sub-national government agents, quasi-
governmental organizations or authorized contractors comply with the agreement obligations.   
Thus the agreements increase pressure on state and local governments to defer to international 
standards rather than community standards or custom.   
 - &."/&0"$$- ". "$
An "investor" is any person, company or lender with a 
financial venture that sells goods or services in a 
participating country where the investor is considered 
foreignii.  These investors have a right to bring nations into 
international arbitration to defend government measures that 
affect their investments (property) negatively.  These 
agreements expand foreign investor rights by granting:  
  property rights greater than domestic citizens and 
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 access to an international court that can award damages for government actions that 
impact investor profits.   
The expanded view of "property" is defined to include future profits, market share, and 
market access.  Partial losses of profit or use of land may require government compensation.  
This is a greater right than U.S. citizens have under the takings clause.  Partial regulatory takings 
are considered non-compensable, reasonable losses for the privilege of citizenship in the 
domestic contextiii.   
Foreign investors have also been granted the right to comment on draft legislation that might 
affect investments.  If displeased with the final legislation, foreign investors can circumvent the 
legislation and challenge the law by asking a secretive international arbitration tribunal to declare 
the law invalid under NAFTA on a number of grounds.     These changes are the basis of much 
of the concern voiced by state and local governments. The concern is not unfounded, and has 
been reinforced by the actions of some 
investors.   
Several California communities noticed a 
terrible smell and taste from their water taps.  
A study of Santa Barbara revealed that MTBE 
(methyl tributyl ethanol), an additive used to 
make gasoline burn cleaner, had leached into 
the wells.  Separate scientific studies found 
MTBE to be carcinogenic and very difficult to 
remove from water.  Aesthetically, a few drops 
of MTBE can make an Olympic pool-sized 
reservoir of water taste and smell like 
turpentine.    Freshwater resources are critical 
to California, so to protect public health and 
the environment, the Governor of California 
called for a ban of the chemical. 
Methanex, a Canadian firm that provides 
one component of MTBE, is currently 
challenging California’s right to ban MTBE on 
the grounds that it violates NAFTA Chapter 11 
obligations.  The company has interpreted the 
ban as an expropriation of their market though 
it accounts for only 6% of their product sales.  
Methanex further claims that the state should 
have pushed for strict compliance with existing 
environmental inspection regulations of 
underground tanks rather than eliminating the 
chemical.  To choose the more expeditious route of eliminating the chemical from the stream of 
commerce conflicts with Methanex’s right to be governed by the least trade restrictive methods 
available.  Methanex is claiming nearly a billion dollars in damages including good will, 
reputation and future profits.  The challenge is being entertained by a tribunal at the time of 
writing though no arguments have been made public .   
Methanex v. U.S.  
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Domestically, the U.S. court system has 
been supporting cities affected by this chemical 
and  making gasoline refiners pay.  California 
cities have sued refiners for  MTBE ground 
water well pollution.  Courts have awarded 
cities close to $40 million for remediation.     
 	
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 The manner in which state and local governments protect public health, encourage sensible 
growth, economic development and interpret their laws is in question under trade agreements.  
These traditional powers are not protected, and may be targets for elimination as "non-tariff 
barriers to trade" in some instances.  The WTO and NAFTA change the way that laws are made, 
the interpretation of those laws in the court system, and the scientific standards on which they are 
based.  Taxes on foreign businesses operating in the U.S. may be limited by NAFTA as will the 
ability of states to require state licenses, certifications, or the residency of key personnel under 
GATS.  Performance requirements, bonds to ensure a fund for liability in case of dispute, and 
any preferences for local goods or labor may conflict with NAFTA.  State and local governments 
are bound to the international trade agreement obligations and must comply  with all of the 
restrictions on government market intervention.   
""$0&"%	 .&
Some state members of Congress, such as California Senator Sheila Kuehl and 
Massachusetts Representative Byron Rushing are concerned that the obligations may go so far as 
to encroach on state sovereignty.  Both states and state legislators support free trade and 
understand the importance of foreign markets to US growth.  California boasted  $1.7 billion of 
exports in 1999 and supported those exports with $13.5 million of subsidies annually.iv  Kuehl 
and Rushing are concerned, however, that the trade agreements lack procedures that promote 
meaningful public input and may undermine domestic legislation.   
States currently pass laws that affect health, property rights, taxation, development, and 
environmental regulations.  These laws are generally upheld if they are rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose and do not conflict with or are not less stringent than federal law.   
NAFTA further burdens all U.S. "government measures" that may impact trade to be consistent 
with international standards.   
*+!+     
#+
 ! ,---
. /0
/$.01
, 2
3 
4 

               
  
 $  
      2  
    
        

May 2003 
City and Regional Planning Working Paper #204.    http://government.cce.cornell.edu 5 
Government measures defined loosely are rules or regulations from any government actor or 
authorized contractor.  Under the trade agreements, government measures may be challenged if 
they affect foreign investment profits, market share, or give preference to domestic investors.   
To be upheld, the laws have to be legitimate under international rules rather than rationally 
related to standards used in the U.S.  The penalties for non-compliance involve huge and 
unpredictable financial awards.  Previous treaties and agreements were voluntary and were 
enforced only by tariffs or boycotts. These new agreements extend the interpretation of ”non-
tariff barriers to trade” to include  many state and local government laws and procedures.   
.&"0$1
Trade agreements have broad implications for the legislative process including changes in the 
formulation of laws, the public participation and representation of citizens and foreign investors, 
and the interpretation in the courts.  Laws must be in compliance with the trade agreement 
obligations, and may be interpreted in international tribunals rather than the traditional courts.  
This circumstance limits citizen input, judicial interpretation, and the state's role as the 
democratic representative of citizen voice. 
	
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Foreign investors will have an opportunity to ensure that the laws passed in the US will not 
negatively affect their investments.  Regulators and rule makers have to provide a comment 
period open to all foreign investors who may be impacted by the resulting government measure.  
All rulemaking bodies must invest in communication procedures that announce pending and new 
rules to all potentially concerned parties including current and future investors.  Investors may 
take this opportunity to explain to the state or locality why the proposed legislation or rule might 
conflict with a trade agreement, and outline how that might translate into an international 
arbitration and a substantial financial reward to the investor.  These concerns may take 
precedence over the will of the citizens and the goals of the state.   

Who Makes These Agreements? 
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Existing laws must also be harmonized with the participating countries.  Either all countries 
have one set of regulations, or each party may simply accept each others' different laws as 
comparable or acceptable. Harmonization results in one law that is a compromise of the other 
laws.   The point is to lower the uncertainty and transaction costs of investors by having similar 
laws in all countries whenever possible.  The Western Governor's Association believes state 
standards may be compromised through this process. State laws regarding environmental 
protection, natural resource management and consumer safety are generally more stringent than 
the standards used by U.S. trading partners.v  U.S. federal and state safety standards would have 
to be lowered to comply with the required harmonization preempting the states' role in setting the 
acceptable risk.    
Once laws are harmonized, challenges may still be brought to 
tribunals under NAFTA.  The controversy over Lindane is a good 
example.  Lindane was targeted as a persistent organic pollutant 
(POP).  Lindane has been used to kill head lice and to stop fungal 
damage in agricultural seeds.  In these applications, Lindane has 
caused death, seizures and rashes in children and adults who have 
come into contact with the chemical.  Equally troubling, the 
chemical breaks down very slowly once in the environment.  It was considered for the POPs 
Treaty but was not included.vi  Since it was not listed, but remained controversial, the U.S. and 
Canada harmonized their laws regarding its use.  Lindane was to be sold freely until July 1, 
2001, and the governments would fund a new study to assess the health risk.  The compromise 
was that all U.S. and Canadian companies would stop manufacturing in December 2000 and sell 
the stock over the next six months.  When the voluntary agreement was published, the Canadian 
announcement said that Lindane could not be used after July 1, 2001, and violators could be 
subject to a $200,000 fine.  Lindane dropped in value precipitously.   
Crompton is a United States manufacturer of Lindane.  The manufacturer is now bringing a 
NAFTA challenge.  Crompton says that it only agreed to take Lindane off the market if the study 
proved it was harmful, and that the government is acting in bad faith.vii  The risk assessment by 
the governments was never completed, so Crompton is challenging the scientific basis for the 
ban.   The governments had included the manufacturers in the initial decision, and Crompton is 
treating the government like a contractual partner that is in default rather than a regulatory 
authority obligated to protect human health.  Crompton questions the need for Lindane to be 
banned, and is demanding $100 million from Canada for the premature loss of market share, the 
retraction of the ban, and return of their license to manufacture the chemical.    If the tribunal 
allows Crompton to move forward, this challenge threatens the finality of negotiations between 
parties to harmonize laws.  Financial compensation for affected profits would be valued above 
the ability of government to stand by a compromise or otherwise legitimate legislation.    
	
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The Lindane case begs the question, “who decides?”  Does a manufacturer have a burden to 
prove a chemical is safe, or must the government prove certain harm before acting to protect the 
public?  The burden seems to be placed on the governments in the NAFTA and WTO cases at 
this time.   
Harmonization 
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U.S. governing agencies are generally allowed to use the precautionary principle to avoid 
damage to the public from a substance that is potentially harmful.  The precautionary principal is 
a risk averse policy that favors erring on the side of safety when scientific evidence suggests that 
something may be harmful, but harm is not certain.  The trade agreements require a scientific 
basis for government measures which suggests that the results of any study be reproducible and 
statistically significantly different from control groups.  Less information tends to settle 
questions in favor of using the product until it is proven harmful rather.  A government 
exercising caution where evidence is forthcoming or scant may be  inviting  a challenge.  The 
same government entity may face some liability domestically for not acting quickly enough to 
protect the affected public.  An imminent NAFTA challenge may make the decisions more 
economically driven because public policy and local conditions are irrelevant to international 
tribunals.   
Foreign investors may try to impose international standards to challenge the scientific basis 
of the state or local government for restricting the use or release of what is considered a pollutant 
in the US.  For example, the California legislature was convinced that there was enough 
scientific evidence that MTBE should not be introduced to the environment.  Other researchers 
in Germany concluded that it was not dangerous, and the Canadian manufacturer is claiming that 
the U.S. should accept those scientific studies.  The challenges may be resolved in the state or 
local government's favor, but at a significant cost to both the state and the federal government 
defender.   
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Harmonization is not limited to health or environmental legislation.  NAFTA and GATS 
require that all laws affecting investment be as similar as possible in the participating countries.1   
One of the first topics being considered by special GATS subcommittees is the issue of licenses 
for professionals.  At this time, without the appropriate license with the credentials required by a 
state, lawyers, accountants, doctors and other professionals cannot operate.  The trade proponents 
are striving to come up with universal criteria for licenses that will allow these services to be 
traded freely.  This is a huge detour from the state character of licenses in the past that require 
specific knowledge of local customs and practices.   

                                                          
1
 “Affecting investment” is a broad category that encompasses anything that could inadvertently change the property 
rights or future expectations of the foreign investor including higher expenses of raw materials which might result in 
a loss of profit.   
Crompton Corporation v. Canada 
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There are some general exceptions that exempt open-
ended categories of laws.  These exceptions provide a 
false sense of security because in some cases these 
exceptions have sunset clauses, and in others they are 
available as candidates for compromises in future rounds 
of liberalization.  The continued obligation to liberalize is 
called a "rollback" requirement.  The grandfathered laws 
are restricted by a "standstill" requirement that means that 
the law can not be strengthened.  This freezes future 
lawmaking powers at the point the agreement is 
negotiated.viii  
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There is no guarantee that exceptions will be interpreted consistently over time.  The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has a general exception for protecting animals, plants, 
and exhaustible natural resources.  It is not clear what those natural resources are.  It is fairly 
certain that water is not among them since the USTR and the Supreme Court of the United States 
both consider water to be a commodity, and the GATT defines water as all water other than sea 
water.  Although NAFTA defers to the GATT,  NAFTA preempts the GATT where the two are 
in conflict, so GATT protections may be overruled by interpretations of NAFTA.  There is a 
potential conflict between the reserved right to protect natural resources (GATT Article XX) and 
the obligation to continue exports of products at the average level of the previous 36 months 
(NAFTA Article 15).  The implication is that a country would be obligated to continue natural 
resource exports regardless of changed local conditions or serious risk of unsustainable 
depletions.   
A U.S. company is challenging a Canadian 
ban on the export of fresh water on this basis as 
well as other national treatment claims.  Sun 
Belt, Inc. claims that British Columbia, a 
province of Canada, expropriated their profits by 
putting a temporary moratorium on freshwater 
export.  Sun Belt had contracted with a local 
firm to export water to California.  Sun Belt is 
asking for $1.5 billion in lost profits and the 
reinstatement of the license to export.  A 
company spokesperson has claimed that NAFTA 
has made them an active participant in Canadian 
political process, and a rightholder of Canadian 
water.  NAFTA is controlling because, in Sun 
Belt's view, water is a commodity like any other, 
and therefore must be traded under NAFTA 
rules.  The case has not been approved for arbitration by the tribunal at this point, but is evidence 
of the types of issues that may be raised under the agreements.  It may inform future decisions of 
planners, conservationists and manufacturers alike.   
U.S. Court System Avoided  
	  !




1
• &  2 2 

• ?     7  
    
8

1
• 
• 
• 


!   
 
  
   
@
  
     
    /0
/
May 2003 
City and Regional Planning Working Paper #204.    http://government.cce.cornell.edu 9 
It is important to note that British Columbia’s moratorium was in effect before NAFTA was 
signed.  Sun Belt is gong back retroactively to say that it was owed the NAFTA treatment before 
the trade agreement was in existence.  Legislators may be concerned that implications of having 
issues as critical as access to the freshwater supply can be decided by an international tribunal 
with no direct accountability to local citizens.  The tribunals emphasis may be given to economic 
criteria over local public health and environmental quality concerns.   
.	$2"$21"$"".""0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The agreements invite foreign investors not only into the legislative process, but also to 
interpret laws once applied.   This is a significant shift in influence that limits the ability of the 
state to act in an autonomous, independent, self-interested manner.  If the resulting measure is 
perceived as discriminating against foreign investors, or gives domestic competitors an 
inadvertent advantage, the foreign investor can challenge the law.  This challenge would be 
heard in international arbitration.  Tribunals are selected by the two parties to the challenge (an 
investor and a party country) and they choose the standard of law that will be used to decide the 
controversy.    
Both the venue and the finality of the courts are modified under NAFTA.  The arbitration 
panels and international law replace the state courts as the venue for hearing complaints against a 
state action and the standards applied.  Under NAFTA, the federal government defends the claim 
in an international setting according to whichever law the parties choose, which has generally 
been the international standard.  The state does not directly participate, and state law is not 
considered unless the parties both agree that it will be the standard. If a domestic court decision 
is made, an unfavorable outcome for the foreign investor might encourage the investor to go into 
arbitration by claiming discrimination and avoid the state law.   
The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States challenge is an example of this threat.ix  Loewen, a 
Canadian funeral home, has been granted standing by a NAFTA tribunal to sue the United States 
for requiring a bond before the appeals process.  Loewen was found guilty of illegal competitive 
tactics and was fined $100 million compensation and $400 million punitive damages award in 
the Mississippi Supreme Court.  Mississippi requires that appellants post a bond (equal to 125% 
of the award) which would be due if the appeal fails.  Loewen settled the case for $175 million.   
Still dissatisfied with the outcome, in 1998 Loewen turned to the NAFTA process for relief.  
Loewen is claiming that the actions of the awarding jury and the court have been influenced by 
its status as a foreign company, and therefore are challenging the damages award.  If Loewen is 
successful, there will be broad implications for all U.S. courts.   If the NAFTA tribunal protects 
Loewen by declaring the Mississippi law invalid, then the impact of NAFTA will be that 
 
 investors will not be required to exhaust remedies before going to arbitration,  
 investors can go through the court system and then challenge it if not satisfied, 
 court decisions will not be given weight by the tribunal or considered in their 
deliberations, 
 no civil dispute with a foreign investor can be considered settled until a tribunal has also 
considered it. 
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If Loewen is successful, the U.S. court system 
could be circumvented entirely.   While this would 
not be a lenient interpretation, it illustrates the 
restrictions on government action integral to the 
trade agreement.  The way the NAFTA is written 
the arbitration panels are under no requirement to 
give the court or the state laws deference. A single 
foreign shareholder, without the consent of the 
company or country of origin, could claim an 
investment loss and challenge the legitimacy of the 
American court system.  The courts would lose 
their ability to interpret the law for foreign cases.  There would be two standards for disputes, 
one for foreigners set by NAFTA, and the traditional U.S. law for domestic companies and 
investors.    
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As outlined above, foreign investors have the right to participate in domestic lawmaking, and 
if they are not satisfied with that process, can take their complaints to an international arbitration 
tribunal that is not available to similarly situated domestic investors.  These arbitration hearings 
are not open to the public, and though the U.S. federal government would be a participant in any 
claim against a U.S. governmental entity, the proceedings remain behind closed doors unless 
both parties agree to make a public disclosure.   
The success of the U.S. system is based on the transparency of the process, and the ability of 
citizens to participate in debates regarding laws, policies and actions.  Public hearings are an 
opportunity for all stakeholders to be heard, and ideally come to a balance of interests.  The U.S. 
system is built on the notion of checks and balances.  If a lawmaking body exceeds its authority, 
the court or the executive can keep the legislature in check.   International trade agreements lack 
such checks and balances.  These trade agreements give foreign private investors the right to 
arbitration tribunals to second-guess the legislature and the courts.  International law may be 
used as proof that a U.S. law is too stringent. Neither U.S. citizens nor state and local 
governments are allowed access to these tribunal proceedings. 
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States  
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On a procedural level, domestic and foreign 
businesses have better access to the negotiators 
because corporations fill the 30 industry-specific 
advisory committees that have direct access to the 
President and the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR).  The public can submit 
written comments to the Committee for the 
Participation of Civil Society, or to each 
negotiating group.  No committee is obligated to 
respond to citizen inquiries.  State representatives 
can try to influence Congress and the members of the committees, but are not privy to the 
negotiations within the advisory committees.  After the trade agreements are passed, 
administrative staff often modify the text without public input.  Under GATS, ongoing 
administrative harmonization is required to continue the process of liberalizing markets and 
removing trade barriers.   As a government action, however, foreign investors can demand to be 
notified of these changes or seek damages later if profits are negatively impacted.   
.1$!"%&."	 $1"- ". &
Of all of the roles of local government, land use is the most specific to place.  Many localities 
post signs at the edge of town announcing that local zoning is in place, and permits for building 
and businesses will be required.  Zoning affects a broad range of on site land uses and allowed 
impacts on neighboring lands and waterways. The placement of businesses, residences, and the 
allowed uses of land are local decisions.  Environmental regulations and emissions standards can 
be set by state governments and sometimes regional or local governments.  The latitude to set 
restrictive land use regulations or environmental regulations to protect human health might be 
challenged under NAFTA and later trade agreements.   
0$# "&2"$
The use of zoning balances the benefits of being a citizen with the rights of a landowner to 
profit from the use of the property.  Commercial enterprises have always been heavily regulated 
and the courts consider it foreseeable that the status quo will change.  Therefore, domestic 
investors have no reasonable expectation that profits from the property will be secured in 
perpetuity.  Foreign investments may use a different standard for deciding appropriate 
compensation for losses of market share or profits.  Governments may have to pay for 
environmentally based restrictions (air, water pollutant restrictions) if the regulations are 
strengthened due to a change in circumstance and inadvertently limit the return on investment 
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expected by the foreign investor.  The national government, as the party to the agreement, may 
be expected to satisfy that lost expectation of profit. 
 
Government compensation for property loss or the act of expropriation or takings is not new.  
The concept of takings in the domestic context awards compensation to citizens whose property 
is used or burdened for the public good.  In the US, only the loss of use of the property in its 
entirety gets compensation unless the government physically occupies all or a portion of the 
land.  (The citizen would be compensated only for the occupied portion).  The courts have long 
held that the diminution of the value of property is insufficient to be considered a takings.  The 
trade agreements suggest that partial takings may be granted to foreign investors.  This would 
mean that counties that wanted to place restrictions on land use that required setbacks, buffer 
zones or denied dredge and fill permits might have to pay foreign investors for their compliance.   
The Metalclad v. Mexico challenge illustrates this expanded definition of takings as well as 
the potential for private investors to overrule public health and environmental concerns.  
Metalclad is a US company that purchased land in Mexico with the intent of building a 
processing plant for toxic wastes.  The Mexican regional and federal governments approved the 
venture.  The building commenced and was completed based on representations of approval from 
the federal government.  The local government never issued a building permit and refused to on 
the basis on the environmental impact report.  The local government would not allow the plant to 
operate because it would have exacerbated the ground water pollution problem.   In a desperate 
attempt to stop the plant, the community zoned the site as a preserve. 
  Metalclad took the claim to a NAFTA tribunal and was awarded $16.8 million, (the cost of 
the building).  The tribunal also could have awarded the lost profits estimated in the business 
plan or loss of reputation.  Judge Tysoe, one of the judges who sat on the tribunal, voiced 
concern that this broad interpretation of the trade agreement could interfere with customary and 
legitimate zoning laws.x  The potential for environmental damage or the health effects of ground 
water contamination were not considered to be critical to the determination of the case.  The 
impact on the investor was the main concern of the tribunal.   
Note that the community would not allow the property to be used as a toxic waste facility, 
but did not say that the property could not be used for other purposes.  A U.S. court would not 
award takings if there were still economic uses of the property available.   The ability to use the 
property is protected, but not a particular use.  Particular 
uses must be consistent with local zoning, and broader 
public policies.  The trade agreement does not incorporate 
any of these criteria in the deliberations.  If foreign investors 
receive similar awards against the U.S., domestic investors 
may lobby for equal rights to partial takings in the future.  In 
Ownership or Access to Natural Resources 
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fact, this has been proposed in Congress and defeated.  Compensation for partial takings would 
undermine the basis for land use law in the U.S.   
1$$# 1 0$!# ""1"
Local and state governments use many mechanisms to enhance economic development.  
Many of the most successful programs include subsidies or preferences available only to resident 
businesses, or businesses that meet a certain criteria for a disadvantaged class.  NAFTA and the 
WTO specifically target subsidies that in any way give preference to domestic business or 
discriminate against foreign investors.   
Performance bonds, performance requirements, local input and labor requirements and local 
business preferences are among the activities that may be interpreted as non-compliant with 
NAFTA and the WTO.  Programs that may be at risk include:xi 
 Community reinvestment acts 
 Living wage ordinances 
 Use of public pension funds for redevelopment 
 Purchasing criteria other than price and quality  
 Minority business support 
 Buy local or buy American policies 
 Recycled or local content preferences 
These programs are common programs used by local governments to support local 
businesses or draw investors to the community.  The use of economic development to nurture 
local business is against the free market principles that guide international trade agreements.  The 
goal of the agreement is to encourage foreign investment by leveling the playing field through 
harmonization or freezing regulation so that investments are more predictable.  State and local 
governments lose flexibility and predictability within that process.   
States use subsidies and tax breaks to encourage economic development, fund services for 
the poor, and reward initiatives that fulfill public purposes.  These practices may be considered 
illegitimate if the result gives the government or domestic investors an edge over foreign 
investors.  Any subsidies available to U.S. companies must also be made available to foreign 
concerns.  Tax breaks must be available equally and without residency requirements.   
"$$0# "01 %/	 .&
As a provider of goods and services, governments receive special interest rates to save the 
public interest on large capital projects.   If a government activity is also provided by private 
industry, any subsidy or better lending rates enjoyed by the government may be considered 
illegal subsidies that favor government providers over foreign private enterprise.  For example, 
United Parcel Service (UPS) is challenging Canada's right to use their letter delivery routes to 
also deliver parcels.  UPS claims that access to the Royal Post infrastructure is unavailable to 
UPS, and therefore puts the Canadian Post at an unfair competitive advantage.  Under the 
NAFTA, any subsidies available to domestic market competitors must be available to foreign 
concerns as well.  Tax breaks must be available equally.  UPS, therefore, is demanding either 
access to this infrastructure, which would allow their packages to be carried by the Canadian 
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letter carriers at no extra charge, or financial compensation equal to that value.  There is no 
reason that this challenge could not be posed to the United States Postal Service if UPS is 
successful since the U.S. uses the same government-owned corporation arrangement and delivers 
the same services.  The challenger could be a Canadian investor in Federal Express, or a sole 
proprietor with a license to deliver packages in Canada.   
0"3"$$1"
Professor John Roberts defines the role of the state as an umpire between private interests, 
and an advocate for the public problem of market failure (Appleton 1994 at 206).xii  Privatization 
has the potential to offer alternative provision of public goods and services.   State and local 
governments fulfill this role when they carefully construct contracts for private industry to 
provide goods and services traditionally provided by the state (solid waste disposal, water 
distribution and treatment, etc.).  However, the government has to play a market-structuring role 
to promote competitive efficiency while serving broader public values in the public service.xiii   
In the NAFTA, GATS and FTAA regime, privatization is a matter of course, not a decision 
to be made by individual localities or public utilities.  The trade agreements, to varying degrees, 
liberalize markets to provide goods and services that have been supplied by the government.  
Recall that governments provide public goods in the first place because of market failures such 
as  externalities and free riders.  From the GATS each party specifically lists the services that the 
government will open to private competition with public providers2.  There is an exception for 
services that are provided by government agencies, but the caveat is that the service must not be 
available in the marketplace.  Thus, the existence of private hospitals, schools and water 
treatment plants could open the door for private industry to compete with the government to 
provide these services.   
Government latitude in a number of areas may be significantly reduced under the 
agreements.  According to Barry Appleton, a Canadian plaintiff's attorney in NAFTA challenges, 
the trade agreement was drafted specifically to restrain the traditional role of the state.  Quality 
and access to public services may be undermined if governmental control over the contracting 
process is weakened.  Government subsidies currently used to lower costs and expand citizen 
access may be claimed by foreign investors as compensation for lost profit and market share due 
to the lower cost of government provision. 
                                                          
2
 GATS is a "bottom-up" approach that includes only what is listed.  NAFTA and FTAA are “top-down” treaties, 
which means that all services that are not specifically excluded are liberalized. 
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 There may be significant costs incurred by local and state governments in trying to satisfy 
these international obligations.   Many localities would have to enhance administrative and legal 
departments to gain the expertise necessary to communicate the legislative agenda with potential 
investors in all participating countries.   
It is unclear whether the localities and states that are challenged will be financially liable for 
the damages awarded to investors.  The known challenges against the United States at this time 
include claims for $1.8 billion.  There may be other claims that have not been reported since, 
there is no obligation for either party of the arbitration or the tribunal to make it public. (The 
Loewen claim was admitted only after a Freedom of Information Act request).  A group at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University undertook a study to assess the 
potential financial liability posed by international trade agreements. They estimated the liability 
at $32 billion in the first four years that all agreements are in effect. Over the following four 
years the estimate climbs to $159 billion.xiv Legal fees, staff time, and lost productivity of 
government employees who will respond to these cases are not included in the estimates. 
/1/"-1$$# 1$01$
The focus of these agreements is on increased trade and economic growth.  These goals are 
not balanced by concerns with other public policies and governance goals.  The historical legal 
framework of the U.S. may be altered dramatically by the property rights expansion for foreign 
investors.  For example, the Clean Water Act relies on land use management techniques and 
zoning.  The technology-forcing advances required by the Clean Air Act  were costs absorbed by 
the private industries benefiting from the production of wastes.   Both of these major federal 
initiatives rely on state and local cooperation and the takings law as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court.  Government regulatory approaches such as these could be stymied by expropriation 
awards under the free trade agreement.  Domestically, some litigators stress that rampant takings 
liability would bankrupt many local governments or divert financial resources from critical 
public works.xv   
There needs to be a balance between the free trade agenda and the need for domestic 
governance.  The restrictions and obligations of the 
trade agreements are substantial and may impact 
significantly state and local governments’ ability to 
protect their residents, resources, and economic 
viability of local industry.  
State and local governments are concerned that 
decision-making based on local conditions might be 
severely restrained and burdened by international 
interests entirely unfamiliar with the needs of the 
residents.   
    
	
  / 
 	
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Governments are trying to understand the best way to enjoy the benefits from markets and 
free trade provided by the agreements while retaining state and local governmental authority. 
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The Western Governors Association (WGA), the National Council of State Legislators (NCSL), 
and the National League of Cities  (NLC) are a few entities that have made public requests to the 
US negotiating body, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) for clarification of or 
protection from the trade agreement obligations.  These entities are not against free trade.  The 
National Conference of State Legislatures, for example, supports free trade, but recognizes that 
reservations can be made to avoid unnecessary preemption and preserve traditional state 
authority.xvi  Similarly, the National Association of Counties (NACo) supports free trade, but not 
to the exclusion of federalism.  NACo supports accountability including federal identification 
and communication of all impacts federal legislation may have on state and local operations.xvii  
Over a dozen counties and municipalities have passed resolutions requesting protection from the 
agreements or declaring that they will not participate in the agreement and do not consider 
themselves bound.  Canadian public unions and some municipalities have been very critical of 
the agreement and have requested major revisions or repeal.   Some of these groups have 
requested that the NAFTA not be used as a template for other agreements without revisions to 
Chapter 11.   
 Despite the public controversy over international trade and the clearly communicated 
concern expressed to the USTR and members of Congress, the FTAA draft made public in 2000 
contained a virtually verbatim replica of Chapter 11.  The ability of state and local governments 
to eliminate the burdens of the legislative restrictions and the threat of Chapter 11 liabilities is 
hindered by the  singular focus on the economic benefits of the agreement.  Giving up the state 
right to immunity provides the corresponding right for U.S. companies to opt out of the court 
systems in other signatory countries.  Allowing foreign input into our legislative process opens 
the door for U.S. business interests to shape foreign laws on subjects that may constrain profits 
abroad.   
State and local governments could benefit from early participation in the negotiation process 
and by educating both their constituencies and representatives in Congress.  State and local 
representatives should seek to understand the impacts of free trade on their constituents.   
 Will investor rights may be in conflict with community values?   
 Will takings legislation, if expanded, could make environmental and health regulations too 
expensive to enforce? 
 Will subsidies and revenues be considered discriminatory? 
State and local government representatives are the frontline of democracy and have an 
obligation to preserve the democratic, federalist character of the U.S. government. Democracy 
requires participation, representation, and debate.  Federalism requires a clear delineation of 
powers shared between the state and federal governments.  International trade agreements blur 
these distinctions, and grant foreign investors rights, participation, and representation superior to 
that of U.S. citizens.   
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Executive Summary
County-run nursing homes have a long and honored tradition of providing high quality care to the elderly
throughout upstate New York.  In spite of being prized assets in the communities they serve, the future
viability of county homes is uncertain.  As the long-term care industry undergoes rapid and significant
change, county homes must seek out new and innovative ways of providing high quality service at the lowest
possible cost. 
To address current challenges and identify strategic opportunities, county home administrators and labor
leaders, with the assistance of Cornell University, collaboratively designed and administered three surveys on
the current status of New York State's 43 county homes.  Broadening the range of services, marketing the
home to the community and other health care providers, strengthening working relationships between labor
and management, and renovating existing facilities are all viewed as top priorities for county homes to
remain competitive in the industry. 
In addition to assessing market trends, we focused on two key findings.  First, staff turnover rates are
significantly lower at county homes compared to their private-sector competitors.  Research suggests that low
staff turnover is strongly correlated with high quality care, and therefore turnover rates constitute a key
comparative advantage that county homes should market to their advantage. 
Second, we assessed county homes' interest in organizational restructuring.  Contrary to popular wisdom, we
find that interest in restructuring is unrelated to either fiscal stress or pressure from county government. 
Rather, we contend that interest in restructuring should be viewed as a signal of managers' willingness to
innovate, and that management and labor can work together to improve the competitiveness of public
nursing homes.
Introduction
In New York State, county governments own and operate over 10,000 nursing home beds in 43 of the state's
63 counties.  County-run nursing homes have a long and honored tradition of providing high quality care to
older persons throughout upstate New York.  In spite of being prized assets in the communities in which they
operate, the future viability of county homes is uncertain.  Continued financial support at both the local and
national level is always tenuous as governments face continued pressures to reduce expenditures and hold
the line on property tax increases.  At the same time, county homes must compete with private-sector and
non-profit nursing homes that are allowed to operate under considerably less restrictive rules and procedures.
The future of county homes is complicated by the rising costs of health care in the United States.  The price
of health care continues to grow significantly faster that national inflation rates, and long-term care is not
immune to this larger trend.  In New York State alone, Medicaid spending on long-term care totaled $5.7
billion in 1995, and annual increases in expenditures of ten percent or more are not uncommon (Weiner and
Stevenson, 1998: 85).  The high costs of long-term care have compelled many counties to consider getting
out of the nursing home business.  Yet some of these bolder initiatives entail significant risks.  In Duchess
County, for example, privatization of the county home resulted in its eventual closure, forcing many elderly
residents to seek care outside their home community. 
An alternative to privatization is internal innovation through labor management cooperation.  These
innovations often succeed, resulting in small but significant improvements in the lives of county home
residents and employees.  All too frequently, though, innovative programs at one facility go on unnoticed by
others, even though all county homes face similar challenges.  To address this problem, labor and
management leaders, with the assistance of the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell
University, engaged in a collaborative strategic planning effort at the statewide level in spring 1999.  Leaders
from the County Nursing Facilities of New York State (CNFNY), the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA)
and Cornell collaboratively designed and administered three surveys for nursing home administrators and
union representatives.  The surveys assessed the financial health of county homes, the status of labor-
management relations in these facilities, and the degree of interest in redesigning established service delivery
models.
In addition to questions about the general characteristics of county nursing homes, we focused on two key
issues.  First, we were interested in learning more about problems with high staff turnover in the industry in
general and in county homes in particular. In Section II of this report we examine the link between nursing
home turnover and the quality of care in county facilities.  We find that staff turnover is lower in county
facilities, but the evidence linking lower turnover and higher quality care is inconclusive.  Nevertheless,
existing research suggests that low turnover is strongly correlated with higher quality care, and we believe
this characteristic is one of the key strengths of county homes. 
The second major issue addressed in this report is county homes' interest in undertaking organizational
change.  In Section III we look at management and labor's perspectives on the likelihood of restructuring,
and attempt to explain why some counties may be more interested in restructuring than others.  Contrary to
popular wisdom, we find that interest in restructuring is unrelated to either fiscal stress or pressure from
county government.  Rather, we view interest in restructuring as a signal of managers' willingness to
innovate.  In our discussions with county home administrators, the message was clear:  managers want their
homes to be the market leader in their communities, but all too often lack the economic resources and legal
framework required to do so.         
Project Methodology
To gain a better understanding of conditions in and challenges to New York county homes, CNFNY and CSEA
worked with Cornell University to design and administer three surveys of New York State's forty-three county
nursing homes in March and April 1999.  Two of the surveys targeted nursing home administrators and one
was directed to labor officials.
Members of the CNFNY Executive Board reviewed drafts of the administrator surveys and provided feedback. 
All three survey instruments were fine-tuned with the assistance of a professional polling firm retained by
CSEA.  Each organization was responsible for administering its own surveys.
For the initial survey of nursing home administrators, which focused on restructuring and fiscal health, 35 of
43 homes responded.  Twenty of 43 homes answered the second administrator survey, which asked questions
about the service mix and quality of the physical facility.  The survey of labor officials had the lowest
response rate, with 14 of 43 homes responding.  While the results in this report cannot be generalized across
all county homes in New York State, they do provide a solid foundation from which to build future research on
county homes.  The results also raise several important but unanswered questions.
To supplement the survey results we conducted additional research on trends in the long-term care industry
both in New York State and across the country.  All sources are listed near the end of this report.  
I.  GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COUNTY HOMES
County homes are larger than the competition
County homes are significantly larger than their non-profit and for-profit counterparts, averaging 233 beds
per facility versus 148 beds.  However, the county home average hides significant variation among facilities,
as Figure 1 shows.
 
Source: HCFA Nursing Home Compare, online at<http://www.medicare.gov/nursing/search.asp?
State=NY>.  Accessed May 1, 1999.
Half of county homes surveyed have not been renovated this decade
From a sample of fifteen responding county homes, we found that seven homes had undergone no renovation
within the last nine years.  According to a report issued by the Center for Governmental Research (CGR),
changing architectural standards and expectations can play a critical role both with respect to the
attractiveness of a facility and how functional the building proves to be for service delivery (CGR 1997: 12). 
Lack of recent renovations not only can give the home an "image problem," but may also reduce worker
efficiency.  For example, simple changes such as the location of nursing stations can have a substantial
impact on the time required to perform routine tasks.  For these reasons, renovation of older homes should
be a high priority for all county facilities. 
Competition in the industry is on the rise in New York State
According to survey respondents, strong competition exists in 85 percent of New York counties.  Some of that
increased competition has come from area hospitals offering similar services, and that form of competition is
expected to increase in the future, according to 58 percent of administrators.  A similar proportion of
respondents (60 percent) indicated that hospitals are currently competing with the nursing home for long
term care, compared to just 40 percent in the past.  
One way of responding to increased competition is to develop contacts with other health care and social
service agencies in the county, which may serve as a referral point for care for the county home.  Eighty
percent of county homes view themselves as a referral point for nursing care, and 61 percent of homes are
referral points for rehabilitative care.  These figures suggest that most county homes are competing
successfully with other nursing homes in their service area, but that a few homes could work harder at
developing long-term relationships with other service providers.
Interest in marketing is strong, yet only half of county homes market their services
Half of all respondents market the services of the county home to the wider community.  Newspaper ads,
radio spots, and community events are the most common forms of advertising, whereas only one home has
used television to convey its message.  Print ads and community events are perceived to be the most
effective ways of reaching out to the community.  Radio ads, in contrast, are viewed as the least effective
form of marketing the county home. Building public interest, educating the public, developing public support,
and filling beds were the most important reasons why county homes chose to advertise.  Attracting paying
clients was the least popular reason for marketing.  This response should be expected, however, given that
the central mission of the county home is to serve clients regardless of their ability to pay.
Another form of marketing that can reap significant rewards is "internal" marketing to other health care
providers in the home's market area.  For example, establishing personal contacts with administrators at area
hospitals or managers of home health care agencies can result in sharp increases in patient referrals to the
county facility. 
Regardless of whether the nursing home has marketed its services in the past or not, 90 percent of
respondents indicated an interest in additional training in marketing.  As competition for residents increases,
so does the importance of an effective marketing strategy.  This includes "non-traditional" marketing
strategies such as networking with regional health care providers.
Client satisfaction with services a priority across the state
Ninety percent of respondents have mechanisms in place that monitor residents' satisfaction with the services
they receive.  Resident council meetings are used in every home where services are monitored, followed by
resident surveys (95 percent), family council meetings (72 percent), and the use of a suggestion box (56
percent).
County homes offer fewer services than the competition
As Table 1 indicates, county homes offer fewer services, on average, than their competitors.   Differences
between county homes and the private sector are particularly striking for head injuries, licensed adult home
care, assisted living, long-term home health care, and adult day care.  While private sector provision of these
services suggests that many of these services are in high demand, legal constraints prevent county homes
from offering many of these services.  In spite of strong consumer preference for assisted living facilities, for
example, New York State law prohibits public nursing homes from establishing assisted living units. 
Table 1.  Service Mix for New York County Homes and
Competition
    
 Service County
Homes*
Competition*
                                                      (Percent of homes
offering)
 Skilled Nursing 100 100 
 Alzheimer's Unit 35  69   
 AIDS Unit 15   15   
 Behavior Unit 10  25   
 Head Injury 10  42   
 Licensed Adult Home
Care
10 68   
 Respite Care 30   30  
 Hospice Care 74   88   
 Assisted Living 0     50  
 Long-Term Home Health
Care
0     78  
 Adult Day Care 16  80 
 Children's Day Care 6   13   
N = 20
*Data on services offered by competitors are based on county home administrators' knowledge and due to the
low response rate should be approached cautiously.
Labor and management relationships are strong, but still room for improvement
County home administrators view management-labor relations in a favorable light.  Of the managers
surveyed, eighty percent characterized labor-management relations as "cooperative", compared to 64 percent
of responding labor leaders.  Labor-management committees represent one way to resolve workplace
conflicts, and approximately 60 percent of homes use these committees. In our survey 62 percent of labor
respondents believe these committees are effective at solving problems. 
II.  GAINING A COMPETITIVE EDGE THROUGH LOW STAFF TURNOVER
Academic research suggests that nursing homes with stable staffing patterns are far more likely to provide
consistent quality and continuity of care (Anderson et al., 1997; Burnfeind and O'Connor 1992; Halbur and
Fears 1986).  In other studies, low staff turnover has been correlated with fewer bedsore problems and lower
incidence of aggressive and disruptive behavior by home residents (Rudman 1994). From a managerial
perspective, low staff turnover correlates with greater cost efficiency (Bonn 1997, Banaszak-Holl and Hines
1996, Alexander, Bloom, and Nichols 1994 in Anderson et al., 1997).
In spite of the benefits of attracting and retaining quality employees, staff turnover in the nursing home
industry is a serious problem.  In the private sector, non-profit homes average annual turnover rates between
48 and 86 percent, and for-profit homes' rates range from 72 to 118 percent annually.  (Serrow et al. 1993,
cited in Anderson et al., 1997). 
Our survey results show that New York county homes have very low rates of staff turnover compared to their
private-sector counterparts nationally.  In 80 percent of responding homes, annual turnover rates for RNs,
LPNs, and support staff were 25 percent or less.  In 60 percent of responding homes, annual turnover for
CNAs was 25 percent  or less.  Only five homes reported turnover rates greater than 50 percent for any
category of nursing staff.
Low levels of staff turnover in county facilities suggest that quality of care should be higher in county homes
compared to their non-profit and for-profit competitors.  When we compared quality of care in inspection
report data available from the New York State Department of Health (Nursing Homes Compare 1999), we
found that on average county nursing homes register fewer health deficiencies per bed than their private
sector counterparts.  County homes average 1.83 deficiencies per 100 beds, compared to 2.04 in proprietary
and 1.86 in the non-profit sectors (see Table 2 below). 
If county homes are evaluated according to the number of deficiencies reported per facility rather than per
bed,  because county facilities are larger, on average, than their private sector counterparts (233 beds versus
148 beds in privately-run homes), it should be expected that county homes have higher incidences of
deficiencies.  When deficiencies are measured on a per-facility basis, county homes have the highest number
of deficiencies.
 Table 2.  Summary Table of Reported Deficiencies by Sector,
According to New York State Department of Health Data, May 1999
 Average
Number of
Beds
Average
Deficiencies
Reported Per
Deficiency Rate
Reported
Per 100 Beds
Facility
Proprietary Homes 148 2.34 2.04
Voluntary Homes 148 2.32 1.86
County Homes 233 2.88 1.83
Average NYS-wide,
excluding NYC, Bronx
and Queens counties
157 2.40 --
Source: "Nursing Home Compare, Nursing Home Search, Nursing Homes in New York," 
<http://www.medicare.gov/nursing/search.asp?State=NY>.  Accessed 1 May 1999.
One possible explanation for the mixed results is the data gathering methodology used by the Health Care
Finance Administration (HCFA) to rate nursing homes.  The number of deficiencies per facility reported by the
HCFA varies widely across counties.  This suggests that the variation in reported deficiencies may have as
much to do with variations in inspection practices from place to place as it has to do with the quality of care
provided at individual homes.
The one firm conclusion we can draw from the data is that staff turnover at county facilities is significantly
lower than the competition.  Both academic research and common sense suggest that low turnover rates
result in higher quality care.  Having loved ones cared for by the same people day after day not only
increases residents' comfort levels but also helps build strong friendships between residents and staff which
are priceless.  We believe that county homes should capitalize on this unique strength by highlighting the
quality of staff in marketing and promotional materials.
III.  RESTRUCTURING COUNTY HOMES IN NEW YORK STATE: CHANGING THE
STATUS QUO
Workplace restructuring in the private sector has been a constant theme for much of the past two decades. 
More recently, restructuring has become a big issue in the public sector as well.  Efforts to  privatize or
"reinvent government" are taking place in many state capitals across the country, and New York State is
certainly part of this larger trend.  For public nursing homes, restructuring comes in a variety of forms.[1] 
While the first part of this report discussed internal restructuring (through marketing, labor management
cooperation, service expansion), we now turn our attention to external forms of restructuring - namely
privatization.  While most nursing homes already operate on an enterprise budget basis (24 of 35
respondents), only five are considering other internal market incentives such as performance based
budgeting.  External market restructuring was assessed in four areas: privatization to a for profit entity,
obtaining voluntary or non-profit status, forming a public benefit corporation (PBC), or closing the home.
About one quarter of homes are considering external restructuring
Of the thirty-five responses we received, nine administrators indicated that they are considering at least one
form of external restructuring at the nursing home. Public benefit corporations are by far the most popular
option (with all nine homes considering) because they allow homes to offer a wider range of services while
keeping the home public.  Privatization to for profits is only being considered by three homes, and
privatization to non-profits only by one home.  No home is considering closure.
The survey results tell us how many administrators are presently thinking about external restructuring but it
does not tell us why the county home might be interested in restructuring.  However, informal conversations
with labor leaders and nursing home administrators suggest that fiscal stress is the leading cause of an
administrator's decision to restructure.  The typical scenario is one where the nursing home faces increasing
pressure from hard-nosed county officials who see the nursing home as an opportunity to cut costs for local
government.
To see if these perceptions mirror reality, the survey asked nursing home administrators questions about the
level of fiscal stress at the home, as well as questions regarding their relationship with county official
Neither fiscal stress nor poor relationships with county officials explain interest in restructuring
If the decision to restructure were the result of poor financial performance by the home, then one might
expect the nine homes that are considering external restructuring to be under fiscal stress.  Yet in every
case, the survey results indicate these homes ran budget surpluses, not deficits.  Thus fiscal stress does not
appear to be driving administrators to consider external restructuring.
 A related argument is that the pressure to restructure comes from county-level officials.  Either the county is
under fiscal stress and is looking to cut costs, or county representatives are looking to shrink the size of
government for ideological reasons.  However under each restructuring option, home administrators indicated
county interest in restructuring was even lower than home administrators'.
 When nursing home administrators were asked about their relationship to county government, 97 percent of
respondents stated that the county legislature sees the nursing home as "essential" to the mission of local
government.  In addition, 94 percent of administrators felt that their relationship with the county legislature
was either "cooperative" or "very cooperative" and only 6 percent of respondents characterized their
relationship as adversarial. One possible conclusion from these data is that county governments value the
important role that the nursing home plays in the community.  Another conclusion is that most county homes
have strong relationships with their local representatives, and therefore the threat of heavy-handed change
being imposed from above is unlikely.
 A less optimistic interpretation of the data is that the current friendliness between county homes and local
governments is a result of additional financial support in the form of intergovernmental transfer payments
(IGT funds) from Washington.  During the 1997-1998 fiscal year county homes received over $63 million in
payments, and 20 counties received payments of $1 million or more for their nursing homes.  Yet the future
of IGT moneys remains uncertain.  Were these funds to be taken away, a majority of county homes would
return to running budgetary deficits.  In this survey, 11 homes reported a deficit with IGT, but 27 homes
predicted a deficit if IGT monies were removed.  If IGT were removed, administrators believe that many more
nursing homes would face increased pressures from county governments to consider restructuring.
Entrepreneurial leadership may explain interest in restructuring
If neither fiscal stress nor poor relations with the county explain administrators' interest in restructuring, what
does?  Our survey can only provide clues to this puzzle.  Other than the fact that the nine homes considering
restructuring have budget surpluses, these homes are indistinguishable from other nursing homes in the
survey.  Turnover rates, measures of fiscal stress at the county level, and range of services offered are no
different at these nine homes than at any other county home in New York State that responded to our
survey.
An alternative explanation for administrators' interest in restructuring has to do with the management and
staff that run the most profitable homes.  Since all the homes that are considering restructuring are also the
homes in the best financial shape, a strong case could be made that the administrators in these homes are
innovators.  As industry leaders, these homes may be open to exploring new ways to increase productivity,
lower costs, and improve service availability and quality.   For example, the public benefit corporation option
may allow county homes to offer a wider range of services without losing their public employee status.  
Gaining access to a wider range of more profitable services (especially assisted living) is key to public sector
nursing home viability.  Simply considering a variety of options, however, does not mean that a home will act
on any one of them.  Rather, interest in restructuring may stem from knowledge of industry trends and a
strong desire to remain at the forefront of this highly competitive industry. Performance based budgeting and
expanding the range of offered services are important in that regard.
The extent to which county nursing homes in New York State are pursing innovation is of major interest to
both management and labor.  Nursing home administrators can learn a lot from what their colleagues in other
counties are doing, so as to improve service in their own facilities.  Employees too have an interest in
promoting innovation.  Not only can education help employees better understand the industry, but cooperation
can empower employees to participate as equal partners in discussions of change with management.  While
privatization is not a likely or preferred option, marketing, labor-management cooperation, and service
expansion appear to offer great potential.
 IV.  PROJECT SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION
The purpose of this project was twofold.  First, our goal was to collect baseline data on the current status of
New York State's county-run nursing homes.  We were especially interested in learning more about the fiscal
health of county homes, the status of labor-management cooperation, and the degree of interest in
redesigning existing service delivery systems.  Second, we wanted to start a conversation between labor and
management about what steps need to be taken to ensure the long-term viability of county homes.  To that
end, labor leaders and nursing home administrators met in Albany to discuss the future of publicly-provided
long-term care in New York State in May 1999.  During that meeting participants suggested a number of
proactive measures that county homes could pursue to make them stronger institutions.  These include: 
·          Increasing investments in the physical plant
·         Developing stronger ties with feeder institutions
·         Broadening the range of services offered at the county home
·         Marketing aggressively the home's services to the community
·         Determining best practices and developing programs for their dissemination
·         Facilitating communication between labor and management
·         Developing new programs to retain employees, especially CNAs
·         Creating opportunities for employee training and skills enhancement
·         Increasing resident satisfaction with existing services, and
·         Building partnerships with advocacy groups and other stakeholders.
Each of these measures can go a long way towards making county homes better places for both county home
residents and the people who work there. Their success, however, depends on the ability of labor and
management to address these challenges in new and innovative ways. 
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APPENDIX
A. Data and Methodological Limitations on Use of Quality of Care Data  
The "health deficiencies" measured by the New York State Department of Health cover a wide range of factors with varying degrees of
severity.  While some have significant health implications (e.g., incorrect medical dosage for patients) others do not (e.g., failure to post the
most recent inspection report in a public place).  Due to time limitations, we assessed the homes only according to incidence of reported
deficiencies.  We made no effort to track the relative scope or severity of these deficiencies and compare them across sectors. (For further
information on the scope, severity and definitions of these data, see the source web page at http://www.medicare.gov/nursing/define.htm -
reg_def.)     
 In our brief overview of inspection data, we noted an apparent wide variance in number of deficiencies
reported by county.  We speculate that some variation in reported deficiencies is attributable to differences in
inspection practices from one team to another.
B. Survey Instruments
C. CGR Report Summary 
[1] The Center for Governmental Research report (1997) details a much broader array of restructuring options
than we examined in our study.  For a more extensive discussion of these options and their implications, see
the CGR report.
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Introduction to Prison Privatization 
The movement towards the privatization of corrections in the United States is a result of 
the convergence of two factors: the unprecedented growth of the US prison population 
since 1970 and the emergence out of the Reagan era of  a political environment favorable 
to free-market solutions. Since the first private prison facility was opened in 1984, the 
industry has grown rapidly; gross revenues exceeded $1 billion in 1997. This paper will 
examine the industry's growth in the US in recent decades, and its current scope. The 
evidence for and against claims that private prisons can realize gains in efficiency will be 
weighed, and implications of privatization for other public values including safety, 
justice, and legitimacy will be examined. 
The Evolution and Scope of the Private Prison Industry 
The birth of the contemporary American private prison industry may be traced to 1984, 
when the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service became the first federal 
agency to contract for private correctional services, with the Corrections Corporation of 
America.  This initial movement toward the federal privatization of corrections was 
quickly followed by contracts for outsourcing developed by the US Marshals Service and 
the US Bureau of Prisons in 1986.  The first county-level private prison contact was 
signed in 1984, between Hamilton County, Tennessee and the Corrections Corporation of 
America.  Shortly thereafter, in 1985, the first state-level contract was signed, between 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the United States Corrections Corporation (NCPA 
1995).  
In 1987, approximately 3,122 inmates out of 3.5 million inmates were confined in 
private corrections facilities in the United States.  By 2001, the total United States inmate 
population had swelled to a staggering 6.5 million inmates—123,000 of whom were 
confined in private facilities.  This 4,000% increase in the number of prison beds in 
private hands was fed by the concomitant 90% growth in total inmate populations in the 
United States as a whole. (BOJS, 2001).  Currently, over 32 states and Puerto Rico have 
formed contacts with corrections corporations.  Figure 1, below, illustrates the inmate 
capacity of private prisons by state as of 1999 (Thomas, 2002). 
Figure 1 
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As the above chart shows, per 1999 estimates, Texas, California and Oklahoma exhibit 
the largest inmate populations incarcerated in private facilities, with populations of 
30,000; 11,000; and 10,000 inmates, respectively (Thomas 1999).   
 Although Texas holds the highest number of our nation’s private prison beds, the 
proportion of inmates in private facilities to the total Texas inmate population is only 
10.1 percent.  New Mexico outsources the largest proportion of its inmate population to 
private corporations (43.8 percent), followed by Alaska (31.7 percent), Montana (32.7 
percent), Wyoming (28.3 percent), Hawaii 22.9 percent), Wisconsin (16 percent), 
Mississippi (16.9 percent), and Tennessee (15.5 percent) (Fig. 2-ok DOC, 2002). 
   
Figure 2 
 
The financing of private corrections facilities varies from state to state, and, 
concurrently, from facility to facility.  The per diem rate formed though a contract in 
Okalahoma, for example, may be substantially different from that formed in Tennessee.  
In general, however, there are two broad methods of financing the capital costs incurred 
through the construction of private corrections facilities – either the corporation 
undertakes the construction of the private corrections facility without pubic assistance 
and rents its services to a contracting jurisdiction, or the jurisdiction issues bonds to 
finance facility development.  When bonding occurs, the private corporation normally 
administers the prison for an established period of time, after which control is diverted 
back to the contracting jurisdiction (Leonard, 1990: 71-76). 
Operational costs of private corrections facilities vary depending upon both the 
type of facility and programs offered to assist in incarceration or rehabilitation.  A 
facility’s security classification has the greatest impact on its operating cost. In 
Oklahoma, the average rate for a medium security facility is forty-eight dollars per 
prisoner per day. This rate is subject to change with each subsequent contract negotiation.  
Indeed, in 2002 New Mexico was able to renegotiate the contracted per diem rate for one 
of its maximum security facilities from ninety-three dollars to sixty-five dollars.  Rates 
can also be adjusted upward; corrections companies operating in Oklahoma have realized 
a forty cent ($0.40) increase in their per diem rates as a material incentive for the 
provision of drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs (OK, DOC, 2002). 
 In 1999 there were 14 private prison corporations operating in the United States, 
with a total capacity of 122,871.  The two largest, Corrections Corporation of America 
and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, operated 55.6% and 21.73% of the total market 
share, respectively.  Table 1 (below) lists the largest private prison firms operating in the 
United States, with their total capacity and market share, as of 1999 (Thomas, Charles, 
1999 Census). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Firms Operating in the United States in 1999 
Management Firm 
Capacity of Facilities Under 
Contract in United States 
Market Share of United 
States Contracts 
Alternative Programs, Inc. 340 0.3% 
Avalon Correctional 
Services, Inc. 350 0.3% 
The Bobby Ross Group 464 0.4% 
CiviGenics, Inc. 2,791 2.3% 
Cornell Corrections, Inc. 7,138 5.8% 
Correctional Services 
Corporation 6,517 5.3% 
Correctional Systems, Inc. 272 0.2% 
Corrections Corporation 
of America  68,256 55.6% 
The GRW Corporation 362 0.3% 
Management & Training 
Corporation 9,177 7.5% 
Maranatha Production 
Company 500 0.4% 
Wackenhut Corrections 
Corporation 26,704 21.7% 
Totals 122,871 100% 
 
Private Prisons, the Efficiency and Quality Questions: 
Most arguments for the privatization of prisons revolve around one issue: efficiency.  The 
purpose of privatization of any government undertaking is to improve the quality of the 
service provided without increasing the costs, or to decrease the costs without decreasing 
the quality of service. It is mainly on the strength of claims to efficiency that prison 
privatization expands in scope. 
Proponents believe that private prisons not only costs the taxpayer less, but also 
require the state-run agencies to operate more efficiently themselves. When private 
companies are allowed to enter into the market for prisons, they argue, state run facilities 
are forced to operate more efficiently or risk losing their funding.  Those who oppose 
prison privatization point to studies claiming that the superior efficiency of private 
facilities has not been conclusively demonstrated (GAO, 1996). Few available studies 
account for both cost and quality, making conclusive judgment about efficiency 
impossible. Insofar as savings are realized, they argue, it is through making dangerous 
cuts in labor costs (Greene, 2001). Further, they say, studies comparing costs have not 
thoroughly accounted for overhead costs and costs of negotiating contracts, thus 
underestimating the cost of private facilities as compared to public ones.     
Whenever a public service becomes privatized a question arises as to whether or 
not the service quality will be affected, either positively or negatively.  But within the 
realm of prisons though there is a dispute which has arisen over what quality of service 
actually means.  Some argue that the purpose of a correctional facility is to rehabilitate 
the offender, so upon release s/he can reenter society and become a productive member.  
Others believe that the purpose of prisons is to lock away those who commit crimes, so 
that they are not free to commit additional crimes in society.  In this view, prisons are 
meant to be a deterrent, to help persuade people from committing the crimes. Generally 
speaking, there are three main types of issues when looking at quality. 
• Security of the institution; number of escapes, number of deaths, etc 
• Rehabilitation efforts; Drug Rehabilitation, Education, etc. 
• Quality of life; medical treatment, food, recreational services, etc. 
 
 
Privatization Proponents 
A study of the quality of prisons in New Mexico showed that private facilities had a 
higher quality of service in all but one category, “care”, as figure 3 (Montague, Erik; 
August 2001) below shows.   
 
Figure 3 
 
The study was based on a Bureau of Prisons survey and included both prisoners and 
correctional staff in the respondents.  When comparing federal, state and private facilities 
within New Mexico, the private prisons were more highly rated by respondents in almost 
every category.  Doubts regarding the quality of the facilities are not supported by this 
analysis. 
 Proponents of privatization argue that private prisons, through innovative design 
and management,  and by realizing economies of scale, can lower the overall costs of 
incarceration: 
• Studies in both 1997 and 2000 by the State of Arizona of costs associated with 
both public and private prisons found evidence of cost savings:   
o The 1997 Study found average costs per inmate per day in government 
prison was $43.08, as compared to $35.90 in the private prison, estimated 
savings of 17% (Thomas, 1997) 
o The 2000 Study found average costs per inmate per day in government 
prisons was $46.72 in 1998 and $45.85 in 1999, as compared with the 
average costs of $40.36 in 1998 and $40.88 in private facilities, estimated 
savings, of 13.6% in 1998, and over 10% in 1999. (Dept. of Corrections, 
Arizona, October 2000) 
• Corrections Corporation of America claims that between 1994 and 1998, the 
states that contracted with them for prison facilities saved a total of $248 Million 
in costs. (www.correctionscorp.com)   
• 1996, Louisiana conducted a survey of the costs of three identically built prisons, 
one run by the state and the other two by private corporations.  The study found 
that the average per diem rate of the state facility was $26.76 while the average 
cost for the private facilities were $22.96 and $23.51, savings of 14 to 16 percent. 
(Reason Policy Institute, Pg. 4) 
 
Opponents of Privatization: 
Critics of privatization claim that there are no true efficiency gains from privatization, 
arguing that comparative studies of efficiency often ignore a number of key factors, by 
looking only at the operational costs (per diem rates).  In 1996 the US General 
Accounting Office brought into question a number of the key assumptions that the 
proponents of privatization claim.  Ultimately, the GAO found that there was no evidence 
conclusively demonstrating efficiency gains from privatization (GAO Reports, 
GAO/GGD-96-158). The GAO pointed out flaws in many of the studies touting 
efficiency gains from prison privatization. They found virtually no reliable multi-year 
studies.  Those that they did find suffered from flaws including: failinure to compare 
similar institutions, failure to account for both cost and quality, or lack of a nuanced 
account of hidden costs. 
The cost of contract negotiation is an example of a cost that is often overlooked.  
The process of gathering proposals from corporations, analyzing them, and determining 
who is awarded the contract is an expense that is usually ignored.  This is an additional 
cost that the state must endure in determining whether or not to contract out the service.  
Another cost that can raise the operation costs of any given contract is excessive health 
care costs.  When a contract is negotiated between a state and a private corporation for 
the costs of a correctional facility, generally a negotiated health care rate is established, 
and anything above this amount must be covered by the state.  While the rates negotiated 
will cover a majority of the health care needs of an inmate, in cases of severe disease this 
is not usually the case, and the additional costs must be borne by the state, which is 
ultimately responsible for the health of the prison population.  
Another possible explanation for the appearance of efficiency gains is the shift in 
tax burden to local municipalities.  In years past, the mentality of “Not In My Back Yard” 
(NIMBY) arose whenever a new prison facility was to be built.  Then, as areas began to 
see that there were possible economic gains by the placement of a prison near an 
economically impoverished town, the mentality began to change.  Rural towns began to 
see prisons as a stable economic source for the area, and municipalities began to offer 
economic development funds to private prison corporations for the construction of new 
facilities within their jurisdiction.   
Table 2: Subsidies Given to Corporations (Jail Breaks, 2002) 
Operating 
Company 
# of Facilities 
in Study 
% Of Facilities 
with Subsidies 
Total Value of 
Construction Bonds 
(in millions) 
Total # of 
Subsidies Found 
Corrections 
Corporation of 
America 37 78% $406.4 41 
Wackenhut 
Corrections 16 69% $165.5 21 
Cornell 
Companies 2 50%     $0.0 1 
Five Others 5 60%   $56.6 4 
Total 60 73% $628.6 67 
 
 What is often overlooked is that there is no clear evidence of prisons being a strong 
source of economic growth.  As in the case of military bases, while the creation of a new 
prison, or the loss of a former older facility may make people believe that excess 
economic growth will occur, there is little evidence supporting these statements.  (Hooks, 
Gregory; 2002). 
Public Values 
 
Efficiency aside, prison privatization presents some serious dilemmas regarding public 
values such as safety, justice, rehabilitation, and legitimacy.  
• Safety: Do private prisons pose a threat to the safety of prisoners, prison workers, 
or the general public? 
• Justice: Are the mechanisms of private prisons liable to distort sentencing? 
• Rehabilitation: Can the profit motive be reconciled with the need to prepare 
inmates for productive lives after prison? 
• Legitimacy: Is incarceration an inherently governmental function? Is it right that 
profits be reaped from human imprisonment? 
 
 
Safety 
 
 Opponents of private prisons argue that their incentive to cut costs to maximize 
profits presents a threat to the safety of prisoners, prison staff, and the public at large. 
They argue that private prisons tend to have fewer guards with less experience, which 
results in an increased rate of violent incidents behind bars. One study found violent 
incidents to be as much as 50% more frequent in private prisons (Greene, 2001). Also, 
private prisons may pose an increased risk of prisoner escape; a study cited by the Reason 
Public Policy Institute, no foe of privatization, found that government-run prisons have 
fewer escapes, less substance abuse and greater recreational and rehabilitation measures 
in place (Moore, Adrian 1998). 
 Further, some critics of privatization claim that the relative ease with which 
private industry can construct new prison cells leads to an over-reliance by government 
on incarceration at the expense of preventive social programs-- programs which, they 
argue, are more effective in preventing violence (Logan, 2002, Currie 1998). A study by 
Grassroots Leadership found that discretionary funds in the state of Mississippi were 
being routed from education to private prisons (www.grassrootsleadership.org). 
 Industry supporters, on the other hand, argue that through innovation in prison 
design and operation, private prisons are made safer than public facilities. Proponents 
argue that the profit motive creates incentives for safety, as violent disturbances in 
facilities leads to greater costs in the long run (Lissner et al, 1998) . A safe prison, they 
argue, is a profitable prison. 
 
Justice 
 
 Those who oppose prison privatization make the case that the industry has the 
incentive and the wherewithal to extend the amount of time convicts will remain in 
prison, and that this presents a threat to justice. The industry, they say, can extend 
sentences in two ways. First, it has thrown its influence, through lobbying and campaign 
contributions, behind “tougher” laws such as "three strikes", mandatory minimum 
sentencing, and "truth in sentencing" that increase the duration of sentences. The 
conservative American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has been extremely active 
in advocating truth-in-sentencing and three strikes policies throughout the United States. 
This organization is heavily funded by the corrections industry, and indeed ALEC's 
Criminal Justice Task Force is co-chaired by Brad Wiggins, a former director of business 
development for the Corrections Corporation of America (Bender, 2000). The strength of 
these kinds of political influence, opponents fear, will only increase as the industry 
grows. As one observer notes, corrections corporations have "paid handsomely to play 
the public policy game, and will likely do so again"(O'Connell, 2002). 
  The second way opponents of privatization worry that private firms will distort 
the administration of justice is by exerting undue influence on parole hearings. 
Opponents argue that since prison firms are generally paid per prisoner per day, they 
have an incentive to extend inmate stays as long as possible, and so are liable to reduce 
prisoner’s chances for parole or good time off by exaggerating or fabricating disciplinary 
infractions (DiIulio, 1990). 
 Industry supporters point out in response to these concerns that industry campaign 
contributions are smaller than those made by public sector unions (Moore, 1998). There 
is no evidence, they say, of private prison officials manipulating parole decisions.  
 
Rehabilitation 
 The profit motive, opponents of privatization say, distorts the function of prisons 
towards incapacitation and away from the provision of rehabilitative services that would 
help prisoners rejoin society productively, and curb recidivism. Corrections firms have no 
incentive, they say, to provide costly rehabilitative treatment and services. Industry 
analysts respond that it all depends on the contract. There is much potential for contracts 
to be structured in ways that provide incentives to firms to provide services such as drug 
treatment (Lissner, et al, 1998.). Indeed, in Puerto Rico and Australia, pilot programs are 
being conducted with so called "outcome-based contracting", wherein fees are tied to the 
impact and measured outcomes of incarceration (Cornell et al, 1998).  
 
Legitimacy 
 Opponents of privatization argue that it is an illegitimate delegation of 
government authority to allow private companies to take control of  an integral part of the 
justice system. Proponents of privatization disagree. They make a distinction between the 
function of the courts and that of the prisons. It is the proper duty of the public sector, 
they allow, to determine just sentences for violations of the law. But the duty of the 
prisons, they argue, is merely to carry out the sentence of the courts, and they see no 
reason why this task ought not be delegated to a private entity. Opponents of privatization 
claim to the contrary that it is difficult or impossible to distinguish these two functions, 
given the level of control that prison officials have over the nature (and, potentially, the 
duration) of an inmate's stay. Prison officials have the prerogative to impose disciplinary 
measures ranging from revocation of yard privileges to the imposition of solitary 
confinement, and so have a great deal of control over just how punitive an experience 
each sentence truly is (DiIulio, 1990). 
 
Shifting Public Values 
Champions of the private prison industry justify its continued expansion by pointing to 
the public will for increased incarceration. Voters have consistently been supportive of 
harsher sentencing measures that create a demand for more prison beds. And yet there is 
a growing movement that has come to see increased incarceration in general, and growth 
of the private prison industry in particular, as a threat to public values. For example, the 
mission statement of the Grassroots Leadership organization's "Public Safety and Justice 
Campaign" reads: 
 For-profit private prisons, jails or detention centers have no place in a democratic 
 society. Profiteering from the incarceration of human beings compromises public 
 safety and corrupts justice. In the spirit of democracy and accountability, we call 
 for an end to all for-profit incarceration(www.stopprivateprisons.org). 
 
Grassroots Leadership has organized religious, labor, student, and community groups to 
fight private prisons through media advocacy, education, lobbying of government 
officials at all levels, and pressuring corporations involved in the private prison industry. 
For example, Sodexho Marriott, the largest single investor in CCA, divested its holdings 
in the prison firm in response to pressure on college campuses to cancel food service 
contracts. (www.grassrootsleadership.org)  
 Many states, such as Louisiana and New York, in response to pressure from labor 
unions and other groups, have enacted moratoriums on or banned private corrections 
facilities, while other states, such as Wisconsin, have enacted statutes that prohibit the 
construction of private prisons on speculation-- that is, without prior contract (AFSCME, 
2002). While the growth of this billion dollar industry seems to have slowed at the level 
of the state prison, the federal government now seems to be contracting for many of its 
facilities with private firms (www.grassrootsleadership.org). It remains to be seem 
whether the efficiency gains promised will be realized, and whether the government can, 
through innovative contracting, reconcile the dilemmas that prison privatization poses 
with respect to public values.   
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Executive Summary: 
 
 Corruption has been identified as a major barrier to economic and social development in 
developing countries, and considerable research as been done into the causes of and the solutions to 
corruption in these countries. Several factors that lead to or mitigate corruption in developing countries 
have been clearly identified: Revenue Proximity, Accountability, Information Transparency, 
Participation, Equality of Power/Wealth and Culture.  In contrast, virtually no research as been 
directed at corruption in the context of the trends toward what is known as the New Public Management, 
or NPM.  NPM is a new pattern of governance associated with the use of a wide range of different 
“tools” and with a reliance on third parties to manage and deliver government services.  However, the 
factors of corruption identified by international research can be used to provide an environmental 
design framework to advise planners and public officials about the potential for corruption and how it 
can be mitigated with the NPM. 
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The Emergence of New Public Management  
 
 New Public Management (NPM) is a public management trend that is gaining popularity 
throughout the United States.  The NPM style of government involves using a wide range of “tools” like 
grants, loans, contracts, vouchers, and other alternatives to direct government provision.  Many of these 
rely on third party actors to play an active role is delivering government services or to act in the public 
good.  These actors form shifting networks of third parties that work with each other and with 
government agencies.   
 
 New Public Management is perhaps most distinguished by its use of internal competition to 
accomplish its ends but is multi-faceted.  Rhodes (1996) notes that NPM refers to two concepts.  The 
most relevant to this paper is the new institutional economics.  "The new institutional economics refers 
to introducing incentive structures (such as market competition) into public service provision.  It stresses 
aggregating bureaucracies; greater competition through contracting-out and quasi-markets; and 
consumer choice."  (Rhodes, 1996.) 
 
 The NPM style of government involves distinguishing between policy decisions and service 
delivery.  Service delivery, proponents of NPM argue, is best left to "entrepreneurial" governments 
based on principles like competition between service providers, outcome based performance standards, 
decentralized authority, market mechanisms and other qualities not traditionally found in government 
bureaucracy.  Rhodes notes that "NPM and entrepreneurial government share a concern with 
competition, markets, customers and outcomes."  (1996) 
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How does corruption relate to New Public Management? 
 As Salamon notes, “What is distinctive about many of the newer tools of public actions is that 
they involve the sharing with third-party actors of a far more basic governmental function: the exercise 
of discretion over the use of public authority and the spending of public funds.”  (Salamon, 2002)  As 
such, New Public Management has two major implications for corruption.  First, NPM creates the 
potential for corruption in a wide range of actors and that the flexibility of these networks makes it more 
difficult to maintain accountability and oversight.  Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the line 
between the government and private actors becomes increasingly blurred in NPM. 
 
 Unfortunately, there is very little empirical research into the relationship between corruption and 
NPM.  Most of current research focuses on developing counties where development agencies like the 
World Bank focus most of their attention.  There is also a substantial amount of cross-national studies 
that compare the level of perceived corruption across many counties.  Neither of these sources looks at 
corruption at the sub-national level in developed counties, and this is where NPM strategies are most 
common.   
 
 This paper attempts to move past the lack of empirical research specifically aimed at corruption 
in NPM environments by using common themes, lessons and issues taken from the international 
corruption research.  Hopefully, these factors will help policy makers mitigate corruption in NPM 
environments by providing an environmental design framework that reduce the potential for corruption.   
 
 
 
 5 
What is corruption and why is it bad?  
 The literature review produced several definitions of corruption.  Harrison & Huntington define 
it as “…efforts to secure wealth or power through illegal means – private gain at public expense” 
(Harrison & Huntington, 2001) However, this defines corruption in terms of legality, which makes it 
difficult to talk about corruption across different legal systems.  A better definition is “the misuse of 
public power for private profit.”  (Joseph Senturia, as quoted by Smelser, 1971)  This definition 
encompasses a wider range of activities, but there was concern that it did not require intentional misuse 
(as opposed to accidental or unknowing uses of public power that benefit individuals at the expense of 
the public).  This paper ultimately took these definitions and defined corruption as the intentional abuse 
of public power for private gain.  This includes all cases where an organization or individual abuses 
government authority, influence or funds for private benefit or the benefit of another private actor.  
 
 Empirical research into the effects of corruption shows that it is not simply a moral concern or a 
matter of principal.  Rather, corruption has a very negative effect on government performance and on the 
well being of individuals without money or power.  International research has shown  that a .78% 
increase in the rate of corruption leads to a decline of the income growth among the poor of 7.8% 
(Lipset and Lenz in Harrison and Huntington, 2001).  It is no surprise, then, that the World Bank called 
corruption the “single greatest obstacle to economic and social development.”   The perception of 
corruption also has negative consequences as citizens are likely to grow cynical of government when 
they feel the government does not work on their behalf.   
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 Why does corruption occur? 
 The temptation to abuse public power for private gain is a natural result of peoples’ self-interest.  
This temptation can be reduced by creating an environment where corruption is difficult and does not 
pay.  Planners and policy makers can create such an environment by understanding the environmental  
factors that influence corruption. 
 
Environmental Factors of Corruption 
 As mentioned earlier there is very little research focusing specifically on corruption within New 
Public Management.  There is, however, a 
fair amount of international research that 
has been done on corruption in general and 
by studying this we hope to identify 
environmental factors of corruption that 
can be used in any municipal context.  
Examining case studies and other research, 
primarily done by the World Bank, this 
report identifies six environmental factors that have an impact on corruption in international contexts.  
They are:  Revenue Proximity, Accountability, Information Transparency, Participation, Inequality of 
Power/Wealth and Culture. 
 Although each has its own drivers, these factors are closely related to each other and tend to 
reinforce one another. Focusing on any one factor at the expense of the others will not effectively curb 
corruption.  Each factor has to be dealt with individually and as a set. 
Revenue
Proximity
Information
Transparency
Accountability Participation
Inequality of
Power/Wealth Culture
Environmental Factors: 
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• Increased 
accountability leads to 
decreased potential 
for corruption
• The closer a decision 
maker is to the 
electorate the more 
accountable they are
Electorate
Elected
Official
Appointed
Official
Bureaucrat
Potential
Influencer
Third Parties
Proximity of Revenue 
 Proximity of revenue is how 
close tax revenues are to their 
respective expenditures.  The further 
removed the source of funds is from 
those who decide how the money 
will be allocated, the greater the 
potential for corruption.  (Fisman & 
Gatti, 1999.) Take two different 
situations: In the first, the Federal government allocates a portion of its total tax revenues to a certain 
state with the understanding that the state will then allocate this money appropriately.  In the second, the 
state taxes its own citizens and then returns that money to those same citizens in the form of services, 
etc.  In the second example, the citizens receiving the services will hold the provider more accountable 
as they seek to “get what they pay for.”  Whereas in the first example the state intermediary could opt 
not to forward federal money at all  or could redirect monies from the intended allocation without the 
citizens missing the intended services . 
 
Accountability 
 Accountability is similar to proximity 
of revenue but instead of dealing with money it 
concerns power.  The idea here is that the 
closer a decision maker is to the electorate the 
less potential for corruption .  If the electorate 
Proximity of Revenue
• The closer the tax 
base and expenditures 
are, the less corruption 
there is apt to be.
• Constituents have a 
better sense of how 
their $ is being spent
Local
Constituents
Federal
Local
Constituents
Less 
Corruption
Accountability: 
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does not approve of the actions of an elected official they can vote him/her out of office.  If the 
electorate does not approve of the actions of an appointed official or third-party agent, they have much 
less recourse.    
 This dynamic is especially important given the trend in the 
United States toward NPM.  Under NPM there is an increasing 
reliance upon third-party providers which are even further removed 
from the electorate than civil servants and as a result are even more 
susceptible to corruption.  Long-term contracts that lock in third 
parties for extended periods of time may further increase the potential 
for corruption.   
 
Information Transparency 
 Informational transparency is the third environmental factor.  
It contributes to the reduction of corruption in two ways.  The first is 
that it helps identify those who are currently engaging in corrupt 
activities.  This could be through audits, open budgeting processes or 
contracting and bidding that is open to the public and the media.  The 
second is that informational transparency creates environments which are unappealing to those tempted 
by corruption.  Nobody wants to get caught and so creating environments where the “lights are always 
on” makes those who might be tempted by corruption to think twice. 
 
 The preponderance of third parties – particularly in the private sector – with the movement 
toward NPM has important implications with regard to information transparency.  For profit concerns 
“one way to improve 
local participation and 
accountability is 
through transparent 
budgeting processes 
and public procurement 
procedures.” (Litvack, 
Ahman, Bird, 1998.) 
“Local elites often take 
leadership roles… this 
can result in the 
hijacking of resources 
unless transparency and 
accountability are 
somehow enforce.” 
(Litvack, Ahman, Bird, 
1998) 
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often view certain types of information as proprietary.  This means that they deem this information 
necessary for them to maintain a competitive advantage in their respective markets.  There may be times 
when a public entity may need access to this proprietary information in order to make effective decisions 
about the continuation of contracts.  In situations like these, information transparency may conflict with 
the private proprietary information of the third party.   Sacrificing transparency for the sake of 
relationships with third parties will increase the potential for corruption. 
 
Participation 
 Closely linked with information transparency is participation.  All the information in the world is 
useless unless citizens engage and act upon that information.  The opposite is true as well.  Participation, 
regardless of how well intended, is blind without transparency.  To truly mitigate corruption, 
municipalities need informed participation and this comes from transparency.  In addition to intuitively 
making sense, research has shown that democracy (participation) is positively correlated with reducing 
corruption internationally.  (Lipset and Lenz in Harrison and Huntington, 2001)  
 
Inequalities of Power and Wealth 
 The fifth environmental factor which contributes to 
corruption is inequalities of power and wealth.  As the 
difference between the “haves” and “have-nots” within a 
municipality increases there is a tendency for those with 
money and power to not only hoard and increase their shares, 
but also to strengthen their positions.  This makes it more 
difficult for those without money or power to engage in the 
“Often, corrupt opportunities arise 
from discrepancies of power 
between public officials or 
community leaders who have 
control over a good or service and 
the poor who lack education, 
knowledge, access to information, 
the financial resources as well as 
good connections.” ( Teggemann, 
2002.) 
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civic process and have a voice.  This is an especially dangerous factor because it can become self-
perpetuating as those in power institute structural changes to discourage real transparency, participation 
and accountability. The result can be a viscous circle leading to even greater discrepancies in power and 
a greater potential for corruption because corruption tends to slow economic growth in the lower strata.   
 
 Inequality also increases the opportunities for what Smelser (1971) calls “crossing-over.”  This 
occurs when those with wealth or political power, but not both, use one to gain the other.  Typical 
examples include a police officer using his political power to receive bribes or a business man using 
bribes to influence government policy.  
 
Cultural Norms 
 Robert Merton, in his book Social Theory and Social Structures (1968) details the final 
environmental factor – cultural norms.  Merton puts forward what is called a “means-ends” schema that 
suggests corruption is more prevalent in those cultures that place a high premium on financial 
achievement or success but which lack the means to attain these goals.   Empirical data bears out this 
hypothesis in countries such as Russia, South Korea and Turkey which are relatively low in terms of 
affluence but which have relatively high cultural norms of achievement.  (Lipset & Lenz. 1998.) 
 
 But how are cultural norms and their impact on corruption relevant to NPM?  Although there is 
no data to support this, there is a striking similarity between the rise of NPM in the United States and the 
means-ends schema.  As the Federal government continues to pass responsibility for the provision of 
public goods and services to the state and local levels there is an increasing expectation of success 
placed on local governments to solve problems and provide a growing array of services.  However, local 
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Tools
Players
Rules
governments have limited powers to raise revenue.  They are entirely dependent upon the monies they 
receive from the state and federal governments, property taxes, user fees, and other sources of revenue .  
This is, in effect, creating the same disequilibrium between expectations for success and the means to 
achieve them in local governments in the United States as Merton observed in individuals in other 
countries.  The result will, in all likelihood, be an increased potential for corruption within local 
governments as they try to “do more with less.”  
 
How can corruption be mitigated at the local level? 
 Mitigating corruption at the local level revolves around taking a proactive approach to designing 
the decentralized networks that make up the backbone of new public management.  These networks 
consist of three key components: tools, players and rules.   
Municipalities can best address the environmental factors of 
corruption by designing the right balance of these key 
components.  Like the factors of corruption each has its own 
primary elements but they all work together to influence and 
reinforce each other.  Designing an effective system requires 
equally diligent attention to all three. 
 
Tools 
 While tools are often determined by a higher level of government in the process of policy 
development, a deep understanding of the tool is critical at the local level.  Tools are the heart of any 
decentralized system.  Tools determine the type of intergovernmental transfer, the vehicle of that 
transfer and the delivery system or agency responsible. While tools can be classified in many ways, it is 
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important to understand that tools have different degrees of directness and automaticity.  These 
characteristics often determine how and what types of corruption a system is susceptible to. 
 
 Direct tools can be less corrupt because they shorten the distance between policy and public 
administration and make it easier to define the agency 
accountable for administration.  However, as local officials 
know, indirect tools such as grants, loan guarantees and 
vouchers have become increasingly common.  As third-parties 
gain greater control over the spending of public monies and the 
operation of public funds, local officials must be keen to 
potential principal agent problems and emphasize relationships 
between organizations. (Salamon, 2002.) 
 
 Tools with a high degree of automaticity are often popular with local governments decentralizing 
the provision of public services.  By utilizing preexisting administrative structures these tools often 
invite agents with little or no experience providing public goods to the table (Salamon).  Tools that are 
highly visible are less prone to corruption.  By definition, such tools allow for transparency and easy 
access to information by outside monitors.  
 
Players 
 Players involve everyone from municipal employees, to elected and appointed officials, to third 
party contractors or agents.  In NPM we see an increasing number of third party agents.  These third-
party agents often vary between localities and differ in their capacity to deliver public goods.  A 
“Automaticity measures the 
extent to which a tool utilizes an 
existing administrative structure 
to produce its effect rather than 
having to create its own special 
administrative apparatus.”  
 
“Visibility measures the extent to 
which the resources devoted to a 
tool show up in the normal 
government budgeting and policy 
review processes.” 
(Salamon, 2002.) 
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principal agent problem often exists between local government and its agents. The principal-agent 
problem refers to the difficulty employers (the principal) have ensuring that employees (agents) to act in 
the best interest of the employers. Depending on the number of third-party agents involved in the 
network and the level of cooperation required among agents, principal agent problems can also arise 
between agents themselves.  Third-party agents may not be accustomed to working with one another and 
may operate in very different ways.  This can make managing the relationships between agents difficult 
and may open many opportunities for corruption. 
 
Rules 
 The rules that govern decentralized networks can not be neglected.  Rules can establish working 
relationships between agents, improve transparency of information and establish accountability 
throughout the provision of public services.  Network rules can come from contracts between third 
parties and municipalities, or they can come from legislatures in the form of laws.  When specified in 
contracts, the contractual relationship should be open to amendment by both principals and agents.  
Ideally, the relationships between agents can be worked out over time as agencies become familiar with 
each other’s roles.  Network rules need to be sensitive to each agency’s culture and modus operandi as 
well as with the intent of limiting the opportunities for corruption.   
  
 An example of a very effective rule toward mitigating corruption passed in the Massachusetts 
legislature is the Pacheco-Manard Act.  This act was passed in response to the ineffectual Weld 
priviatization efforts in the early 1990s.  It states simply that all contracts must undergo a uniform cost 
analysis. (Sclar, 2000).  Although a seemingly simply law, it has far reaching impact on both 
accountability and transparency in contracting and as a result also serves to mitigate corruption in the 
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Massachusetts contracting process.   Before the existence of this rule, decisions with regard to awarding 
contracts could be justified in any number of ways.  There was no set accounting standard.  With the 
presence of the Act, however, all parties are measured equally and contracts are a step closer to being 
awarded to those best able to provide the services truly needed by the municipality rather than those best 
able to game the system or have influential contacts. 
 Similar to thinking about the changing roles of the players in new public management, the 
increase in third party relationships in NPM means that an increasing number of rules that govern an 
area’s ability to govern itself will come from contracts.  For this reason a special focus needs to be 
placed on the short-term and long-term effects contract terms as well as the enforceability of these 
terms.  Much of this will revolve around the ability to effectively monitor and change contractual 
relationships. Another way to look at protecting against corruption in the contracting process is by 
analyzing whether or not it makes sense to contract out services at all.   
 
In the case of New Public Management this is a decision that will need to be made continually.  This 
decision becomes a de facto rules question.  Do we stick with the current system (whatever that may be) 
and its rules or do we negotiate a new system through a contract (a new set of rules).   In his assessment 
of this process Sclar offers some important advice on those four things that one should think about 
continually when making these types of decisions. (Sclar, 2000.) 
1. The first is to utilize good accounting practices regardless of whether you are providing services 
in house or contracting out.  This includes understanding the true cost of the services in question 
through the use of activity-based cost accounting.  The other important element here is to always 
fully account for transaction cost when contemplating a change in service provision. 
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2. The second rule is to always compare “three” alternatives.  Whereas most people think in terms 
of should I contract a service out or not planners should entertain a third option.  Namely, should 
I continue to provide services in house the way we are now?  Should I contract the services out?  
Or should I restructure internally and continue to provide services in-house.  This third 
alternative tends to yield the best results while at the same time being considered the least. 
3. The third bit of advice is to make meaningful participation possible.  This important bit simply 
implies that systems are comprised of people and any rules that are made concerning the 
development of new rules for the system should include the various people who will be effected 
by the rules.  This may be unions, contractors, constituents or others.  Both from an intelligence 
gathering perspective as well as a buy-in perspective this is crucial to arriving at sustainable 
solutions. 
4. And fourthly, politics needs to be removed from contracting if at all costs.  Ideally this would be 
accomplished by passing a law banning campaign contributions from contractors but in the 
absence of this strict enforcement of accountability and transparency rules will have to suffice. 
 
 
 
Tying it all together – Leadership in New Public Management 
  
 Thinking about the components involved in the decentralized networks of new public 
management in terms of tools, players and rules can be helpful in keeping track of the various forces that 
may lead to corruption.  But simply keeping track of these forces is not enough.  To truly mitigate 
corruption requires a constant attentiveness to the interplay of the myriad forces that manifest 
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themselves in the forms of tools, players and rules and the ability to react accordingly.  This is 
leadership.  For, although one can design systems that help mitigate corruption the new public 
management, by its very nature of involving so many different parties, will be constantly changing.  As 
a result, the systems will need to constantly change as well.   
 
 Leaders in new public management will need to be fluent in their use and understanding of the 
various tools, players and rules available to them.  They are the glue that will enable the systems to 
work.  And they are also the individuals that will need to recognize when the current system is no longer 
appropriate and needs to be changed – whether this means contracting out a service, changing 
contractors or making the decision not to contract at all.   The ability to both interpret and act on 
situations these situations takes training and this training takes money.   And where does the money 
come from?  It needs to come from the very municipalities that are trying to save funds by contracting 
out services.   The irony here is that in order to make the new public management system of government 
work -- a system that has gained popular appeal by its purported ability to cut costs through the use of 
competition -- additional investment in government workers are needed so as to avoid the expensive 
threat of corruption. 
 
 Irony aside, the important thing to keep in mind here is that in order for corruption to be 
effectively mitigated under new public management it will require a new approach to leadership in the 
public sector.  In order for this to happen effectively norms among the public that have until now not 
endorsed the types of leadership training that are more commonplace in the private sector will  have to 
change.  So, although new public management does create the increased possibility of corruption it can 
be controlled.  But this will require not only a new model of leadership for the public sector but also a 
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new willingness on behalf of constituents to fund these new models in hopes that in the long run the 
quality of the services they receive are commensurate with the money being spent. 
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Industrial Relations Theory: Lessons from a Private Sector Model for Public
Sector Transformation
Lindy Burt, May 1998
According to some experts, private sector industrial relations theory can provide useful information to
local officials in their efforts to better understand and restructure the public sector labor-management
relationship. Editors of a recent (1996) publication of the Industrial Relations Research Association claim
that "Changing constraints on the public sector have created pressure to emulate the changing workplace
practices experienced earlier by the private sector...While the public sector used to be a model for the
introduction of progressive employment practices into the private sector, the pressure is now in the
opposite direction."
The public sector is under pressure to adopt the same types of "production" goals undertaken by the private
sector long ago-improved productivity and efficiency at lower cost. Components of contemporary industrial
relations theory can be applied to the public sector to provide greater insight into the three levels of the labor
management relationship, the influence that environment and choice have on this relationship, and the
implications of both for local government restructuring.
 Download the .PDF version
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 The Nature of the Management-Labor Relationship
 Private Sector Model: Management as the Initiator of Change in the Workplace
In contrast to earlier models of industrial relations which did not go much beyond the importance of external
factors and management's reaction to them (see Dunlop's footnote), in the 1990s a new model was devised
which places management in the role of the initiator of workplace innovation. Developed by Thomas Kochan,
Harry Katz, and Robert McKersie, this model also recognizes that there is often a lack of consensus between
management and labor, and that both parties are greatly impacted by the instability prevalent in the
economic, technological, political and social environments.
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Also different from traditional industrial relations theory, the newer model acknowledges that management
does not genuinely accept collective bargaining as a legitimate and permanent element of the labor-
management relationship, but is simply making a practical, pragmatic decision in agreeing to participate in
collective bargaining.
 The Importance of Environment and Choice in Management and Labor Decision Making
Private Sector: Environmental Influences and the Importance of Awareness of Choice
Management is heavily influenced by environmental factors, which include: its values, beliefs and
philosophies; the outcomes of previous organizational decisions; the current distribution of power within the
organization, and between itself and other organizations; and the values and strategies that influence the
behavior and policies of unions and government agencies. Choice and discretion on the part of management,
labor, and the government affect the course and structure of the industrial relations system. An
understanding of the choices parties make in any period must be informed by an analysis of the structures
and history that constrain these choices.
Public Sector: The Influence of Politics and Power Distribution, and Choices about Collective Bargaining
Public sector officials and management are very much influenced by the political process in their decisions.
The position of public sector elected officials demands that their actions and decisions be in the interest of the
public good, yet they are also potentially compelled to make decisions which will help them to retain their
position in office. Management also takes into consideration the political implications of their decisions and
actions, as they are often appointed by elected officials and can be impacted by changes resulting from a
turnover of administrations.
The distribution of power within the public sector, although structured differently from that of the private
sector and subject to different forces, also impacts the behavior and thoughts of management. Public sector
power is actually more diffuse than that of the private sector, and can make certain elements of the
employment relationship more complicated.
Relating the notion of choice to the public sector, public sector officials and management have choices to
make about the legislative environment for collective bargaining and about defining their role as legislator vs.
employer. Unions, on the other hand, have a choice over whether to follow a mutual gains bargaining
approach, or an adversarial, distributive bargaining approach.
 The Three Levels of Decision Making in the Labor-Management Relationship
There are essentially three layers of decision making in the labor-management relationship which capture the
interrelationships among activities at different levels of the institutional structure; explain the origins of any
prevailing contradictions or inconsistencies among the practices and strategies of the three levels; consider
the effects of strategic decisions; and analyze the effects of increased participation by individuals and work
groups on the industrial relations system.
Level 1: Strategic Decision Making
It is at this level that major strategies are considered which exert long-run influences on collective
bargaining. Examples of such issues are: what businesses to invest in, where to locate work sites, and
whether to buy or make various components. The public sector engages in strategic decision-making of
the first level in deciding what services and goods it is responsible for providing to the public, and
deciding whether to provide goods and services itself or privatize/contract out (i.e. "make or buy").
Level 2: Collective Bargaining
The second layer describes the process and outcomes of contract negotiation, and encompasses such
issues as collective bargaining, personnel policy formulation, and development and administration of key
public policies governing labor management relations
Level 3: Day to Day Workplace Issues
The third layer describes the process through which policies are played out which effect individual
workers, supervisors, and union representatives on a day to day basis. Job and work organization and
design, work rules, worker-supervisor relations, and public policy governing individual rights at the
workplace are played out at this level.
 Constraints of Public Sector Industrial Relations and Their Implications for Restructuring
The environment and contemporary choices available to management and labor in the public sector are
having an impact on all three levels of the employment relationship. In the face of increased public
resentment toward the public sector (unwillingness to pay higher or more taxes, and perceived inefficiency of
services, for example), and decreasing government revenues, public sector management and labor must
attempt a restructuring of old goals and methods of operation. Characteristics of the employment relationship,
management and labor do have implications for public sector efforts at restructuring.
 Multi-Lateral Bargaining: A Diffuse Decisionmaking Structure Makes Bargaining a Complicated Process
Because managerial authority is widely shared in the public sector, collective bargaining is multi-lateral and
not bilateral as it is in the private sector. Multi-lateral bargaining is a negotiation process that includes more
than two distinct parties. Additionally, "in multi-lateral bargaining, no clear dichotomy exists between union
and the management organization (Kochan 1992). It can lead to such bargaining techniques as the union
tactic of end running, in which case unions side-step one management party that is part of the bargaining
process in order to appeal to another management party. Another possible outcome of multi-lateral
bargaining is a case where one decision-making group that is part of the process rejects a negotiated
agreement, resulting in a failure of implementation (e.g. City Council fails to ratify a negotiated agreement
between the Mayor and employees). Finally, community interest groups can also have a role in, and therefore
an impact on the process.
Multi-lateral bargaining complicates the employment relationship. It can undermine the negotiations process
and make reaching an agreement on service restructuring a much more challenging endeavor. Any negotiated
agreement is subject to reversal, either through rejection of the agreement by a group participating in its
negotiation, or because of a change in administration. "The vicissitudes of the political process can be more
extreme than the vicissitudes of the market (Belman 1996).
The Decentralized Structure of Public Sector Bargaining
Collective bargaining in the public sector is also highly decentralized; i.e. almost all bargaining is done on a
single-employer (particular government or agency) basis, with almost no examples of multi-employer
bargaining. Additionally public sector bargaining tends to follow much more occupational lines (e.g. separated
amongst police, fire, waste collection, etc.) than in the private sector. Given these traits, collective bargaining
can provide a viable arena to negotiate restructuring, or it can hinder it for the following reasons (Belman
1996):
Unions taking an adversarial stance
Fragmentation of bargaining units inhibiting unions speaking with one voice
Unions holding onto narrow job classifications and seniority principles, which may be in conflict with
restructuring programs that don't guarantee such provisions, or are trying to eliminate them entirely
Rigidities Imposed upon Public Sector Labor Relations and Restructuring by Unionization
The degree of unionization tends to be higher in the public sector, which has had important effects on the
process and substance of employment in the public sector. There has been an increase in the formalization of
personnel practices and a decrease in management's ability to decide upon matters of discipline, discharge,
promotions, transfers and work assignments (Kochan and Katz 1992).
One expert (Belman) identifies the two main strategies of "new" government (restructured) as:
1. emphasizing efficiency improvement through innovative practices and a movement away from the
bureaucratic civil service model, and
2. emphasizing cost-cutting
As a response to unionization, the public sector has become more rigid and more bureaucratic in its workplace
practices. For labor, conditions of increased bureaucratization and blocked communication channels as a result
of the hierarchical structure, de-personalization, and paternalism in public service has alienated employees
and led them to perceive the need for intermediary organizations like unions (Kearney 1992). In summary,
successful restructuring will require trust, cooperation, flexibility and a willingness to try non-traditional ways
of doing things on the part of both sides. "As in the private sector, the effects of public sector unions and
collective bargaining on the economic performance of the employer depend on the effectiveness of the
relationship between the union and the employer" (Kochan and Katz 1992).
Notes:
 One of the significant theories of industrial labor relations was put forth by John Dunlop in the 1950s.
Dunlop's model identifies three key factors to be considered in conducting an analysis of the management-
labor relationship:
1. environmental, or external economic, technological, political, legal and social forces that impact
employment relationships
2. characteristics and interaction of the key actors in the employment relationship: labor, management, and
government
3. rules that are derived from these interactions that govern the employment relationship
The Dunlop model gives great significance to external, or environmental forces, with the key actors being
held to respond in a relatively uniform and mechanical manner to a given environmental change. In other
words, management, labor, and the government possess a shared ideology, or consensus that defines their
roles within the relationship and provides stability to the system.
Dunlop's model worked well to organize the labor-management relationship into a framework in the 1960s
and 1970s, but it worked only as long as there existed stability in the environmental forces and a shared
consensus of the key actors in the employment.
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Transforming Work
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Across the nation, workplaces are changing.
In order to increase efficiency, productivity, and quality, employers are moving away from the old
hierarchical management systems to more decentralized, flatter ones that give workers more autonomy
and include them in decision making. Although the private sector has been the source of most workplace
innovations, many of them can be transferred to the public sector to help it achieve its goals of
improving productivity and reducing costs while maintaining service quality.
Cooperation between management and labor is important to successful workplace change.
Unions must take on a new role, working with management to help achieve performance goals. In
additional to representing traditional worker interests, they must focus on worker skills and participation
in decision making as the key to competitive advantage. As local government struggles with fiscal
pressures and the demand for more flexible services, it must look toward a new, more cooperative
workplace to meet these challenges.
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Why Transform Work in the Public Sector?
While efforts to transform the workplace may have started in the private sector, the public sector is also
experiencing enormous pressure to change. Reductions in state and federal funding, tax revolts, and the
advent of privatization are leading to reexaminations of how the local government can best meet the public's
demand for services. The public sector is unique in that it provides a "public good"; it is removed from the
market system and thus receives less feedback on its performance than does the private sector. Yet
government agencies are accountable not only to their customers but also to the general public. In addition,
the public and private sectors are interconnected, and improving productivity and quality in the public sector
strengthens the private sector.
While models for organizational change originated in manufacturing settings, experts agree that they can be
applied to all work settings. Evidence indicates that in the service sector, simply adding higher technology has
not been effective in achieving long-term productivity. As primarily a service provider, government must
examine new ways to meet the growing challenges of service provision in an age of shrinking budgets and
increasing mandates. Many of the jobs we expect our local government to perform have become increasingly
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complex, and a strategy of automating and routinizing jobs to improve productivity is equally inadequate in
today's public sector as it is in the private sector. Successful workplace change must focus not just on cutting
costs but also on improving workforce skills and decision-making capabilities.
 Moving from Hierarchical to Participatory Management
Worker participation and autonomy are key elements of workplace transformation leading to better
performance. Creating a "healthy hierarchy" involves not just removing layers, but fundamentally changing
how management operates. Not only should lower-level employees be given decision-making power, but they
also need the training that will provide them with the ability to make good decisions. Employees should be
rewarded for expanding their capabilities to contribute to the organization.
Practices that have been used in both the private and public sectors to transform the workplace include:
Increasing worker autonomy
Flattening hierarchies
Decentralizing authority
Creating labor-management committees to address workplace problems
Instituting quality programs, such as TQM
Upgrading workers' skills through training
Increasing flexibility in deployment of labor
Establishing work teams
Sharing rewards for increased productivity with workers
Local governments can adapt many of these same strategies to help improve service delivery and overall
government functioning. Government agencies and labor need to work together to identify the programs that
will help bring about positive change in the workplace and in government's performance.
More on the key elements of creating a high-performance organization
 Models for Workplace Change
Drawn from previous experiences in the United States as well as those from abroad, two distinct but
overlapping American models of workplace transformation have emerged. They draw on similar management
tools and techniques, but their human resource and industrial relations policies differ, depending on the
extent to which they focus on front-line workers as the source of continuous performance improvement.
The Lean Production Model:
uses a centralized approach
aims to align the goals of employees with those of the agency
focuses on quality through elements such as process management and performance measurements
limits worker participation in decision making to the immediate work process
involves selected employees in problem-solving committees under the direction of a supervisor or
manager
The Collaborative Team Production Model:
relies on decentralized decision making through collaboration
allows worker representation in decision making at every level of the agency, through joint labor-
management structures
emphasizes self-directed work
provides for extensive training of nonmanagerial workers
offers job security that encourages workers contribute to improving quality and efficiency
Both models seem to result in substantial performance improvements, and in both cases joint labor-
management structures play a vital role. Worker participation, however, can have significant effects on
productivity, depending on the form and content of the participation. Four features are important to
increasing productivity:
1. sharing of gains from productivity improvements with workers
2. employment security
3. measures to build group cohesiveness
4. guaranteed rights for individual employees
More on international models of workplace transformation
 Challenges for Management and Labor
Workplace transformation can be difficult for many reasons:
In the United States, little institutional support for change exists. Change is likely to occur in response to
economic crises, leading to the piecemeal adoption of new strategies.
Most workplace change is highly dependent on the personalities and commitments of key individuals:
directors, managers, and union officials. Those in charge often find it difficult to cede power.
Cooperative change requires both labor and management to give up their traditional adversarial stance.
Entrenched ways of thinking and behaving will need to change.
The up-front costs of the training necessary to implement tangible change can also be prohibitive. In an
era where the focus is on short-term gains, such investments are undervalued.
Alternative structures for employee involvement may have the effect of undermining or competing with
the traditional union system.
Despite the inevitable hurdles, the relative stability of the public sector and its focus on service provision
make it a highly appropriate environment for implementing workplace change.
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The Role of Cooperative Structures in Workplace Transformation
Nicole Blumner, May 1998
Cooperative structures have been used in the public and private sector with varying degrees of success
for the past 70 years, with a revival of their use in the last two decades. The overall goals of cooperative
structures fall into two major categories: improving productivity and increasing employee satisfaction.
Cooperative programs may take form in several venues: those within an organization, those within an
industry, and finally those covering a variety of establishments in an area or region. These programs
most typically include labor-management committees, productivity sharing plans, and quality of worklife
programs. Although cooperative structures offer many benefits to organizations, there often exist various
internal and external barriers that limit their implementation and effectiveness. Examples from New York
State illustrate the role that these structures can play in improving service delivery in the public sector.
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 Structural Changes
Labor-Management Committees
The focus of labor-management committees is often on problem-solving activities and building trust.
Committees typically deal with issues including workplace safety, work hours, training, personnel issues, and
daily workplace concerns. Although committees may initially focus on less controversial issues, such as safety,
over time they may build a level of trust between labor and management that allows them to deal with more
complex problems. Management and labor may use these committees to avoid bringing unnecessary issues to
the bargaining table, ultimately simplifying the bargaining process. Furthermore, the trust established in
committee meetings can have a positive impact on the relationship between management and labor at the
traditionally contentious bargaining table.
When establishing a committee, labor and management often write a letter of understanding to establish the
committee's jurisdiction as separate from the basic labor agreement. Unfortunately, the letter of agreement
may prevent committees from discussing urgent issues covered in the bargaining agreement that arise
between negotiations. For instance, committees at Xerox are not allowed to discuss vital issues such as:
salaries, union grievances, the union contract, benefits, company policy, working hours, rates, breaks,
classifications, overtime, personalities, the payroll, discipline, problems on which shop chairs were working,
and production standards. Although this measure protects workers in one sense from losing ground on vital
issues during the course of a contract, it limits the ability of committees to solve workplace problems outside
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of the bargaining table when they may be capable of doing so.
Quality of Worklife Programs
Quality of Worklife Programs provide opportunities for workers to participate in organizational decisions that
directly affect their jobs. These structures may be known as quality circles, employee-involvement teams, or
by other terms. These programs function not only to improve quality of the product, but also to enhance the
productivity and work life of employees and to further labor-management relations. Quality circles may
consider implementing initiatives to improve job tasks, job stress, scheduling of work hours, social relations,
career development, and control over the work environment.
Productivity Gainsharing Plans
Gainsharing combines worker participation an incentive plan for productivity gains. Incentives are provided in
the form of cash, a deferred bonus paid into a trust fund for later use, or a combination of the two. However,
this form of cooperative structure has had limited use in the public sector, where "profit" is traditionally not
the paramount motivation of the organization. Gainsharing was implemented in New York City after the fiscal
crisis of 1976, although in a more punitive and unpopular form: workers received pay raises only if they
increased productivity levels.
Barriers to Cooperative Structures
Despite its numerous benefits, worker participation often faces limits and barriers. First, participation is often
limited by the fact that some decisions, such as corporate financial planning, must be made by management
alone. In fact, most of the participation that takes place involves the employee's immediate workplace
environment. Management may resist cooperative structures for several reasons. Citing loss of authority and
the fact that workers don't have much to offer to improve productivity, managers often believe that workers
will bypass and inhibit middle management and slow the decision-making process. Fundamentally, it is
questionable whether labor-management committees actually increase productivity. However, this is partly
because it is difficult to isolate and measure committees' role in improving productivity. The clearest
indicators that have been documented are reduced absenteeism, accidents, grievances, improved collective
bargaining relationships, and increased overall job satisfaction.
Union opposition to cooperative structures may also limit worker participation. Unions may construe
cooperative structures as a management ploy to weaken labor and divert attention from basic issues such as
wages, job security, and workplace health and safety. Other union objections include the argument that the
economic benefits go only to management. Furthermore, unions may fear that increasing workplace efficiency
can lead to employees putting themselves out of a job. Unions may argue that participation does not give
workers any real power and will undermine the union's strength at the bargaining table. Finally, unions have
even argued that the responsibility for increasing productivity lies with only with management, and not with
labor.
Cooperative structures also raise legal questions. For instance, do the presence of labor-management
committees violate the union's exclusivity to collective bargaining? The National Labor Relations Bureau has
on several occasions invalidated labor-management committees as violating U.S. labor law as interfering with
the union's exclusive bargaining power. However, most of these cases also involved charges of unfair labor
practices against the corporation. It therefore appears that the committees have rarely invalidated on a
purely categorical basis.
Fortunately, productivity gain sharing plans are cooperative structures that may spark less controversy than
labor-management committees or quality programs. Furthermore, gainsharing is cost-free, since salary
increases are paid from productivity increases. Gainsharing has not been widely used in the public sector, but
it should be considered for its potentially positive impact on labor-management relations.
Overcoming the Barriers
Despite the obstacles, there are certainly proven tactics that can be used to overcome some of the barriers
to cooperative structures.
Invite union participation early in the process to adopt committees. This can prove essential to later
successes.
Serious management problems that exist prior to the establishment of a cooperative structure may
severely limit its effectiveness and need to be resolved beforehand.
Real commitment to the structure must be communicated to all the stakeholders and then proven by the
later actions of both labor and management.
Training must ensure all stakeholders have a clear understanding of the process. In particular, managers
and supervisors must understand and be ready to accept their new roles. Middle managers may block
implementation if they feel threatened by the loss of their traditional role in areas such as quality control
and workplace improvement.
Workers may justifiably believe that gains in productivity may lead to lay-offs. Management needs to
ensure that there are safeguards for current employees to avoid this barrier to change.
 Successful Examples of Workplace Transformation
National Survey of Workplace Transformation
In 1992, Paul Osterman published a survey of the incidence of innovative work practices in 694 U.S.
manufacturing establishments. Innovative practices observed in the study included the use of self-directed
work teams, job rotation, quality circles, and Total Quality Management (TQM) practices. This study has
several implications for the practice of workplace transformation in local government. First, firms undertake
transformation not only to save costs, but also to improve service level and quality. Second, competition is a
significant factor in firms' decision to adopt innovative practices. In the public sector, the threat of
privatization may be a strong motivator in improving service provision. Finally, organization size plays a role in
firms' ability to implement new structures. For smaller governments, this implies that they may have limited
resources and need assistance to undertake restructuring efforts.
The study found that only 35% of private sector establishments with 50 or more employees made substantial
use of innovative work practices in the study year. The remaining organizations made limited or no use of
such practices. Of the firms making substantial use of programs, worker teams appear to be most common
(54%), followed by job rotation (43%), TQM (33%) and quality circles (40%). 21% of responding firms used
none of these measures.
Factors associated with adoption of new practices included the presence of competitive global markets, the
use of technology in the workplace that requires high levels of skill. Other factors include a competitive
strategy emphasizing product over cost, human resource practices which emphasize training and innovative
pay systems. The size of the organization was also key as large organizations were more likely to have the
financial and human resources to initiate change that might not pay off immediately.
Workplace Transformation in New York State
Several studies have cited examples of cooperative structures in local government in New York State. A 1983
U.S. Department of Labor survey found 37 examples nationally of labor-management committees on a local
government or authority level, two of which were from New York States. Jamestown, NY, a labor-
management committee for the public school system involved both AFSCME and other union representatives.
Two management representatives meet with 25 labor representatives each month, with an executive group of
3 people developing each meeting's agenda. The committee, founded in 1977, worked on issues such as
education, work improvement, communication, service quality, training. Among other accomplishments, this
committee won awards for its cost-saving recommendations.
Onondaga County also implemented a labor-management committee with CSEA, the New York State Nurses
Association, and other unions in the area of health care services. This committee of 5 managers and 5 union
representatives meets monthly to discuss issues of scheduling, automation, training, productivity, waste,
safety and health, overtime, absenteeism, quality of work life, etc. Its accomplishments include reduced
grievances, increased productivity, and reduced waste and costs.
I believe that both labor
and management must
take a fresh approach to
worker-management
relations. The old,
A 1997 survey provides many examples of current restructuring efforts in New York State. All town and
county governments in New York State outside of New York City were surveyed. Twenty-one of twenty-six
counties responding cited at least one case of restructuring in their jurisdiction. Factors such as fiscal
pressures for greater cost efficiency, increasing responsiveness of government and increasing the quality of
service were all cited as motivations for restructuring local government. Several counties used cooperative
structures in implementing change, including Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties, all of which are
profiled in a Special Report on labor-management cooperation found at this web site.
Go to Special Report
Go to Survey Results
The Ulster County Example
Ulster County is an excellent example of the effective use of labor-management committees. The U.S.
Department of Labor profiled Ulster County, New York, in its Task Force Report on Workplace Innovation. In
1977, a joint labor-management committee was established in the collective bargaining agreement between
Ulster County, New York (with a work force of about 1,600) and CSEA Local 856. The relationship became a
truly productive problem-solving team effort in 1985-86, when the county, the union and the New York State
Public Employees Relations Bureau jointly received a grant to improve the effectiveness of the existing
committee. The grant provided for training, the hiring of a full-time facilitator, and the adoption of consensus
decision-making as standard county practice. The county-wide committee has joint co-chairs and 10 members
each from labor and management. There are also four departmental committees at the county's largest
agencies: mental health services, social services, the residential health care facility, and the Community
College.
Since 1986, these committees have addressed many issues of mutual concern. Cost containment, training
needs, scheduling of work (including implementation of flexitime), fair administration of a furlough program,
as well as safety and security concerns of employees are all issues that have been successfully addressed by
these committees. Currently, the county is establishing a network of safety committees to address unique
safety issues at each county work site. Also recently, a quality management initiative has been undertaken
and implemented in Ulster County.
A significant benefit of establishing a more cooperative relationship between labor and management has been
the improvement of the collective bargaining process. While the 1992 agreement took 24 months to reach,
the 1995 contract took only "a few days." Both labor and management attributed this improvement to
increased trust, better communications, and improved problem-solving skills that had developed in the
cooperative process.
 Other Examples of Cooperation
Other counties in New York State have implemented workplace improvement using cooperative structures. In
particular, Tioga County has successfully used mutual gains bargaining to smooth the process of contract
negotiation. However, Tioga has not used other forms of cooperation, hence the effectiveness of the
cooperative relations established by mutual gains bargaining has been limited to the contract negotiation
process only. Genesee, Ontario and Tompkins Counties have all implemented several forms of cooperative
structures, which are all profiled in detail in the case study section of this web page (HOTLINK to case
studies). In addition, many counties have entered into cooperative agreements on an intermunicipal level,
including Dutchess, Ulster, Suffolk, Putnam and Tompkins.
 Lessons
The above discussion should make clear that cooperative structures are not
without their flaws and difficulties. Their recent resurgence and growing
incidence in the public sector may indicate their usefulness as a tool for both
labor and management to accomplish their objectives. In an age of fiscal
uncertainty and increasing demand for limited government budgets, the public
adversarial approach
squanders resources
and increases worker
and management
frustration with the
system. ...More and
more these days, we are
seeing that cooperation
is taking the place of
confrontation. Both
workers and
supervisors are
beginning to realize that
they are on the same
team."
U.S. Senator Nancy
Kasserbaum, Committee on
Labor and Human Resources
Hearing, February 9, 1995.
sector is using the innovative tool of cooperative relations to improve the
quality and efficiency of government service. By working together, labor and
management can achieve mutual goals, forging a cooperative relationship
where benefits easily outweigh costs. The models presented here are examples
of current and past successful cooperative structures. As the public sector
continues to innovate in service delivery, new examples will emerge, and
should be documented for labor and management alike to examine and adopt
in future initiatives.
The Minnesota Example
The Minnesota "Strive Toward Excellence in Performance" (STEP) Program is a
well-documented example of innovative practices on a state-wide level in the
1980's. In 1989, over 50 workplace innovation programs had been initiated in
individual Minnesota state agencies through the STEP program. STEP's basic
concept is as a process for planning and managing "long-term fundamental
changes in...government's management values and practices." To develop the
STEP initiative, a top-down approach was initially used-an appointed steering
committee established goals and objectives. The committee then solicited pilot
projects from individual agencies. Then, STEP staff provided support to
agencies through training, advice, and cutting through red tape to implement
these project ideas.
STEP provides several lessons to local governments considering re-structuring
services. First, STEP is a state-wide program; thus it has more financial and
human resources available to it than a local government program might
typically have. This is not a fundamental obstacle, as many local governments
have found special funding and additional resources to undertake workplace transformation. Second, STEP is
fundamentally a project-oriented program that does not necessarily involve making structural changes to each
agency participating. If government is truly interested in instituting structural change, STEP may not be the
best model to follow.
A Historical Note
The history of labor-management committees in the United States began in 1918, when the National War
Labor Board (NWLB) first developed shop committees and work councils in the defense industry. These
structures provided a democratic alternative to a unionized workplace, but they were also used in combination
with unions. Examples of successful cooperative structures were first found in the public sector in 1940, when
the Tennessee Valley Authority initiated cooperative committees in its workplaces.
Remaining strong during the two world wars, committees dealt with such issues as safety, absenteeism,
training and personnel. However, few committees continued after the war, with the dismantling of the NWLB.
More recently, there has been a resurgence of public sector labor-management committees across the
country. Training to establish and support these structures has also been institutionalized. Since 1982, the
Program for Employment and Workplace Systems at Cornell has helped both the private and public sectors
develop such committees.
 Resources
Gold, Charlotte. Labor-Management Committees: Confrontation, Co-optation, or Cooperation? Ithaca: ILR
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http://www.dol.gov/dol/_sec/public/media/reports/worktogether/append_e.htm, 1998.
This website provides an inventory of local governments implementing workplace transformation
through cooperative structures. This site also includes a task force report on the role of flexible and
cooperative practices in the improvement of government service delivery. Suggestions are made for
further research on determining barriers to restructuring in order to develop better methods for
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management cooperation on a variety of workplace issues.
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"Best Practices" for Promoting Cooperation Among Multiple Stakeholders
Jon Gans, May 1998
Labor-Management Committees
The benefits of cooperation between labor and management are increasingly becoming obvious to
governments in New York State. The labor-management committee is an effective tool to promote
communication and cooperation. The dynamics of labor-management committees are complex due to the
diversity of viewpoints represented. Analyzing other efforts at cooperation between multiple stakeholders
may yield insights that will enable these committees to be more successful. For labor-management
committees, the following "best practices" are recommended:
Establish a central, guiding committee to oversee the endeavor.
Integrate committees into the organizational structure.
Define expectations and parameters for decision making.
Include as many stakeholders as possible and necessary.
Communicate and foster a shared understanding of goals and objectives for both the committee and
the organization.
Address issues that are easy to reach consensus at the outset in order to build momentum to tackle
more difficult topics.
Be cognizant of power differentials and the effect these may have on communication.
Working in groups is often difficult when there are many stakeholders with diverse points of view
involved in the process. Two models which provide insights that are relevant to efforts in labor-
management cooperation are Quality of Work-Life (QWL) programs and Search Conferences. In terms of
labor-management cooperation, these insights may be helpful to enable communication, develop trust,
and identify potential obstacles to success. Developing mission statements creates a shared
understanding of the goals for an organization based on the activities and values that have guided the
organization in the past. One tool that is useful in creating mission statements is concept mapping. A
review of these tools highlights key elements of multiple stakeholder cooperation in decision making.
Quality of Work-Life
Search Conferences
Mission Statements
Concept Mapping
 Quality of Work-Life
The Quality of Work-Life experience reveals three points for both labor and management to consider in
establishing committees:
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1. Integrate committees into the organizational structure.
2. Define the parameters of decision making authority.
3. Communicate objectives and goals clearly.
Quality of Work-Life programs show the usefulness of a central administration, with the inclusion of as many
stakeholders as possible, to coordinate the effort. In addition, considering how power differentials influence
the committee process is important. One limitation is due in part to the committee structure of QWL.
Committee Structures in Quality of Work-Life Programs
One mechanism that has been implemented to enhance labor-management cooperation in the private sector
is referred to as Quality of Work-Life (QWL). Edward Lawler is one proponent of QWL who asserts that
cooperation results in more effective organizational performance. QWL projects seek to not only improve
productivity but all aspects of life at work. While QWL initiatives have many drawbacks, such as limited
authority to implement ideas and poor communication flows, there are several elements of the framework
that might contribute positively to discussions of labor-management cooperation in the public sector.
Joint Committees
The committee is the centerpiece of QWL and they form the link between labor and management.
Administratively, these joint committees are parallel to the formal organizational structure. The hierarchical
nature of this structure turns out to be one of the major shortcomings of QWL initiatives. The ability for
committees to effect change is limited because there are no formal mechanisms that provide the necessary
authority. The committee must convince management to implement any ideas that emanate from the process.
Shared Goals
The implementation of QWL has led to several important lessons regarding labor/management cooperation.
One insight is to overcome obstacles that are relatively easy to address in order to create momentum to
tackle larger, more difficult issues. Every committee drafts a letter of agreement specifying the framework
and objectives of the group. Once the framework is established the letter is signed by both parties and
disseminated throughout the organization. The objectives are summarized into a few general statements to
create a shared understanding of the overall goals. For management, these may be improved quality,
productivity and labor/management relations. Unions may seek to provide a better environment for
membership.
Training
Training in cooperative problem-solving initiates relations between labor and management and serves to build
trust. It also shows the commitment of both union and management to the process. In order for QWL
programs to be successful both parties must be committed to the idea. One strategy to overcome this
obstacle is to approach the union and determine which organizations are most willing to attempt using the
model. Implementing QWL becomes easier when management is assured of the unions' commitment to the
idea.
Search Conferences
Search Conferences (Weisbord and Janoff, 1995) recognize the value of considering both internal and external
factors in decision making. Expanding the scope of committee discussions to incorporate the entire system
within which the organization operates helps the group develop a shared understanding of the goals and
objectives. This provides managers and employees with a sense of their larger purpose in the organization.
Search conferences also focus on the history of the group in order to foster this sentiment. Perhaps the most
influential exercise in a Search Conference is an evaluation of what will likely happen if the organization
maintains its present course. This 'Do-Nothing' evaluation enables conference participants to recognize the
organization's vulnerabilities.
Search conferences attempt to deal with problems that are multi-dimensional in nature and require
coordinated strategies with multiple stakeholders to be dealt with effectively. The ultimate goal of a search
conference is to map where a group has come from, where they would like to go, and what resources they
have to get there. This past, present and future mapping of resources and goals develops a shared
understanding of the direction the organization is heading toward within the context of a larger system.
 The Search Conference Process
There are typically three modules in a search conference spread out over three consecutive days. The first
day is oriented toward building timelines of past events to identify trends, influential people and other factors
both internal and external to the organization that have affected its historical development. Once this task is
accomplished, every participant has a shared understanding of the history of the organization. The second day
is spent identifying and articulating a vision for the future of the group. A scenario of what will likely happen
if the group continues along its present course is developed. This 'do-nothing' evaluation enables the
conference participants to recognize where the organization is vulnerable and contributes to the overall
expression of an ideal future. The third day is devoted to planning a course of action for achieving the ideal
future. Operationalizing the strategic plan involves identification of the individuals or groups linked to
available resources and the key relationships between organizations to build networks.
Shortcomings of Search Conferences
Although the search conference is meant to blur or eliminate traditional power differentials they remain in
place inhibiting open communication. Individuals mat be fearful of expressing ideas that may comprise their
relationships with their superiors once the conference is over. In addition, traditional conflicts and biases
toward individuals present obstacles that are not easy to overcome.
Insights from Search Conferences
The recognition that problems are multifaceted and due, in part, to structural, systemic factors is an
important insight. Likewise, creating a shared understanding of the historical elements enables participants to
understand the broader context of their involvement with the group as well as foment a common vision for
the future. Search conferencing, like QWL projects, recognizes the value of knowledge that resides in all
facets of the organization or association. The importance of this last point cannot be understated. Accessing
the expertise of individuals on the 'frontline' is crucial to successful efforts at labor-management cooperation.
 Mission Statements
Developing a shared understanding of purpose in the context of labor-management committees may be
achieved through Mission Statements. Indirectly, creating a mission statement develops a foundation for
relationships that enhances future committee work.
Developing Consensus
A mission statement is a clear formulation of an organization's 'reason for being'. It is an expression of the
functions and processes that an organization uses to fulfill a purpose. For employees a mission can provide
'an understanding of how what they do is tied into a greater purpose' (Goodstein, 1993). Ideally, a mission
statement should indicate the scope and direction of an organization's activities based on the values that
have guided the organization in the past.
Labor and management committees should, at some point, articulate the mission for their group and, if
necessary, the overall organization they serve. The advantage of creating a mission statement lies in the
creation of a shared understanding between labor and management for the goals of a committee. It also
serves to develop relationships that will likely enhance future committee work. Mission statements bring focus
and energy to an organization and its members because of the need to reach a consensus on the specifics of
the document. For these reasons, developing a mission statement is worth the effort.
 Concept Mapping
Concept Mapping is one tool that can be used to define the mission of an organization. The strength of
Concept Mapping lies in its ability to visually represent a set of ideas that the group creates itself. Reaching
consensus in this manner is easier because the map is a fair representation of the opinions of the group.
The idea of charting out ideas that relate to each other is a common practice in many strategic planning
discussions. Concept mapping provides a framework to structure ideas in such a manner as to recognize
patterns or clusters of ideas that are related to each other and represent them visually (Trochim, 1997).
Concept mapping has proven to be a valuable tool in planning for public, private and not-for-profit
organizations alike and could enhance efforts at labor-management cooperation.
The concept mapping process starts by identifying and selecting a focus for the conceptualization, for example
the overall mission of an organization, with the input of as many relevant stakeholders as possible. Once a
focus is established each group member generates statements that attempt to capture their individual
understanding of the concept.
Individual cards that have each statement printed on them are distributed to the participants as a set. The
individuals are asked to create piles by distributing the statements in a way that makes sense to them. Every
statement is also ranked, usually on a scale of one to five, for its importance to the overall concept.
The next step is to define clusters of ideas that each participant has determined are linked through the
sorting process. This can be done with a computer or by simply using the index cards. A map of the
statements is produced and the process is complete. Plans of action and strategies may now be undertaken
to fulfill the goals and visions generated by the participants in the concept map.
Concept mapping is a very flexible tool used to identify common ground in strategic planning. Labor-
management cooperation efforts could benefit from such a framework because it visually represents ideas in
clusters that have been created by both parties; concept mapping is particularly useful for reaching consensus
on difficult issues between multiple stakeholders. Most importantly, perhaps, is the ability of a concept map
to create a shared vision of the future direction of the organization that is comprehensible to all participants;
a prerequisite for developing mission statements. (For more information on concept mapping visit:
http://trochim.human.cornell.edu/research/epp1/epp1.htm)
Conclusion
Labor-management committees have the benefit of learning from past attempts at multiple stakeholder
cooperation. Quality of Work-Life initiatives reveal the value training can add to the functioning of
committees. Likewise, commitment on behalf of both management and labor is required for success. Search
conferences provide a rationale for incorporating labor in decision making given the value of knowledge that
resides in frontline employees. Power differentials play an important role in limiting search conferences and
this awareness should be considered in labor-management committees. Developing a mission statement is
one way to foster a shared understanding of committee goals and represents an opportunity to develop
important relationships between labor and management. Concept mapping is a tool that can facilitate the
development of a mission statement. Labor-management committees can be successful when both parties
understand some of the shortcomings of other attempts at multiple stakeholder cooperation.
Resources
Goodstein, Leonard, Timothy Nolan, and J. William Pfeiffer. 1993. Applied Strategic Planning. New York, NY:
McGraw-Hill.
This publication gives a detailed framework for strategic planning in various types of organizations.
Several tools are discussed for developing an effective strategic planning environment in
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Some very practical information on the process of conducting a Search Conference with examples.
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Mutual Gains Bargaining
Darth Vaughn, May 1998
"The smartest strategy in war is the one that
allows you to achieve your objectives
without having to fight."
--Sun Tzu, 500 BC
Mutual Gains Bargaining (MBG) is preventative medicine. It helps to circumvent many of the ills
associated with traditional labor-management interaction, and allows for healthier more productive
cooperation. MGB is a method of bargaining designed to dramatically improve the quality of solutions,
and increase the likelihood of compliance between labor and management, ultimately benefiting their
constituents. The philosophy behind the process is that through in-depth discussion with an emphasis on
side by side problem solving (as opposed to face to face confrontation), you can get what you need, and
I can get what I need. This is a much more effective approach compared to the traditional adversarial
process.
Mutual Gains is about becoming a more effective negotiator by recognizing and avoiding those behaviors
that intensify conflict. This review gives a basic introduction into the philosophy behind the concept and
process of using MGB. In addition, this site lists the keys to success with MGB, and the resources to get
more information on, and training for, Mutual Gains Bargaining.
 Download the .PDF version
The Concept
The Process
Keys to Interest Based Bargaining Success
Union and Management's Benefits
Resources
Training
 The Concept
Public management has a responsibility to promote taxpayers interests, and labor unions have a duty to
represent workers' interests, but often times unions and management find themselves distracted from their
intended purposes and engaged in ideological fights with each other. Too many bargaining situations are
resulting in bad contracts both from the point of view of management and the unions, with neither side really
getting what they needed.
With traditional bargaining, groups enter the negotiations with their own preferred solutions and then haggled
over whose proposal is best. Labor and management will develop their positions on issues, submit overblown
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proposals to each other, and argue emphatically. Arguing on positions leaves both sides with one of four
options; "I win, you lose," "You win, I lose," "We both compromised, and lost", or "No deal." Eventually the
outcome is determined by a series of power struggles concentrating on personalities and anecdotal data
rather than the issues. Traditional bargaining is adversarial, the approach is to beat the other guy. Mutual
Gains Bargaining, on the other hand, is a different way of thinking.
With MGB both sides understand the need to focus on interests before their positions. It's not to beat the
other guy, but rather to get the best for what you need and the other side as well, because their interests
are linked to your interests. Labor-management cooperation is supposed to be an affirmation of the
leadership in both the union and management with the goal of seeking better ways of working and new
avenues to success. This cooperation in no way compromises or denies the identity of either party. It is also
not an answer to all ills. Conflict may still arise, as it should for if handled correctly it sparks creativity and
change. This cooperation, is rather a process that can provide a better way to get things done.
The mutual gains process focuses negotiating teams on interests rather than positions. MGB is a simple
concept that unions and management can identify at least one goal in common and find ways to jointly
accomplish that goal.
As simple as the concept might be, it's critical that labor, management, and legislation go through a formal
training process before they decide to embark on mutual gains. Often times, too much distrust exists between
the groups not to. Legislators are often ignored, but it's important that they be pulled on board so they
understand and support the process.
 The Process
There are various approaches and techniques to Mutual Gains Bargaining. This approach is used by Cornell
University's Program for Employment and Workplace Systems (PEWS).
Opening Discussion: The Big Picture
This is the preparation phase where each side constructs a list of interests instead of constructing
positions. Union and management team members sit dispersed around a table (as opposed to traditional
negotiations where parties sit across from each other) and openly and honestly discuss their interests
and concerns regarding an issue. Lists of interests should be made separately at first, although ultimately
you may be able to construct the lists together.
List the interest underlying the positions
This is a pre-bargaining phase in which each side exchanges their interests and concerns. This is not a
wish list or a list of outcomes wanted. Team members analyze all interests, and focus in on those that
are mutual. Many times both parties are surprised by how many common interests they have. The
parties then agree on the process for bargaining.
List options (Inventing not deciding)
You have now entered the bargaining process. The parties will find an outside facilitator useful, until
confidence in the process develops. In this context the facilitator is a facilitator to the process, not to
either party. Once both parties are familiar with the process, team members can take turns serving as
facilitators and recorders of information if desired. 
Once interests have been identified and examined, the parties participate in a brainstorming process to
develop a series of potential solutions and options for each interest. The information is shared openly
among both bargaining teams and the potential solutions and options are listed without assessing their
feasibility. A list is then complied of both parties' interests.
Try to arrive at some standards
Once options are developed, the groups agree upon a set of objective standards to use in evaluating the
options. It is during this phase that the parties decide what data they need to analyze issues or concerns,
and gather the data jointly. The parties then brainstorm again to compile another list of interests, which
is refined and polished through discussion until a consensus is reached.
Evaluation Options (DECIDING)
Finally, through open discussion, the teams begin to apply the objective standards and identify those
potential solutions and options on which team members can reach consensus. The groups also identify
what is clearly unrealistic and eliminate those options. This is a process for distinguishing the options that
meet your interests. As options are agreed upon, together union and management team members draft
contract language and a bargaining history for final review and consensus approval by the full team.
Labor-management cooperation is the key to having an effective relationship between unions and
management while keeping the public sector competitive and viable. Mutual Gains bargaining is not a cure all
solution, and does not prevent the different parties from disagreeing with each other on issues. Under this
process, however, disagreements neither affect the overall relationship, or the ability to resolve other issues.
The parties can agree to disagree, but disputed issues will be resolved through the MGB process. For labor-
management cooperation to result, two powerful institutions (union and management) must respect each
other and work together to achieve mutual interests whenever possible.
Mutual Gains is more than just a process. It is a cultural change in philosophy that cannot occur without
careful preparation. As an organization begins to implement contracts using Mutual Gains to effect changes in
working, trained union and management officials will need to jointly train other supervisors, union officials,
and employees on the process, contract topic, and key contractual terms. Both parties will need to continue
to work together to implement and effectively administer these contracts.
 Keys to Interest Based Bargaining Success
There are a number of key factors in making win-win negotiations and labor- management cooperation
successful.
Stick to the Process. Labor and management must be committed to MGB. They must communicate with
each other, understand each other's needs and interests, and pursue answers that benefit both groups.
Share Information to Build Trust. Sincerity, openness, and honesty are fundamental in building trust
between labor and management.
Set an Example. During negotiations, and during day-to-day contract, the administration, union leaders
and managers need to set an example of open communication for all to follow.
Do What You Say. Trust and rapport are key for making labor management cooperation work. Labor and
management leaders must follow through on their promises and be open and honest with each other.
Isolate the Problem from the People. Often people tend to link the problem with the people, and a
conflict of personalities emerges. Some people will not accept a new approach and will be subversive to
both groups' mutual interests. These individuals will need to be removed, and concentration should be
placed on the majority of managers and employees who prefer the cooperative model.
Long-term Partnership. Partnership does not end when the contracts are finalized. The conclusion of the
Mutual Gains Bargaining process is the initiation of a long-term partnership between union and
management. Both groups need to develop a system for cooperative change extending beyond the
duration of the contract.
 Union and Management's Benefits
For the union and management, the primary question centers on what cooperation will mean for both groups
in the short and long run. The union can use MGB as a way to empower workers and their institutions to
shape their lives at work. In, Mutual Gains: A Guide to Union-Management Cooperation, authors Rosenthal &
Burton identify the benefits for unions and management. Union Benefits Include:
Increased access to information, and prenotification of changes in work arrangements and technology.
Increased input, which helps management avoid errors or decisions that would hurt union membership.
Work satisfaction may increase.
Union may be able to address a broader range of personal concerns.
Members concerns are resolved more quickly and fully.
Membership, education and skill levels increase.
In the public sector, management must make the organization as effective as possible to meet the needs and
expectations of citizens and their legislative authorities. Authors Rosenthal & Burton also identify the benefits
for management. Management's benefits include:
Improved management effectiveness.
Increased organizational flexibility.
Improved working environment.
Enhanced productivity.
The Mutual Gains bargaining approach establishes that common ground can be located, mutual interests
identified, and cooperative relationships between unions and management built.
 Resources
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees -(AFSCME)
Interest-Based Bargaining
http://www.igc.org/afscme/bargtabl/cbr3a.htm
Redesigning Government
http://www.igc.org/afscme/wrkplace/redgo.htm
Fisher, Roger, & Ury, William. Getting to Yes. Penguin Books: New York, New York. 1991.
This is the classic work, where many of the Mutual Gains philosophy originate from.
Flaherty, Benard. "Mutual Gains Negotiating A Skills Workshop." Cornell University.
This is a training manual from a two-day training session offered by Cornell University's ILR
Extension department, and conducted by Mr. Flaherty. Because of the initial difficulties involved in
starting the MGB process, it is strongly suggested groups interested in Mutual Gains Bargaining
engage in some type of formal training.
Kochan, Thomas, & Osterman, Paul. The Mutual Gains Enterprise. Harvard Business School Press: Boston,
Massachusetts. 1994.
This work brings together the authors recent work on labor market and employment policies with
their work on the human resource strategies and labor management practices of individual firms.
The book supplies a lot of theoretical and practical approaches to Mutual Gains Bargaining.
Program for Employment and Workplace Systems (PEWS) http://www.ILR.cornell.edu/depts/extension/PEWS
To get more information on Mutual Gains and training. The Program for Employment and Workplace
Systems (PEWS) works jointly with union and management groups to design and implement
organizational changes and work restructuring. PEWS works in the public and private sector on
issues such as work flow and job redesign, quality improvement, problem solving and team building,
alternative compensation, union-management relationships, and collective bargaining and workplace
negotiations. PEWS also works with industry groups, economic development areas, and union
internationals on participative design, strategic planning, and problem-solving processes.
Rosenthal & Burton's , Mutual Gains: A Guide to Union-Management Cooperation. ILR Press, Cornell
University: Ithaca, NY, 1993.
This book is about why and how to cooperate in ways that lead to mutual gains for both the union
and management. This work lays out the theoretical and practical aspects of implementing Mutual
Gains.
California Teachers Association: http://www.ctarrce.org/ctaibb.htm
Schools and the education industry are increasingly becoming huge users and supporters of Mutual
Gains. CTA helps public school teachers create the best possible learning conditions for California's
children. Through collective bargaining and legislation, CTA is working to create a safe and positive
learning environment for all children.
 Training
For Access to Formal MGB Training See:
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/extension/mgmtprog/LR304.htm
This is a workshop in Management programs, Labor Relations, and Mutual Gains Negotiation offered by ILR
Extension at Cornell University. The goal of this workshop is to teach how to realize bargaining objectives by
focusing the negotiation process on interests as opposed to the use of power and rights at the collective
bargaining table. It will increase your proficiency in:
How to avoid taking positions that lead to conflict
How to explore interests with the intent to realize mutual resolution of issues
Exploring the possibilities of joint gains for management and unions
Turning negotiations marked by disputes into a process that emphasizes collaboration and improved
relationships
http://www.research.cornell.edu/VPR/CenterDir/PEWS.html
Cornell's Program for Employment and Workplace Systems (PEWS) works jointly with union and management
groups to design and implement organizational changes and work restructuring. PEWS works in the public and
private sector on issues such as work flow and job redesign, quality improvement, problem solving and team
building, alternative compensation, union-management relationships, and collective bargaining and workplace
negotiations. PEWS also works with industry groups, economic development areas, and union internationals
on participative design, strategic planning, and problem-solving processes.
http://www.ctarrce.org/ctaibb.htm
Interest-Based Bargaining is a three-day program in which Management and Association bargaining teams are
trained together and learn to improve their table skills using the "interest-based" methodology. The program's
philosophy emphasizes that successful bargaining rests on the ability of the parties to achieve shared goals
without undermining either party's ability to attain their separate goals or protect their traditional rights and
responsibilities. It is co-trained by California Teachers Association (CTA) staff and school district
representatives.
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 Executive Summary
The public sector, particularly local government, is under pressure to simultaneously improve performance and curtail
costs. Reductions in state and federal funding, a continuing demand for efficient and flexible government services, and
fear of tax revolts are leading to reexaminations of how local governments can best meet the demand for their services.
Governments are utilizing a number of tools for restructuring service delivery to increase efficiency and reduce costs.
In our background research, we identified two types of restructuring: external restructuring, where a government turns
to outside organizations to provide services (through privatization or intermunicipal cooperation, for example), and
internal restructuring, which seeks to improve service delivery by altering organizational structure and decision-making
processes. High levels of public sector unionization in New York State make internal restructuring through labor-
management cooperation an especially important alternative. Through case studies of three New York State counties,
we examined the use of three specific tools for labor-management cooperation: labor-management committees,
mutual-gains bargaining (MGB), and total quality management (TQM). Genesee, Tompkins, and Ontario Counties
were chosen as cases where at least two of these three internal restructuring tools have been implemented successfully.
We found that these cooperative workplace structures improve communication and broaden participation in decision
making, leading to greatly improved labor-management relations and employee morale. They may also reduce costs
and improve service delivery. However, limited evaluation in the three counties makes savings and service
improvements difficult to document.
These tools appear to fall on a continuum of complexity, investment costs, and comprehensiveness. Labor-
management committees provide a foundation for the other tools by building an ongoing forum for communication and
trust building. They are flexible, deal with a wide array of concerns, and require minimal training. Mutual-gains
bargaining requires more training and, in our cases, a preexisting environment of trust. While there are spillover
benefits to other areas, MGB is primarily limited to contract negotiations. TQM is the most comprehensive of the three
tools and requires the greatest degree of training and organizational culture change to be effective. It also may offer the
greatest potential for service improvement.
The case study counties all enjoyed a preexisting environment of trust, committed leadership, and lack of political or
fiscal crisis. Given the investments in training and change in perspective required of labor, management, and elected
officials, implementation of these tools may be more successful in counties not experiencing crisis or a recent history
of labor-management conflict.
These internal restructuring tools are not designed to address external stakeholders. Service improvements may be
limited by higher-level policies and mandates these tools cannot address. Similarly, citizen involvement is not
enhanced by these tools. However, by creating new forums for communication and participatory decision making, local
government enhances its ability to identify and implement programs for service improvement. Adding mechanisms for
citizen involvement and strategies to push for needed policy change at higher levels may further increase local
government's capacity to restructure to meet the needs of its diverse constituents.
 Introduction
The public sector is under pressure to simultaneously improve performance and curtail costs, and this is particularly
true of local government. Reductions in state and federal funding, tax revolts, and the advent of privatization are
leading to reexaminations of how local governments can best meet the demand for their services. Keeping taxes down
while delivering the quality services that citizens expect is a difficult challenge. Local government must become more
efficient and more accountable to the general public.
External Restructuring
External restructuring, which involves privatization or contracting out for services, can create a competitive
environment and result in increased efficiency and cost savings (Savas 1987). In New York State, however,
privatization has been limited (Lauder 1992). A 1997 survey of local government restructuring in the state found
intermunicipal cooperation to be the most common form of restructuring (45% of respondents). Privatization was the
next most common form of restructuring (31%), but reverse privatization (bringing services back into the public sector)
was also significant (Warner and Hebdon 1997). This suggests that local governments in New York State recognize the
value of both cooperation and competition in improving service delivery.
Privatization can create an uneasy or even hostile environment between labor and management. It can result in lower
wages, benefits, and levels of unionization (Hebdon 1995; Chandler and Feuille 1991, 1994) despite government
efforts to ensure no layoffs. Some empirical studies have shown the impacts of contracting on unionized workers' pay
and employment to be minimal (Pendleton 1997). However, lowered employee morale and fears about job security
have significant negative effects on the potential for a cooperative relationship. In addition, public sector unions must
fight privatization if they are to retain their membership base (CSEA 1995).
In New York State, public sector collective bargaining is governed by the Taylor Law, which mandates that employers
negotiate with the union before contracting out a service that is essentially the same as one union members currently
provide. Thus the Taylor Law is often perceived as a roadblock to privatization. However, under some circumstances,
New York State's governments may contract out services without negotiating with the union, and they also may
downsize when there is no longer the need for a particular service or when financial circumstances demand it.
Nonetheless, collective bargaining restrictions under the Taylor Law may limit opportunities for contracting out. This
makes the search for other, more cooperative methods for implementing workplace innovations essential for local
government restructuring in New York State (Donovan 1990; Lawyers Co-operative Publishing 1982).
Internal Restructuring for Transforming Government
In their well-known book Reinventing Government (1992), David Osborne and Ted Gaebler argue that a sweeping
overhaul of how government does business can be achieved through internal restructuring. They describe this as a
move from a supply-driven system to a demand-driven system. The rigidity of budgeting, service delivery, and the
labor-management relationship in traditional supply-driven governments, they argue, must be replaced by flexible,
quality-oriented systems that are responsive to customers' needs. Internal competition and more cooperative labor-
management relationships can provide an effective alternative to privatization for improving government efficiency.
Decentralization of authority can help government achieve better performance. The private sector has demonstrated
that decentralizing authority and flattening hierarchies can be very effective in improving efficiency and product
quality (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). Giving decision-making power to front-line workers, who are closest to most of
the problems and opportunities, and encouraging employee innovation are important steps (Marshall 1992). Direct
citizen participation is also vital to improving government services (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Osborne and Plastrik
1997).
Total quality management (TQM) is one vehicle for internal restructuring. TQM programs are being used to transform
government, especially at the federal level, but also in New York State and in more than 400 municipalities nationwide
(Rusaw 1997, U.S. GAO 1995, New York State GOER 1992). TQM emphasizes an organization's commitment to the
customer and to continuous improvement of every process through the use of data-driven problem-solving approaches
based on empowerment of employee groups and teams. Cooperative processes such as TQM help to create a culture
change, perhaps the most important requirement for transforming the public sector.
The Potential of Labor-Management Cooperation
Traditional industrial relations practices relied on the acceptance of a shared ideology among labor, management, and
government that defined workplace roles and provided stability to the system. The 1990s saw the development of a
new model, one that recognizes there is often a lack of consensus between management and labor, and that both are
greatly impacted by the instability in economic, technological, political, and social environments. In this context,
methods that focus on building communication and cooperation between management and labor offer considerable
promise (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994).
Cooperative labor-management structures such as labor-management committees, total quality management (TQM)
programs, and mutual-gains bargaining can be used effectively in the public sector. While the public sector is distinct
in many ways from the private sector, it can learn from the experiences of private firms in implementing some of these
progressive labor-management practices (Lawler 1990).
However, resistance to cooperative practices can be substantial. Any of the major stakeholders in the process—
management, elected officials, and labor—may resist the change for different reasons, making transition difficult and
time-consuming. Managers may resent their loss of authority and harbor doubts that productivity gains can be attained
through these methods. Elected officials may be hesitant to accept the political risks of instituting change. Unions may
perceive cooperative structures as a ploy to weaken labor and divert attention from basic issues such as wages and job
security. They also fear that by increasing workplace efficiency, they are putting their jobs in jeopardy (Gold 1986). In
addition, participation may not necessarily give workers any real power.
Cooperative tools are inherently limited, since many fundamental decisions about organizational structure and work
processes still remain in the domain of upper management. This is a commonly cited drawback to programs such as
TQM (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). But more and more it is being recognized that all interested parties (labor,
management, elected officials, customers) should have a voice in decision making, and that valuable production
knowledge resides in all levels of an organization, especially with front-line workers (Marshall 1992). Having been
implemented in the private sector with success, cooperative techniques are clearly beginning to take hold in public
sector workplaces, as evidenced by the many examples profiled in the U.S Department of Labor report Working
Together for Public Service, better known as the Florio Report (1996).
The literature indicates that effects of labor-management cooperation on the ability of local government to undertake
internal restructuring and to improve service delivery are worth examining. While obstacles clearly exist, with effort,
many of the barriers to labor-management cooperation can be overcome (Gold 1986). By profiling counties where
several tools of labor-management cooperation have been employed successfully, we hope to add to the existing
knowledge of how these specific tools can be used to improve local government services.
 Methodology
Initial research for this project was conducted in collaboration with the New York State Civil Service Employees
Association (CSEA), the New York State Association of Counties (NYSAC), and the New York State Department of
State's (DOS) Division of Local Government. Representatives from each of these groups were interviewed for their
perspectives on and concerns about local government restructuring. The team found, through these discussions, that
public sector management was searching for ways to improve internal and external operations, while labor was
interested in exploring ways to prevent privatization of services. We hypothesized that labor-management cooperation
can reduce costs and increase service quality, diminishing the impetus for privatization.
Further interviews with key informants helped the team focus on the relevant issues surrounding labor-management
cooperation and identify the types of labor-management tools being employed in counties throughout New York State.
Key informants included: CSEA, NYSAC, DOS, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), the Governor's
Office of Employee Relations (GOER), staff and faculty of Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, and elected officials from counties which had implemented some form of cooperation (see Appendix A for
complete list).
We found that formal labor-management cooperative initiatives were not widely used in the state, but that a handful of
both exemplary and semi-successful cases did exist. In the majority of cases, the most commonly implemented tools
were labor-management committees, mutual-gains bargaining (MGB), and total quality management (TQM) programs.
As a result, the team decided to focus on these three initiatives as tools of the labor-management cooperative process.
A 1997 survey of local government restructuring in New York State provided a preliminary indication of the incidence
of privatization and restructuring in NYS counties (Warner and Hebdon 1997)1. Twelve of the counties that responded
to this survey indicated they had used cooperative labor-management initiatives. Key informants provided names of
counties which had participated in TQM or mutual-gains bargaining training, or had implemented labor-management
committees2. The research team then selected three counties—Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins—which had been
successful in implementing formal labor-management cooperation.
To explore our hypothesis that labor-management cooperative efforts could be an attractive alternative to privatization,
the following key questions were formulated for the case studies based on the preliminary interviews and relevant
literature:
What are the basic elements of a cooperative labor-management relationship in county government?
What are the goals that labor, management, and county officials hope to achieve through cooperation?
What is the impact of a cooperative labor-management program on labor relations, service quality, and cost of
service delivery?
These key questions reflect an attempt to describe the process of labor-management cooperation. Therefore, the chosen
research method for the project is that of a case study, a descriptive research tool (Yin 1984).
The case study counties were selected on the following criteria:
Utilizing several tools of labor-management cooperation. Having examined in our preliminary investigation
several counties that had implemented one cooperative tool with marginal success, the team hypothesized that
several tools may be necessary to substantively change the relationship between management and labor. Thus we
chose counties that had implemented more than one of the cooperative tools identified: total quality
management, labor-management committees, or mutual-gains bargaining.
Key informant recommendations. The case study selection was also based on the beliefs of key informants listed
in Appendix A that these counties were among the more successful of New York State in implementing
cooperative labor-management efforts.
Willingness to participate and proximity. Cases were selected on the basis of the willingness and ability of the
counties to provide us with the necessary access to personnel and resources. Geographic proximity to Ithaca was
also a consideration due to time constraints.
In each case, every attempt was made to interview one or more representatives from each of the three perspectives:
elected officials, management, and organized labor (see Appendix B). An interview guide (see Appendix C) was
developed to provide consistency and direction across all interviews. However, the interview format also provided
flexibility for open-ended responses, so that the elements, advantages, challenges, and lessons of labor-management
cooperative initiatives could be fully explored. Interviewees were able to respond to questions and expand on their
ideas verbally, in a manner that a survey does not allow.
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the majority of interviewees. When this was not possible, interviews
were conducted by telephone. Interviews were summarized and shared with interviewees for review. Where necessary,
follow-up interviews were conducted by telephone.
The research team compared the cases, discussing the commonalities and differences across them. Preconditions, goals,
and limitations of the three tools of labor-management cooperation studied were emphasized. The analysis was written
as a draft report and shared with the key informants in the case study counties. Their comments were incorporated into
the final report. Permission to share the information contained in this report with the public was obtained from all
county officials and staff who were interviewed.
 Findings
The case study counties—Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins—are located in central and western New York State.
Genesee County has a population of about 60,000, while Ontario and Tompkins each have about 95,000 residents.
Politically, Genesee and Ontario are governed by Republican-dominated legislatures and Tompkins currently has a
Democrat-controlled board. All three counties have an appointed full-time county manager or administrator. This is
the most common form of county government in New York State3. The presence of a professional, full-time manager
was a control factor across these three counties. The ability to generalize findings to other counties with county
executives or no full-time, professional manager may be limited. However, key informants familiar with cooperative
efforts across the state indicate that strong leadership and support for change appear to be more important to successful
implementation than type of governance structure.
Additionally, the environment between labor and management in all three cases was found to be generally cooperative,
or at least noncombative, prior to the implementation of cooperative initiatives. Therefore, this study cannot speak to
counties where an adversarial relationship between labor and management is present.
The three labor-management tools were found to exist along a continuum of complexity, with labor-management
committees providing the foundation for the other two tools. These committees provide a flexible forum for problem
solving and building trust, and they require minimal training. Labor-management committees in all cases predated
mutual-gains bargaining and TQM. The interest-based bargaining approach of MGB required substantial training for
successful implementation. Used primarily for contract negotiations, MGB appears to have had very positive effects on
negotiation processes and outcomes, as well as positive spillover effects to other arenas of decision making. TQM was
by far the most comprehensive and complex of the three tools studied. Extensive training of labor, management, and
elected officials was required to support the culture change toward shared decision making required for a successful
TQM effort.
Key elements for successful cooperation include training, committed leadership, communication, and evaluation. In the
case study counties, improved morale, costs savings, and service improvements resulted from the use of these three
tools, suggesting they do provide an effective alternative to privatization. However, limited evaluation in the counties
prevented definitive analysis of the true costs and benefits of labor-management cooperation.
 Labor-Management Committees
Labor-management committees are cooperative structures that focus on problem solving and building trust. They
typically deal with issues including workplace safety, work hours, training, personnel issues, and daily workplace
concerns. Although labor-management committees may initially focus on less controversial issues, such as worker
safety standards, over time they may build a level of trust between labor and management that allows them to deal
with more complex problems (Gold 1986).
Labor-management committees may be permanent or they may form around a particular issue and disband once
resolution is reached. However, they are not necessarily formed to solve crises. Many are proactive and attempt to
improve current work practices. They are flexible and easy to implement, and require minimal training. Labor-
management committees are cornerstones of cooperation in each of the counties studied.
Structure
The labor-management committees in Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties are similar in terms of their goals:
enhanced labor-management relations, decreased costs, and improved services. Each county has a central guiding or
umbrella committee that oversees the activities of issue-based or departmental labor-management subcommittees. They
may facilitate training and provide direction to subcommittees or they may address specific program innovations or
daily operations. All three counties implemented labor-management committees before mutual-gains bargaining and
total quality management.
There are differences in how each county uses the committees, however. In Ontario County, where such committees
have existed since the early 1980s, they operate independently of the TQM program. Ontario County has a countywide
committee, committees that operate within departments, and others that address specific issues, such as safety and
health.
Tompkins County's labor-management committees, which have existed since the mid-1980s, now function as part of
its TQM program. Prior to the inception of the TQM program, non-union members who volunteered or were voted in
by all employees were allowed to serve on labor-management committees. Under the total quality management
agreement negotiated between the CSEA and the county board of representatives, now there are more committees, and
only union-selected representatives may serve on them (see the total quality management section, below).
Genesee County does not have a TQM program, and their labor-management committees are the main venue for
workplace innovation. There is one main committee for the general bargaining unit, which covers most county
departments, and a separate committee for the nursing home unit.
Representation
Labor-management committees are composed of representatives of management and the union. Only in Tompkins
County were legislators also included. Tompkins County's umbrella committee has 13 members, including
representatives from top management, middle management, and labor. In Ontario County, the countywide committee is
made up of the county administrator, deputy administrator, director of human resources, and several of the local union
presidents. In Genesee County, the general unit committee consists of the county manager, the personnel officer, the
CSEA general unit president, and the regional labor relations specialist, as well as two more representatives from both
management and labor who rotate onto the committee in three-year intervals. This provides more people an
opportunity to be part of the process. Size of the committees varies according to the scope of the issue and the need for
stakeholder input. Most have eight or fewer members, but at least one committee in Tompkins County has over twenty
members.
Functions
In all counties, labor-management committees address a broad spectrum of workplace concerns. In Genesee County,
the general unit committee emphasizes relationships and creating an environment where employees feel their input is
valued and decisions are made by consensus. The labor-management committee has introduced policies that create a
more family-oriented environment.
Labor-management committees can also be forums for discussing alternatives to privatization proposals. In Ontario
County, labor has the opportunity to give their input before a decision to privatize a service is made by the
administration. In Genesee County, labor and management formed a special joint action committee to address the
threat of possible privatization in the Department of Mental Health Services.
Labor-management committees can impact the delivery of government services by finding ways to reduce costs while
maintaining or improving the service itself. While hard data documenting the impact of innovations on cost was
difficult to obtain, workers' compensation costs were significantly reduced in Tompkins County as a result of safety
measures and training recommended by a labor-management committee (prior to the implementation of TQM). In
Genesee County, labor-management committee recommendations and process improvements have led to cost savings
through reduced absenteeism, increased productivity, and decreased supervision time. Their nursing home committee
has helped the facility improve efficiency and avoid privatization. Client surveys in Ontario and Tompkins Counties
have indicated overall improvements in services.
Labor-management committees do not address contract disputes or grievances, although they appear to be effective in
defusing potential problems before they reach the grievance stage. All three counties credited labor-management
committees for helping to keep the number of formal grievances low.
Role and Authority of Committees
There is great flexibility in how roles are defined for labor-management committees. Tompkins County has a formal
agreement defining the roles, expectations, and boundaries of authority for the Leadership Council, which took one
year to negotiate and which clearly outlines the scope of the committee process. Genesee County has less formal
written guidelines that articulate the goals and procedures of the committee. The authority of the labor-management
committee is not written into a contract but is accepted by both parties. Ontario County's labor-management committee
is well entrenched and seems to function effectively without a written agreement.
Labor-management committees have varying degrees of authority and power. In some cases, their policy
recommendations are binding, while in others they merely offer suggestions that must gain the approval of elected
officials. This is often the case when budget or cost decisions are involved. Committees in Ontario County are
empowered to draft letters of agreement around issues that would normally be addressed through contract negotiations.
In some cases, the use of labor-management committees may impact traditional lines of authority. Middle managers
may lose some of their decision-making authority because employees can voice concerns directly to top levels of
management through the committee. In Ontario County this was an issue, but in Genesee and Tompkins Counties,
middle managers are included on committees.
Training/Support
Training committee members in conflict resolution and consensus decision making may help committees work more
smoothly. Training sessions allow both groups to establish their commitment to the concept and to forge cooperative
relationships. For example, in the Genesee County Nursing Home, a half-day training session for the entire staff
helped them use their labor-management committee more effectively. In this case, a CSEA facilitator from Albany was
used. The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and Cornell's Industrial and Labor Relations Extension are
other valuable sources of training and information. It is important to recognize, however, that there may be a
significant time lag after training before measurable results are seen.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties, which had longer-standing labor-management committees, have invested more in
training for mutual-gains bargaining techniques and total quality management than for labor-management committees.
Relationships
Labor-management committees can be contentious because they bring together individuals with diverse points of
view. Strong leadership, good communication, and commitment to the process make the difference between success
and failure. Without these elements it is difficult, if not impossible, to build the necessary level of trust to make a
labor-management committee work. Both Tompkins and Genesee Counties had attempted labor-management
committees in the past, with limited scope and success. By focusing on relationships, building trust, and gaining the
commitment of leadership they were able to establish the successful committees that operate today. One strategy used
was to begin by addressing issues that are less contentious, to build momentum so committees can tackle larger, more
difficult problems in the future. This increases the level of trust among committee members and reduces the potential
for early conflict.
Employee morale has been greatly improved in the counties studied. There are still conflicts and differences of
opinion, but labor-management committees provide a mechanism for giving voice to these problems before they
become intractable.
Challenges and Limitations
Several challenges in implementing labor-management committees are evident:
Time is required to build the trust necessary for effective committees.
They have limited authority: they are not designed to make decisions about broad structural changes in county
operations.
Defining the appropriate roles and boundaries of committees is important: many problems lie beyond the scope
of committees and call for wider participation of elected officials and citizens.
Conclusion
Labor-management committees are excellent forums for communication and workplace problem solving. They are
flexible and require minimal training, which also makes them inexpensive. In all three counties, good communication,
strong relationships, committed leadership, and trust proved to be the most important factors for committee success.
While the most compelling impact seen was on labor-management relations, committee efforts also led to
improvements in county government functioning. Labor-management committees are relatively easy to implement and
provide a foundation for incorporating more sophisticated tools, such as mutual-gains bargaining and total quality
management, into an organization.
The following are recommendations to consider for labor-management committees:
Establish a central, guiding committee to oversee the endeavor.
Integrate committees into the organizational structure.
Define expectations and parameters for decision making.
Include as many stakeholders as possible and necessary.
Communicate and foster a shared understanding of goals and objectives for both the committee and the
organization.
Be cognizant of power differentials and the effect these may have on communication.
Address issues where it is easy to reach consensus at the outset in order to build momentum to tackle more
difficult topics.
 Mutual-Gains Bargaining
Mutual-gains bargaining (MGB) is a method of bargaining designed to dramatically improve the quality of contract
negotiations and increase the likelihood of compliance between labor and management, ultimately benefiting their
constituents. The mutual-gains process focuses on negotiations based on interests rather than positions and on building
consensus. Through this process, unions and management identify at least one common goal and find ways to jointly
accomplish that goal (Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton 1993). While MGB can be used for many types of negotiations,
the case studies focused on its use for contract negotiations. Ontario County has been using mutual-gains bargaining
since 1994, Tompkins County since 1995, and Genesee County since 1996.
Preconditions
All three counties had existing cooperative labor-management relationships in place before the initiation of MGB.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties indicated they had been using interest-based bargaining techniques informally for
years, and that they moved to MGB as a way of formalizing the process. This leads us to speculate that counties that
have good labor-management relationships may be more apt to implement MGB because the idea of cooperating isn't
very radical to them and there is less distrust between labor and management to overcome. Genesee County, however,
was less satisfied with their standard negotiation process and wanted to use MGB to improve the quality of
negotiations.
Benefits
Mutual-gains bargaining led to smoother contract negotiations in all three counties. This was especially true in
Genesee, where labor and management agreed the new techniques were far more productive than previous
negotiations. Perhaps because Ontario and Tompkins Counties already had well-established cooperative structures that
resembled MGB in place, the changes were less dramatic, but in both counties labor and management spoke positively
about the effects of MGB techniques on the negotiating process.
MGB can be used to empower workers and strengthen their organizations, as well as to shape their lives at work. The
benefits include increased access to information, prenotification of changes in work arrangements and technology, and
increased input, which helps management avoid errors or decisions that would hurt union membership. There is also an
indication that work satisfaction may increase, and the union may be able to address a broader range of members'
concerns more quickly and fully. In addition, the literature on the subject indicates that union membership, education,
and skill levels increase.
In the public sector, management must make the organization as effective as possible to meet the needs and
expectations of citizens and their legislative authorities. Management's benefits include improved effectiveness,
increased organizational flexibility, an improved working environment, and enhanced productivity (Cohen-Rosenthal
and Burton, 1993).
Labor and management in the case study counties agree MGB has saved a lot of time. The use of MGB allowed
Genesee County to complete their last contract in about a month, whereas it used to take up to six or seven months.
The same is true for Tompkins County, where labor and management found the salary issue was on the table faster
than ever before, in part because the economy was doing well, but also as a result of MGB.
Neither management nor labor see MGB as a panacea, but both concede that both parties walk away from the
negotiating process feeling better. While both labor and management in Ontario County are pleased with MGB, the
union appears to favor the process a bit more. CSEA representatives felt that MGB would definitely be used in the
future. At least one manager, on the other hand, was of the opinion that MGB was a bit "tedious" and might not be
used in the next contract because levels of trust were already high. In Tompkins County, labor felt that the "win-win"
solutions that MGB is supposed to create often result in compromises. Management respected the process, but felt it
was nothing new in comparison to the way they interacted in the past.
Leadership
The commitment of top management and union leaders to MGB is very important to its success. Some people will find
it difficult to accept a new approach and will be subversive to both groups' mutual interests. In some cases, a change in
leadership was necessary before a county could effectively implement MGB. In Ontario and Genesee Counties, for
example, changes in union and/or management leadership preceded their formal implementation of MGB.
During negotiations, and during day-to-day interaction, the administration, union leaders, and managers need to set an
example of open communication for all to follow. Labor and management must be committed to MGB. They must
communicate with each other, understand each other's needs and interests, and pursue answers that benefit both
groups. Tompkins, Genesee, and Ontario Counties' MGB efforts had the support of top management.
Training
Mutual-gains bargaining requires a change in philosophy that cannot occur without careful preparation. Unlike
traditional collective bargaining, mutual-gains bargaining operates on trust and open information sharing, and as
simple as the concept might be, it is critical that labor, management, and legislators receive training before they decide
to embark on mutual gains. While legislators do not participate in negotiation, it is important they understand and
support the process.
In their efforts to implement MGB, Ontario, Genesee, and Tompkins Counties all turned to the New York State School
of Industrial and Labor Relations Extension for training. Tompkins County trained 300 out of 720 employees in MGB
before its formal implementation in 1995, and had few problems. Now all bargaining units in Tompkins County
(except the sheriff's department) use mutual-gains techniques for all terms except salary. In the case of Genesee
County, the assistant county manager was trained to facilitate the negotiations, while Ontario and Tompkins used
outside facilitators. Although Genesee's general unit contract was successfully negotiated using MGB in a much
shorter period of time than was typical, the negotiating process was still very challenging, and the rank and file
expressed skepticism about the initial contract. Because of the distrust that traditionally exists between the two groups,
it may help to use an outside facilitator at the outset. Even with training, it can take employees and management time
to learn to trust and accept the process.
Challenges
MGB can benefit both labor and management, but it can also be risky to both parties. Both union leaders and
management are in danger of being perceived as too close to the "adversary"— legislators may fear management is
being too easy on the union, while union members may fear their leadership is being "co-opted." Since the union is
negotiating the terms and conditions of employment for its members, it has more at stake. The open negotiation process
inherently requires each side to relinquish some of its negotiating power and may limit the union's ability to act as a
unified group. In Tompkins County, the union has not yet agreed to negotiate salary using mutual-gains bargaining
techniques largely for these reasons.
Mutual-gains bargaining is a process that was developed in the private sector to increase labor-management
cooperation, but also to aid downsizing efforts. MGB inherently cuts out middle management as the mediators between
labor and top management. In Ontario County, for example, middle managers were resistant to MGB, as it appeared to
take some of their authority away.
Finally, because mutual-gains bargaining is a tool which is used only during contract negotiation time, it is limited in
its ability to have a direct impact on the daily interaction between labor and management. However, there were
important "spillover" effects of mutual-gains bargaining training to other venues such as labor-management
committees and total quality management teams.
Conclusion
Interest-based bargaining appears to save money and time, and have positive effects on labor-management
relationships. MGB resulted in quicker contract negotiation where both parties walked away feeling better about the
process and the outcome. However, as with other similar labor-management cooperative methods, it is difficult to
quantify the results of MGB. For example, Ontario County tries to quantify cost savings whenever possible but finds it
difficult to assign a dollar value to the intangible benefits of their cooperative efforts. The counties studied did not
establish evaluation measures to determine what impact (positive or negative) MGB has made.
 Total Quality Management (TQM)
While Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties have all implemented labor-management committees and mutual-
gains bargaining, only Ontario and Tompkins Counties have instituted total quality management (TQM) initiatives.
Ontario County began to implement total quality management in 1993, Tompkins County in 1994.
Total quality management represents a shift in management philosophy from autocratic, hierarchical decision-making
structures to flatter organizational structures and shared decision-making responsibility (Kursat and Calicchia 1994). In
the past few decades, following the model of the private sector, local governments have come to realize that top-down
management is not always the best way to achieve results and that line workers have valuable contributions to make in
identifying strategies for improvement (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).
In Tompkins and Ontario Counties, total quality management has changed the way decisions are made, processes are
designed, and labor and management interact. Informants describe total quality management programs as a "visceral
change," a "paradigm shift," and a "culture change." Both counties' total quality management programs are new, and
therefore conclusions about the programs' impacts and differences between them are tentative.
Three Components: Shared Decision Making, Customer Focus, Management by Fact
Total quality management initiatives have three primary components according to Kursat and Calicchia (1994):
1. Shared leadership and employee involvement
Total quality management programs are based in part on the idea that employees performing the work can create
more efficient and effective processes to produce a higher-quality product. Total quality management programs
typically establish formal structures such as labor-management committees for sharing decision making between
managers and front-line employees.
2. Customer focus and an emphasis on service and product quality
TQM focuses on the needs and wants of two types of customers: "internal" customers—the next people down the
line in the work process—and "external" customers—those who purchase or utilize a good or service. TQM
seeks to improve the quality of both the product and the process by identifying the type and quality of good
desired by both internal and external customers and providing what each customer wants. This can be difficult,
since in the public sector, external customers include the people using a good or service but also the people
paying for the good (taxpayers) and their representatives (elected officials).
3. Management by fact and continual improvement
Total quality management encourages steady data collection and rational decision making based on data rather
than on impressions or uninformed opinions. Labor-management committees are one way to collect data about
many facets of a complex issue. Others include customer surveys and careful tracking and documentation of any
cost or time savings. The second component, a philosophy of continual improvement, encourages employees and
managers to exceed current standards. Continuous improvement is achieved through constant experimentation,
learning from mistakes, and diffusing learning throughout the organization.
Goals
In both Tompkins and Ontario Counties, the goals of total quality management most often articulated by managers and
employees were to improve labor-management relations and work conditions, leading to a more smoothly functioning
organization. All parties also expressed a desire to improve service quality. This desire is exemplified by Ontario
County's slogan for total quality management: "We aspire to excellence." In Tompkins County, elected officials' goals
focused primarily on service improvement and cost savings.
Training
Participatory methods of decision making, identifying customer needs, and determining what kind of data to collect
and how to collect it require skills of employees and managers that are not inborn or traditionally taught in schools or
in the workplace. Thus, to effectively implement a total quality management program and achieve the paradigm shift
required for success, training is essential.
Of the two counties, Tompkins has conducted more extensive training and spent more money. Tompkins County's
Leadership Council (the labor-management committee charged with planning and managing the total quality
management program) has the goal of training all employees, managers, and elected officials in quality methods.
Initial training sessions were conducted by consultants, who are still involved in the process. In the fall of 1996,
however, the county hired a full-time training coordinator, and now more sessions are conducted by in-house staff.
Between 1994 and 1997, Tompkins County spent just over $300,000 for outside consultants to conduct training. In
1998, the county will spend an estimated $170,000 on consultants to complete the bulk of the training. Since 1997, in-
house costs have been around $100,000. These costs will drop dramatically after 1998, when all employees, managers,
and elected officials will have been trained in total quality management techniques and only training for new
employees and refresher courses will be necessary.
Ontario County appears to have spent significantly less on their training program, particularly on outside consultants.
Initially both labor and management leaders as well as county legislators were trained at the Rochester Institute of
Technology. Initial training cost $35,000 for employees and $50,000 for supervisors, managers, and elected officials.
The county gradually built their capacity to do training in-house, and today all county employees have been trained in
TQM concepts.
It is important to remember when comparing these figures, however, that we obtained dollar amounts from Tompkins
County for both outside and in-house costs, whereas the figures reported for Ontario County's training costs are only
initial start-up costs for consultants. Still, there appears to be an appreciable difference in expenditures on consultants.
This difference may be due to the values held by county leaders. Tompkins County leaders are professionally and
personally interested in organizational theory and process, and are willing to wait for long-term results. These may be
the reasons for the strong emphasis on process and formal training. Ontario County leaders seem less interested in
process and more interested in both short- and long-term results.
Support Structures
Individuals, however well trained in new ways of thinking and doing, will not be able to maintain the culture shift
without a system of structural supports that devolve authority for decision making to labor-management teams.
Supportive structures are probably one of the largest differences between total quality management programs which
employees perceive to be "fake" and those which seem more real and effective.
Ontario County's Service Excellence program is structured around a countywide steering committee that acts as a core
planning group, setting the direction for the program and coordinating the activities of the subgroups. The four
departmental work group committees each have the same organizational structure as the steering committee and
coordinate their corresponding functions.
Tompkins County's Leadership Council includes representatives from labor, top management, middle management,
and elected officials. The Leadership Council guides the training process and the activities of departmental committees,
and facilitates the work of smaller, project-oriented or cross-functional committees.
Another support mechanism is in-house training facilitators. Currently, Tompkins County employs a full-time training
coordinator. An additional twenty employees act as facilitators, assuming leadership roles on various departmental and
issue-related committees. They lend practical support based on their understanding of TQM and committee concepts.
In addition, they are role models for other employees and managers.
Advantages
Total quality management is the most comprehensive cooperative tool for restructuring that the research team
investigated. More than labor-management committees, total quality management programs can address inefficiencies
in work processes and strive to identify customer needs. Unlike mutual-gains bargaining techniques, which are used
primarily for contract negotiations once every few years, total quality management is ongoing and suffuses all work
processes. It empowers labor to improve the workplace. In Tompkins County, for instance, labor-management relations
had been good for some time, but TQM forced managers to rethink their traditional style to allow greater employee
involvement in decision making. Employees and management now work together to solve problems, and by all
accounts, both find the new process more productive and rewarding.
The cases studied indicate that total quality management does improve the functioning of the organization, employee
morale, and labor-management relations. Based on the suggestions of a total quality management committee in the
Department of Social Services, Tompkins County streamlined the intake process for several social service programs. A
Tompkins County survey indicates that employee morale in the Department of Public Works improved 22% between
1990 and 1997. Further, since the TQM programs have been implemented, both Ontario and Tompkins Counties have
had fewer frivolous grievances as a result of increased communication and trust.
The programs have also reduced costs in both counties, although the cost savings have not always been well
documented. Tompkins County representatives believe they have saved a great deal due to improved morale and
greater efficiency. Ontario County has documented savings through the efforts of its workplace safety team. The team
project began with county safety coordinators identifying high-risk job duties, such as driving and heavy lifting, based
on local and national accident and injury data. Employees performing these tasks were then trained in safer driving
and lifting techniques, resulting in a 37% reduction of OSHA-recordable injuries in the county from 1994 to 1997.
Lost days were reduced by 60% in the same time period. As a result of these safety improvements, a special tax
assessment to pay for workers' compensation, to be spread out over five years, was paid off in only three, saving
taxpayers $1.5 million.
Limitations
Both middle managers and elected officials may resist the total quality management culture change because it devolves
supervisory and decision-making power to TQM teams and committees. While middle managers and elected officials
are formally involved in several levels of the TQM program in Tompkins County, they are absent from the committees
in Ontario County, and have understandably been more resistant to the process. Middle managers may also fear for
their jobs. Tompkins County is dealing with this issue by retaining middle managers as top-level technical employees
and ensuring their representation on the TQM committees.
Another limitation of total quality management as a tool for restructuring is its internal focus. The difficulty in
identifying the "customer" for public sector goods and services and the focus on internal work processes make it hard
to truly involve citizens in these TQM efforts. Both counties seek to identify external customer needs with surveys, and
Tompkins County includes elected representatives on committees, but neither county includes citizens on committees.
In Ontario County, citizen involvement in the TQM program is slightly greater than in Tompkins, since it includes an
advisory council made up of a select group of local business owners.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties both seem to focus more attention on internal customers, (through surveys and
participation in labor-management committees), in the belief that process improvements will result in product and
service improvements. This is not an unreasonable assumption, though it can be difficult to document. Customer
satisfaction surveys in Ontario and Tompkins Counties indicate external customers are generally satisfied with service
improvements generated by total quality management programs.
The substantial cost of total quality management training and implementation as well as the time required to reap
benefits are also limitations of total quality management as a tool for local government restructuring. Finally, because
total quality management focuses primarily on internal work processes, policy about external factors is outside its
purview. The inability to address broader policy issues may limit the ultimate impact of investments in total quality
management.
 Conclusions
Goals of Cooperative Tools and Processes
Most of our informants articulated their goal as a more smoothly functioning organization, with more creative problem
solving and positive interactions between management and labor. Managers and elected officials focused on increased
efficiency, cost savings, and improved service quality. Labor representatives expressed goals of increasing employee
participation in decision making and improving service delivery by widening employees' stake in the process and
product. Thus, improving service delivery was a goal of all parties, but with slightly different emphases. Elected
officials valued improved service delivery for its impact on citizen constituents, whereas labor representatives valued
increased service quality for its effects on job quality.
Preconditions for Success
Several conditions existed in our counties prior to the successful introduction of formalized cooperative processes.
First, the labor-management relationship in all three counties was already cooperative, or at least noncombative,
providing fertile ground in which cooperative structures could thrive. Second, all the counties we studied were in
relatively stable economic and political positions prior to establishing cooperative structures. We were not informed of
any fiscal or political crises in recent memory that might put pressure on leaders to avoid the risk-taking inherent in
cooperative initiatives. These three counties made a significant culture change not as a last-resort strategy, but as a
means to improve already functional but imperfect processes. However, the cooperative structures have proven useful
in dealing with crisis, such as the threatened sale of the nursing home in Genesee County.
We observed several other essential preconditions in our study counties. Committed, supportive leaders are required.
This sometimes necessitates a change in the legislature, county administration, or union leadership. The attitudes of
those in leadership positions proved crucial to the counties' ability to embrace the new ideas and paradigms of
cooperative tools. Furthermore, in order to buy into the new cooperative relations, middle managers and line
employees had to trust the intentions of both labor and management leaders. Even in counties where cooperative tools
have been used successfully, the departments with a lower degree of labor-management trust have been slower to
make the transition to new tools.
Impacts of Cooperation
Internal Process Improvements
The changes seen in government service delivery seem to be primarily internal in nature. Tompkins County, for
instance, streamlined its intake processes for various social services. Genesee County instituted several policies that
affect employee benefits, encouraging workplace efficiency and increased job satisfaction. The efficiency gains from
internal restructuring are thought to "trickle down" to external improvements. The Genesee County Nursing Home, for
instance, through its labor-management committee, has addressed staffing issues that are crucial to efficient
functioning and effective service delivery.
Employee Morale
The second area where impacts have been significant is employee morale, which was uniformly reported by our
informants to have improved under cooperative processes. Again, data for improvements are difficult to obtain, and
most employee surveys were completed after new structures were implemented, and therefore lack a comparative
benchmark. All counties stated the number of grievances has decreased, and the grievances that are filed are uniformly
serious in nature, the less serious problems being resolved in other forums, due to improved communication and trust.
Cost Savings
Though gains and savings have sometimes proven difficult to measure due to a fear of budget cuts to agencies that
report cost savings, the overriding sentiment is that cooperative efforts are resulting in real cost savings. Ontario
County has documented at least one instance of large financial savings in its reduction of worker compensation costs
due to a safety program implemented by a TQM committee. Genesee County's nursing home has become profitable
again in part due to the efforts of its labor-management committee.
Key Elements for Cooperation
From the case studies, we have identified a number of elements that are necessary for cooperation to be successful:
Training
First, a substantial amount of time and resources were devoted to training labor and management leaders, and more
often than not, legislators and line employees as well, in cooperative structures and processes. In Ontario and
Tompkins Counties for instance, all employees are being trained in total quality management concepts. Line employees
were less likely to be trained in mutual-gains bargaining, which is used primarily by representatives of labor and
management for the contract agreement. In Genesee County, for instance, while the assistant county manager was
trained to facilitate the negotiation process, the employees were not trained prior to the switch to mutual-gains
bargaining, and perhaps for this reason, the first contract negotiated by this method was voted down by union
members. On the other hand, the Genesee County Nursing Home sponsored a half-day training session for the entire
nursing home staff with a CSEA facilitator, which helped their labor-management committee become much more
effective. Whether or not all employees were trained, training brought about a critical shift in how members of the
organization viewed labor-management relations.
Local colleges and universities were valuable resources for training in these methods. Both Tompkins and Ontario
Counties made extensive use of nearby educational facilities.
Leadership Commitment and Support
The counties we studied all shared the presence of an appointed, professional administrator to manage the transition to
cooperative tools. However, one expert on local government told us that the form of government is less important than
the administrator or leader's commitment to the cooperative process. A high level of emotional maturity is essential, as
is the ability to work well with people and to get them to buy into the process. The case study counties possessed
leaders who were willing to work with, but ultimately hold responsible, resistant managers. The commitment of union
leadership was also an important factor. Without the willingness of the union officials in these counties to try new
ways of working with management, cooperative processes would not have been possible.
The role of elected officials was significant only to the extent they were generally supportive and did not interfere with
the process. We did not observe a high degree of involvement in cooperative tools on the part of county elected
officials, with the notable exception of Tompkins County, where a legislator was actively engaged in developing the
TQM initiative.
Additionally, in the three counties we observed a clear commitment to the process of implementing cooperative tools.
Since gains from TQM, for instance, were not immediate, and could take several years after training to realize, the
commitment of leaders to see the process through was essential to its success. Administrators and union officials'
commitment to labor-management committees as an effective vehicle for problem solving also seemed to be a
significant factor in their success. Tools that yield faster results, such as mutual-gains bargaining, perhaps require less
depth of commitment from county leaders. In all cases, however, all parties must buy in to the process. Given the
levels of trust required, cooperative efforts are likely to be sensitive to attempts to undermine them.
Communication
Communication of the goals, structure, and roles of key players in cooperative processes is also important, both within
the organization and in the larger community. Umbrella or countywide committees play important roles here as the
central forums for sharing of information and ideas. Creating public awareness of county efforts also may be desirable
but was not emphasized in our case study counties.
Evaluation
Evaluation is essential to assure appropriate and effective implementation of cooperative tools and to create support
among elected officials and the public. Better evaluation of the cooperative processes in all three counties is needed.
For instance, in Ontario County cooperative relations are so strong that some perceive mutual-gains bargaining as an
administrative burden that in and of itself may not add significant benefits. However, county leaders currently have no
means to gauge MGB's effectiveness. Management in Genesee County indicated that evaluation was an area they
hoped to address in the future. The private sector may be a source for evaluation tools that counties can use to measure
the success of their efforts.
Key Differences Between the Counties
We recognized several key differences among the counties in the implementation of cooperative tools. First, the
amount of money spent on training varied widely. Tompkins County had by far the greatest expenditures, almost
entirely attributable to its TQM program. Tompkins' use of outside consultants on a regular basis also distinguished it
from the other two counties. Genesee County, in contrast, only approached outside consultants on an infrequent basis.
However, Genesee's labor-management committees required lower levels of training and hence less cost, compared to
the formal TQM programs of Ontario and Tompkins. Interest in the process of workplace change rather than a focus on
outcomes or products seemed to guide efforts in Tompkins County, perhaps partly because of its close ties to the
academic community through Cornell University.
The level of involvement of elected officials and middle managers also varied. In Genesee County, middle managers
may participate in the negotiating process and sit on labor-management committees. In Tompkins County, middle
managers are well represented on total quality management committees. In Ontario, where the committees create a
direct channel from workers to top management, it is less clear that middle managers are adequately incorporated into
the structure. Tompkins is the only county in which an elected official sits on the countywide labor-management
committee. In Genesee County, county management felt that by not participating in committees, elected officials
maintained a beneficial distance from the process. Whether elected officials should be involved may depend on the
extent of the changes being implemented; in a more formal and expensive process such as TQM, their participation
seems more appropriate and essential, while it may not be necessary for internally focused committees.
Continuum of Cooperative Tools
The three cooperative tools exist along a continuum based on the complexity of the tool, the level of investment
required, and its degree of departure from traditional labor-management relations. The following diagram illustrates
this continuum:
A government with labor-management committees may not choose to implement a TQM program, but a government
without labor-management committees may not be wise to implement TQM as its first cooperative effort. Thus, the
diagram may also be viewed as a time line of cooperative structures, indicating a progression from relatively simple
tools such as labor-management committees to more complex, formal, costly, and comprehensive processes such as
TQM. Other tools we did not observe in our counties could be added to this model, such as gainsharing.
Limitations and Further Questions
As tools for restructuring, the cooperative methods discussed here have several limitations. Their ability to affect the
external policy environment is limited, so they are constrained by the political contexts in which they must operate.
They also do not afford an opportunity for citizens to become more involved in government. Since public support for
its activities is important to local governments, they should come up with ways for creating greater citizen involvement
in their restructuring efforts.
Many questions emerged during the course of our study. First, what is the true impact of cooperative tools and
processes on middle management? Much has been written about the downsizing of middle management in the private
sector. Is this also the case in government? Second, what are the appropriate roles for citizens and elected officials in
efforts to restructure government—through both internal and external methods? Finally, our cases only addressed
examples of successful cooperative tools and processes in counties that had developed a significant degree of trust
between labor and management. What are the outcomes of cooperative initiatives in counties that lacked this
precondition of trust?
Notes
1.  Conducted by Cornell University in cooperation with the County Legislators and Supervisors Association of
New York State, this survey was distributed to all towns (932) and upstate county governments (57) in New
York State. Responses were received from 196 towns (21% response rate) and 26 counties (45.6% response
rate).
2.  The counties initially considered were Chautauqua, Clinton, Columbia, Dutchess, Erie, Genesee, Livingston,
Oneida, Ontario, Putnam, Schenectady, Tioga, Tompkins, Ulster, and Westchester.
3.  Of the 57 counties outside of New York City, 18 (31.5%) are governed by the county executive structure
(elected official), 27 (47.5%) are governed by county managers or administrators (appointed), and 12 (21%) have
no full-time manager or county executive.
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 Appendix A: Key Informants
Steve Alviene, Deputy Director of Labor Relations, New York Civil Service Employees Association
John Bartow, Director, Division of Local Government, New York State Department of State
Franklin Bassett, Administrator, Livingston County Office of Aging
Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sr. Extension Associate, New York State School of Industrial Labor Relations Divison of
Extension and Public Service
Marcia Calicchia, Sr. Extension Associate, New York State School of Industrial Labor Relations Division of Extension
and Public Service
Ken Crannell, Director of Research, New York State Association of Counties
John Crotty, Deputy Chair and Counsel, Public Employment Relations Board
Ron Dougherty, former County Chair, Tioga County
Kevin Flanigan, Supervising Public Employment Mediator, Public Employment Relations Board
Andrew Goodell, former County Executive, Chautauqua County
Todd Grenci, Governor's Office of Employee Relations
Robert Hebdon, Assistant Professor, New York State School of Industrial Labor Relations
Scott Heyman, County Administrator, Tompkins County
Sally Klingel, Director, Programs for Employment and Workplace Systems, New York
State School of Industrial Labor Relations Division of Extension and Public Service
Karen Macintosh-Frering, Labor Management Coordinator, Ulster County
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The public sector, particularly local government, is under pressure to simultaneously improve performance
and curtail costs. Reductions in state and federal funding, a continuing demand for efficient and flexible
government services, and fear of tax revolts are leading to reexaminations of how local governments can best
meet the demand for their services. Governments are utilizing a number of tools for restructuring service
delivery to increase efficiency and reduce costs.
In our background research, we identified two types of restructuring: external restructuring, where a
government turns to outside organizations to provide services (through privatization or inter-municipal
cooperation, for example), and internal restructuring, which seeks to improve service delivery by altering
organizational structure and decision-making processes. High levels of public sector unionization in New York
State make internal restructuring through labor-management cooperation an especially important alternative.
Through case studies of three New York State counties, we examined the use of three specific tools for labor-
management cooperation: labor-management committees, mutual-gains bargaining (MGB), and total quality
management (TQM). Genesee, Tompkins, and Ontario Counties were chosen as cases where at least two of
these three internal restructuring tools have been implemented successfully.
We found that these cooperative workplace structures improve communication and broaden participation in
decision making, leading to greatly improved labor-management relations and employee morale. They may
also reduce costs and improve service delivery. However, limited evaluation in the three counties makes
savings and service improvements difficult to document.
These tools appear to fall on a continuum of complexity, investment costs, and comprehensiveness. Labor-
management committees provide a foundation for the other tools by building an ongoing forum for
communication and trust building. They are flexible, deal with a wide array of concerns, and require minimal
training. Mutual-gains bargaining requires more training and, in our cases, a preexisting environment of trust.
While there are spillover benefits to other areas, MGB is primarily limited to contract negotiations. TQM is the
most comprehensive of the three tools and requires the greatest degree of training and organizational culture
change to be effective. It also may offer the greatest potential for service improvement.
The case study counties all enjoyed a preexisting environment of trust, committed leadership, and lack of
political or fiscal crisis. Given the investments in training and change in perspective required of labor,
management, and elected officials, implementation of these tools may be more successful in counties not
experiencing crisis or a recent history of labor-management conflict.
These internal restructuring tools are not designed to address external stakeholders. Service improvements
may be limited by higher-level policies and mandates these tools cannot address. Similarly, citizen
involvement is not enhanced by these tools. However, by creating new forums for communication and
participatory decision making, local government enhances its ability to identify and implement programs for
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service improvement. Adding mechanisms for citizen involvement and strategies to push for needed policy
change at higher levels may further increase local government's capacity to restructure to meet the needs of
its diverse constituents.
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Goals of Cooperative Tools and Processes
Most of our informants articulated their goal as a more smoothly functioning organization, with more creative
problem solving and positive interactions between management and labor. Managers and elected officials
focused on increased efficiency, cost savings, and improved service quality. Labor representatives expressed
goals of increasing employee participation in decision making and improving service delivery by widening
employees' stake in the process and product. Thus, improving service delivery was a goal of all parties, but
with slightly different emphases. Elected officials valued improved service delivery for its impact on citizen
constituents, whereas labor representatives valued increased service quality for its effects on job quality.
Preconditions for Success
Several conditions existed in our counties prior to the successful introduction of formalized cooperative
processes. First, the labor-management relationship in all three counties was already cooperative, or at least
noncombative, providing fertile ground in which cooperative structures could thrive. Second, all the counties
we studied were in relatively stable economic and political positions prior to establishing cooperative
structures. We were not informed of any fiscal or political crises in recent memory that might put pressure on
leaders to avoid the risk-taking inherent in cooperative initiatives. These three counties made a significant
culture change not as a last-resort strategy, but as a means to improve already functional but imperfect
processes. However, the cooperative structures have proven useful in dealing with crisis, such as the
threatened sale of the nursing home in Genesee County.
We observed several other essential preconditions in our study counties. Committed, supportive leaders are
required. This sometimes necessitates a change in the legislature, county administration, or union leadership.
The attitudes of those in leadership positions proved crucial to the counties' ability to embrace the new ideas
and paradigms of cooperative tools. Furthermore, in order to buy into the new cooperative relations, middle
managers and line employees had to trust the intentions of both labor and management leaders. Even in
counties where cooperative tools have been used successfully, the departments with a lower degree of labor-
management trust have been slower to make the transition to new tools.
Impacts of Cooperation
Internal Process Improvements
The changes seen in government service delivery seem to be primarily internal in nature. Tompkins County,
for instance, streamlined its intake processes for various social services. Genesee County instituted several
policies that affect employee benefits, encouraging workplace efficiency and increased job satisfaction. The
efficiency gains from internal restructuring are thought to "trickle down" to external improvements. The
Genesee County Nursing Home, for instance, through its labor-management committee, has addressed
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staffing issues that are crucial to efficient functioning and effective service delivery.
Employee Morale
The second area where impacts have been significant is employee morale, which was uniformly reported by
our informants to have improved under cooperative processes. Again, data for improvements are difficult to
obtain, and most employee surveys were completed after new structures were implemented, and therefore
lack a comparative benchmark. All counties stated the number of grievances has decreased, and the
grievances that are filed are uniformly serious in nature, the less serious problems being resolved in other
forums, due to improved communication and trust.
Cost Savings
Though gains and savings have sometimes proven difficult to measure due to a fear of budget cuts to
agencies that report cost savings, the overriding sentiment is that cooperative efforts are resulting in real cost
savings. Ontario County has documented at least one instance of large financial savings in its reduction of
worker compensation costs due to a safety program implemented by a TQM committee. Genesee County's
nursing home has become profitable again in part due to the efforts of its labor-management committee.
Key Elements for Cooperation
From the case studies, we have identified a number of elements that are necessary for cooperation to be
successful:
Training
First, a substantial amount of time and resources were devoted to training labor and management leaders,
and more often than not, legislators and line employees as well, in cooperative structures and processes. In
Ontario and Tompkins Counties for instance, all employees are being trained in total quality management
concepts. Line employees were less likely to be trained in mutual-gains bargaining, which is used primarily by
representatives of labor and management for the contract agreement. In Genesee County, for instance, while
the assistant county manager was trained to facilitate the negotiation process, the employees were not
trained prior to the switch to mutual-gains bargaining, and perhaps for this reason, the first contract
negotiated by this method was voted down by union members. On the other hand, the Genesee County
Nursing Home sponsored a half-day training session for the entire nursing home staff with a CSEA facilitator,
which helped their labor-management committee become much more effective. Whether or not all employees
were trained, training brought about a critical shift in how members of the organization viewed labor-
management relations.
Local colleges and universities were valuable resources for training in these methods. Both Tompkins and
Ontario Counties made extensive use of nearby educational facilities.
Leadership Commitment and Support
The counties we studied all shared the presence of an appointed, professional administrator to manage the
transition to cooperative tools. However, one expert on local government told us that the form of government
is less important than the administrator or leader's commitment to the cooperative process. A high level of
emotional maturity is essential, as is the ability to work well with people and to get them to buy into the
process. The case study counties possessed leaders who were willing to work with, but ultimately hold
responsible, resistant managers. The commitment of union leadership was also an important factor. Without
the willingness of the union officials in these counties to try new ways of working with management,
cooperative processes would not have been possible.
The role of elected officials was significant only to the extent they were generally supportive and did not
interfere with the process. We did not observe a high degree of involvement in cooperative tools on the part
of county elected officials, with the notable exception of Tompkins County, where a legislator was actively
engaged in developing the TQM initiative.
Additionally, in the three counties we observed a clear commitment to the process of implementing
cooperative tools. Since gains from TQM, for instance, were not immediate, and could take several years after
training to realize, the commitment of leaders to see the process through was essential to its success.
Administrators and union officials' commitment to labor-management committees as an effective vehicle for
problem solving also seemed to be a significant factor in their success. Tools that yield faster results, such as
mutual-gains bargaining, perhaps require less depth of commitment from county leaders. In all cases,
however, all parties must buy in to the process. Given the levels of trust required, cooperative efforts are
likely to be sensitive to attempts to undermine them.
Communication
Communication of the goals, structure, and roles of key players in cooperative processes is also important,
both within the organization and in the larger community. Umbrella or countywide committees play important
roles here as the central forums for sharing of information and ideas. Creating public awareness of county
efforts also may be desirable but was not emphasized in our case study counties.
Evaluation
Evaluation is essential to assure appropriate and effective implementation of cooperative tools and to create
support among elected officials and the public. Better evaluation of the cooperative processes in all three
counties is needed. For instance, in Ontario County cooperative relations are so strong that some perceive
mutual-gains bargaining as an administrative burden that in and of itself may not add significant benefits.
However, county leaders currently have no means to gauge MGB's effectiveness. Management in Genesee
County indicated that evaluation was an area they hoped to address in the future. The private sector may be
a source for evaluation tools that counties can use to measure the success of their efforts.
Key Differences Between the Counties
We recognized several key differences among the counties in the implementation of cooperative tools. First,
the amount of money spent on training varied widely. Tompkins County had by far the greatest expenditures,
almost entirely attributable to its TQM program. Tompkins' use of outside consultants on a regular basis also
distinguished it from the other two counties. Genesee County, in contrast, only approached outside
consultants on an infrequent basis. However, Genesee's labor-management committees required lower levels
of training and hence less cost, compared to the formal TQM programs of Ontario and Tompkins. Interest in
the process of workplace change rather than a focus on outcomes or products seemed to guide efforts in
Tompkins County, perhaps partly because of its close ties to the academic community through Cornell
University.
The level of involvement of elected officials and middle managers also varied. In Genesee County, middle
managers may participate in the negotiating process and sit on labor-management committees. In Tompkins
County, middle managers are well represented on total quality management committees. In Ontario, where
the committees create a direct channel from workers to top management, it is less clear that middle
managers are adequately incorporated into the structure. Tompkins is the only county in which an elected
official sits on the countywide labor-management committee. In Genesee County, county management felt
that by not participating in committees, elected officials maintained a beneficial distance from the process.
Whether elected officials should be involved may depend on the extent of the changes being implemented; in
a more formal and expensive process such as TQM, their participation seems more appropriate and essential,
while it may not be necessary for internally focused committees.
Continuum of Cooperative Tools
The three cooperative tools exist along a continuum based on the complexity of the tool, the level of
investment required, and its degree of departure from traditional labor-management relations. The following
diagram illustrates this continuum:
A government with labor-management committees may not choose to implement a TQM program, but a
government without labor-management committees may not be wise to implement TQM as its first
cooperative effort. Thus, the diagram may also be viewed as a time line of cooperative structures, indicating
a progression from relatively simple tools such as labor-management committees to more complex, formal,
costly, and comprehensive processes such as TQM. Other tools we did not observe in our counties could be
added to this model, such as gainsharing.
Limitations and Further Questions
As tools for restructuring, the cooperative methods discussed here have several limitations. Their ability to
affect the external policy environment is limited, so they are constrained by the political contexts in which
they must operate. They also do not afford an opportunity for citizens to become more involved in
government. Since public support for its activities is important to local governments, they should come up
with ways for creating greater citizen involvement in their restructuring efforts.
Many questions emerged during the course of our study. First, what is the true impact of cooperative tools
and processes on middle management? Much has been written about the downsizing of middle management
in the private sector. Is this also the case in government? Second, what are the appropriate roles for citizens
and elected officials in efforts to restructure government-through both internal and external methods? Finally,
our cases only addressed examples of successful cooperative tools and processes in counties that had
developed a significant degree of trust between labor and management. What are the outcomes of
cooperative initiatives in counties that lacked this precondition of trust?
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Websites
Local Government Restructuring Website
http://www.crp.cornell.edu/projects/restructuring/
This website contains summaries of key literature on local government restructuring: privatization,
intermunicipal cooperation, and internal governmental restructuring. Special emphasis is given to labor-
management cooperation, including case studies from New York State counties.
AFSCME, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
http://www.afscme.org
AFSCME is the nation's largest public employee and health-care workers' union, with more than 1.3 million
members. This site provides useful information on reinventing government and labor-management
cooperation.
Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA)
http://www.cseainc.org/
CSEA is one of the major labor unions in New York State. One of their goals is to prevent privatization or
contracting out of services. They see privatization as a politically popular quick- fix that eventually leaves
taxpayers footing the bill. CSEA believes that front-line employees themselves know best how to improve
services, and should be the focus of workplace improvement efforts.
Department of Labor, U.S. Government
http://www.dol.gov/
This website provides an inventory of local governments implementing workplace transformation through
cooperative structures. This site also includes a task force report on the role of flexible and cooperative
practices in the improvement of government service delivery.
Department of State, New York State Government
http://www.state.ny.us/
The mission of the department is to make state and local governments more efficient and to improve
responsiveness to customers. The Department's Division of Local Government Services provides excellent
resources on inter-municipal cooperation.
Economic Policy Institute (EPI)
http://epinet.org/#recent
EPI, founded in 1986 by a group of economic policy experts, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank that seeks
to broaden the public debate about strategies to achieve a prosperous and fair economy. The Institute has
published a number of studies exploring limitations of privatization from a labor perspective (Starr, 1987;
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Sclar, 1997; Sclar, 1989).
Indianapolis Government
http://www.IndyGov.org/mayor/comp/indyexp/
This site describes some of the experiences that Indianapolis city government has encountered as it moves to
a leaner, more effective, and efficient organization. It is organized in four parts: a small government
philosophy, a community emphasis for policing, stronger neighborhoods for citizens, and a thriving economy
for the future. Each section includes a short introduction and a series of "case study" examples.
International City/County Management Association (ICMA)
http://www.icma.org/resources/index.htm
Founded in 1914, the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) is a professional and
educational association that seeks to strengthen the quality of local government through professional
management. ICMA is a leading publisher of in-depth information about local government management. ICMA
does regular surveys on alternative local government service provision
New York State Association of Counties (NYSAC)
http://www.state.ny.us/nysac
The Association serves all 57 counties in New York State to promote more effective local government and
present county concerns on the state and federal levels.
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu
Research at the ILR school focuses on some of the most important issues in the workplace: protecting jobs,
increasing productivity, worker participation, expanding and declining labor markets. Through their extension
programs, the school provides training for local governments in mutual-gains bargaining and TQM.
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) of New York State
http://unix2.nysed.gov/ils/executive/perb/mission.htm
PERB is responsible for assisting in resolving labor-relations disputes between public-employee organizations
and agencies of state and local government and school districts. PERB provides mediation, fact-finding, and
arbitration services in disputes over contract agreements.
Reason Foundation
http://www.reason.org/privatizationctr.html The Reason Foundation, established in 1978, provides excellent
materials on privatization. Advocating public policies based upon individual liberty and responsibility and a
free-market approach, the Foundation turns to practical policy research. Their annual yearbook, Privatization,
describes recent developments in privatization.
Publications
Ashekenas, Ron, et al. 1995. The Boundaryless Organization: Breaking the Chains of Organizational Structure.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
The authors detail the steps necessary to create effective organizations, stressing the need for
information sharing, creating competence, decentralizing authority, and performance-based rewards.
Belman, Dale, Morley Gunderson, and Douglas Hyatt, eds. 1996. Public Sector Employment in a Time of
Transition. Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Published by the Industrial Relations Research Association, this book presents eight papers by
various authors on the transitions taking place in public sector industrial relations. Subjects discussed
include law, employee attitudes, dispute resolution, compensation, the merit model, and much more.
Cohen-Rosenthal, Edward, and Cynthia E. Burton. 1993. Mutual Gains: A Guide to Union-Management
Cooperation. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, Cornell University.
This book is about why and how to cooperate in ways that lead to mutual gains for both the union
and management. It lays out the theoretical and practical aspects of implementing mutual-gains
bargaining.
Gold, Charlotte. 1986. Labor-Management Committees: Confrontation, Co-optation, or Cooperation? Ithaca,
NY: ILR Press, Cornell University.
This book examines the history and current role of labor-management committees as well as other
cooperative structures in improving service delivery and generating organizational transformation in
both the private and public sectors.
Hebdon, Robert, and Hazel Dayton Gunn. 1995. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization at the Local Level in
New York State." Community Development Report. Ithaca, NY: Community and Rural Development Institute,
Cornell University.
http://www.cardi.cornell.edu/research_briefs/cdr3-2.cfm
The article describes the arguments surrounding privatization. By subjecting service provision to the
rigors of market competition proponents believe efficiency will be increased; however, opponents are
concerned that service quality, social equity, and labor conditions may be diminished.
Kochan, Thomas, and Harry Katz. 1992. An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
One of the standard college-level textbooks on industrial relations, this volume provides a basic
introduction to labor relations theory.
Kochan, Thomas, Harry C. Katz, and Robert B. McKersie. 1994. The Transformation of American Industrial
Relations. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, Cornell University.
This book is thought by some to be one of the most important books on industrial relations of the
past 15 years. Kochan, Katz, and McKersie present a framework for contemporary trends in
unionization, industrial relations systems at the workplace, negotiations, and strategic choices of both
management and workers.
Marshall, Ray, et al. 1992. Restructuring the American Workplace: Implications for the Public Sector. LERC
Monograph Series, University of Oregon, no. 11: 26-27.
The authors describe the changing roles of workers and managers in the new global economy, and
how the dramatic changes seen in the private sector can be transferred to the public sector, with a
focus on the need for greater employee involvement.
Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is
Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
In order to transform staid bureaucracies into innovative, flexible, and responsive organizations, the
authors suggest new models, giving examples of how government can become more community-
focused, competitive, mission-driven, and results-oriented.
Savas, E. S. 1987. Privatization: The Key to Better Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
The book, written by an advocate of privatization, describes the theory and practice of privatization
and alternative service delivery arrangements.
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Labor-management committees are cooperative structures that focus on problem solving and building trust.
They typically deal with issues including workplace safety, work hours, training, personnel issues, and daily
workplace concerns. Although labor-management committees may initially focus on less controversial issues,
such as worker safety standards, over time they may build a level of trust between labor and management
that allows them to deal with more complex problems (Gold 1986).
Labor-management committees may be permanent or they may form around a particular issue and disband
once resolution is reached. However, they are not necessarily formed to solve crises. Many are proactive and
attempt to improve current work practices. They are flexible and easy to implement, and require minimal
training. Labor-management committees are cornerstones of cooperation in each of the counties studied.
Structure
The labor-management committees in Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties are similar in terms of their
goals: enhanced labor-management relations, decreased costs, and improved services. Each county has a
central guiding or umbrella committee that oversees the activities of issue-based or departmental labor-
management subcommittees. They may facilitate training and provide direction to subcommittees or they
may address specific program innovations or daily operations. All three counties implemented labor-
management committees before mutual-gains bargaining and total quality management.
There are differences in how each county uses the committees, however. In Ontario County, where such
committees have existed since the early 1980s, they operate independently of the TQM program. Ontario
County has a countywide committee, committees that operate within departments, and others that address
specific issues, such as safety and health.
Tompkins County's labor-management committees, which have existed since the mid-1980s, now function as
part of its TQM program. Prior to the inception of the TQM program, non-union members who volunteered or
were voted in by all employees were allowed to serve on labor-management committees. Under the total
quality management agreement negotiated between the CSEA and the county board of representatives, now
there are more committees, and only union-selected representatives may serve on them (see the total
quality management section, below).
Genesee County does not have a TQM program, and their labor-management committees are the main venue
for workplace innovation. There is one main committee for the general bargaining unit, which covers most
county departments, and a separate committee for the nursing home unit.
Representation
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Labor-management committees are composed of representatives of management and the union. Only in
Tompkins County were legislators also included. Tompkins County's umbrella committee has 13 members,
including representatives from top management, middle management, and labor. In Ontario County, the
countywide committee is made up of the county administrator, deputy administrator, director of human
resources, and several of the local union presidents. In Genesee County, the general unit committee consists
of the county manager, the personnel officer, the CSEA general unit president, and the regional labor
relations specialist, as well as two more representatives from both management and labor who rotate onto
the committee in three-year intervals. This provides more people an opportunity to be part of the process.
Size of the committees varies according to the scope of the issue and the need for stakeholder input. Most
have eight or fewer members, but at least one committee in Tompkins County has over twenty members.
Functions
In all counties, labor-management committees address a broad spectrum of workplace concerns. In Genesee
County, the general unit committee emphasizes relationships and creating an environment where employees
feel their input is valued and decisions are made by consensus. The labor-management committee has
introduced policies that create a more family-oriented environment.
Labor-management committees can also be forums for discussing alternatives to privatization proposals. In
Ontario County, labor has the opportunity to give their input before a decision to privatize a service is made
by the administration. In Genesee County, labor and management formed a special joint action committee to
address the threat of possible privatization in the Department of Mental Health Services.
Labor-management committees can impact the delivery of government services by finding ways to reduce
costs while maintaining or improving the service itself. While hard data documenting the impact of innovations
on cost was difficult to obtain, workers' compensation costs were significantly reduced in Tompkins County as
a result of safety measures and training recommended by a labor-management committee (prior to the
implementation of TQM). In Genesee County, labor-management committee recommendations and process
improvements have led to cost savings through reduced absenteeism, increased productivity, and decreased
supervision time. Their nursing home committee has helped the facility improve efficiency and avoid
privatization. Client surveys in Ontario and Tompkins Counties have indicated overall improvements in
services.
Labor-management committees do not address contract disputes or grievances, although they appear to be
effective in defusing potential problems before they reach the grievance stage. All three counties credited
labor-management committees for helping to keep the number of formal grievances low.
Role and Authority of Committees
There is great flexibility in how roles are defined for labor-management committees. Tompkins County has a
formal agreement defining the roles, expectations, and boundaries of authority for the Leadership Council,
which took one year to negotiate and which clearly outlines the scope of the committee process. Genesee
County has less formal written guidelines that articulate the goals and procedures of the committee. The
authority of the labor-management committee is not written into a contract but is accepted by both parties.
Ontario County's labor-management committee is well entrenched and seems to function effectively without a
written agreement.
Labor-management committees have varying degrees of authority and power. In some cases, their policy
recommendations are binding, while in others they merely offer suggestions that must gain the approval of
elected officials. This is often the case when budget or cost decisions are involved. Committees in Ontario
County are empowered to draft letters of agreement around issues that would normally be addressed through
contract negotiations.
In some cases, the use of labor-management committees may impact traditional lines of authority. Middle
managers may lose some of their decision-making authority because employees can voice concerns directly to
top levels of management through the committee. In Ontario County this was an issue, but in Genesee and
Tompkins Counties, middle managers are included on committees.
Training/Support
Training committee members in conflict resolution and consensus decision making may help committees work
more smoothly. Training sessions allow both groups to establish their commitment to the concept and to
forge cooperative relationships. For example, in the Genesee County Nursing Home, a half-day training
session for the entire staff helped them use their labor-management committee more effectively. In this case,
a CSEA facilitator from Albany was used. The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and Cornell's
Industrial and Labor Relations Extension are other valuable sources of training and information. It is
important to recognize, however, that there may be a significant time lag after training before measurable
results are seen.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties, which had longer-standing labor-management committees, have invested
more in training for mutual-gains bargaining techniques and total quality management than for labor-
management committees.
Relationships
Labor-management committees can be contentious because they bring together individuals with diverse
points of view. Strong leadership, good communication, and commitment to the process make the difference
between success and failure. Without these elements it is difficult, if not impossible, to build the necessary
level of trust to make a labor-management committee work. Both Tompkins and Genesee Counties had
attempted labor-management committees in the past, with limited scope and success. By focusing on
relationships, building trust, and gaining the commitment of leadership they were able to establish the
successful committees that operate today. One strategy used was to begin by addressing issues that are less
contentious, to build momentum so committees can tackle larger, more difficult problems in the future. This
increases the level of trust among committee members and reduces the potential for early conflict.
Employee morale has been greatly improved in the counties studied. There are still conflicts and differences
of opinion, but labor-management committees provide a mechanism for giving voice to these problems before
they become intractable.
Challenges and Limitations
Several challenges in implementing labor-management committees are evident:
Time is required to build the trust necessary for effective committees.
They have limited authority: they are not designed to make decisions about broad structural changes in
county operations.
Defining the appropriate roles and boundaries of committees is important: many problems lie beyond the
scope of committees and call for wider participation of elected officials and citizens.
Conclusion
Labor-management committees are excellent forums for communication and workplace problem solving. They
are flexible and require minimal training, which also makes them inexpensive. In all three counties, good
communication, strong relationships, committed leadership, and trust proved to be the most important factors
for committee success. While the most compelling impact seen was on labor-management relations,
committee efforts also led to improvements in county government functioning. Labor-management
committees are relatively easy to implement and provide a foundation for incorporating more sophisticated
tools, such as mutual-gains bargaining and total quality management, into an organization.
The following are recommendations to consider for labor-management committees:
Establish a central, guiding committee to oversee the endeavor.
Integrate committees into the organizational structure.
Define expectations and parameters for decision making.
Include as many stakeholders as possible and necessary.
Communicate and foster a shared understanding of goals and objectives for both the committee and the
organization.
Be cognizant of power differentials and the effect these may have on communication.
Address issues where it is easy to reach consensus at the outset in order to build momentum to tackle
more difficult topics.
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Mutual-gains bargaining (MGB) is a method of bargaining designed to dramatically improve the quality of
contract negotiations and increase the likelihood of compliance between labor and management, ultimately
benefiting their constituents. The mutual-gains process focuses on negotiations based on interests rather than
positions and on building consensus. Through this process, unions and management identify at least one
common goal and find ways to jointly accomplish that goal (Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton 1993). While MGB
can be used for many types of negotiations, the case studies focused on its use for contract negotiations.
Ontario County has been using mutual-gains bargaining since 1994, Tompkins County since 1995, and
Genesee County since 1996.
Preconditions
All three counties had existing cooperative labor-management relationships in place before the initiation of
MGB. Tompkins and Ontario Counties indicated they had been using interest-based bargaining techniques
informally for years, and that they moved to MGB as a way of formalizing the process. This leads us to
speculate that counties that have good labor-management relationships may be more apt to implement MGB
because the idea of cooperating isn't very radical to them and there is less distrust between labor and
management to overcome. Genesee County, however, was less satisfied with their standard negotiation
process and wanted to use MGB to improve the quality of negotiations.
Benefits
Mutual-gains bargaining led to smoother contract negotiations in all three counties. This was especially true in
Genesee, where labor and management agreed the new techniques were far more productive than previous
negotiations. Perhaps because Ontario and Tompkins Counties already had well-established cooperative
structures that resembled MGB in place, the changes were less dramatic, but in both counties labor and
management spoke positively about the effects of MGB techniques on the negotiating process.
MGB can be used to empower workers and strengthen their organizations, as well as to shape their lives at
work. The benefits include increased access to information, prenotification of changes in work arrangements
and technology, and increased input, which helps management avoid errors or decisions that would hurt
union membership. There is also an indication that work satisfaction may increase, and the union may be
able to address a broader range of members' concerns more quickly and fully. In addition, the literature on
the subject indicates that union membership, education, and skill levels increase.
In the public sector, management must make the organization as effective as possible to meet the needs and
expectations of citizens and their legislative authorities. Management's benefits include improved
effectiveness, increased organizational flexibility, an improved working environment, and enhanced
productivity (Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton, 1993).
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Labor and management in the case study counties agree MGB has saved a lot of time. The use of MGB
allowed Genesee County to complete their last contract in about a month, whereas it used to take up to six
or seven months. The same is true for Tompkins County, where labor and management found the salary
issue was on the table faster than ever before, in part because the economy was doing well, but also as a
result of MGB.
Neither management nor labor see MGB as a panacea, but both concede that both parties walk away from the
negotiating process feeling better. While both labor and management in Ontario County are pleased with
MGB, the union appears to favor the process a bit more. CSEA representatives felt that MGB would definitely
be used in the future. At least one manager, on the other hand, was of the opinion that MGB was a bit
"tedious" and might not be used in the next contract because levels of trust were already high. In Tompkins
County, labor felt that the "win-win" solutions that MGB is supposed to create often result in compromises.
Management respected the process, but felt it was nothing new in comparison to the way they interacted in
the past.
Leadership
The commitment of top management and union leaders to MGB is very important to its success. Some people
will find it difficult to accept a new approach and will be subversive to both groups' mutual interests. In some
cases, a change in leadership was necessary before a county could effectively implement MGB. In Ontario and
Genesee Counties, for example, changes in union and/or management leadership preceded their formal
implementation of MGB.
During negotiations, and during day-to-day interaction, the administration, union leaders, and managers need
to set an example of open communication for all to follow. Labor and management must be committed to
MGB. They must communicate with each other, understand each other's needs and interests, and pursue
answers that benefit both groups. Tompkins, Genesee, and Ontario Counties' MGB efforts had the support of
top management.
Training
Mutual-gains bargaining requires a change in philosophy that cannot occur without careful preparation. Unlike
traditional collective bargaining, mutual-gains bargaining operates on trust and open information sharing, and
as simple as the concept might be, it is critical that labor, management, and legislators receive training
before they decide to embark on mutual gains. While legislators do not participate in negotiation, it is
important they understand and support the process.
In their efforts to implement MGB, Ontario, Genesee, and Tompkins Counties all turned to the New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations Extension for training. Tompkins County trained 300 out of 720
employees in MGB before its formal implementation in 1995, and had few problems. Now all bargaining units
in Tompkins County (except the sheriff's department) use mutual-gains techniques for all terms except salary.
In the case of Genesee County, the assistant county manager was trained to facilitate the negotiations, while
Ontario and Tompkins used outside facilitators. Although Genesee's general unit contract was successfully
negotiated using MGB in a much shorter period of time than was typical, the negotiating process was still very
challenging, and the rank and file expressed skepticism about the initial contract. Because of the distrust that
traditionally exists between the two groups, it may help to use an outside facilitator at the outset. Even with
training, it can take employees and management time to learn to trust and accept the process.
Challenges
MGB can benefit both labor and management, but it can also be risky to both parties. Both union leaders and
management are in danger of being perceived as too close to the "adversary"- legislators may fear
management is being too easy on the union, while union members may fear their leadership is being "co-
opted." Since the union is negotiating the terms and conditions of employment for its members, it has more
at stake. The open negotiation process inherently requires each side to relinquish some of its negotiating
power and may limit the union's ability to act as a unified group. In Tompkins County, the union has not yet
agreed to negotiate salary using mutual-gains bargaining techniques largely for these reasons.
Mutual-gains bargaining is a process that was developed in the private sector to increase labor-management
cooperation, but also to aid downsizing efforts. MGB inherently cuts out middle management as the mediators
between labor and top management. In Ontario County, for example, middle managers were resistant to
MGB, as it appeared to take some of their authority away.
Finally, because mutual-gains bargaining is a tool which is used only during contract negotiation time, it is
limited in its ability to have a direct impact on the daily interaction between labor and management.
However, there were important "spillover" effects of mutual-gains bargaining training to other venues such as
labor-management committees and total quality management teams.
Conclusion
Interest-based bargaining appears to save money and time, and have positive effects on labor-management
relationships. MGB resulted in quicker contract negotiation where both parties walked away feeling better
about the process and the outcome. However, as with other similar labor-management cooperative methods,
it is difficult to quantify the results of MGB. For example, Ontario County tries to quantify cost savings
whenever possible but finds it difficult to assign a dollar value to the intangible benefits of their cooperative
efforts. The counties studied did not establish evaluation measures to determine what impact (positive or
negative) MGB has made.
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While Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties have all implemented labor-management committees and
mutual-gains bargaining, only Ontario and Tompkins Counties have instituted total quality management
(TQM) initiatives. Ontario County began to implement total quality management in 1993, Tompkins County in
1994.
Total quality management represents a shift in management philosophy from autocratic, hierarchical decision-
making structures to flatter organizational structures and shared decision-making responsibility (Kursat and
Calicchia 1994). In the past few decades, following the model of the private sector, local governments have
come to realize that top-down management is not always the best way to achieve results and that line
workers have valuable contributions to make in identifying strategies for improvement (Osborne and Gaebler
1992).
In Tompkins and Ontario Counties, total quality management has changed the way decisions are made,
processes are designed, and labor and management interact. Informants describe total quality management
programs as a "visceral change," a "paradigm shift," and a "culture change." Both counties' total quality
management programs are new, and therefore conclusions about the programs' impacts and differences
between them are tentative.
Three Components: Shared Decision Making, Customer Focus, Management by Fact
Total quality management initiatives have three primary components according to Kursat and Calicchia
(1994):
1. Shared leadership and employee involvement 
Total quality management programs are based in part on the idea that employees performing the work
can create more efficient and effective processes to produce a higher-quality product. Total quality
management programs typically establish formal structures such as labor-management committees for
sharing decision making between managers and front-line employees.
2. Customer focus and an emphasis on service and product quality 
TQM focuses on the needs and wants of two types of customers: "internal" customers-the next people
down the line in the work process-and "external" customers-those who purchase or utilize a good or
service. TQM seeks to improve the quality of both the product and the process by identifying the type
and quality of good desired by both internal and external customers and providing what each customer
wants. This can be difficult, since in the public sector, external customers include the people using a good
or service but also the people paying for the good (taxpayers) and their representatives (elected
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officials).
3. Management by fact and continual improvement 
Total quality management encourages steady data collection and rational decision making based on data
rather than on impressions or uninformed opinions. Labor-management committees are one way to
collect data about many facets of a complex issue. Others include customer surveys and careful tracking
and documentation of any cost or time savings. The second component, a philosophy of continual
improvement, encourages employees and managers to exceed current standards. Continuous
improvement is achieved through constant experimentation, learning from mistakes, and diffusing
learning throughout the organization.
Goals
In both Tompkins and Ontario Counties, the goals of total quality management most often articulated by
managers and employees were to improve labor-management relations and work conditions, leading to a
more smoothly functioning organization. All parties also expressed a desire to improve service quality. This
desire is exemplified by Ontario County's slogan for total quality management: "We aspire to excellence." In
Tompkins County, elected officials' goals focused primarily on service improvement and cost savings.
Training
Participatory methods of decision making, identifying customer needs, and determining what kind of data to
collect and how to collect it require skills of employees and managers that are not inborn or traditionally
taught in schools or in the workplace. Thus, to effectively implement a total quality management program and
achieve the paradigm shift required for success, training is essential.
Of the two counties, Tompkins has conducted more extensive training and spent more money. Tompkins
County's Leadership Council (the labor-management committee charged with planning and managing the total
quality management program) has the goal of training all employees, managers, and elected officials in
quality methods. Initial training sessions were conducted by consultants, who are still involved in the process.
In the fall of 1996, however, the county hired a full-time training coordinator, and now more sessions are
conducted by in-house staff.
Between 1994 and 1997, Tompkins County spent just over $300,000 for outside consultants to conduct
training. In 1998, the county will spend an estimated $170,000 on consultants to complete the bulk of the
training. Since 1997, in-house costs have been around $100,000. These costs will drop dramatically after
1998, when all employees, managers, and elected officials will have been trained in total quality management
techniques and only training for new employees and refresher courses will be necessary.
Ontario County appears to have spent significantly less on their training program, particularly on outside
consultants. Initially both labor and management leaders as well as county legislators were trained at the
Rochester Institute of Technology. Initial training cost $35,000 for employees and $50,000 for supervisors,
managers, and elected officials. The county gradually built their capacity to do training in-house, and today all
county employees have been trained in TQM concepts.
It is important to remember when comparing these figures, however, that we obtained dollar amounts from
Tompkins County for both outside and in-house costs, whereas the figures reported for Ontario County's
training costs are only initial start-up costs for consultants. Still, there appears to be an appreciable
difference in expenditures on consultants.
This difference may be due to the values held by county leaders. Tompkins County leaders are professionally
and personally interested in organizational theory and process, and are willing to wait for long-term results.
These may be the reasons for the strong emphasis on process and formal training. Ontario County leaders
seem less interested in process and more interested in both short- and long-term results.
Support Structures
Individuals, however well trained in new ways of thinking and doing, will not be able to maintain the culture
shift without a system of structural supports that devolve authority for decision making to labor-management
teams. Supportive structures are probably one of the largest differences between total quality management
programs which employees perceive to be "fake" and those which seem more real and effective.
Ontario County's Service Excellence program is structured around a countywide steering committee that acts
as a core planning group, setting the direction for the program and coordinating the activities of the
subgroups. The four departmental work group committees each have the same organizational structure as the
steering committee and coordinate their corresponding functions.
Tompkins County's Leadership Council includes representatives from labor, top management, middle
management, and elected officials. The Leadership Council guides the training process and the activities of
departmental committees, and facilitates the work of smaller, project-oriented or cross-functional committees.
Another support mechanism is in-house training facilitators. Currently, Tompkins County employs a full-time
training coordinator. An additional twenty employees act as facilitators, assuming leadership roles on various
departmental and issue-related committees. They lend practical support based on their understanding of TQM
and committee concepts. In addition, they are role models for other employees and managers.
Advantages
Total quality management is the most comprehensive cooperative tool for restructuring that the research
team investigated. More than labor-management committees, total quality management programs can
address inefficiencies in work processes and strive to identify customer needs. Unlike mutual-gains bargaining
techniques, which are used primarily for contract negotiations once every few years, total quality
management is ongoing and suffuses all work processes. It empowers labor to improve the workplace. In
Tompkins County, for instance, labor-management relations had been good for some time, but TQM forced
managers to rethink their traditional style to allow greater employee involvement in decision making.
Employees and management now work together to solve problems, and by all accounts, both find the new
process more productive and rewarding.
The cases studied indicate that total quality management does improve the functioning of the organization,
employee morale, and labor-management relations. Based on the suggestions of a total quality management
committee in the Department of Social Services, Tompkins County streamlined the intake process for several
social service programs. A Tompkins County survey indicates that employee morale in the Department of
Public Works improved 22% between 1990 and 1997. Further, since the TQM programs have been
implemented, both Ontario and Tompkins Counties have had fewer frivolous grievances as a result of
increased communication and trust.
The programs have also reduced costs in both counties, although the cost savings have not always been well
documented. Tompkins County representatives believe they have saved a great deal due to improved morale
and greater efficiency. Ontario County has documented savings through the efforts of its workplace safety
team. The team project began with county safety coordinators identifying high-risk job duties, such as driving
and heavy lifting, based on local and national accident and injury data. Employees performing these tasks
were then trained in safer driving and lifting techniques, resulting in a 37% reduction of OSHA-recordable
injuries in the county from 1994 to 1997. Lost days were reduced by 60% in the same time period. As a
result of these safety improvements, a special tax assessment to pay for workers' compensation, to be spread
out over five years, was paid off in only three, saving taxpayers $1.5 million.
Limitations
Both middle managers and elected officials may resist the total quality management culture change because
it devolves supervisory and decision-making power to TQM teams and committees. While middle managers
and elected officials are formally involved in several levels of the TQM program in Tompkins County, they are
absent from the committees in Ontario County, and have understandably been more resistant to the process.
Middle managers may also fear for their jobs. Tompkins County is dealing with this issue by retaining middle
managers as top-level technical employees and ensuring their representation on the TQM committees.
Another limitation of total quality management as a tool for restructuring is its internal focus. The difficulty in
identifying the "customer" for public sector goods and services and the focus on internal work processes
make it hard to truly involve citizens in these TQM efforts. Both counties seek to identify external customer
needs with surveys, and Tompkins County includes elected representatives on committees, but neither county
includes citizens on committees. In Ontario County, citizen involvement in the TQM program is slightly greater
than in Tompkins, since it includes an advisory council made up of a select group of local business owners.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties both seem to focus more attention on internal customers, (through surveys
and participation in labor-management committees), in the belief that process improvements will result in
product and service improvements. This is not an unreasonable assumption, though it can be difficult to
document. Customer satisfaction surveys in Ontario and Tompkins Counties indicate external customers are
generally satisfied with service improvements generated by total quality management programs.
The substantial cost of total quality management training and implementation as well as the time required to
reap benefits are also limitations of total quality management as a tool for local government restructuring.
Finally, because total quality management focuses primarily on internal work processes, policy about external
factors is outside its purview. The inability to address broader policy issues may limit the ultimate impact of
investments in total quality management.
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Genesee County is located in western New York State, between Rochester and Buffalo. It has a population of
approximately 60,000. The county functions under a county manager who is appointed by a nine-member
legislature. The main tools of labor-management cooperation being used in Genesee County are labor-
management committees and mutual-gains bargaining. Through face-to-face and telephone interviews, we
examined how these cooperative structures developed in Genesee and their role in helping county government
function better.
The following people were interviewed for this study:
Jay Gsell, County Manager
Martha Standish, Personnel Officer
Nancy Smith, CSEA General Unit President
Jack Pease, Administrator, County Nursing Home
Darlene Acker, CSEA Nursing Home Unit President
 
Labor-Management Committees
Mutual-Gains Bargaining
Necessary Elements for a Cooperative Labor-Management Relationship
Goals of Labor-Management Cooperation
Impacts of Labor-Management Cooperation
Lessons and Insights
 Labor-Management Committees
The Origins of Labor-Management Committees in Genesee County
There are two main labor-management committees in Genesee County. The general unit labor-management
committee includes most county departments, with about 320 CSEA members represented, and the Genesee
County Nursing Home labor-management committee, which has about 150 CSEA member employees.
The general unit committee was started in 1991, and the nursing home committee was started during the
late 1980s. The nursing home has its own committee because of the special nature of the services it
provides. It also operates as an "enterprise fund," which means that its finances are separate from the rest
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of the county's departments. As an enterprise fund, the nursing home is able to keep the money it earns, but
when it is losing money, it cannot draw on other county revenue. Currently, the home is earning money,
which has enabled the county to invest in improvements in the facility.
The two committees operate within somewhat different contexts. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
nursing home was losing money due to a change in the state's reimbursement policy for Medicare and
Medicaid patients. It faced the prospect of being sold by the county legislature if it did not become self-
sustaining on its own revenues. It was realized that the home had to change its mode of operating in order
to survive, and that the cooperation and involvement of both management and labor would be necessary. The
labor-management committee provided a good vehicle for the two groups to work together to try to improve
the operations of the home.
With the general unit committee, management saw great potential in improving workplace practices through
the more cooperative structure provided by a labor-management committee. The county personnel officer
approached the CSEA labor relations specialist, who agreed that establishing a committee was a good idea.
How Labor-Management Committees Work
The labor-management committees in the general unit and the nursing home work in a very similar fashion.
They both meet once per month at a set time and day. In the nursing home, the union officers and stewards
meet a week and a half prior to the monthly meeting to develop their list of items for the agenda. The union
president and nursing home administrator then meet one week prior to the monthly meeting to discuss each
other's proposed items for the agenda, and put it in its final form. Issues are not placed on the agenda
unless agreed to by mutual consent. During this preliminary meeting, the nursing home administrator and
union president are sometimes able to resolve certain issues, which don't require the input of other
committee members.
While the authority of the nursing home committee is actually written into the nursing home unit contract,
the authority of the general unit committee is not incorporated into the general unit contract, but is mutually
accepted by labor and management.
The purpose of both committees is to serve as a forum for discussion and a vehicle for active improvement
on management issues, labor issues, program ideas, and operations. The resolution of any issue requires
consensus among all committee members. The committees do not address contract disputes or grievances.
These matters are dealt with using standard procedure.
The permanent members of the general unit committee are the personnel officer, the county manager, the
CSEA general unit president, and the labor relations specialist from the CSEA regional office. Two department
heads and two additional union members also sit on the committee; these positions rotate in about three-
year intervals to give different people exposure to the process and to the issues being discussed. The nursing
home committee is comprised of the nursing home administrator (Jack Pease), the director and assistant
director of nursing, the activities director, the officers of the union, including the president, vice-president,
treasurer, secretary, and the head nurse.
Members of the county legislature do not sit on the committees or participate in the meetings. By not
participating in the committees, the legislators can remain more neutral and objective with respect to the
management and labor positions. The legislators are kept aware of the activities of the labor-management
committees through meeting minutes.
Through the committees, many more union members are involved in labor-management initiatives than ever
before. According to the president of the general unit, currently about 25 percent of the 300+ employees in
the general unit participate in some way through subcommittees and various programs. Within the nursing
home unit, union members also serve on various subcommittees organized around different program
initiatives. Additionally, according to the nursing home unit president, employees are always encouraged to
bring their ideas and concerns to the committee representatives.
Creating Solutions to Workplace Problems
One of the greatest concerns of the nursing home is to ensure sufficient staffing 24 hours a day, seven days
per week. Its committee has developed such initiatives as an incentive program for attendance and a
voluntary work program. Because it is crucial to the operation of the nursing home that there be sufficient
staffing at all times, management has the right to mandate employees to work overtime or to come in on
their days off when there exists a shortage of staff. The voluntary work program allows the employees to
"volunteer" (with pay) to work extra hours at their own convenience. After working a certain number of
"voluntary" hours, employees are then eligible to be taken off of the mandate list during the upcoming
quarter. The nursing home committee has also served as a forum to discuss worker safety issues during
building renovations.
One of the most significant programs developed by the general unit committee is the sick-leave bank.
Through the sick-leave bank, employees may choose to donate some of their allotted sick days to the bank,
which can be used in the future by any employee who needs to take an extended medical leave. This
program serves as a close substitute for long-term disability, which is not provided to employees of the
general unit. Other programs initiated by the general unit committee include a volunteer tuition
reimbursement program, which grants employees who perform community service tuition credits for their
family members at the local community college; a job-share program; and participation in Make-a-Difference
Day, a national community service day. The labor-management committee also started a newsletter for
county employees, which is partially funded by CSEA.
Through labor-management committees, the management of the nursing home and other county departments
represented by the general bargaining unit have worked cooperatively with labor to develop innovative ways
to improve productivity, efficiency, and flexibility in the workplace. Such initiatives have a positive effect on
the county's ability to deliver services to the community.
 Mutual-Gains Bargaining
The Origins of Mutual-Gains Bargaining in Genesee County
Mutual-gains bargaining was first tried in the general unit in 1996. The assistant county manager was trained
by Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations Extension, and he facilitated the negotiating
process. Jay Gsell, County Manager, and Nancy Smith, President of the Local CSEA General Unit, had just
taken their positions at the county a few years prior, and were very interested in trying a new approach to
contract negotiations.
The first tentative agreement negotiated under mutual-gains bargaining was not accepted by the union
membership. Many members were very skeptical, and it took time for them to trust and accept the process,
which was completely different from the way previous negotiations were conducted. However, employees
eventually came to accept the process, and in 1997 the general unit contract was successfully negotiated
using mutual-gains bargaining.
The nursing home does not use mutual-gains bargaining. Labor is not yet interested in implementing the
process.
How Mutual-Gains Bargaining Works
The mutual-gains bargaining process requires that both parties reveal their true interests rather than
defending their positions. After this is done, the specifics are discussed. For labor, the priority is in
determining what they need in order to achieve a contract that will provide general satisfaction to the
greatest number of people. Management needs to consider the expectations of the elected officials they
represent.
Both labor and management agree that the mutual-gains bargaining process was more productive than any
previous negotiations. There was more input, openness, brainstorming, and problem solving among the
participants. The negotiations were a continuous, open dialogue between the two sides, with no side
discussions taking place. Even the lunch break was taken together. Another benefit of mutual gains is that it
greatly accelerated the negotiations process. While typical contract negotiations can take up to six or seven
months, the most recent contract was negotiated in about a month. By revealing their true interests, each
group comes to a better understanding of the other's position. Participants look for ways to mutually resolve
the issues, instead of wondering what they will have to concede. County Manager Jay Gsell also noted that
mutual gains helps facilitate identification of the sticking points in the issues.
In coming to agreement on a contract, although not every interest was satisfied, participants came away from
the process feeling as though a great deal had been accomplished. Because of the cooperation that is
inherent to the process, resentment and hurt feelings are avoided. Agreement is easier to achieve and people
feel better, even about the things that did not make it into the contract.
Necessary Elements for a Cooperative Labor-Management Relationship
Trust and Openness
In order for the county to use mutual-gains bargaining and labor-management committees, trust must exist
between labor and management. Everyone involved in labor-management cooperation concurs that keeping to
agreements once they have been made is one of the most important elements in building trust. For union
officials, in a situation where there are preconceived notions about "the union," delivering on promises you've
made is key to allaying the suspicions of management and building trust. Nancy Smith used this approach
when she became the CSEA general unit president. It took some time, but eventually management started to
understand that they could work with her on the basis of trust.
In 1996, new union officers were elected at the nursing home, and they proved to be more willing to hold to
agreements than the previous union leadership. Management concurs it is very important that both sides
"stick to the course" of whatever has been agreed upon.
Both management and labor must be open about their interests and positions. Maintaining an open-door
policy and encouraging employees to approach management when they have concerns is important to
fostering labor-management cooperation. County Personnel Officer Martha Standish says she believes that
openness and honesty are the best ways to build the trust necessary for cooperation. However, she
acknowledges that sometimes this openness backfires. All it takes is one person to make a comment, and it
can affect people's trust in you. When you are trying to bring together two groups that have traditionally
been very adversarial toward one another, trust is very fragile and takes time to build. Yet she still holds to a
policy of being "very available and honest, telling things like they are-even if sometimes people don't like to
hear it."
The Role of Commitment and Leadership
People who are involved in these joint efforts must be committed to the county. Both management and labor
must think beyond what is beneficial to their own interests and instead think about what is good for the
county as a whole and for their total membership. Both labor and management feel that it is difficult to get
people to shift to this new way of thinking.
Before efforts at labor-management cooperation can even begin, the key people involved must see the value
of these efforts. There must be a commitment on the part of both labor and management to invest time and
effort in the meetings and in the initiatives that emerge. Personalities of the leadership can influence whether
labor-management committees are adopted. In the nursing home, the turnover of the union leadership from
a president who had operated for a long tenure in an adversarial manner to a president with a very different
style was very important. Similarly, Nancy Smith has had a very large influence as president of the CSEA
general unit.
There must be a willingness to work things out on the part of the key individuals. In Genesee County, the
individuals active in labor-management efforts come to the table with a real desire to work together to
resolve workplace issues. One indicator of commitment on labor's part is that all the current officers in the
general unit plan to run for reelection this year. They all feel very positive about the way things are going
and want to stay involved.
In departments where management and staff do not see the value in trying to address issues that fall outside
of their contract or outside of day-to-day operations in a nontraditional manner, labor-management
committees are difficult to establish. The county went as far as bringing in a PERB mediator to try to help
facilitate the development of a labor-management committee in one of their non-CSEA units, but it was
unsuccessful. However, this department's management has recently turned over, as has the union leadership,
and Martha Standish is hopeful that it may now be possible to start a labor-management committee there.
Changing Perceptions and Attitudes
Labor and management perceptions clearly play a role in how effective cooperation can be. At the nursing
home, the belief among unionized workers was that when management spoke to other people, such as the
legislature, they were critical of the union. Management's perception was that the labor-management
committee was something that they had to do, but not really a useful forum for solving problems. Both of
these perceptions needed change before cooperation could occur.
As Nancy Smith says, in today's workplace, "we need to realize that change is inevitable." One of the
challenges of cooperation is that people often find it difficult to accept that sometimes things have to change,
even if they might prefer the status quo.
The elected officials agree with the concept of labor-management cooperation, but sometimes have concerns
about management too often taking the side of labor. Additionally, there is also some degree of
dissatisfaction on the part of some union members who are less knowledgeable and enthusiastic about the
process.
 Goals of Labor-Management Cooperation
The goals of labor-management cooperation in Genesee County are not written down anywhere, and the
individuals we spoke with each focused on different goals.
Management describes the goal of labor-management committees as fostering an environment of equality
among and between labor and management, encouraging everyone to bring their ideas forward. One
important purpose of committees is to empower employees, by letting them know their opinion is valued and
encouraging them to share their ideas for improvement. Management strives to have good, functioning labor-
management committees, a good understanding with the union officials, and an established basis of trust, so
they will avoid grievances, which are time-consuming and costly. However, the county manager notes that
the bottom line is the client-the person they're serving. Anything they do must be done with the final product
(the service) and the customer (the taxpayer) in mind.
The union has a goal of educating people on the benefits of cooperative efforts. Believing that most
employees sincerely do not want an adversarial relationship, the CSEA general unit president is getting more
people involved in some way in the union, and in labor-management committees. She also hopes to establish
smaller labor-management committees within county departments.
According to Administrator Jack Pease, one of the main goals at the nursing home is to address the issue of
interpersonal relationships. Everybody needs to be treated respectfully in order for things to work, so they are
going to be looking more closely at relationships in the workplace. The nursing home staff works in a very
demanding environment, which puts a great deal of pressure on the employees, and he believes improving
work relationships can help improve overall performance.
 Impacts of Labor-Management Cooperation
The county doesn't have objective measures of the effects of labor-management cooperation. Measurement of
success should be implemented through the cooperative process.
The union leadership believes that cooperative efforts have made workers more productive and have
improved relationships between people in the workplace. Because of the programs they have implemented,
the workplace is more family-oriented. For example, you can take a sick day to care for a sick child or
spouse.
Not many grievances are filed in Genesee County. When a problem arises, the general unit president will call
the personnel officer to discuss it, and they will go from there.
Fortunately, they have not had much downsizing-most of their workforce reductions have occurred through
attrition. Privatization has not played a significant role in the county. While some employees have perceived it
as a threat, very few, if any, services in the county have been privatized to date.
Currently, however, the county legislature is considering privatization of the county Mental Health Services.
Cuts in state aid have put the agency under fiscal pressure. Together, labor and management in the agency
responded to the problem by forming a joint action committee to work on alternatives to privatization. The
general unit president works at Mental Health Services and has been heavily involved in this effort. The
process has not been negative or adversarial; employees have been involved and have agreed to make
changes, some of which have been implemented already. While a decision has not yet been made, it is very
possible that privatization will be avoided because of this cooperative effort.
The nursing home unit president believes labor-management cooperation enables management and employees
to see the "big picture." It broadens everyone's perspective on the functioning of the facility, and is a good
forum for bringing people together and getting to the root of challenges in operations.
Service Quality
The county has not implemented formal measurements of customer satisfaction with their services. Service
quality monitoring and evaluation is probably one of the next areas that the county will be getting into.
County Manager Jay Gsell believes that "it's a priority to understand the needs of the customers. Quality of
service, reasonable cost and being treated fairly and equitably are the priorities in service delivery."
Personnel Officer Martha Standish notes that programs like TQM are great, but they take a great deal of time
and effort. They have tried instituting quality workgroups in the Department of Social Services, but they have
had a difficult time. Right now they have one self-directed workgroup there, with about five to seven people.
Especially in the nursing home, the quality of service delivery is critical. Nursing homes have changed a great
deal-they must operate with much more flexibility in service provision than in the past. So workplace change
is happening within the context of a very different environment. They need to keep employees involved, and
use the labor-management committee. It doesn't work to make changes in a top-down manner.
Every year the state health department surveys the nursing home. They are trying to use the state survey to
do their own evaluation, and they are trying to come up with other ways to measure quality internally, using
survey of residents or their family and other information.
Cost
The effects of labor-management efforts on cost aren't formally quantified. Martha Standish and Nancy Smith
both suggested that the sick-leave bank probably contributes to cost savings, since it encourages people to
take fewer paid sick days. There is also a general impression that labor-management cooperation leads to
increased productivity and less supervision time, which ultimately lead to cost savings.
In the county nursing home, it is easier to determine costs, as the home's finances are independent from the
rest of the county. They are currently making money and are able to pay their bills, so this indicates that the
labor-management cooperation has had some positive financial effects.
 Lessons and Insights
Training has played an important role in the county's efforts with the labor-management committees and
mutual-gains bargaining. People are often skeptical of a new way of operating, and outside assistance can be
crucial in resolving such skepticism. Cornell's Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) Extension and the New York
State Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) are very good resources.
Martha Standish also believes that it's important that people maintain a "cooperative spirit." Disagreements
will still occur, yet people must realize that there is a forum for resolving these disagreements. Labor-
management committees and mutual-gains bargaining provide excellent vehicles for arriving at these
resolutions.
For the nursing home, the support of and flexibility allowed by the county manager and personnel officer were
important to the success of the labor-management committee. Training also helped labor and management at
the home to use the committee more effectively. For some time, the members seemed to get stuck on the
same old issues, meeting after meeting. A trainer was brought in from CSEA who showed them how to run
the process in a more productive manner. The union president recommends distributing the monthly meeting
agenda to all committee members prior to the meeting. This ensures no one is surprised or caught off guard
by the issues that come up at the meeting. It also allows participants time to gather any information they
feel might be relevant to the meeting discussion.
Finally, Genesee County is essentially a small community where connections are close. While the county's
community service programs developed out of the labor-management committee, they also have served to
strengthen the cooperative character of relations between everyone involved in county government.
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Twenty years ago in Ontario County, labor-management relationships were confrontational, and walkouts
during contract negotiations were not uncommon. Ontario County was then one of several New York counties
to have legislative determinations (the Board of Supervisors could impose contracts on the bargaining units),
a practice that was very unpopular with employees and was later discontinued. Beginning in the 1980s,
changes in management and union leadership led to a new interest in building "win-win" situations that
characterize today's more cooperative labor-management relations in Ontario County. The County has built
cooperation through a variety of structures and tools, including labor-management committees, a "Service
Excellence" total quality management program, and mutual-gains bargaining.
The following people were interviewed for this study:
Edward Grace, County Administrator
Geoffrey Astles, Deputy County Administrator
John Garvey, Human Resources Director
Robert Russo, President, CSEA Unit #7850
 
Labor-Management Committees
The Service Excellence Program
Mutual-Gains Bargaining
The Right Climate
Privatization, Engaging Labor, and Performance Measurement
Key Lessons
Conclusion
 Labor-Management Committees
Since the early 1980s, labor-management committees have been key for developing successful day-to-day
labor-management relations. These committees function at countywide and departmental levels and around
specific issues, such as safety and health. The committees provide an opportunity for workers to bring their
issues to the highest level of management in the county. Currently, the county administrator as well as the
deputy administrator, the director of human resources, and several local union presidents, sit on the
countywide committee. However, county administrators say they are gradually decentralizing the work of
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these committees so that individual departmental committees handle most of the work.
The committees meet monthly and have dealt with many day-to-day workplace issues, such as work
scheduling, flexible hours and overtime, procedures for dealing with employee absences, and treatment of
employees by supervisors. They also deal with long-range planning issues related to the workplace. For
instance, prior to the recent construction of the new human services building, the countywide committee met
with the architects to develop a building program that suited their needs. Committees do not deal with issues
formally dealt with in the labor contract, such as compensation and benefits. Agency-wide committees have
formed in the Social Service and Public Works Departments, and a committee is currently forming in the
County Nursing Home.
County managers laud the committees as being very effective. Although it sometimes takes a couple of
months for people to get used to the idea and build trust, both labor and management agree the committees
are useful in solving daily issues. Now issues don't build up until contract renegotiation. Instead, a letter of
agreement can be issued, ultimately allowing for a smoother bargaining process. In fact, one union leader
reported that the existence of the labor-management committee was a form of "preventive medicine" that
allowed him to resolve more workplace issues as they occurred. Labor-management relations were so
improved by the committees that he did not have to bring many minor issues to the committee meeting.
Officials also point to a reduced number of employee grievances filed, which is likely a result of the
committees' efforts. For both labor and management, this means increased time to deal with matters other
than labor disputes. Furthermore, labor was able to achieve its goal of gaining greater employee involvement
in the decision-making process.
One drawback of the committees is that they effect a loss of authority for middle managers that some resent,
since employees are now empowered to bring their concerns directly to the highest level of management.
Furthermore, the County only trains the top labor and management leaders in the concepts and techniques of
labor-management committees, effectively shutting out middle managers from the process. However, despite
middle managers' resistance, both labor and management leaders view the committees as successful
endeavors. County leaders say they are taking steps to train middle managers in cooperative processes with
the goal of getting them to buy into to the new structures. However, training is expensive, and so it may not
be possible to train every manager unless proven necessary for success.
 The Service Excellence Program
Another cooperative initiative that has been successful in Ontario County is the Service Excellence Program
(also known as total quality management or TQM). This program was initiated in 1993 with union
participation in order to promote "customer satisfaction by continuous improvement through employee
involvement." Initially both labor and management leaders as well as county legislators were trained by
Rochester Institute of Technology staff. Initial training cost $35,000 for employees and $50,000 for
supervisors, managers and elected officials. The county gradually built its capacity to do training in-house,
and today all county employees have been trained in Service Excellence concepts.
The Service Excellence program is structured around a countywide steering committee that acts as a core
planning group, setting the direction for the program and coordinating the activities of the subgroups. Four of
the 37 departments have operational workgroups, which have the same organizational structure as the
steering committee and coordinate their corresponding functions.
There are currently six subgroups that perform the following functions:
Trainers and Facilitators: trains new employees in service excellence concepts.
Training and Development: provides technical tools and training to TQM teams.
Measurement and Assessment: surveys and measures customer and employee satisfaction; develops
measures for performance standards.
Team Chartering: selects projects for service excellence efforts; provides mentoring and assistance to
teams in improving job performance.
Communications: shares information and ideas through a quarterly newsletter; publicizes the program,
and increases awareness of program success.
Recognition and Reward: provides rewards for good work, incentives to improve operations, with the goal
of better service as a result. Rewards include free dinners at area restaurants, pins for long-serving
employees, and engraving employee names on a plaque in the county courthouse.
The Service Excellence initiative has resulted in "win-win" situations for labor and management. It has also
saved county taxpayers money. The workplace safety team project, for instance, began with county safety
coordinators identifying high-risk job duties, such as driving and heavy lifting, based on local and national
accident and injury data. Employees performing these tasks were then trained by professionals in safer
driving and lifting techniques. This initiative resulted in a 37% reduction of OSHA-recordable injuries in the
county from 1994 to 1997. Lost days were reduced by 60% in the same time period. As a result of these
safety improvements, a special tax assessment to pay for workers' compensation, to be spread out over five
years, was paid off in only three due to reduced injuries, saving taxpayers $1.5 million. Furthermore,
employees received an important morale-building message-that management truly cares about their safety
on the job.
Another example of the benefits of service excellence is the county sheriff's department, one of only two
sheriff's departments in the state accredited by CALEA (Commission for the Accreditation of Law Enforcement
Agencies), which requires that 800 standards be met before granting accreditation. Managers emphasize that
through service excellence, the county aspires to have the highest professional law enforcement standards in
New York State, a goal borne out by the fact that the county jail is also nationally accredited. It's a win-win
situation for law enforcement and citizens alike, since there is a lessened liability to the community for
lawsuits from dissatisfied citizens. A string of deficiency-free state auditor's ratings in the nursing home and
in the home health program further illustrate the quality improvements engendered by the service excellence
program.
This is not to say that service excellence is without its drawbacks. Training is expensive and the results are
not always immediate. The work groups have experienced varying levels of success, according to the human
resources director. In particular, there is a need for greater employee-based innovation in both health and
social services departments, both of which have experienced greater resistance from middle managers.
Finally, it should be noted that the work of the Service Excellence committees does not overlap with that of
the labor-management committees. However, in a small organization such as Ontario County, there is overlap
among the key players in the various groups that allows for communication between them.
 Mutual-Gains Bargaining
A third tool, mutual-gains bargaining, has been used in the county to negotiate labor contracts since 1994,
when the county used this process to re-negotiate four contracts with CSEA. Training, provided by staff from
the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University, helped to educate both
management and labor about the techniques of mutual-gains bargaining. Results were positive, and both
labor and management say they would use mutual-gains bargaining again in future contracts. Through the
mutual gains process, they both have become more adept at cooperative skills, such as listening to each other
and providing information up front.
Union leaders extolled the benefits of mutual gains, although they acknowledged the difficulty of adjusting to
providing information up front. Sounding a less satisfied note, one manager noted that mutual gains is a
"tedious process" and might not be used in the next contract, now that trust levels are high, making formal
processes for information-sharing less necessary. Mutual gains has proven valuable to smooth negotiation
contracts, but as another manager put it, "it is the respect and mutual trust developed the other 11 months
of the year that really matters."
 The Right Climate
There were several pre-existing conditions needed to build cooperative labor-management relationships in
Ontario County. Above all, it was willingness of both labor and management to risk upsetting a stable but
fundamentally adversarial relationship to move towards a more cooperative, "win-win" model of relations. To
do so, county leaders focused on the county's changing needs and saw the value of changing the status quo
in order to "be the best", as one manager said.
There was some initial resistance to the Service Excellence program, for example, on the part of the Board of
Supervisors. They were skeptical of, in the words of one manager, "another one of those touchy-feely
programs". Today the legislators are much more supportive of the program, but as elected officials, ultimately
they are most interested in the bottom line. Since improvements are sometimes hard to quantify, this can be
a barrier to gaining their endorsement for new initiatives.
Some employees and middle managers have also remained uncomfortable with the new cooperative outlook.
Middle managers may rightfully believe they are being cut out of the decision-making loop, and that their
jobs are threatened as a result. However, county leaders say this resentment has diminished over time, as
people have gotten involved and helped to solve problems. However, some leaders wished they had made
more effort to train middle managers before cooperative processes were instituted. Some county officials
believe it may take up to ten years for a full transition to a new philosophy of cooperation.
Support from union leadership has been more uniform, especially in regard to safety, which is also a top
priority for national AFL-CIO leaders. Service Excellence parameters have even been incorporated into the
most recent labor contract. Still, leaders on both sides remark that some people are resistant to change of
any kind, and that it takes time to build the trust and teamwork necessary for change.
 Privatization, Engaging Labor, and Performance Measurement
Privatization is a contentious issue that can stymie even the smoothest labor-management relations. Ontario
County has successfully dealt with privatization issues by bringing labor into the process. When the county
receives an unsolicited offer to privatize a particular service, as it has for the county landfill, nursing home,
and home health care, both management and labor are involved in making the decision. In the case of home
health, employees are giving input to an outside consultant hired to study the costs and benefits of
privatization. County administrators consider the input of employees and the consultant alike before making a
final decision.
As a result of the decision-making process, the landfill and nursing home have remained county-run, and the
study of home health care is ongoing. County officials, however, do make it clear that just because a service
is not privatized today does not mean it can't be in the future. If the private sector can provide the service
cheaper and better, according to county management, then the service will go private. This belief, in the
words of union leaders, is a "constant challenge," but they are glad to have the opportunity to conduct their
own research and bring the results to the table to discuss with management in a cooperative setting.
In another effort to engage labor in decision making, Ontario County union (CSEA) representatives serve on
the search committees for new county administrators. The present County Administrator was chosen this way,
as was the Director of Planning. County management and the union also cooperated in developing a new
cafeteria health plan, which, after a year-long education period, now allows workers to choose their own
benefits package.
The effects on employee morale and citizen satisfaction of Ontario's cooperative programs have been positive,
but have only been quantified to a limited extent. Officials cite the difficulty of finding objective measures of
performance quality. The county has obtained some information through a "Citizen Survey" and an "Employee
Survey" conducted under the auspices of the Service Excellence program. The results of the surveys indicate
that both citizens and employees are generally satisfied with county services and workplaces. However, there
was no survey taken prior to implementing the changes. Nor was the data compared to national norms. While
attitude change may be difficult to quantify, the County is able to show clear instances of cost savings in
particular departments, such as the workman's compensation tax windfall. However, the County still does not
have a way to measure cost savings on an inter-agency level.
 Key Lessons
Cooperative labor-management structures have had a short but productive existence in Ontario County.
Several key lessons have emerged, according to both labor and management leaders:
It may be tempting to jump into the latest trendy program, but few people realize the amount of work
needed to sustain the effort. Begin by understanding the level of commitment needed to implement
these programs.
It takes time to build a cooperative labor-management relationship. There is no such thing as a quick fix.
However, significant success was achieved in Ontario County in just three years of service excellence and
mutual gains.
In any negotiation, it is important to make sure the other side looks good. This mindset can lead to a
more productive negotiation process.
The right people need to be at the table for a successful result. If labor leaders don't represent
employee's true interests but defer to management, for instance, the negotiation will be futile. The
people at the table also need to have the authority to make a final decision.
One group can adhere to its principles and still maintain a regard for the other group's interests. There
can be mutual gains in the negotiation process.
Middle management must buy into the process and be trained in the cooperative philosophy. Even if top
management buys into the idea, middle managers need to support it. Leaders should not be afraid to
make ultimatums if middle managers continue to resist changes.
Attain small victories like safety improvements, and build on those successes to make broader changes.
Certain resources were especially helpful to both labor and management in getting the cooperative process
started. First and foremost, they did extensive background research on each initiative. For instance, county
leaders recruited an advisory council of eight business people who use Service Excellence in their firms. This
council continues to provide information to the county about private sector innovations that improve
performance and service. Managers cited the importance of looking to the private sector to learn about
successful methods for building labor-management cooperation.
Area educational institutions were also a valuable resource. The Finger Lakes Community College Business
Institute (FLCC), the Rochester Institute of Technology College of Continuing Education, the Cornell School of
Industrial and Labor Relations, and the Center for Government Research, a nonprofit public-policy consulting
firm in Rochester, all aided the process through information and/or training. The FLCC, for example, houses
an Excellence in Government Institute, which offers all county employees free certificate programs in
supervision, customer skills, and workplace skills. Course topics include conflict management, problem solving,
meeting skills, and tools for process improvement. On a national level, a summer program of the Institute for
Local Government at the University of Virginia gave officials a larger perspective on government restructuring
efforts around the country.
 Conclusion
Instituting cooperative processes involves a culture change, an evolution in the way work systems are
designed. It does not occur overnight, nor without careful preparation. In order to effect changes in working
relationships and labor-management relations, managers, union officials, legislators, and employees need to
be trained on the philosophy behind cooperation. Both parties need to work together continuously to
implement and effectively administer change.
Labor-management cooperation in Ontario County is a testimony to the leadership of both the union and
management in seeking better ways of working and new paths to success. Ontario County's example shows
that cooperation does not have to compromise or deny the identity of either party. However, cooperative
structures are not panaceas. Conflict may still arise, and if handled correctly, can spark creativity and change.
Ontario County's example demonstrates that labor-management cooperation can provide a better way for
government to function effectively.
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Tompkins County is located in the Finger Lakes region of New York State at the base of Cayuga Lake. It has
a population of approximately 95,000, and operates under a county administrator who is appointed by the
fifteen-member elected Board of Representatives.
In Tompkins County, the primary focus of cooperative labor-management relations is a total quality
management initiative called Partners for Quality. All labor-management committees are implemented under
the structural umbrella of the Partners for Quality initiative. Mutual-gains bargaining is another tool used in
Tompkins County. However, the scope of mutual-gains bargaining is not as broad as the Partners for Quality
program nor as central to day-to-day decision making and service delivery.
The following people were interviewed for this study:
David Chase, President, CSEA Local 855
Scott Heyman, County Administrator
Barbara Mink, Chair, Board of Representatives
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Benefits of Labor-Management Cooperation in Tompkins County
Key Lessons and Insights
Conclusion
 Labor-Management Committees
The Origins of Labor-Management Committees in Tompkins County
Labor-management committees have long been implemented in an ad hoc manner in Tompkins County. There
was a clause in the standard labor contract which allowed for creating labor-management committees to
resolve workplace conflicts or address specific projects, and labor-management committees were occasionally
used in that context. There was also an Employee Council (comprised primarily of employees) which served
as a venue for communication.
These committees set the stage for implementing a formal total quality management program in the county
in several ways. First, they demonstrated to employees, managers, and elected officials that cooperative
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structures could be effective. Second, the ad hoc committees on which any employee, union or non-union,
could serve and which were beginning to address contract matters such as terms and conditions of
employment, represented a threat to the authority of the CSEA Local 855, which bargains for all county
employees. Thus, when county managers wanted to formalize labor-management committees and subsume
them under a total quality management initiative, it was in the union's interest to work to negotiate an
exclusive agreement between the county Board of Representatives and the union. At that time, the other
existing cooperative structures such as the Employee Council were disbanded.
How Labor-Management Committees Function Now
Under the total quality management program, there is a nested system of labor-management committees; a
heirarchy stepping down from the Leadership Council, to departmental committees, to cross-functional project
teams.
The umbrella committee is the Leadership Council which directs the implementation of the program and
provides structural organizational support for departmental labor-management committees operating under
the program. The large departments in the County, such as the Department of Social Services, the Health
Department, and the Probation Department, each have a departmental labor-management committee which
addresses general workplace matters and formulates policy recommendations designed to improve the
efficiency of the department. Cross-functional project teams are created to work on a particular project such
as coordinating intake systems for welfare and other social service recipients.
Partners for Quality
In 1993, county administrators and elected officials decided to formalize the cooperative structures in the
county and implement a more comprehensive mechanism for cooperative decision-making: the Partners for
Quality program (also known as total quality management or TQM).
Tompkins County Administrator, Scott Heyman, had been interested in the concept of TQM for a number of
years, but information about implementing total quality management in the public sector was difficult to find.
After some research of successful examples of total quality management in the public sector in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, and Madison, Wisconsin, the Board agreed to hire Marcia Calicchia from the School of Industrial
and Labor Relations (ILR) at Cornell University and the Program for Employment and Workplace Systems
(PEWS) to assist in planning the implementation and conduct employee training. These consultants were
chosen due to their jargon-free and labor-oriented approach to TQM. This perspective on total quality
management was, and still is, very important to the goals of the county.
Shifting from Autocratic to Cooperative Work Systems
Barbara Mink, Chair of the Board of Representatives, described total quality management as "an absolute
visceral change in the way [we] react to problems and the way [we] take initiative for change." As a result of
the Partners for Quality initiative, many managers have shifted from an autocratic way of directing operations
to one that is more cooperative. This change in management style is beginning to impact all departments.
Almost everything that is done in Tompkins County now is done through a labor-management framework.
Total quality management has impacted Tompkins County employees and managers in a profound way; a
higher degree of communication and cooperation is now part of the culture in Tompkins County.
Structure of the Partners for Quality Program
There are three primary components to Partners for Quality:
1. The Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) Local 855 and the Tompkins County Board of
Representatives spent a year negotiating an agreement establishing the labor-management partnership.
The agreement outlines the guiding principles and overall expectations for the initiative. The agreement is
still in force.
2. The Leadership Council - a labor-management committee which guides the implementation of the
Partners for Quality program and provides structural, organizational support for departmental labor-
management committees operating under the program.
3. Every employee, manager, and legislator in Tompkins County is trained in total quality management
techniques and work processes. The goal is to provide training that crosses formal organizational
boundaries. Marcia Calicchia and her colleagues have trained twenty in-house facilitators in TQM
techniques and several people within the county now have leadership roles with the program.
Tompkins County has invested heavily in training for this program. Between 1994 and 1997, the county spent
just over $300,000 for outside consultants to conduct training. In 1998, the county will spend an estimated
$170,000 for consultants to complete the bulk of the training (for all departments except the sheriff's
department which is independent of other county government). Since 1997, in-house costs have been around
$100,000. These costs will drop dramatically after 1998, when all employees, managers, and elected officials
have been trained in total quality management techniques and only training for new employees and refresher
courses will be necessary.
Successes
Certain projects are ideally suited for joint decision-making. It can be a time-consuming process, but the
tangible results are often worthwhile.
Example - Human Services Building
In December of 1997, Tompkins County completed construction on a new building to house the Department
of Social Services. The building was planned using TQM methods with a great deal of employee involvement
in decision making. The old building had inadequate ventilation and a lawsuit had been filed by employees
which prompted the search for a new facility.
When decisions such as these were made in the past, a committee of five legislators was chosen to oversee
the project without representation from labor. When the Board announced the formation of this committee,
union representatives requested labor's involvement in the design and construction of the facility. The size of
the preliminary planning committee grew to twenty-one members and, although it was large, the contribution
of labor to the overall project resulted in an extremely functional building.
The process took four years from conceptualization to completion. Most importantly, a lot of the controversy
that usually accompanies this kind of dramatic change was eliminated. When the committee was first
established, labor expressed some fear and anxiety toward the project. These concerns were largely dealt
with in the context of the various labor-management committees that were formed.
There were at least three committees established to construct the building: a stakeholders committee
comprised of building occupants (both labor and management) to do the preliminary planning of what was
needed in a new building, a building design committee which determined room sizes, color scheme, carpet
types, etc., and a building construction committee which organized and supervised construction. Barbara Mink
reported: "[I]t was extremely labor intensive, but not agonizingly so, and it resulted in the best building
project we have ever had."
Limitations
Labor-management committees and total quality management methods can only function well when
committee authority is clearly-defined and consistent.
Example - Downtown Ithaca Parking
A county labor-management committee was formed to address the lack of employee parking in downtown
Ithaca, and was charged with the task of making recommendations to the Board of Representatives. The
parking committee did not have jurisdiction over expenditures; so the members could not recommend putting
up a gate that costs $20,000, for example, without going through the Board. However, the committee was
given the authority to determine the policies for county parking lots. The committee has recommended that
several parking spaces currently reserved for Board members be reassigned to other county employees. The
Board is poised to reject the committee's recommendations.
The labor-management committee in this case does not have the authority to determine a policy that the
Board of Representatives does not like. Situations like this which give authority only to take it away can
undermine cooperative efforts and slowly-developing trust. To prevent failures, the role and authority of
committees should be clearly defined from the outset, and elected officials must be as committed to the
process as others involved.
 Mutual-Gains Bargaining
In Tompkins County mutual-gains bargaining techniques have been instinctively used for many years. In
1995, County administrators decided to formalize a mutual gains approach by training employees in the
technique. Bernie Flaherty of the School of Industrial Labor Relations at Cornell University trained
approximately 300 of 720 county employees in mutual-gains. Now all bargaining units other than the sheriff's
department utilize mutual-gains techniques for all terms and conditions except salary.
Mutual-gains bargaining is not a panacea for Tompkins County. The impact of using this tool depends on the
commitment of the participant as the President of the CSEA Local 855, David Chase pointed out:
Mutual-gains bargaining can be whatever you want it to be. Some people don't see [win-win] as win-win.
Some people see it as compromise-compromise...There's a contract between labor and management which
automatically creates sides. But, that doesn't mean that the two shouldn't look at each other and say: we
should do what's best for the both of us (and) for the entity that we serve which is Tompkins County...We
realize the reality of the situation; there is X amount of money to be allocated and we need to figure out the
best way to move it around.
Mutual-gains bargaining serves to improve the process of negotiations. Through the use of this tool,
consensus and agreement can be reached more quickly and with less aggravation in Tompkins County.
Advantages of Mutual-Gains Bargaining
All three interviewees recognized the benefits of mutual gains techniques in negotiations. The fact that
interest-based approaches to problem solving have extended beyond the collective bargaining process to
committee, and other discussions, is an indication of their usefulness. Chair of the Board of Representatives,
Barbara Mink indicated that the Sheriff's Department used the language of mutual gains in the latest
discussion of health care benefits.
In collective bargaining, salary remains the only issue that is not negotiated with mutual gains techniques.
The county has offered to negotiate salary using mutual gains but the union has resisted. However, the issue
of salary was 'on the table' faster than ever before in the latest round of contract negotiations according to
David Chase.
 Benefits of Labor-Management Cooperation in Tompkins County
There are three broad expectations associated with labor-management cooperation in Tompkins County: to
improve labor/management relations, to decrease costs for delivering services, and to keep taxes down. The
decision to establish formal structures to share decision-making with labor was not due to particular fiscal or
service pressures. TQM is a formalization of the labor-management relationship that has been developing
since the 1980s.
Improved Relations Between Labor and Management
The focus of the Tompkins County Partners for Quality (PfQ) initiative is on improved labor-management
relations. This reflects the perception that cooperation will directly, and indirectly, result in cost savings and
improved service quality. Barbara Mink describes its effects as:
"...a shift in our paradigm; an absolute visceral change in the way we react to problems and the way we take
initiative for change...Tompkins County is a good example of how TQM can work...The best evidence for this,
in addition to the cost savings and improvements in efficiency, is the change in people's attitudes."
These goals have been articulated through various mission and vision statements. In addition, TQM
orientation sessions, which have occurred since December 1994, are another forum for developing a shared
understanding of these goals.
Grievances
One indication of improved relations between labor and management is in the type and number of grievances
that have been filed since the implementation of TQM. The grievances that are filed today represent issues
that are not resolvable through labor-management committees. In Tompkins County, grievances have been
minimized through these new avenues for communication.
Improved Service Quality
In Tompkins County, the focus of labor-management cooperation is on process issues. For instance, the
Department of Social Services labor-management committee developed a framework for eliminating excessive
layers of administration. Now, there is a single intake system for food stamps and Medicaid. Indirectly, this
change is impacting more than service quality. The cost of providing services is being reduced.
Cost Savings from Improved Labor-Management Relations
Management believes the benefits of TQM more than outweigh the costs and has been willing to invest
heavily in the process. However, figures documenting these cost savings are hard to come by due to a fear
that cost savings will result in budget cuts, punishing successful departments. Coupling total quality
management with performance-based budgeting techniques could help to encourage documentation of cost
savings. Another strategy would be to simply make it clear at the outset to departmental staff that if funds
for training and to sustain the overall initiative were going to continue to flow, documentation of cost savings
must be forthcoming.
 Key Lessons and Insights
Trust, Leadership, and Defining Roles
The most important factor in developing cooperation between labor and management is people. One of the
main reasons for the success of TQM in Tompkins County is that both management and labor were committed
to the idea. The degree of trust that existed prior to the implementation of TQM enabled Tompkins County to
proceed with the initiative.
Both Barbara Mink (Chair, Board of Representatives) and David Chase (CSEA Local 855 President)
acknowledged the role Scott Heyman (County Administrator) played in developing support for the Partners for
Quality program in Tompkins County. One concern David Chase has is the impact Scott Heyman's retirement
will have on the initiative. Subsequently, one priority of the interview process is to determine whether or not
the values of candidates for County Administrator are consistent with the TQM program.
The expectations and roles for labor-management committees must be defined as clearly as possible to limit
misunderstandings. Clear roles enable committees to remain focused. Union representatives have played an
important role in keeping this focus and pointing out when the committee is getting off track.
Communication and Planning
Communication is paramount to success. Through communication goals are defined, expectations are
delineated, and relationships are built. Limiting the use of jargon and terms also facilitates the process,
especially during training sessions.
Careful planning will result in a smooth transition during implementation. It is important to make sure the
strategy for implementation is clearly defined before presenting it to employees. Tompkins phased in its
program and this led to a lot of confusion among union members and employees because of the time lag
between the start of training in the Department of Social Services and the full implementation of TQM. Two
years have elapsed since the initiative was announced and some people have just begun their training.
Information
The major obstacle was not the will to begin using TQM, but the means by which to implement the program.
Tompkins devoted a lot of time and effort to finding the right people to conduct the TQM training. County
Administrator Scott Heyman asserts, "You have to make sure that you get the right people to do the training;
that the consultant's conception of TQM is what you want; that it is consistent with what you have been
doing." In addition to finding the right facilitators, reviewing the experience of local governments through
hands-on practice is important.
 Conclusion
This case study has shown that labor-management cooperation is not only possible, but viable in Tompkins
County. With the right people to coordinate the effort and the support of labor, management, and elected
officials, the TQM initiative in Tompkins County has been, to a large degree, successful. The insights drawn
from this case may provide other county governments with information necessary to pursue labor-
management cooperation as a tool for service delivery.
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New York State Taylor Law: Negotiating To Avoid Strikes in the Public Sector
Kristin Guild, May 1998
Governments Look to Labor for Restructuring
As local government officials and agencies seek ways to cut costs and improve efficiency, restructuring
and reinventing government have become common catchphrases. Since labor costs are the largest single
expenditure of most government agencies, it is natural to turn first to labor in efforts to restructure
government. It is tempting for local governments to follow the transformative model implemented by
private corporations - i.e. downsize, utilize temporary workers, out-source/privatize, cut wages and
benefits, demand longer hours from remaining employees, and increase investment in labor-saving
capital equipment. However, government has constraints and responsibilities that the private sector does
not face.
In order to restructure government to meet the challenge posed by dramatic changes in the United
States economy, local government officials must have a solid working knowledge of their rights and
responsibilities with respect to civil service personnel. There is no Federal law targeted specifically at civil
service unions or personnel policy, and legislation varies widely between states. New York State
government employees are among the most unionized civil servants in the nation, and the State also has
strongly-defined employee rights within its statutory Civil Service Law (colloquially known as the Taylor
Law) topical case law.
The major points of the Taylor Law and subsequent case law pertinent to local government officials and
labor representatives, and the history and development of the law are described below.
No Labor Strike = Strong Bargaining Rights
Due to the potentially severe impacts to citizens of a halt in essential government service provision, New
York State law has long prohibited public sector strike. The legal strategy until the 1960s was to apply
harsh penalties to striking workers. This strategy did not, however, prevent such serious strikes as the
1966 New York City transit worker strike which effectively crippled the city and cost an estimated $100
million per day. By the late 1960s, a number of public sector employee strikes in the State pushed the
government to shift from a penalty-based system to a prevention-based one.
The Taylor Law
The new law passed in 1967, the Taylor Law, permits union organizing, and provides a system within
which to resolve labor-management conflict short of striking. Public employers are required to recognize
and negotiate in good faith with the union representatives of a bargaining unit. The law establishes
certain mandatory bargaining issues, which public employers must negotiate with union representation.
Broadly stated, mandatory bargaining issues are terms and conditions of employment.
The Public Employees Relations Board(PERB) interprets which issues are terms and conditions of
employment under the law. PERB is also mandated to facilitate union recognition and labor-management
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 The Origin of the Taylor Law
From 1947 to 1967, employees of all levels of government in New York State were governed by the Condon-
Wadlin Act which prohibited public sector strikes and assessed harsh penalties to strikers. However, workers
continued to strike, despite the prohibition, and penalties were seldom applied because they were perceived
to be too extreme. The Condon-Wadlin Act provided no alternative methods to resolve labor-management
disputes.
In the 1960s, a series of large public sector strikes, including a transit workers strike which brought New York
City to a halt for twelve days, made it clear that the law needed an overhaul. In January of 1966, Governor
Nelson Rockefeller created a Public Employee Relations Committee chaired by Professor George W. Taylor of
the University of Pennsylvania to make legislative recommendations that became the Taylor Law.
More detailed history
 The Interpretive Role of the Public Employment Relations Board
The Taylor Law created an agency called the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) to implement and
interpret the statute, resolve any negotiating conflict, and conduct research on civil service industrial
relations. The PERB board consists of three members appointed by the Governor to staggered six-year terms.
PERB employs approximately forty staff to perform mediation, legal and administrative duties. The board is
located administratively within the State Department of Civil Service, but is independent of any governmental
department.
PERB can be involved in any stage of the negotiation process, upon the request of either party, or on the
board's own initiative. The Public Employment Relations Board has "exclusive jurisdiction of labor disputes
between public employers and public employees involving the right to organize and the right to negotiate in
good faith" (Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co. 1982: 199). PERB has broad powers to prevent improper
practices of negotiation such as bad faith negotiation by imposing penalties to parties which engage in
improper practices. However, the board only has authority over the organizing and negotiating process, not
the contracts which are the end result of collective bargaining.
 What is the collective bargaining process mandated by the Taylor Law?
The collective bargaining steps required of local governments by the Taylor Law are as follows:
1. Determine the bargaining unit.
A bargaining unit is usually determined based on either a common employer, place of work, or a common
job task. For example, all employees of a county may be represented by one union, or the custodial staff
by one union and administrative staff by another. The bargaining units are most likely already
established, but may need occasional revisions. If there is conflict over designating the bargaining unit,
Public Employment Relations Board mediators can help to resolve the conflict.
2. Determine the recognized employee organization for each bargaining unit.
This organization will represent all employees of that bargaining unit in negotiations with the public
employer, whether all employees are members or not. If there are competing employee organizations
with nearly equal membership within the bargaining unit, employees will vote to determine which
organization will represent them in negotiations. Here too, the PERB can assist with conflict resolution.
3. Determine mandatory bargaining issues.
If there is conflict over what constitutes a mandatory bargaining issue (and there often is), the Public
Employee Relations Board determines this based on the statute and case law. The PERB decision can be
appealed to New York courts, and decisions have been overruled in the past. Numerous examples appear
in Volume 19 of New York Jurisprudence published by the Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co.
4. Negotiate in good faith.
If either the public employer or the union do not negotiate in good faith, PERB has the authority to
impose penalties. If negotiation reaches an impasse,
a. PERB mediates. If mediation is unsuccessful,
b. the parties may voluntarily submit to binding arbitration or
c. PERB assigns a fact-finding board which investigates the negotiating issues and makes
recommendations.
d. If the parties refuse to comply with the fact-finders' recommendations, the matter goes to the
appropriate legislative body for a hearing. The appropriate legislative body makes the ultimate
decision. Which legislative body has jurisdiction over the final decision depends upon the level of
government. For example the local school board has jurisdiction over a dispute with educational
workers, and the county legislative board would determine the contract conditions of county
employees.
e. The Taylor Law exempts fire and police services from this process, due to the essential nature of the
service, and requires that they go directly to binding arbitration following unsuccessful mediation.
5. The appropriate legislative body approves the negotiated contract.
 What are mandatory bargaining issues?
Public employers are required by the Taylor Law to negotiate with recognized employee groups on mandatory
bargaining issues, which some call "bargainable" issues. This does not mean that public employers must yield
to union demands on the issue in question, but just that it must be a topic of negotiation. The Taylor Law
defines terms and conditions of employment as mandatory bargaining issues. What legitimately constitutes
"terms and conditions of employment," however, is defined not by the statute itself, but by subsequent
decisions by the Public Employment Relations Board, and when the PERB decision has been contested, by the
New York courts.
According to case law, any provision relating to payment including wages, medical benefits, sick, vacation,
and holiday leave, reimbursement for expenses, or severance pay, or to disciplinary policies and work rules is
subject to mandatory collective bargaining (Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 1982, 206-7). Job security,
however, is not a condition of employment and is not a mandatory issue for bargaining, nor is the allocation
of positions to salary grades. According to the New York courts, class size in the case of educational services
is not a term or condition of employment, and thus does not have to be a subject of collective bargaining
(ibid.: 207).
 When is subcontracting a government service a mandatory bargaining issue?
One major means for government restructuring is subcontracting government services to the private or non-
profit sectors. Subcontracting unionized services is sometimes deemed to be a term and condition of
employment in New York State and, therefore, a mandatory issue for collective bargaining. Case law and
PERB decisions have established two broad criteria for services proposed for subcontracting which must be
collectively bargained:
1. The service is currently provided exclusively by unionized workers, and
2. the work to be subcontracted must be substantially the same as the work conducted by unionized
employees.
However, even if these two conditions are the case, the issue may not require negotiation if the public
employer can demonstrate that there has been a significant change in the qualifications for service. John
Crotty, Counsel to the Public Employment Relations Board and PERB Deputy Chairperson, gives a recent
example from Erie County. Medical care to elderly and infirm citizens has traditionally been provided by
general practitioners. County officials decided that geriatric specialists would better serve their constituents,
and contracted with a private firm of geriatric specialists to provide the service, firing all of the county-
employed general practitioners. The employee organization representing the general practitioners claimed that
this change in service provision was a mandatory issue of collective bargaining, and the matter went to the
Public Employment Relations Board for a decision. While the service was previously provided exclusively by
the general practitioners, and while the service to be provided would still be medical care to the same client
group, PERB determined that the qualifications for employment, and thus the nature of the service provided,
had been substantially changed. PERB ruled that this change was not an issue of mandatory collective
bargaining.
Crotty estimates that, of cases of subcontracting brought to PERB, 40% are determined to be mandatory
bargaining issues, whereas 60% are dismissed.
 Is downsizing government services legal according to the Taylor Law?
Yes. The purpose of civil service legislation is "to protect efficient public employees from partisan control [It]
is not designed to prevent reorganization of a department to promote effectiveness and economy (Lawyers
Co-operative Publishing Co. 1982: 230). Public service positions can be abolished in good faith when there is
no longer a need for the service, or when financial circumstances require government cost-cutting. To legally
eliminate a position for economic reasons, the cost savings must be equal, or nearly equal, to the amount
that would be paid to the employee. Thus, it is illegal to discharge an employee only to replace them with a
newly hired employee to perform essentially the same or similar services. Similarly, it is illegal in New York
State to eliminate positions by subcontracting the service if the service will remain essentially the same.
 What resources for contract negotiation, mediation, and information are available?
The Public Employment Relations Board employs mediators and lawyers who can help guide local governments
through the process and assist in conflict resolution. However, PERB is a small agency with numerous
responsibilities, and does not have much time to devote to improving labor-management relations and
mediation. PERB has offices in Albany, Buffalo, and New York City.
http://unix2.nysed.gov/ils/executive/perb/mission.htm
The United States Secretary of Labor's Task Force on Excellence in State and Local Government Through
Labor-Management Cooperation produced a report in 1996. The report gives numerous examples of
cooperation throughout the country. http://www.dol.gov/dol/_sec/public/media/reports/worktogether/toc.htm
The text of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act can be easily accessed through the internet at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/states/ny.html#codes. Select Statutes, then Civil Service.
Written resources include:
Donovan, Ronald. 1990 Administering the Taylor Law: Public Employee Relations in New York. Ithaca, NY: ILR
Press Cornell University.
This text describes the events in New York State leading to the passage of the Taylor Law. It
describes the role of the Public Employee Relations Board in administering the law.
Kearney, Richard C. 1984. Labor Relations in the Public Sector. New York: Marcell Dekker, Inc.
Documents the history and legal environment of public sector collective bargaining in the United
States, and notes the proportion of public sector unionization in the states of the union. It
investigates the monetary and personnel impacts of collective bargaining, and explores methods to
resolve impasses in the negotiating process.
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 1982 New York Jurisprudence 2d. Volume 19. Civil Service Law ß347-
ß404. Rochester, NY: Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co.
One in a series of volumes describing important case law pertaining to New York statutes (organized
by statute, subject, and keyword) in a readable narrative format which highlights critical aspects of
cases and of decisions. This volume contains descriptions of civil service case law.
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PRIVATIZATION AND THE MARKET
ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Small growth in contracting underscores
 dominance of service provision by public employees
by Mildred Warner and Amir Hefetz
In the early 1990s, Chautauqua County, N.Y. was pulling out of an economic slump.  Keen to maintain
services while reducing taxes and building government reserves, the county executive aggressively
restructured government services using a mix of strategies — sometimes privatizing services, but at other
times bringing previously privatized work back in house. The county also cooperated with other local
governments to achieve economies of scale, and introduced performance-based incentives to promote
efficiency and investment in new technologies within county departments.  By 1997 the county funds
were up, the tax rate had fallen, and services had expanded. In the end, the county’s officials decided that,
barring a few exceptions, neither the private nor public sector offered an inherent advantage, so they
found a middle path between those who stress the advantages of privatization and those who advocate for
the direct provision of services by government. (For more details on Chautauqua County’s experiences,
see the case study in Appendix C.)
Successful local governments such as Chautauqua County’s recognize privatization as one of a
number of available tools for restructuring their operations.  Other such tools include inter-municipal
2cooperation, performance-based incentives, and cooperative labor-management relations.  All of these
options can help governments enhance economic and social efficiency.  While privatization represents the
most widely pursued alternative to public service delivery, local governments use a wide set of restructur-
ing strategies in order to address a variety of market conditions and a broad range of social concerns.
Local governments often find themselves to be the sole buyer of a given type of service, and, as
such, must give careful attention to their role in the market.  When it comes to interacting with the market-
place, governments can play many roles, acting as regulator, provider, and contract manager.  Sometimes
governments even create a market simply by their need to deliver a certain kind of service. In these cases
governments must ensure competition, acceptable costs, adequate service quality, and stability in service
provision.
Our analysis of national longitudinal survey data from the International City/County Management
Association (ICMA) for 1982 to 1997 shows that:
• Although local governments employ a broad array of restructuring alternatives, service delivery by
public employees remains the dominant form of provision, hovering around an average of 60%
when all services are taken into account.
• Despite the increasing political acceptance of private forms of governmental service delivery,
privatization to for-profit and non-profit firms has risen only slightly, from 22% in 1982 to 24% in
1997, an increase that has not been steady.
• The next most common alternative form of service delivery—inter-municipal cooperation, which
achieves similar economies of scale but keeps work in the public sector—also has risen slightly,
from 12% in 1982 to 15% in 1997.
• Ninety percent of all public service restructuring takes one of three forms—privatization to for-
profit companies, privatization to non-profits, and inter-municipal cooperation.
Data for this study are based on ICMA surveys of alternative service delivery arrangements of local
governments.  ICMA surveys have been conducted every five years since 1982 and include all U.S.
counties with populations over 25,000 and all cities with populations over 10,000. The ICMA surveys
provide a very comprehensive view of the complex mix of services offered by local governments and the
array of delivery alternatives employed (see Appendix Table A-2).  Conducted in 1982, 1988, 1992, and
1997, the surveys measure the form of service delivery for 64 different services in seven broad areas:
public works and transportation, public utilities, public safety, health and human services, parks and
recreation, culture and art, and support functions.  Forms of contracting out measured by the ICMA
surveys include: contracts with other governments (inter-municipal cooperation); contracts with for-profit
or non-profit providers; and use of subsidies, franchises, or volunteers.   The surveys also measure local
government managers’ reasons for considering alternative forms of service delivery.  The stability in
3survey design and large sample size (over 1,500 municipalities) make the ICMA surveys an excellent
source of data for comparing governmental restructuring over time.
The persistence of public service delivery
Why does traditional provision of services by government employees persist as the dominant form of
service delivery? Past theorizing offers two possible answers: government failure, or quasi-market failure.
Government failure may explain why privatization doesn’t occur even when it might be appropriate.
Such failure may take the form of bureaucratic concerns over loss of control or power (Niskanen 1971).
Some studies also suggest that traditional forms of public service provision may persist because of civil
service employees’ opposition to privatization (McGuire et al. 1987; Savas 2000).  Support for this view
in our findings, however, is limited.
In theory, privatization attempts to address government failure by separating service provision from
service delivery, potentially giving the citizen/consumer more choice. When local governments outsource
service delivery, the government remains responsible for the finance and provision of the service, but
production and delivery are carried out by private firms or non-profit organizations. These contracts,
though, are not always forged in truly competitive markets, a situation that can lead to incorrect service
specification—where cost savings come at the expense of service quality—or to a loss of community
values (e.g., when privacy is sacrificed in order to contract out tax collection) (Lowery 1998).
Local governments employ several strategies to minimize such problems.  They may resort to
different levels of contracting in different service areas.  They may mix public and private provision in the
same service area.  Or they may reclaim responsibility for service provision in areas that were formerly
contracted out.  The availability of these complex restructuring strategies may explain why there has been
limited growth in overall privatization trends.
Our research challenges traditional views on service restructuring as a black-and-white choice
between only public or private provision, and we provide both a theoretical and empirical basis for
understanding the complexity of local government restructuring behavior. Using national statistics, we
address the full range of restructuring alternatives and the stability of those choices.  We complement the
data on trends with examples from the case of Chautauqua County, N.Y. to illustrate the complexity of
local government restructuring.
Furthermore, our research shows that ideology does not dictate local service delivery decisions.
Rather, as other research has also shown, pragmatic local governments explore a range of options and
recognize the need to structure their market for the sake of economic efficiency, service quality, and
accountability to community values (Warner and Hebdon 2001).
Why did privatization increase so little?
The privatization movement stemmed from a recognition that the political choices about service
provision can be separated from the actual mechanics of service delivery (Boyne 1996; Oakerson
1987).  Privatization is advocated as a solution to problems of government failure.  Government
4monopoly of production, bureaucratic unresponsiveness to citizen needs, and budget-maximizing
public officials are typical examples of the kinds of government failure that privatization claims to
remedy (Eggers and O’Leary 1995; Savas 2000).  The benefits of both public-sector engagement and
market discipline can be achieved through quasi-markets that separate provision from production
through contracts.
But contracts and quasi-markets also create failures of their own. Lowery (1998) discusses three
types of quasi-market failure: failure of market formation, preference error, and preference substitution.
The first of these, failure of market formation, results from a lack of competition, which is often due to
the limited number of suppliers that can actually provide many public services.  If privatization merely
substitutes a private monopoly for a public one, then savings will likely disappear after the initial contract.
Another kind of market failure is caused by lack of full information and high transaction costs in contract
specification and monitoring.   Difficulty in contract specification and monitoring can result in service
delivery that does not match public preferences. A third form of market failure results when citizen
preferences are not in line with collective preference as expressed through government provision.  When
decisions regarding policy provision are separated from the delivery of the service, “citizen consumers”
may exercise choice based on factors such as race or income rather than efficiency or quality, the latter of
which government providers intend to be the motivators of citizen choice.
Is the lack of growth in privatization due to government failure?
Theory would suggest that the same processes that create government inefficiency, bureaucratic unrespon-
siveness, government monopoly production, and principal agent problems (Eggers and O’Leary 1995;
Savas 2000) also cause governmental reluctance to privatize.  However, published research and the ICMA
data provide limited support for this view.
Contracting is not new. One reason why there may be so little growth in privatization is that con-
tracting out is not a new phenomenon for local governments.  Many services were contracted out in the
19th century and only brought in house as part of the “good government” movement launched to stem
problems of corruption (Adler 1999).  Henig (1989) argues that contracting by local governments has
been a long-standing practice, and that naming these activities “privatization” was part of an effort by
public-choice proponents to show empirical support for their propositions.  Thus, the trend shown in
Figure 1 is flat because the baseline is 1982, when contracting out was already common.
Fiscal stress was declining. The fact that fiscal stress was declining over much of this period may
explain some of the lack of growth in privatization. Pressure to restructure local government service
delivery is driven, in part, by concerns with fiscal stress and the notion that private providers, who are
subject to the rigors of market competition, will be more efficient than government.  So if privatization
offers efficiency gains, we might expect to see higher levels of privatization during recessionary periods
(e.g., 1982) or times of local government fiscal stress (e.g., 1992).  Indeed, the up and down pattern of the
privatization trends does appear to mirror the overall economy’s cycles.  Beginning in 1988, ICMA
tracked local government concerns with fiscal stress, tax pressure, and cost control.  However, with the
exception of fiscal stress, which rose in 1992, the percentage of governments reporting these factors as
important in their decision to restructure shows a steady decline over the period (see Table 1).
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Opposition to privatization is stable or falling. The lack of growth in privatization also can’t be
explained by a strong opposition to the practice. Some argue that privatization reflects a desire for a
“smaller” government.  While this seems to be the general public’s view of privatization, internal opposi-
tion to government contracting would be expected from line employees, department heads, and elected
officials.  But with the exception of line employees, who have the most to lose from privatization, the
ICMA data show opposition from department heads and elected officials is declining or stable.  Although
the percentage of government managers who cite a “change in political climate emphasizing a decreased
role for government” as a factor in their decision to restructure has almost doubled since 1988, it still
accounts for less than a fifth of all respondents.  This may reflect greater public trust in local government
and a recognition of the essential nature of the services it provides (Conlan 1998).
Managerial capacity is rising. Lack of managerial capacity does not appear to explain the limited
increase in privatization. The restructuring that must occur in privatization requires experience and
leadership on the part of local government officials (Bartle et al. 1996; Boyne 1998).  It also requires
capacity and willingness to take risks (Warner and Hebdon 2001). Almost 70% of all the responding
governments report that they are studying the feasibility of private delivery, and over 95% report that they
FIGURE 1
Trends in local government service provision over time
Public employee entirely Inter municipal cooperation
Privatization (for-profit & non-profit)
U.S. cities and counties, number: 1982=1675, 1988=1627, 1992=1444, 1997=1460.
Average provision by service delivery alternative as percent of total provision (averaged across all places and all services).
Provision level is number of services provided by each place.  Privatization includes for-profit and non-profit contracts.
Source: International City/County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data,
1982, 1988, 1992, 1997, Washington, D.C.
6currently contract out for at least one service. The number of governments reporting that they lacked staff
expertise in contract management dropped by half from 1988 to 1997 to less than 6%.  The percentage
allowing competitive bidding between public employees and private providers increased by 50%, and
there was a similar increase in governments offering programs to minimize the effect on displaced public
employees. However, lack of monitoring and low levels of competitive bidding suggest room for manage-
rial improvement.
TABLE 1
Factors affecting local government restructuring
Survey year
1988 1992 1997
Fiscal stress is declining
External fiscal pressures, restrictions placed on raising taxes 36.5% 37.8% 30.2%
Internal attempts to decrease costs of service delivery 66.0 62.0 59.9
State or federal mandates tied to intergovernmental financing 13.5 11.7 7.3
Opposition is stable or falling
Has your local government encountered any obstacle in
   various private alternatives for service delivery? NA 46.8% 47.0%
Opposition from citizens 18.9% 14.8 14.0
Opposition from elected officials 26.1 18.2 19.5
Opposition from local government line employees 27.2 25.5 28.4
Opposition from department heads 18.4 13.7 15.1
Change in political climate emphasizing a decreased role for government 9.2 13.7 16.4
Concerns about government liability 22.1 10.5 8.0
Insufficient supply of competent private deliverers 23.8 11.6 12.1
Management capacity is rising
Has your local government studied the feasibility of adopting private
   service delivery withing the past five years? NA 69.3% 68.8%
Has your local government undertaken any activities to ensure
   success in implementing private sector delivery alternatives? NA 48.6 49.0
Lack of staff with sufficient expertise in contract management 12.5% 7.2 5.9
Allowed government departments to compete with private sector
   in bidding process 10.9 10.4% 16.5%
Developed programs to minimize the effect on displaced public employees 8.7 10.0 12.9
Kept the service complaint mechanism in-house 14.0 12.5 11.2
Monitoring is not rising
Does your local government use any techniques to systematically
   evaluate its alternative service delivery? 47.4% 46.8% 47.7%
Citizen satisfaction 33.4 28.8 27.5
Cost 41.2 41.5 39.5
Compliance with delivery standards specified in contract 36.2 33.6 38.2
Monitoring citizen complaints 34.5 30.9 29.4
U.S. Cities and Counties, Number: 1988=1627, 1992=1444, 1997=1460. Percent places that checked a factor, as a percent of all
respondents.
Source: International City/ County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Approaches, Survey Data, 1988, 1992, 1997,
Washington DC.
7  Another indicator of rising managerial capacity is the increased use of internal competition —
performance-based incentives, merit-based pay and bonuses, performance-based budgeting — to encour-
age departments and work teams to identify opportunities to increase efficiency (Osborne and Gaebler
1992).  These efforts are often characterized by organizational flexibility and increased labor-management
cooperation (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; U.S. Department of Labor 1996; Martin 1999).  When depart-
ments are allowed to reinvest savings into improved technology, further efficiency gains result.  These
internal forms of restructuring address two of the most serious causes of public-sector inefficiency —
outdated technology, and rigid organizational management systems.  The ICMA surveys of alternative
service delivery do not assess internal restructuring.  However, a special 1993 survey of total quality
management in local government found 55% of responding cities reported using these principles (West et
al. 1994).  A 1998 ICMA survey of government managers’ support for principles of “reinventing govern-
ment” (e.g., entrepreneurial government, consumer orientation, internal competition) also showed wide
acceptance of these principles (Feldman 1999). Thus, limited growth in privatization may be due to
enhanced governmental capacity to achieve service delivery efficiencies internally.
Is the limited growth in contracting due to quasi-market failure?
Public goods are those goods and services for which externalities are high and exclusion of free riders is
difficult.  Private contracts may help government address important capital, technology, and management
constraints.  But governments still retain their responsibility for ensuring quality service and addressing
the externalities that cause goods and services to be public in the first place (e.g., the public health ben-
efits of frequent garbage collection).  Thus, careful attention must be given to the way in which govern-
ments structure these contract markets.  The sources of quasi-market failure outlined by Lowery (1998)
— failure of a market to form, high costs of contracting, and potential loss of community values — are
not merely theoretical but are reflected in the ICMA data.
Contracting is a difficult process. What makes service contracting such a difficult process?  For
services that are easily specified and measured and for which there are many alternate suppliers,
privatization should be easy and may yield cost savings (Starr 1987).  However, a competitive market of
alternative suppliers may not exist in every community.   Thin markets of alternative providers can be
especially important at the local level (Hirsh 1995) and among rural governments where the benefits of
privatization may be short lived (Kodrzyski 1994).
Many local government services are complex in nature, making quality harder to monitor.  Even in
the private sector the decision to make or buy is a complex one.  Just like private firms, governments must
carefully assess things like market structure, transaction costs, and the difficulty of contract specification
and monitoring before making a decision to contract out (Nelson 1997).  For both the private sector and
government, timeliness, dependability, and quality often are more important than cost efficiency (Bartle et
al. 1996; Pouder 1996).  In a study of local government restructuring in New York State, quality concerns
were highest among those governments that contracted out more because they no longer held internal
control over service delivery (Warner and Hebdon 2001).
In the decision to privatize, governments often fail to include the costs of contracting and monitor-
ing, which can average over 20% of total project costs (Prager 1994; Pack 1989).  To overcome difficul-
8ties in specifying services and monitoring quality, many local governments develop ongoing, close
relations with their contractors.  This form of relational contracting may ensure quality, but it also erodes
the distance between government and contractor and may lead to rising costs or corruption (Sclar 2000).
The ICMA surveys do not address monitoring costs, but they do ask governments if they monitor
service-delivery costs and quality.  Although over 95% of governments report some level of contracting,
less than half report any monitoring activity at all.  Cost was the most commonly monitored item, but it
was monitored by only 40% of responding governments. Similarly, contract compliance with service
delivery standards was monitored by only 38% of governments. Citizen satisfaction was monitored by
less than a third of responding governments.  Only 11% of governments reported keeping the service-
complaint mechanism in house (see Table 1).
Efficiency gains are hard to secure. Clear evidence of the increased efficiency of private contracts
does not exist.  Case studies showing increased efficiency under privatization (Savas 2000; Eggers and
O’Leary 1995) are counterbalanced by cases showing increased costs (Sclar 2000).  Boyne (1998), in his
analysis of a range of studies looking at the efficiency of private contracts, finds no clear support for
greater efficiency.  Other research suggests that the benefits from privatization are overstated (Stein 1990;
Ferris 1996).   Lack of competition, high costs of contracting and monitoring, and erosion in service
quality are commonly cited reasons (Kodrzycki 1994; Prager 1994).
The labor-intensive nature of most public services means that most of the potential savings from
privatization are likely to come from wages and benefits or reductions in service quality (Hebdon 1995).
Concern about losses in wages and benefits causes many local governments to require that contractors
maintain similar wage and benefit levels after privatization (Martin 1999).  In these cases, cost savings
must come from increased process efficiency or decreased service quality.  Because the complex nature of
many local government services is hard to specify in a contract, the potential for erosion in service quality
is high.  This was demonstrated by Sclar (1997) in the case of Albany Fleet maintenance, a case in which
costs rose and service quality declined as a result of privatization.  Other cases have resulted in improve-
ments, but the key seems to rest in the nature of the market and contract specification (Osborne and
Gaebler 1992; Sclar 2000).
Concern about loss of public values. Loss of direct control over service delivery means care must
be given to delineate the full range of social benefits included in a service (Lowery 1998).  Given the
difficulties in contract specification, government contractors must ensure valuable social benefits are not
lost once service delivery is contracted (Starr 1987).  Some benefits of public provision extend beyond the
service itself and include legal rights of redress, freedom of expression, and public access (Sullivan 1987;
Moe 1987).  In some cases, governmental responsibility remains despite the fact that private parties
control service delivery.  This enduring responsibility and liability may cause governments to be cautious
in relinquishing control over service delivery.
When service provision is separated from delivery, and the “consumer/citizen’s” decision is swayed
by factors other than collective well-being, preference substitution can occur  (Lowery 1998).  One only
has to look at the segregated nature of metropolitan areas to understand that “consumer/citizen” decisions
about housing and education are often based on race and income rather than efficiency or service quality
9(Altshuler et al. 1999).  Public services provide the means by which local governments build community
(Marmolo 1998; Frug 1998), so if contracting causes these broader community benefits to be lost, then an
important public good is also sacrificed.   Potential efficiency gains through contracting must be weighed
against the community-building mission of local government.
Understanding government restructuring behavior
Local governments recognize the potential for both government failure and quasi-market failure, but the
evidence suggests that the limited growth in privatization thus far is not primarily due to government
failure.  Governments must balance concerns over efficiency with concerns over service quality and
community values.   Further analysis of the ICMA restructuring data shows an active market-structuring
role on the part of local governments.  These governments employ a range of restructuring options that
vary according to service and local market conditions; they mix public and private provision for the same
service, and recognize the dynamic nature of local service delivery by shifting among different delivery
alternatives over time.
Governments recognize that their role in structuring the market is critical to ensure competition and
true efficiency gains from privatization.  As the primary funder of the contracted service, local govern-
ment is in a monopsonist position and must take care to identify the potential market of alternative
suppliers and structure contracts to ensure that quality is maintained and efficiency gains secured.  This is
why we often see mixed public/private provision where part of the service is provided in-house and part
by private contract.  A local government plays many roles in the market, including that of regulator,
contractor, and direct service provider.  Depending on the service in question, a local government selec-
tively chooses which role to play, with an eye to ensuring service quality, dependability, efficiency, and
community values.
 By longitudinally linking the ICMA surveys, we are able to compare the stability of contracts and
in-house provision.  Some instability reflects changes in service demands, new technologies, and capital-
investment needs that benefit from privatization or partnership with the private sector.  But part of the
instability in contracts also reflects dissatisfaction with contracted services and the need to bring work
back in-house to maintain quality.   For services on which public health and safety depend, quality and
dependability are often more important than efficiency.  The flat privatization trends are not due to lack of
governmental effort.  Rather, they reflect concerns with quasi-market failure.  Pragmatic local govern-
ments are cautious innovators. (See Appendix C.)
Governments structure markets to ensure competition
Ensuring efficiency and quality in public service delivery requires attention to both public and private
markets.  Competition can promote efficiency, and increased attention is being given to external forms of
competition.  To make effective use of external providers, governments must give special attention to the
way they structure contracts in local supplier markets.  Competitive bidding has become quite common
among local governments and is used to ensure contestability in contract markets (Martin 1999; Osborne
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and Plastrick 1997).  Many governments compare internal cost estimates with external bids to create
benchmarks for efficient costs.  The ICMA surveys show that 16.5% of governments report allowing
competitive bidding (Table 1.) This benchmarking process often results in mixed provision of services
whereby part of the service or service area may be delivered by a private contractor, and part by public
employees.  This redundancy in service delivery not only promotes cost efficiency, it also creates compe-
tition in quality and ensures service dependability in case of contract failure (Miranda and Lerner 1995).
Contestability has been widely used in England and Australia and may be achieved through inter-depart-
mental competition as well. The lack of efficiency gains from privatization is attributed, in part, to con-
testable markets among public bureaucracies (Stein 1990).
There may be a progression from providing services totally in-house, to mixed public/private
provision, and ultimately to total contracting out.  The ICMA data show that, in 1982, governments were
more likely to use mixed provision, contracting out a part of the service while keeping the remainder in
house.  Mixed provision accounted for 47% of all restructuring in 1982, while total contracting out
accounted for 53%.   However, after 16 years of experience with privatization, the ICMA surveys still
show a third of all restructuring was in the form of mixed public/private provision in 1997.  Of the
roughly 40% of services that are restructured, services that are totally contracted out accounted for 70%
of the restructuring, while mixed public/private provision accounted for 30% in 1997.  Thus, while the
level of contracting has risen, the level of mixed public/private provision remains significant.
Not surprisingly, mixed provision is most common in service areas where contracting out is high.
It is low only in public utilities, where returns to economies of scale (through natural monopolies) would
make redundancy too expensive. Even for the areas in which total contracting out has risen, mixed
provision has remained stable.  Many governments realize they must remain players in the market to
ensure competition, service quality, and accountability to citizens.
The persistence of mixed public/private provision confirms Miranda and Lerner’s (1995) notion of
“benchmarking,” a process by which governments intentionally use both public employees and contrac-
tors in the same service area to ensure quality and competitiveness.  In order to guide provision, govern-
ments must have a hand in service delivery, and studies show that this redundancy does not increase costs
but rather helps ensure service quality and fair bidding (Miranda and Lerner 1995).  Chautauqua County
Executive Andrew Goodell describes it this way:
The secret is competition.  Whether it is a public or private monopoly, it is still a
monopoly and will charge monopoly rents.  Local governments must create
competition where none exists—even if that means competition between the
public and private sectors.
Local government restructuring is a complex process
Given the broad mandate of local government, it is not surprising that a wide range of service delivery
alternatives are used.  While the most common form of service delivery is public provision with public
employees entirely, privatization and inter-municipal cooperation are the most common alternatives.
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In the ICMA data, public services are usually provided through the use of public employees except
for public works, health and human services, and culture and arts. There has always been a high level of
non-profit provision in health and human services and culture and arts — a reflection of the evolution of
our social welfare state from non-profit providers.  Inter-municipal cooperation and non-profits tradition-
ally have accounted for close to 70% of all service provision in these two areas.  The level of contracting
in public utilities also has been high traditionally (around 50%), and it has remained at that level.  Where
the dramatic growth in contracting out has occurred is in public works/transportation, public safety, and
support functions — areas where services are more easily specified and where back-office functions (e.g.,
dispatching, purchasing, etc.) benefit from economies of scale.
Privatization and cooperation are the most popular forms of contracting. Privatization to for-profit
and non-profit firms and inter-municipal cooperation are the most common alternatives, together account-
ing for almost 90% of all restructuring cases.  Franchises, subsidies, vouchers, and volunteers account for
the remaining 10%.  For-profit privatization is the most common alternative and rose from 16% to 19% of
all service provision from 1982 to 1997.  For-profit privatization is most common in support functions,
public works, public utilities, and public safety (Table 2). These services are more easily specified, are
more likely to have competitive supplier markets, and, in the case of support functions and public safety,
include indirect services (e.g., dispatching and back-office processes) not directly visible to the citizen.
This makes for-profit privatization viable.
Inter-municipal cooperation is the second most common restructuring alternative.  This sort of
cooperation accounts for about 15% of service provision.  Cooperation is highest in health and human
services and culture and arts.  These are complex service areas where the social benefit extends beyond
the direct-service recipient.  Cooperation also is high in the same areas where privatization is high (e.g.,
public works, public safety, and parks and recreation) because of the benefits of economies of scale.
However, governments choosing cooperation over privatization enjoy these scale economies without
resorting to private sector provision.
Privatization to the non-profit sector is the third significant restructuring alternative, but it averages
only 5% of service provision.  Non-profit privatization is most common in health and human services and
culture and arts.  Non-profits traditionally have provided these services — in fact many of these services
began to receive public contracts only after the need overwhelmed non-profit providers and public
attitudes shifted toward including these services as public benefits.  Although non-profit provision as a
service-delivery alternative has not risen, new partnerships between government and non-profit providers
create opportunities for improvements in service quality and efficiency.
The level of contracting is falling. Although the level of contracting, when averaged across all
places and all services, is rising slightly (as seen in Figure 1), both the percentage of governments con-
tracting out and the percentage using high levels of contracting is dropping.  The increase is due to a few
governments that do very high levels of contracting and an increase in contracting in public works and
support functions, as shown in Table 2.
Most governments have at least one case of contracting out.  In 1992, almost equal numbers of
governments used for-profit privatization (91%) and cooperation (88%) for at least one service.  By 1997
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the percentage of governments contracting out actually dropped.  The percentage of governments with at
least one case of privatization fell to 85%, and cooperation dropped to 73%.  Non-profit privatization was
less common and dropped most dramatically from 65% of all governments in 1992 to 52% of all govern-
ments in 1997 (Table 3).
If a government chooses to restructure service delivery, it is likely to do so in several services.  In
fact, the majority of governments reported at least one case of privatization (for-profit and non-profit) and
of inter-municipal cooperation.  However, the level of restructuring by place declined from 1992 to 1997.
The percentage of governments restructuring three or more services dropped from 74% in 1992 to 67%
TABLE 2
Trends in local government restructuring by service area
Service Inter-municipal Private Non-
Year area cooperation for-profit profit
1992 Support functions 12.5% 17.4% 1.2%
1997 7.7 20.5 1.4
1992 Public works 17.0% 20.4% 1.8%
1997 14.8 25.3 1.5
1992 Public utilities 9.7% 31.5% 2.8%
1997 7.2 24.1 1.3
1992 Public safety 12.7% 15.5% 3.5%
1997 11.4 14.2 3.0
1992 Parks and recreation 11.4% 7.2% 2.9%
1997 11.2 13.6 4.1
1992 Health and human 40.9% 10.2% 16.5%
1997 33.2 11.3 16.6
1992 Culture and art 28.1% 2.7% 22.0%
1997 25.4 3.6 21.4
1982** All services 11.9% 16.1% 5.4%
1988** 8.5 17.3*
1992 14.3 16.2 5.2
1997 15.1 18.7 4.9
U.S. cities and counties, number: 1982=1675, 1988=1627, 1992=1444, 1997=1460. The average use of service delivery alterna-
tives as a percent of total provision, where provision level is the number of cases of service provision across a place.
*   Contracting out to for-profit or non-profit firms was not differentiated in the 1988 survey.
** The 1982 and 1988 surveys contain more service delivery alternatives than the 1992 and 1997 surveys.
The analysis includes only the seven major alternatives that appear on all surveys: entirely public, cooperation, privatization to for-
profit firm, privatization to non-profit firm, subsidies, franchises, and volunteers.
Source: International City/County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data 1992,
1997, Washington, D.C.
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for for-profit privatization and to 53% for cooperation by 1997.  Non-profit privatization showed a similar
drop from 33% of responding governments having three or more cases in 1992 to 25% in 1997.
Contracting out is more likely in suburbs. Public choice theory suggests that suburban areas would
be the most favored in the market for public goods and services (Boyne 1996).  Service demands will be
more homogeneous (given a more homogeneous population), and residential choice (mobility) is higher.
Figure 2 shows both privatization to for-profit firms and inter-municipal cooperation are highest among
suburban governments. As expected, public provision is highest among metropolitan and independent
rural governments.  Rural independent governments have the lowest privatization levels (probably due in
part to lack of a competitive market of private suppliers), and metropolitan governments have a lower
level of inter-municipal cooperation, in part because they are already large enough to enjoy economies of
scale (Warner and Hefetz 2001).
Cooperation is highest among both suburbs and independent (rural) areas, where smaller sizes make
cooperation necessary to gain scale.  Metropolitan places where service areas are already large may
realize only limited economy-of-scale gains through increased cooperation.  These trends may also be, in
part, a reflection of the forces driving suburbanization in the first place.  The desire to escape the true
social costs of provision of urban services may encourage the isolation of high-need, high-cost urban
populations (Frug 1998).
Use of alternative forms of service delivery also varies along income lines.  Public provision of all
services is most common among areas with lower average incomes, while privatization is more likely as
community income levels rise (Warner and Hefetz 2001).  If cost savings from privatization were large,
we might expect lower-income areas to privatize more.  Instead, these data suggest there is something in
the nature of supplier markets and transactions costs that makes privatization a less compelling option for
low-income areas.  Cooperation, by contrast, appears to be income-neutral in its effects. Markets create
TABLE 3
Level of restructuring by local government
Private Inter-municipal Non-
for-profit cooperation profit
Year 1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997
Percent places restructuring 91% 85% 88%  73% 65% 52%
One or two services 17 18 13 20 32 26
Three services or more 74 67 75 53 33 25
Avg. no. services provided by form* 6.7 6.4 7.9 5.2 2.2 1.7
U.S. cities and counties, number: 1992=1444, 1997=1460. Percent places restructuring by level of restructuring. All places = 100%.
* The same service may be provided by more than one delivery alternative.  Average number of services provided: 1992 = 43, 1997
= 39.
Source: International City/County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data, 1992,
1997, Washington, D.C.
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competitive landscapes.  It appears that, by bringing markets into public-service delivery, we see a
competitive landscape emerging that favors richer, suburban locales.
Restructuring is a dynamic process
Government service delivery is responsive to changes in citizen demand, technology, and local
market conditions.  New services, service shedding, new contracting out, and the contracting back in
of previously privatized services are all captured in the dynamic nature of the restructuring process.
While stability in service delivery may reflect a lack of willingness to innovate on the part of govern-
ment, the instability in contracts may reflect a lack of dependability of private providers.  There is a
high cost to switching providers, and one important feature of government service is dependability
and stability.  Interestingly, the stability of alternative forms of service provision has received little
attention in the literature  (Lopez de Silanes et al. 1997 is an exception).   Warner and Hebdon were
the first to measure specifically reverse privatization (contracting back in house of services previ-
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FIGURE 2
Restructuring by metro status, 1997
U.S. cities and counties, number 1997=1460 (metro=260, suburb=741, independent=459).
Source: International City/County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data,
1997, Washington, D.C
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TABLE 4
Level of new contracting-out and contracting back in by local governments
New contracting out Contracting back in
Year 1982-88 1988-92 1992-97 1982-88 1988-92 1992-97
Percent places contracting 93% 97% 96% 97% 92% 88%
  One or two services 19% 11% 12% 10% 22% 23%
  Three to 10 services 74% 86% 84% 87% 70% 65%
  Avg. number services
     contracted in or out 5.7 7.7 7.9 7.1 5.3 4.6
U.S. cities and counties. percent places contracting out and contracting back in. All places = 100%
Paired sample size: 1982 and 1988 = 749; 1988 and 1992 = 638; and 1992 and 97 = 628; Number of common services surveyed:
1982 and 1988 =62; 1988 and 1992 = 65; and 1992 and 97 =64.
Source: International City/ounty Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data, 1988,
1992, 1997, Washington, D.C.
ously privatized) in a survey of local governments in New York State.  Township and county officials
in New York described privatization as just one side of the coin; they also were willing to bring
previously contracted work back in house (Warner 2000; Warner and Hebdon 2001).  In the New
York survey, contracting back in accounted for 8% of all restructuring cases.  However, New York,
with its exceptionally high levels of public-sector unionization, may have higher-than-normal levels
of contracting back in.
To test whether the New York results were similar to local governments across the nation, we paired
ICMA survey responses across survey years to track shifts in forms of service delivery for each respond-
ing government.  Roughly 40% of responding governments were the same in each pair of years, from
1982 to 1988 (749), 1988 to 1992 (638), and 1992 to 1997 (628). (See Appendix B for a fuller explanation
of our methodology for pairing survey responses.)
Almost all governments contract out and contract back in. Table 4 shows the percentage of
governments engaged in new contracting, both out and in, for the three paired time periods: 1982-88,
1988-92, and 1992-97.  Almost all governments engaged in new contracting out (96% in 1992-97 period).
New contracting out includes any movement toward more contracting (see Appendix Table B-1).  The
percentage of governments engaging in at least three cases of new contracting out rose from 74% in the
first period to around 85% for the later two time periods.   On average across all governments, 7.9 ser-
vices were newly contracted out between 1992 and 1997.  That the level of new contracting out could be
so high when the overall level of contracting is relatively stable suggests that new contracts are balanced
against contracts being brought back in house.
Indeed, most governments that contract out also contract back in.  From 1992 to 1997 88% of
governments had contracted back in at least one service, and 65% had contracted back in more than three
services.   On average across all places, five services were contracted back in from 1992 to 1997 (more
than half the level of new contracting out reported above).  Although the level and percentage of govern-
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ments contracting back in dropped over the three time periods, these data show that dissatisfaction with
contracting out is a reality and causes some governments to bring services back in house.
Provision entirely via public employees is the most stable. To determine which forms of service
delivery were the most stable, we compared public, cooperative, and for-profit service provision during
the most recent period for which data are available (1992-97).  Figures 3 and 4 clearly show that deliv-
ery of services entirely by public employees is the most common and the most stable form of provision
— more than two-and-a-half times as stable as either alternative.  On average, over half of all services
provided by public employees were still provided that way in 1997. By contrast, only one-fifth of
services provided by cooperation or privatization in 1992 were still provided that way in 1997.
Changes in service delivery may be due to the addition of new services, service shedding, shifts
toward alternative forms of delivery, or contracting back in services that were previously contracted
out.  There are important differences in the movement patterns for each alternative form of service
delivery.  While public provision is the most stable form of service delivery, the largest movements
within public provision (22.6%) are toward some alternative (either cooperation or privatization),
which is a reflection of the restructuring process.  Service shedding from public provision is quite low
(6.2%).  Within the privatization alternative, the largest movements are toward privatization (29.0%).
However, movements from privatization toward other forms (about 23% for either cooperation or
public provision) and service shedding from for-profit privatization (16.1%) are also quite high.  This
may explain why the overall level of privatization has barely risen despite high rates of new
privatization.
When looking specifically at cooperation, there is a balance between movement toward coopera-
tion (15.9%), movement away from cooperation (18.8%), and use of cooperation for the provision of
new services (13.5%).  But cooperation has the highest levels of service shedding (33.0%) of any of the
three forms of service provision.  Some of the service shedding may reflect new regional forms of
provision, with the responsibility for a service assumed by another government or a special district or
authority, thus relieving the local municipality of the responsibility. The ICMA data, however, do not
distinguish among types of inter-municipal cooperation.
We can see from these figures that both service shedding and new service provision are highest in
the privatization and cooperation alternatives.  Part of the instability of these alternatives is due to their
flexibility in enabling governments to meet changes in citizen demand for services or changes in local
market conditions.
Why are contracts unstable? Stability in form of service provision is important.  The significance
of contracting back in what had once been a privatized service has been given little attention in the
theoretical or empirical literature. More research is needed into the nature of contracting and the reasons
for instability in alternative service delivery.  Absent a new national survey directly measuring the trends
in contracting back in, we cannot know why it occurs nor distinguish competitive bidding from failed
contracts.   At our request, the National Association of Counties added three questions about the stability
of private contracts to its spring 2000 survey of governmental operations.  Of the 144 county respon-
dents, 14% (20) reported bringing a previously contracted service back in house during the last three
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FIGURE 3
U.S. cities and counties, number responding in both 1992 and 1997 = 628.
Average number of movements within a delivery alternative as a percent of average number of services provided by that
alternative (provision = at least one time period).
Source: International City/County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data
1992, 1997, Washington, D.C.
years.  Not surprisingly, the highest levels of contracting back in were for services where contracting out
was also high: data processing, garbage collection and disposal, building maintenance, and emergency
medical service.  Respondents indicated factors important in their decision to bring service delivery back
in house.  Half reported problems with the service provider and economic concerns.  A quarter reported
problems with contracting and monitoring, and another quarter listed management and labor issues.  Only
10% of respondents listed political concerns as a factor (NACO 2000).
Additional evidence from 22 case studies of contracting back in (drawn from the ICMA sample)
shows that most governments contract back in because of dissatisfaction with contracts (Ballard and
Warner 2000).   Difficulty and costs of monitoring, problems with service quality, cost and lack of flex-
ibility in contracting, and failure to realize anticipated savings were commonly cited as reasons for
contracting back in.  Not unlike the contracting decision in the private sector (to make or to buy), public
officials find the need for flexibility, responsiveness to changing citizen concerns, and service quality to
be crucial determinants (Nelson 1997).   Even simple services that are logical candidates for market-based
provision may have important public attributes that are lost when provided via contracts. Decisions to
Stability of in-house service provision, 1992-97
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bring work back in house are also based on increased efficiency in public sector provision and are often
accompanied by cooperation between labor and management. Thus, internal process improvements
provide an important and viable alternative to privatization, providing similar efficiency gains with fewer
downside risks (Ballard and Warner 2000).
Conclusion
This research provides evidence that the limited growth in privatization over the past 16 years is not due to
government failure.  Local government service-delivery restructuring is a complex process that requires
New service: 11% Service shedding: 16%
Toward for-profit
from other forms: 29%
From for-profit
to other forms: 23%
FIGURE 4
U.S. cities and counties, number responding in both 1992 and 1997 = 628.
Average number of movements within a delivery alternative as a percent of average number of services provided by that
alternative (provision = at least one time period).
Source: International City/ County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data
1992, 1997, Washington, D.C.
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keen attention to the relative benefits of both internal production and market-based contracting. The complex
mix of restructuring alternatives and new evidence on the stability of service delivery alternatives illustrate
the active role of local governments in structuring markets to ensure economic and social efficiency.   Far
from a retreat of government, increased use of market-based provision requires an expansion of government
into the administration of markets both public and private (Blanchard et al. 1998). Pragmatic local officials
recognize the complexity of the restructuring process and the importance of ensuring service quality, effi-
ciency, and the preservation of community values.  Given the difficulties inherent in contracting and moni-
toring, it is not surprising that the majority of local government services are still provided by public employ-
ees. These trends suggest that the scope for privatization may be more limited than some advocates believe.
While the overall trends show a slight drop in in-house public provision, and slight increases in
privatization and inter-municipal cooperation, they mask the significant movement between these catego-
ries over the 16-year period under study (1982-97).  Most governments that contract out also contract
back in.  The major restructuring alternatives — privatization and cooperation — are both shown to be
highly unstable.  This reflects the flexible way contracts are used by local governments to ensure eco-
nomic and social efficiency.  Governments can meet citizen demands for new services first through
contracts and later by developing in-house delivery capacity.  This is an example of market success.
However, instability in contracts also reflects inadequate monitoring and government dissatisfaction with
the contracting process.  This reflects market failure.  For the majority of services, the most stable mode
of delivery continues to be provision of services by public employees.
In the end, the evidence suggests that local governments recognize the need for flexibility in deter-
mining how services are delivered.  Privatization would seem to be an important, but limited, tool.  To be
effective, privatization requires that local governments increase their role in structuring the market, which
they accomplish by giving special attention to contract specification, monitoring, and the nature of
competition in supplier markets.  For many local government services, conditions for efficient market
provision are not present, hence public provision by public employees remains the preferred service
delivery option.  Even when privatization is possible, governments often must remain providers in the
market to ensure competitive contracts and continued cost savings.  Osborne and Gaebler, in their popular
book, Reinventing Government (1992), admonished local government to “steer rather than row.”   Our
research shows that local governments do what any good captain would, they steer and row.  To ad-
equately steer the service delivery process and ensure efficient market functioning, governments maintain
direct involvement in service delivery.
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Appendix A
Data sources on local government contracting
The most complete source of data on alternative service delivery arrangements of local governments is provided by the
International City/County Management Association (ICMA). Every five years since 1982, ICMA has surveyed all
counties in which the population exceeds 25,000 (roughly 1,600 out of the 3,100 total counties in the U.S.) and cities
with populations over 10,000 (roughly 3,300 U.S. cities).  In addition, a sample is drawn from one in eight of the cities
and counties with populations between 2,500 to 9,999 and those under 2,500. Roughly a third of all governments
contacted respond (31% for the 1992 survey and 32% in 1997). Cities — which include villages, towns, and townships
— vastly outnumber counties.  Compared to the Census of Governments, which covers all governments (even those
with populations under 2,500), this survey is more heavily weighted to more densely populated places, and the survey
subject is limited to questions about alternative forms of service delivery.  Thus, the level of restructuring found among
survey respondents is expected to be higher than that found among local governments as a whole.
Comparing ICMA and U.S. Census data
There are two national sources of data on local government restructuring: the ICMA surveys and the Census of
Governments organization file. While ICMA does not have universal coverage of governments, its broader coverage
of services and of service delivery alternatives makes it a more useful source for measuring the complexity of local
government restructuring behavior. The consistency in survey design is also helpful (though the 1988 survey causes
some problems due to its failure to include a category for non-profit privatization).
One might expect governments that have higher levels of restructuring activity to be more likely to respond to
the lCMA survey. To check for such bias, the ICMA results are compared to U.S. Census of Governments organiza-
tion surveys for the nearest available years, 1987 and 1992 (the Census of Governments is conducted every five
years). The Census has wider coverage of governments (roughly 40,000, although complete responses were only
available from 34,445) but narrower coverage of services and restructuring alternatives. Thus, the Census data
provide limited information for restructuring analysis.
The Census shows a dramatic increase in percentage of governments contracting out from 30.5% in 1987 to
59.4% in 1992. (See Appendix Table A- 1.) This increase is due primarily to changes in survey design.  In 1992,
several services with generally high contracting out potential (recycling, highways, and garbage collection) were added
to the Census questionnaire.  (The Census of Governments included the following services in 1987 and 1992:
airport, water utility/supply, electric utility, gas utility, hospitals, landfills (dump), libraries, nursing homes, public
transit, sewage system, stadiums/convention centers, fire protection. Five additional services were added in 1992:
ambulance; resource recovery (recycling); refuse collection, streets, roads, and highways; and industrial develop-
21
 TABLE A-1
Restructuring trends: a comparison of ICMA and Census of Governments data
Percent Percent Average number Number of
Year contracting out1 cooperation2 of services provided3,4 places
Census of
government
1987 30.5% NA 2.2% 34,445
1992 59.4 21.2% 4 34,445
ICMA
1988 92.9 75.4 38.4 1,628
1992 97.9 88 43.4 1,444
1997 92.4 72.8 39 1,460
U.S. cities and counties.
1  Includes all types of contracting (for-profit, non-profit, government cooperation, franchise, and volunteers).
2 Percent of those places that answered the question.
3
 Out of a possible 12 services listed in 1987 and 17 services listed in 1992 (Census of Governments).
4 Out of a possible 71 services listed in 1988, 65 services listed in 1992, and 64 services listed
   in 1997 (ICMA).
Source: International City/County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data 1988,
1992, 1997, Washington, D.C. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: Government Organization Survey, 1987, 1992,
Washington, D.C.
ment. We, however, do not include industrial development in our analysis.) Although the level of restructuring
reported in the ICMA sample is higher, it is also more stable. This may be due to less dramatic changes in survey
design and a wider array of services for which contracting out is measured. Both incidence and level of restructuring
reported are affected by actual provision of specified services by responding governments. On average, ICMA respon-
dents provide 40 of 64 services, whereas Census respondents provide four of 16 services. Thus, opportunity to report
restructuring activity is higher in the ICMA sample.
Not only does the ICMA track a broader range of services, it also distinguishes a broader range of restructur-
ing opportunities. Specific forms of restructuring include inter-municipal cooperation, privatization to for-profit and
non-profit firms, and use of franchises, subsidies, and volunteers. Because it asks about each of these alternatives for
each of 64 specific services, the ICMA survey permits analysis of the mix of restructuring options local govern-
ments use. The Census, by contrast, only followed 16 different services in 1992 (12 in 1987) and one general
provision alternative (contracting out), which doesn’t distinguish inter-municipal cooperation from other forms of
contracting. The percentage of ICMA governments contracting in this table is higher than presented in Table 3
because it includes all alternative delivery forms. This enables comparison with the Census, which does not differ-
entiate forms of contracting. (For a complete list of services covered by the ICMA surveys, see Table A-2.)
Contracting out to for-profit firms and inter-municipal cooperation are the most common restructuring
alternatives in the ICMA data. The Census does not distinguish between contracting to public or private providers,
but in 1992 it added a question on inter-municipal cooperation. Many governments did not answer this question, but
of those that did, only 21% reported any cooperative agreements. The percentage reporting at least one cooperative
agreement in the ICMA sample was 88% in 1992 and 73% in 1997. (See Appendix Table A-1.)
Part of the explanation for the very different levels of contracting out and cooperation reported in the two
surveys is that the Census reports for all places. Of the 34,445 governments covered by the Census, 28,736 are
under 10,000 population, and 76% of these are under 2,500. The level of service provision in such small places is
half that of larger places. The effect of so many small governments in the survey biases the average restructuring
level downward. The ICMA data, by contrast, with a wider range of services reported, affords more opportunity for
respondents (even small governments) to indicate service-delivery restructuring.
Thus, although the ICMA survey may be biased toward governments that contract out more, the greater
comprehensiveness of the coverage and stability in survey design makes it a better resource for the analysis of
trends over time and complexity of restructuring behavior.
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TABLE A-2
Services included in ICMA survey
              Year of survey
Service area and service name 1982 1988 1992 1997
Public works / transportation
Residential solid-waste collection x x x x
Commercial solid-waste collection x x x x
Solid-waste disposal x x x x
Street repair (excluding street construction) x x x x
Street/parking lot cleaning x x x x
Snow plowing/sanding x x x x
Traffic sign/signal installation and maintenance x x x x
Parking meter maintenance and collection x x x x
Tree trimming/tree planting on public rights of way x x x x
Maintenance and administration of cemeteries x x x x
Inspection/code enforcement x x x x
Operation of parking lots and garages x x x x
Operation and maintenance of bus transit system x x x x
Operation and maintenance of paratransit system x x x x
Operation of airports x x x x
Water treatment* x x x x
Water distribution* x x x x
Sewer collection and treatment* x x x x
Disposal of sludge* x x x x
Disposal of hazardous materials* NA x x x
Public utilities
Utility operation and management x NA NA NA
Electricity x x x x
Gas x x x x
Utility meter reading (e.g., gas, water, electricity) x x x x
Utility billing (e.g., gas, water, electricity) x NA NA x
Utility building NA x x NA
Operation of street lights x x NA NA
Public safety
Crime prevention/patrol x x x x
Police/fire communications x x x x
Fire prevention/suppression x x x x
Emergency medical service x x x x
Ambulance service x x x x
Traffic control/parking enforcement x x x x
Vehicle towing and storage x x x x
Health and human services
Sanitary inspection
   (e.g., inspection of restaurants and food outlets) x x x x
Insect/rodent control x x x x
Animal control x x x x
Operation of animal shelters x x x x
Operation of day care facilities x x x x
Child welfare programs x x x x
Programs for the elderly
   (e.g., recreation, transportation, health) x x x x
(cont.)
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TABLE A-2 (cont.)
Services included in ICMA survey
              Year of survey
Service area and service name 1982 1988 1992 1997
Health and human services (cont.)
Operation and management of public/elderly housing x x NA NA
Operation and management of hospitals x x x x
Public health programs x x x x
Drug and alcohol treatment programs x x x x
Operation of mental health and
   retardation programs/facilities x x x x
Prisons/jails NA x x x
Parole programs NA x NA NA
Operation of homeless shelters NA x x x
Food programs for homeless NA x NA NA
Parks and recreation
Recreation services x x NA NA
Operation and maintenance of recreation facilities x x x x
Parks landscaping and maintenance x x x x
Operation of convention centers and auditoriums x x x x
Cultural and arts programs
Operation of cultural and arts programs
   (e.g., fine arts, music, drama) x x x x
Operation of libraries x x x x
Operation of museums x x x x
Support functions
Buildings and ground maintenance x x x x
Building security x x x x
Fleet management/vehicle maintenance x NA NA NA
     Heavy equipment x x x x
     Emergency vehicles x x x x
     All other vehicles x x x x
Payroll x x x x
Tax bill processing x x x NA
Tax assessing x x x x
Data processing x x x x
Delinquent tax collection x x x x
Legal services x x x x
Secretarial services x x x x
Personnel services x x x x
Labor relations x x NA NA
Public relations/public information x x x x
Title record/plat map maintenance NA x x x
NA – Not included in that year’s survey.
* Listed under Public Utilities in 1982 and 1988.
Source: International City/County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data 1982,
1988, 1992, and 1997, Washington, D.C.
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Appendix B
Methodology for studying stability of service delivery alternatives
Average levels of a particular form of service delivery may obscure movements between alternative service-delivery
options.  ICMA surveys ask only how the service is provided currently — not whether this is new privatization or long-
standing procedure. To determine how much movement between alternative service delivery forms was actually
occurring, we tracked changes in form of service delivery for every service for each government. Although the ICMA
surveys were not designed to track movements among forms of service delivery over time, by pairing the survey years,
we were able to track shifts in form of service delivery for each responding government. Roughly 40% of responding
governments were the same in each pair of years, 1982-88 (749), 1988-92 (638), and 1992-97 (628).
The data were recoded to track movements among four broad service-delivery options (public, mixed (public/
contract), contract, not provided) for each service and each responding government. These movements were then
averaged across all services and governments, resulting in an average picture of movements among different forms
of service delivery over time. Appendix Figure B-1 presents a matrix of all possible movements among these four
service delivery options. The movements can be divided into three major parts:
 stability in provision, with form of service provision not changing between the two time periods (the
center diagonal of the matrix),
 toward private provision, which includes new privatization and service shedding, including those govern-
ments that listed a service as not provided in 1997 but had listed that service as provided in the prior survey
year (the upper right hand corner of the matrix)
 toward public provision, which includes “reverse privatization” and new service provision (the lower left
hand corner of the matrix).
This matrix method allows us to compare stability in provision regardless of service delivery alternative and
to assess shifts in the direction of provision — toward public provision or toward private provision. What was of
FIGURE B-1
Service provision over time – movements by service-delivery alternative
                            LATER SURVEY
Mix public/ Totally Not
Public contract out contract out Provided
             Toward private
Public Stable New contracting New contracting Shedding
out out service
Public-public Public-mix Public-contract Public-not provided
Mix Contracting Stable New contracting Shedding
public/contract back in out service
out Mix-public Mix-mix Mix-contract Mix-not provided
Totally contract Contracting Contracting Stable Shedding
out back in back in service
Contract-public Contract-mix Contract-contract Contract-not provided
Not provided New service New service New service Stable
Not provided- Not provided- Not provided- Not provided-
public mix contract not provided
             Toward public
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 S
UR
VE
Y


Matrix based on ICMA survey design.
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special interest here was the relative stability of provision by each major alternative — public provision,
for-profit privatization, and inter-municipal cooperation. To determine relative stability by delivery alternative
this matrix process was conducted separately for each alternative. If a government provided a service by one of
these alternatives in either of the two time periods (1992 and 1997), then it was included in the analysis. In this
analysis, the number of services provided by a specific delivery alternative and movement is summed across all
services provided by a place. The average is then calculated across all places.
Using this method for each alternative allows us to compare the relative stability of each, but we must be
careful to note that the magnitude of use of the three alternatives is not equal (see Appendix Table B-1). Public
provision by public employees entirely accounts for over half of all service provision but has trended slightly
downward from 53% in 1992 to 50% in 1997. Cooperation, which accounted for almost 18% of service provision in
this paired sample in 1992 had dropped to 13% by 1997. Privatization to for-profits moved in the opposite direction,
growing from 15% of all service provision in 1992 to 17% by 1997. Percentages for the paired sample are slightly
different than the percentages for the full sample but track the general trends for the full sample shown in Figure 1.
Appendix C
Local government’s market structuring role: The case of Chautauqua County
 To achieve efficiency gains from market-based provision, local governments must be skillful contract negotiators
and show a clear understanding of local market conditions. Chautauqua County, N.Y. (population 140,000), pro-
vides an interesting case study of the way in which local governments use a complex range of strategies to ensure
service quality and respond to dynamic changes in market conditions and citizen demand. Led by Republican
County Executive Andrew Goodell from 1990 to 1997, Chautauqua County used a wide range of both internal and
external strategies to increase service quality and efficiency. Privatization to for-profits and non-profits as well as
inter-municipal cooperation were used alongside new strategies designed to increase in-house performance.
TABLE B-1
Stability of service delivery alternatives, 1992-97
Entirely public employees Inter-municipal cooperation Privatization for-profit
U.S. cities and counties, number for 1992 and 1997 = 628.
Average number of movements within a delivery alternative as a percent of average number of services provided by that alternative
(provision = at least one time period).  See Appendix B for more on methodology.
1
 Percent services provided by that delivery alternative in 1997 as percent of total provision.
Source: International City/County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data 1992,
1997, Washington, D.C.
Stable: public - public 52.9%
Toward public from
other forms 13.1%
From public to
service shedding 6.2%
From public to other forms 22.6%
New service added to public 5.1%
Perfcent all movements 100.0%
Relative importance
of form - 19971 50.0%
Stable: coop. - coop. 18.8%
Toward coop. from
other forms 15.9%
From coop. to
service shedding 33.0%
From coop. to other forms 18.8%
New service added to coop. 13.5%
Percent all movements 100.0%
Relative importance
of form - 19971 13.0%
Stable: for-profit - for-profit 20.4%
Toward for-profit from
other forms 29.0%
From for-profit to
service shedding 16.1%
From for-profit to other forms 23.4%
New service added to for-profit 11.1%
Percent all movements 100.0%
Relative importance
of form - 19971 17.0%
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Mixed public/private strategies were common. For example, printing, cleaning, and computer-support
services were all put on a contract basis. While the county print shop, computer services, and cleaning staff had the
right of first refusal on the work, if the requesting department could obtain better or less expensive service from the
private sector, it could contract out for the service. Not only did this cause department heads to look closely at their
printing, computer, and cleaning needs, it also encouraged these departments to look carefully at their private sector
competition and determine ways to reduce costs. In the end, some government offices were served by county
service providers, others by the private sector.
Goodell was keenly aware of the market-structuring role of local government and used the county’s position
as provider and funder to influence the behavior of other players. When declining reimbursement rates and increas-
ing paperwork made Medicaid service delivery unattractive to private doctors, the county agreed to pay primary
care physicians a flat rate per patient and eliminate all of their Medicaid paperwork. The Medicaid patients obtained
higher health care coverage, and the county saved on its total Medicaid costs when the use of emergency room
services fell.
Continued competition is key to ensuring long-term efficiency gains. In the early 1990s, Chautauqua County
considered selling its landfill. Situated near the border shared by New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, the county
could benefit from competition among national waste-management companies that were vying to consolidate
control in the region. Chautauqua County could use its market position to lock in competitive rates but also under-
stood the need to demand a long-term contract that would buffer the county against future price increases certain to
occur when one of the national firms gained monopoly control in the region. Interestingly, the political debate then
shifted to the value of the local landfill as a public resource, and ultimately the county legislature voted not to
privatize.
Contract specification is extremely important and requires a high level of sophistication. Recognizing that
private providers are motivated by profit, government contractors must ensure that cost savings are not at the
expense of service quality. For services that are complex and for which quality is difficult to measure, government
must take care to structure its contracts to achieve necessary performance goals. For example, Chautauqua County
was careful to structure its contracts with a local job-placement program to ensure that appropriate emphasis was
given to job training and long-term job placements with career potential. Rather than pay for training and job
preparation services, the county paid the contractor for actual job placements. To avoid the “churning” typical of
many job placement providers, the county structured the contracts so that payments were made incrementally — at
initial placement, after six months, and after a year on the job. Premiums were paid for placements to jobs with
higher wages, skill levels, or career potential.
Restructuring is a dynamic process. Government may move in and out of the market for service provision to
stimulate a more socially efficient market response. During the mid-1980s, Chautauqua County was facing a severe
shortage of pediatricians, so the county health department opened its own prenatal care unit. It recruited local pediatri-
cians, provided office staff, liability insurance, administrative support, and a reasonable stipend. The county handled all
the Medicaid reimbursement paperwork and provided the physicians with a much higher net reimbursement rate paid
directly by the county. After additional pediatricians relocated to the county, competitive market forces eliminated the
need for the county-operated clinic. It was then closed, allowing the private sector to provide all the prenatal care services.
Once governments recognize a market of providers, both public and private, they must be careful not to
subsidize for-profit providers by allowing them to serve only the least costly customers. In New York State, for
example, most nursing homes operated by county governments lose a substantial amount of money every year
because they take greater than their share of indigent or Alzheimer patients. Chautauqua County operated its nursing
home in a profitable manner by competing for private-pay patients, who pay a higher rate than typical Medicaid
patients. To compete, the county nursing home was forced to dramatically improve its physical facility by adding air
conditioning, new carpets, new wallpaper, private telephones, and other amenities, which resulted in a substantial
improvement for all patients. The county also had to use its position in the local nursing home market to insist that
area hospitals refer indigent and Alzheimer patients equitably to all nursing homes, both public and private.
Goodell was a great proponent of the principles of Reinventing Government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992), and
internal-efficiency improvements, such as the ones cited in the nursing home example above, were common
throughout county departments. Using both external and internal restructuring resulted in dramatic improvements to
the county’s fund balance, while the tax rate actually dropped. Goodell’s pragmatic approach to service delivery
included both external restructuring and internal process improvements. For local governments whose goal is
enhanced service quality and efficiency, a complex approach that takes advantage of the potential for both internal
improvement and market engagement makes the most sense.
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Complexity of Local Government Restructuring 
Local Governments Structure Markets
Major Trends
• Level of privatization among local governments
relatively stable.
• Government restructuring is a complex process. 
• Local government service delivery is dynamic. 
• Local governments structure markets to ensure
competition and service quality.
Data
International City County Management Association
Surveys of Alternative Service Delivery 1982, 1988,
1992, 1997
Sample Frame: 
All cities over 10,000
All counties over 25,000.  
Response rate 31% (roughly 1500 municipalities).
Scope:
64 specific services
6 service delivery options
Factors motivating restructuring
Trends in Local Government Service Provision over Time
Form of service delivery as percent of total provision across all places and
all services.
U.S. Cities and Counties, Number: 1982=1675, 1988=1627, 1992=1444,
1997=1460.
Source: International City/ County Management Association, Profile of
Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data, 1982, 1988, 1992, 1997,
Washington DC.
Level of Restructuring by Local Government
Census ICMA
1988 1992 1988 1992 1997
Contracting
Out 31% 59% 93% 98% 92%
Cooperation - 21%* 75% 88% 73%
No. Services
Measured 12 17 71 65 64
Sample Size 34,4451 34,4451 1628 1444 1460
Percent places restructuring. All places = 100%.
*Of those places, which answered the cooperation question. Many did not.
1 Common respondents for both time periods.  83 % of respondents
under 10,000 in population.
Source: 
International City/ County Management Association, Profile of
Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data, 1992, 1997,
Washington DC.
US Census of Governments Organization File 1988, 1992.
Why So Little Growth in Privatization? 
Theoretical basis for privatization - Public Choice 
separate service provision from service delivery
• Privatization addresses government failure and
gives more consumer choice.
I. Is the lack of growth in privatization due to
government failure?
1. Local governments have always contracted
services.
2. Fiscal stress is declining.
Survey Year: 1992 1997
External fiscal pressures, restrictions on raising taxes 38% 30%
Internal attempts to decrease costs of service delivery 62% 60%
Change in political climate - decreased role for government 14% 16%
3. Opposition is stable.
Opposition from citizens 15% 14%
Opposition from elected officials 18% 20%
Opposition from local government line employees 26% 28%
Opposition from departments heads 14% 15%
4. Managerial capacity is rising.
Allowed government to compete in the bidding process 10% 17%
Programs to minimize effect on displaced public employees 10% 13%
Insufficient supply of competent private deliverers 12% 12%
Lack of staff with expertise in contract management 7% 6%
II.  Is lack of growth in contracting due to
quasi-market failure?  (Lowery) 
Failure of a market to form
High cost of contracting - preference error
Loss of community values  - preference substitution
1.  Contracting Is a Difficult Process
• Services hard to specify or measure.
• Lack a competitive market of alternative suppliers.
• Cost of contracting is high.
• Monitoring is difficult and expensive.
• Less than half governments report monitoring.
1992 1997
Cost 42% 40%
Compliance with delivery standards specified in contract 34% 38%
Citizen satisfaction 29% 28%
2. Efficiency Gains Hard To Secure
• Labor intensive services.  Savings come from:
increased process efficiency or 
reduced service quality.
• Case study evidence inconclusive.
• Quantitative studies show benefits overstated.
3. Concern about loss of public values.
C Loss of public control and accountability
C Loss of service quality
C Loss of social benefits
By separating provision decision from service delivery
“citizen consumers” may exercise choice based on race
or income rather than efficiency or service quality.
Local Governments Structure Markets
Government is a major market player:
regulator, provider, contractor 
Governments structure markets
• to ensure competition
• service quality
• cost savings
• public values
Restructuring is a Complex Process
• Privatization to for-profits 
• Privatization to non-profits
• Inter-municipal cooperation
• Mixed public/private provision
• Reverse privatization
• Governmental entrepreneurship
• Internal process improvements
Trends in Local Government Restructuring By Service Area
Year Service Area Inter-
Municipal
Cooperation
Private for
Profit
Non-Profit
92
Support Functions
13% 17% 1%
97 8% 21% 1%
92
Public Works
17% 20% 2%
97 15% 25% 2%
92
Public Safety
13% 16% 4%
97 11% 14% 3%
92
Health and Human
41% 10% 17%
97 33% 11% 17%
82
All Services
12% 16% 5%
88 9% 17%*
92 14% 16% 5%
97 15% 18% 5%
U.S. Cities and Counties, Number: 1982=1675, 1988=1627, 1992=1444,
1997=1460.
The average place probability to provide a service by alternative restructuring form as
percent of provision level
*Contracting out to for-profit or non-profit firms was not differentiated in the 1988
survey. 
Source: International City/ County Management Association, Profile of
Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data, 1992, 1997,
Washington DC.
Mixed Public/Private Provision
• ensures competition in service quality and cost 
• enhances internal efficiency
• ensures dependability in the case of contract failure 
Year Service Area Public
Entirely
Mix Public/
Contracting
Out
Totally
Contracted
Out
92
Public Works
53% 24% 23%
97 43% 21% 36%
92 Health and
Human
28% 16% 56%
97 31% 15% 54%
92 Support
Functions
65% 19% 16%
97 56% 19% 25%
92
Public Safety
60% 11% 29%
97 54% 9% 37%
U.S. Cities and Counties, Number: 1982=1675, 1988=1627, 1992=1444,
1997=1460.
Stability and Reverse Contracting
Stability in overall trends masks considerable
movement - in and out and among alternatives.
Most governments which contract out also contract
back in.
From 1992-1997 (ICMA Data)
New Privatization - 90 % of all responding governments 
(on average 8 services)
Contracting Back In - 86% of all responding
governments 
(on average 4.5 services) 
Reverse contracting is:
C Highest where contracting is also high.
C Driven by problems with service provider.
• Substitute for monitoring
Service Shedding: 6.2%New Service: 5%
Reverse Contracting: 13% New Contracting Out: 23%
Stability of Service Delivery Alternatives 1992 to 1997
U.S. Cities and Counties, N for 1992 and 1997 = 628
Average number of movements within a delivery alternative as a percent of
average number of services provided by that alternative (provision = at least one
time period). 
Source: International City/ County Management Association, Profile of Alternative
Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data 1992, 1997, Washington DC.
Public Entirely
Stable Provision
53%
Service Shedding: 16%
Service Shedding: 33%
New Service: 11%
New Service: 14%
Toward For Profit from
Other Forms: 29%
Toward Cooperation from
Other Forms: 16%
From For Profit to
Other Forms: 23%
From Cooperation to
Other Forms: 19%
Stability of Service Delivery Alternatives 1992 to 1997
U.S. Cities and Counties, N for 1992 and 1997 = 628
Average number of movements within a delivery alterna tive as a percent of average number
of services provided by that alternative (provision = at least one time period). 
Source: International City/ County Management Associa tion,  Profile of Alternative Service
Delivery Approaches, Survey Data 1992, 1997, Washington DC.
For Profit
Stable Provision
20%
Cooperation
Stable Provision
19%
Conclusion
Overall privatization trends mask considerable
instability in contracts.
Local government service delivery is complex.
Governments structure markets as provider, contractor
and regulator to ensure efficiency and service quality.
Public choice should balance consumer choice with
community choice
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Savas defines privatization as 'the act of reducing the role of government, or increasing the role of the private
sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets.' Privatization takes both generic and specific forms:
generic forms include contracting out to private or nonprofit firms and volunteer provision of services. Specific
forms include food stamps, housing vouchers, and volunteer fire departments.
Savas notes the general confusion today over the meaning of the word 'public', varying from 'government
ownership' to 'widespread ownership' or 'widespread access'. He notes that in this book 'public service' refers
to a wide range of government activities, from trash collection to national defense.
Savas cites several pressures or reasons that are compelling privatization across the country. These reasons
divide into four categories: pragmatic, where people define a need for government to improve services;
ideological, where there is a desire for less government; commercial, where the private sector sees
opportunities for profit by performing government services; and populist, where people justify privatization in
the name of a better society.
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Chapter 2: The Growth of Government
Savas discusses four pressures that cause government to grow. First, demographic changes cause increased
public demands. Second, public desire to ratify social ills or to preserve existing social programs. Third,
demands of service providers such as government itself, caused by political imperatives, government
monopolies, employee voting. Fourth, as a consequence of inefficiency such as overstaffing, overpaying,
overbuilding. Because government caves in to these pressures, Savas concludes that its actions can no longer
be synonymous with serving the public interest.
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Chapter 3: Basic Characteristics of Goods and Services
Overview
The nature of goods and services is investigated in this chapter to determine the role, if any, government
should play in the provision of goods with special characteristics. Goods and services may be categorized by
their exclusivity and consumability. These definitions enable the classification of goods and services into four
broad categories; 1) Private goods, 2) Toll goods, 3) Collective goods and, 4) Common-pool goods. The
degree to which a good is excludable and the ability for a good to be consumed individually or jointly, without
diminishing the quality of the good, determines each categorical association.
Exclusion
Exclusion refers to the ability of a supplier to limit or deny access to a potential user of a good unless certain
conditions are satisfied. Specifically, the buyer and seller must agree on the terms for exchange. Ususally this
occurs by exchanging money for the product. Excluding consumers from utilizing the good or service in this
case is fairly easy simply raise the price. Exclusion is feasible or infeasible to the degree 'that the cost of
enforcing exclusion is relatively low or high" (p. 36). The other case is the classic economic example of a
lighthouse. A lighthouse beacon is nearly impossible to make available to only those that pay for it. Thus, it is
infeasible to exclude anyone from using the service.
Consumption
Goods and services share another defining characteristic based on the ability of consumers to utilize the
product. Some may be consumed jointly and/or simultaneously will others may only be consumed by an
individual at a single point in time.
Goods and services may be classified according to the degree to which they possess the two properties of
excludability and consumability. The matrix below summarizes the four cases that result when the categories
are combined:
 Easy to deny access Difficult to deny access
Individual consumption Private goods Common-pool goods
Joint consumption Toll goods Collective goods
Private Goods
Private goods are individually consumed and it is relatively easy to exclude consumers from using the
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product.
Common-pool Goods
Common-pool goods are individually consumed but nearly impossible to exclude others from using the
good. Air and water are two examples of common-pool goods.
Toll Goods
Toll goods are consumed jointly but it is feasible to exclude consumers from their use. A toll bridge is an
example of this type of good. Users must pay for the opportunity to cross the bridge. Depending on the
price charged for the privilege of using the bridge individuals may be excluded.
Collective Goods
Collective goods may be thought of as those goods which are jointly consumed and infeasible to exclude
consumption. National defense is the classic example of this type of good. The protection offered by the
armed forces is jointly consumed but one person's consumption of this service in no way detracts from
the ability of another person to benefit from national security.
Classification of Goods and Services
Why are goods and services classified in this manner? The main reason lies in the provision of these goods
and services. Some goods are provided without encouragement. Private goods, especially, are produced to
meet demands of consumers without too much concern for market failures. However, collective goods, by
their inherent properties pose a serious problem in terms of provision. Because it is nearly impossible to
exclude consumers of collective goods, and the fact that they are consumed jointly, leads to a supply
dilemma. No individual has an economic incentive to pay for the service and, hence, there may be "free-
riders" of the good. Likewise, no producer is willing to supply the good or service. This is the rationale for
government intervention in the marketplace.
Discussion
These abstractions are useful for definitional purposes but it should be pointed out that most goods may be
classified into more than one category depending on the transformations they undergo. For instance, air is a
common-pool good until it is pressurized into a canister. At this point, it becomes a private good. Similarly,
private goods may be transformed into collective goods and this poses the greatest problem for society. As
the responsibility for providing goods in the marketplace shifts from private suppliers to the collective, the
role of government should, theoretically, increase. Savas' point is that this is not happening. Without
collective action a continued supply of goods with common-pool and collective good characteristics is
jeopardized. Another element of his argument is that more and more goods with private and toll good
characteristics are increasingly being deemed worthy and are being treated as collective and common-pool
goods. A basic principle arises from this discussion with respect to who should pay for these products: "the
smallest collective unit that embraces most of the beneficiaries should provide the collective good" (p. 50). In
addition, because it is impossible to charge directly for the use of collective goods, payment is unrelated to
demand (p. 49). Thus, a political process of some kind must be employed to answer the questions of how
much to provide and which individuals should receive a discount for using the service. In this sense the
quantity and quality of the good is subject to the outcome of the political process.
Conclusion
Increasingly, governments are providing goods that are deemed worthy but do not have common-pool or
collective characteristics. Indeed, as Savas points out, government growth in the provision of goods with
private and toll-good characteristics has surpassed the expenditures for common-pool and collective goods.
There are societal costs associated with this trend. When these goods are subsidized, underpriced, or given
away the result is overconsumption and waste.
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Chapter 4: Alternative Arrangements for Providing Goods and Services
Savas argues that there are three parties to service provision: 1) the consumer who directly receives the
service, 2) the producer who directly provides the service to the consumer, and 3) the arranger or provider
who selects the producer and assigns producers to consumers. These three parties should be thought of as
roles played by different agents depending on the service provided. The consumer can be an individual, a
household, or a business. The producer role can be played by the government, a private firm (either for profit
or nonprofit), or by the consumer herself. The arranger role is, in the case of public goods, played by a
government agency. In the case of goods from which people can be excluded and thus money charged, the
arranger is often the consumer herself. Savas outlines ten ways in which goods and services are provided,
identifying which party plays each role.
Government Arranges
Government produces
Government service - The government provides the service directly to the consumer, acting
both as an arranger and a producer. The consumer pays for the service either indirectly
through taxes or directly with a user fee.
Intergovernmental agreement - The government, acting as an arranger, contracts with
another government to provide a service. This strategy is frequently employed by small
communities. Services commonly provided in this way are schools, road maintenance,
libraries, recreation facilities, and fire-protection.
Private sector produces
Contract - The government selects, authorizes, and pays a private firm to provide a service.
Tangible goods such as public works, public safety, and support functions are most
commonly contracted to for profit private firms, whereas health and human services and
parks and recreation are commonly contracted to nonprofit firms.
Franchise - Government awards monopoly privileges to a private firm to supply a service,
usually with regulated prices. Utilities such as electricity, telephone service and heating gas
are often supplied in this way by private firms with rates either determined or carefully
regulated by government.
Grant - This is one strategy used to provide goods whose consumption is to be encouraged,
such as housing, education, and health care. In this case, the government and consumer
act as co-arrangers, and usually both the government and the consumer make payments to
the producer. For example, a non-profit organization providing affordable housing may
receive some operating and development funds from local, state, or national government
agencies, but will also collect rents from residents.
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All situations where the government arranges and the private sector produces assume that
government has the capacity to select contractors and monitor contractors.
Private Sector Arranges
Private sector produces
Voucher - This is another strategy used to provide goods whose consumption is to be
encouraged. In this case, the government subsidizes the consumer rather than the
producer, and the consumer is the arranger. The consumer is not limited to firms
subsidized by the government. Food stamps are an example of a voucher system. Food
stamps are given directly to the consumer and can be used to purchase almost any type of
food in most grocery stores.
Market - The consumer arranges service and pays the producer. The government is not
involved other than in a regulatory mode. This is the dominant arrangement in the US for
many types of goods and services ranging from haircuts to stereo equipment.
Voluntary - A voluntary association either acts as arranger and producer, providing a service
directly to consumers (such as a church which operates a shelter for the homeless) or acts
as an arranger by contracting with a private firm to provide a service (such as a non-profit
organization contracting with a hotel to provide temporary shelter for the homeless).
Self-service - The consumer provides services directly to him or herself such as taking
his/her own garbage to the landfill.
Government Produces
Government vending - In this case, the private sector arranges to purchase a good or
service from a government agency. Examples include purchase of water, mineral, or logging
rights to government-owned land, or hire of government agents for a private purpose such
as hiring police services for a private event.
There are also hybrid combinations of these ten fundamental types of goods and services provision. For
example, government may give a grant to a day care provider to provide service to low income families, and
give day care vouchers to low income parents.
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Chapter 5: An Analysis and Comparison of Alternative Arrangements
In chapter 5, Savas summarizes and analyzes the appropriate institutional arrangements for different types of
service delivery. His analysis includes an examination of the inherent properties of different types of goods,
the arrangements which work best in delivering those goods, and factors to be given careful consideration in
evaluating the utilization of different arrangements. He concludes his analysis with a summary of the
characteristics of privatization alternatives.
According to Savas, the nature of goods determines which arrangement is most appropriate for their delivery.
Private goods can be provided by any arrangement, while toll goods can be provided by any arrangment
except self-service. Collective goods can be provided by government, intergovernmental agreement, contract
or by voluntary arrangement. Common-Pool goods, although supplied by nature, can be created by
government action and then supplied through government service, intergovernmental agreements, contracts,
grants or vouchers.
Savas describes, in detail, eleven different attributes and characteristics of goods and the arrangements which
are important in determining the suitability of a particular arrangement for supplying a good:
1. Service specificity: How easy is it to specify the services provided and needed?
The progress of the services? The success of those provided?
Services that can be specified to a great degree can be provided by any arrangement.
Services that cannot be specified to a great degree cannot be readily provided by
intergovernmental agreement, contract, franchise or grant.
2. Availability of producer
If there are many producers to choose from, the most appropriate arrangements are contract,
market, and voucher.
3. Efficiency and effectiveness
The three fundamental criteria of service performance are: efficiency,
effectiveness and equity. The degree of competition determines the amount of
efficiency and effectiveness: the greater the amount of competition permitted by
an arrangement, the greater the efficiency.
Market, contract and voucher systems are most conducive to foster competition.
Franchising, grants, intergovernmental contracting, governmental vending and voluntary
arrangements promote less competition.
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Self-service yields no competition.
4. Scale: the scale of service affects its efficiency.
Government service is likely to be inefficient because the production unit must, by definition, be
the same size as the consumer unit without regard to its optimal size.
All of the arrangements (except govt. service and self-service) can achieve economies of scale
by allowing the size of the producer to be independent of the size of the arranger.
Those arrangements most able to take advantage of economies of scale are contracting and
franchising. Voucher and inter-governmental service, to some small degree, can realize
economies of scale.
5. Relating costs and benefits
Efficiency is more likely to be achieved when there is a direct link between paying for the
service and realizing its benefits, and the consumer has economic incentive to shop wisely. Such
a relationship is only possible for private and toll goods.
Those arrangements which allow for a direct link between the paying consumer and service
producer are: market, voucher, grant and franchise.
6. Responsiveness to consumers
More responsive service is achieved when the consumer is the arranger, as in market, voucher,
self-service, and voluntary arrangements, and in arrangements where there exist multiple
grantees and franchises.
7. Susceptibility to fraud (types of fraud include bribery, collusion, and extortion.)
Each arrangement is susceptible to some degree of fraud.
8. Economic equity: the difference in the ability of each arrangement to provide
services in a fair and equitable manner with regard to financial means.
There are two opposing viewpoints on the relationship between the market
mechanism and equity. The first viewpoint says the market mechanism is
inherently equitable in that all people are treated equally and everyone pays the
same amount of money for the same thing. The second believes the market is
inherently inequitable because incomes are distributed unequally and, therefore,
rich and poor cannot buy the same things (i.e. ability to obtain services and
goods is based on income.)
Savas believes that opposition to privatization on the grounds that it is unfair to
the poor is unfounded, as privatization does not require a pure market
arrangement. A combination of arrangements may be employed. In summary,
however, the arrangements clearly do differ in their ability to redistribute.
9. Equity for minorities
Privatization does not necessarily mean a decrease in the availability of jobs for minorities. The
private sector is subject to the same laws and regulations of anti-discriminatory hiring practices
as the public sector. Additionally, the public sector has not been without problems in
discriminatory hiring. Privatization can also create entrepreneurial opportunities for minorities.
Because of the inefficiency of the public sector, contracting can often result in greater efficiency
and therefore eliminate the bias in service provision where the quality of services has been
worse for minorities. Any arrangement that results in better-quality or more cost-effective public
services is likely to benefit minorities more, as they are more dependent on private goods that
have been collectivized.
10. Responsiveness to government direction
Direct Government service arrangement is not very responsive to public policy, as the elected
chief executive or local official has very little control over the agency that is under his or her
nominal control.
Private firms can actually be more responsive to public policy than government agencies.
No arrangement, however, stands out as being significantly more responsive to government
direction or control than any other.
11. Size of government
The size of government is greatest under government service and least under market, franchise,
voluntary and self-service arrangements.
Contracts, grants, and vouchers result in smaller number of government employees, but can
result in larger government expenditures due to an increase in demand by the consumer and a
resultant increase in prices (especially under the arrangements of vouchers or grants.)
Savas compares different arrangements with a chart, which shows that:
Market system and voucher system have the greatest number of positive attributes.
Government service, government vending, intergovernmental agreements have the fewest number of
positive attributes. (note: These conclusions are influenced heavily by the values that are inherent in the
table. Different results can be obtained by weighing each arrangement against a different set of values.)
Characteristics of the Privatization Alternatives
Contracting
Privatization of public services that supply collective goods is most successfully achieved through
contracts, voluntary action and vouchers.
Privatization of nationalized or state-owned enterprises that supply private and toll goods is most
successfully achieved through the market mechanism.
Summary of the literature on theoretical differences in motivation and performance of public and
private organizations:
There is less incentive to perform in the public than in the private sector (the private sector
can use raises, promotions, demotions and firings more readily.
In the public sector, operating and capital budgets are arrived at through two separate
processes, and it is therefore difficult to trade-off between them.
The budget in the public sector can grow even if the customer is dissatisfied. Therefore, the
public sector lacks motivation for "satisfying the customer."
Vouchers
Conditions under which a voucher system will work well:
There are widespread differences in people’s preferences for the service, and these
differences are recognized and accepted by the public as legitimate.
Individuals have incentives to shop aggressively for the service.
Individuals are well informed about market conditions, including the cost and quality of the
service and where it may be obtained.
There are many competing suppliers of the service, or else start-up costs are low and
additional suppliers can readily enter the market if the demand is there.
The quality of the service is easily determined by the user.
The service is relatively inexpensive and purchased frequently, so the user learns by
experience.
Good ways to use vouchers: transportation, child care, legal services, health insurance, housing and
food.
Bad ways to use vouchers: medicaid and medicare
Voluntary Action
Requirements for a voluntary organization to successfully provide services:
the need or demand is clear and enduring
enough individuals are motivated to try to satisfy the need
the service is within the technical and material means of the group
the results are evident to the provider group and provide psychic rewards and re-
inforcement.
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Chapter 6: Applications in Physical and Commercial Services
Savas examines various studies to show the ability of the private sector to deliver services that make up the
"physical amenities of modern life" in a more efficient and effective manner than government can, especially
when government has a monopoly with regard to those services. Savas uses the following criteria to analyze
the relative merits of public versus private service provision: efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. He defines
efficiency as the economically appropriate allocation of resources. Effectiveness has to do with the
arrangement whose output satisfies the need. Equity has to do with the fair distribution of the service.
Savas breaks down his analysis by citing studies and specific examples in the following categories:
Solid Waste Management:
Studies found municipal workers were less efficient due to government monopoly
of this service. Privatization saved costs, but cities should seek competitive bids
from both private sector and their own solid waste departments.
Street Services: Private sector had lower costs yet paid higher wages. Firms
could do so due to greater knowledge of the work which led to more efficient and
cost-saving practices.
Transportation: Urban buses and subways are transport modes where
privatization reduces costs, although competitive bidding is the key to this.
Studies in US, UK and Germany have shown that subsidies to public provision of
these services produces inefficiency and private firms can save costs without
sacrificing quality.
Water Supply and Treatment: Again, private firms can provide this traditionally
public service at lower cost.
Electric Power: Public providers had higher costs due to lower user rates. Private
firms charged more but worked more efficiently.
Commercial and Administrative Activities: Traditionally taboo area for
privatization (printing, secretarial, janitorial, etc.) Many government activities in
this area could be effectively privatized. Reduced worker salaries and fringe
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benefits contribute to the savings.
State-Owned Property: Studies show government can manage its land assets
more effectively and efficiently by privatizing the management of forests, range
land, etc.
State-Owned Enterprises: Privatization can turn around inefficient and/or heavily
subsidized enterprises including: power utilities, railroads, postal service,
airports, consumer and business loan services, etc. Many developing countries
have established these as state-owned enterprises, only to privatize then later
because they were so inefficient.
Miscellaneous and Prospective Applications: Savas cites such examples as
weather forecasting, bank deposit insurance, even money supply as candidates
for privatization.
In sum, Savas states that government in general should no longer own, operate, and franchise monopolies in
the services listed above. Instead, he sees government's role to facilitate, coordinate, purchase contract or
market services, and to inspect and enforce the provision of these services by the private sector.
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Chapter 8: How to Privatize
In this chapter, Savas lays out the ways in which government can undertake privatization of services. The
first and most basic strategy for privatization is "load shedding," the partial or complete withdrawal of
government from an activity, in favor of this activity being provided by the for-profit, nonprofit, or voluntary
sector. He offers examples of how load shedding has been occurring for some time, resulting in both
improved services and lowered costs, even as government itself has grown. One major method of load
shedding is divestiture, or the selling of state-owned enterprises, such as bus services or utilities.
Other options for privatization include limited-government arrangements. These involve limiting the role of
government to making grants or supplying vouchers to facilitate the provision of a service through the private
market, or devolving responsibility to a lower level of government, closer to the people being served. Savas
believes this method may be appropriate for services that are paid for collectively.
User charges are a third strategy, one that can be applied to goods and services provided directly by
government, by intergovernmental agreement, or by contract arrangement. Although this is not strictly
"privatization," it reveals hidden subsidies and requires users to pay the true cost of services.
Finally, competition must be introduced and government monopolies must be broken up. Savas believes that
despite the many efforts to improve government services, as long as they remain monopolies, they will
continue to perform poorly. With competition, citizens can and will express their choices, and as a result,
ineffective, expensive, or unneeded services will be revealed and discontinued.
In the final section of this chapter, Savas discusses the requirements for effective contracting out of
government services. He argues that the costs for government provision of services are greatly
underestimated, in part because governments often do not include capital expenditures, overhead costs,
supplies, and other items in the cost of a particular service, but rather in the operating budget of the agency.
When actual costs are measured, government's cost for providing a service rarely compare favorably to costs
in the private market. The existence of multiple suppliers leads to better performance and provides a
yardstick for measuring government's performance in providing that same service. Contracting must be
undertaken carefully, however, with clear specifications, a fair bidding process, and monitoring to ensure
satisfactory performance once a contract is in effect. Savas makes no mention, however, of how fiscal
resources can restrain citizen choice and impact social equity.
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Chapter 9: The Problems with Privatization.
As one might expect, if a man writes a book about privatization being the key to better government he most
likely won't find many problems with it. Chapter 9 is about the problems associated with privatization. Savas
claims that the first problem is the use of the word turns people off. "Public" denoted brotherhood, sharing,
and community and people mistakenly interpret private to mean the negation of the important values. Savas
believes that as a means privatization can be employed effectively by the welfare state (through vouchers),
and as an end it is inimical to the welfare state. Another problem Savas identifies is fulfilling the necessary
conditions for successful privatization. These conditions are pretty much the same conditions for a successful
free market. There must be a large number of suppliers, well spelled out specifications for the services, and
well informed consumers. There are also issues in regard to hard and soft services. Contractors for soft
services (human services) have their performance evaluated according to their adherence to rules, not their
output. This stifles innovation. In all, Savas doesn't see problems with privatization, but he does see
obstacles. User charges (price discrimination), opposition to deregulation of franchises, halting ribbon cutting,
the contracting out of human services to receive federal funds, and cream skimming (taking most profitable
patients or services, leaving government services to provide residual care) are all seen as obstacles. While
Savas discusses the effects (or lack of) of privatization on minorities (for hiring) in chapter 4, he doesn't see
it as a problem.
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Sclar, Chapter One, “The Urge to Privatize”Chapter 1 of You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The
Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press.
In his introductory chapter, Elliot D. Sclar suggests that we strike a balance between privatization, primarily
the use of contracts for services, and internal reform of government entities.  His first chapter examines the
strengths and weaknesses of privatization through a systematic analysis and explanation of economic theory
as well as the specific problems with contractual competition.
 First, Sclar tracks the historical change in the prevailing view of the role of government.  At the turn of the
century, people viewed government as the key to solving the great social problems created by capitalism. 
After the collapse of many socialist governments, capitalism became deeply entrenched as the solution to the
social problems created by massive, sluggish governments.
 Sclar then explains the standard market model and its underlying assumptions.  In this model, the cost of
anything is determined by the expense of its production.  Producers work to reduce costs in order to sell at
the lowest price so that consumers will purchase their product.  Sclar points out the many ludicrous
assumptions required to make this model work, emphasizing the model’s inability to account for inequality. 
He then explains that the contract market doesn’t fit this model because market barriers are too high.
Economic power tends to concentrate with certain sellers in what Sclar describes as mountain peaks among
the more plateau-like competitive markets.  Most sellers don’t like these competitive markets because they
are not sustainable over the long term.  He uses the analogy of the “good guy” against all the “bad guys” to
illustrate the level plateau.  Through illustrations and examples such as these Sclar disproves the assumption
that markets are a level playing field, and therefore, calls for a more realistic view of the market to better
comprehend the potential benefits and drawbacks of privatization.
Several factors limit contractual competition.  Most contracts are made for multi-year periods, thus
eliminating competition.  Many services, such as water and sewer treatment, are inherently monopolistic. 
Furthermore, contractual relationships are more efficient when sustained over long periods of time. 
Finally, outsourcing can become a problem for governments.  The contractors do not have ownership of the
particular service they provide.  Sclar uses the example of a jet crash due to improperly handled hazardous
material.  The contractor wanted to get rid of his/her responsibility of the material and return it to its owner. 
Governments must use the “spot market” to buy specialized services.  The very fact that the government has
entered the market will affect the price of those services, especially over a long term.
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Sclar, Elliot 2000.  “What is the Public Buying?  Identifying the Contracted Public Good.”  Chapter 2 of
You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University
Press.
In the second chapter of his 2000 book entitled You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of
Privatization, Elliot Sclar examines the characteristics of public services that may complicate their privatization
and develops criteria that should govern contracts extended by the public sector to provide public services
through private suppliers.  Sclar argues that accurately quantifying the complete public service to be
privatized is very difficult.  Most publicly provided services generate externalities, which reverberate beyond
the direct buyers and sellers.  Furthermore, the complexity of many of the government provided services
makes a true cost accounting nearly impossible.  He illustrates his theoretical points through case studies.
Sclar offers the example of a low-cost, reliable postal system.  Sclar argues that our market economy and
democratic society derive important benefits that private niche players, such as FedEx, could not duplicate. 
Sclar argues that private providers could not offer the range, price, and security of the post office’s services
without a public subsidy.
Sclar also examines highway privatization efforts in Massachusetts in order to illustrate the problems that
arise when contracting out a complex service. Although isolated road projects are routinely bid out, Sclar
maintains that efforts to privatize the coordination and administration of highway maintenance fell far short of
the proclaimed successes.  Most importantly, policymakers never understood, or accurately accounted for,
everything that the Massachusetts highway department had done.  For example, public road workers routinely
sealed road cracks because it helps roads last longer, thus keeping long-term repair and capital improvement
budgets under control.  On the other hand, while private contractors had to fill potholes, they were not
responsible for the less noticeable road cracks.
Sclar notes that this privatization effort was ideologically conceived.  Subsequent reviews found that state
contracts were written to hide or defer many of the contractor’s expenses, making privatization seem
cheaper.  Investigators also found that policy makers overstated the costs of the original service provided by
public workers, while unfairly criticizing the quality of their work.  Policymakers moreover failed to realize that
the Massachusetts Highway department had a lot of experience taking care of its roads whereas outside
contractors faced a steep and expensive learning curve.
In his conclusions, Sclar proposes three preconditions to successful public contracting:
1)      Carefully specify and delineate the services to be privatized.
2)      Conduct a thorough pre-privatization cost accounting of the work to be contracted out to
ensure that privatization makes economic sense not just political sense.
3)      Consider the ”learning curve” costs of privatization by accounting for the expertise already
developed in the public sector but not necessarily held by potential private providers.  
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Sclar, Elliot, 2000.  “Public vs. Private Production:  Is One Better and How Would You Know?.”  Chapter
3 of You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell
University Press.
In the third chapter, Sclar questions the simple assertion that the private sector can provide public services
more efficiently. Economic arguments for privatization claim that the public sector can save money by moving
away from direct production and relying on private providers.  Sclar, however, argues that comparative cost
studies  often fail to fully consider the complex character of the services that they claim to analyze. 
For Sclar, the proper way to compare public work with privately contracted work is on the basis of avoidable
costs.  What are the costs that the public organization can truly avoid through privatization and what are
those incurred by extending the contract?  Three kinds of costs are crucial when deciding between private
contracting and direct public production:
·         The direct costs of publicly supplied services,
·         The costs of the outside service contractor,
·         The internal costs brought upon by a contractual arrangement. 
A comparative analysis of the cost of public versus private production must include an account of the
transaction costs even if the private sector is more efficient than the public sector at production.  What
matters is whether the sum of both the contract price and the transaction costs is less than the cost of
directly provided public services.
To test the assumption of private provider cost savings, Sclar examines several case studies in order to
demonstrate that context matters.  Differences in and the complex nature of specific services in specific
locations affect costs.  Sclar, for example, analyzes all Canadian transit systems, and his findings failed to
show any statistically significant (that is, clear and meaningful) difference between the cost of private service
and public service.  He suggests that one needs to consider productivity and cost issues in the context of
specific market conditions and their specific organizationally complex environment.
Arguments for privatization often hinge on the potential to capture labor-cost savings,   always the largest
part of any public-service operating budget.  It is impossible to create meaningful savings without somehow
lowering personnel costs.  Privatization advocates stress that public employees are greatly overpaid.  The
author contends however, that privatization arguments need to move away from arguments about differences
in public/private wages.  Instead they must examine [1] the extent to which private contractors can create
higher output per worker and [2] the degree to which private suppliers are forced to pass productivity gains
along to the public buyer in the form of lower prices.
Sclar concludes that the question should not be “to privatize or not to privatize.” Instead the task should be
to determine how public and private strengths (e.g. capacity for technological innovation, existing expertise,
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market structuring power, etc.), might be leveraged in order to provide more value for the tax dollar. 
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Sclar, Elliot 2000.  “Restructuring Work: The Relational Contract,” Chapter 6 of You Don’t Always Get
What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press.   
In the sixth chapter, Sclar examines a specific case study in order to illustrate a successful alliance between
labor and management and to highlight the features of relational contracting.  The author analyzes the
attempted privatization of the Indianapolis Fleet Services [IFS] department, a division responsible for
providing upkeep, fueling, procuring and disposing of all city vehicles.  The department had previously been
created by merging many different city departments’ fleet vehicle maintenance divisions including social
services and fire departments.  The merger, however, resulted in a bloated department that exceeded its
budget and failed to provide timely maintenance for city vehicles.
The 1991 mayoral election signaled a turning point.  The citizens of Indianapolis elected Stephen Goldsmith as
new mayor, a candidate who had run on a privatization platform.  The new mayor singled out IFS (then
known as the Central Equipment Management Department -- CEMD) as his first privatization effort.  However,
three factors helped the CEMD fend off privatization: 1) due to years of internal management-labor conflicts,
line workers had developed a sense of solidarity, 2) after the elections the manager stepped down and was
replaced by a forward thinking division head, John McCorkhill and 3) a cooperative union President, Dominic
Mangine, struck an alliance with management. 
The internal alliance of workers and the new management convinced city hall to desist from immediately
dissolving the division.  Goldsmith received this combination of bold leadership and union support favorably. 
The mayor approved the following steps in order to give CEMD both the time and power to restructure itself:
1) to dismiss ineffectual managers, 2) to develop an implementation and reorganization plan, and 3) to allow
CEMD to bid for the contract along with other private companies.  An outside consulting firm requested bids
for the city.  The CEMD now as IFS was chosen. 
In his conclusion, Sclar remarks that most would laud this case as an instance where the public sector was
successfully forced to compete with the private sector, as a “salutary example of competition” (143).  Sclar,
however argues that the real lesson is about relational contracting.  The genuinely constructive relationship
that developed between city hall, CEMD management and line workers, he argues, facilitated the restructuring
of the department and fostered an environment in which privatization was not a forgone conclusion.  The
alliance made trimming politically appointed managers possible , resolved internal worker-management
conflicts and improved the quality of the service.  Consequently, the CEMD, transformed into the IFS, became
a financially viable business.
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Sclar, Elliot, 2000.  “The Privatization of Public Service: Economic Limits of the Contract State,” Chapter
7 of You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell
University Press.
The concluding chapter of his 2000 book entitled You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics
of Privatization, opens with examples of privatization form New York to illustrate the limitations of private
contracting out public services.  Sclar then offers a list of eight rules to improve the public sector.  The
brief history of New York City corruption dating from the Boss Tweed days of the 1850’s to Guliani’s
administration, Sclar notes, serves to illustrate that while a wide variety of reforms have followed these
abuses of public money and trust, “no one [has] found a way not to pay the contractors when the work
was shoddy or nonexistent”(154).  One of the main problems in contracting remains the inability to
ensure public accountability through the terms of a contract.
Sclar, in this chapter briefly outlines his critiques of the standard economic model, on which the
arguments of privatization proponents rest.  Advocates of privatization, he notes, make several unrealistic
assumptions: 1) existence of a competitive market for a given service, 2) presence of a large number of
buyers and sellers with equal access to information and expertise to use this, 3) zero transaction costs,
and 4) a social, economic and institutional environment that does not cause friction.  Contracting, as the
case-studies in this book illustrate, occurs in environments characterized by a high degree of uncertainty
in which actors (buyers and sellers) have differential access to information and in which a competitive
market for the service has not and may not form.  
Sclar, furthermore, argues that privatization advocates are often ideologically blinded and therefore
dismiss the possibility of public sector reform.  Sclar, however, hones in precisely on this option in his
conclusions.  He offers eight rules to restructure and improve public sector contracting, rules that do not
foreclose the option of public sector provision.
1.      Carefully specify the product and the service rendered. Many public sector products have social
components to them. The post office in small towns serves a much greater purpose than the simple
delivering of the mail.
2. Use activity based accounting when figuring the actual cost of providing a service.  There can be no
comparison between in house work and outsourced work unless there is a reliable accounting of what it costs
to provide a service.
3. For the actual cost comparisons use “avoidable cost accounting” because it does not include overhead and
direct operating costs. 
4. Transaction costs are not zero and must be addressed when figuring the costs of privatization.  There will
always be public management of the private provider.
5. Acknowledge that public contracting is different from private contracting.  Public contracts have different
standards of accountability, flexibility, and are often more problematic.
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6. Review more than simply all private or all public alternatives when judging the merits of either system.
Sometimes governments find other permutations or rearrangements that work well.
7. Allow employees to make contributions to the process of reorganizing the provisions of services.
8. Remove politics from contracting.
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Savas, E. S., ed. 1992. Privatization for New York: Competing for a Better Future. The Lauder Report; A
report of the NYS Senate Advisory Commission on Privatization. New York.
Chapter 1: Introduction (E. S. Savas)
Overview
This chapter outlines some broad reasons for privatization and indicates the stance of the Commission on the
subject. There are some relevant discussions of the general impact privatization will likely have on service
delivery and the gains which may be expected. As well, the impact on employees is addressed and some
ideas for ameliorating the consequences of privatization on this group are offered. Perhaps the most
important statement in this chapter contributes to the overall theoretical debate: "Public agencies and public
firms should have to compete for the privilege of providing public services and earning the taxpayers' money"
(p. 9). Generating tax revenues to provide services is not a right of governments and its agencies, it is a
privilege which should be questioned and evaluated regularly.
Rationale for Privatization
The Commission would like to see more competition take place for the opportunity to provide public services.
There are many reasons for this that pervade the literature on privatization, taxation thresholds and demands
for better services to name two, but, perhaps the most compelling reason is organizational:
...government services are so often costly and poor ...not because the people who work in government are
somehow inferior to those who work in the private sector; they are not. It is because monopoly is generally
inferior to competition in providing high-quality, low-cost goods and services, and most government activities
are unnecessarily organized and run as monopolies. (p. 3)
Thus, encouraging an environment where competition is central to organizing the delivery of services will
result in several measurable benefits and an overall improvement in productivity.
Sources of Improvements from Privatization
Several methods or techniques are discussed to achieve improved productivity from privatization; contracting,
franchisement, subsidization, vouchering, deregulation, and the selling of government assets are proposed.
However, the notion that productivity gains are a result of lower wages is misleading according to the
authors. The observed improvement in output per employee is a result of:
less paid time off
the use of part-time and lower-skilled employees
a managers' ability to hire and fire employees
the use of incentive systems
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a reduction in the overall use of labor
While this raises many concerns for public employees and administrators, several approaches may be
integrated into the privatization process to ameliorate the consequences of privatization on certain groups of
individuals. Some of these methods take the form of controlling the implementation of the process while
others are related to hiring practices, retraining, early retirement and severance packages.
The goal of privatizing government services is increased productivity but the method for achieving this goal
has to come from more efficient organizations.
Conclusion
The authors are careful to point out, several times, that prudence and caution should inform every discussion
on privatization. Their recommendations are essentially that the New York State Legislature should enact
legislation that introduces more competition into the delivery of government services.
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Chapter Summary
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report of the NYS Senate Advisory Commission on Privatization. New York.
Chapter 2: What Other States Are Doing (Keon S. Chi)
Overview
This chapter, as the title suggests, provides a summary discussion of how some states are involving
themselves in privatization activities. Chi categorizes the privatization activities of states into three categories:
1) implementation states that have implemented or are implementing privatization, 2) study states that are
looking into the feasibility of privatization, and 3) reluctant states that have made little or no use of
privatization. This chapter essentially discusses the accomplishments of those governments that could be
characterized as implementation states.
Areas for Privatization
Chi identifies broad categories where privatization has already taken place in the United States. Among the more prominent categories are
human services, corrections, transportation, and education. In addition, the use of contracting is discussed in delivering support services to
government agencies such as computer system design and telecommunications.
Benefits of Privatization
The key issues for engaging in privatization activities are stated to emphasize the rationale for pursuing such
an agenda. Cost-savings, lack of technological expertise, the short-term nature of some projects, and the
need to meet deadlines imposed by courts are some that are cited. Employee opposition and legal barriers
were identified as the two most frequently cited obstacles to privatization. This is particularly important for
New York State as they have more of these impediments than any other state in the country.
Examples of Privatization
Activity in privatization has taken place in many fields across the United States. In the delivery of social
services contracting has occurred to improve hospital operations, mental health facilities, child care, day care
and employment training.
Prison management has benefited from privatization in five main areas: 1) services, 2) construction, 3)
management, 4) take-over, and 5) operation. Responding to court orders to expand prison capacity, relieving
financial burdens to jurisdictions that lack capital budgets, and unloading responsibility for non-violent
inmates have all been cited.
Private sector involvement in transportation has been equally diverse. Administration, construction,
maintenance, and operation of highways, toll roads, and public transportation facilities have taken place
across the United States.
In education, states have utilized vouchers, private managers, private funds for teacher education, and
Search Cornell
private, contract teachers on an extremely limited basis.
Support services have also been an area where governments have been willing to experiment with
contracting. Some examples include custodial services, maintenance, trash removal, security, snow removal
and grounds maintenance.
Cost Savings from Privatization
A lengthy and detailed discussion of the nature and extent to which states have saved money by privatizing
is contained in this section. The sources of these savings are varied and different in each case. The nature of
the service, the degree of contract monitoring, the larger economic conditions at the time of privatization,
and, most importantly, the method of comparison used between the private and public service providers are
all factors that may contribute to an assessment of cost-savings. The Colorado Auditor's Office developed a
practical guide to estimate the potential for cost savings for its agencies. Among the factors considered
important to this assessment are market strength, political resistance, quality of service, impact on
employees, legal barriers, risk, resources, and control.
Obstacles to Privatization
Some major obstacles are identified here in order to provide a rationale for why states may be reluctant to
engage in privatization. Loss of control and inconclusive feasibility studies appear to be the most common
reasons. Chi states that the majority of these barriers are either legal or administrative in nature which is
characteristic of New York State. State constitutions, regulatory restrictions, federal grant conditions, and
state purchasing practices are some of the obstacles cited by Chi.
Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of some of the privatization activities states across the country are
currently involved in. While there is very little depth provided in the examples, they do indicate the breadth of
applications state governments have found appropriate for investigating privatization opportunities.
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Chapter 3: Medicaid (Edwin S. Rubinstein)
Medicaid is a federally mandated program under which states provide health services to low-income and
disabled people. New York State's Medicaid costs have escalated rapidly in recent years; the estimated
expenditure in 1992 was $14 billion. These costs are shared by the federal, state, and local governments.
New York spends much more on Medicaid than any other state in the country, largely because it has chosen
to deliver more optional services than most other states, has fewer limitations on services, and has less
stringent eligibility requirements than many other states. In addition to those who qualify under income
guidelines, New York includes people considered "medically needy," meaning those who are not poor but face
extraordinary medical bills. These cases represent 52 % of the total cost of New York's program. Unlike in
most other states, more money goes to long-term care—nursing homes and home health care—in New York
and less to physician visits, prescriptions, and outpatient clinics.
The reasons for the higher costs of New York's Medicaid program are primarily:
longer nursing home stays
higher labor costs
higher pay for nurses' aides
extensive use of home health care services for personal care services
more outpatient mental health care visits are allowed
inpatient stays are longer
In addition, fraud is estimated to cost $2 billion per year, mostly due to corrupt providers, not recipients of
Medicaid.
The author believes that privatization techniques can be effectively used to control the spiraling costs of
Medicaid, without reducing services, tightening eligibility requirements, or lowering reimbursement rates. He
describes efforts to privatize some or all Medicaid services in states across the country, including California,
Texas, Indiana, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Nevada. Many, but not all, of these efforts have
been successful. The main techniques recommended for New York are:
managed care: requiring all Medicaid recipients to enroll in HMOs, which receive a fixed per-capita
payment for providing services. Regulation should be reduced and doctors'; payments should be raised
(they are now lower than in many other states). For example, Arizona assigned all Medicaid recipients to
HMOs, saving 6 % a year in the first five years of the plan. In contrast, New York operates under the
fee-for-service plan, which encourages costly and sometimes unnecessary tests and procedures.
abolish CON program: a CON (Certificate of Need) is required before any public or private hospital or
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clinic expands its facilities or equipment; this prevents supply from expanding in response to need and
inhibits competition. Nursing homes in particular need to increase capacity.
cost sharing: small co-payments should be required of recipients, especially for prescriptions, non-urgent
emergency room care, and home personal-care visits.
selective hospital contracting: for example, California was successful in contracting out its Medicaid
hospital services to private hospitals, paying a flat monthly fee.
competitive bidding: some services, such a lab work, can be purchased under this approach, or using
volume discounts.
long-term-care tax credit: this is a tax credit allowing middle-income earners to deduct a portion of their
premium from their tax return when they purchase long-term-care insurance; it would shift some of the
expense of long-term care to private insurers.
strengthen asset test for eligibility: to help eliminate abuse by those who spend down their assets in
order to qualify as "medically needy."
Other recommendations include improving data management, possibly through outside contracting,
reestablishing the post of Welfare Inspector General to coordinate anti-fraud efforts, and introducing photo ID
cards for recipients to help prevent fraud (mostly a New York City problem). Through these measures,
Rubinstein estimates that New York could save at least $1.2 billion a year. The recommended approach is a
combination of several privatization techniqes, such as introducing competition, relaxing regulation,
implementing cost-sharing, and moving some of the costs of care onto those who can afford it. The ultimate
goal is to provide Medicaid recipients with more choices and better access to medical care, while lowering
costs.
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Chapter 6: Bus Service (Wendell Cox and Jean Love)
Bus service in the United States began in New York City in 1827. In New York State it has grown to account
for over one quarter of all transit miles operated in the country. Initially, bus service was administered and
operated by the private sector, but was eventually turned over to the public sector to ensure the provision of
low fares and adequate routing - something that the public believed the private sector could not achieve.
However, public subsidization of the transit system is actually the cause of increased transit costs and
declining productivity.
Since 1979, bus fares in New York State have risen at rates that are 2.5 times that of the contracted bus
industry and greater than inflation. Additionally, although ridership is down, unit costs have increased by
forty-two percent, after adjusting for inflation. The increase in fares and costs is a result of unreasonably high
wages paid to bus service employees. These problems are not, however, the fault of the management or
employees of public transit service; they are behaving as one normally would under the incentives of a
monopoly system. By definition, a monopoly produces less service at a higher cost than competitive
enterprises. Therefore, improvements in the bus industry will only come with a change in its structure. In
other words, the public sector's monopoly on bus service in New York State should be broken up.
Competition is the key to improving mass transit service in New York State. Two practices that will ensure
competition in the industry are:
1. competitive contracting and
2. allowing smaller commercial operators to enter the market where they do not duplicate or divert
revenues from publicly sponsored operations.
At this time, only 8% of bus service in the U.S. is provided by competitive contracting, however, where it has
been implemented, in cities like San Diego, L.A., and Denver, savings of between 30-60% have been
achieved. Free entry of commercial services has been implemented in countries such as the U.K, New
Zealand, and South Africa through legislation, separation of the policy makers from the operators, and, in
South Africa's case, simply opening up the market to small operators. Each case has yielded successful
results.
Barriers to competitive contracting in New York State are of a political, legal and bureaucratic nature.
Politically, transit management and organized labor present the greatest opposition. Legally, competitive
contracting is prohibited either directly or indirectly through the labor bargaining process. Additionally, "public
prerogative" legislation (legislation which could determine that citizens of New York do not have the right to
negotiate for services at market rate), and Section 13C of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964
(guaranteeing up to six years severance pay for an employee whose job is eliminated due to economies or
efficiencies) serve as legal obstacles to implementation of competitive contracting. All of these should be
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removed and replaced with well-designed competitive contracting legislation and the amendment of existing
laws.
Bureaucratically, the bidding process in competitive contracting has, in many cases, been improperly
evaluated, awarded, and/or administered. These problems can be overcome through disallowing a public
transit agency to both oversee and participate in the bidding process. A separate entity should be created to
oversee transit policy processes such as bidding.
The most daunting barriers to competitive contracting are merely perceived. Concerns over access to, safety,
and quality of service can be disputed by examining cases where privatization has occurred and successfully
maintained, and in some instances improved, the levels of safety, quality of service and routing. Fear of
increased corruption, under-handed cost increases by contractors, lay-offs, and union-busting can all be
avoided through careful monitoring, contract provisions, and limiting the rate at which privatization occurs.
To reverse the trend in increasing costs and decreasing services in New York State, the author recommends
that competition be introduced at the rate of attrition. Additionally, awarded contracts should be limited in
both scope and length in order to ensure that the benefits of competition are realized. Both measures can be
accomplished through legislative actions and the establishment of and adherence to rigid standards for
competitive contracting.
Expected costs and benefits of such action include a projected ten-year cumulative savings of approximately
30% or more, an increase in service quality, and the transformation of public policy concerning the bus
industry from that which has traditionally served the "private interests" of managers and employees of public
transit agencies to serving public interest as it should. In the end, the winners of competitive contracting will
be the riders, the taxpayers, the unemployed, and communities. The only losers will be future (not present)
transit employees who will receive market-rate compensation instead of the above-market wages they've
received for years.
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Chapter 7: Infrastructure (Steve Steckler and Lavinia Payson)
This chapter illustrates the benefits of privatization as it relates to the infrastructure of local areas. Our nation
has a history of privatization in infrastructure, particularly during the colonial period and the first 150 years of
independence. As Eastern cities grew governments thought infrastructure should be a subsidized government
responsibility due to their tax-exempt status, leaving electric power, gas, and water utilities to private
interests for the most part. During the 1950s, 60s, and early 70s, federal infrastructure grant programs
further killed any chance of privatization because almost no private firms were awarded these grants. Today,
a tax-exempt status of government property, income, and debt gives New York State and local government a
subsidy of over 40% compared to a private firm. Users pay less, but taxpayers pay more. Currently, much of
New York's infrastructure is in much needed repair and rehabilitation, for example New York needs $856
million more a year just to maintain state highways and bridges.
The authors, Steve Steckler and Lauinia Payson who work for Price Waterhouse's Privatization Infrastructure
Finance Group, contend that privatization holds a number of positive possibilities; Privatization will provide
new private capita; Facilities will be built more quickly, more efficiently and operated more cost-effectively.
New sources of tax revenue are created, and greater customer satisfaction is likely due to the financial
interest of the private operator.
Steckler and Payson propose the government sell or lease existing infrastructure to private interests for the
purpose of repairing, expanding, or otherwise enhancing the value of the facility. This will work best when:
The facility is already financed with direct user fees. When the facility has relatively little outstanding debt
compared to market value of the facility. When there is relatively little obligation to repay state and federal
grants, and when substantial opportunity for a new owner to expand the revenues of the facility and
otherwise increase its commercial value through changes in type, quality, and quantity of services. The idea is
for these private sector developers to finance and operate facilities, collecting revenue from users. They also
propose the government contract with and pay private firms to operate the facilities.
This appears to be the right time to take such action. In addition to the Federal Transportation Bill (Dec.
1991), there are many other opportunities to take advantage of. Of the 17,350 bridges that are in need of
repair many should be turned over to private interests. The Thruway could be sold (for $1 billion) or
operations and maintenance could be contracted out with reduced tolls. Private interests should also develop
land along the canal system, develop a high-tech. MAGLEV rail system, and build wastewater treatment
plants and correctional facilities. The authors also propose the selling of state buildings as well as the selling
or contracting of street lighting to unbundled ownership, and provide better maintenance and electric power.
To achieve these goals NY legislation will have to take some steps. First they should promote private sector
involvement in many areas. Legislation should require reports on surpluses and reserves in state-chartered
infrastructure authorities. There should be tax exemptions of the interest on project debts by private firms,
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and there should be conditional state infrastructure grants to private projects where the profits and user
chargers are strictly regulated.
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Chapter 8: Solid Waste Management (Barbara J. Stevens)
Municipal solid waste (MSW) is defined as the materials discarded by household, business, and institutions
(not include industrial process waste). The process of handling MSW includes collection, disposal, and
processing. There are four types of arrangements for MSW collection:
1. Municipal: city employees, paid by government entity
2. Contract: provided by a private firm selected by local jurisdiction, paid by the local jurisdiction
3. Franchise: provide by a private firm selected by local jurisdiction, customers are billed directly for
service, price determined by the community
4. Private: provided by a private firm, licensed by local jurisdiction, customers are billed directly, price
determined by market
Collection Arrangements in New York State
Residential service (% of cities): municipal (54%), private (42%), contracts (4%), franchise (0%). [U.S.
as a whole: municipal (33%), private (37%),contracts (23%), franchise (8%)]
Commercial service (% of cities): municipal (25%), private (71%), contracts (4%), franchise (0%). [U.S.
as a whole: municipal (16%), private (59%), contracts (15%), franchise (8%)]
Processing and Disposal Arrangements in New York State
Landfill: Public ownership and public operation (82%), private ownership and operation (18%). However,
with respect to permitted landfills: public ownership and public operation (26%), private ownership and
operation (74%)
Incineration: public ownership and public operation (15%), public ownership and private operation
(23%), private ownership and operation (62%)
Material Recovery facilities (MRF's): public ownership and public operation (38%), public ownership and
private operation (28%), private ownership and operation (34%) (MRF's are less dominated by the
private sector than is incineration.)
Estimated Savings from Contracting Collection
Contracting and franchises with exclusive territory are most efficient, with costs that are 22% - 25% less
than municipal collection. In New York, fewer than 1% of arrangements are exclusive contracts. If New York
City used private contracts or franchises, 25% would be saved in residential service ($70 million annually)
and costs would be reduced by 10% in commercial service ($62 million annually). In New York State, $60
million in residential service and $34 million in commercial service would be saved by contracts and franchises
Search Cornell
annually. Disposal and processing are also less costly when privatized than when operated by the public
sector.
Responses to Concerns About Privatization
Anti-competitive behavior: Some fear that private sector firms will increase price once they have procured a
contract, "when they've got us over a barrel." Proponents argue that this can prevented by a properly
constructed procurement.
Environmental problems: It is also feared that private firms would not satisfy environmental regulations for
solid waste disposal; for example, they may attempt to dump illegal wastes at landfills. This possibility would
be eliminated by careful prequalification of the firm and its principals, based on legal records.
Inflexibility: With regard to recycling, it is noted that it may be preferable not to contract with private firms
for a long period, because it is not certain how soon the economics of recycling will develop. On the other
hand, proponents believe that flexibility can be acquired through a flexible contract.
Service disruption: There is a concern that private firms are apt to abruptly cease service delivery, leaving
municipalities without vital services. Proponents argue that there has recently been no example of such case,
despite the thousands of contracts in effect.
Low-quality services: Some fear that private firms would provide lower-quality services compared to public
sector. However, proponents point out that "a national study found that private collection received the highest
ranking, with 93% of customers ranking it as good or excellent, followed by municipal service with a good or
excellent ranking from 90 percent of respondents, and contract service, with a good or excellent ranking from
89 percent of customers."
Loss of control: Some argue that under privatization jurisdictions will not have control over equipment,
manpower, or resources, so they will be unable to act when problems arise. But proponents argue that this
fear can be eased by careful preparation of a procurement document and by discussions with officials who
have successful experience with privatization in solid waste collection, disposal, and recycling.
Examples of Successful Privatization
Fort Worth and Newark: By means of contract, Fort Worth saved 36% (or $861,000 per year) and
Newark realized savings of 18%.
Seattle, Washington: Seattle realized a $1 million savings on refuse collection by enhancing competition
among private firms.
Town of Babylon, New York: Service levels increased with no increase in cost through a change from a
private arrangement to a contract arrangement.
Rochester, New York: A comparative analysis between Rochester and Utica, which had similar
circumstances, shows that contract employees collected more than five times as much waste per worker
as did the municipal employees. In order to prevent the awarding of the contract to a private firm, the
city’s labor union agreed to change its work practices, which more than doubled the output per crew.
Implementing Privatization
To succeed in privatization of solid waste services, first, competition among private firms must be generated.
Second, appropriate governmental involvement is needed to regulate the rate charged by disposal facilities in
order to make entry easy. In addition, if there is local opposition to siting a new facility, the government
must regulate this sector in order to prevent an existing private owner from having monopoly power. Labor
concerns about privatization can be allayed by measures such as no-layoff policies.
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Chapter 9: Housing in New York City (Jack Richman)
Richman's chapter addresses several aspects of government involvement in the New York City housing
market: rent regulation, public housing, housing vouchers, housing owned by city government due to tax
arrears foreclosure, and housing the homeless.
The discussion of rent regulation is pertinent only to New York City, and is not germane to this audience.
Briefly, Richman argues that rent regulation has limited housing revenue, preventing routine maintenance and
stifling new housing construction. Further, rent control subsidizes middle and upper class tenants more than
more mobile low-income residents. He recommends eliminating rent regulation for high-income households,
when subsidized residents vacate the dwelling, and for apartments that rent for $1,000/month or more.
Other topics are pertinent to housing markets in other parts of New York State and the nation. Richman
recommends tenant screening by public housing residents to increase safety and rent payment rates. As an
alternative to public housing, he recommends vouchers to subsidize housing consumers rather than
producers. Vouchers provide freedom of choice to residents and introduce market competition into subsidized
housing provision, which may help to alleviate the housing shortage which is the only limit Richman sees to
housing vouchers in New York City.
One of Richman's primary goals for housing in New York City is to keep it on the tax rolls. When housing is
owned by government due to tax foreclosure or by a not-for-profit cooperative housing agency, it is not
yielding property tax revenues to the city. He advocates two measures to minimize city ownership of housing
due to foreclosure: 1) conducting realistic tax assessments of properties including reassessing properties in
marginal areas already owing back taxes, and 2) selling at public auction all housing obtained through
foreclosure to return the property promptly to the tax rolls. Richman also supports eliminating legal barriers
to residents of public housing purchasing their units.
Because not having shelter is often a function of other very broad problems such as alcohol or drug abuse or
mental illness, homelessness cannot be solved through housing alone. However, encouraging privately-owned
and operated shelters and Single Room Occupancy (SRO) dwelling units through tax policy, zoning
ordinances, and building codes can ameliorate the problem.
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Chapter 11: Privatization in Britain (Peter Young)
Privatization has played a key part in economic reforms in Britain since 1979. More than 800,00 jobs in state
sector have been transferred to the private sector. More than 1.2 million public housing units have been sold
to their tenants. In addition, many public services have been contracted out to the private sector.
Mandatory competitive bidding for local services went in effect in 1988. Six services were to be subjected to
competitive bidding: refuse collection, street cleaning, cleaning of public buildings, vehicle maintenance,
ground maintenance, and catering services. Further services are being added. Local authorities and the
private sector were required to compete fairly and equitably to provide their services. As a result, by 1990,
after two years of contracting out services to the private sector through competitive bidding, savings were 42
million pounds a year. One interesting change has been management and employee buyouts in local
government. A management buyout frees local managers from the major constraints on public organizations,
such as capital control and the restriction on trading with private customers.
Bus services, which were largely state-owned and monopolized, took the first step to privatization in 1980.
The deregulation of local bus services allowed maximum competition and satisfied various interest groups.
Those routes that were thought to be unprofitable but socially necessary became profitable. The amounts of
subsidies were decreased, compared with the previous publicly operated system.
Before 1987, airports in Britain were owned by the national government. They were privatized by the creation
of the BAA (British Airport Authority), through a public stock offering. BAA as a private sector organization
could access private capital markets. Therefore it enabled the company to construct a new airport and to
develop new lines needed for business travelers.
Private funding of transport infrastructure is a well-established and expanding practice in the UK. The first
privately funded scheme was the Dartford Bridge over the river Thames. The largest such project is the
Channel tunnel which is 32 miles in length and cost over 7 billion pounds. The project was financed by
individual investors and investment institutions from various countries. Such projects can be undertaken more
speedily and efficiently by the private sector than the public sector.
Privatization in Britain started twelve years ago in a hostile political and ideological climate. As the policy went
from success to success, opposition decreased gradually, the possibilities expanded, and proponents
multiplied. The experience shows the broad range of public services that can be privatized for better service
and lower cost.
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Chapter 2: Markets and Public Goods in Chile: Schools, Pensions, and Popular Capitalism
    In this second chapter of her comprehensive book examining how market incentives
can deliver public goods in developing countries, Carol Graham focuses on Chilean social
service restructuring in social security and education during Pinochet’s authoritarian
regime (1973-90) and through the 1990s. Based on private sector participation, market-
based incentives, and on new opportunities for individual choice, Chile’s public sector
restructuring broadened the base of stakeholders in a new model for delivering public
goods and services. Graham emphasizes the context for social policy reform in Chile
before examining the politics and economics of social security and pension reform, the
implementation of a voucher-based education reform, the privatization program of
“popular capitalism”, and the effects of these reforms on equity.
      Chile’s extensive social welfare system, relatively efficient public sector institutions, and strong
administrative capacity aided the implementation of the substantial and initially, highly controversial, social
service restructuring. Adequate regulation, far-reaching dissemination of information, an extensive stakeholder
constituency, and effective competition, all contributed to the success and political sustainability of the market
incentive approach in the Chilean social security reforms.
       While in general, Graham finds that new market incentives and increased competition improved the
performance of both public and private sector institutions, she nevertheless maintains that at times it may be
impossible sometimes to avoid trade-offs between efficiency and equity improvements. Graham concedes that
the most disadvantaged people are more likely to lose out in a system with increasing market incentives and
broadening individual choice.  However, the extent to which the state should correct for inequitable market
outcomes, who should be eligible for assistance, and how much assistance they should receive is highly
debatable. She raises concerns related to equity about application of the Chilean reform model to nations with
much higher poverty and much weaker administrative capacity than Chile. The problems with the introduction
of market incentives into the public sector were especially evident in the less successful voucher-based
education reform.
  In the 1990s Chilean policymakers have focused on equity reforms because the 1970s macroeconomic
reforms and the 1980s social policy reforms failed to incorporate the poorest sector of the population as full
participants, leaving them with limited access or inferior quality public services. However, more attention can
now be focused on the lower income groups because most of the middle and higher-income groups receive
their social services from the private sector – a result of the privatization efforts during the 1980s.  
Social Security Reforms
        The Chilean social security reform is internationally considered
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one of the most highly successful efforts in the privatization of
pension programs.  The reforms have five major goals: 1) Introduce
uniformity into the social security program; 2) Create better
incentives for the workers to contribute to the fund, such as
individual retirement accounts; 3) Permit workers to choose their
own fund managers; 4) Use government subsidies to help with the
poorest workers; and 5) Introduce efficiency through competition
between different fund managers.               
       The pension system reforms were largely successful and
politically sustainable because of a high level of worker participation.
The increased choice within the social security system heightened
competition between pension funds and thus created incentives to
improve performance. The reforms raised the overall level of savings,
avoided taxing the young for the benefit of the old, and increased
pensions for the poorest workers. However, the new system’s
choice-based approach introduced new equity problems. Less-
educated, low-income workers are more likely to make poorly
informed decisions and take riskier, high return options.
Voucher-Based Education Reform
         The educational reforms gave people the right to choose public
or private school education by issuing government-subsidized
vouchers.  Private schools could receive government subsidies in
exchange for relinquishing the right to charge fees. In alignment with
the reform’s aim to generate competition between public and private
schools, allocation of state funding was shifted to a per-pupil basis
for both public and private institutions.  The reforms reduced the size
and power of the Education Ministry and transferred the
responsibility for management of primary and secondary schools to
municipalities. Two implicit objectives of the reforms were: 1) To
diminish the power of the teachers’ union; and 2) transfer resources
from higher education to basic education, thus benefiting lower-
income groups.
         Although private schools are still associated with a better
quality of education, the introduction of competition did generally
encourage the public schools to improve performance.  In spite of
this trend, the education reforms were largely ineffective in the effort
to benefit low-income groups. Even though all the participants were
offered new choices and opportunities, the participation of the poor
was often precluded by the lack of adequate information, logistical
access, and admissions selection processes to private or improved
public schools. Since the private schools could be more selective
about the students they chose to admit, they tended to accept
wealthier children.  Moreover, key actors such as rural communities,
parents, and teachers were not properly consulted nor incorporated
into the model. For instance under the reforms, almost 10,000
teachers were dismissed when they lost their status as civil servants.
Indeed the teachers’ union’s opposition considerably hindered the
effectiveness of the stakeholder-based reforms, thus demonstrating
how the political priorities of the government can sometimes
undermine policy reforms.
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Chapter 3:  Social Services, Social Security, and Privatization in Peru
          Despite President Fujimori’s successes with resolving Peru’s economic problems, the reform of public
sector institutions that provide basic services remains on Peru’s agenda.  Reducing poverty and improving the
average Peruvian’s capacity to participate in market-oriented growth are necessary objectives.  Graham
explores how attempts to create new stakeholders in market reform in Peru can provide a basis for reform of
public sector institutions.  She concentrates on reform in three kinds of public institutions:  education and
healthcare services, social security, and state-owned enterprises.
          Graham reveals the difficulties in reforming main line public agencies such as education and
healthcare due to fear of political opposition and unwillingness to devolve authority.  Subsequently, Graham
reviews the successes in reforming semi-public institutions such as social security and state-owned
enterprises which had the President’s support and were based on dividing the goods among citizen
stakeholders.
          Graham asserts that the reforms of the pension program and the Citizen Participation Program (a
program encouraging participation in share buying of state owned enterprises) were successful because the
public goods involved were divisible among the citizens, who then became stakeholders and investors in those
services. The semi-public institution reforms were also politically feasible for the Peruvian government
because they had little political opposition due to the small numbers the institutions served.  It is important
to note that while these programs achieved the most success, they did not serve extremely poor Peruvians. 
Major reform efforts of main line ministries, such as education and healthcare, did not succeed because they
serve the majority of the population and provide social welfare benefits, as opposed to direct financial
benefits.  As a result, these reforms conjured up a large amount of political opposition and Presidential
support evaporated.  The contrasting experiences of the three reform efforts reveal that reforms in semi-
public institutions are easier to implement but cannot substitute for reforms of public institutions that offer
basic services to the majority of the population, including the poor.  It is the latter reforms that are crucial to
the longer-term sustainability of market-led growth and will improve the capacity of the poor to participate in
growth as stakeholders.
 Education:  Fugimori backed away from any proposals dealing with the privatization or decentralization of
education after his proposed comprehensive reform of the education system almost cost him the October
1993 referendum.  The reform was based on Chile’s municipal administration policy and voucher-based
subsidizing of both public and private schools. (See Chile).  Since then, progress in education reform in Peru
has been limited to infrastructure improvements. 
 Healthcare:  Reform of healthcare was implemented at the local level through Committees for Local Social
Administration (CLAS), which were given legal and financial responsibility for administering the health posts in
their jurisdiction.  They were provided with public funds to pay for the personnel and this allowed the facilities
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to contract with other doctors and remain open longer hours.  All revenues collected from service fees are
kept in the CLAS rather than sent to regional authorities.  Their success reveals the vitality of community
initiative in Peru and the strong potential for creating local-level stakeholders in reform.  A drawback is that
CLAS’s influence is limited to the local level because it has no point of entry into the larger public health
system.  It also has not reached the poorest of the population. 
 Social Security:  Both pension reform and privatization of state owned enterprises increased the number of
stakeholders in the reforms, encouraged savings and investment, and provided valuable experience with
participation in newly emerging capital markets. Ultimately, these actions contributed to the political
sustainability of reform.  The pension program (based on private alternatives) was largely successful because
the President supported it and because it covered only 2 million workers (1 million who stayed with the public
plan and 1 million who switched to the private plan).  Because the pension program only covered a small part
of the total work force, rather than an entire population, opposition was limited to weak labor unions.  As a
result, reform was politically feasible.  The public plan was “pay as you go” while the new plan administered
individual accounts based on investment.  It offered no minimum and the contribution rates were higher
which resulted in younger and richer people switching to the new plan. Advantages of the new plan were
having life insurance, being able to contribute to one’s own retirement, and being able to retire earlier than
the official age.  Those who stayed with the public plan did so mainly because of lack of experience with
savings and/or lack of access to information.  The new plan was reasonably successful in attracting workers
from one forced saving plan to another, but 70% of the work force in the informal sector remains outside
either system.
 Privatization of State-owned Enterprises:  Similar to the pension reform program, the Citizen
Participation Program, designed to encourage participation in share buying of state owned enterprises,
received immense support from the President.  Executive commitment provided sufficient resources to attract
a good technical team for the Citizen Participation Program and the President provided important publicity for
the program.  The program was designed to reach lower-income investors by pricing the shares
inexpensively.  The minimum purchase was 515 soles, or US $234, and the maximum was 3,090 soles, or US
$1404.  An aggressive marketing campaign targeted low-income investors, especially in provinces outside of
Lima. Over half a million investors participated in the Citizen Participation Program which made the reform
more politically sustainable.
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Chapter 4: The Capitalization and Popular Participation Programs in Bolivia
Introduction
The capitalization and Popular Participation programs in Bolivia addressed inefficiencies in the
government. The highly centralized system could not adequately meet local needs or address major social
problems such as a 60% poverty rate. Bolivia privatized its government-owned industries to increase
productivity and capital investment. It reformed its social security system, rescuing it from bankruptcy and
expanding it to cover most of the population. It also decentralized functions to local government and greatly
enhanced citizen political participation.
Capitalization 
            The capitalization program (1993) had three objectives- privatization, social security reform, and
creating more stakeholders in the program. The program was designed to attract foreign investment in Bolivia
without giving up ownership.
            Bolivia did not have the money to invest in its own industries and foreign investment was the
solution, increasing economic growth by 6-8% per year. When the government privatized its businesses, it
required the foreign investors to buy half of the shares of the company by investing that amount of money in
Bolivia instead of paying the government for the shares.
The government invested the other half of the shares in the new social security program. The old
social security program was almost bankrupt and only covered 11% of the workforce. The new system covers
more employees and allows workers to retire upon accumulating a pension based on 70% of their average
salary. Upon retirement, a person buys an annuity to pay out his benefits and there is no guaranteed
minimum benefit. The new pension system increased national savings from 2% of GDP to 5% of GDP.
The public could purchase government-issued shares in privatization at book value with only 5% down.
Many people who could not ordinarily afford to purchase shares were able to because the shares were sold at
book value (cheaper than the market price) and only a small downpayment was required. These shareholders
were directly involved in privatization, creating widespread public support for the program. The poorest
people could not afford shares, which increased inequality.
The dividends from the shares, called bonosols, were invested to pay $200 per year to all Bolivians 65
and older. This measure helped poor Bolivians and increased equality among the elderly.
Popular Participation
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            The Popular Participation program (1994) decentralized the government and devolved responsibility
and resources to the local level. The changes resulted in the creation of 250 new municipalities and
recognition of 19,000 community and grassroots organizations, compared to 100 before the program, that
could oversee and help direct local resource use.
The local governments received a larger proportion of tax revenues for their new responsibilities and
community groups had a voice in what investments they would like the government to make. These groups
helped to create a municipal development plan (PDM) to coordinate local interests with investments. Then,
the mayor, municipal council, and vigilance committee look at the PDM and formulate an annual operating
plan. The plan is then examined by the vigilance committees and the Finance Ministry for approval.
Vigilance committees (VCs) were formed to supervise the spending of funds and ensure accountability.
They could get Congress to freeze local funds if they were misused. This program created a huge change in
the way the country was run. Instead of top-down dictation of projects, communities could design their own
projects and only had to get the central government to approve the financing, which was just a technicality.
The program also reformed education, allowing more local control in financing schools, evaluating
teachers, textbooks, and curriculum. More control needs to be devolved in the school system, such as hiring
and firing control.
 
Conclusion
Bolivia is an interesting case because it was successful. The reforms resulted in increased investment,
productivity improvements, and citizen participation despite the extreme poverty of the country. The reforms
could have gone further by giving the citizens a voice that carries more weight and by devolving more power
to the local government over the school system. VC members are not paid and they do not have significant
resources. Some mayors have tried to influence VC members through bribes or threats, and some VCs are
not truly representative because the mayor ordered their formation. Despite shortcomings in the reforms,
other countries used Bolivia as a role model in implementing their own reforms.
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Chapter 5: Voucher Privatization in the Czech Republic
            Over the last decade, the Czech Republic has emerged as one of the most successful of the
eastern-European transition societies in building a market-based economy.  With its comparatively high per
capita income, low poverty and unemployment rate, and stable political party system, this egalitarian society
has demonstrated a strong capacity to embrace rapid free market reform programs.  At the forefront of public
policy initiatives was the voucher privatization program, beginning in 1992, which enabled all adult citizens of
the republic to purchase vouchers and use them to bid on stocks of state-owned enterprises which were in
the process of privatization.  One of the primary goals of this program was to expand public participation in
the market economy and build public support for privatization and economic reform in general, by making
individual citizens stakeholders in newly privatized entities. 
            Ostensibly, voucher privatization was successful.  The rapid transfer of billions of public dollars into
private hands brought in nearly 75% of the eligible public to purchase these vouchers.  A closer look,
however,  at the distribution of shareholders in the Czech Republic reveals that the results of the voucher
privatization program were not nearly as equitable in redistributing responsibilities and ownership as it
seemed at the outset.  Despite the democratic design and relatively even income distribution of the society,
the responses of citizens were nevertheless determined largely by income and education levels.  Smaller
investors, especially those who lacked the financial and information resources to make longer-term
investments, had more incentive to sell their shares immediately to make quick profits, rather than hold onto
their stakes in privatization.  The more privileged members of society who chose not to immediately sell their
shares were able to reap much larger profits that were close to thirty times the nominal value of each stock.  
Individuals who were a part of the former communist nomenklatura, were some of the quickest to embrace
these business capital initiatives, utilizing their social networks to maintain a privileged position in the new
market economy.
            Early on in the process of voucher privatization large investment funds emerged which bought out
smaller investors, and quickly began to dominate the entire process of privatization.  Instead of private
citizens holding on to these shares, by the mid 1990s such funds possessed nearly two-thirds of the vouchers
in circulation.  Collusion with banks was a common practice. Czech banks, which owned over half of these
investment funds, were inclined to provide open lines of credit and, in turn, exert a considerable amount of
control over enterprise shares and implicitly support potentially risky acquisitions on the part of the funds. 
The funds, which were restricted from purchasing more than 20% of shares on any enterprise, were
prevented from having a majority stake in privatization, and therefore were little concerned with the
responsibility of ownership, corporate restructuring, and managerial reform.  This became a huge liability for
the long term success of privatization, as foreign investors shrank from what they saw as risky acquisitions,
and consequently, the market value of voucher privatization began to diminish. 
            The initial “success” of voucher privatization can be attributed largely to the way the government
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was able to market the program with an inherently egalitarian pitch.  The majority of citizens in the Czech
Republic recognized the opportunity to make money at little cost – the price of vouchers were cheap enough
that even those in the lower income brackets could participate.  The degree to which participants were to
remain stakeholders, however, was linked intrinsically to levels of wealth and education among citizens.  Most
small investors with less available resources did not develop a sense of ownership or responsibility as a result
of their investments, and hence, gained relatively little in the long-run from voucher privatization.  Like most
countries experimenting with the stakeholder approach, the Czech Republic was ultimately unsuccessful in
achieving an equitable system in which participation was even and gains were equitable.  Most citizens lacked
the means of access to truly learn and profit from privatization, and were quickly swallowed by much stronger
and more capable forces.
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               The case of Zambia illustrates the limitations of a market approach in the
context of an impoverished post-colonial country.  In 1991, Zambia began a program of
privatization of parastatal enterprises and decentralization of government services. 
External pressures from the IMF and internal pressures to end corruption, along with a
real decrease in social spending due to debt service, drove decentralization. However,
these very pressures also decreased the viability of reform.  The largest devolution was in
the health sector.  Local health personnel took over management and resources of clinics,
and service delivery was reinvigorated because the health workers became stakeholders. 
In particular, provision of drug and linen supplies were greatly improved. A system of
user fees for services was implemented, with the goal of decreasing public expenditure
and empowering citizens to direct their own care.  Theoretically user fees should give
citizens a voice to force change.  In such a poor country, however, the poorest citizens
cannot shift to private alternatives, and neither can they pay public user fees.  As a
result of fees, many of the poorest citizens lost all access to health care. Although certain
citizens qualified for exemptions, such as mothers and those with HIV, the government
did a poor job of communicating this to the population. Reduced access resulted in
declining health despite improvements in local clinics. 
                The political feasibility of health care reform stemmed from the HIV crisis,
which cut across all economic classes.   In contrast, education reform was less successful
because few stakeholders could bring effective pressure for change.  The middle class
uses private education, and many poor citizens lack access to education because of fees
and distance from schools.
                Devolution moves control into the hands of local workers, but user fees
imposed on poor citizens hindered the provision of basic needs. For market reform to
work, the government must be responsive to people's needs and capable of administering
programs effectively. Government capacity, crippled by a legacy of colonialism,
corruption, and macroeconomic pressures of the world economy, was not sufficient.
Graham concludes that the potential for market reform is limited in cases where poverty
is high and government capacity weak, but is there an alternative?
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Chapter 7: Private Markets and Public Goods: Efficiency Gains and Equity Tradeoffs
The central objective of Graham’s work is to explore what has made public institutions perform better,
and how these improvements can make market-led growth more sustainable and equitable. Graham asserts
optimistically that private market incentives such as competition and choice can broaden the base of
participation and substantially improve institutional performance. The sustainability of reforms is greatly
enhanced as a consequence of  wider stakeholder support.
                A closer look at the case studies, however, reveals more diverse and perhaps less optimistic
realities. While in some instances, new market incentives successfully resulted in an increased role for
beneficiaries and an increased capacity of public institutions to deliver essential services, in other cases,
certain sectors of society were unwilling or unable to respond to new incentives, and reforms met with little
success. The results of reform depend on a complex interaction of  market forces, pre-existing infrastructure,
political economy and  the nature of civil society.  Thus, there can be no single, failsafe reform model which
will be optimal in every context. It is possible, however,  to glean more general guiding principles from the
studies presented, particularly with respect  to issues of  equity and government responsibility.
Considerations for Poverty and Equity  
Graham makes four overarching observations with regard to poverty and equity considerations:
(i) Equity problems can limit the potential of reforms. To the extent  the poor are unable to
participate in markets for public goods, both the growth potential of these markets and  the
political sustainability of reforms are compromised.  
(ii) Success of the stakeholder approach relies in part on the pre-existence of basic institutional
infrastructure and a public sector which can serve as a default provider. The countries most
likely to be deficient in these respects are the poorer ones which are most in need of reform.  
(iii)  The ideal solution for poorer countries, where poverty related constraints are near prohibitive,
is to gradually introduce private incentives while simultaneously introducing complimentary
policies such as cross-subsidies in order to improve the ability of the poor to respond and
participate in reforms. Even gradual improvements in institutional efficiency are likely to have
significant marginal returns in poorer countries with lots of room for improvement.  
(iv) Failure to improve equity in the short run may be justified by improvements in
institutional performance and sustainability. To the extent    that governments are
committed to future equity improvements, stronger, more efficient government
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institutions may serve as a more  substantial foundation on which to build equity
improvements in the long term.
The Role of the State
Private market approaches to the provision of public goods do not replace the state. Most unsuccessful
market reforms have not stemmed from market failure, but rather from the government’s failure to fulfill its
responsibilities.  Graham identifies several important functions which governments must perform in the
interest of facilitating successful reform.  
(i) Governments need to be committed to reforms. Organized opposition from well established
groups with vested interest in maintaining the status quo, (as was the case with education in
Peru), will be difficult to override without strong commitment from government.  
(ii) Governments must provide and enforce the laws which regulate political and economic
interactions.  
(iii) Flexibility is very important. Governments need to be monitoring reforms closely and be
willing to correct and adjust policy as problems emerge.  
(iv) Governments must be able to offer the administrative capacity to ensure the availability of
basic physical infrastructure.
(v) Governments must be able to finance the provision of the more basic essential goods and
services.  
(vi) Governments must ensure a coherent set of macroeconomic policies in place, for the  logic
behind privatization and market reform is contingent upon market-led growth.
(vii) Communication and public education programs are critical to achieving broad
participation. Governments need to disseminate information effectively and
provide channels for making demands and resolving conflicts.
Using criteria such as political sustainability and institutional efficiency, Graham is optimistic about the potential
embodied in the reforms discussed. She acknowledges that equity concerns can be ignored or even exacerbated by
reform, but takes comfort in the notion that in the long term, market reform will be the best means for reducing
poverty
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Introduction: An American Perestroika
"Perestroika" is a recent enough addition to the American lexicon from the Russian language that it is not in
dictionaries over ten years old. The direct translation from a Russian-English dictionary is "rebuilding,
reconstruction, reorganization," adaptation, or changing one’s views. This is precisely what Osborne and
Gaebler argue is occurring to the American system of governance.
In the introduction to their book documenting this reconstruction, Osborne and Gaebler demonstrate
structural reasons for the shift from bureaucratic government to entrepreneurial governance. They argue that
the American bureaucracy, which was appropriate to the industrial era and times of economic and military
crisis during which it was created, is not the best system of governance for the post-industrial information
age. During the Great Depression and two World Wars, people wanted stability and security from
government. Further, in response to political graft of the late 1800s and early 1900s, the nation wanted
regulation of government to prevent corruption. The rigidly hierarchical bureaucracy which emerged provided
this stability and control. While national tastes were somewhat uniform, and the emphasis was on stability
rather then quality, this system worked reasonably well. By focusing on regulating the process, however, the
bureaucracy lost sight of the results, and by making it difficult to steal public money, it became difficult also
to manage public money.
Since the 1960s, the American public wants increased quality and choice of goods and services, and
efficiency of producers. Slowing income growth has caused taxpayers to demand tax cuts and more services
for their tax dollars. Quality and choice are not what bureaucratic systems are designed to provide, nor is
efficiency possible in a system of complex rules and drawn-out decision-making. Due to redirected allocations
of federal funds, by 1982 state and local governments had lost nearly 1/4 of the federal funds that they had
received just four years earlier. That trend has continued. This abrupt change in revenue, coupled with
continued citizen demand for services, and increasing expectations of quality, choice, and efficiency has led
state and local governments to change the ways they provide services from the bureaucratic model to a more
entrepreneurial one characterized by flexibility and creativity as well as a conscious effort to improve public
sector incentive systems.
The authors emphasize two points: 1) that government cannot simply be "run like a business" because
business and government serve fundamentally different purposes, both of them valuable and necessary; and
2) that the question is not how much government we have, but what kind of government.
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Chapter 1: Catalytic Government: Steering Rather Than Rowing
Drawing from the last main point of the introduction, Osborne and Gaebler explore the issue of what kind of
government we need. They argue that different sectors of the economy (public, private, and nonprofit) should
provide the goods and services that each system produces best separately or as a collective effort. Because it
is broad in scope and capacity and run democratically, government is best at providing policy, social equity,
direction to the economy, and preventing discrimination. Due to the flexibility of the market and to the forces
of competition, the private sector is best at providing quality goods and services and choices to consumer.
The nonprofit, "voluntary," or "third" sector is best at providing human services and goods that do not yield a
profit due to the generally small scale and local focus of nonprofit organizations. In other words, "steering,"
or providing guidance and direction, is what government does best, whereas "rowing," or producing goods
and services, is best provided by the private or nonprofit sectors. Osborne and Gaebler give numerous
examples of these three sectors working together in innovative ways to provide more to citizens at lower
expense.
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Chapter 2: Community-Owned Government: Empowering Rather Than Serving
In chapter 2, Osborne and Gaebler describe efforts to improve government performance by including
communities in the process of service delivery and giving them more control, sometimes even turning
responsibility for service delivery over to communities themselves. Their examples show how bringing
communities into the picture empowers the people who are the intended recipients of services and results in
better performance. For example, community-oriented policing, through which police collaborate with
neighborhoods to address their most pressing concerns, has been very effective in many places. Involvement
of parents, community leaders, churches, and volunteers has led to improvements in services ranging from
recycling to public schools.
Osborne and Gaebler discuss how community members can add special knowledge and experience that
professionals and bureaucrats don't have. They quote John McKnight of Northwestern University, who believes
that by pulling services out of communities into centralized bureaucracies, we have weakened our
communities and undermined the people in them. McKnight feels that since communities are closer to their
problems than government professionals, they are better able to understand and address them; they are also
more committed, flexible, and creative, and can often accomplish tasks more cheaply than service
professionals.
Public agencies can nurture community control by removing existing barriers; encouraging communities to
take control of services; providing seed money, training, and technical assistance; and creating citizen
advisory boards. However, government is still ultimately responsible for making sure services reach those
who need them. The structures must be in place to identify corruption and ensure that decentralized programs
are working properly.
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Chapter 3: Competitive Government: Injecting Competition into Service Delivery
Osborne and Gaebler believe competition is perhaps the most important element for improving both the
quality and cost-effectiveness of government services. Introducing competition does not necessarily mean
that a service will be turned over to the private sector; rather, the crucial function of competition is ending
government monopolies. While we decry private monopolies, we have long permitted monopolistic structures
in our government. When service providers are required to compete, they keep their costs down, respond
quickly to changing demands, and strive to satisfy customers. Monopolies, on the other hand, stifle
innovation, since an entrenched bureaucracy and the politically powerful often have control over them.
Competition can actually boost morale among public sector workers, because they receive public recognition
when they are successful.
Competition can come in various forms, including allowing public agencies to compete with private firms,
having private firms compete with each other, even fostering competition among public agencies. Not only
services provided to the public, but also internal services such as printing, accounting, purchasing, and repair
services, can be made more efficient and responsive by introducing competition. Most often, competition
comes in the form of contracting out for services in the private sector. There are pitfalls, however.
Contracting can be difficult because it requires skill in writing and monitoring contracts. In many cases, the
possibility exists that a contractor will eventually develop a monopoly; if this occurs and the public sector no
longer has the capacity to perform the task, they are at the mercy of the private firm should it decide to
raise its prices. Contracts can also be unfairly awarded to political patrons. Osborne and Gaebler believe that
corruption can be avoided if four criteria are met:
1. if bidding is truly competitive;
2. if competition is based on hard information about cost and quality of performance;
3. if contractors are carefully monitored; and
4. if a relatively nonpolitical body is set up to perform these tasks.
Finally, the government must create the market rules that ensure equity and monitor service providers so
that they remain accountable for their performance.
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Chapter 4: Mission-Driven Government: Transforming Rule-Driven Organizations
The authors in this chapter argue that public organizations should be driven by their mission, not by their
rules and their budgets. Rules on operations, budgets, personnel, procurement, and accounting are embedded
in rule-driven systems, resulting in wasted time and inefficiency in government. On the other hand, mission-
driven organizations free their employees to pursue the organization's mission, resulting in systems that are
more efficient, effective, innovative, and flexible.
To create mission-driven governments, the authors argue that the dead weight of accumulated rules,
regulations, and obsolete activities should be scraped off. Governments have so far tried some methods,
including sunset laws, review commissions, and zero-based budgets. Two major areas, budgeting and
personnel, are especially important to overhaul. Budgeting procedures should be changed to give employees
an incentive to save money, free up resources to test new ideas, give managers the autonomy they need to
respond to changing circumstances, create a predictable environment. Simplifying the budget process would
save millions of dollars on auditors and budget officers and free legislators to focus on the important issues.
Personnel systems should also be changed. In current systems, pay and status are based on longevity, not
performance. Promotions are controlled by personnel department, not managers, and ineffective employees
cannot be fired while capable ones may be subject to unfair layoffs. Personnel systems should be restructured
to offer broad job classifications and pay bands, market-rate salaries, performance-based pay, promotions
and layoffs by performance rather than seniority, hiring systems that allow managers to recruit and hire the
most qualified people, and a streamlined appeals process for employees who are fired.
Government agencies should create mission statements, and then create a culture around the mission. In
order to achieve this, the authors argue government should overcome the "We've always done it this way"
mindset and the desire by some elected officials to retain control.
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Chapter 5: Results-Oriented Government: Funding Outcomes, Not Inputs
The authors argue that governments have focused on inputs but ignored outcomes, words like accountability,
performance, and results. Under traditional systems employees are likely to protect their jobs and pursue
larger budgets, larger staffs, and more authority. The authors recommend results- or performance-oriented
government, which call for new ways of measuring and rewarding outcomes in various fields, such as job
training, vocational education, housing, highway construction, even courts.
Sunnyvale, California, is introduced as an example of a government that focuses on performance. Managers in
that city measure the quantity, quality, and cost of every service they deliver in terms of four categories;
goals, community condition indicators, objectives, and performance indicators. The switch to a new system
has led to the elimination of many rules and budget line items. This system brought high productivity;
smaller staff levels (35 to 45 percent), higher salaries, and lower costs.
The authors suggest several themes for result-oriented government:
1. What gets measured gets done; after performance measures are established, people begin to ask the
right questions, to redefine the problem, to diagnose that problem, and to think about organizational
goals.
2. If you don't measure results, you can't tell success from failure; when government lacks objective
information, decisions depend largely on political considerations.
3. If you cannot see success, you cannot reward it; by rewarding successful managers, Sunnyvale has
increased its productivity.
4. If you cannot reward success, you are probably rewarding failure; In practice, if you are failing , you
qualify for aid. When the crime rate rises, we give the police more money.
5. If you can't see success, you can't learn from it; unexpected success may be an important lesson to be
learned.
6. If you can't recognize failure, you can't correct it; no one outside the bureaucracy can tell if these
agencies do anything worthwhile, because no one measures the results of their work.
7. If you can demonstrate results, you can win public support; we can compare Florida Taxwatch with
Florida DOT.
The authors suggest three approaches of performance measurement. First, use pay-for- performance systems
to reward high-performing employees rather than traditional approaches such as Management By Objective
(MBO). Second, manage for results rather than management by guesswork or MBO. Total quality
management (TQM) is introduced as a key approach for this. Third, budget for results. Budget systems
should fund outcomes rather than inputs. In order to achieve this, output (quantity) and outcome (quality)
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goals are defined to mission-driven budgets. In conclusion, a modern budget system must be not only
mission-driven, decentralized, and result-oriented, but also customer-oriented (see Chapter 6).
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Chapter 6: Customer-Driven Government: Meeting the Needs of Customer, Not the Bureaucracy
In this chapter, the authors argue that government services often fail to meet the needs of their customers,
because funding for services comes not from customers but from elected representatives like legislatures and
city councils. As our society become more complex and diverse, the needs and preferences of customers are
no longer homogeneous, yet governments still provide standardized services.
The authors argue that government must make a greater effort to perceive the needs of customers and give
them a choice of producers. In order to learn the needs and preferences of its customers, government should
give them a voice through methods such as surveys, customer contact, customer interviews, customer
councils, and ombudsmen.
To respond to the needs of customers, however, it is not sufficient to know about their needs. It is also
necessary to let them have a choice of providers by putting resources in the customer's hands' through
vouchers and cash grants, for example. This "customer-driven system" approach has many advantages:
1. It makes service providers be accountable to their customers: if customers can choose their providers,
providers should meet customers needs.
2. It can prevent political influence from choosing the service providers. If the public agency select
providers, politicians may interfere with the decision. In this case, the providers with the largest
constituencies will be selected, regardless of the quality of the service they can provide.
3. It stimulates more innovation. Competition will make providers pursue the most efficient way of providing
service, so that they will invest in innovation.
4. It makes it possible for customers to choose the service that they want.
5. This approach wastes less, because the quality and quantity of service are determined when supply
meets what consumers want, rather than when supply meets what legislatures or city councils want.
6. It makes consumers commit themselves to the service. For instance, students are more committed to
education in schools they have chosen.
7. It provides the opportunity for greater equity. For example, if government funds institutions rather than
individuals, on the one hand, institutions that are targeted at the poor will deteriorate and the poor will
be stigmatized. On the other hand, the institutions not limited to the poor will promote inequality,
because the most intensive users of the service are the affluent. In contrast, through this approach,
governments can equalize the funding for each individual and get rid of the stigma of the poor.
There are some limitations to this approach. It cannot be applied to the regulatory sector, because in this
case the primary customers are not individuals but the community as a whole. This approach is best applied
to service delivery. The other drawback is that it cannot be applied when market is dominated by a monopoly
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situation, and when competition for a service would result in inefficiency, as is the case with garbage
collection routes.
The authors point out that in addition to putting resources in their customers' hands, governments need to
restructure the existing bureaucracy. Because the traditional public systems are designed for administrators
and service providers, it is difficult to expect public managers to serve customers. According to them, the
bureaucracy should be transformed from the old systems to new systems that are both "user-friendly" and
"transparent." Customers should not be faced with a confusing maze of fragmented programs, conflicting
eligibility requirements, and multiple forms to fill out; and they should be able to sort through their options
without having to sort through the complex bureaucracy behind them.
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Chapter 7: Enterprising Government: Earning Rather Than Spending
Government is under constant pressure to keep local taxes down. In this chapter, Osborne and Gaebler
describe how some state and local governments have used innovative methods to actually earn money that
would otherwise need to be raised from taxes. These enterprising governments have learned to recognize
their assets and generate revenue from them. They have done so in four main ways:
1. Making use of the profit motive. Government rarely thinks in terms of raising money. But government
often owns land and provides other services that can be turned into profit-making ventures. Sale of land
for development or of public services that only benefit some individuals, such as golf courses or marinas,
are examples of ways government can raise money.
2. Charging user fees. User fees are already fairly common, for services such as garbage collection and
parking. However, in some cases public services that benefit affluent individuals, such as golf courses and
tennis courts, are subsidized by all taxpayers. A simple and fair alternative is to charge user fees to
those who benefit from a service. User fees are appropriate as long as the services provided are private
goods, not collective goods, which benefit society at large, such as police services. In addition, special
arrangements may be necessary to ensure lower-income people have access to services.
3. Making investments based on expected returns. Government traditionally focuses on minimizing costs,
but enterprising governments pay attention not only to cost but also to potential returns on
expenditures. This requires thinking over a longer term, which can be politically difficult. But several
examples illustrate how initial spending by government—such as to protect land under intense
development pressure that will later require massive government investment—can pay off with savings
later.
4. Turning managers into entrepreneurs. There are several techniques for allowing managers to operate in a
more entrepreneurial fashion. By reforming traditional budget systems to allow departments to keep the
funds they save or earn, government provides managers with incentives to save and make money.
Introducing a loan pool against which managers could borrow automatically, up to a certain limit, would
give managers access to capital that they could use for innovational purposes.
Governments can, and often do, create enterprise funds to operate certain services. In contrast to agencies
funded from general revenues, enterprise funds are self-supporting. While they are not appropriate for all
services, they can be effective for those services that are expected to support themselves either fully or
partially, such as water and sewer services. Because any funds they earn or save are returned to the fund,
enterprise fund managers are encouraged to spend less money and make more money than other managers.
Amazingly, public managers are often unaware of the true costs of the services they provide. Budget figures
often exclude indirect costs such as overhead, capital costs, and employee benefits. If they don't know how
much they are spending, they cannot pursue profits. Determining their true costs helps entrepreneurial
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governments discover what services are being subsidized and make decisions about how to turn costs into
earnings.
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Chapter 8: Anticipatory Government: Prevention Rather Than Cure
Osborne and Gaebler detail several examples where city, state and federal governments have incorporated
mechanisms into their decision-making processes to plan for the future. Many of these cases simply projected
out budget considerations into the future. By doing this, governments are better able to integrate costs that
will arise in the future with those short-term decisions that politicians make to maintain the approval of their
constituencies. The central idea that is driving this trend is the realization that prevention costs less and is
much easier than suppression.
Prevention vs. Crisis Management
At the present, public institutions are geared towards crisis management. Fire departments, for example,
spend significantly more time putting out fires than they do preventing them. Slowly, these institutions are
recognizing the superiority of preventative, rather than reactive, solutions to society's problems. By creating
and enforcing building codes, installing sprinkler systems, and working closely with developers on building
plans and construction, fire departments are beginning to enjoy tremendous savings. Changing the orientation
from suppression to prevention is being accomplished in many ways.
Futures Commissions
Governments have turned to the community for input by creating organizations called "Futures Commissions."
A Futures Commission can take on a variety of forms but ideally they are comprised of citizens from within
the community who are charged with the task of identifying and developing goals. Once the goals have been
established, subcommittees are organized to prod the relevant public and private agencies into achieving
them.
Strategic Planning
Strategic planning is another method being used to incorporate foresight into the decision-making process. A
practice used in the private sector for years, strategic planning is a process of "examining an organization's or
community's current situation and future trajectory, setting goals, developing a strategy to achieve those
goals, and measuring the results."
Long-Term Budgeting
Perhaps the most important realization is the impact of short-term budgets on community and organizational
planning. Many governments budget on an annual or bi-annual basis, causing most decisions to be made with
little regard for the long-term financial impact. Governments are beginning to recognize the benefits of
predicting costs and revenues as many as ten years in the future.
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Accrual vs. Cash Accounting
Another way to incorporate a long-term focus into the budget is to include the costs of future obligations as
expenses. Most governments rely on the practice of cash accounting, in which expenses are not recorded until
they have actually been paid. By incorporating accrual accounting techniques, which counts the future
financial commitments of an organization as expenses, governments will be better positioned to assess their
abilities to meet those commitments given the projected revenue flows.
Cross-Departmental Budgeting
Governments are also beginning to view the impact of a budget decision in one area on other departmental
and institutional funding streams. Cross-departmental budgeting, as this practice is commonly called, is one
way to identify when spending cuts in child care, for example, drive up costs in welfare transfers.
Regional Concerns
Long-term planning has been incorporated into the decision-making process in ways beyond budgeting.
Recognizing the impact of decisions made in neighboring jurisdictions and anticipating regional problems have
proven to be beneficial for some governments. In addition to this orientation toward the intergovernmental
system, governments have realized that constituencies can be created to monitor plans and react as any
other special interest group might. Organizations such as BUILD Baltimore and the Greater Indianapolis
Progress Committee have become, in essence, stakeholders of the future in the system of public affairs. They
assess government policy for its long-term practicality and lobby decision makers.
Conclusion
These are just some of the many ways governments are building preventative methods into their decision-
making processes. Changing the environment in which governments make decisions is difficult but necessary
given today's fiscal, economic and political realities. One place to start is by transforming the budget process
and projecting costs beyond the standard one or two years. Anticipating upcoming obligations and recognizing
the impact of short-term decisions in the future builds yet another mechanism into the governmental
decision-making process that will enable public institutions to be successful in pursuing their goals.
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Chapter 9: Decentralized Government: From Hierarchy to Participation and Teamwork.
One of the principle tenets of entrepreneurial government is the free flow of information from the field. In
this chapter, Osborne and Gaebler discuss the many advantages of flattening the traditional organizational
hierarchy. Centralized decision making has crippled the ability of organizations to repond to various
challenges. In a centralized system, knowledge accumulates at the top of an organization where decision
makers are far removed from the reality of the 'frontline'. Decentralized organizations seek to empower those
individuals who are in the best position to develop effective and innovative solutions to problems. Generally,
these indiviuals are at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy.
Advantages
There are many advantages to decentralizing authority. Organizations become more flexible. They are better
able to respond to changing environments and customer needs when those people who understand the
intricacies of a situation are able to make decisions. This also makes institutions more effective.
Improvements to the organization and problem solving occurs quickly with the added advantage of
engendering some ownership among employees of the solution. Thus, decentralizing enables innovation.
Entrusting employees with some degree of decision making authority improves commitment and morale which
also leads to increased productivity.
Insights
One important insight to come out of the discussion is the observation that managers present the greatest
obstacle to entrepreneurial govewrnment. One perception of organizational change would portray unions as
the greatest threat to particpatory management. Indeed, unions are concerned for their membership.
However, managers, especially middle managers, prevent the free flow of ideas up and down the hierarchy
because their insitnct is intervene.
Teamwork
One element of decentralization is the notion of teamwork. Government institutions are task-oriented and, as
such, must be fluid. Their goal is to achieve results. As tasks change, so too must their structures and
procedures. One way to do this is to build teams that coalesce around a particular problem, work out a
solution, and disband only to reform when another problem arises. This serves to accomplish the immediate
goal of solving a problem but it also obscures metaphorical boundaries that exist in many hierarchical
organizations. Different perspectives are incorporated into solutions and, more importantly, networks across
departments are developed that enhance the ability of an organization to respond to future challenges.
Implications for the System of Government
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One goal given the difficulties the federal government has recently had in dealing with societal problems
should be to apply this framework to our system of government. This is not to say that there is no longer a
need for the federal government, just that state and local governments are in a better position to develop
more effective and innovative solutions to many of society's problems. The federal government would assume
a directive role setting goals and allowing the most appropriate mechanisms, state and local government
institutions, to make the decisions to reach those goals. Osborne and Gaebler suggest a competitive funding
environment whereby a mission is defined by the central government with the proposed outcomes clearly
identified and institutions would bid on funding for their programs. They envision the replacement of
categorical and block grants with this approach.
Conclusion
Much of this discussion centers on the degree to which employees and 'frontline' personnel have knowledge
which may imporve the ability of institutions to deliver services. A centralized bureaucracy inhibits innovation
and flexibility because information must first flow upwards to decision makers who know little about the
situation before a decision is made. Often these decisions are misguided and inappropriate. Transferring
decision making authority to those individuals and organizations who address problems on a regular basis will
result in more effective and innovative solutions.
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Chapter 10: Market Oriented Government: Leveraging Change Through the Market
Osborne and Gaebler view cities as markets – "vast, complex aggregations of people and institutions, each
constantly making decisions and each adjusting to the other's behavior based on the incentives and
information available to them" (p. 282). According the the authors, the most effective way for government to
meet the public needs of this local 'marketplace' is not through central control, but by steering the decisions
and activities of its players through restructuring the marketplace. Government can use policy to leverage the
decisions and behavior of individuals, instead of attempting to directly control them through administrative
programs.
Osborne and Gaebler believe government does not have the resources to fulfill all of the public's needs.
However, by intervention in the market, government can create incentives for the public to find alternative
ways to meet these needs. The authors believe the market can play the same role for social and economic
activity as computers do for information, using prices as a signaling mechanism to "[process] millions of
inputs efficiently and [allow] millions of people to make decisions for themselves."
Osborne and Gaebler identify eight problems associated with the programs that government employs to meet
society's needs:
1. Programs are driven by constituencies, not customers
2. Programs are driven by politics, not policy
3. Programs create turf, which public agencies defend at all costs
4. Programs tend to create fragmented service delivery systems
5. Programs are not self-correcting
6. Programs that are obsolete rarely die
7. Programs rarely achieve the scale necessary to make a significant impact
8. Programs normally use commands, not incentives
In order to utilize a market mechanism in substitute of an administrative program in providing goods and
services to the public, the good or service to be provided must possess several characteristics: there should
be an adequate supply of the good/service and many providers; customers must have adequate purchasing
power and a desire to exercise that power; sellers must be easily accessible to buyers, while buyers must
have sufficient information about price, quality and risks; and finally, the government should establish rules
of the marketplace and adequately police the participants in the market to enforce those rules.
The authors give many examples of ways in which government can restructure the market place – many of
these have been practiced for some time. Through such activities as setting rules in the market place,
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facilitating the provision of information, augmenting demand, catalyzing private sector suppliers and new
market sectors, creating market institutions, risk sharing, and regulation through the application of market-
oriented incentives, government can reinvent itself to implement any agenda - an agenda that should be
determined not only by government, but also by the community.
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Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is
Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Chapter 11: Putting It All Together
Osborne and Gaebler suggest that the ten principles of government, as outlined in the ten chapters of the
book, can serve as a checklist to unleash new ways of thinking and acting for any public organization. To test
the list as an analytical tool, they take three of the most challenging public problems faced by American
society and apply their principles of entrepreneurial government.
Health Care is the first problem tackled. The authors cite many problems with the industry, and conclude that
government has abdicated its steering role in health care and has allowed the private sector to dictate policy.
The government has reduced itself to a reactionary role in the health care sector. In adopting a more market-
oriented strategy, government should set the rules and limits, but leave practicing to the private sector.
Government should ensure that all citizens have health insurance, and help provide healthcare to the poor
and elderly. It should work to encourage competition, and at the same time make sure citizens have
sufficient information about providers in order to make well-informed choices. Government to provide
incentives in order to make healthcare preventive instead of reactive. And finally, the government should
push for less hierarchy, advocating for a shift of duties that are inefficiently reserved for highly trained
doctors to nurses and physicians assistants.
Education is the second challenging public issue to which the authors apply their principles of entrepreneurial
government. They see the educational system as a perfect example of a monopoly and believe much can be
done to improve it. Schools have failed to implement progressive change in their methods, and as a result,
the system has been on the road to failure over the years and is largely out of synch with the changing
family structure.
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Search Cornell
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Article Summary
Reinventing Government. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Chapter Six, "The Customer Strategy: Putting
the Customer in the Driver’s Seat" pp. 157-202.
The Customer Strategy and Competitive Choice Model
In this chapter, Osborne and Plastrik outline the key elements of a successful customer strategy, drawing
primarily from Minnesota’s experience with open enrollment and structured school choice. The authors argue
that an organization built strategically around accountability to customers leads to systematic improvements
in quality, diversity and public responsiveness and can be applied as much in the delivery of public goods as
private. Critical to Osborne and Plastrik’s competitive choice model is the need for carefully crafted
protections for the public interest as market choice is introduced. Government does not abdicate its watchdog
role to the "invisible hand"; nor are consumer preferences absolutely sovereign. "Competitive choice"
demands that the government play an active role structuring the market, monitoring the outcomes, and
remediating gaps in access, equity or erosion in the integrity of public goods.
The customer strategy starts with empowering service recipients to choose among competing service
providers. Consumer demand can be effective only if two conditions are met. First, consumers need to have
free access to information about choices and second, they need the buying power to create consequences for
providers on the supply side. To meet the first condition, governments can measure the performance of
service providers and make that information accessible to citizens by way of brokers. As for the second
condition, dollars must follow consumers’ preferences. In Minnesota, tax dollars follow students to the public
school districts where their parents choose to send them. Often, a government needs to provide vouchers to
supplement incomes of those least prepared to "buy" according to their preferences. Citizens are given
control of their own resources and can take them to competitive service providers, but public units do not
become enterprises able to set their own prices.
Balancing Consumer Demand with A Concern for Equity
On the one hand, government has the obligation to ensure that effective demand—that consumers are able
to demonstrate their preferences through their purchasing power. Government has an equal obligation to
ensure that manifestations of consumer demand do not distort the civic nature of the public goods. For
example, in Minnesota, the courts and the legislature have made explicit the requirement that school choice
cannot lead to further segregation of the schools by race. Concretely, Minneapolis children of color can leave
the school district for other districts, but this is not a prerogative open to the white students of Minneapolis.
Similar principles underlie rules that prohibit "creaming" by public schools in an especially good competitive
position and thus overenrolled. In such cases, government may require, as Minnesota’s school system does,
that all potential entrants be chosen by random lottery. In this way, public goods like education, health care,
or social services retain their public character and do not become yet more aggravated expression of the
inequalities in the economic marketplace.
Dual Accountability
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Osborne and Plastrik justify such limits on consumer sovereignty on grounds of dual accountability. Public
organizations are accountable not only to the primary customers, service recipients, but also to secondary
customers, communities which share an interest in the enterprise the government is undertaking. In
Minnesota’s open enrollment program, school officials have a primary responsibility to respond to students’
and parents’ needs. In addition, they carry a secondary responsibility to the legislature, courts, and elected
officials. Consumer sovereignty must defer to public policies established by democratically elected officials. As
the authors put it: "Elected officials, who represent the citizens at large, set the overall rules of the service
delivery system. Within those rules, providers should be accountable to customers and customers should be
king. But customers must obey those rules" (198).
Effective Supply
In addition to demand, there must be an effective supply for a customer strategy to work. Without a diversity
of choices, the well-structured market is moot. Governments can often play a supportive role to encourage
the development of service providers. First, governments may choose to participate financially by subsidizing
startup costs of new service providers. In health care, this might mean subsidy of rural health care providers
or scholarship moneys reserved for rural family practitioners. Second, a government can choose to authorize
or license new service providers or make flexible historically rigid requirements. Minnesota’s open enrollment
program grew out of the post secondary program, which opened community colleges and universities to any
high school students looking for a different type of education or challenge. Alternative programming and
creation of charter schools exploded with legislation authorizing teachers to start their own schools to meet
the needs of at-risk students and students with special interests.
Conclusion
Competitive choice, then, is often the best choice for goods that are at least partially public in nature,
meaning that benefits accrue to more than the individual consumer. We all have a vested interest in ensuring
high quality education, as we do in health care. To ensure equal access, the service can be delivered for free,
consumers can receive vouchers or the price can be fixed so that the service is affordable. Public officials also
have to intervene to prevent "creaming", deceptive marketing, and increased race or class segregation, using
techniques outlined above. In this way, public officials bring market advantages to the consumer while the
ugliest of market inequalities are not recreated in public good delivery.
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Tendler, Judith, 1997.  Chapter 1 in Good Governance in the Tropics. Maryland: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Tendler lays out the purpose and central theme of the book, which is to highlight examples of good
government in developing countries, especially Latin America.  She says that the literature is full of examples of
self-interested government servants, clientelism, bloated and inefficient bureaucracies.  This has further led most
think tanks and donor institutions to advise developing countries to trim their government, privatize, contract out
and subject public agencies to market-like pressures and incentives.  She points out that flaws in the literature on
poor performance can be divided into four categories:
1.      Emphasis on poor performance rather than on good performance in these countries.
2.      Examples of success are from the industrialized countries, which the developing countries are expected to
‘import’.
3.      Preoccupation with regional models, neglecting the country specific contexts.
4.      Overwhelming belief in markets and minimal government intervention.
She sees as a crucial failing in the literature on governance the neglect of the literature on industrial
performance and workplace transformation (IPWT), which discusses the importance of worker motivation as an
important determinant of productivity. Factors like autonomy, worker discretion, team spirit have raised
productivity in large firms. The donor community has not drawn on these lessons to ‘complement’ measures
required to increase performance of governments.  Instead they have thought of downsizing and decentralizing
government as the only solution.  Ironically, the belief about the need to include the ‘user,’ which has driven the
policies to encourage Civil society participation in the restructuring process but no similar policies have been
applied to public servants or public sector unions.
Tendler then discusses how the book uses case studies of successful good performance of governments in
developing countries to highlight changes that work and those that go wrong. The examples are from Ceara, a
poor and small state in Brazil, where 87% of state receipts were being spent on payroll until a reformist governor
in 1987 came into power.  In the decade of reforms Ceara grew at 3.4%. Tendler delves into the reasons for their
success in preventive health, public procurement, and public works and agriculture productivity.  There were 5
broad reasons behind this success:
1.      Government workers showed unusual dedication in all of these cases.
2.      The state government contributed in developing a new sense of recognition and mission among the public
servants.
3.      Workers did a large variety of tasks and had the discretion to customize.
4.      Larger autonomy did not create accountability problems due to simultaneous trimming of the bureaucracy
along with higher community pressure to perform.
Tendler argues that this example does not support the necessity to downsize government.  Instead, she asserts,
a three way dynamic between an activist state government, local governments as well as civil society produces
positive outcomes.  Government promoted citizen advocacy and played an activist role, not supporting
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decentralization as a solution.
She sums up with two caveats: 1) while success stories are mixed and appear unintentional, it possible to draw
lessons from them. 2) good performance cases should outlive the leader that initiates them.
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Tendler, Judith, 1997.  Preventative Health: The Case of the Unskilled Meritocracy,“ Chapter 2 in Good
Governance in the Tropics. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
In Chapter 2, Tendler explores replicable lessons in the Ceará’s Health Agent Program. The program began
in 1987. Within five years of its inception, the program produced tremendous improvements in child health
indicators. Tendler proposes several mechanisms to explain how a large number of low-paid, unskilled, public
health workers are able to perform exceptionally well.  Tendler emphasizes the role of the “central in the
decentralized.” She argues that the success of the program is not a triumph of local government, but rather
that of the state government, which involved itself in the health sector by:
(1)               Quelling fears of clientelism and potential opposition.
The state retained control over certain aspects of the program.  During early years, it
kept funds for health agent salaries from the municipal government and the Department
of Health.  The state also retained responsibility for hiring in order to prevent hiring
through informal patronage at the local level. This quelled potential opposition from
medical professionals by turning nurses from “potential resisters into ardent advocates.”
The Department of Health left the nurse-supervisors with substantial control over the way
they ran the program. They then became champions of the program.
(2)               Creating a sense of mission, or “calling,” to the program and to its public
servants.
Through massive publicity campaigns, state officials declared that all those involved in
the program would be taking part in the “ ‘noble’ mission of bringing the community ‘into
the 20th century’ by reducing infant mortality and disease” (33). Health agents would not
only contribute to this mission, but their involvement would come with added prestige,
free training/education, and a decent wage. To be chosen for the job of health agent was
like “being awarded an important prize in public” (29).
(3)        Strengthening pressures for accountability.
The state government held massive publicity campaigns to instruct citizens on their rights to quality public
services. They told citizens to pressure their mayors with the threat of voting non-participating or corrupt
mayors out of office in subsequent elections. During the hiring process, they explained to those who were not
chosen for the job that they were still motivated community leaders with the ability to monitor those who
were chosen. The state created an informed group of public monitors through the hiring process and through
publicity campaigns.
(4)               Providing agents and nurse-supervisors, with more autonomy, discretion
and control over the program and thus encouraging in them existing predilections
to “do good.”
Workers engaged in a broader set of tasks than that formally proscribed. Some
complemented curative with preventative health activities. Others engaged in community-
wide activities to reduce public health hazards. Many helped overburdened mothers with
housework and child care. Workers were allowed to customize their services to their
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clients/community.
Ultimately, the Health Agent Program decreased infant mortality and the prevalence of disease in rural
communities by enabling an environment conducive to worker dedication. Workers, with a certain level of
autonomy, built relationships of mutual respect and trust with their clients which created internal pressures
for accountability.  Concomitantly, public messages to teach citizens that they had a right to demand better
health care created external pressures. What emerged was an informed public with close relationships to its
public servants based on ties of trust and respect.  These explanations, Tendler argues, are much more useful
to the planner than any description/proscription for good performance based on a notion of “good leadership.”
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Chapter Summary
Tendler, Judith. 1997.  Chapter 3 in Good Governance in the Tropics. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Among the states in the Northeast of Brazil, Cearà is the most severely affected by drought.  These droughts
routinely trigger relief in the form of employment-creating public works projects and supplies of food and
drinking water.  Historically, the drought relief programs were administered through clientelism and benefited
the region’s large landowners, private contractors (“drought industrialists”) and suppliers of relief more than
those needing jobs, food and water.  In 1987, Cearà was hit by a drought that greatly damaged its rural
agricultural economy and left a large part of the rural population without work, food, and drinking water. 
This chapter focuses on the successful emergency relief program that was put in place after the 1987
drought.  This success hinges on its radical departure from prior programs in Cearà and other states in that it
was able to overcome the deeply entrenched tradition of clientelism in the allocation of works projects, jobs
and relief supplies. 
 
How was de-clientelization and improved public performance of drought relief achieved?
Tendler identifies several factors that are not necessarily in congruence with dominant mainstream
development paradigms as contributing to this success including:
 
·         The central state developed new projects and procedures that attempted to introduce decentralization and
democratic decision-making while at the same time wresting control of the program from other local
actors (such as mayors and local elites).
 
·          Agricultural extension field workers were key to this success.  The 1987 drought relief program gave
direct responsibility in the field to the Extension Services rather than building agencies for supervising the
large share of the construction.  Demands and rewards of this program and the managerial presence of
the central government elicited strong commitment from these workers.
 
·         Contrary to previous programs, the 1987 program focused on smaller community-based and less
equipment-based projects. 
 
·         State presence vis-à-vis the municipality was strengthened: the new director of the Department of Social
Action made his presence felt at the local level in a way that made field workers feel appreciated and
shielded them from local politics; the state government’s directions regarding how the program should
operate locally created conditions for a greater heterogeneity of opinion to emerge among local elites and
for a more public-minded voice to develop among some elite actors; the state government surrounded
rural communities and towns with public messages about the program that created some constraints on
rent-seeking behavior by elites and government workers. 
 
With respect to these tactics, Tendler points out that, contrary to this program, “Most current discussions of
how to improve public service focus on increasing the power of local actors over service providers—as
consumers of these services.” (64) While she believes this view is progressive, she states “it has resulted in a
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neglect of the darker side of ‘consumer sovereignty’ – the side that wields influence in a way that undermines
public-minded goals of equity and efficiency.” (64)  Tendler sees that the focus on local actors has kept the
development field from understanding the strong and innovative moves that central government must make if
decentralized programs are to be successful.
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Tendler, Judith, 1997.  “Frontline Workers and Agricultural Productivity,” Chapter 4 in Good Governance
in the Tropics. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
The chapter, drawing on the example of three farmer cooperative in Santana, Brazil, describes a set of
customized and client-driven arrangements that have sprung up informally in various countries between
extension agents and farmers.  The author describes how the above arrangement produced good results in
terms of agricultural productivity, and suggest that though the approach is not very popular among public
extension offices, it is superior to the standardized service delivery characteristic of many extension agencies.
Throughout the chapter, the author makes interesting comparisons between the performance of the public
agricultural extension services and farmer-driven services.
Notable among the points raised are the following:
·         The case of the Santana cooperative dispels the assumption that extension services provided by
nongovernmental entities tend to perform better. The Santana farmers performed better than other
farmers, and yet the association was served by public extension services
·         The case also illustrates that switching from public sector service provision to private sector service
provision does not necessarily cure the ills viewed to be inherent in the public provision.
·         Based on the accounts from the three farmers cooperatives, the author argues that public officials and
their workers pursue their own private interests rather than those of the public good
·         Issues of lack of consultation by public sector need to be reviewed and examined.
However, it is not easy to change attitude of public officials in the interest of the public good.  More
research is needed to find ways of changing the public official’s attitude towards the issues of public and
private service provisions.
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Tendler, Judith, 1997.  Chapter 6 in Good Governance in the Tropics. Maryland: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
In Chapter six Tendler reviews different aspects of the cases discussed in this book that led to their
success.  She argues that much of the advice offered to developing countries has not taken into account the
“the evidence of good government in the countries being advised”( 135).  Tendler states that all programs
discussed in the book presented signs of high performance and impact.
The cases described in the book “reveal that government can be a remarkably strong moral presence”
(141).  Tendler argues that the experiences described in the book do not confirm theories that local
government and non-government agents are better suited to provide good services at the local level.  First,
she suggests that improvement local governments government performance was less a result of
decentralization, but more a result of an active central government promoting good governance standards to
citizens and pressuring local government through publicity to be a part of these programs. Second, she points
to a two-way dynamic between civil society and government, “government was causing civil society to form,
then, at the same time civil society was acting  “independently” from the outside to challenge its wisdoms
and its actions, or to demand better services.”(146).  Third, the cases discussed do not support the
assumption that non-governmental organizations are inherently more flexible and client friendly than
government.  Tendler gives the example of the preventive health program and suggests that the state
department of health delivered in a more decentralized, flexible and client friendly fashion than the existing
NGOs.
Tendler also argues that to the extent that the cases in Ceara reflected the assumed benefits of
decentralization, these cases revealed a different dynamic.  In fact central government took power away from
the local government, “even though its actions ultimately contributed to strengthening the capacity of local
government” (147). Furthermore, contrary to the theoretical assumptions about decentralization, the state
(Central) government was more active, doing things that it had never done before. The local government and
civil society were also more active with these new programs than they were prior to it.
According to Tendler proponents of the decentralization and privatization would argue that the case of
Ceara is not a case of “genuine decentralization,” given that the state government is playing a central role in
these programs.  But in this chapter, Tendler challenges these proponents to recognize the limitations of their
theory and advises them to develop premises that can explain the good government practices in Ceara. She
suggests that even though this might not be a case of genuine decentralization, the results achieved through
these programs were in accordance with the results supposed to be achieved through decentralization:
“stronger local institutions in the form of more capable government, and a more developed and demanding
civil society” (148).
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Katz, Michael (2001).  “The American Welfare State, “ Chapter 1 in The Price of Citizenship: Redefining
the American Welfare State. New York: Metropolitan Books
Michael Katz delineates the current state of social policy in the United States, focusing on the political and
economic trends that limit welfare and its ability to alleviate poverty and inequality.  He discusses inaccurate
views Americans hold of welfare, the ascension of conservative political theory, the devolution of power to the
states, and the increased use of private markets to provide social goods.
Architecture of the American Welfare State
Katz argues that US citizens, blinded by the belief that welfare disproportionally benefits the “undeserving
poor,” fail to recognize the full spectrum of public welfare sources.  Katz outlines two main types of welfare
provision: 1) public sector and 2) private.  Public provision includes a) public assistance (such as Aid to
Families with Dependent Children), b) public insurance (such as Social Security and unemployment insurance)
(10) and c) taxation, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit.  Private sector provision comes from independent
(soup kitchens and religious charities) and private providers (employer subsidized health care and pension
funds). 
Welfare and the Conservative Agenda
Perceptions of public assistance have been shaped by the ascension of political conservatism during the 1970s
and 1980s.  Business interests’ opposition was grounded in the argument that the welfare state increased
their costs by raising taxes and wages.  Concurrently, middle class [white] Americans experienced falling real
wages and saw the implementation of desegregation and affirmative action policies.  Katz writes, “[i]nstead of
directing anger at the wealthy and powerful, the fusion of race and taxes deflected the hostility of the hard-
pressed lower-and middle-class Americans toward disadvantaged minorities – and, in the process, eroded
support for the welfare state” (19).   Demographic and political trends, the growth of the suburbs and the
Sunbelt, and the entrance of religious fundamentalists into the political arena helped catapult conservative
politicians into office (20).  Finally, the creation of conservative think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation,
provided the research to refine and disseminate the conservative agenda.
The conservative ideology put in place during the Reagan Administration brought together three intellectual
strands - economic, social and nationalist, which reversed the federal assistance programs, devolved power to
the states, and placed more emphasis on private sector delivery of public goods (26).  Welfare and public
assistance became recast as privilege to be earned.  The culmination of this effort came when President
Clinton, a Democrat whose election signified that the center of America’s political spectrum had moved to the
right, signed the welfare reform act in 1996, vowing to, “end welfare as we know it.”  As Katz writes, “The
republicans may have lost the battle in the 1992 and 1996 elections, but they won the war” (26).  Katz,
however, argues that the misguided focus of conservative public policy has sought to address the symptoms
of our society’s problems, rather than its causes.  The introductory chapter delineates the current structure of
the American welfare state and provides the background knowledge for the critiques of current welfare
reforms he presents in the following chapters.
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Katz, Michael (2001).  “Poverty and Inequality in the New American City,” Chapter 2 in The Price of
Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Katz presents the post-industrial spatial development of American cities. Katz argues that revolutions in economy, demography and space
have shaped the new American city, reinforcing inequality and creating new forms of poverty. He asserts that economic changes shaping the
American city transformed labor markets in ways that heightened the risks faced by the poor that the welfare states should have helped to
reduce. (33)
Labor Market Restructuring: After presenting a brief history retracing the roots of the new American city, Katz points out that the
negative impacts of deindustrialization on labor market were not realized until the 1960s as businesses competing in the global economy
reduced the workforce, wages, and benefits. Large cities increasingly assumed new responsibilities in housing, social services, medical care,
and education (34).  At the same time, a new generation of urban economists argued, the people and services essential to commerce and
finance continued to concentrate in cities (35). Y, the most dynamic sectors of the economy increasingly generated poorly paid jobs that lack
benefits and lead nowhere (36).  This has resulted in the informalization of labor market undermining job security (37).
Demography: Deindustrialization was accompanied by increasing income inequality.  Gains in productivity were accompanied by falling
real wages. Those reaping the benefits of growth were shareholders and senior management.  Growing income inequality also translated into
the growth of poverty (38). Black migrants and Hispanic immigrants, disproportionally represented in low-wage jobs were especially hard
hit.  These trends, in conjunction with the devolution of welfare program responsibilities to the sates placed increasing pressures on the
ability of states to provide adequate assistance (41). While whites moved out enticed by inexpensive suburban housing, cheap government-
backed mortgages, and the interstate highway system (40), black migrants and immigrants stemmed the population flow out of the American
city. 
Space: Municipal governments devised policies, such as urban renewal and highway construction, to spur economic development.  Highway
instead of channeling traffic downtown, gave further impetus to the growth of suburbs.  Furthermore, highway construction in conjunction
with urban renewal destroyed poor minority communities, displacing residents and disrupting lives (50).
Politics: Finally, the reorganization of space changed the balance of political power.  Suburbs are now where most Americans live; and since
1975, they represent the largest voting bloc in Congress.  As separate jurisdictions, they act as mini-governments empowered to define land
use, organize institutions, and tax residents.  The subsequent disparities between suburban and city tax bases have translated into dramatic
inequalities and spatial economic and racial segregation (45).  This demographic and political spatial shift in the end supported the rise of
conservative politics.  The new American city, Katz argues, is the result of political choices as well structural transformations. (56).
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Katz, Michael (2001).  “Governors as Welfare Reformers,” Chapter 4 in The Price of Citizenship:
Redefining the American Welfare State. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Katz recounts the aggressive role that state governors played in the 1990s in gaining control over and
transforming public welfare, focusing on Republican Governors John Engler of Michigan and Tommy Thompson
of Wisconsin as leaders in the devolution and reform of welfare.  He argues that “in the name of free-market
reform Engler and Thompson increased welfare bureaucracy and intruded further into the lives of citizens”
(83).
Engler, elected in 1990, set out to end welfare dependency.  He sought to uproot federal welfare programs
and return power to the local level.  Under his leadership, Michigan greatly reduced spending on AFDC and
other poverty-related programs.  He virtually eliminated Michigan’s General Assistance (GA) program.  His
initiatives were aimed at forcing able-bodied individuals into jobs.  Despite protests, other states followed
Michigan’s lead, eliminating GA, restricting eligibility and cutting other social services; thereby, shifting costs
to local hospitals, jails and other facilities.  Influenced by Catholic social thought and a free-market
economics, Engler increased contracts to faith-based agencies to move away from government assistance. 
Michigan’s former General Assistance recipients, however, fared poorly, most did not find the jobs anticipated,
most were poorer, developed chronic illnesses, and homelessness rose. 
Engler also engaged in national policy debates, relentlessly lobbying the Clinton Administration to alter the
AFDC waiver process, enabling states to innovate in administering and delivering services.  In the late 1980s
waivers began to be used to curtail benefits and limit entitlements.  Clinton, sympathetic to governors’ desire
for increased power over welfare reform, eased the approval process for waivers in 1995; and by the time
the 1996 federal welfare legislation was passed, forty-three states had been granted waivers.  Clinton also
announced state welfare experiments and changes in regulations. 
Governor Tommy Thomspon of Wisconsin also led the campaign to devolve public assistance to the states
and instituted radical reforms.  One of Thompson’s policies, Learn fare, limited AFDC eligibility by tying the
size of family benefits to school attendance by the family’s teenagers.  Learnfare failed to increase school
attendance; yet, other states followed suit.  By February 1996, thirty-four states were permitted to link
welfare benefits to school performance.  The emphasis on “personal responsibility” became the hallmark of
welfare reform.  Taking advantage of bipartisan anti-welfare sentiment, Thompson instituted the W-2
program.  It rejected entitlements and family size as the basis of support and replaced it with the criterion
that for those who can work, only work should pay.  Benefits were also tied to strict time limits for finding
jobs.  W-2 resulted in an increase in poverty and homelessness in Milwaukee, lower quality and increased
cost of child-care, negative effects on ordinary workers and union wages as the supply of low-wage workers
grew.  Despite these problems, Wisconsin became a model for welfare reform. 
As governors responded to a national bipartisan anti welfare consensus, however, caseload reduction rather
than poverty alleviation became the sole measure of success.  Until the 1990s, the federal government took
the lead in ensuring the welfare of vulnerable US citizens.  Aggressive governors like Engler and Thompson
redefined America’s welfare state and helped to transform the nature of American federalism.
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Katz, Michael 2001. “Urban Social Welfare in an Age of Austerity,” Chapter 5 in The Price of Citizenship:
Redefining the American Welfare State. New York: Metropolitan Books.
In this chapter, Katz chronicles funding changes that have affected America’s largest urban areas. In the
1980s and 1990s, Federal cutbacks forced mayors to look for alternate ways to manage their cities’ finances.
The new wave of mayors in the 1990s slashed programs and froze wages to balance city budgets. They also
initiated market-driven approaches to address the needs of their cities. In the cases of both Mayor Rendell in
Philadelphia and Mayor Goldsmith in Indianapolis, these measures were successful in privatizing municipal
functions, but did not deal with the larger problems of homelessness and poverty. The Federal government
took this marketization to heart and used it to promote an urban agenda of housing vouchers, Empowerment
Zones, and an attempt to privatize federal housing projects.
Urban Fiscal Crisis
During the 1980s, cities began a slow slide into fiscal crisis. There were five contributing factors: cuts in
federal funding, heightened poverty, increased homelessness, the emergence of AIDS, and rising costs
associated with hard drug use. These factors pushed some cities to the edge of bankruptcy and many
considered drastic measures to maintain solvency. These measures were modeled after those used by New
York City during its near bankruptcy in the mid-1970s: cutting services, freezing or cutting wages and
general pork cutting. Two mayors, Rendell and Goldsmith, were heralded as the vanguard of a new group of
city leaders equipped and willing to make the hard choices necessary to steer their cities through tough
times.
A Tale of Two Mayors
Ed Rendell in Philadelphia, after stabilizing city finances, promoted a “new economic agenda” that balanced
budgets but did not directly deal with the standard social welfare and public health issues. Instead, he hoped
that his plan would bring back jobs that would “have a dramatic effect on everything-crime, drugs, housing,
all of the ills of the cities.” Unfortunately, Rendell’s $2.2 billion Economic Stimulus Program was not enough
to overcome the serious problems of urban flight, job loss, and homelessness.
Stephen Goldsmith, the Indianapolis mayor and privatization booster, took a similar tack, relying on fiscal
austerity to strengthen his city while hoping that social welfare would follow. His goal was to “marketize” city
services and inject competition into public services. His political detractors brushed the successes aside,
claiming favoritism and non-competitive bidding. 
Proof of success for these mayors will only be seen in the long run. Katz implies that the “supermayors” of
the 1990s reached the limits of their abilities when it came to meeting the needs of their poorest citizens.
Urban Policy Returns
The Federal government slowly accepted the marketization strategy. The Clinton administration saw the role
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of government as a complement to, not competitor with, the market. Ideas such as vouchers and enterprise
zones that were discussed in the 1980s became reality. HUD continued to focus on rent vouchers,
homeownership, and reinvesting in inner-city markets. HUD also increased funds available for development in
neglected areas as well as creating networks of CDCs.  All of these attempts cost little and were very hands-
off for the Federal Government.
Affordable Housing
Similar to suggestions made by Reagan in 1982, Clinton’s plans for housing included devolution of authority,
deregulation, strict oversight, and businesslike practices.  Clinton’s plan, however, was put into action through
block grants, vouchers, mixed income housing projects, and tenant purchase plans, paired with tough crime
policies.
Unfortunately, all of these practices were emergency responses to a nationwide housing crisis and did little to
address the underlying causes of the lack of affordable housing. This was also the case with regard to
homelessness. Leveraged funds increased 3,000 percent to $1.1 billion, but were spent on the immediate
problems of the homeless and not on causes of homelessness.  Consequently, homelessness continued to
increase.  Cities were also at a loss as to how to alleviate the problem of homelessness within the vague
paradigm of market solutions. Katz notes this as an example of the limitations of markets as a universal
solution to public problems.
By the late 1990s, the cities and the national economy had turned around. Thanks to their fiscal austerity,
many cities were in the black and complaining of being unable to fill the needs of their growing class of
affluent citizens. Yet the duality of cities remained; both rich and poor citizens were left with unmet needs.
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Article Summary
Katz, Michael 2001. “The Independent Sector, the Market, and the State,” Chapter 6 in The Price of
Citizenship:  Redefining the American Welfare State. Henry Holt and Company, New York.
American charity and social services have traditionally been provided by a complex blend of private
organizations and public agencies.  Despite this fact, many conservatives propagate the myth that welfare
traditionally has been provided by private individuals and organizations, especially religious ones.  In fact, in
the early years of the United States, the majority of social welfare services in small communities was
provided by private individuals and/or organizations.  In cities, where problems such as disease,
homelessness, poverty, hunger and infirmity were more common in a proportional absolute sense, aid was
more often provided by the government.  However, there was still a mix of both public and private provision
of welfare services in both rural  and urban areas. 
 During the New Deal of the 1930’s and the Great Society programs of the 1960’s, there was a drastic
increase in the provision of services by the federal government.  This included the establishment of Social
Security, AFDC, and public housing provision.  However, beginning in the 1970’s and through to the present,
there has been a backlash against federal provision of social services in particular and government provision
of social services in general.  In some cases, the government has completely cut funding for services and
hoped that private entities would fill the void.  In other instances, such as in the case of health-care aid and
homeless shelters, the government has partnered with private organizations who provide the services and
receive at least partial funding from the government.  For the remainder of their needs, these organizations
depend on donations and/or volunteerism, which are not dependable and often inadequate.
 Many social services have been delegated to religious groups.  In many cases, churches have proven
inadequate at providing social services because they do not have expertise in the area, or may proselytize
rather than provide services, or face declining membership and money and cannot afford an expanded social
role.
 Katz concludes that non-profits cannot substitute for the state.
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Chapter Summary
Katz, Michael (2001).  “The Private Welfare State and the End of Paternalism,” Chapter 7 in The Price of
Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State. New York: Metropolitan Books.
The private welfare state refers to work-related benefits, mainly those offered by employers to their workers.
Since it began, private welfare has provided a huge amount of security to American workers and their
families, but because it is not universal, it has intensified inequalities. The degree of protection provided by
employers is constantly changing, the trend in most recent decades being a general rollback of benefits. This
is due to the decline of manufacturing employment, lower benefits, reduced union strength, massive layoffs,
and increased part-time jobs. Also, corporations have ended the paternalistic relationship with their
employees that existed for most of the 20th century by offering fewer benefits, and shifting the burden of
paying for benefits onto the employees themselves. 
Origins
The private welfare state began in the late 19th century when employers started to offer pensions to their
employees, as a means of stabilizing the workforce. The national government also promoted the spread of
pensions with tax incentives.
From pensions, private welfare expanded into comprehensive programs. These industrial strategies included
improved safety and conditions, plans to help workers buy property, save at high interest rates, earn bonuses
and purchase stock. Insurance against accidents, illness, old age, and death was added. These plans
transformed the management of labor and created the specialty field of personnel management.
In the 1950s and 60s, the growth of private welfare led to a public-private trade-off. Unionized workers
enjoyed protection, and this undermined support for universal public benefits that would go to all.
Scale
According to one estimate, pension plans hold about one-quarter of national wealth. They are supported by a
web of federal regulations, but are provided voluntarily by firms. The private welfare state is vast,
decentralized, complex and chaotic.
Trends
The inequalities built into the employer benefit structure are constantly widening. The new global economy
has shifted firms’ focus from the goal of keeping employees long-term, to focus on short-term ventures.
Small firms and organizations with network cultures (“highly flexible, innovative, and transitory”) offer the
least benefits, and the number of these firms is increasing. Part-time and low wage workers fare the worst.
Employer benefits once helped to close part of the pay gap between workers, but by the 1990s they
reinforced growing wage inequality. 
The End of Paternalism
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Corporate philosophy has changed from paternalism, or the desire of a firm to take care of its workers for the
purpose of maintaining them and their productivity, to shifting responsibility for their welfare to the workers
themselves. The goal is to end the “entitlement mentality.” Increasingly, benefit programs are changing from
“defined benefit” to “defined contribution,” in which employees contribute to their own pensions and
insurance. One example is a 401(k) plan, in which employees can deposit some of their earnings for
investment. Katz emphasizes that using such a market model introduces the element of risk, which is contrary
to the very idea of security in pensions.
This shift is often referred to by corporations as fostering a more “adult relationship” with their employees.
Concludes Katz, “the end of paternalism helped employers design flexible new strategies for competition in
the global market-place; it also left employees increasingly vulnerable to the insecurities of unemployment,
sickness, and old age.”
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Chapter Summary
Katz, Michael B., 2001. “New Models for Social Security,” Chapter 9 in The Price of Citizenship:
Redefining the American Welfare State. New York: Henry Holt.
Katz examines Social Security in the United States and the question of whether or not government
should privatize this system. He believes that though flawed, Social Security will continue to exist and
to serve senior citizens in America indefinitely.  It is central to the maintenance of the welfare state,
and it would be a mistake to change the fundamental structure of Social Security to a market based
model.
Social Security was created to address the poverty fears of senior citizens after retirement and was
implemented through the Economic Security act of 1935.  FDR advocated the importance of keeping
the program self-sustaining by basing it entirely on individual contributions versus a broad-based tax.
This debate continues to be an issue for the Social Security system. Social Security is a social
insurance program, distinct from public assistance and private insurance. It is “compulsory, sponsored
and regulated by government, financed through earnings-based contributions, redistributive- and its
benefits are prescribed by law.” 
Though Social Security has effectively decreased the poverty level of senior citizens without adding to
the national deficit, it is still criticized. One of the major fears is that the program will run out of
money. Critics also feel Social Security will not repay a fair proportion of contributions to US citizens. 
Katz evaluates the financial instability of the program as stemming from the 1970’s, when the oil crisis
led to inflation and prices increased more rapidly than wages. As a result, the cost of Social Security
increased more than the taxes that supported it.
The Libertarian Cato Institute advocates privatizing Social Security, in order to end the paternalism of
government in favor of choice and to promote a free market and reduce labor tensions. Criticisms of
the privatization of Social Security include increased costs due to transition and administration and
individual ignorance about financial markets.  Efficiencies gained as a national system could be lost
through privatization.  There also is fear that citizens would perceive private institutions as ones from
which they could withdraw their funds before they are due, undermining the system.
The question of whether to privatize remained until the economic surplus in the late 1990s that enabled
Clinton to stabilize Social Security.  Clinton ultimately addressed both camps by maintaining the system
as it stands but incorporating elements of privatization by creating “universal savings accounts” for low
and middle income citizens whose investments would be matched in proportion to income.  Clinton’s
plan incorporated the important elements of not raising taxes, lowering debt and utilization of the stock
market and is described by Katz as a “reasonable and painless reform of America’s premiere domestic
program.”  It was decided that the Social Security reserves should be invested in less risky federal
bonds, and not the stock market.
George W. Bush reintroduced privatization of Social Security in his campaign by recommending
investing a percentage of payroll tax into separate retirement accounts.  His plan was found to be
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economically inefficient, especially for young employees, but revived the continuing debate as to
whether or not to privatize social security.
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Katz, Michael (2001).  “The Assimilation of Healthcare to the Market,” Chapter 10 in The Price of
Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State. New York: Metropolitan Books.
In this chapter Katz recounts the development of the U.S. healthcare system and notes its chronic inability to
provide reasonable coverage at reasonable costs to those most in need of public assistance.  Throughout its
development, America remained the only developed country that did not consider healthcare a citizenship
entitlement.  This was partially a consequence of linking the welfare state to employment (257). 
Forms of health insurance with enduring significance developed in the 1930s and 1940s.  By the 1950s,
America had a nascent system of health insurance; however, it tied benefits to employment because medical
care was considered in terms of rights rather than citizenship (259).  In the 1960s public policy created a dual
system private insurance for the working population and public insurance for the needy.   The 1964
Democratic victory ushered in Medicare and Medicaid, which were created as public assistance rather than
social insurance programs.  This dual system resulted in cost inflation; at the same time it excluded millions
of Americans.  Yet, by 1980, Medicaid was often the largest program in state budgets, and by the 1990s,
Medicaid had broadened into a program that assisted a broader range of people. In some states it cost six
times as much as AFDC (262-263).  With the ascendance of conservative politics in the 1980s, Medicaid and
Medicare came under fire along with other social spending programs.  Katz argues, that the Reagan
administration ran up an enormous deficit in order to justify cutting these programs.
Consequently, the Clinton administration was faced with the imperative to restructure health insurance.  At a
time when public trust in government was low and anti-tax sentiment flourished, Clinton had to assert a
stronger role for government (267).  Clinton devised a system of "managed competition" through which
private health plans would compete under terms set and supervised by the government.  This system, Clinton
believed, responded to new labor market conditions, based on labor mobility rather than job security.  Yet,
business interests feared that the generous benefits required under the plan would be too expensive.  At the
same time, the general popular sentiment swung against the plan as people feared losing their own
unrestricted access to care or higher costs.  The program never passed.  As a result universal coverage was
sacrificed. 
Instead the 1997 budget bill changed Medicare along the lines of a 1995 Republican proposal 1995, which
promised to introduce savings by scaling back payments to providers and by increasing premiums for
beneficiaries.  The legislation reduced Medicare spending faster and more sharply than expected and the
budget office revised projected spending downward for the next four years.  Katz cites a 1998 study, which
found that 2 million persons who lived at or below the poverty line spent more than 50 percent of their
income on medical expenses not reimbursed by Medicare. 
The politics of Medicare reform in the 2000 election reflected the public anger at health insurers and managed
care.  Popular sentiment expressed waning support for a healthcare system radically restructured by powerful
corporate interests, which had aggressively limited the authority of providers and the choice of individuals. 
Industry consolidation had furthermore reorganized hospitals, insurers, and physicians into vast regional
systems that controlled markets for health care.  Katz concludes that the close election results in 2000 left
the resolution of the health care issue ambiguous and less likely to be resolved soon (292).
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Katz, Michael (2001).  “The End of Welfare,” Chapter 12 in The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the
American Welfare State. New York: Metropolitan Books.
This chapter addresses the reasons why the AFDC model of public assistance had become unpopular by the
1990s and analyzes the debate surrounding the passage of the 1996 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF) bill.  The chapter concludes with an evaluation of TANF up to the publication of the book in 2001. 
Katz presents two sides of the debate: 1) conservatives focused on ending dependence on and entitlement to
federal funds through the application of market based welfare reform as well as on the devolution of authority
and responsibility to state, and in some cases, local governments; the opposing view was rooted in a concern
for the poor, particularly children, that would be forced off public assistance, and for the deepening divide
between cities and suburbs, and blacks/Hispanics and whites.
Attitudes toward AFDC
Katz argues that opposition to AFDC emanated from both the Republican and Democratic parties.  According
to these opponents of welfare, AFDC was encouraging dependence on welfare and provided disincentives to
work.  Of the negative consequences, Katz argues, it was out of wedlock birth that led both Republicans and
Democrats to attack AFDC in the 1990s (318).  At the same time that these negative attitudes towards AFDC
were becoming politically mainstream, conservative State Governors were calling for the devolution of
authority regarding welfare programs from the federal to the state level.  These Governors agued that the
AFDC rules limited their ability to innovate and to combat poverty (321).  Tired of the federal bureaucracy
that stifled their best intentions and forced them to seek handouts from Washington, these governors
advocated for a local level approach to welfare provision.
Expectations of TANF
Thus, the passage of TANF signaled a move away from government provision, and the victory of conservative
advocacy of private market provision and personal responsibility.  Under the new TANF program, states had
the latitude to decide how public assistance would be provided, whether through “private providers, non-
profit, faith-based, or for profit, either directly or through vouchers” (324).  Some of the provisions, Katz
notes, did attempt to address the shortcomings of the private market approach.  These included subsidies for
single parents that left the welfare rolls for employment, such as, child care, health insurance, job training,
and child support enforcement (326). 
Results of TANF
Katz concludes with a discussion of TANF’s short-term results.  He notes four points: 1) the rapid decline in
welfare rolls, partly due to a booming economy but also to stricter eligibility rules 2) the differential effects
on cities and suburbs, due to concentrated poverty, lack of jobs in the inner city 3) the lack of oversight and
monitoring, due to a failure to include clear standards and tracking mechanisms in the legislation and 4) and
the effects on America’s poor, due to low-wage jobs which has trapped many former welfare recipients in a
cycle of low-wage poverty.
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Why Should Local and State Governments Pay 
Attention to the New International Trade Agreements? 
Jennifer Gerbasi and Mildred Warner 
June 2002 
International trade arena is gaining a new audience. Traditionally a matter reserved 
exclusively for the federal government, state, county and municipal governments are taking a 
closer look at how the new generation of trade agreements may place greater demands on all 
levels of government.  Governments are trying to understand the best way to enjoy the benefits 
from the markets and protections provided by the agreements while retaining local governmental 
authority. The Western Governors Association, the National Conference of State Legislators, and 
the National League of Cities are a few entities that have made public requests to the US 
negotiating body, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) for clarification of or 
protection from the treaty obligations.  Why are they concerned?   
 
International Trade Agreements Impact Local And State Laws 
As currently formulated, the new trade agreements may significantly restrain the authority of 
state and local governments i.  Though the agreements do not directly require changes to existing 
laws, they do lay a foundation for challenging democratically created laws and customary 
domestic practices.  A broad range of state and local powers may be impacted including, but not 
limited to zoning, water management, land use planning, the finality of the court system, and 
public service provisionii.  Regional cooperation, business subsidies, regional environmental 
plans and precautionary health regulations are common tools planners and legislators use to 
encourage growth and protect human health as well as property values. These mechanisms may 
be impractical or non-compliant with trade agreement obligations. New international standards 
stemming from free trade agreements (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) waive government immunity, forbid the use of many planning tools like 
those listed above, and supercede local preference and democratically established legislation.  
Other areas that may be affected by the agreements include pesticide residue laws, recycled 
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content laws, pollution control, licensing requirements and labeling. Customary public policy 
considerations may not be legitimate in the international trade arena. 
Deference to State Laws Supplanted by International Standards  
States and localities are currently able to customize legislation to meet local needs and 
concerns. The agreements obligate federal, state and local laws to comply with international 
standards.  If there is a conflict, international arbitration tribunals are authorized to interpret the 
law and levy heavy financial fines for non-compliance. Historically, when federal and state laws 
have differed, US courts have given deference to state laws as long as they did not contradict the 
federal law.  The government closest to the citizens is assumed to be most able to represent local 
preferences and priorities.   Public policy and economic conditions are criteria for selecting what 
is appropriate in the context of each geographical area. These new international trade tribunals 
are not obligated or encouraged to follow or consider US customs or law.  State and federal 
governments have historically enjoyed some protections from frivolous lawsuits because they 
cannot be sued without consenting to the case.  Under the NAFTA, immunity is waived.  Foreign 
nationals with financial investments in the United States can challenge laws they perceive as 
limiting expected profits.  Investors challenge the national government directly, not the specific 
state or local government.  State and local governments have no seat at the negotiating table or 
arbitration panel hearings.  It is unclear whether the government body that passed the offending 
measure or the nation will pay if the challenge is successful.   
New Rights Bring Investors on Par with Nations 
An "investor" is any person, company or lender with a financial venture that sells goods or 
services in a participating country where the investor is considered foreign (i.e. US investor in 
Mexico)iii.  These investors have a right to sue for "government measures" that affect their 
investments negatively.  The rights are based on the legal principle that commercial entities have 
a right to be ruled by the least burdensome laws necessary to achieve the stated objective.  Laws 
must pass a three-part test that proves that: 
1. the objective is considered legitimate under the WTO; 
2. it is the least trade restrictive alternative available; and 
3. the measure does not constitute a disguised restriction on trade. 
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These new investor rights may exceed the rights given to citizens under the Constitution. Foreign 
investors may be paid for partial regulatory takings that are considered non-compensable, 
reasonable losses for the privilege of citizenship in the domestic contextiv.  This change is the 
basis of much of the concern voiced by state and local governments.  
Devolution and Preemption: Concurrent and Competing Trends  
In contrast to "devolution" which is increasing the authority of state and local government, 
international trade agreements appear to encroach on state sovereignty.  State and local 
government associations have made public statements to Congress outlining their concerns that 
State rights to self-governance under the 10th amendment are being eroded.  The National 
Association of Counties (NACo) has long been on guard against federal preemption in the 
domestic context.  NACo has only recently voiced concerns about international trade agreements 
prompted by investor provisions in the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Enforcement Treaty.  
California has created the Senate Select Committee on International Trade Policy and drafted 
legislation specifically to identify the potential threats to public health, the environment and the 
legislative process. Local governments from Oregon to Massachusetts have written resolutions 
requesting a more meaningful presence in the negotiations, or the ability to opt out of these 
agreements entirely.  Academics, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the international 
community are also studying international agreements and attempting to join the debate at the 
negotiating table. 
The concerns of the government groups are similar, and the resolutions to Congress and 
requests for information from the USTR have common themes.  State and local governments are 
seeking to participate fully in the negotiations to try to preserve the traditional powers of state 
and local governments.  In case of failure in that pursuit, they are requesting that the USTR 
protect these rights in the negotiations.  Specifically, they are asking the USTR or Congress to: 
 Provide open and transparent proceedings including negotiations, submissions and 
arbitrations and a mechanism for meaningful participation in those proceedings. 
 Reserve equal rights to the people, and apply constitutional restrictions equally to foreign 
investors. 
 Preserve police powers that are the basis for protecting human health, environmental 
resource conservation and fair competition.  
 Make states and localities immune from the investor challenges. 
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 Require the investor's national government to consent to the claim being brought against 
the defending government to avoid frivolous claims or those that do not serve the greater 
public interest.   
  Preserve the concept of federalism in practice in the United States by ensuring that States 
continue to be the dominant policy makers in traditional areas such as land use planning, 
education, and public services. 
Financial Claims May Stall Legitimate Regulations 
In theory, governments can continue to manage in the usual fashion even under the 
agreements.  However, the taxpayer would have to pay millions of dollars for the federal 
government to defend the measure and pay the fines if defeated. The current potential liability to 
the United States from NAFTA claims is $1.8 billion USD.    The number of claims is expected 
to expand proportionally with the addition of 31 more countries under the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA).  There is no indication at this point if the Federal government will pass the 
cost of fines on to the state and local governments or continue to pay out of general funds. 
The challenges span the gamut of local legislative effortsv.   
 Methanex v. United States: A Canadian company is challenging a California resolution to 
ban a ground water pollutant.   Potential cost: $970 million 
 Ethyl v. Canada: $13 million was paid as a settlement in a case parallel to Methanex.  
Canada also apologized and lost the right to ban the chemical (banned already in some 
US states). 
 Loewen v. United States: Challenges the Illinois standard court of appeals process, which 
requires a bond equal to 150% of damages.  Potential cost: $725 million 
 Sun Belt Water, Inc. v. Canada: Questions the right to refuse to export a natural resource. 
 Potential cost: $220 million 
 Metalclad v. Mexico: $17 million paid to stop water pollution from a hazardous waste 
facility. 
Ohio Democrat Congressman Sherrod Brown stated that “in NAFTA and in every public health 
challenge under the WTO, 33 straight times, public health laws, environmental laws, and food 
safety laws, every single time they have been struck down”.  Given the potential implications of 
these challenges, it is surprising that there are not more governments actively involved in this 
debate. In early 2002, Bill Moyers broadcast the issue to the public over PBS in the program 
“Trading Democracy”.  The media has given a glimpse of the increasingly popular protests 
against "free trade", the WTO and the FTAA.  However, these protests have not focused on state 
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and local government concerns.  NGOs have been effective in getting their agenda heard, but 
state and local governments have not been very active in the public debate. 
More State and Local Governments Should Join the Debate 
States and local governments rely on history and future demands to formulate current but 
predictable legislation that meets the needs of the communities they serve.  State representatives 
have not convinced the treaty negotiators of the dangers of loss of this stability due to trade 
obligations.  Treaty negotiators believe free trade agreements should focus on economic issues 
and some state and national sovereignty must be lost in the give and take of treaty formation.vi 
Neither the framers (including government and commercial interests) nor the public are focused 
on the implications for everyday governance of our states and cities.  Planners and elected 
representatives of this country need to educate themselves about the issues that affect their 
constituents and regions.  A balance must be struck between the benefits of free trade and the 
preservation of state and local sovereignty.  
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What Should Be Done with County Nursing Facilities in New York State?
Center for Governmental Reseasrch, Inc.
September, 1997
Executive Summary
Counties across New York State face the above question with each annual budget. Most of the 44 county-
owned and operated nursing facilities lose money each year, and pressure from voters to hold the line on
property taxes is stronger than ever. Many counties have considered selling their nursing homes, or other
options, to reduce the burden on their taxpayers. Elected officials are asking fundamental questions about
the county’s role as a service provider: Should the county be in the business of operating a nursing home? If
so, how should the county home react to a rapidly changing health environbment and position itself for an
uncertain future?
The County Nursing Facilities of New York, Inc. (CNFNY), a statewide association of county homes and an
affiliate of the New York Association of Counties (NYSAC), commissioned the Center for Governmental
Research, Inc. (CGR) to probe these questions. In What Should be Done With County Nursing Facilities in
New York State?, CGR outlines the challenges facing county homes and investigates alternatives various
counties have pursued or considered. The report does not recommend or advocate particular solutions for
individual homes, but presents the array of options counties must consider for the future of their nursing
homes.
The Changing Face of Long Term Care
What Makes the County Home Different?
What Can Counties Do?
The Changing Face of Long-Term Care
A number of changes in the funding and delivery of care have profoundly affected the way all nursing homes
do business. These changes will continue to compel nursing home administrators and operators to adapt and
seek new opportunities. The principal developments affecting county nursing homes today include:
State and Federal efforts to control Medicaid long-term care costs;
The impact of managed care on long-term care delivery;
A growing array of "lower levels’ of care; and
The possibility of publicly-traded corporations operating nursing homes in New York State.
Medicaid is the health care program designed for the poor and indigent, funded primarily by the Federal and
State governments. In New York and other states, middle class elderly often rely on Medicaid to pay for the
often prohibitive cost of nursing home stays. For this and other reasons, the cost of Medicaid has outpaced
inflation for several years, and policymakers are now attempting to contain the costs.
Moreover, New York is one of few states to pass a portion of Medicaid costs to county taxpayers. The State
Department of Health, which regulates all nursing homes, has responded to these pressures by adjusting the
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reimbursement mechanism to control costs and encourage homes to care for more physically infirm patients.
These adjustments, many feel, have had a particularly adverse impact on county homes, which have unique
costs not shared by their competition in the private sector.
Managed care is one avenue policymakers are using to control health care costs. New York State is continuing
to enroll Medicaid recipients in managed care plans, but has yet to enroll long-term care recipients on a
widespread basis. In anticipation of this likely occurrence, however, hospitals, nursing homes and other care
providers are pursuing alliances and networks in an effort to become the low cost service provider with which
the coming managed care organizations will want to contract.
In response to the need for cost containment and to changing demands, a variety of long-term care options
are emerging. The elderly today are making more use of options such as home care, adult day care, adult
care facilities, assisted living and other models that are less medically intensive than the nursing home. These
alternative services represent increased competition and promise to redefine the role of the nursing home in
the future.
Currently, New York law prohibits publicly-traded corporations from operating nursing homes in the state. The
state’s nursing homes have to date been sheltered from competing with large national chains like Beverly and
Marriott Host, but this could change. Many expect that NYS lawmakers will eventually pass legislation allowing
these companies to operate in New York. Many small operators in the state will be hard pressed to compete
with the chains because of their economies of scale. County homes are likely to be in the poorest competitive
position.
What Makes the County Home Different?
There are three kinds of nursing homes in New York State. Proprietary homes are run as businesses by
private individuals or corporations. Voluntary homes are not-for-profit entities, often affiliated with religious
organizations, and are run by elected boards. County homes are departments of county government and are
ultimately governed by elected representatives. In New York, there are over 600 nursing homes and more
than 100,000 beds. About ten percent of these beds are in county home.
Several factors distinguish county homes from proprietary and voluntary homes:
County homes have a mission distinct from private sector homes. Their traditional mission is to
care for poor and indigent elderly county residents regardless of ability to pay. Proprietary and voluntary
homes, on the other hand, typically pursue persons with the greatest ability to pay. Nursing homes
charge "private pay" residents at a rate higher than the State-determined rate for Medicaid residents.
County homes typically do not compete for these private pays as aggressively as private homes do. On
the whole, county homes have ten percent more resident days paid by Medicaid than do private homes,
and have only half the rate of private pay resident days as do proprietary and voluntary homes.
County homes can have difficulty competing for the Medicaid dollar as well. Medicaid
reimbursement is designed to increase with the intensity of a patient’s medical needs, known as the
"case mix index." Many county homes see nearby private homes "cherry picking" residents with high
case mix indices (CMI’s) while their own beds fill with less reimbursable residents. Some relatively
healthy patients have low CMI’s but complex behavioral problems. These patients demand increased staff
attention but carry no additional reimbursement. Some private homes have refused admission to such
patients, who often ultimately end up in the county home. CGR estimates that the typical county home
would receive over $450,000 more in revenues each year if it maintained the same aggregate case mix
index as the average private home.
County nursing homes receive certain revenue and incur unique expenses because of their
status as government entities. In addition to revenues from Medicaid, Medicare and private pay, which
all homes receive, county homes benefit from inter-governmental transfers, or IGT’s, from the Federal
government. The total local share of IGT’s for the 1997-8 State fiscal year will be over $63 million, and
20 counties will each receive over $1 million for their nursing homes. The future of IGT’s is, however,
uncertain.
Many homes also receive operating subsidies from the county when their expenses exceed their
revenues. In 1996, counties contributed an average of more than $600,000 to the operation of their
nursing homes.
Unlike proprietary and voluntary homes, county homes receive most administrative and support
services from the county government. County departments provide services such as snow plowing and
legal advice and charge the cost to the nursing home. While some of these cost allocations are for
services a private home would obtain by contracting, many county costs allocated against the nursing
home budget bear little relationship to the actual use by the home of the services. As such, they often
artificially inflate the true cost of operation. These county cost allocations are not, in most cases,
calculated consistenly from year to year within or across counties. CGR estimates that county homes had
a total of $27 million in county costs allocated against them in 1996, an average of $627,000 per home.
County nursing home employees are county employees and generally receive more generous
wages, salaries and benefits than their counterparts in private homes. More than 80% of county
nursing home employees are represented by unions, compared to about 40% in other homes. Most are
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) and are part of countywide bargaining
units. The typical county nursing home administrator has almost no input in labor negotiations. By law,
county homes must contribute to the State Retirement System on behalf of their employees. Payments
range from 10 to 20% of salary and generally exceed pension benefits, where they are offered, in the
private sector. The graph above normalizes wages, salaries and benefits by patient day. With average
benefits of 31% of salary, county homes are significantly more generous than proprietary and voluntary
homes. Benefits in county homes exceed those in voluntary homes by 21% and proprietary homes by
57%.
While each county home has an administrator, policy and management decisions ultimately rest
with the county legislature or board of supervisors. Understandably, these policymakers are
sensitive to numerous pressures, and the efficient operation of the nursing home is not always the top
priority. For reasons both within and beyond the control of county policy makers, county homes generally
spend more than they make each year. In CGR’s survey of county nursing home administrators, many
indicated that they had less flexibility in management decisions than their peers in private homes, and
that they were relatively constrained in what they could do.
Many expressed interest in a variety of alternatives with the potential to make their enterprises more
profitable and more able to meet the challenges of a changing health care landscape.
What Can Counties Do?
Counties will have an increasingly difficult time operating their nursing homes as if they were just another
department of county government. If the Federal government should one day limit or eliminate IGT’s, or if
the State or Federal government seeks aggressive reductions in Medicaid reimbursements for long-term care,
counties will require huge increases in county taxpayer support to keep their homes open. The time to make
informed policy decisions is now, before events force rapid and uninformed decisions with far-reaching
consequences. Counties are considering a variety of approaches. Some of these may be appropriate for some
counties and not others. Each county and its nursing home must examine its own unique situation and plan
for its future with the necessary information and careful consideration.
In What Should be Done With County Nursing Facilities in New York State?, CGR details various alternatives a
county might choose to take, that follow three broad paths:
Continue to operate the nursing home essentially as is, but with individual reforms addressing cost and
efficiency issues;
Continue to operate with additional long-term services beyond traditional nursing home care in order to
be more competitive and cost-effective; and/or
Change the present relationship between the county government and the nursing home.
Each of these broad alternatives contains numerous options, which are not mutually exclusive, although some
options call for the county to give up partial or complete control of the operation of the nursing home.
There are various ways counties can respond to the individual factors contributing to their higher costs. Many
counties have, in fact, attempted one or more of the following reforms:
Counties can allocate funds for their nursing homes to market more aggressively. If the marketing effort
results in even a few added private pay admissions, the investment should more than pay for itself.
Some counties have effectively forged special agreements with labor unions outside of the countywide
contract negotiations. Conties could also increase the involvement of their nursing home administrators in
contract negotiations.
While difficult to do, a county could create a separate bargaining unit for its nursing home employees.
This would separate the home’s interests from larger county issues.
Other options a county might consider are the use of private contractors and consultants for special services,
merging with other county departments, and revisiting the cost allocations against the nursing home in an
effort to make them more realistic reflections of actual costs.
In February 1997, Business Week ran an article with the provocative title "Farewell to the Nursing Home" and
a subtitle that read "a host of alternatives help the aging live independently." Health care providers and
elderly customers are fueling the growth of lower levels of care that are generally less expensive than
traditional nursing homes. Some counties have added services form a growing list of alternative long-term
care models, and others are considering doing the same. These services include assisted living, adult day
care, respite care, adult care facilities, early- to mid-state dementia services, home health care, continuing
care networks and continuing care retirement communities. There are both advantages and potential
disadvantages to counties offering each of these and other services, which are discussed in greater detail in
the report. While CGR does not recommend any specific services for county homes to offer, directly or in
partnership, it is clear that their growth will reshape the role of the nursing home along the spectrum of long-
term care.
More and more, counties are asking whether they should even be in the nursing home business. Because
some, if not most, of the higher costs associated with county homes stem from the fact that they are units of
county government, counties are looking into options that limit their role in the operation of the nursing
home. Along a continuum ranging from the least limitation of the county’s role to complete divestiture of
responsibilities, options that counties have considered or tried include:
Contract for management services to operate the county home. Under this option the county would
retain ownership of the home, but in contract out responsibilities for varying degrees of the day-to-day
management of the home. 
Sell licensed beds. The county could transfer the license to operate some of its beds to a new operator.
While the county would lose control of those beds, it would gain financially from the sale and could
convert the sold nursing home beds into lower levels of care while retaining the remaining unsold beds
for nursing home care. 
Convert the home to a public benefit corporation. The nursing home would become a quasi-
governmental entity essentially divorced from the county, though the county could retain some control by
appointsing some members of the PBC board. Two counties in New York State are attempting to put
public benefit corporations in place. This option frees counties from the responsibility of operating the
nursing home, and depending on the enabling legislation, preserves civil service protections for
employees. 
Transfer the home to a not-for-profit corporation or sell to a proprietary corporation. A county
could transfer or sell the home to a newly created or already existing not-for-profit corporation or sell
the home outright to a proprietary operator. In each of these scenarios, the county is freed from the
costs and responsibilities of operating the home, but also loses control. Its ability to help assure a
continuation of the home’s historic mission will vary by the type of organization to which the home is
transferred.
These and other alternatives to the existing relationship between counties and their nursing homes are
discussed in greater detail in the report. While giving up ownership of its nursing home may save a county
home, the county will also lose the ability to control the home’s future and the extent to which the new
owner maintains the homes’ historic mission. Many administrators expressed concern about what would
happen to the county’s more difficult-to-place patients; many were also concerned with job protection for
their staff (an average of 300 employees per county home).
In the report, CGR details the points that county policymakers will need to consider as they grapple with
decisions about the county home in a changing environment. The most appropriate options must be
determined on a case by case basis, depending on the circumstances unique to each county.
NOTE: For a full copy of the report, contact the Center for Governmental Research Inc. at 37 South
Washington Street, Rochester, N.Y. 14608, tel. (716) 325-6360
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Heath Care Finance
Financing long-term care (LTC) for the elderly is difficult for both individuals and governments. Health
care costs continue to rise at rates faster than the economy as a whole, and the number of persons
requiring long-term care is growing at an accelerating pace.  This page discusses how long-term care is
financed in the United States, with links to summaries of recent articles on long-term care finance as
well as other related web sites.
The Costs of Long-Term Care
The Role of Medicaid and Medicare
Controlling the costs of long-term care
Online references
The Cost of Long Term Care
Table 1 presents an overview of long-term care spending in the United States. Spending on LTC services
totaled $91 billion in 1995, with the majority of funding (about 60 percent) coming from public sources.
Medicaid is the largest source of public funding, financing nearly one third of all long-term care and 38
percent of nursing home care. Yet while Medicaid accounts for just 38 percent of all nursing home care
dollars, the number of persons that rely on Medicaid to pay for their care is much higher: nearly 7 out of 10
nursing home residents are paid for by Medicaid. Medicare is the primary funding source for home- and
community-based care, accounting for 25 percent of total spending and over one half of all home care
expenditures.
Table 1. Expenditures for Long-Term Care for the Elderly, 1995 
(Billions of Dollars)
Funding source Nursing Home Home Care Total
Out-of-pocket 30.0 5.5 35.5
Medicaid 24.2 4.3 28.5
Medicare 8.4 14.3 22.7
Other public sources 1.3 2.2 3.5
Private Insurance 0.4 0.3 0.7
Total 64.3 26.6 90.9
Source: GAO (1998) Long-Term Care: Baby Boom Generation Presents
Financing Challenges. p. 3.
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Table 1 also shows that individuals pay a substantial portion (nearly 40 percent) of the country’s total long-
term care bill. While many private payers are wealthy Americans with the resources to pay for their own care
indefinitely, the more typical private pay resident "spends down" her savings quickly once she enter a nursing
home. On average, a year in a nursing home cost $46,000 in 1995, which means that most elderly persons
eventually rely on Medicaid to pay for most of their care.
The Role of Medicare & Medicaid
Medicaid is the Nation’s Largest Provider of Long-Term Care
Medicaid was originally established to provide acute care to low income families. With the high costs of
nursing home care, however, Medicaid has become the most important public program providing long-term
care as well. Medicaid’s importance to long-term care should not be underestimated: Over $28 billion was
spent by Medicaid for long-term care needs in 1995, accounting for 26 percent of the total Medicaid budget
but only covering 11 percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries.
Medicare Pays Only a Fraction of Long-Term Care Costs
Many people mistakenly believe that Medicare will pay for long-term care, but that is rarely the case.
Medicare does pay for skilled nursing facility benefits and home health care services, but eligibility is limited
to those with acute medical problems, such as short-term nursing home stays following an operation. Elderly
persons in need of chronic care must rely on private insurance, personal savings, or Medicaid to pay for their
care.
Who Pays What: Public Health Care Programs and Federalism
While both Medicaid and Medicare are national programs, each is financed differently.  Medicaid is financed
jointly by the federal government and the states (and, in some cases, local governments).  While each state's
contribution to Medicaid is different, on average the costs of Medicaid are split 50/50 between the federal
government and the states.  In contrast, Medicare is financed entirely at the national level.  For this reason,
many state programs to restructure Medicaid involve shifting payment from Medicaid to Medicare.  The net
effect of such a shift is lower costs for state and local governments, but the total cost of health care for the
elderly remains the same. 
Controlling the Cost of Long Term Care
Efforts to reduce government spending on LTC fall into one of two categories. The first is to cut costs, by (1.)
increasing use of managed care, or (2.) expanding home- and community-based services.  The second broad
strategy is to increase revenues from private sources.  Examples include promoting long-term care insurance,
and ensuring that those with the ability to pay for their own care do so out of their own pockets.  The limited
success of each of these options illustrates the complexity of long-term care reform.
Managed Care no Panacea for Long-Term Care
To date, managed care has yet to enter the long-term care market in any significant way.  Nevertheless,
there are a number of demonstration projects underway that suggest managed care may be able to reduce
costs if implemented effectively.   The basic principle behind these projects is that acute and long-term care
needs can be integrated into a single program, thereby providing better service to clients and lowering total
costs.  Savings derived from these programs is difficult to calculate given the complexity of LTC finance, yet
initial studies in this direction indicate that total costs can be lowered through managed care without any
reduction in service quality.   Still, serious doubts about the ability of managed care organizations to serve
elderly clients with long-term care needs remain.  In particular, the common fear that managed care
organizations cut costs at the expense of quality care is a longstanding concern of consumer advocates. 
Home- and Community-Based Services are Rarely a Substitute for Nursing Home Care
A number of states have attempted to control costs by expanding home- and community-based
services(HCBS) for the elderly.  By expanding HCBS it is hoped that the rate of nursing home admissions will
be reduced, thereby lowering total long-term care costs.  In most cases, however, the very small reduction in
nursing home admissions has been offset by very large increases in HCBS spending.  Why?  Given the choice
between nursing home care and no care at all, most elderly people will choose the latter.  When the menu of
services offered is expanded to include HCBS, however, the number of elderly people demanding HCBS
increases significantly, and these people are often not those most at risk of institutionalization.  In other
words, to save money HCBS must serve as a substitute, not a complement, for institutional care, but very
few programs have been able to target their services with this level of precision. 
Private Insurance for Long-Term Care Slow to Catch On
In order to protect families from the catastrophic costs of long-term care, as well as lower future Medicaid
spending, a number of states (including New York) have initiated long-term care insurance programs.  To
date, however, few policies have been sold.  High premiums and  limited public awareness of the costs
associated with  long-term care are often cited as the major reasons for limited sales. 
Efforts to Make the Elderly Pay More Produce Little Additional Revenue
Attempts to recoup long-term care costs from the elderly and their families have produced few savings and
may adversely affect service quality.  During the 1960s, for example, the family responsibility requirements of
the Old Age Assistance Program resulted in many elderly parents forgoing aid rather than comply with
requirements that their children contribute to the program.  Today, a number of states are attempting to
increase private revenue streams by cracking down on "Medicaid estate planning" and attempting to recoup
costs through estate recovery programs.    Medicaid estate planning--where middle and upper class elderly
transfer their assets to their children in order to qualify for Medicaid--is rarer than is commonly assumed. 
Efforts to expand estate recovery--the practice of recovering Medicaid costs by taking the profits from the
sale of the deceased's homes--are not only politically unpopular but produce little revenue. 
Online References
In addition to the GAO report above, the following sources were consulted for this web page:
John Holahan and David Liska, "Variations in Medicaid Spending Among States", Assessing the New
Federalism, Series A, No. A-3, January 1997.  Available at  http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/anf_a3.htm
Urban Institute, "Long-Term Care for the Elderly:  Ten Questions Answered"  Available at
http://www.urban.org/news/factsheets/elderlyFS.html
Joshua M. Wiener and David G. Stevenson,  "Long Term Care for the Elderly and State Health Policy". 
Available at http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/anf17.html
Information about long-term care insurance in New York State can be found at http://www.nyspltc.org/
Government resources on LTC finance include the Medicaid Long Term Care Main Page and HCFA, the Health
Care Finance Administration.
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Policy Innovations
Managed Care and Long-Term Care for the Elderly:  The Arizona Experience
This study looks at one state's experience with using managed care to deliver long-term care services
for the elderly.  In the state of Arizona, managed care has been able to reduce demand for both
acute care and nursing home care through an aggressive preventative health care program and
extensive use of home- and community-based services.  Quality of care in Arizona is comparable to
that found elsewhere, but the per capita costs of the program are considerably lower than long-term
care costs in similar states.  Arizona's success rests on the combined efforts of private health care
contractors and innovative state and federal health care agencies.
Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly
Modeled after the On Lok Senior Health Services Program in San Francisco's Chinatown, the Program
of All-inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) is an innovative approach to providing long-term care
services to frail senior citizens. By October 1997 more than 70 organizations in 31 states were in
some stage of PACE development (Employee Benefit Plan Review, 1997). This number is expected to
grow rapidly over the next several years because the 1997 Balanced Budget Act establishes PACE as
a permanent provider under Medicare, and allows states the option to pay for PACE using Medicaid
dollars (Irvin et al., 1997). 
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Labor Issues and Demographic Change
Labor Issues
The quality of care at any nursing home is only as good as the quality of its employees.  As a labor-intensive
industry, attracting quality staff is a central concern of long-term care professionals, nursing home residents,
and families.  Yet attracting quality employees to the field and keeping them has become a major problem in
the industry.  Staff turnover rates at nursing homes vary widely, ranging from 40 percent  to as high as 500
percent annually in some facilities (Cohen-Mansfield 1997). 
Turnover varies depending on the type of facility, administration, location, and characteristics of the current
workforce (Cohen-Mansfield 1997).
Demographic Change
The graying of the U.S. population is accelerating. The number of "young old" (65 to 69-year olds) is
expected to double in the next fifty years, even as the number of "old old" (85 years and older) will triple or
quadruple. Three-quarters of these senior citizens will be single, divorced, or widowed. Many will therefore
depend on public support (Atlantic Monthly, May 1996).
The ratio of taxpayers to the elderly will decline. In 1960, 5.1 taxpayers could support each beneficiary; in
the mid-1990’s, the ratio was 3.3. Within fifty years, this will shrink to around 2.0 taxpayers per beneficiary
(Atlantic Monthly, May 1996). The Congressional Budget Office (1997) notes that between 2010 and 2030 the
population over 65 will rise by 70 percent, while the number of individuals paying payroll taxes will rise less
than four percent.
Congress is under increasing pressure to reduce reimbursement rates for Medicare and Medicaid, the primary
public programs that support the delivery of long-term care, assisted living and other services upon which the
elderly depend.
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Search Cornell
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Summary of Labor Summary
(Selected Questions)
This survey was conducted via telephone by CSEA staff of all 44 CSEA local representatives in county
nursing homes in March and April 1999. Only 14 responded.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP
1. Do management and labor share in the decision-making process?
Yes 4
No 3
2. Does your facility have a labor-management committee?
Yes 8
No 6
3. If yes, how often does the committee meet?
Monthly 1
Quarterly 4
Annually 2
Never 1
4. How would you characterize the relationship between labor and management at your
facility?
cooperative 9
adversarial 5 
don’t know 0
5. How would you characterize the relationship between union and non-union employees?
Very Cooperative 0
Cooperative 12
Adversarial 2
Very Adversarial
QUALITY OF CARE
6. How would you rate the quality of care in your facility?
Excellent 6
Very Good 5 
Search Cornell
Good 3 
Fair 0
Poor 0
7. Does your nursing home have a team-based management quality program?
Yes 8
No 6
8. If so, how effective is it?
Not effective 3
Moderately effective 2
Effective 1
Very Effective 2
9. Please answer the following questions regarding restructuring options:
Home considering? County considering?
 yes no don't
know
yes no don't
know
performance-
based budgeting
2 3 9 3 3 8
privatization 3 10 1 5 7 2
voluntary
organization
1 8 5 1 6 7
PBC 2 7 5 3 6 5
closure 1 12 1 1 12 1
other 0 0 0 0 0 0
10. Does your county legislature see the nursing home as essential to the mission of local
government?
Yes 6
No 8
11. How involved is the county legislature in nursing home management concerns?
Very involved 7
Somewhat Involved 5
Not Involved at All 2
12. How would you characterize the relationship?
Very Cooperative 1
Cooperative 8
Adversarial 5
Very Adversarial 0
13. Do you think your county is under fiscal stress?
Yes 9
No 5
14. If yes, does this affect the nursing home’s viability?
Yes 6
No 3
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Summary of Nursing Home Administrators Survey 1
This survey was mailed to all 44 county owned nursing facilities in New York State in March 1999. Thirty
six nursing homes responded. The number of homes responding to each question is given after each
possible answer.
1. What is the rate of annual employee turnover for these positions at your facility?
 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% no answer
RNs: 29 5 0 0 2
LPNs: 28 4 1 0 2
CNAs: 22 9 3 0 2
support: 28 2 1 1 3
2. How many shifts per day does your facility have an RN supervisor?
1 shift 1
2 shifts 2
3 shifts 33
3. What is your normal staffing ratio of licensed nursing staff to beds for the following shifts?
The answers for this question are unreliable, as the question was poorly understood by respondents. For each
shift, a staffing ratio of over 1: 13 was the most common answer (e.g., 25/32 respondents).
RELATIONSHIP WITH COUNTY GOVERNMENT
4. How is your facility financed?
Enterprise budget: 24
Part of County Budget: 10
Other: 1
No answer: 1
Please describe the current fiscal health of your facility WITHOUT IGT:
Search Cornell
5a. Do you have a deficit?
yes: 27
no: 5
no
answer:
4
5b. If YES, how much?
under $1 million 15
$1-3 million 8
more than 3 million 3
5c. If YES, what percentage is this of your county nursing home budget?
less than 1% 2
1-3% 3
4-7% 6
7-10% 8
greater than 10% 5
6a. Do you have a surplus?
yes 5
no 27
no answer 4
6b. If YES, how much?
under $1 million 4
$1-3 million 1
more than 3 million 0
Describe the current fiscal health of your facility WITH IGT:
7a. Do you have a deficit:
yes 11
no 18
no answer 7
7b. If YES, how much?
under $1 million 9
$1-3 million 1
more than 3 million 1
7c. If YES, what percentage is this of your county nursing home budget?
less than 1% 2
1-3% 0
4-7% 2
7-10% 1
greater than 10% 2
8a. Do you have a surplus?
yes 18
no 11
no answer 7
8b. If YES, how much?
under $1 million 13
$1-3 million 3
more than 3 million 1
no answer 1
8c. If YES, what percentage is this of your county nursing home budget?
less than 1% 0
1-3% 5
4-7% 6
7-10% 2
greater than 10% 4
no answer 1
9. Does your county legislature see the nursing home as essential to the mission of local
government?
yes 30
no 1
unsure 1
no answer 4
10a. How involved is the county legislature in nursing home management concerns?
very involved 10
somewhat involved 20
not involved at all 6
10b. How would you characterize the relationship?
very cooperative 12
cooperative 21
adversarial 2
very adversarial 0
no answer 1
11. Please answer the following questions regarding restructuring options:
Home considering? County considering?
 yes no yes no don't know
performance-
based budgeting
5 28 3 22 9
privatization 3 31 3 22 8
voluntary
organization
1 34 1 25 8
PBC 9 23 2 22 9
closure 0 35 0 27 7
other 0 0 0 0 0
12a. Is your county under fiscal stress?
a great deal 3
somewhat 22
not at all 10
12b. IF YES, does this affect the nursing home's viability?
a great deal 2
somewhat 13
not at all 9
no answer 1
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Survey of Labor
  Download pdf version
CSEA is conducting the following survey in an attempt to understand principal challenges to public sector
nursing home viability in New York State and to contribute toward a larger process of strategic planning
for the future. Cornell University students will assist in analyzing the results of this survey and will
present these to CNFNY and CSEA at a future date.
SIZE OF INSTITUTION
1. What is the total number of employees at your facility, including management and union employees?
Of those, how many are full-time employees?_____________________________
Of those, how many are part-time employees?_____________________________
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP
Do management and labor share in the decision-making process?
Yes No
2A. Does your facility have a labor-management committee? Yes No
2B. If yes, how often does the committee meet?
Monthly Quarterly
Annually Never
3. How would you characterize the relationship between labor and management at your facility?
cooperative adversarial don’t know
4. Does the nursing home have a separate bargaining unit? Yes No
If no, then skip to 5.
4B. How many bargaining units are there in your facility? ___________
Search Cornell
What are they?
CSEA Yes No
SEIU Yes No
NYSNA Yes No
Teamsters Yes No
Other Yes No
Skip to 6.
5. Where is the union leadership employed in your county?
DDS DPW nursing home
6. How would you characterize the relationship between union and non-union employees?
Very Cooperative Cooperative Adversarial Very Adversarial
QUALITY OF CARE.
7. How would you rate the quality of care in your facility?
Excellent Very
Good
Good Fair Poor
8A. Does your nursing home have a team-based management quality program?
Yes No
8B. If so, how effective is it?
Not effective Moderately
effective
Effective Very Effective
MARKETING.
9A. Does your facility market the services it provides? Yes No
If no, skip to 10.
9B. If yes, how important are the following goals for doing marketing?
 Very
important
Somewhat
important
Not very
important
Not
important
Build public enthusiasm     
Legislative support     
Fill beds     
Attract paying clients     
Educate the public     
Other (specify)
__________________________
    
9C. If yes, have you used any of the following strategies to market the county home?
Print media:
yes no
Television:
yes no
Radio:
yes no
Community events:
yes no
Other:______________________ yes no
10. Are you viewed as a referral point for nursing care?     
Yes No
11. Are you viewed as a referral point for rehabilitative care?
Yes No Do not offer rehabilitative care
12. Are hospitals currently competing with you for long term care delivery?
Yes No
THE FUTURE/RELATIONSHIP TO COUNTY GOVERNMENT
Please be aware your answers to the following questions will not be linked to particular institutions or
respondents. The results of this last section of the survey will be summarized in broad terms for public sector
nursing facilities across New York State for the final report.
13A. Do you think your county is under fiscal stress?
Yes No
13B. If yes, does this affect the nursing home’s viability?
Yes No
14. Please answer the following questions regarding restructuring options by your nursing facility or the local
legislature.
Is your RHCF investigating this option
for restructuring?
Is your legislature investigating this option for
restructuring your RHCF?
a) performance-based
budgeting
Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
b) privatization Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
c) voluntary sector Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
d) public benefit
corporation
Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
e) closure Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
f) other Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
15. Does your county legislature see the nursing home as essential to the mission of local government?
Yes No
16. How involved is the county legislature in nursing home management concerns?
Very involved Somewhat Involved Not Involved at All
17. How would you characterize the relationship?
Very Cooperative Cooperative Adversarial Very Adversarial
18. Are there other issues you see as essential for the viability of your county nursing facility that CSEA
should know?
19. What are your facility’s biggest concerns as you look toward the future?
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Survey of Nursing Home Administrators 1
 Download PDF Version
LABOR ISSUES
1. What is the rate of annual employee turnover for these positions at your facility?
a) RN’s: 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%
b) LPN’s: 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%
c) CNA’s: 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%
d) support staff: 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%
 
2. For how many shifts per day does your facility have an RN supervisor?
1 2 3
 
3. What is your normal staffing ratio of licensed nursing staff to beds for the following shifts?
 Less
than
1:5
1:5 1:6 1:7 1:8 1:9 1:10 1:11 1:12 More
than1:12
7am-
3pm
          
3pm-
11pm
          
11pm-
7am
          
RELATIONSHIP WITH COUNTY GOVERNMENT.
4. How is your facility financed?
enterprise budget
part of county budget
Search Cornell
                              other: _______________________
Please describe the current fiscal health of your facility, WITHOUT intergovernmental transfer monies:
5a. Do you have a DEFICIT? Yes No (if no, skip to question 6)
5b. If YES, how much?
Under $1 million $1-3 million more than $3 million
5c. If YES, what percentage is this of your county nursing facility budget?
Less than 1% 1-3% 4-7% 7-10% more than 10%
6a. Do you have a SURPLUS? Yes No (if no, skip to question 7)
6b. If YES, how much?
Under $1 million $1-3 million more than $3 million
6c. If YES, What percentage is this of your county nursing facility budget?
Less than 1% 1-3% 4-7% 7-10% more than 10%
Please describe the current fiscal health of your facility WITH intergovernmental transfer monies:
7a. Do you have a DEFICIT? Yes No (If no, skip to question 8)
7b. If YES, how much?
Under $1 million $1-3 million more than $3 million
7c. If YES, what percentage is this of your county nursing facility budget?
Less than 1% 1-3% 4-7% 7-10% more than 10%
8a. Do you have a SURPLUS? Yes No (If no, skip to question 9)
8b. If YES, how much?
Under $1 million $1-3 million more than $3 million
8c. If YES, what percentage is this of your county nursing facility budget?
Less than 1% 1-3% 4-7% 7-10% more than 10%
9. Does your county legislature see the nursing home as essential to the mission of local government?
Yes No
10a. How involved is the county legislature in nursing home management concerns?
Very involved Somewhat involved Not involved at all
10b. How would you characterize the relationship?
Very cooperative Cooperative Adversarial Very Adversarial
11. Please answer the following questions regarding restructuring options:
Is your RHCF investigating this option
for restructuring ?
Is your legislature investigating this option for
restructuring your RHCF ?
a) performance-based
budgeting
Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
b) privatization Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
c) voluntary sector Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
d) public benefit
corporation
Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
e) closure Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
f) other Yes No Don’t
know
Yes No Don’t
know
12a. Is your county under fiscal stress?
A great deal Somewhat Not at all
12b. If yes, does this affect the nursing home’s viability?
A great deal Somewhat Not at all
13. Are there other issues you see as essential for the viability of your county nursing facility that CNFNY
should be aware of?
14. How could CNFNY help you in meeting such challenge(s)?
©2006 Cornell University | Restructuring Local Government Home | Report a technical problem
Economic Development Government Restructuring Special Projects Databases
Survey of Nursing Home Administrators 2
  Download PDF Version
CNFNY is conducting the following survey in an attempt to understand principal challenges to public sector nursing home viability in New York
State and to contribute toward a larger process of strategic planning for the future. Cornell University students will assist in analyzing the
results of this survey and will present these to CNFNY and CSEA in May 1999.
 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
1. When was your facility built?
Pre-1960 1960’s 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s
2. When was the most recent significant renovation of your facilities?
           1960’s 1970’s 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-present
3. What is the TOTAL NUMBER of employees at your facility? __________________
4. Of these, how many FULL-TIME employees are there at your facility? ___________
MARKET PROFILE
5. Name one service your facility would like to offer, but doesn’t offer currently:
____________________________________________________________________
6.  Does your facility contract with a third party to provide any of the following?
A) maintenance services? Yes   No     If so, is this for (circle):
          Management or Service Position
B) dietary services? Yes No If so, is this for (circle):
          Management or Service Provision
C) laundry services? Yes No If so, is this for (circle):
         Management or Service Provision
D) housekeeping services? Yes No If so, is this for (circle):
         Management or Service Provision
E) pharmaceutical services? Yes No If so, is this for (circle):
         Management or Service Provision
Search Cornell
F) nursing staff? Yes No If so, is this for (circle):
         Management or Service Provision
G) overall management? Yes No If so, is this for (circle):
        Management or Service Provision
MARKETING
8A. Does your facility market the services it provides? Yes No
If no, skip to 9.
8B. How important are the following goals for doing marketing?
 Very
important
Somewhat
important
Not
important
Build public interest    
Legislative support    
Fill beds    
Attract paying clients    
Educate the public    
Other (specify)
__________________________
   
8C. Have you used any of the following strategies to market your facility?
Print media: yes no
Television: yes no
Radio: yes no
Community events: yes no
Other:______________________ yes no
8D. Of the strategies you named, which was MOST effective in achieving your goal?
___________________________________________________________
8E. Of the strategies you named, which was LEAST effective in achieving your goal?
__________________________________________________________
Is outreach and marketing an area where seminars or educational training would be useful to you?    
   Yes       No
10A. Does your facility monitor clients’ satisfaction with services? Yes No
If no, skip to 11A.
10B. How is client satisfaction monitored?
Resident surveys       yes no
Family council meetings     yes no
Resident council meetings      yes no
Suggestion box     yes no
Other (specify)_____________________________________________________
LABOR ISSUES
11A. Does your facility have a separate bargaining unit? Yes No
11B. If no, where is the union leadership employed in your county?
          Corrections DDS DPW nursing home Other: ______________
12A. Does your facility have a labor-management committee? Yes No
If no, skip to 13.
12B. How often does the committee meet?
Monthly   Quarterly    Annually       Never
13. How would you characterize the relationship between labor and management at
your facility?
cooperative
adversarial
don’t know
14. Beyond contract negotiations, do labor and management share in broader
decision making processes (e.g. total quality management)?
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LONG TERM CARE PROVIDERS
15. What is your latest full-house Case Mix Index? _____________________
16. Based on your latest census figures, what was your breakdown by payment
class?
Medicaid __________________________________________
Medicare __________________________________________
Other insurance __________________________________________
Private pay __________________________________________
17. Do you currently perceive significant competition from other long term  care providers?
                   Yes        No
18. Is your facility viewed as a referral point for nursing care by area hospitals?
Yes       No
19. Is your facility viewed as a referral point for rehabilitative care by area hospitals?
Yes      No      Do not offer rehabilitative care
20. Are hospitals currently competing with your facility for long term care delivery?
Yes No
21. Have hospitals historically competed with your facility for long term care
delivery?
Yes No
22. Do you anticipate hospitals expanding into services you currently provide?
Yes No
23. What are your biggest concerns as you look toward the future?
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Transforming Work: Key Elements
The eight key elements of a high-performance organization are:
1. Effective use of all company resources, especially the insights and experiences of front-line workers, in
order to achieve continuous improvements in productivity.
2. Acute concern for the quality of products and services in order to satisfy the demands of a consumer-
driven marketplace.
3. A participative and nonauthoritarian management style in which workers-both at the point of production
and at the point of customer contact-are empowered to make significant decisions by:
a. using their individual discretion, experience, and creativity; and
b. cooperating with their peers in a mutually supportive atmosphere.
4. Internal and external flexibility in order to:
a. rapidly adjust internal production processes to produce a variety of goods or services; and
b. accurately comprehend the external environment and adjust to changing economic and social trends.
5. A positive incentive structure that includes: employment security; rewards for effectively working in
groups; decent pay and working conditions; and policies that promote an appreciation for how the
company functions as an integrated whole.
6. Leading-edge technology deployed in a manner that extends human capabilities and builds upon the
skills, knowledge, and insights of personnel at all levels of the company.
7. A well-trained and well-educated workforce capable of: improving a company's work organization and
production processes; adapting existing machine technology and selecting new equipment; developing
new and improved products or services; and engaging in continuous learning, both on-the-job and in the
classroom.
8. An independent source of power for workers-a labor union and collective bargaining agreement-that
protects employee interests in the workplace; helps to equalize power relations with management; and
provides mechanisms to resolve disagreements that arise because of the inherently adversarial nature of
labor-management relations.
Source:
Ray Marshall et al. Restructuring the American Workplace: Implications for the Public Sector. LERC Monograph
Series, University of Oregon, no. 11. (1992): 26-27.
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Transforming Work: Models of Workplace Change
Model 1: The American Human Resources Model of the 1960s
Goals: promote superior performance by stressing individual motivation and job satisfaction.
Organizational structure: nonunion, hierarchical setting, with a focus on managerial competence and creation
of common goals between workers and managers.
Workers'/managers' status: sharp distinctions between workers and managers.
For more about the American human resources model:
Thomas Kochan, Harry Katz, and Thomas McKersie, The Transformation of American Industrial Relations (New
York: Basic Books, 1986).
Model 2: The Swedish Sociotechnical Model
Goals: to "humanize" workplaces, increase efficiency.
Organizational structure: centralized, somewhat hierarchical.
Workers'/managers' status: egalitarian; workers work in autonomous, functional teams with high skill levels,
receive rewards for group performance.
For further information on the Swedish model:
Peter Auer and Claudius Reigler, Post-Taylorism: The Enterprise as a Place of Learning Organizational Change
(Stockholm: Swedish Work Environment Fund, 1993).
Model 3: Japanese Lean Production
Goals: reduce bottlenecks, quality defects, and other impediments to smooth production; link production and
innovation.
Organizational structure: centralized, flattened. Voluntary groups of line workers led by a supervisor meet
regularly to solve job-related problems, but traditional corporate structure remains intact.
Workers'/managers' status: egalitarian; workers gain increased participation, leading to greater morale,
productivity, and motivation. However, power still resides in upper-level management.
For further information on quality management:
W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984)
J. M. Juran and Frank Gurna, Juran's Quality Control Handbook 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988)
Kaoru Ishikawa, Total Quality Control: The Japanese Way (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985).
For more information on lean production:
Robert E. Cole, "Learning from the Japanese: Prospects and Pitfalls," Management Review 69 (Sept.1980):
22-42
Strategies for Learning: Small Group Activities in American, Japanese, and Swedish Industry (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989).
Model 4: Italian Flexible Specialization
Goals: adaptability to changing markets, through small-scale production of a large variety of goods.
Search Cornell
Organizational structure: decentralized, flexible; strong collaboration with other firms and institutions
(municipal governments provide services that encourage cooperation).
Workers'/managers' status: firms form and dissolve frequently, leading to mobility between worker and
owner roles. Workers frequently work in autonomous groups.
For further information on flexible specialization:
Michael J. Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
Model 5: German Diversified Quality Production
Goals: effective adjustment to new technology and changing market conditions.
Organizational structure: centralized and hierarchical, although unions actively advocate decentralization of
decision making and the use of self-directed teams.
Workers'/managers' status: differentiated; work councils and other labor-management institutions negotiate
the terms of development and flexible deployment of a highly skilled labor force.
For further information on diversified quality production:
Wolfgang Streeck, "On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production," pp. 21-61 in Beyond
Keynesianism: The Socio-Economics of Production and Full Employment, edited by Egon Matzner and
Wolfgang Streeck (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1991)
Lowell Turner, Democracy at Work: Changing World Markets and the Future of Labor Unions (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1991).
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Tools for Cooperation - Mutual Gains Bargaining.
Prepared by Darth Vaughn
Mutual Gains Bargaining
Public management has a responsibility to promote taxpayers interests, and labor
unions have a duty to represent workers’ interests, but often times unions and
management find themselves distracted from their intended purposes and engaged in
ideological fights with each other.  Too many bargaining situations are resulting in bad
contracts both from the point of view of management and the unions, with neither side
really getting what they needed.
Mutual Gains Bargaining (MBG) is preventative medicine.  It helps to circumvent
many of the ills associated with traditional labor-management interaction, and allows for
healthier more productive cooperation.  MGB is a method of bargaining designed to
dramatically improved the technical quality of solutions, and increase the likelihood of
compliance between labor and management, ultimately benefiting their constituents.  The
philosophy behind the process is that through in-depth discussion with an emphasis on side
by side problem solving (as opposed to face to face confrontation), you can get what you
need, and I can get what I need.  This is a much more effective approach compared to the
traditional process.
With traditional bargaining, groups enter the negotiations with their own preferred
solutions and then haggled over whose proposal is best.  Labor and management will
develop their positions on issues, submit overblown proposals to each other, and argue
emphatically. Arguing on positions leaves both sides with one of four options; “I win, you
lose,” “You win, I lose,” “We both compromised, and lost”, or “No deal.”  Eventually the
outcome is determined by a series of power struggles concentrating on personalities and
anecdotal data rather than the issues. Traditional bargaining is adversarial, the approach is
to beat the other guy.  Mutual Gains Bargaining, on the other hand, is a different way of
thinking.
With MGB both sides understand the need to focus on interests before their
positions.  It’s not to beat the other guy, but rather to get the best for what you need and
the other side as well, because their interests are your interests.  Labor-management
cooperation is supposed to be an affirmation of the leadership in both the union and
management with the goal of seeking better ways of working and new avenues to success.
This cooperation in no way compromises or denies the identity of either party.  It is also
not an answer to all ills.  Conflict may still arise, as it should for if handled correctly it
sparks creativity and change.  This cooperation, is rather a process that can provide a
better way to get things done.
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The  Process
"The smartest strategy in war is the one that allows you to achieve your
objectives without having to fight."
            --Sun Tzu, 500 BC
The mutual gains process focuses negotiating teams on interests rather than
positions.  “The concept is simple.  It is that unions and management can identify at least
one goal in common that they can work toward together - and find ways to accomplish
that goal jointly.”1
Mutual Gains Benefit -The Concept.
M A N A G E M E N T
G O A L S
U N IO N  G O A L S
J O I N T
G O A L S
*This model is adapted from Rosenthal & Burton’s , Mutual Gains: A Guide to Union-Management
Cooperation.  ILR Press, Cornell University: Ithaca, NY, 1993,  P. 11.
As simple as the concept might be, it’s critical that labor, management, and
legislation go through a formal training process before they decide to embark on mutual
gains.  Often times, too much distrust exists between the groups not to. Legislation is
often ignored, but it’s important that they be pulled on board so they understand and
support the process.
There are various approaches and techniques to Mutual Gains Bargaining.
Primarily union and management team members sit dispersed around a table (as opposed
to traditional negotiations where parties sit across from each other) and openly and
honestly discuss their interests and concerns regarding an issue.  Team members then
analyze all interests, and focus in on those that are mutual.  Many times both parties are
surprised by how many common interests they have.
Once interests have been identified and examined, the parties participate in a
brainstorming process to develop a series of potential solutions and options for each
interest.  The information is shared openly among both bargaining teams and the potential
solutions and options are listed without assessing their feasibility.  Team members can take
turns serving as facilitators and recorders of information if desired.  For first time users of
mutual gains, however, it is usually a good idea to have an outside facilitator.
                                                 
1. Rosenthal & Burton’s , Mutual Gains: A Guide to Union-Management Cooperation.  ILR Press, Cornell
University: Ithaca, NY, 1993,  P. 3.
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Once options are developed, the groups agree upon a set of objective standards to
use in evaluating the options.  The parties then brainstorm again to compile an initial list,
which is refined and polished through discussion until a consensus is reached.
Finally, through open discussion the teams to apply the standards and identify
those potential solutions and options on which team members can reach consensus.  As
options are agreed upon, together union and management team members draft contract
language and a bargaining history for final review and consensus approval by the full team.
For access to formal training see:
· http://www.research.cornell.edu/VPR/CenterDir/PEWS.html.or
http://www.ctarrce.org/ctaibb.htm
To register for an upcoming training session see:
· http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/extension/mgmtprog/LR304.htm
PERMISS - Keys to Interest Based Bargaining Success
There are a number of key factors in making win-win negotiations and labor-
management cooperation successful. 2
· Commitment to the Process. Both parties must be committed to brining about a
cultural change whereby they listen to each other, understand each other’s needs and
interests, and seek solutions designed to strengthen each party.
· Information Sharing and Trust. Candor is essential to building trust. Neither party
can be surprised by the other and privileged and private conversations stay that way.
· Model Behavior. At all stages of negotiation and during day-to-day contract
administration, union leaders and managers need to model cooperative behavior. They
must set the example for all to follow.
· Time to Prepare. Key leaders on each bargaining team need to have a sense of trust
and commitment to the effort so they are willing to take risks, be candid, share
information, and model cooperative behavior. It takes time to build this trust and
rapport and between key players it must be done prior to sitting down at the
bargaining table.
· Isolate the Problem. The parties need to accept that some people will not adopt this
new approach and can be disruptive to their mutual interests. The parties need to
isolate these individuals, if at all possible, and concentrate on the vast majority of
managers and employees who prefer the cooperative model.
· Contract Is Only Paper. The key to success is understanding that the conclusion of
negotiations is only the beginning of a long term partnership between union and
management to implement the contract and market this new cooperative approach.
Organizational culture cannot be changed just by issuing a new contract to everyone.
                                                 
2 Reproduction of “PERMISS – Keys to Interest Based Bargaining Success”:
http://www.ctarrce.org/ibbkeys.html
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The parties must develop a strategy for change over the life of the contract and
beyond.
Union and Management’s Benefits.
Labor-management cooperation is the key to having an effective relationship
between unions and management while keeping the public sector competitive and viable.
For labor-management cooperation to result, two powerful institutions (union and
management) must respect each other and work together to achieve mutual interests
whenever possible.  Mutual Gains bargaining is not a cure all solution, and does not
prevent the different parties from disagreeing with each other on issues.  Under this
process, however, disagreements neither affect the overall relationship, or the ability to
resolve other issues.  The parties can agree to disagree, but disputed issues will be
resolved through dispute mechanisms, including the use of third parties where necessary.
Union’s Benefits
For the union and management, the primary question centers on what cooperation
will mean for both groups in the short and long run.3  The union can use MGB as a way to
empower workers and their institutions to shape their lives at work.  Union Benefits
Include:4
· Increased access to information, and prenotification of changes in work arrangements
and technology.
· Increased input, which helps management avoid errors or decisions that would hurt
union membership.
· Work satisfaction may increase.
· Union may be able to address a broader range of personal concerns.
· Members concerns are resolved more quickly and fully.
· Membership, education and skill levels increase.
Management’s Benefits
In the public sector, management must make the organization as effective as
possible to meet the needs and expectations of citizens and their legislative authorities.
Management’s benefits include:5
· Higher Profitability.
· Improved management effectiveness.
· Increased organizational flexibility.
· Improved working environment.
· Enhanced productivity.
· Stronger Market Profile.
                                                 
3 Rosenthal & Burton’s , Mutual Gains: A Guide to Union-Management Cooperation.  ILR Press, Cornell
University: Ithaca, NY, 1993,  P. 23.
4 Ibid. p. 23-29.
5 Ibid. p. 38-44.
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Mutual Gains is more than just a process.  It is a cultural change in philosophy that
cannot occur without careful preparation.  As an organization begins to implement
contracts using Mutual Gains to effect changes in working, trained union and management
officials will need to jointly train other supervisors, union officials, and employees on the
process, contract topic, and key contractual terms.  Both parties will need to continue to
work together to implement and effectively administer these contracts.
The Mutual Gains bargaining approach establishes that a common ground can be
located, mutual interests can be identified, and cooperative relationships between unions
and management can be built. While the bargaining experience generates improved labor-
management relations, both parties can clearly recognize that beginning and continuing a
mutual commitment is a key to long-term cultural change and success.6
Resources
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees –(AFSCME)
· Interest-Based Bargaining
http://www.igc.org/afscme/bargtabl/cbr3a.htm
· Redesigning Government
http://www.igc.org/afscme/wrkplace/redgo.htm
Fisher, Roger, & Ury, William.  Getting to Yes.  Penguin Books: New York, New
York.  1991.
This is the classic work, where many of the Mutual Gains philosophy originate from.
Flaherty, Benard.  “Mutual Gains Negotiating A Skills Workshop.”  Cornell
University.
This is a training manual from a two-day training session conducted by Mr. Flaherty.
It is strongly suggested groups interested in Mutual Gains Bargaining engaged in
some type of formal training.
Kochan, Thomas, & Osterman, Paul. The Mutual Gains Enterprise.  Harvard
Business School Press: Boston, Massachusetts.  1994.
The Mutual Gains Enterprise brings together the authors recent work on labor
market and employment policies with their work on the human resource strategies
and labor management practices of individual firms.
Program for Employment and Workplace Systems (PEWS)
http://www.ILR.cornell.edu/depts/extension/PEWS/
To get more information on Mutual Gains and training.
Rosenthal & Burton’s , Mutual Gains: A Guide to Union-Management
Cooperation.  ILR Press, Cornell University: Ithaca, NY, 1993.
                                                 
6 Based on PERMISS - Federal Labor Organizations.
Cornell University
Department of Regional and City Planning
May 1998
6
This book is about why and how to cooperate in ways that lead to mutual gains for
both the union and management.  This work lays out the theoretical and practical
aspects of implementing Mutual Gains.
California Teachers Association: http://www.ctarrce.org/ctaibb.htm.
Keys to Interest Based Bargaining Success:
 http://www.ctarrce.org/ibbkeys.html.
CTA helps public school teachers create the best possible learning conditions for
California's children.  Through collective bargaining and legislation, CTA is working
to create a safe and positive learning environment for all children.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The public sector, particularly local government, is under pressure to simultaneously improve
performance and curtail costs. Reductions in state and federal funding, a continuing demand for
efficient and flexible government services, and fear of tax revolts are leading to reexaminations
of how local governments can best meet the demand for their services. Governments are utilizing
a number of tools for restructuring service delivery to increase efficiency and reduce costs.
In our background research, we identified two types of restructuring: external restructuring,
where a government turns to outside organizations to provide services (through privatization or
intermunicipal cooperation, for example), and internal restructuring, which seeks to improve
service delivery by altering organizational structure and decision-making processes. High levels
of public sector unionization in New York State make internal restructuring through labor-
management cooperation an especially important alternative. Through case studies of three New
York State counties, we examined the use of three specific tools for labor-management
cooperation: labor-management committees, mutual-gains bargaining (MGB), and total quality
management (TQM). Genesee, Tompkins, and Ontario Counties were chosen as cases where at
least two of these three internal restructuring tools have been implemented successfully.
We found that these cooperative workplace structures improve communication and broaden
participation in decision making, leading to greatly improved labor-management relations and
employee morale. They may also reduce costs and improve service delivery. However, limited
evaluation in the three counties makes savings and service improvements difficult to document.
These tools appear to fall on a continuum of complexity, investment costs, and
comprehensiveness. Labor-management committees provide a foundation for the other tools by
building an ongoing forum for communication and trust building. They are flexible, deal with a
wide array of concerns, and require minimal training. Mutual-gains bargaining requires more
training and, in our cases, a preexisting environment of trust. While there are spillover benefits to
other areas, MGB is primarily limited to contract negotiations. TQM is the most comprehensive
of the three tools and requires the greatest degree of training and organizational culture change to
be effective. It also may offer the greatest potential for service improvement.
The case study counties all enjoyed a preexisting environment of trust, committed leadership,
and lack of political or fiscal crisis. Given the investments in training and change in perspective
required of labor, management, and elected officials, implementation of these tools may be more
successful in counties not experiencing crisis or a recent history of labor-management conflict.
These internal restructuring tools are not designed to address external stakeholders. Service
improvements may be limited by higher-level policies and mandates these tools cannot address.
Similarly, citizen involvement is not enhanced by these tools. However, by creating new forums
for communication and participatory decision making, local government enhances its ability to
identify and implement programs for service improvement. Adding mechanisms for citizen
involvement and strategies to push for needed policy change at higher levels may further increase
local government’s capacity to restructure to meet the needs of its diverse constituents.
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ASPIRING TO EXCELLENCE:  Comparative Case Studies of Public Sector
Labor-Management Cooperation in New York State
INTRODUCTION
The public sector is under pressure to simultaneously improve performance and curtail costs, and
this is particularly true of local government. Reductions in state and federal funding, tax revolts,
and the advent of privatization are leading to reexaminations of how local governments can best
meet the demand for their services. Keeping taxes down while delivering the quality services that
citizens expect is a difficult challenge. Local government must become more efficient and more
accountable to the general public.
EXTERNAL RESTRUCTURING
External restructuring, which involves privatization or contracting out for services, can create a
competitive environment and result in increased efficiency and cost savings (Savas 1987). In
New York State, however, privatization has been limited (Lauder 1992). A 1997 survey of local
government restructuring in the state found intermunicipal cooperation to be the most common
form of restructuring (45% of respondents). Privatization was the next most common form of
restructuring (31%), but reverse privatization (bringing services back into the public sector) was
also significant (Warner and Hebdon 1997). This suggests that local governments in New York
State recognize the value of both cooperation and competition in improving service delivery.
Privatization can create an uneasy or even hostile environment between labor and
management. It can result in lower wages, benefits, and levels of unionization (Hebdon 1995;
Chandler and Feuille 1991, 1994) despite government efforts to ensure no layoffs. Some
empirical studies have shown the impacts of contracting on unionized workers’ pay and
employment to be minimal (Pendleton 1997). However, lowered employee morale and fears
about job security have significant negative effects on the potential for a cooperative relationship.
In addition, public sector unions must fight privatization if they are to retain their membership
base (CSEA 1995).
In New York State, public sector collective bargaining is governed by the Taylor Law, which
mandates that employers negotiate with the union before contracting out a service that is
essentially the same as one union members currently provide. Thus the Taylor Law is often
perceived as a roadblock to privatization. However, under some circumstances, New York
State’s governments may contract out services without negotiating with the union, and they also
may downsize when there is no longer the need for a particular service or when financial
circumstances demand it. Nonetheless, collective bargaining restrictions under the Taylor Law
may limit opportunities for contracting out. This makes the search for other, more cooperative
methods for implementing workplace innovations essential for local government restructuring in
New York State (Donovan 1990; Lawyers Co-operative Publishing 1982).
INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING FOR TRANSFORMING GOVERNMENT
In their well-known book Reinventing Government (1992), David Osborne and Ted Gaebler
argue that a sweeping overhaul of how government does business can be achieved through
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internal restructuring. They describe this as a move from a supply-driven system to a demand-
driven system. The rigidity of budgeting, service delivery, and the labor-management relationship
in traditional supply-driven governments, they argue, must be replaced by flexible, quality-
oriented systems that are responsive to customers’ needs. Internal competition and more
cooperative labor-management relationships can provide an effective alternative to privatization
for improving government efficiency.
Decentralization of authority can help government achieve better performance. The private
sector has demonstrated that decentralizing authority and flattening hierarchies can be very
effective in improving efficiency and product quality (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). Giving
decision-making power to front-line workers, who are closest to most of the problems and
opportunities, and encouraging employee innovation are important steps (Marshall 1992). Direct
citizen participation is also vital to improving government services (Osborne and Gaebler 1992;
Osborne and Plastrik 1997).
Total quality management (TQM) is one vehicle for internal restructuring. TQM programs
are being used to transform government, especially at the federal level, but also in New York
State and in more than 400 municipalities nationwide (Rusaw 1997, U.S. GAO 1995, New York
State GOER 1992). TQM emphasizes an organization’s commitment to the customer and to
continuous improvement of every process through the use of data-driven problem-solving
approaches based on empowerment of employee groups and teams. Cooperative processes such
as TQM help to create a culture change, perhaps the most important requirement for transforming
the public sector.
THE POTENTIAL OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
Traditional industrial relations practices relied on the acceptance of a shared ideology among
labor, management, and government that defined workplace roles and provided stability to the
system. The 1990s saw the development of a new model, one that recognizes there is often a lack
of consensus between management and labor, and that both are greatly impacted by the
instability in economic, technological, political, and social environments. In this context,
methods that focus on building communication and cooperation between management and labor
offer considerable promise (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994).
Cooperative labor-management structures such as labor-management committees, total
quality management (TQM) programs, and mutual-gains bargaining can be used effectively in
the public sector. While the public sector is distinct in many ways from the private sector, it can
learn from the experiences of private firms in implementing some of these progressive labor-
management practices (Lawler 1990).
However, resistance to cooperative practices can be substantial. Any of the major
stakeholders in the process—management, elected officials, and labor—may resist the change for
different reasons, making transition difficult and time-consuming. Managers may resent their loss
of authority and harbor doubts that productivity gains can be attained through these methods.
Elected officials may be hesitant to accept the political risks of instituting change. Unions may
perceive cooperative structures as a ploy to weaken labor and divert attention from basic issues
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such as wages and job security. They also fear that by increasing workplace efficiency, they are
putting their jobs in jeopardy (Gold 1986). In addition, participation may not necessarily give
workers any real power.
Cooperative tools are inherently limited, since many fundamental decisions about
organizational structure and work processes still remain in the domain of upper management.
This is a commonly cited drawback to programs such as TQM (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). But
more and more it is being recognized that all interested parties (labor, management, elected
officials, customers) should have a voice in decision making, and that valuable production
knowledge resides in all levels of an organization, especially with front-line workers (Marshall
1992). Having been implemented in the private sector with success, cooperative techniques are
clearly beginning to take hold in public sector workplaces, as evidenced by the many examples
profiled in the U.S Department of Labor report Working Together for Public Service, better
known as the Florio Report (1996).
The literature indicates that effects of labor-management cooperation on the ability of local
government to undertake internal restructuring and to improve service delivery are worth
examining. While obstacles clearly exist, with effort, many of the barriers to labor-management
cooperation can be overcome (Gold 1986). By profiling counties where several tools of labor-
management cooperation have been employed successfully, we hope to add to the existing
knowledge of how these specific tools can be used to improve local government services.
METHODOLOGY
Initial research for this project was conducted in collaboration with the New York State Civil
Service Employees Association (CSEA), the New York State Association of Counties (NYSAC),
and the New York State Department of State’s (DOS) Division of Local Government.
Representatives from each of these groups were interviewed for their perspectives on and
concerns about local government restructuring. The team found, through these discussions, that
public sector management was searching for ways to improve internal and external operations,
while labor was interested in exploring ways to prevent privatization of services. We
hypothesized that labor-management cooperation can reduce costs and increase service quality,
diminishing the impetus for privatization.
Further interviews with key informants helped the team focus on the relevant issues
surrounding labor-management cooperation and identify the types of labor-management tools
being employed in counties throughout New York State. Key informants included: CSEA,
NYSAC, DOS, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), the Governor’s Office of
Employee Relations (GOER), staff and faculty of Cornell University’s School of Industrial and
Labor Relations, and elected officials from counties which had implemented some form of
cooperation (see Appendix A for complete list).
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We found that formal labor-management cooperative initiatives were not widely used in the
state, but that a handful of both exemplary and semi-successful cases did exist. In the majority of
cases, the most commonly implemented tools were labor-management committees, mutual-gains
bargaining (MGB), and total quality management (TQM) programs. As a result, the team decided
to focus on these three initiatives as tools of the labor-management cooperative process.
A 1997 survey of local government restructuring in New York State provided a preliminary
indication of the incidence of privatization and restructuring in NYS counties (Warner and
Hebdon 1997).1 Twelve of the counties that responded to this survey indicated they had used
cooperative labor-management initiatives. Key informants provided names of counties which had
participated in TQM or mutual-gains bargaining training, or had implemented labor-management
committees.2 The research team then selected three counties—Genesee, Ontario, and
Tompkins—which had been successful in implementing formal labor-management cooperation.
To explore our hypothesis that labor-management cooperative efforts could be an attractive
alternative to privatization, the following key questions were formulated for the case studies
based on the preliminary interviews and relevant literature:
• What are the basic elements of a cooperative labor-management relationship in county
government?
• What are the goals that labor, management, and county officials hope to achieve through
cooperation?
• What is the impact of a cooperative labor-management program on labor relations, service
quality, and cost of service delivery?
These key questions reflect an attempt to describe the process of labor-management
cooperation. Therefore, the chosen research method for the project is that of a case study, a
descriptive research tool (Yin 1984).
The case study counties were selected on the following criteria:
• Utilizing several tools of labor-management cooperation. Having examined in our
preliminary investigation several counties that had implemented one cooperative tool
with marginal success, the team hypothesized that several tools may be necessary to
substantively change the relationship between management and labor. Thus we chose
counties that had implemented more than one of the cooperative tools identified: total
quality management, labor-management committees, or mutual-gains bargaining.
                                                          
1
 Conducted by Cornell University in cooperation with the County Legislators and Supervisors Association of New
York State, this survey was distributed to all towns (932) and upstate county governments (57) in New York State.
Responses were received from 196 towns (21% response rate) and 26 counties (45.6% response rate).
2
 The counties initially considered were Chautauqua, Clinton, Columbia, Dutchess, Erie, Genesee, Livingston,
Oneida, Ontario, Putnam, Schenectady, Tioga, Tompkins, Ulster, and Westchester.
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• Key informant recommendations. The case study selection was also based on the beliefs
of key informants listed in Appendix A that these counties were among the more
successful of New York State in implementing cooperative labor-management efforts.
• Willingness to participate and proximity. Cases were selected on the basis of the
willingness and ability of the counties to provide us with the necessary access to
personnel and resources. Geographic proximity to Ithaca was also a consideration due to
time constraints.
In each case, every attempt was made to interview one or more representatives from each of
the three perspectives: elected officials, management, and organized labor (see Appendix B). An
interview guide (see Appendix C) was developed to provide consistency and direction across all
interviews. However, the interview format also provided flexibility for open-ended responses, so
that the elements, advantages, challenges, and lessons of labor-management cooperative
initiatives could be fully explored. Interviewees were able to respond to questions and expand on
their ideas verbally, in a manner that a survey does not allow.
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the majority of interviewees. When this was not
possible, interviews were conducted by telephone. Interviews were summarized and shared with
interviewees for review. Where necessary, follow-up interviews were conducted by telephone.
The research team compared the cases, discussing the commonalities and differences across
them. Preconditions, goals, and limitations of the three tools of labor-management cooperation
studied were emphasized. The analysis was written as a draft report and shared with the key
informants in the case study counties. Their comments were incorporated into the final report.
Permission to share the information contained in this report with the public was obtained from all
county officials and staff who were interviewed.
FINDINGS
The case study counties—Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins—are located in central and western
New York State. Genesee County has a population of about 60,000, while Ontario and Tompkins
each have about 95,000 residents. Politically, Genesee and Ontario are governed by Republican-
dominated legislatures and Tompkins currently has a Democrat-controlled board. All three
counties have an appointed full-time county manager or administrator. This is the most common
form of county government in New York State. 3 The presence of a professional, full-time
manager was a control factor across these three counties. The ability to generalize findings to
other counties with county executives or no full-time, professional manager may be limited.
However, key informants familiar with cooperative efforts across the state indicate that strong
                                                          
3
 Of the 57 counties outside of New York City, 18 (31.5%) are governed by the county executive structure (elected
official), 27 (47.5%) are governed by county managers or administrators (appointed), and 12 (21%) have no full-
time manager or county executive.
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leadership and support for change appear to be more important to successful implementation than
type of governance structure.
Additionally, the environment between labor and management in all three cases was found to
be generally cooperative, or at least noncombative, prior to the implementation of cooperative
initiatives. Therefore, this study cannot speak to counties where an adversarial relationship
between labor and management is present.
The three labor-management tools were found to exist along a continuum of complexity, with
labor-management committees providing the foundation for the other two tools. These
committees provide a flexible forum for problem solving and building trust, and they require
minimal training.  Labor-management committees in all cases predated mutual-gains bargaining
and TQM. The interest-based bargaining approach of MGB required substantial training for
successful implementation. Used primarily for contract negotiations, MGB appears to have had
very positive effects on negotiation processes and outcomes, as well as positive spillover effects
to other arenas of decision making. TQM was by far the most comprehensive and complex of the
three tools studied. Extensive training of labor, management, and elected officials was required
to support the culture change toward shared decision making required for a successful TQM
effort.
Key elements for successful cooperation include training, committed leadership,
communication, and evaluation. In the case study counties, improved morale, costs savings, and
service improvements resulted from the use of these three tools, suggesting they do provide an
effective alternative to privatization. However, limited evaluation in the counties prevented
definitive analysis of the true costs and benefits of labor-management cooperation.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES
Labor-management committees are cooperative structures that focus on problem solving and
building trust. They typically deal with issues including workplace safety, work hours, training,
personnel issues, and daily workplace concerns. Although labor-management committees may
initially focus on less controversial issues, such as worker safety standards, over time they may
build a level of trust between labor and management that allows them to deal with more complex
problems (Gold 1986).
Labor-management committees may be permanent or they may form around a particular issue
and disband once resolution is reached. However, they are not necessarily formed to solve crises.
Many are proactive and attempt to improve current work practices. They are flexible and easy to
implement, and require minimal training. Labor-management committees are cornerstones of
cooperation in each of the counties studied.
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STRUCTURE
The labor-management committees in Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties are similar in
terms of their goals: enhanced labor-management relations, decreased costs, and improved
services. Each county has a central guiding or umbrella committee that oversees the activities of
issue-based or departmental labor-management subcommittees. They may facilitate training and
provide direction to subcommittees or they may address specific program innovations or daily
operations. All three counties implemented labor-management committees before mutual-gains
bargaining and total quality management.
There are differences in how each county uses the committees, however. In Ontario County,
where such committees have existed since the early 1980s, they operate independently of the
TQM program. Ontario County has a countywide committee, committees that operate within
departments, and others that address specific issues, such as safety and health.
Tompkins County’s labor-management committees, which have existed since the mid-1980s,
now function as part of its TQM program. Prior to the inception of the TQM program, non-union
members who volunteered or were voted in by all employees were allowed to serve on labor-
management committees. Under the total quality management agreement negotiated between the
CSEA and the county board of representatives, now there are more committees, and only union-
selected representatives may serve on them (see the total quality management section, below).
Genesee County does not have a TQM program, and their labor-management committees are
the main venue for workplace innovation. There is one main committee for the general
bargaining unit, which covers most county departments, and a separate committee for the nursing
home unit.
REPRESENTATION
Labor-management committees are composed of representatives of management and the union.
Only in Tompkins County were legislators also included. Tompkins County’s umbrella
committee has 13 members, including representatives from top management, middle
management, and labor. In Ontario County, the countywide committee is made up of the county
administrator, deputy administrator, director of human resources, and several of the local union
presidents. In Genesee County, the general unit committee consists of the county manager, the
personnel officer, the CSEA general unit president, and the regional labor relations specialist, as
well as two more representatives from both management and labor who rotate onto the
committee in three-year intervals. This provides more people an opportunity to be part of the
process. Size of the committees varies according to the scope of the issue and the need for
stakeholder input. Most have eight or fewer members, but at least one committee in Tompkins
County has over twenty members.
FUNCTIONS
In all counties, labor-management committees address a broad spectrum of workplace concerns.
In Genesee County, the general unit committee emphasizes relationships and creating an
environment where employees feel their input is valued and decisions are made by consensus.
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The labor-management committee has introduced policies that create a more family-oriented
environment.
Labor-management committees can also be forums for discussing alternatives to privatization
proposals. In Ontario County, labor has the opportunity to give their input before a decision to
privatize a service is made by the administration. In Genesee County, labor and management
formed a special joint action committee to address the threat of possible privatization in the
Department of Mental Health Services.
Labor-management committees can impact the delivery of government services by finding
ways to reduce costs while maintaining or improving the service itself. While hard data
documenting the impact of innovations on cost was difficult to obtain, workers’ compensation
costs were significantly reduced in Tompkins County as a result of safety measures and training
recommended by a labor-management committee (prior to the implementation of TQM). In
Genesee County, labor-management committee recommendations and process improvements
have led to cost savings through reduced absenteeism, increased productivity, and decreased
supervision time. Their nursing home committee has helped the facility improve efficiency and
avoid privatization. Client surveys in Ontario and Tompkins Counties have indicated overall
improvements in services.
Labor-management committees do not address contract disputes or grievances, although they
appear to be effective in defusing potential problems before they reach the grievance stage. All
three counties credited labor-management committees for helping to keep the number of formal
grievances low.
ROLE AND AUTHORITY OF COMMITTEES
There is great flexibility in how roles are defined for labor-management committees. Tompkins
County has a formal agreement defining the roles, expectations, and boundaries of authority for
the Leadership Council, which took one year to negotiate and which clearly outlines the scope of
the committee process. Genesee County has less formal written guidelines that articulate the
goals and procedures of the committee. The authority of the labor-management committee is not
written into a contract but is accepted by both parties. Ontario County’s labor-management
committee is well entrenched and seems to function effectively without a written agreement.
Labor-management committees have varying degrees of authority and power. In some cases,
their policy recommendations are binding, while in others they merely offer suggestions that
must gain the approval of elected officials. This is often the case when budget or cost decisions
are involved. Committees in Ontario County are empowered to draft letters of agreement around
issues that would normally be addressed through contract negotiations.
In some cases, the use of labor-management committees may impact traditional lines of
authority. Middle managers may lose some of their decision-making authority because employees
can voice concerns directly to top levels of management through the committee. In Ontario
County this was an issue, but in Genesee and Tompkins Counties, middle managers are included
on committees.
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TRAINING/SUPPORT
Training committee members in conflict resolution and consensus decision making may help
committees work more smoothly. Training sessions allow both groups to establish their
commitment to the concept and to forge cooperative relationships. For example, in the Genesee
County Nursing Home, a half-day training session for the entire staff helped them use their labor-
management committee more effectively. In this case, a CSEA facilitator from Albany was used.
The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and Cornell’s Industrial and Labor Relations
Extension are other valuable sources of training and information. It is important to recognize,
however, that there may be a significant time lag after training before measurable results are
seen.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties, which had longer-standing labor-management committees,
have invested more in training for mutual-gains bargaining techniques and total quality
management than for labor-management committees.
RELATIONSHIPS
Labor-management committees can be contentious because they bring together individuals with
diverse points of view. Strong leadership, good communication, and commitment to the process
make the difference between success and failure. Without these elements it is difficult, if not
impossible, to build the necessary level of trust to make a labor-management committee work.
Both Tompkins and Genesee Counties had attempted labor-management committees in the past,
with limited scope and success. By focusing on relationships, building trust, and gaining the
commitment of leadership they were able to establish the successful committees that operate
today. One strategy used was to begin by addressing issues that are less contentious, to build
momentum so committees can tackle larger, more difficult problems in the future. This increases
the level of trust among committee members and reduces the potential for early conflict.
Employee morale has been greatly improved in the counties studied. There are still conflicts
and differences of opinion, but labor-management committees provide a mechanism for giving
voice to these problems before they become intractable.
CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS
Several challenges in implementing labor-management committees are evident:
• Time is required to build the trust necessary for effective committees.
• They have limited authority: they are not designed to make decisions about broad structural
changes in county operations.
• Defining the appropriate roles and boundaries of committees is important: many problems lie
beyond the scope of committees and call for wider participation of elected officials and citizens.
CONCLUSION
Labor-management committees are excellent forums for communication and workplace problem
solving. They are flexible and require minimal training, which also makes them inexpensive. In
all three counties, good communication, strong relationships, committed leadership, and trust
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proved to be the most important factors for committee success. While the most compelling
impact seen was on labor-management relations, committee efforts also led to improvements in
county government functioning. Labor-management committees are relatively easy to implement
and provide a foundation for incorporating more sophisticated tools, such as mutual-gains
bargaining and total quality management, into an organization.
The following are recommendations to consider for labor-management committees:
• Establish a central, guiding committee to oversee the endeavor.
• Integrate committees into the organizational structure.
• Define expectations and parameters for decision making.
• Include as many stakeholders as possible and necessary.
• Communicate and foster a shared understanding of goals and objectives for both the
committee and the organization.
• Be cognizant of power differentials and the effect these may have on communication.
• Address issues where it is easy to reach consensus at the outset in order to build momentum
to tackle more difficult topics.
MUTUAL-GAINS BARGAINING
Mutual-gains bargaining (MGB) is a method of bargaining designed to dramatically improve the
quality of contract negotiations and increase the likelihood of compliance between labor and
management, ultimately benefiting their constituents. The mutual-gains process focuses on
negotiations based on interests rather than positions and on building consensus. Through this
process, unions and management identify at least one common goal and find ways to jointly
accomplish that goal (Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton 1993). While MGB can be used for many
types of negotiations, the case studies focused on its use for contract negotiations. Ontario
County has been using mutual-gains bargaining since 1994, Tompkins County since 1995, and
Genesee County since 1996.
PRECONDITIONS
All three counties had existing cooperative labor-management relationships in place before the
initiation of MGB. Tompkins and Ontario Counties indicated they had been using interest-based
bargaining techniques informally for years, and that they moved to MGB as a way of formalizing
the process. This leads us to speculate that counties that have good labor-management
relationships may be more apt to implement MGB because the idea of cooperating isn’t very
radical to them and there is less distrust between labor and management to overcome. Genesee
County, however, was less satisfied with their standard negotiation process and wanted to use
MGB to improve the quality of negotiations.
BENEFITS
Mutual-gains bargaining led to smoother contract negotiations in all three counties. This was
especially true in Genesee, where labor and management agreed the new techniques were far
more productive than previous negotiations. Perhaps because Ontario and Tompkins Counties
already had well-established cooperative structures that resembled MGB in place, the changes
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were less dramatic, but in both counties labor and management spoke positively about the effects
of MGB techniques on the negotiating process.
MGB can be used to empower workers and strengthen their organizations, as well as to shape
their lives at work. The benefits include increased access to information, prenotification of
changes in work arrangements and technology, and increased input, which helps management
avoid errors or decisions that would hurt union membership. There is also an indication that
work satisfaction may increase, and the union may be able to address a broader range of
members’ concerns more quickly and fully. In addition, the literature on the subject indicates that
union membership, education, and skill levels increase.
In the public sector, management must make the organization as effective as possible to meet
the needs and expectations of citizens and their legislative authorities. Management’s benefits
include improved effectiveness, increased organizational flexibility, an improved working
environment, and enhanced productivity (Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton, 1993).
Labor and management in the case study counties agree MGB has saved a lot of time. The
use of MGB allowed Genesee County to complete their last contract in about a month, whereas it
used to take up to six or seven months. The same is true for Tompkins County, where labor and
management found the salary issue was on the table faster than ever before, in part because the
economy was doing well, but also as a result of MGB.
Neither management nor labor see MGB as a panacea, but both concede that both parties
walk away from the negotiating process feeling better. While both labor and management in
Ontario County are pleased with MGB, the union appears to favor the process a bit more. CSEA
representatives felt that MGB would definitely be used in the future. At least one manager, on the
other hand, was of the opinion that MGB was a bit “tedious” and might not be used in the next
contract because levels of trust were already high. In Tompkins County, labor felt that the “win-
win” solutions that MGB is supposed to create often result in compromises. Management
respected the process, but felt it was nothing new in comparison to the way they interacted in the
past.
LEADERSHIP
The commitment of top management and union leaders to MGB is very important to its success.
Some people will find it difficult to accept a new approach and will be subversive to both
groups’ mutual interests. In some cases, a change in leadership was necessary before a county
could effectively implement MGB. In Ontario and Genesee Counties, for example, changes in
union and/or management leadership preceded their formal implementation of MGB.
During negotiations, and during day-to-day interaction, the administration, union leaders, and
managers need to set an example of open communication for all to follow. Labor and
management must be committed to MGB. They must communicate with each other, understand
each other’s needs and interests, and pursue answers that benefit both groups. Tompkins,
Genesee, and Ontario Counties’ MGB efforts had the support of top management.
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TRAINING
Mutual-gains bargaining requires a change in philosophy that cannot occur without careful
preparation. Unlike traditional collective bargaining, mutual-gains bargaining operates on trust
and open information sharing, and as simple as the concept might be, it is critical that labor,
management, and legislators receive training before they decide to embark on mutual gains.
While legislators do not participate in negotiation, it is important they understand and support the
process.
In their efforts to implement MGB, Ontario, Genesee, and Tompkins Counties all turned to
the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations Extension for training. Tompkins
County trained 300 out of 720 employees in MGB before its formal implementation in 1995, and
had few problems. Now all bargaining units in Tompkins County (except the sheriff’s
department) use mutual-gains techniques for all terms except salary. In the case of Genesee
County, the assistant county manager was trained to facilitate the negotiations, while Ontario and
Tompkins used outside facilitators. Although Genesee’s general unit contract was successfully
negotiated using MGB in a much shorter period of time than was typical, the negotiating process
was still very challenging, and the rank and file expressed skepticism about the initial contract.
Because of the distrust that traditionally exists between the two groups, it may help to use an
outside facilitator at the outset. Even with training, it can take employees and management time
to learn to trust and accept the process.
CHALLENGES
MGB can benefit both labor and management, but it can also be risky to both parties. Both union
leaders and management are in danger of being perceived as too close to the “adversary”—
legislators may fear management is being too easy on the union, while union members may fear
their leadership is being “co-opted.” Since the union is negotiating the terms and conditions of
employment for its members, it has more at stake. The open negotiation process inherently
requires each side to relinquish some of its negotiating power and may limit the union’s ability to
act as a unified group. In Tompkins County, the union has not yet agreed to negotiate salary using
mutual-gains bargaining techniques largely for these reasons.
Mutual-gains bargaining is a process that was developed in the private sector to increase
labor-management cooperation, but also to aid downsizing efforts. MGB inherently cuts out
middle management as the mediators between labor and top management. In Ontario County, for
example, middle managers were resistant to MGB, as it appeared to take some of their authority
away.
Finally, because mutual-gains bargaining is a tool which is used only during contract
negotiation time, it is limited in its ability to have a direct impact on the daily interaction between
labor and management. However, there were important “spillover” effects of mutual-gains
bargaining training to other venues such as labor-management committees and total quality
management teams.
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CONCLUSION
Interest-based bargaining appears to save money and time, and have positive effects on labor-
management relationships.  MGB resulted in quicker contract negotiation where both parties
walked away feeling better about the process and the outcome. However, as with other similar
labor-management cooperative methods, it is difficult to quantify the results of MGB. For
example, Ontario County tries to quantify cost savings whenever possible but finds it difficult to
assign a dollar value to the intangible benefits of their cooperative efforts. The counties studied
did not establish evaluation measures to determine what impact (positive or negative) MGB has
made.
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (TQM)
While Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties have all implemented labor-management
committees and mutual-gains bargaining, only Ontario and Tompkins Counties have instituted
total quality management (TQM) initiatives. Ontario County began to implement total quality
management in 1993, Tompkins County in 1994.
Total quality management represents a shift in management philosophy from autocratic,
hierarchical decision-making structures to flatter organizational structures and shared decision-
making responsibility (Kursat and Calicchia 1994). In the past few decades, following the model
of the private sector, local governments have come to realize that top-down management is not
always the best way to achieve results and that line workers have valuable contributions to make
in identifying strategies for improvement (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).
In Tompkins and Ontario Counties, total quality management has changed the way decisions
are made, processes are designed, and labor and management interact. Informants describe  total
quality management programs as a “visceral change,” a “paradigm shift,” and a “culture change.”
Both counties’ total quality management programs are new, and therefore conclusions about the
programs’ impacts and differences between them are tentative.
THREE COMPONENTS: SHARED DECISION MAKING, CUSTOMER FOCUS,
MANAGEMENT BY FACT
Total quality management initiatives have three primary components according to Kursat and
Calicchia (1994):
1. Shared leadership and employee involvement
Total quality management programs are based in part on the idea that employees performing the
work can create more efficient and effective processes to produce a higher-quality product. Total
quality management programs typically establish formal structures such as labor-management
committees for sharing decision making between managers and front-line employees.
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2. Customer focus and an emphasis on service and product quality
TQM focuses on the needs and wants of two types of customers: “internal” customers—the next
people down the line in the work process—and “external” customers—those who purchase or
utilize a good or service. TQM seeks to improve the quality of both the product and the process
by identifying the type and quality of good desired by both internal and external customers and
providing what each customer wants. This can be difficult, since in the public sector, external
customers include the people using a good or service but also the people paying for the good
(taxpayers) and their representatives (elected officials).
3. Management by fact and continual improvement
Total quality management encourages steady data collection and rational decision making based
on data rather than on impressions or uninformed opinions. Labor-management committees are
one way to collect data about many facets of a complex issue. Others include customer surveys
and careful tracking and documentation of any cost or time savings. The second component, a
philosophy of continual improvement, encourages employees and managers to exceed current
standards. Continuous improvement is achieved through constant experimentation, learning from
mistakes, and diffusing learning throughout the organization.
GOALS
In both Tompkins and Ontario Counties, the goals of total quality management most often
articulated by managers and employees were to improve labor-management relations and work
conditions, leading to a more smoothly functioning organization. All parties also expressed a
desire to improve service quality. This desire is exemplified by Ontario County’s slogan for total
quality management: “We aspire to excellence.” In Tompkins County, elected officials’ goals
focused primarily on service improvement and cost savings.
TRAINING
Participatory methods of decision making, identifying customer needs, and determining what
kind of data to collect and how to collect it require skills of employees and managers that are not
inborn or traditionally taught in schools or in the workplace. Thus, to effectively implement a
total quality management program and achieve the paradigm shift required for success, training is
essential.
Of the two counties, Tompkins has conducted more extensive training and spent more
money. Tompkins County’s Leadership Council (the labor-management committee charged with
planning and managing the total quality management program) has the goal of training all
employees, managers, and elected officials in quality methods. Initial training sessions were
conducted by consultants, who are still involved in the process. In the fall of 1996, however, the
county hired a full-time training coordinator, and now more sessions are conducted by in-house
staff.
Between 1994 and 1997, Tompkins County spent just over $300,000 for outside consultants
to conduct training. In 1998, the county will spend an estimated $170,000 on consultants to
complete the bulk of the training. Since 1997, in-house costs have been around $100,000. These
costs will drop dramatically after 1998, when all employees, managers, and elected officials will
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have been trained in total quality management techniques and only training for new employees
and refresher courses will be necessary.
Ontario County appears to have spent significantly less on their training program, particularly
on outside consultants. Initially both labor and management leaders as well as county legislators
were trained at the Rochester Institute of Technology. Initial training cost $35,000 for employees
and $50,000 for supervisors, managers, and elected officials. The county gradually built their
capacity to do training in-house, and today all county employees have been trained in TQM
concepts.
It is important to remember when comparing these figures, however, that we obtained dollar
amounts from Tompkins County for both outside and in-house costs, whereas the figures
reported for Ontario County’s training costs are only initial start-up costs for consultants. Still,
there appears to be an appreciable difference in expenditures on consultants.
This difference may be due to the values held by county leaders. Tompkins County leaders
are professionally and personally interested in organizational theory and process, and are willing
to wait for long-term results. These may be the reasons for the strong emphasis on process and
formal training. Ontario County leaders seem less interested in process and more interested in
both short- and long-term results.
SUPPORT STRUCTURES
Individuals, however well trained in new ways of thinking and doing, will not be able to maintain
the culture shift without a system of structural supports that devolve authority for decision
making to labor-management teams. Supportive structures are probably one of the largest
differences between total quality management programs which employees perceive to be “fake”
and those which seem more real and effective.
Ontario County’s Service Excellence program is structured around a countywide steering
committee that acts as a core planning group, setting the direction for the program and
coordinating the activities of the subgroups. The four departmental work group committees each
have the same organizational structure as the steering committee and coordinate their
corresponding functions.
Tompkins County’s Leadership Council includes representatives from labor, top
management, middle management, and elected officials. The Leadership Council guides the
training process and the activities of departmental committees, and facilitates the work of
smaller, project-oriented or cross-functional committees.
Another support mechanism is in-house training facilitators. Currently, Tompkins County
employs a full-time training coordinator. An additional twenty employees act as facilitators,
assuming leadership roles on various departmental and issue-related committees. They lend
practical support based on their understanding of TQM and committee concepts. In addition, they
are role models for other employees and managers.
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ADVANTAGES
Total quality management is the most comprehensive cooperative tool for restructuring that the
research team investigated. More than labor-management committees, total quality management
programs can address inefficiencies in work processes and strive to identify customer needs.
Unlike mutual-gains bargaining techniques, which are used primarily for contract negotiations
once every few years, total quality management is ongoing and suffuses all work processes. It
empowers labor to improve the workplace. In Tompkins County, for instance, labor-management
relations had been good for some time, but TQM forced managers to rethink their traditional
style to allow greater employee involvement in decision making. Employees and management
now work together to solve problems, and by all accounts, both find the new process more
productive and rewarding.
The cases studied indicate that total quality management does improve the functioning of the
organization, employee morale, and labor-management relations. Based on the suggestions of a
total quality management committee in the Department of Social Services, Tompkins County
streamlined the intake process for several social service programs. A Tompkins County survey
indicates that employee morale in the Department of Public Works improved 22% between 1990
and 1997. Further, since the TQM programs have been implemented, both Ontario and Tompkins
Counties have had fewer frivolous grievances as a result of increased communication and trust.
The programs have also reduced costs in both counties, although the cost savings have not
always been well documented. Tompkins County representatives believe they have saved a great
deal due to improved morale and greater efficiency. Ontario County has documented savings
through the efforts of its workplace safety team. The team project began with county safety
coordinators identifying high-risk job duties, such as driving and heavy lifting, based on local
and national accident and injury data. Employees performing these tasks were then trained in
safer driving and lifting techniques, resulting in a 37% reduction of OSHA-recordable injuries in
the county from 1994 to 1997. Lost days were reduced by 60% in the same time period. As a
result of these safety improvements, a special tax assessment to pay for workers’ compensation,
to be spread out over five years, was paid off in only three, saving taxpayers $1.5 million.
LIMITATIONS
Both middle managers and elected officials may resist the total quality management culture
change because it devolves supervisory and decision-making power to TQM teams and
committees. While middle managers and elected officials are formally involved in several levels
of the TQM program in Tompkins County, they are absent from the committees in Ontario
County, and have understandably been more resistant to the process. Middle managers may also
fear for their jobs. Tompkins County is dealing with this issue by retaining middle managers as
top-level technical employees and ensuring their representation on the TQM committees.
Another limitation of total quality management as a tool for restructuring is its internal focus.
The difficulty in identifying the “customer” for public sector goods and services and the focus on
internal work processes make it hard to truly involve citizens in these TQM efforts. Both
counties seek to identify external customer needs with surveys, and Tompkins County includes
elected representatives on committees, but neither county includes citizens on committees. In
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Ontario County, citizen involvement in the TQM program is slightly greater than in Tompkins,
since it includes an advisory council made up of a select group of local business owners.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties both seem to focus more attention on internal customers,
(through surveys and participation in labor-management committees), in the belief that process
improvements will result in product and service improvements. This is not an unreasonable
assumption, though it can be difficult to document. Customer satisfaction surveys in Ontario and
Tompkins Counties indicate external customers are generally satisfied with service
improvements generated by total quality management programs.
The substantial cost of total quality management training and implementation as well as the
time required to reap benefits are also limitations of total quality management as a tool for local
government restructuring. Finally, because total quality management focuses primarily on
internal work processes, policy about external factors is outside its purview. The inability to
address broader policy issues may limit the ultimate impact of investments in total quality
management.
CONCLUSIONS
GOALS OF COOPERATIVE TOOLS AND PROCESSES
Most of our informants articulated their goal as a more smoothly functioning organization, with
more creative problem solving and positive interactions between management and labor.
Managers and elected officials focused on increased efficiency, cost savings, and improved
service quality. Labor representatives expressed goals of increasing employee participation in
decision making and improving service delivery by widening employees’ stake in the process and
product. Thus, improving service delivery was a goal of all parties, but with slightly different
emphases. Elected officials valued improved service delivery for its impact on citizen
constituents, whereas labor representatives valued increased service quality for its effects on job
quality.
PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS
Several conditions existed in our counties prior to the successful introduction of formalized
cooperative processes. First, the labor-management relationship in all three counties was already
cooperative, or at least noncombative, providing fertile ground in which cooperative structures
could thrive. Second, all the counties we studied were in relatively stable economic and political
positions prior to establishing cooperative structures. We were not informed of any fiscal or
political crises in recent memory that might put pressure on leaders to avoid the risk-taking
inherent in cooperative initiatives. These three counties made a significant culture change not as
a last-resort strategy, but as a means to improve already functional but imperfect processes.
However, the cooperative structures have proven useful in dealing with crisis, such as the
threatened sale of the nursing home in Genesee County.
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We observed several other essential preconditions in our study counties. Committed,
supportive leaders are required. This sometimes necessitates a change in the legislature, county
administration, or union leadership. The attitudes of those in leadership positions proved crucial
to the counties’ ability to embrace the new ideas and paradigms of cooperative tools.
Furthermore, in order to buy into the new cooperative relations, middle managers and line
employees had to trust the intentions of both labor and management leaders. Even in counties
where cooperative tools have been used successfully, the departments with a lower degree of
labor-management trust have been slower to make the transition to new tools.
IMPACTS OF COOPERATION
Internal Process Improvements
The changes seen in government service delivery seem to be primarily internal in nature.
Tompkins County, for instance, streamlined its intake processes for various social services.
Genesee County instituted several policies that affect employee benefits, encouraging workplace
efficiency and increased job satisfaction. The efficiency gains from internal restructuring are
thought to “trickle down” to external improvements. The Genesee County Nursing Home, for
instance, through its labor-management committee, has addressed staffing issues that are crucial
to efficient functioning and effective service delivery.
Employee Morale
The second area where impacts have been significant is employee morale, which was uniformly
reported by our informants to have improved under cooperative processes. Again, data for
improvements are difficult to obtain, and most employee surveys were completed after new
structures were implemented, and therefore lack a comparative benchmark. All counties stated
the number of grievances has decreased, and the grievances that are filed are uniformly serious in
nature, the less serious problems being resolved in other forums, due to improved
communication and trust.
Cost Savings
Though gains and savings have sometimes proven difficult to measure due to a fear of budget
cuts to agencies that report cost savings, the overriding sentiment is that cooperative efforts are
resulting in real cost savings. Ontario County has documented at least one instance of large
financial savings in its reduction of worker compensation costs due to a safety program
implemented by a TQM committee. Genesee County’s nursing home has become profitable again
in part due to the efforts of its labor-management committee.
KEY ELEMENTS FOR COOPERATION
From the case studies, we have identified a number of elements that are necessary for
cooperation to be successful:
Training
First, a substantial amount of time and resources were devoted to training labor and management
leaders, and more often than not, legislators and line employees as well, in cooperative structures
and processes. In Ontario and Tompkins Counties for instance, all employees are being trained in
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total quality management concepts. Line employees were less likely to be trained in mutual-gains
bargaining, which is used primarily by representatives of labor and management for the contract
agreement. In Genesee County, for instance, while the assistant county manager was trained to
facilitate the negotiation process, the employees were not trained prior to the switch to mutual-
gains bargaining, and perhaps for this reason, the first contract negotiated by this method was
voted down by union members. On the other hand, the Genesee County Nursing Home sponsored
a half-day training session for the entire nursing home staff with a CSEA facilitator, which
helped their labor-management committee become much more effective. Whether or not all
employees were trained, training brought about a critical shift in how members of the
organization viewed labor-management relations.
Local colleges and universities were valuable resources for training in these methods. Both
Tompkins and Ontario Counties made extensive use of nearby educational facilities.
Leadership Commitment and Support
The counties we studied all shared the presence of an appointed, professional administrator to
manage the transition to cooperative tools. However, one expert on local government told us that
the form of government is less important than the administrator or leader’s commitment to the
cooperative process. A high level of emotional maturity is essential, as is the ability to work well
with people and to get them to buy into the process. The case study counties possessed leaders
who were willing to work with, but ultimately hold responsible, resistant managers. The
commitment of union leadership was also an important factor. Without the willingness of the
union officials in these counties to try new ways of working with management, cooperative
processes would not have been possible.
The role of elected officials was significant only to the extent they were generally supportive
and did not interfere with the process. We did not observe a high degree of involvement in
cooperative tools on the part of county elected officials, with the notable exception of Tompkins
County, where a legislator was actively engaged in developing the TQM initiative.
Additionally, in the three counties we observed a clear commitment to the process of
implementing cooperative tools. Since gains from TQM, for instance, were not immediate, and
could take several years after training to realize, the commitment of leaders to see the process
through was essential to its success. Administrators’ and union officials’ commitment to labor-
management committees as an effective vehicle for problem solving also seemed to be a
significant factor in their success. Tools that yield faster results, such as mutual-gains bargaining,
perhaps require less depth of commitment from county leaders. In all cases, however, all parties
must buy in to the process. Given the levels of trust required, cooperative efforts are likely to be
sensitive to attempts to undermine them.
Communication
Communication of the goals, structure, and roles of key players in cooperative processes is also
important, both within the organization and in the larger community. Umbrella or countywide
committees play important roles here as the central forums for sharing of information and ideas.
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Creating public awareness of county efforts also may be desirable but was not emphasized in our
case study counties.
Evaluation
Evaluation is essential to assure appropriate and effective implementation of cooperative tools
and to create support among elected officials and the public.  Better evaluation of the cooperative
processes in all three counties is needed. For instance, in Ontario County cooperative relations
are so strong that some perceive mutual-gains bargaining as an administrative burden that in and
of itself may not add significant benefits. However, county leaders currently have no means to
gauge MGB’s effectiveness. Management in Genesee County indicated that evaluation was an
area they hoped to address in the future. The private sector may be a source for evaluation tools
that counties can use to measure the success of their efforts.
KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COUNTIES
We recognized several key differences among the counties in the implementation of cooperative
tools. First, the amount of money spent on training varied widely. Tompkins County had by far
the greatest expenditures, almost entirely attributable to its TQM program. Tompkins’ use of
outside consultants on a regular basis also distinguished it from the other two counties. Genesee
County, in contrast, only approached outside consultants on an infrequent basis. However,
Genesee’s labor-management committees required lower levels of training and hence less cost,
compared to the formal TQM programs of Ontario and Tompkins. Interest in the process of
workplace change rather than a focus on outcomes or products seemed to guide efforts in
Tompkins County, perhaps partly because of its close ties to the academic community through
Cornell University.
The level of involvement of elected officials and middle managers also varied. In Genesee
County, middle managers may participate in the negotiating process and sit on labor-management
committees. In Tompkins County, middle managers are well represented on total quality
management committees. In Ontario, where the committees create a direct channel from workers
to top management, it is less clear that middle managers are adequately incorporated into the
structure. Tompkins is the only county in which an elected official sits on the countywide labor-
management committee. In Genesee County, county management felt that by not participating in
committees, elected officials maintained a beneficial distance from the process. Whether elected
officials should be involved may depend on the extent of the changes being implemented; in a
more formal and expensive process such as TQM, their participation seems more appropriate and
essential, while it may not be necessary for internally focused committees.
CONTINUUM OF COOPERATIVE TOOLS
The three cooperative tools exist along a continuum based on the complexity of the tool, the level
of investment required, and its degree of departure from traditional labor-management relations.
The following diagram illustrates this continuum:
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A government with labor-management committees may not choose to implement a TQM
program, but a government without labor-management committees may not be wise to
implement TQM as its first cooperative effort. Thus, the diagram may also be viewed as a time
line of cooperative structures, indicating a progression from relatively simple tools such as labor-
management committees to more complex, formal, costly, and comprehensive processes such as
TQM. Other tools we did not observe in our counties could be added to this model, such as
gainsharing.
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER QUESTIONS
As tools for restructuring, the cooperative methods discussed here have several limitations. Their
ability to affect the external policy environment is limited, so they are constrained by the political
contexts in which they must operate. They also do not afford an opportunity for citizens to
become more involved in government. Since public support for its activities is important to local
governments, they should come up with ways for creating greater citizen involvement in their
restructuring efforts.
Many questions emerged during the course of our study. First, what is the true impact of
cooperative tools and processes on middle management? Much has been written about the
downsizing of middle management in the private sector. Is this also the case in government?
Second, what are the appropriate roles for citizens and elected officials in efforts to restructure
government—through both internal and external methods? Finally, our cases only addressed
examples of successful cooperative tools and processes in counties that had developed a
significant degree of trust between labor and management. What are the outcomes of cooperative
initiatives in counties that lacked this precondition of trust?
Labor-management
committees
Mutual-gains bargaining Total quality management
Less comprehensive in
focus and participation
More flexible
Minimal training
Limited to bargaining context
Some training required
Comprehensive in focus
and participation
Long-term investment
Requires extensive training
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APPENDIX A: KEY INFORMANTS
Steve Alviene, Deputy Director of Labor Relations, New York Civil Service Employees
Association
John Bartow, Director, Division of Local Government, New York State Department of State
Franklin Bassett, Administrator, Livingston County Office of Aging
Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sr. Extension Associate, New York State School of Industrial Labor
Relations Divison of Extension and Public Service
Marcia Calicchia, Sr. Extension Associate, New York State School of Industrial Labor Relations
Division of Extension and Public Service
Ken Crannell, Director of Research, New York State Association of Counties
John Crotty, Deputy Chair and Counsel, Public Employment Relations Board
Ron Dougherty, former County Chair, Tioga County
Kevin Flanigan, Supervising Public Employment Mediator, Public Employment Relations Board
Andrew Goodell, former County Executive, Chautauqua County
Todd Grenci, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations
Robert Hebdon, Assistant Professor, New York State School of Industrial Labor Relations
Scott Heyman, County Administrator, Tompkins County
Sally Klingel, Director, Programs for Employment and Workplace Systems, New York
State School of Industrial Labor Relations Division of Extension and Public Service
Karen Macintosh-Frering, Labor Management Coordinator, Ulster County
Alan McAdams, Associate Professor, Johnson School of Management, Cornell University
Barbara Mink, Chair, Tompkins County Board of Representatives and four-year member,
Tompkins County Leadership Council
Jeff Osinksi, Project Director, New York State Association of Counties
David Pilliod, Assistant Director, Department of State, Division of Local Government
Jim Platner, Director, Chemical Hazard Information Program, New York State School of
Industrial and Labor Relations Division of Extension and Public Service
Keith Stack, Special Assistant, Department of State, Division of Local Government
Jeff Swain, Assistant Deputy Comptroller, New York State Office of the Comptroller
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APPENDIX B: CASE STUDY INFORMANTS
GENESEE COUNTY
Darlene Acker, CSEA Nursing Home Unit President
Jay Gsell, County Manager
Jack Pease, Administrator, County Nursing Home
Nancy Smith, CSEA General Unit President
Martha Standish, County Personnel Officer
ONTARIO COUNTY
Geoffrey Astles, Deputy County Administrator
John Garvey, Human Resources Director
Edward Grace, County Administrator
Robert Russo, President, CSEA Local 7850
TOMPKINS COUNTY
David Chase, President, CSEA Local 855
Scott Heyman, (former) County Administrator
Barbara Mink, Chair, Tompkins County Board of Representatives
Aspiring to Excellence: Comparative Case Studies of Public Sector Labor-Management
Cooperation in New York State / Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University
C-1
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE
Project Description
This project is part of a graduate course on local government restructuring in Cornell’s
Department of City and Regional Planning.  Acknowledging the fiscal and legal pressures on
local governments in New York State and the importance of front-line workers in service
delivery, we have chosen to focus on the role of labor-management cooperation in efforts to
improve county government functioning.  As an example of success, we would like to examine
how cooperation developed in your county and the role that it played in bringing about changes
in service delivery or in workplace systems.  We have selected counties that have implemented a
combination of mutual-gains bargaining, labor-management committees, and/or Total Quality
Management initiatives.  We plan to interview local officials, union representatives, and
managers in order to create a case study investigating the cooperative labor-management
programs you have implemented.
Confidentiality
We would ideally like to discuss the details of this interview, and subsequent analysis of your
case, as openly as possible.  For that reason, we are asking for your permission to quote and
paraphrase this interview in our project.  We will provide you with a draft of our interview
notes—including any quotes we would like to use—and, if you wish, a copy of the case study
itself, for your approval.  In addition, in order for our research to be more useful to others, we
would like to include your name in our report as a contact.  We may be reached easily to discuss
any confidentiality concerns, at (607) 255-6647 or by email at the following addresses:
Nicole Blumner nb42@cornell.edu
Lindy Burt mkb14@cornell.edu
Jon Gans jag33@cornell.edu
Lisa Goldberg leg8@cornell.edu
Kristin Guild kag24@cornell.edu
Young Sung Kim yk67@cornell.edu
Chang Kil Lee ckl2@cornell.edu
Darth Vaughn dkv1@cornell.edu
Prof. Mildred Warner mew15@cornell.edu
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County _______________________________________
Organization/Agency/Dept ______________________
Perspective oL oM oO
Interviewer name: _______________________________
Date: __________________________________________
Interviewee name: _______________________________
Address: _______________________________________
_________________________________________
Phone:__________________   Fax: _________________
Position: _______________________________________
Time started: ___________________________________
I. What tools are you using to develop labor-management cooperation?
1. Have you used a mutual-gains bargaining process?
a) If so, what was the impetus behind it?
b) Is the contract that resulted still in force?
c) Do you expect mutual-gains bargaining to be used in the future?
2. Do you have active labor-management committees in your county?
a) How do they (does it) function (for what functions or around what issues)?
b) Are they effective in solving workplace problems?
c) If so, what types of problems?
3. Do you have a TQM program?
a) How does it work?  What departments are involved?
b) Are there mechanisms for implementing TQM committee recommendations?
c) Have any TQM committee recommendations been implemented?
d) Do you think the program is successful?
4.  Are there other efforts to engage labor in decision making?
II. What are the necessary elements to build a cooperative labor-management
relationship in local government in New York State?
1. What previous conditions, if any, existed in your county that made cooperation possible?
2. What challenges did labor and management face going into the process?
3. What type of training preceded the effort?
4. Who were the key players?
5. How do perceptions of labor and management affect the process?
6. Was privatization a factor in the decision to change the labor-management relationship?
III.What goals do local officials, labor, and management hope to achieve through
cooperation?
1. How were these goals articulated?
2. What do you think were the goals of the other key players?
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3. Were there any conflicts between goals of the different parties?
4. So far, have goals been met by cooperative labor-management initiatives?
5. Which programs have met expectations? Which have not met expectations?
IV. What impact does a successful cooperative program have on:
(A) future labor relations?
Are there new relational systems in place?
Permanent committees, new communication networks?
Are grievances handled any differently?  Are fewer or more grievances filed?
Are there impacts on employee morale?
Are employees encouraged to innovate?
(B) service quality?
Are any objective measures of quality used?
If not, how would you measure the effects on quality, if you were to do so?
Are customers asked about their opinions of service quality?
If so, have they remarked of any change in service quality?
(C) cost?
Are there ways to determine whether the cooperative program results in cost savings?
Were there substantial costs involved in the implementation of the program?
V. What do you wish you had known about this process before embarking on it?
What advice would you offer to others?
-Key lessons?
-Unforeseen problems?
-Were there any particular resources that you found valuable?
VI. Are there any available background documents (memos, contracts, newsletters)
which you could provide us?
We will fax the interview summary to you on April _  and call you for approval shortly after.
We do really want your comments, but we’re on a very tight schedule so we’ll be asking you for
a quick turnaround.
The information you provide is very valuable to us, and we appreciate your time.  Thank you!
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Project Description
This project is part of a graduate course on local government restructuring in Cornell's Department of City and
Regional Planning. Acknowledging the fiscal and legal pressures on local governments in New York State and the
importance of front-line workers in service delivery, we have chosen to focus on the role of labor-management
cooperation in efforts to improve county government functioning. As an example of success, we would like to examine
how cooperation developed in your county and the role that it played in bringing about changes in service delivery or
in workplace systems. We have selected counties that have implemented a combination of mutual-gains bargaining,
labor-management committees, and/or Total Quality Management initiatives. We plan to interview local officials,
union representatives, and managers in order to create a case study investigating the cooperative labor-management
programs you have implemented.
Confidentiality
We would ideally like to discuss the details of this interview, and subsequent analysis of your case, as openly as
possible. For that reason, we are asking for your permission to quote and paraphrase this interview in our project. We
will provide you with a draft of our interview notes—including any quotes we would like to use—and, if you wish, a
copy of the case study itself, for your approval. In addition, in order for our research to be more useful to others, we
would like to include your name in our report as a contact. We may be reached easily to discuss any confidentiality
concerns, at (607) 255-6647 or by email at the following addresses:
Nicole Blumner nb42@cornell.edu 
Lindy Burt mkb14@cornell.edu 
Jon Gans jag33@cornell.edu 
Lisa Goldberg leg8@cornell.edu 
Kristin Guild kag24@cornell.edu 
Young Sung Kim yk67@cornell.edu 
Chang Kil Lee ckl2@cornell.edu 
Darth Vaughn dkv1@cornell.edu 
Prof. Mildred Warner mew15@cornell.edu 
County:
Organization/Agency/Dept:
Perspective: Labor Management Official
Interviewer name:
Date:
Interviewee name:
Address:
Phone:
Fax:
Position:
Time started:
I. What tools are you using to develop labor-management cooperation?
1. Have you used a mutual-gains bargaining process?
a. If so, what was the impetus behind it?
b. Is the contract that resulted still in force?
c. Do you expect mutual-gains bargaining to be used in the future?
2. Do you have active labor-management committees in your county?
a. How do they (does it) function (for what functions or around what issues)?
b. Are they effective in solving workplace problems?
c. If so, what types of problems?
3. Do you have a TQM program?
a. How does it work? What departments are involved?
b. Are there mechanisms for implementing TQM committee recommendations?
c. Have any TQM committee recommendations been implemented?
d. Do you think the program is successful?
4. Are there other efforts to engage labor in decision making?
II. What are the necessary elements to build a cooperative labor-management relationship in local
government in New York State?
1. What previous conditions, if any, existed in your county that made cooperation possible?
2. What challenges did labor and management face going into the process?
3. What type of training preceded the effort?
4. Who were the key players?
5. How do perceptions of labor and management affect the process?
6. Was privatization a factor in the decision to change the labor-management relationship?
III. What goals do local officials, labor, and management hope to achieve through cooperation?
1. How were these goals articulated?
2. What do you think were the goals of the other key players?
3. Were there any conflicts between goals of the different parties?
4. So far, have goals been met by cooperative labor-management initiatives?
5. Which programs have met expectations? Which have not met expectations?
IV. What impact does a successful cooperative program have on:
1. future labor relations?
a. Are there new relational systems in place?
b. Permanent committees, new communication networks?
c. Are grievances handled any differently? Are fewer or more grievances filed?
d. Are there impacts on employee morale?
e. Are employees encouraged to innovate?
2. service quality?
a. Are any objective measures of quality used?
b. If not, how would you measure the effects on quality, if you were to do so?
c. Are customers asked about their opinions of service quality?
d. If so, have they remarked of any change in service quality?
3. cost?
a. Are there ways to determine whether the cooperative program results in cost savings?
b. Were there substantial costs involved in the implementation of the program?
V. What do you wish you had known about this process before embarking on it? What advice would you
offer to others?
1. Key lessons?
2. Unforeseen problems?
3. Were there any particular resources that you found valuable?
VI. Are there any available background documents (memos, contracts, newsletters) which you could provide us?
The information you provide is very valuable to us, and we appreciate your time. Thank you!
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Genesee County is located in western New York State, between Rochester and Buffalo. It has a population of
approximately 60,000. The county functions under a county manager who is appointed by a nine-member legislature.
The main tools of labor-management cooperation being used in Genesee County are labor-management committees
and mutual-gains bargaining. Through face-to-face and telephone interviews, we examined how these cooperative
structures developed in Genesee and their role in helping county government function better.
The following people were interviewed for this study:
Jay Gsell, County Manager
Martha Standish, Personnel Officer
Nancy Smith, CSEA General Unit President
Jack Pease, Administrator, County Nursing Home
Darlene Acker, CSEA Nursing Home Unit President
Labor-Management Committees
Mutual-Gains Bargaining
Necessary Elements for a Cooperative Labor-Management Relationship
Goals of Labor-Management Cooperation
Impacts of Labor-Management Cooperation
Lessons and Insights
 Labor-Management Committees
The Origins of Labor-Management Committees in Genesee County
There are two main labor-management committees in Genesee County. The general unit labor-management committee
includes most county departments, with about 320 CSEA members represented, and the Genesee County Nursing
Home labor-management committee, which has about 150 CSEA member employees.
The general unit committee was started in 1991, and the nursing home committee was started during the late 1980s.
The nursing home has its own committee because of the special nature of the services it provides. It also operates as an
"enterprise fund," which means that its finances are separate from the rest of the county's departments. As an
enterprise fund, the nursing home is able to keep the money it earns, but when it is losing money, it cannot draw on
other county revenue. Currently, the home is earning money, which has enabled the county to invest in improvements
in the facility.
The two committees operate within somewhat different contexts. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the nursing home
was losing money due to a change in the state's reimbursement policy for Medicare and Medicaid patients. It faced the
prospect of being sold by the county legislature if it did not become self-sustaining on its own revenues. It was realized
that the home had to change its mode of operating in order to survive, and that the cooperation and involvement of
both management and labor would be necessary. The labor-management committee provided a good vehicle for the
two groups to work together to try to improve the operations of the home.
With the general unit committee, management saw great potential in improving workplace practices through the more
cooperative structure provided by a labor-management committee. The county personnel officer approached the CSEA
labor relations specialist, who agreed that establishing a committee was a good idea.
How Labor-Management Committees Work
The labor-management committees in the general unit and the nursing home work in a very similar fashion. They both
meet once per month at a set time and day. In the nursing home, the union officers and stewards meet a week and a
half prior to the monthly meeting to develop their list of items for the agenda. The union president and nursing home
administrator then meet one week prior to the monthly meeting to discuss each other's proposed items for the agenda,
and put it in its final form. Issues are not placed on the agenda unless agreed to by mutual consent. During this
preliminary meeting, the nursing home administrator and union president are sometimes able to resolve certain issues,
which don't require the input of other committee members.
While the authority of the nursing home committee is actually written into the nursing home unit contract, the authority
of the general unit committee is not incorporated into the general unit contract, but is mutually accepted by labor and
management.
The purpose of both committees is to serve as a forum for discussion and a vehicle for active improvement on
management issues, labor issues, program ideas, and operations. The resolution of any issue requires consensus among
all committee members. The committees do not address contract disputes or grievances. These matters are dealt with
using standard procedure.
The permanent members of the general unit committee are the personnel officer, the county manager, the CSEA
general unit president, and the labor relations specialist from the CSEA regional office. Two department heads and two
additional union members also sit on the committee; these positions rotate in about three-year intervals to give
different people exposure to the process and to the issues being discussed. The nursing home committee is comprised
of the nursing home administrator (Jack Pease), the director and assistant director of nursing, the activities director, the
officers of the union, including the president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, and the head nurse.
Members of the county legislature do not sit on the committees or participate in the meetings. By not participating in
the committees, the legislators can remain more neutral and objective with respect to the management and labor
positions. The legislators are kept aware of the activities of the labor-management committees through meeting
minutes.
Through the committees, many more union members are involved in labor-management initiatives than ever before.
According to the president of the general unit, currently about 25 percent of the 300+ employees in the general unit
participate in some way through subcommittees and various programs. Within the nursing home unit, union members
also serve on various subcommittees organized around different program initiatives. Additionally, according to the
nursing home unit president, employees are always encouraged to bring their ideas and concerns to the committee
representatives.
Creating Solutions to Workplace Problems
One of the greatest concerns of the nursing home is to ensure sufficient staffing 24 hours a day, seven days per week.
Its committee has developed such initiatives as an incentive program for attendance and a voluntary work program.
Because it is crucial to the operation of the nursing home that there be sufficient staffing at all times, management has
the right to mandate employees to work overtime or to come in on their days off when there exists a shortage of staff.
The voluntary work program allows the employees to "volunteer" (with pay) to work extra hours at their own
convenience. After working a certain number of "voluntary" hours, employees are then eligible to be taken off of the
mandate list during the upcoming quarter. The nursing home committee has also served as a forum to discuss worker
safety issues during building renovations.
One of the most significant programs developed by the general unit committee is the sick-leave bank. Through the
sick-leave bank, employees may choose to donate some of their allotted sick days to the bank, which can be used in
the future by any employee who needs to take an extended medical leave. This program serves as a close substitute for
long-term disability, which is not provided to employees of the general unit. Other programs initiated by the general
unit committee include a volunteer tuition reimbursement program, which grants employees who perform community
service tuition credits for their family members at the local community college; a job-share program; and participation
in Make-a-Difference Day, a national community service day. The labor-management committee also started a
newsletter for county employees, which is partially funded by CSEA.
Through labor-management committees, the management of the nursing home and other county departments
represented by the general bargaining unit have worked cooperatively with labor to develop innovative ways to
improve productivity, efficiency, and flexibility in the workplace. Such initiatives have a positive effect on the county's
ability to deliver services to the community.
 Mutual-Gains Bargaining
The Origins of Mutual-Gains Bargaining in Genesee County
Mutual-gains bargaining was first tried in the general unit in 1996. The assistant county manager was trained by
Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations Extension, and he facilitated the negotiating process. Jay
Gsell, County Manager, and Nancy Smith, President of the Local CSEA General Unit, had just taken their positions at
the county a few years prior, and were very interested in trying a new approach to contract negotiations.
The first tentative agreement negotiated under mutual-gains bargaining was not accepted by the union membership.
Many members were very skeptical, and it took time for them to trust and accept the process, which was completely
different from the way previous negotiations were conducted. However, employees eventually came to accept the
process, and in 1997 the general unit contract was successfully negotiated using mutual-gains bargaining.
The nursing home does not use mutual-gains bargaining. Labor is not yet interested in implementing the process.
How Mutual-Gains Bargaining Works
The mutual-gains bargaining process requires that both parties reveal their true interests rather than defending their
positions. After this is done, the specifics are discussed. For labor, the priority is in determining what they need in
order to achieve a contract that will provide general satisfaction to the greatest number of people. Management needs
to consider the expectations of the elected officials they represent.
Both labor and management agree that the mutual-gains bargaining process was more productive than any previous
negotiations. There was more input, openness, brainstorming, and problem solving among the participants. The
negotiations were a continuous, open dialogue between the two sides, with no side discussions taking place. Even the
lunch break was taken together. Another benefit of mutual gains is that it greatly accelerated the negotiations process.
While typical contract negotiations can take up to six or seven months, the most recent contract was negotiated in
about a month. By revealing their true interests, each group comes to a better understanding of the other's position.
Participants look for ways to mutually resolve the issues, instead of wondering what they will have to concede. County
Manager Jay Gsell also noted that mutual gains helps facilitate identification of the sticking points in the issues.
In coming to agreement on a contract, although not every interest was satisfied, participants came away from the
process feeling as though a great deal had been accomplished. Because of the cooperation that is inherent to the
process, resentment and hurt feelings are avoided. Agreement is easier to achieve and people feel better, even about the
things that did not make it into the contract.
Necessary Elements for a Cooperative Labor-Management Relationship
Trust and Openness
In order for the county to use mutual-gains bargaining and labor-management committees, trust must exist between
labor and management. Everyone involved in labor-management cooperation concurs that keeping to agreements once
they have been made is one of the most important elements in building trust. For union officials, in a situation where
there are preconceived notions about "the union," delivering on promises you've made is key to allaying the suspicions
of management and building trust. Nancy Smith used this approach when she became the CSEA general unit president.
It took some time, but eventually management started to understand that they could work with her on the basis of trust.
In 1996, new union officers were elected at the nursing home, and they proved to be more willing to hold to
agreements than the previous union leadership. Management concurs it is very important that both sides "stick to the
course" of whatever has been agreed upon.
Both management and labor must be open about their interests and positions. Maintaining an open-door policy and
encouraging employees to approach management when they have concerns is important to fostering labor-management
cooperation. County Personnel Officer Martha Standish says she believes that openness and honesty are the best ways
to build the trust necessary for cooperation. However, she acknowledges that sometimes this openness backfires. All it
takes is one person to make a comment, and it can affect people's trust in you. When you are trying to bring together
two groups that have traditionally been very adversarial toward one another, trust is very fragile and takes time to
build. Yet she still holds to a policy of being "very available and honest, telling things like they are-even if sometimes
people don't like to hear it."
The Role of Commitment and Leadership
People who are involved in these joint efforts must be committed to the county. Both management and labor must
think beyond what is beneficial to their own interests and instead think about what is good for the county as a whole
and for their total membership. Both labor and management feel that it is difficult to get people to shift to this new
way of thinking.
Before efforts at labor-management cooperation can even begin, the key people involved must see the value of these
efforts. There must be a commitment on the part of both labor and management to invest time and effort in the
meetings and in the initiatives that emerge. Personalities of the leadership can influence whether labor-management
committees are adopted. In the nursing home, the turnover of the union leadership from a president who had operated
for a long tenure in an adversarial manner to a president with a very different style was very important. Similarly,
Nancy Smith has had a very large influence as president of the CSEA general unit.
There must be a willingness to work things out on the part of the key individuals. In Genesee County, the individuals
active in labor-management efforts come to the table with a real desire to work together to resolve workplace issues.
One indicator of commitment on labor's part is that all the current officers in the general unit plan to run for reelection
this year. They all feel very positive about the way things are going and want to stay involved.
In departments where management and staff do not see the value in trying to address issues that fall outside of their
contract or outside of day-to-day operations in a nontraditional manner, labor-management committees are difficult to
establish. The county went as far as bringing in a PERB mediator to try to help facilitate the development of a labor-
management committee in one of their non-CSEA units, but it was unsuccessful. However, this department's
management has recently turned over, as has the union leadership, and Martha Standish is hopeful that it may now be
possible to start a labor-management committee there.
Changing Perceptions and Attitudes
Labor and management perceptions clearly play a role in how effective cooperation can be. At the nursing home, the
belief among unionized workers was that when management spoke to other people, such as the legislature, they were
critical of the union. Management's perception was that the labor-management committee was something that they had
to do, but not really a useful forum for solving problems. Both of these perceptions needed change before cooperation
could occur.
As Nancy Smith says, in today's workplace, "we need to realize that change is inevitable." One of the challenges of
cooperation is that people often find it difficult to accept that sometimes things have to change, even if they might
prefer the status quo.
The elected officials agree with the concept of labor-management cooperation, but sometimes have concerns about
management too often taking the side of labor. Additionally, there is also some degree of dissatisfaction on the part of
some union members who are less knowledgeable and enthusiastic about the process.
 Goals of Labor-Management Cooperation
The goals of labor-management cooperation in Genesee County are not written down anywhere, and the individuals
we spoke with each focused on different goals.
Management describes the goal of labor-management committees as fostering an environment of equality among and
between labor and management, encouraging everyone to bring their ideas forward. One important purpose of
committees is to empower employees, by letting them know their opinion is valued and encouraging them to share
their ideas for improvement. Management strives to have good, functioning labor-management committees, a good
understanding with the union officials, and an established basis of trust, so they will avoid grievances, which are time-
consuming and costly. However, the county manager notes that the bottom line is the client-the person they're serving.
Anything they do must be done with the final product (the service) and the customer (the taxpayer) in mind.
The union has a goal of educating people on the benefits of cooperative efforts. Believing that most employees
sincerely do not want an adversarial relationship, the CSEA general unit president is getting more people involved in
some way in the union, and in labor-management committees. She also hopes to establish smaller labor-management
committees within county departments.
According to Administrator Jack Pease, one of the main goals at the nursing home is to address the issue of
interpersonal relationships. Everybody needs to be treated respectfully in order for things to work, so they are going to
be looking more closely at relationships in the workplace. The nursing home staff works in a very demanding
environment, which puts a great deal of pressure on the employees, and he believes improving work relationships can
help improve overall performance.
 Impacts of Labor-Management Cooperation
The county doesn't have objective measures of the effects of labor-management cooperation. Measurement of success
should be implemented through the cooperative process.
The union leadership believes that cooperative efforts have made workers more productive and have improved
relationships between people in the workplace. Because of the programs they have implemented, the workplace is
more family-oriented. For example, you can take a sick day to care for a sick child or spouse.
Not many grievances are filed in Genesee County. When a problem arises, the general unit president will call the
personnel officer to discuss it, and they will go from there.
Fortunately, they have not had much downsizing-most of their workforce reductions have occurred through attrition.
Privatization has not played a significant role in the county. While some employees have perceived it as a threat, very
few, if any, services in the county have been privatized to date.
Currently, however, the county legislature is considering privatization of the county Mental Health Services. Cuts in
state aid have put the agency under fiscal pressure. Together, labor and management in the agency responded to the
problem by forming a joint action committee to work on alternatives to privatization. The general unit president works
at Mental Health Services and has been heavily involved in this effort. The process has not been negative or
adversarial; employees have been involved and have agreed to make changes, some of which have been implemented
already. While a decision has not yet been made, it is very possible that privatization will be avoided because of this
cooperative effort.
The nursing home unit president believes labor-management cooperation enables management and employees to see
the "big picture." It broadens everyone's perspective on the functioning of the facility, and is a good forum for bringing
people together and getting to the root of challenges in operations.
Service Quality
The county has not implemented formal measurements of customer satisfaction with their services. Service quality
monitoring and evaluation is probably one of the next areas that the county will be getting into. County Manager Jay
Gsell believes that "it's a priority to understand the needs of the customers. Quality of service, reasonable cost and
being treated fairly and equitably are the priorities in service delivery."
Personnel Officer Martha Standish notes that programs like TQM are great, but they take a great deal of time and
effort. They have tried instituting quality workgroups in the Department of Social Services, but they have had a
difficult time. Right now they have one self-directed workgroup there, with about five to seven people.
Especially in the nursing home, the quality of service delivery is critical. Nursing homes have changed a great deal-
they must operate with much more flexibility in service provision than in the past. So workplace change is happening
within the context of a very different environment. They need to keep employees involved, and use the labor-
management committee. It doesn't work to make changes in a top-down manner.
Every year the state health department surveys the nursing home. They are trying to use the state survey to do their
own evaluation, and they are trying to come up with other ways to measure quality internally, using survey of residents
or their family and other information.
Cost
The effects of labor-management efforts on cost aren't formally quantified. Martha Standish and Nancy Smith both
suggested that the sick-leave bank probably contributes to cost savings, since it encourages people to take fewer paid
sick days. There is also a general impression that labor-management cooperation leads to increased productivity and
less supervision time, which ultimately lead to cost savings.
In the county nursing home, it is easier to determine costs, as the home's finances are independent from the rest of the
county. They are currently making money and are able to pay their bills, so this indicates that the labor-management
cooperation has had some positive financial effects.
 Lessons and Insights
Training has played an important role in the county's efforts with the labor-management committees and mutual-gains
bargaining. People are often skeptical of a new way of operating, and outside assistance can be crucial in resolving
such skepticism. Cornell's Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) Extension and the New York State Public Employee
Relations Board (PERB) are very good resources.
Martha Standish also believes that it's important that people maintain a "cooperative spirit." Disagreements will still
occur, yet people must realize that there is a forum for resolving these disagreements. Labor-management committees
and mutual-gains bargaining provide excellent vehicles for arriving at these resolutions.
For the nursing home, the support of and flexibility allowed by the county manager and personnel officer were
important to the success of the labor-management committee. Training also helped labor and management at the home
to use the committee more effectively. For some time, the members seemed to get stuck on the same old issues,
meeting after meeting. A trainer was brought in from CSEA who showed them how to run the process in a more
productive manner. The union president recommends distributing the monthly meeting agenda to all committee
members prior to the meeting. This ensures no one is surprised or caught off guard by the issues that come up at the
meeting. It also allows participants time to gather any information they feel might be relevant to the meeting
discussion.
Finally, Genesee County is essentially a small community where connections are close. While the county's community
service programs developed out of the labor-management committee, they also have served to strengthen the
cooperative character of relations between everyone involved in county government.
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Twenty years ago in Ontario County, labor-management relationships were confrontational, and walkouts during
contract negotiations were not uncommon. Ontario County was then one of several New York counties to have
legislative determinations (the Board of Supervisors could impose contracts on the bargaining units), a practice that
was very unpopular with employees and was later discontinued. Beginning in the 1980s, changes in management and
union leadership led to a new interest in building "win-win" situations that characterize today's more cooperative
labor-management relations in Ontario County. The County has built cooperation through a variety of structures and
tools, including labor-management committees, a "Service Excellence" total quality management program, and
mutual-gains bargaining.
The following people were interviewed for this study:
Edward Grace, County Administrator
Geoffrey Astles, Deputy County Administrator
John Garvey, Human Resources Director
Robert Russo, President, CSEA Unit #7850
Labor-Management Committees
The Service Excellence Program
Mutual-Gains Bargaining
The Right Climate
Privatization, Engaging Labor, and Performance Measurement
Key Lessons
Conclusion
 Labor-Management Committees
Since the early 1980s, labor-management committees have been key for developing successful day-to-day labor-
management relations. These committees function at countywide and departmental levels and around specific issues,
such as safety and health. The committees provide an opportunity for workers to bring their issues to the highest level
of management in the county. Currently, the county administrator as well as the deputy administrator, the director of
human resources, and several local union presidents, sit on the countywide committee. However, county administrators
say they are gradually decentralizing the work of these committees so that individual departmental committees handle
most of the work.
The committees meet monthly and have dealt with many day-to-day workplace issues, such as work scheduling,
flexible hours and overtime, procedures for dealing with employee absences, and treatment of employees by
supervisors. They also deal with long-range planning issues related to the workplace. For instance, prior to the recent
construction of the new human services building, the countywide committee met with the architects to develop a
building program that suited their needs. Committees do not deal with issues formally dealt with in the labor contract,
such as compensation and benefits. Agency-wide committees have formed in the Social Service and Public Works
Departments, and a committee is currently forming in the County Nursing Home.
County managers laud the committees as being very effective. Although it sometimes takes a couple of months for
people to get used to the idea and build trust, both labor and management agree the committees are useful in solving
daily issues. Now issues don't build up until contract renegotiation. Instead, a letter of agreement can be issued,
ultimately allowing for a smoother bargaining process. In fact, one union leader reported that the existence of the
labor-management committee was a form of "preventive medicine" that allowed him to resolve more workplace issues
as they occurred. Labor-management relations were so improved by the committees that he did not have to bring many
minor issues to the committee meeting. Officials also point to a reduced number of employee grievances filed, which
is likely a result of the committees' efforts. For both labor and management, this means increased time to deal with
matters other than labor disputes. Furthermore, labor was able to achieve its goal of gaining greater employee
involvement in the decision-making process.
One drawback of the committees is that they effect a loss of authority for middle managers that some resent, since
employees are now empowered to bring their concerns directly to the highest level of management. Furthermore, the
County only trains the top labor and management leaders in the concepts and techniques of labor-management
committees, effectively shutting out middle managers from the process. However, despite middle managers' resistance,
both labor and management leaders view the committees as successful endeavors. County leaders say they are taking
steps to train middle managers in cooperative processes with the goal of getting them to buy into to the new structures.
However, training is expensive, and so it may not be possible to train every manager unless proven necessary for
success.
 The Service Excellence Program
Another cooperative initiative that has been successful in Ontario County is the Service Excellence Program (also
known as total quality management or TQM). This program was initiated in 1993 with union participation in order to
promote "customer satisfaction by continuous improvement through employee involvement." Initially both labor and
management leaders as well as county legislators were trained by Rochester Institute of Technology staff. Initial
training cost $35,000 for employees and $50,000 for supervisors, managers and elected officials. The county gradually
built its capacity to do training in-house, and today all county employees have been trained in Service Excellence
concepts.
The Service Excellence program is structured around a countywide steering committee that acts as a core planning
group, setting the direction for the program and coordinating the activities of the subgroups. Four of the 37
departments have operational workgroups, which have the same organizational structure as the steering committee and
coordinate their corresponding functions.
There are currently six subgroups that perform the following functions:
Trainers and Facilitators: trains new employees in service excellence concepts.
Training and Development: provides technical tools and training to TQM teams.
Measurement and Assessment: surveys and measures customer and employee satisfaction; develops measures for
performance standards.
Team Chartering: selects projects for service excellence efforts; provides mentoring and assistance to teams in
improving job performance.
Communications: shares information and ideas through a quarterly newsletter; publicizes the program, and
increases awareness of program success.
Recognition and Reward: provides rewards for good work, incentives to improve operations, with the goal of
better service as a result. Rewards include free dinners at area restaurants, pins for long-serving employees, and
engraving employee names on a plaque in the county courthouse.
The Service Excellence initiative has resulted in "win-win" situations for labor and management. It has also saved
county taxpayers money. The workplace safety team project, for instance, began with county safety coordinators
identifying high-risk job duties, such as driving and heavy lifting, based on local and national accident and injury data.
Employees performing these tasks were then trained by professionals in safer driving and lifting techniques. This
initiative resulted in a 37% reduction of OSHA-recordable injuries in the county from 1994 to 1997. Lost days were
reduced by 60% in the same time period. As a result of these safety improvements, a special tax assessment to pay for
workers' compensation, to be spread out over five years, was paid off in only three due to reduced injuries, saving
taxpayers $1.5 million. Furthermore, employees received an important morale-building message-that management
truly cares about their safety on the job.
Another example of the benefits of service excellence is the county sheriff's department, one of only two sheriff's
departments in the state accredited by CALEA (Commission for the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies),
which requires that 800 standards be met before granting accreditation. Managers emphasize that through service
excellence, the county aspires to have the highest professional law enforcement standards in New York State, a goal
borne out by the fact that the county jail is also nationally accredited. It's a win-win situation for law enforcement and
citizens alike, since there is a lessened liability to the community for lawsuits from dissatisfied citizens. A string of
deficiency-free state auditor's ratings in the nursing home and in the home health program further illustrate the quality
improvements engendered by the service excellence program.
This is not to say that service excellence is without its drawbacks. Training is expensive and the results are not always
immediate. The work groups have experienced varying levels of success, according to the human resources director. In
particular, there is a need for greater employee-based innovation in both health and social services departments, both
of which have experienced greater resistance from middle managers.
Finally, it should be noted that the work of the Service Excellence committees does not overlap with that of the labor-
management committees. However, in a small organization such as Ontario County, there is overlap among the key
players in the various groups that allows for communication between them.
 Mutual-Gains Bargaining
A third tool, mutual-gains bargaining, has been used in the county to negotiate labor contracts since 1994, when the
county used this process to re-negotiate four contracts with CSEA. Training, provided by staff from the New York
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University, helped to educate both management and labor
about the techniques of mutual-gains bargaining. Results were positive, and both labor and management say they
would use mutual-gains bargaining again in future contracts. Through the mutual gains process, they both have
become more adept at cooperative skills, such as listening to each other and providing information up front.
Union leaders extolled the benefits of mutual gains, although they acknowledged the difficulty of adjusting to
providing information up front. Sounding a less satisfied note, one manager noted that mutual gains is a "tedious
process" and might not be used in the next contract, now that trust levels are high, making formal processes for
information-sharing less necessary. Mutual gains has proven valuable to smooth negotiation contracts, but as another
manager put it, "it is the respect and mutual trust developed the other 11 months of the year that really matters."
 The Right Climate
There were several pre-existing conditions needed to build cooperative labor-management relationships in Ontario
County. Above all, it was willingness of both labor and management to risk upsetting a stable but fundamentally
adversarial relationship to move towards a more cooperative, "win-win" model of relations. To do so, county leaders
focused on the county's changing needs and saw the value of changing the status quo in order to "be the best", as one
manager said.
There was some initial resistance to the Service Excellence program, for example, on the part of the Board of
Supervisors. They were skeptical of, in the words of one manager, "another one of those touchy-feely programs".
Today the legislators are much more supportive of the program, but as elected officials, ultimately they are most
interested in the bottom line. Since improvements are sometimes hard to quantify, this can be a barrier to gaining their
endorsement for new initiatives.
Some employees and middle managers have also remained uncomfortable with the new cooperative outlook. Middle
managers may rightfully believe they are being cut out of the decision-making loop, and that their jobs are threatened
as a result. However, county leaders say this resentment has diminished over time, as people have gotten involved and
helped to solve problems. However, some leaders wished they had made more effort to train middle managers before
cooperative processes were instituted. Some county officials believe it may take up to ten years for a full transition to a
new philosophy of cooperation.
Support from union leadership has been more uniform, especially in regard to safety, which is also a top priority for
national AFL-CIO leaders. Service Excellence parameters have even been incorporated into the most recent labor
contract. Still, leaders on both sides remark that some people are resistant to change of any kind, and that it takes time
to build the trust and teamwork necessary for change.
 Privatization, Engaging Labor, and Performance Measurement
Privatization is a contentious issue that can stymie even the smoothest labor-management relations. Ontario County has
successfully dealt with privatization issues by bringing labor into the process. When the county receives an unsolicited
offer to privatize a particular service, as it has for the county landfill, nursing home, and home health care, both
management and labor are involved in making the decision. In the case of home health, employees are giving input to
an outside consultant hired to study the costs and benefits of privatization. County administrators consider the input of
employees and the consultant alike before making a final decision.
As a result of the decision-making process, the landfill and nursing home have remained county-run, and the study of
home health care is ongoing. County officials, however, do make it clear that just because a service is not privatized
today does not mean it can't be in the future. If the private sector can provide the service cheaper and better, according
to county management, then the service will go private. This belief, in the words of union leaders, is a "constant
challenge," but they are glad to have the opportunity to conduct their own research and bring the results to the table to
discuss with management in a cooperative setting.
In another effort to engage labor in decision making, Ontario County union (CSEA) representatives serve on the search
committees for new county administrators. The present County Administrator was chosen this way, as was the Director
of Planning. County management and the union also cooperated in developing a new cafeteria health plan, which, after
a year-long education period, now allows workers to choose their own benefits package.
The effects on employee morale and citizen satisfaction of Ontario's cooperative programs have been positive, but have
only been quantified to a limited extent. Officials cite the difficulty of finding objective measures of performance
quality. The county has obtained some information through a "Citizen Survey" and an "Employee Survey" conducted
under the auspices of the Service Excellence program. The results of the surveys indicate that both citizens and
employees are generally satisfied with county services and workplaces. However, there was no survey taken prior to
implementing the changes. Nor was the data compared to national norms. While attitude change may be difficult to
quantify, the County is able to show clear instances of cost savings in particular departments, such as the workman's
compensation tax windfall. However, the County still does not have a way to measure cost savings on an inter-agency
level.
 Key Lessons
Cooperative labor-management structures have had a short but productive existence in Ontario County. Several key
lessons have emerged, according to both labor and management leaders:
It may be tempting to jump into the latest trendy program, but few people realize the amount of work needed to
sustain the effort. Begin by understanding the level of commitment needed to implement these programs.
It takes time to build a cooperative labor-management relationship. There is no such thing as a quick fix.
However, significant success was achieved in Ontario County in just three years of service excellence and
mutual gains.
In any negotiation, it is important to make sure the other side looks good. This mindset can lead to a more
productive negotiation process.
The right people need to be at the table for a successful result. If labor leaders don't represent employee's true
interests but defer to management, for instance, the negotiation will be futile. The people at the table also need to
have the authority to make a final decision.
One group can adhere to its principles and still maintain a regard for the other group's interests. There can be
mutual gains in the negotiation process.
Middle management must buy into the process and be trained in the cooperative philosophy. Even if top
management buys into the idea, middle managers need to support it. Leaders should not be afraid to make
ultimatums if middle managers continue to resist changes.
Attain small victories like safety improvements, and build on those successes to make broader changes.
Certain resources were especially helpful to both labor and management in getting the cooperative process started.
First and foremost, they did extensive background research on each initiative. For instance, county leaders recruited an
advisory council of eight business people who use Service Excellence in their firms. This council continues to provide
information to the county about private sector innovations that improve performance and service. Managers cited the
importance of looking to the private sector to learn about successful methods for building labor-management
cooperation.
Area educational institutions were also a valuable resource. The Finger Lakes Community College Business Institute
(FLCC), the Rochester Institute of Technology College of Continuing Education, the Cornell School of Industrial and
Labor Relations, and the Center for Government Research, a nonprofit public-policy consulting firm in Rochester, all
aided the process through information and/or training. The FLCC, for example, houses an Excellence in Government
Institute, which offers all county employees free certificate programs in supervision, customer skills, and workplace
skills. Course topics include conflict management, problem solving, meeting skills, and tools for process improvement.
On a national level, a summer program of the Institute for Local Government at the University of Virginia gave
officials a larger perspective on government restructuring efforts around the country.
 Conclusion
Instituting cooperative processes involves a culture change, an evolution in the way work systems are designed. It does
not occur overnight, nor without careful preparation. In order to effect changes in working relationships and labor-
management relations, managers, union officials, legislators, and employees need to be trained on the philosophy
behind cooperation. Both parties need to work together continuously to implement and effectively administer change.
Labor-management cooperation in Ontario County is a testimony to the leadership of both the union and management
in seeking better ways of working and new paths to success. Ontario County's example shows that cooperation does
not have to compromise or deny the identity of either party. However, cooperative structures are not panaceas. Conflict
may still arise, and if handled correctly, can spark creativity and change. Ontario County's example demonstrates that
labor-management cooperation can provide a better way for government to function effectively.
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Tompkins County is located in the Finger Lakes region of New York State at the base of Cayuga Lake. It has a
population of approximately 95,000, and operates under a county administrator who is appointed by the fifteen-
member elected Board of Representatives.
In Tompkins County, the primary focus of cooperative labor-management relations is a total quality management
initiative called Partners for Quality. All labor-management committees are implemented under the structural umbrella
of the Partners for Quality initiative. Mutual-gains bargaining is another tool used in Tompkins County. However, the
scope of mutual-gains bargaining is not as broad as the Partners for Quality program nor as central to day-to-day
decision making and service delivery.
The following people were interviewed for this study:
David Chase, President, CSEA Local 855
Scott Heyman, County Administrator
Barbara Mink, Chair, Board of Representatives
Labor-Management Committees
Mutual-Gains Bargaining
Benefits of Labor-Management Cooperation in Tompkins County
Key Lessons and Insights
Conclusion
 Labor-Management Committees
The Origins of Labor-Management Committees in Tompkins County
Labor-management committees have long been implemented in an ad hoc manner in Tompkins County. There was a
clause in the standard labor contract which allowed for creating labor-management committees to resolve workplace
conflicts or address specific projects, and labor-management committees were occasionally used in that context. There
was also an Employee Council (comprised primarily of employees) which served as a venue for communication.
These committees set the stage for implementing a formal total quality management program in the county in several
ways. First, they demonstrated to employees, managers, and elected officials that cooperative structures could be
effective. Second, the ad hoc committees on which any employee, union or non-union, could serve and which were
beginning to address contract matters such as terms and conditions of employment, represented a threat to the authority
of the CSEA Local 855, which bargains for all county employees. Thus, when county managers wanted to formalize
labor-management committees and subsume them under a total quality management initiative, it was in the union's
interest to work to negotiate an exclusive agreement between the county Board of Representatives and the union. At
that time, the other existing cooperative structures such as the Employee Council were disbanded.
How Labor-Management Committees Function Now
Under the total quality management program, there is a nested system of labor-management committees; a heirarchy
stepping down from the Leadership Council, to departmental committees, to cross-functional project teams.
The umbrella committee is the Leadership Council which directs the implementation of the program and provides
structural organizational support for departmental labor-management committees operating under the program. The
large departments in the County, such as the Department of Social Services, the Health Department, and the Probation
Department, each have a departmental labor-management committee which addresses general workplace matters and
formulates policy recommendations designed to improve the efficiency of the department. Cross-functional project
teams are created to work on a particular project such as coordinating intake systems for welfare and other social
service recipients.
Partners for Quality
In 1993, county administrators and elected officials decided to formalize the cooperative structures in the county and
implement a more comprehensive mechanism for cooperative decision-making: the Partners for Quality program (also
known as total quality management or TQM).
Tompkins County Administrator, Scott Heyman, had been interested in the concept of TQM for a number of years, but
information about implementing total quality management in the public sector was difficult to find. After some
research of successful examples of total quality management in the public sector in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and
Madison, Wisconsin, the Board agreed to hire Marcia Calicchia from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations
(ILR) at Cornell University and the Program for Employment and Workplace Systems (PEWS) to assist in planning
the implementation and conduct employee training. These consultants were chosen due to their jargon-free and labor-
oriented approach to TQM. This perspective on total quality management was, and still is, very important to the goals
of the county.
Shifting from Autocratic to Cooperative Work Systems
Barbara Mink, Chair of the Board of Representatives, described total quality management as "an absolute visceral
change in the way [we] react to problems and the way [we] take initiative for change." As a result of the Partners for
Quality initiative, many managers have shifted from an autocratic way of directing operations to one that is more
cooperative. This change in management style is beginning to impact all departments. Almost everything that is done
in Tompkins County now is done through a labor-management framework. Total quality management has impacted
Tompkins County employees and managers in a profound way; a higher degree of communication and cooperation is
now part of the culture in Tompkins County.
Structure of the Partners for Quality Program
There are three primary components to Partners for Quality:
1. The Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) Local 855 and the Tompkins County Board of
Representatives spent a year negotiating an agreement establishing the labor-management partnership. The
agreement outlines the guiding principles and overall expectations for the initiative. The agreement is still in
force.
2. The Leadership Council - a labor-management committee which guides the implementation of the Partners for
Quality program and provides structural, organizational support for departmental labor-management committees
operating under the program.
3. Every employee, manager, and legislator in Tompkins County is trained in total quality management techniques
and work processes. The goal is to provide training that crosses formal organizational boundaries. Marcia
Calicchia and her colleagues have trained twenty in-house facilitators in TQM techniques and several people
within the county now have leadership roles with the program.
Tompkins County has invested heavily in training for this program. Between 1994 and 1997, the county spent just over
$300,000 for outside consultants to conduct training. In 1998, the county will spend an estimated $170,000 for
consultants to complete the bulk of the training (for all departments except the sheriff's department which is
independent of other county government). Since 1997, in-house costs have been around $100,000. These costs will
drop dramatically after 1998, when all employees, managers, and elected officials have been trained in total quality
management techniques and only training for new employees and refresher courses will be necessary.
Successes
Certain projects are ideally suited for joint decision-making. It can be a time-consuming process, but the tangible
results are often worthwhile.
Example - Human Services Building
In December of 1997, Tompkins County completed construction on a new building to house the Department of Social
Services. The building was planned using TQM methods with a great deal of employee involvement in decision
making. The old building had inadequate ventilation and a lawsuit had been filed by employees which prompted the
search for a new facility.
When decisions such as these were made in the past, a committee of five legislators was chosen to oversee the project
without representation from labor. When the Board announced the formation of this committee, union representatives
requested labor's involvement in the design and construction of the facility. The size of the preliminary planning
committee grew to twenty-one members and, although it was large, the contribution of labor to the overall project
resulted in an extremely functional building.
The process took four years from conceptualization to completion. Most importantly, a lot of the controversy that
usually accompanies this kind of dramatic change was eliminated. When the committee was first established, labor
expressed some fear and anxiety toward the project. These concerns were largely dealt with in the context of the
various labor-management committees that were formed.
There were at least three committees established to construct the building: a stakeholders committee comprised of
building occupants (both labor and management) to do the preliminary planning of what was needed in a new building,
a building design committee which determined room sizes, color scheme, carpet types, etc., and a building
construction committee which organized and supervised construction. Barbara Mink reported: "[I]t was extremely
labor intensive, but not agonizingly so, and it resulted in the best building project we have ever had."
Limitations
Labor-management committees and total quality management methods can only function well when committee
authority is clearly-defined and consistent.
Example - Downtown Ithaca Parking
A county labor-management committee was formed to address the lack of employee parking in downtown Ithaca, and
was charged with the task of making recommendations to the Board of Representatives. The parking committee did not
have jurisdiction over expenditures; so the members could not recommend putting up a gate that costs $20,000, for
example, without going through the Board. However, the committee was given the authority to determine the policies
for county parking lots. The committee has recommended that several parking spaces currently reserved for Board
members be reassigned to other county employees. The Board is poised to reject the committee's recommendations.
The labor-management committee in this case does not have the authority to determine a policy that the Board of
Representatives does not like. Situations like this which give authority only to take it away can undermine cooperative
efforts and slowly-developing trust. To prevent failures, the role and authority of committees should be clearly defined
from the outset, and elected officials must be as committed to the process as others involved.
 Mutual-Gains Bargaining
In Tompkins County mutual-gains bargaining techniques have been instinctively used for many years. In 1995, County
administrators decided to formalize a mutual gains approach by training employees in the technique. Bernie Flaherty of
the School of Industrial Labor Relations at Cornell University trained approximately 300 of 720 county employees in
mutual-gains. Now all bargaining units other than the sheriff's department utilize mutual-gains techniques for all terms
and conditions except salary.
Mutual-gains bargaining is not a panacea for Tompkins County. The impact of using this tool depends on the
commitment of the participant as the President of the CSEA Local 855, David Chase pointed out:
Mutual-gains bargaining can be whatever you want it to be. Some people don't see [win-win] as win-win. Some
people see it as compromise-compromise...There's a contract between labor and management which automatically
creates sides. But, that doesn't mean that the two shouldn't look at each other and say: we should do what's best for the
both of us (and) for the entity that we serve which is Tompkins County...We realize the reality of the situation; there is
X amount of money to be allocated and we need to figure out the best way to move it around.
Mutual-gains bargaining serves to improve the process of negotiations. Through the use of this tool, consensus and
agreement can be reached more quickly and with less aggravation in Tompkins County.
Advantages of Mutual-Gains Bargaining
All three interviewees recognized the benefits of mutual gains techniques in negotiations. The fact that interest-based
approaches to problem solving have extended beyond the collective bargaining process to committee, and other
discussions, is an indication of their usefulness. Chair of the Board of Representatives, Barbara Mink indicated that the
Sheriff's Department used the language of mutual gains in the latest discussion of health care benefits.
In collective bargaining, salary remains the only issue that is not negotiated with mutual gains techniques. The county
has offered to negotiate salary using mutual gains but the union has resisted. However, the issue of salary was 'on the
table' faster than ever before in the latest round of contract negotiations according to David Chase.
 Benefits of Labor-Management Cooperation in Tompkins County
There are three broad expectations associated with labor-management cooperation in Tompkins County: to improve
labor/management relations, to decrease costs for delivering services, and to keep taxes down. The decision to
establish formal structures to share decision-making with labor was not due to particular fiscal or service pressures.
TQM is a formalization of the labor-management relationship that has been developing since the 1980s.
Improved Relations Between Labor and Management
The focus of the Tompkins County Partners for Quality (PfQ) initiative is on improved labor-management relations.
This reflects the perception that cooperation will directly, and indirectly, result in cost savings and improved service
quality. Barbara Mink describes its effects as:
"...a shift in our paradigm; an absolute visceral change in the way we react to problems and the way we take initiative
for change...Tompkins County is a good example of how TQM can work...The best evidence for this, in addition to the
cost savings and improvements in efficiency, is the change in people's attitudes."
These goals have been articulated through various mission and vision statements. In addition, TQM orientation
sessions, which have occurred since December 1994, are another forum for developing a shared understanding of these
goals.
Grievances
One indication of improved relations between labor and management is in the type and number of grievances that have
been filed since the implementation of TQM. The grievances that are filed today represent issues that are not
resolvable through labor-management committees. In Tompkins County, grievances have been minimized through
these new avenues for communication.
Improved Service Quality
In Tompkins County, the focus of labor-management cooperation is on process issues. For instance, the Department of
Social Services labor-management committee developed a framework for eliminating excessive layers of
administration. Now, there is a single intake system for food stamps and Medicaid. Indirectly, this change is impacting
more than service quality. The cost of providing services is being reduced.
Cost Savings from Improved Labor-Management Relations
Management believes the benefits of TQM more than outweigh the costs and has been willing to invest heavily in the
process. However, figures documenting these cost savings are hard to come by due to a fear that cost savings will result
in budget cuts, punishing successful departments. Coupling total quality management with performance-based
budgeting techniques could help to encourage documentation of cost savings. Another strategy would be to simply
make it clear at the outset to departmental staff that if funds for training and to sustain the overall initiative were going
to continue to flow, documentation of cost savings must be forthcoming.
 Key Lessons and Insights
Trust, Leadership, and Defining Roles
The most important factor in developing cooperation between labor and management is people. One of the main
reasons for the success of TQM in Tompkins County is that both management and labor were committed to the idea.
The degree of trust that existed prior to the implementation of TQM enabled Tompkins County to proceed with the
initiative.
Both Barbara Mink (Chair, Board of Representatives) and David Chase (CSEA Local 855 President) acknowledged
the role Scott Heyman (County Administrator) played in developing support for the Partners for Quality program in
Tompkins County. One concern David Chase has is the impact Scott Heyman's retirement will have on the initiative.
Subsequently, one priority of the interview process is to determine whether or not the values of candidates for County
Administrator are consistent with the TQM program.
The expectations and roles for labor-management committees must be defined as clearly as possible to limit
misunderstandings. Clear roles enable committees to remain focused. Union representatives have played an important
role in keeping this focus and pointing out when the committee is getting off track.
Communication and Planning
Communication is paramount to success. Through communication goals are defined, expectations are delineated, and
relationships are built. Limiting the use of jargon and terms also facilitates the process, especially during training
sessions.
Careful planning will result in a smooth transition during implementation. It is important to make sure the strategy for
implementation is clearly defined before presenting it to employees. Tompkins phased in its program and this led to a
lot of confusion among union members and employees because of the time lag between the start of training in the
Department of Social Services and the full implementation of TQM. Two years have elapsed since the initiative was
announced and some people have just begun their training.
Information
The major obstacle was not the will to begin using TQM, but the means by which to implement the program.
Tompkins devoted a lot of time and effort to finding the right people to conduct the TQM training. County
Administrator Scott Heyman asserts, "You have to make sure that you get the right people to do the training; that the
consultant's conception of TQM is what you want; that it is consistent with what you have been doing." In addition to
finding the right facilitators, reviewing the experience of local governments through hands-on practice is important.
 Conclusion
This case study has shown that labor-management cooperation is not only possible, but viable in Tompkins County.
With the right people to coordinate the effort and the support of labor, management, and elected officials, the TQM
initiative in Tompkins County has been, to a large degree, successful. The insights drawn from this case may provide
other county governments with information necessary to pursue labor-management cooperation as a tool for service
delivery.
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 Executive Summary
The public sector, particularly local government, is under pressure to simultaneously improve performance
and curtail costs. Reductions in state and federal funding, a continuing demand for efficient and flexible
government services, and fear of tax revolts are leading to reexaminations of how local governments can best
meet the demand for their services. Governments are utilizing a number of tools for restructuring service
delivery to increase efficiency and reduce costs.
In our background research, we identified two types of restructuring: external restructuring, where a
government turns to outside organizations to provide services (through privatization or intermunicipal
cooperation, for example), and internal restructuring, which seeks to improve service delivery by altering
organizational structure and decision-making processes. High levels of public sector unionization in New York
State make internal restructuring through labor-management cooperation an especially important alternative.
Through case studies of three New York State counties, we examined the use of three specific tools for labor-
management cooperation: labor-management committees, mutual-gains bargaining (MGB), and total quality
management (TQM). Genesee, Tompkins, and Ontario Counties were chosen as cases where at least two of
these three internal restructuring tools have been implemented successfully.
We found that these cooperative workplace structures improve communication and broaden participation in
decision making, leading to greatly improved labor-management relations and employee morale. They may
also reduce costs and improve service delivery. However, limited evaluation in the three counties makes
savings and service improvements difficult to document.
These tools appear to fall on a continuum of complexity, investment costs, and comprehensiveness. Labor-
management committees provide a foundation for the other tools by building an ongoing forum for
communication and trust building. They are flexible, deal with a wide array of concerns, and require minimal
training. Mutual-gains bargaining requires more training and, in our cases, a preexisting environment of trust.
While there are spillover benefits to other areas, MGB is primarily limited to contract negotiations. TQM is the
most comprehensive of the three tools and requires the greatest degree of training and organizational culture
change to be effective. It also may offer the greatest potential for service improvement.
The case study counties all enjoyed a preexisting environment of trust, committed leadership, and lack of
political or fiscal crisis. Given the investments in training and change in perspective required of labor,
management, and elected officials, implementation of these tools may be more successful in counties not
experiencing crisis or a recent history of labor-management conflict.
These internal restructuring tools are not designed to address external stakeholders. Service improvements
may be limited by higher-level policies and mandates these tools cannot address. Similarly, citizen
involvement is not enhanced by these tools. However, by creating new forums for communication and
participatory decision making, local government enhances its ability to identify and implement programs for
service improvement. Adding mechanisms for citizen involvement and strategies to push for needed policy
change at higher levels may further increase local government's capacity to restructure to meet the needs of
its diverse constituents.
 Introduction
The public sector is under pressure to simultaneously improve performance and curtail costs, and this is
particularly true of local government. Reductions in state and federal funding, tax revolts, and the advent of
privatization are leading to reexaminations of how local governments can best meet the demand for their
services. Keeping taxes down while delivering the quality services that citizens expect is a difficult challenge.
Local government must become more efficient and more accountable to the general public.
External Restructuring
External restructuring, which involves privatization or contracting out for services, can create a competitive
environment and result in increased efficiency and cost savings (Savas 1987). In New York State, however,
privatization has been limited (Lauder 1992). A 1997 survey of local government restructuring in the state
found intermunicipal cooperation to be the most common form of restructuring (45% of respondents).
Privatization was the next most common form of restructuring (31%), but reverse privatization (bringing
services back into the public sector) was also significant (Warner and Hebdon 1997). This suggests that local
governments in New York State recognize the value of both cooperation and competition in improving service
delivery.
Privatization can create an uneasy or even hostile environment between labor and management. It can result
in lower wages, benefits, and levels of unionization (Hebdon 1995; Chandler and Feuille 1991, 1994) despite
government efforts to ensure no layoffs. Some empirical studies have shown the impacts of contracting on
unionized workers' pay and employment to be minimal (Pendleton 1997). However, lowered employee morale
and fears about job security have significant negative effects on the potential for a cooperative relationship.
In addition, public sector unions must fight privatization if they are to retain their membership base (CSEA
1995).
In New York State, public sector collective bargaining is governed by the Taylor Law, which mandates that
employers negotiate with the union before contracting out a service that is essentially the same as one union
members currently provide. Thus the Taylor Law is often perceived as a roadblock to privatization. However,
under some circumstances, New York State's governments may contract out services without negotiating with
the union, and they also may downsize when there is no longer the need for a particular service or when
financial circumstances demand it. Nonetheless, collective bargaining restrictions under the Taylor Law may
limit opportunities for contracting out. This makes the search for other, more cooperative methods for
implementing workplace innovations essential for local government restructuring in New York State (Donovan
1990; Lawyers Co-operative Publishing 1982).
Internal Restructuring for Transforming Government
In their well-known book Reinventing Government (1992), David Osborne and Ted Gaebler argue that a
sweeping overhaul of how government does business can be achieved through internal restructuring. They
describe this as a move from a supply-driven system to a demand-driven system. The rigidity of budgeting,
service delivery, and the labor-management relationship in traditional supply-driven governments, they argue,
must be replaced by flexible, quality-oriented systems that are responsive to customers' needs. Internal
competition and more cooperative labor-management relationships can provide an effective alternative to
privatization for improving government efficiency.
Decentralization of authority can help government achieve better performance. The private sector has
demonstrated that decentralizing authority and flattening hierarchies can be very effective in improving
efficiency and product quality (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). Giving decision-making power to front-line
workers, who are closest to most of the problems and opportunities, and encouraging employee innovation
are important steps (Marshall 1992). Direct citizen participation is also vital to improving government services
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Osborne and Plastrik 1997).
Total quality management (TQM) is one vehicle for internal restructuring. TQM programs are being used to
transform government, especially at the federal level, but also in New York State and in more than 400
municipalities nationwide (Rusaw 1997, U.S. GAO 1995, New York State GOER 1992). TQM emphasizes an
organization's commitment to the customer and to continuous improvement of every process through the use
of data-driven problem-solving approaches based on empowerment of employee groups and teams.
Cooperative processes such as TQM help to create a culture change, perhaps the most important requirement
for transforming the public sector.
The Potential of Labor-Management Cooperation
Traditional industrial relations practices relied on the acceptance of a shared ideology among labor,
management, and government that defined workplace roles and provided stability to the system. The 1990s
saw the development of a new model, one that recognizes there is often a lack of consensus between
management and labor, and that both are greatly impacted by the instability in economic, technological,
political, and social environments. In this context, methods that focus on building communication and
cooperation between management and labor offer considerable promise (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994).
Cooperative labor-management structures such as labor-management committees, total quality management
(TQM) programs, and mutual-gains bargaining can be used effectively in the public sector. While the public
sector is distinct in many ways from the private sector, it can learn from the experiences of private firms in
implementing some of these progressive labor-management practices (Lawler 1990).
However, resistance to cooperative practices can be substantial. Any of the major stakeholders in the process-
management, elected officials, and labor-may resist the change for different reasons, making transition
difficult and time-consuming. Managers may resent their loss of authority and harbor doubts that productivity
gains can be attained through these methods. Elected officials may be hesitant to accept the political risks of
instituting change. Unions may perceive cooperative structures as a ploy to weaken labor and divert attention
from basic issues such as wages and job security. They also fear that by increasing workplace efficiency, they
are putting their jobs in jeopardy (Gold 1986). In addition, participation may not necessarily give workers any
real power.
Cooperative tools are inherently limited, since many fundamental decisions about organizational structure and
work processes still remain in the domain of upper management. This is a commonly cited drawback to
programs such as TQM (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). But more and more it is being recognized that all
interested parties (labor, management, elected officials, customers) should have a voice in decision making,
and that valuable production knowledge resides in all levels of an organization, especially with front-line
workers (Marshall 1992). Having been implemented in the private sector with success, cooperative techniques
are clearly beginning to take hold in public sector workplaces, as evidenced by the many examples profiled in
the U.S Department of Labor report Working Together for Public Service, better known as the Florio Report
(1996).
The literature indicates that effects of labor-management cooperation on the ability of local government to
undertake internal restructuring and to improve service delivery are worth examining. While obstacles clearly
exist, with effort, many of the barriers to labor-management cooperation can be overcome (Gold 1986). By
profiling counties where several tools of labor-management cooperation have been employed successfully, we
hope to add to the existing knowledge of how these specific tools can be used to improve local government
services.
 Methodology
Initial research for this project was conducted in collaboration with the New York State Civil Service
Employees Association (CSEA), the New York State Association of Counties (NYSAC), and the New York State
Department of State's (DOS) Division of Local Government. Representatives from each of these groups were
interviewed for their perspectives on and concerns about local government restructuring. The team found,
through these discussions, that public sector management was searching for ways to improve internal and
external operations, while labor was interested in exploring ways to prevent privatization of services. We
hypothesized that labor-management cooperation can reduce costs and increase service quality, diminishing
the impetus for privatization.
Further interviews with key informants helped the team focus on the relevant issues surrounding labor-
management cooperation and identify the types of labor-management tools being employed in counties
throughout New York State. Key informants included: CSEA, NYSAC, DOS, the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB), the Governor's Office of Employee Relations (GOER), staff and faculty of Cornell University's
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, and elected officials from counties which had implemented some
form of cooperation (see Appendix A for complete list).
We found that formal labor-management cooperative initiatives were not widely used in the state, but that a
handful of both exemplary and semi-successful cases did exist. In the majority of cases, the most commonly
implemented tools were labor-management committees, mutual-gains bargaining (MGB), and total quality
management (TQM) programs. As a result, the team decided to focus on these three initiatives as tools of
the labor-management cooperative process.
A 1997 survey of local government restructuring in New York State provided a preliminary indication of the
incidence of privatization and restructuring in NYS counties (Warner and Hebdon 1997)1. Twelve of the
counties that responded to this survey indicated they had used cooperative labor-management initiatives. Key
informants provided names of counties which had participated in TQM or mutual-gains bargaining training, or
had implemented labor-management committees2. The research team then selected three counties-Genesee,
Ontario, and Tompkins-which had been successful in implementing formal labor-management cooperation.
To explore our hypothesis that labor-management cooperative efforts could be an attractive alternative to
privatization, the following key questions were formulated for the case studies based on the preliminary
interviews and relevant literature:
What are the basic elements of a cooperative labor-management relationship in county government?
What are the goals that labor, management, and county officials hope to achieve through cooperation?
What is the impact of a cooperative labor-management program on labor relations, service quality, and
cost of service delivery?
These key questions reflect an attempt to describe the process of labor-management cooperation. Therefore,
the chosen research method for the project is that of a case study, a descriptive research tool (Yin 1984).
The case study counties were selected on the following criteria:
Utilizing several tools of labor-management cooperation. Having examined in our preliminary
investigation several counties that had implemented one cooperative tool with marginal success, the
team hypothesized that several tools may be necessary to substantively change the relationship between
management and labor. Thus we chose counties that had implemented more than one of the cooperative
tools identified: total quality management, labor-management committees, or mutual-gains bargaining.
Key informant recommendations. The case study selection was also based on the beliefs of key
informants listed in Appendix A that these counties were among the more successful of New York State in
implementing cooperative labor-management efforts.
Willingness to participate and proximity. Cases were selected on the basis of the willingness and ability
of the counties to provide us with the necessary access to personnel and resources. Geographic proximity
to Ithaca was also a consideration due to time constraints.
In each case, every attempt was made to interview one or more representatives from each of the three
perspectives: elected officials, management, and organized labor (see Appendix B). An interview guide (see
Appendix C) was developed to provide consistency and direction across all interviews. However, the interview
format also provided flexibility for open-ended responses, so that the elements, advantages, challenges, and
lessons of labor-management cooperative initiatives could be fully explored. Interviewees were able to
respond to questions and expand on their ideas verbally, in a manner that a survey does not allow.
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the majority of interviewees. When this was not possible,
interviews were conducted by telephone. Interviews were summarized and shared with interviewees for
review. Where necessary, follow-up interviews were conducted by telephone.
The research team compared the cases, discussing the commonalities and differences across them.
Preconditions, goals, and limitations of the three tools of labor-management cooperation studied were
emphasized. The analysis was written as a draft report and shared with the key informants in the case study
counties. Their comments were incorporated into the final report. Permission to share the information
contained in this report with the public was obtained from all county officials and staff who were interviewed.
 Findings
The case study counties-Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins-are located in central and western New York State.
Genesee County has a population of about 60,000, while Ontario and Tompkins each have about 95,000
residents. Politically, Genesee and Ontario are governed by Republican-dominated legislatures and Tompkins
currently has a Democrat-controlled board. All three counties have an appointed full-time county manager or
administrator. This is the most common form of county government in New York State3. The presence of a
professional, full-time manager was a control factor across these three counties. The ability to generalize
findings to other counties with county executives or no full-time, professional manager may be limited.
However, key informants familiar with cooperative efforts across the state indicate that strong leadership and
support for change appear to be more important to successful implementation than type of governance
structure.
Additionally, the environment between labor and management in all three cases was found to be generally
cooperative, or at least noncombative, prior to the implementation of cooperative initiatives. Therefore, this
study cannot speak to counties where an adversarial relationship between labor and management is present.
The three labor-management tools were found to exist along a continuum of complexity, with labor-
management committees providing the foundation for the other two tools. These committees provide a
flexible forum for problem solving and building trust, and they require minimal training. Labor-management
committees in all cases predated mutual-gains bargaining and TQM. The interest-based bargaining approach
of MGB required substantial training for successful implementation. Used primarily for contract negotiations,
MGB appears to have had very positive effects on negotiation processes and outcomes, as well as positive
spillover effects to other arenas of decision making. TQM was by far the most comprehensive and complex of
the three tools studied. Extensive training of labor, management, and elected officials was required to support
the culture change toward shared decision making required for a successful TQM effort.
Key elements for successful cooperation include training, committed leadership, communication, and
evaluation. In the case study counties, improved morale, costs savings, and service improvements resulted
from the use of these three tools, suggesting they do provide an effective alternative to privatization.
However, limited evaluation in the counties prevented definitive analysis of the true costs and benefits of
labor-management cooperation.
 Labor-Management Committees
Labor-management committees are cooperative structures that focus on problem solving and building trust.
They typically deal with issues including workplace safety, work hours, training, personnel issues, and daily
workplace concerns. Although labor-management committees may initially focus on less controversial issues,
such as worker safety standards, over time they may build a level of trust between labor and management
that allows them to deal with more complex problems (Gold 1986).
Labor-management committees may be permanent or they may form around a particular issue and disband
once resolution is reached. However, they are not necessarily formed to solve crises. Many are proactive and
attempt to improve current work practices. They are flexible and easy to implement, and require minimal
training. Labor-management committees are cornerstones of cooperation in each of the counties studied.
Structure
The labor-management committees in Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties are similar in terms of their
goals: enhanced labor-management relations, decreased costs, and improved services. Each county has a
central guiding or umbrella committee that oversees the activities of issue-based or departmental labor-
management subcommittees. They may facilitate training and provide direction to subcommittees or they
may address specific program innovations or daily operations. All three counties implemented labor-
management committees before mutual-gains bargaining and total quality management.
There are differences in how each county uses the committees, however. In Ontario County, where such
committees have existed since the early 1980s, they operate independently of the TQM program. Ontario
County has a countywide committee, committees that operate within departments, and others that address
specific issues, such as safety and health.
Tompkins County's labor-management committees, which have existed since the mid-1980s, now function as
part of its TQM program. Prior to the inception of the TQM program, non-union members who volunteered or
were voted in by all employees were allowed to serve on labor-management committees. Under the total
quality management agreement negotiated between the CSEA and the county board of representatives, now
there are more committees, and only union-selected representatives may serve on them (see the total
quality management section, below).
Genesee County does not have a TQM program, and their labor-management committees are the main venue
for workplace innovation. There is one main committee for the general bargaining unit, which covers most
county departments, and a separate committee for the nursing home unit.
Representation
Labor-management committees are composed of representatives of management and the union. Only in
Tompkins County were legislators also included. Tompkins County's umbrella committee has 13 members,
including representatives from top management, middle management, and labor. In Ontario County, the
countywide committee is made up of the county administrator, deputy administrator, director of human
resources, and several of the local union presidents. In Genesee County, the general unit committee consists
of the county manager, the personnel officer, the CSEA general unit president, and the regional labor
relations specialist, as well as two more representatives from both management and labor who rotate onto
the committee in three-year intervals. This provides more people an opportunity to be part of the process.
Size of the committees varies according to the scope of the issue and the need for stakeholder input. Most
have eight or fewer members, but at least one committee in Tompkins County has over twenty members.
Functions
In all counties, labor-management committees address a broad spectrum of workplace concerns. In Genesee
County, the general unit committee emphasizes relationships and creating an environment where employees
feel their input is valued and decisions are made by consensus. The labor-management committee has
introduced policies that create a more family-oriented environment.
Labor-management committees can also be forums for discussing alternatives to privatization proposals. In
Ontario County, labor has the opportunity to give their input before a decision to privatize a service is made
by the administration. In Genesee County, labor and management formed a special joint action committee to
address the threat of possible privatization in the Department of Mental Health Services.
Labor-management committees can impact the delivery of government services by finding ways to reduce
costs while maintaining or improving the service itself. While hard data documenting the impact of innovations
on cost was difficult to obtain, workers' compensation costs were significantly reduced in Tompkins County as
a result of safety measures and training recommended by a labor-management committee (prior to the
implementation of TQM). In Genesee County, labor-management committee recommendations and process
improvements have led to cost savings through reduced absenteeism, increased productivity, and decreased
supervision time. Their nursing home committee has helped the facility improve efficiency and avoid
privatization. Client surveys in Ontario and Tompkins Counties have indicated overall improvements in
services.
Labor-management committees do not address contract disputes or grievances, although they appear to be
effective in defusing potential problems before they reach the grievance stage. All three counties credited
labor-management committees for helping to keep the number of formal grievances low.
Role and Authority of Committees
There is great flexibility in how roles are defined for labor-management committees. Tompkins County has a
formal agreement defining the roles, expectations, and boundaries of authority for the Leadership Council,
which took one year to negotiate and which clearly outlines the scope of the committee process. Genesee
County has less formal written guidelines that articulate the goals and procedures of the committee. The
authority of the labor-management committee is not written into a contract but is accepted by both parties.
Ontario County's labor-management committee is well entrenched and seems to function effectively without a
written agreement.
Labor-management committees have varying degrees of authority and power. In some cases, their policy
recommendations are binding, while in others they merely offer suggestions that must gain the approval of
elected officials. This is often the case when budget or cost decisions are involved. Committees in Ontario
County are empowered to draft letters of agreement around issues that would normally be addressed through
contract negotiations.
In some cases, the use of labor-management committees may impact traditional lines of authority. Middle
managers may lose some of their decision-making authority because employees can voice concerns directly to
top levels of management through the committee. In Ontario County this was an issue, but in Genesee and
Tompkins Counties, middle managers are included on committees.
Training/Support
Training committee members in conflict resolution and consensus decision making may help committees work
more smoothly. Training sessions allow both groups to establish their commitment to the concept and to
forge cooperative relationships. For example, in the Genesee County Nursing Home, a half-day training
session for the entire staff helped them use their labor-management committee more effectively. In this case,
a CSEA facilitator from Albany was used. The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and Cornell's
Industrial and Labor Relations Extension are other valuable sources of training and information. It is
important to recognize, however, that there may be a significant time lag after training before measurable
results are seen.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties, which had longer-standing labor-management committees, have invested
more in training for mutual-gains bargaining techniques and total quality management than for labor-
management committees.
Relationships
Labor-management committees can be contentious because they bring together individuals with diverse
points of view. Strong leadership, good communication, and commitment to the process make the difference
between success and failure. Without these elements it is difficult, if not impossible, to build the necessary
level of trust to make a labor-management committee work. Both Tompkins and Genesee Counties had
attempted labor-management committees in the past, with limited scope and success. By focusing on
relationships, building trust, and gaining the commitment of leadership they were able to establish the
successful committees that operate today. One strategy used was to begin by addressing issues that are less
contentious, to build momentum so committees can tackle larger, more difficult problems in the future. This
increases the level of trust among committee members and reduces the potential for early conflict.
Employee morale has been greatly improved in the counties studied. There are still conflicts and differences
of opinion, but labor-management committees provide a mechanism for giving voice to these problems before
they become intractable.
Challenges and Limitations
Several challenges in implementing labor-management committees are evident:
Time is required to build the trust necessary for effective committees.
They have limited authority: they are not designed to make decisions about broad structural changes in
county operations.
Defining the appropriate roles and boundaries of committees is important: many problems lie beyond the
scope of committees and call for wider participation of elected officials and citizens.
Conclusion
Labor-management committees are excellent forums for communication and workplace problem solving. They
are flexible and require minimal training, which also makes them inexpensive. In all three counties, good
communication, strong relationships, committed leadership, and trust proved to be the most important factors
for committee success. While the most compelling impact seen was on labor-management relations,
committee efforts also led to improvements in county government functioning. Labor-management
committees are relatively easy to implement and provide a foundation for incorporating more sophisticated
tools, such as mutual-gains bargaining and total quality management, into an organization.
The following are recommendations to consider for labor-management committees:
Establish a central, guiding committee to oversee the endeavor.
Integrate committees into the organizational structure.
Define expectations and parameters for decision making.
Include as many stakeholders as possible and necessary.
Communicate and foster a shared understanding of goals and objectives for both the committee and the
organization.
Be cognizant of power differentials and the effect these may have on communication.
Address issues where it is easy to reach consensus at the outset in order to build momentum to tackle
more difficult topics.
 Mutual-Gains Bargaining
Mutual-gains bargaining (MGB) is a method of bargaining designed to dramatically improve the quality of
contract negotiations and increase the likelihood of compliance between labor and management, ultimately
benefiting their constituents. The mutual-gains process focuses on negotiations based on interests rather than
positions and on building consensus. Through this process, unions and management identify at least one
common goal and find ways to jointly accomplish that goal (Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton 1993). While MGB
can be used for many types of negotiations, the case studies focused on its use for contract negotiations.
Ontario County has been using mutual-gains bargaining since 1994, Tompkins County since 1995, and
Genesee County since 1996.
Preconditions
All three counties had existing cooperative labor-management relationships in place before the initiation of
MGB. Tompkins and Ontario Counties indicated they had been using interest-based bargaining techniques
informally for years, and that they moved to MGB as a way of formalizing the process. This leads us to
speculate that counties that have good labor-management relationships may be more apt to implement MGB
because the idea of cooperating isn't very radical to them and there is less distrust between labor and
management to overcome. Genesee County, however, was less satisfied with their standard negotiation
process and wanted to use MGB to improve the quality of negotiations.
Benefits
Mutual-gains bargaining led to smoother contract negotiations in all three counties. This was especially true in
Genesee, where labor and management agreed the new techniques were far more productive than previous
negotiations. Perhaps because Ontario and Tompkins Counties already had well-established cooperative
structures that resembled MGB in place, the changes were less dramatic, but in both counties labor and
management spoke positively about the effects of MGB techniques on the negotiating process.
MGB can be used to empower workers and strengthen their organizations, as well as to shape their lives at
work. The benefits include increased access to information, prenotification of changes in work arrangements
and technology, and increased input, which helps management avoid errors or decisions that would hurt
union membership. There is also an indication that work satisfaction may increase, and the union may be
able to address a broader range of members' concerns more quickly and fully. In addition, the literature on
the subject indicates that union membership, education, and skill levels increase.
In the public sector, management must make the organization as effective as possible to meet the needs and
expectations of citizens and their legislative authorities. Management's benefits include improved
effectiveness, increased organizational flexibility, an improved working environment, and enhanced
productivity (Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton, 1993).
Labor and management in the case study counties agree MGB has saved a lot of time. The use of MGB
allowed Genesee County to complete their last contract in about a month, whereas it used to take up to six
or seven months. The same is true for Tompkins County, where labor and management found the salary
issue was on the table faster than ever before, in part because the economy was doing well, but also as a
result of MGB.
Neither management nor labor see MGB as a panacea, but both concede that both parties walk away from the
negotiating process feeling better. While both labor and management in Ontario County are pleased with
MGB, the union appears to favor the process a bit more. CSEA representatives felt that MGB would definitely
be used in the future. At least one manager, on the other hand, was of the opinion that MGB was a bit
"tedious" and might not be used in the next contract because levels of trust were already high. In Tompkins
County, labor felt that the "win-win" solutions that MGB is supposed to create often result in compromises.
Management respected the process, but felt it was nothing new in comparison to the way they interacted in
the past.
Leadership
The commitment of top management and union leaders to MGB is very important to its success. Some people
will find it difficult to accept a new approach and will be subversive to both groups' mutual interests. In some
cases, a change in leadership was necessary before a county could effectively implement MGB. In Ontario and
Genesee Counties, for example, changes in union and/or management leadership preceded their formal
implementation of MGB.
During negotiations, and during day-to-day interaction, the administration, union leaders, and managers need
to set an example of open communication for all to follow. Labor and management must be committed to
MGB. They must communicate with each other, understand each other's needs and interests, and pursue
answers that benefit both groups. Tompkins, Genesee, and Ontario Counties' MGB efforts had the support of
top management.
Training
Mutual-gains bargaining requires a change in philosophy that cannot occur without careful preparation. Unlike
traditional collective bargaining, mutual-gains bargaining operates on trust and open information sharing, and
as simple as the concept might be, it is critical that labor, management, and legislators receive training
before they decide to embark on mutual gains. While legislators do not participate in negotiation, it is
important they understand and support the process.
In their efforts to implement MGB, Ontario, Genesee, and Tompkins Counties all turned to the New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations Extension for training. Tompkins County trained 300 out of 720
employees in MGB before its formal implementation in 1995, and had few problems. Now all bargaining units
in Tompkins County (except the sheriff's department) use mutual-gains techniques for all terms except salary.
In the case of Genesee County, the assistant county manager was trained to facilitate the negotiations, while
Ontario and Tompkins used outside facilitators. Although Genesee's general unit contract was successfully
negotiated using MGB in a much shorter period of time than was typical, the negotiating process was still very
challenging, and the rank and file expressed skepticism about the initial contract. Because of the distrust that
traditionally exists between the two groups, it may help to use an outside facilitator at the outset. Even with
training, it can take employees and management time to learn to trust and accept the process.
Challenges
MGB can benefit both labor and management, but it can also be risky to both parties. Both union leaders and
management are in danger of being perceived as too close to the "adversary"- legislators may fear
management is being too easy on the union, while union members may fear their leadership is being "co-
opted." Since the union is negotiating the terms and conditions of employment for its members, it has more
at stake. The open negotiation process inherently requires each side to relinquish some of its negotiating
power and may limit the union's ability to act as a unified group. In Tompkins County, the union has not yet
agreed to negotiate salary using mutual-gains bargaining techniques largely for these reasons.
Mutual-gains bargaining is a process that was developed in the private sector to increase labor-management
cooperation, but also to aid downsizing efforts. MGB inherently cuts out middle management as the mediators
between labor and top management. In Ontario County, for example, middle managers were resistant to
MGB, as it appeared to take some of their authority away.
Finally, because mutual-gains bargaining is a tool which is used only during contract negotiation time, it is
limited in its ability to have a direct impact on the daily interaction between labor and management.
However, there were important "spillover" effects of mutual-gains bargaining training to other venues such as
labor-management committees and total quality management teams.
Conclusion
Interest-based bargaining appears to save money and time, and have positive effects on labor-management
relationships. MGB resulted in quicker contract negotiation where both parties walked away feeling better
about the process and the outcome. However, as with other similar labor-management cooperative methods,
it is difficult to quantify the results of MGB. For example, Ontario County tries to quantify cost savings
whenever possible but finds it difficult to assign a dollar value to the intangible benefits of their cooperative
efforts. The counties studied did not establish evaluation measures to determine what impact (positive or
negative) MGB has made.
 Total Quality Management (TQM)
While Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties have all implemented labor-management committees and
mutual-gains bargaining, only Ontario and Tompkins Counties have instituted total quality management
(TQM) initiatives. Ontario County began to implement total quality management in 1993, Tompkins County in
1994.
Total quality management represents a shift in management philosophy from autocratic, hierarchical decision-
making structures to flatter organizational structures and shared decision-making responsibility (Kursat and
Calicchia 1994). In the past few decades, following the model of the private sector, local governments have
come to realize that top-down management is not always the best way to achieve results and that line
workers have valuable contributions to make in identifying strategies for improvement (Osborne and Gaebler
1992).
In Tompkins and Ontario Counties, total quality management has changed the way decisions are made,
processes are designed, and labor and management interact. Informants describe total quality management
programs as a "visceral change," a "paradigm shift," and a "culture change." Both counties' total quality
management programs are new, and therefore conclusions about the programs' impacts and differences
between them are tentative.
Three Components: Shared Decision Making, Customer Focus, Management by Fact
Total quality management initiatives have three primary components according to Kursat and Calicchia
(1994):
1. Shared leadership and employee involvement
Total quality management programs are based in part on the idea that employees performing the work
can create more efficient and effective processes to produce a higher-quality product. Total quality
management programs typically establish formal structures such as labor-management committees for
sharing decision making between managers and front-line employees.
2. Customer focus and an emphasis on service and product quality 
TQM focuses on the needs and wants of two types of customers: "internal" customers-the next people
down the line in the work process-and "external" customers-those who purchase or utilize a good or
service. TQM seeks to improve the quality of both the product and the process by identifying the type
and quality of good desired by both internal and external customers and providing what each customer
wants. This can be difficult, since in the public sector, external customers include the people using a good
or service but also the people paying for the good (taxpayers) and their representatives (elected
officials).
3. Management by fact and continual improvement 
Total quality management encourages steady data collection and rational decision making based on data
rather than on impressions or uninformed opinions. Labor-management committees are one way to
collect data about many facets of a complex issue. Others include customer surveys and careful tracking
and documentation of any cost or time savings. The second component, a philosophy of continual
improvement, encourages employees and managers to exceed current standards. Continuous
improvement is achieved through constant experimentation, learning from mistakes, and diffusing
learning throughout the organization.
Goals
In both Tompkins and Ontario Counties, the goals of total quality management most often articulated by
managers and employees were to improve labor-management relations and work conditions, leading to a
more smoothly functioning organization. All parties also expressed a desire to improve service quality. This
desire is exemplified by Ontario County's slogan for total quality management: "We aspire to excellence." In
Tompkins County, elected officials' goals focused primarily on service improvement and cost savings.
Training
Participatory methods of decision making, identifying customer needs, and determining what kind of data to
collect and how to collect it require skills of employees and managers that are not inborn or traditionally
taught in schools or in the workplace. Thus, to effectively implement a total quality management program and
achieve the paradigm shift required for success, training is essential.
Of the two counties, Tompkins has conducted more extensive training and spent more money. Tompkins
County's Leadership Council (the labor-management committee charged with planning and managing the total
quality management program) has the goal of training all employees, managers, and elected officials in
quality methods. Initial training sessions were conducted by consultants, who are still involved in the process.
In the fall of 1996, however, the county hired a full-time training coordinator, and now more sessions are
conducted by in-house staff.
Between 1994 and 1997, Tompkins County spent just over $300,000 for outside consultants to conduct
training. In 1998, the county will spend an estimated $170,000 on consultants to complete the bulk of the
training. Since 1997, in-house costs have been around $100,000. These costs will drop dramatically after
1998, when all employees, managers, and elected officials will have been trained in total quality management
techniques and only training for new employees and refresher courses will be necessary.
Ontario County appears to have spent significantly less on their training program, particularly on outside
consultants. Initially both labor and management leaders as well as county legislators were trained at the
Rochester Institute of Technology. Initial training cost $35,000 for employees and $50,000 for supervisors,
managers, and elected officials. The county gradually built their capacity to do training in-house, and today all
county employees have been trained in TQM concepts.
It is important to remember when comparing these figures, however, that we obtained dollar amounts from
Tompkins County for both outside and in-house costs, whereas the figures reported for Ontario County's
training costs are only initial start-up costs for consultants. Still, there appears to be an appreciable
difference in expenditures on consultants.
This difference may be due to the values held by county leaders. Tompkins County leaders are professionally
and personally interested in organizational theory and process, and are willing to wait for long-term results.
These may be the reasons for the strong emphasis on process and formal training. Ontario County leaders
seem less interested in process and more interested in both short- and long-term results.
Support Structures
Individuals, however well trained in new ways of thinking and doing, will not be able to maintain the culture
shift without a system of structural supports that devolve authority for decision making to labor-management
teams. Supportive structures are probably one of the largest differences between total quality management
programs which employees perceive to be "fake" and those which seem more real and effective.
Ontario County's Service Excellence program is structured around a countywide steering committee that acts
as a core planning group, setting the direction for the program and coordinating the activities of the
subgroups. The four departmental work group committees each have the same organizational structure as the
steering committee and coordinate their corresponding functions.
Tompkins County's Leadership Council includes representatives from labor, top management, middle
management, and elected officials. The Leadership Council guides the training process and the activities of
departmental committees, and facilitates the work of smaller, project-oriented or cross-functional committees.
Another support mechanism is in-house training facilitators. Currently, Tompkins County employs a full-time
training coordinator. An additional twenty employees act as facilitators, assuming leadership roles on various
departmental and issue-related committees. They lend practical support based on their understanding of TQM
and committee concepts. In addition, they are role models for other employees and managers.
Advantages
Total quality management is the most comprehensive cooperative tool for restructuring that the research
team investigated. More than labor-management committees, total quality management programs can
address inefficiencies in work processes and strive to identify customer needs. Unlike mutual-gains bargaining
techniques, which are used primarily for contract negotiations once every few years, total quality
management is ongoing and suffuses all work processes. It empowers labor to improve the workplace. In
Tompkins County, for instance, labor-management relations had been good for some time, but TQM forced
managers to rethink their traditional style to allow greater employee involvement in decision making.
Employees and management now work together to solve problems, and by all accounts, both find the new
process more productive and rewarding.
The cases studied indicate that total quality management does improve the functioning of the organization,
employee morale, and labor-management relations. Based on the suggestions of a total quality management
committee in the Department of Social Services, Tompkins County streamlined the intake process for several
social service programs. A Tompkins County survey indicates that employee morale in the Department of
Public Works improved 22% between 1990 and 1997. Further, since the TQM programs have been
implemented, both Ontario and Tompkins Counties have had fewer frivolous grievances as a result of
increased communication and trust.
The programs have also reduced costs in both counties, although the cost savings have not always been well
documented. Tompkins County representatives believe they have saved a great deal due to improved morale
and greater efficiency. Ontario County has documented savings through the efforts of its workplace safety
team. The team project began with county safety coordinators identifying high-risk job duties, such as driving
and heavy lifting, based on local and national accident and injury data. Employees performing these tasks
were then trained in safer driving and lifting techniques, resulting in a 37% reduction of OSHA-recordable
injuries in the county from 1994 to 1997. Lost days were reduced by 60% in the same time period. As a
result of these safety improvements, a special tax assessment to pay for workers' compensation, to be spread
out over five years, was paid off in only three, saving taxpayers $1.5 million.
Limitations
Both middle managers and elected officials may resist the total quality management culture change because
it devolves supervisory and decision-making power to TQM teams and committees. While middle managers
and elected officials are formally involved in several levels of the TQM program in Tompkins County, they are
absent from the committees in Ontario County, and have understandably been more resistant to the process.
Middle managers may also fear for their jobs. Tompkins County is dealing with this issue by retaining middle
managers as top-level technical employees and ensuring their representation on the TQM committees.
Another limitation of total quality management as a tool for restructuring is its internal focus. The difficulty in
identifying the "customer" for public sector goods and services and the focus on internal work processes
make it hard to truly involve citizens in these TQM efforts. Both counties seek to identify external customer
needs with surveys, and Tompkins County includes elected representatives on committees, but neither county
includes citizens on committees. In Ontario County, citizen involvement in the TQM program is slightly greater
than in Tompkins, since it includes an advisory council made up of a select group of local business owners.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties both seem to focus more attention on internal customers, (through surveys
and participation in labor-management committees), in the belief that process improvements will result in
product and service improvements. This is not an unreasonable assumption, though it can be difficult to
document. Customer satisfaction surveys in Ontario and Tompkins Counties indicate external customers are
generally satisfied with service improvements generated by total quality management programs.
The substantial cost of total quality management training and implementation as well as the time required to
reap benefits are also limitations of total quality management as a tool for local government restructuring.
Finally, because total quality management focuses primarily on internal work processes, policy about external
factors is outside its purview. The inability to address broader policy issues may limit the ultimate impact of
investments in total quality management.
 Conclusions
Goals of Cooperative Tools and Processes
Most of our informants articulated their goal as a more smoothly functioning organization, with more creative
problem solving and positive interactions between management and labor. Managers and elected officials
focused on increased efficiency, cost savings, and improved service quality. Labor representatives expressed
goals of increasing employee participation in decision making and improving service delivery by widening
employees' stake in the process and product. Thus, improving service delivery was a goal of all parties, but
with slightly different emphases. Elected officials valued improved service delivery for its impact on citizen
constituents, whereas labor representatives valued increased service quality for its effects on job quality.
Preconditions for Success
Several conditions existed in our counties prior to the successful introduction of formalized cooperative
processes. First, the labor-management relationship in all three counties was already cooperative, or at least
noncombative, providing fertile ground in which cooperative structures could thrive. Second, all the counties
we studied were in relatively stable economic and political positions prior to establishing cooperative
structures. We were not informed of any fiscal or political crises in recent memory that might put pressure on
leaders to avoid the risk-taking inherent in cooperative initiatives. These three counties made a significant
culture change not as a last-resort strategy, but as a means to improve already functional but imperfect
processes. However, the cooperative structures have proven useful in dealing with crisis, such as the
threatened sale of the nursing home in Genesee County.
We observed several other essential preconditions in our study counties. Committed, supportive leaders are
required. This sometimes necessitates a change in the legislature, county administration, or union leadership.
The attitudes of those in leadership positions proved crucial to the counties' ability to embrace the new ideas
and paradigms of cooperative tools. Furthermore, in order to buy into the new cooperative relations, middle
managers and line employees had to trust the intentions of both labor and management leaders. Even in
counties where cooperative tools have been used successfully, the departments with a lower degree of labor-
management trust have been slower to make the transition to new tools.
Impacts of Cooperation
Internal Process Improvements
The changes seen in government service delivery seem to be primarily internal in nature. Tompkins County,
for instance, streamlined its intake processes for various social services. Genesee County instituted several
policies that affect employee benefits, encouraging workplace efficiency and increased job satisfaction. The
efficiency gains from internal restructuring are thought to "trickle down" to external improvements. The
Genesee County Nursing Home, for instance, through its labor-management committee, has addressed
staffing issues that are crucial to efficient functioning and effective service delivery.
Employee Morale
The second area where impacts have been significant is employee morale, which was uniformly reported by
our informants to have improved under cooperative processes. Again, data for improvements are difficult to
obtain, and most employee surveys were completed after new structures were implemented, and therefore
lack a comparative benchmark. All counties stated the number of grievances has decreased, and the
grievances that are filed are uniformly serious in nature, the less serious problems being resolved in other
forums, due to improved communication and trust.
Cost Savings
Though gains and savings have sometimes proven difficult to measure due to a fear of budget cuts to
agencies that report cost savings, the overriding sentiment is that cooperative efforts are resulting in real cost
savings. Ontario County has documented at least one instance of large financial savings in its reduction of
worker compensation costs due to a safety program implemented by a TQM committee. Genesee County's
nursing home has become profitable again in part due to the efforts of its labor-management committee.
Key Elements for Cooperation
From the case studies, we have identified a number of elements that are necessary for cooperation to be
successful:
Training
First, a substantial amount of time and resources were devoted to training labor and management leaders,
and more often than not, legislators and line employees as well, in cooperative structures and processes. In
Ontario and Tompkins Counties for instance, all employees are being trained in total quality management
concepts. Line employees were less likely to be trained in mutual-gains bargaining, which is used primarily by
representatives of labor and management for the contract agreement. In Genesee County, for instance, while
the assistant county manager was trained to facilitate the negotiation process, the employees were not
trained prior to the switch to mutual-gains bargaining, and perhaps for this reason, the first contract
negotiated by this method was voted down by union members. On the other hand, the Genesee County
Nursing Home sponsored a half-day training session for the entire nursing home staff with a CSEA facilitator,
which helped their labor-management committee become much more effective. Whether or not all employees
were trained, training brought about a critical shift in how members of the organization viewed labor-
management relations.
Local colleges and universities were valuable resources for training in these methods. Both Tompkins and
Ontario Counties made extensive use of nearby educational facilities.
Leadership Commitment and Support
The counties we studied all shared the presence of an appointed, professional administrator to manage the
transition to cooperative tools. However, one expert on local government told us that the form of government
is less important than the administrator or leader's commitment to the cooperative process. A high level of
emotional maturity is essential, as is the ability to work well with people and to get them to buy into the
process. The case study counties possessed leaders who were willing to work with, but ultimately hold
responsible, resistant managers. The commitment of union leadership was also an important factor. Without
the willingness of the union officials in these counties to try new ways of working with management,
cooperative processes would not have been possible.
The role of elected officials was significant only to the extent they were generally supportive and did not
interfere with the process. We did not observe a high degree of involvement in cooperative tools on the part
of county elected officials, with the notable exception of Tompkins County, where a legislator was actively
engaged in developing the TQM initiative.
Additionally, in the three counties we observed a clear commitment to the process of implementing
cooperative tools. Since gains from TQM, for instance, were not immediate, and could take several years after
training to realize, the commitment of leaders to see the process through was essential to its success.
Administrators and union officials' commitment to labor-management committees as an effective vehicle for
problem solving also seemed to be a significant factor in their success. Tools that yield faster results, such as
mutual-gains bargaining, perhaps require less depth of commitment from county leaders. In all cases,
however, all parties must buy in to the process. Given the levels of trust required, cooperative efforts are
likely to be sensitive to attempts to undermine them.
Communication
Communication of the goals, structure, and roles of key players in cooperative processes is also important,
both within the organization and in the larger community. Umbrella or countywide committees play important
roles here as the central forums for sharing of information and ideas. Creating public awareness of county
efforts also may be desirable but was not emphasized in our case study counties.
Evaluation
Evaluation is essential to assure appropriate and effective implementation of cooperative tools and to create
support among elected officials and the public. Better evaluation of the cooperative processes in all three
counties is needed. For instance, in Ontario County cooperative relations are so strong that some perceive
mutual-gains bargaining as an administrative burden that in and of itself may not add significant benefits.
However, county leaders currently have no means to gauge MGB's effectiveness. Management in Genesee
County indicated that evaluation was an area they hoped to address in the future. The private sector may be
a source for evaluation tools that counties can use to measure the success of their efforts.
Key Differences Between the Counties
We recognized several key differences among the counties in the implementation of cooperative tools. First,
the amount of money spent on training varied widely. Tompkins County had by far the greatest expenditures,
almost entirely attributable to its TQM program. Tompkins' use of outside consultants on a regular basis also
distinguished it from the other two counties. Genesee County, in contrast, only approached outside
consultants on an infrequent basis. However, Genesee's labor-management committees required lower levels
of training and hence less cost, compared to the formal TQM programs of Ontario and Tompkins. Interest in
the process of workplace change rather than a focus on outcomes or products seemed to guide efforts in
Tompkins County, perhaps partly because of its close ties to the academic community through Cornell
University.
The level of involvement of elected officials and middle managers also varied. In Genesee County, middle
managers may participate in the negotiating process and sit on labor-management committees. In Tompkins
County, middle managers are well represented on total quality management committees. In Ontario, where
the committees create a direct channel from workers to top management, it is less clear that middle
managers are adequately incorporated into the structure. Tompkins is the only county in which an elected
official sits on the countywide labor-management committee. In Genesee County, county management felt
that by not participating in committees, elected officials maintained a beneficial distance from the process.
Whether elected officials should be involved may depend on the extent of the changes being implemented; in
a more formal and expensive process such as TQM, their participation seems more appropriate and essential,
while it may not be necessary for internally focused committees.
Continuum of Cooperative Tools
The three cooperative tools exist along a continuum based on the complexity of the tool, the level of
investment required, and its degree of departure from traditional labor-management relations. The following
diagram illustrates this continuum:
A government with labor-management committees may not choose to implement a TQM program, but a
government without labor-management committees may not be wise to implement TQM as its first
cooperative effort. Thus, the diagram may also be viewed as a time line of cooperative structures, indicating
a progression from relatively simple tools such as labor-management committees to more complex, formal,
costly, and comprehensive processes such as TQM. Other tools we did not observe in our counties could be
added to this model, such as gainsharing.
Limitations and Further Questions
As tools for restructuring, the cooperative methods discussed here have several limitations. Their ability to
affect the external policy environment is limited, so they are constrained by the political contexts in which
they must operate. They also do not afford an opportunity for citizens to become more involved in
government. Since public support for its activities is important to local governments, they should come up
with ways for creating greater citizen involvement in their restructuring efforts.
Many questions emerged during the course of our study. First, what is the true impact of cooperative tools
and processes on middle management? Much has been written about the downsizing of middle management
in the private sector. Is this also the case in government? Second, what are the appropriate roles for citizens
and elected officials in efforts to restructure government-through both internal and external methods? Finally,
our cases only addressed examples of successful cooperative tools and processes in counties that had
developed a significant degree of trust between labor and management. What are the outcomes of
cooperative initiatives in counties that lacked this precondition of trust?
Notes
1.  Conducted by Cornell University in cooperation with the County Legislators and Supervisors Association
of New York State, this survey was distributed to all towns (932) and upstate county governments (57)
in New York State. Responses were received from 196 towns (21% response rate) and 26 counties
(45.6% response rate).
2.  The counties initially considered were Chautauqua, Clinton, Columbia, Dutchess, Erie, Genesee,
Livingston, Oneida, Ontario, Putnam, Schenectady, Tioga, Tompkins, Ulster, and Westchester.
3.  Of the 57 counties outside of New York City, 18 (31.5%) are governed by the county executive
structure (elected official), 27 (47.5%) are governed by county managers or administrators (appointed),
and 12 (21%) have no full-time manager or county executive.
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COOPERATIVE LABOR-MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES
IN GENESEE COUNTY
Authors: Lindy Burt and Lisa Goldberg
From the report, Aspiring to Excellence: Comparative Case Studies of Public Sector
Labor-Management Cooperation in New York State
Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, June 1998
Genesee County is located in western New York State, between Rochester and Buffalo. It
has a population of approximately 60,000. The county functions under a county manager
who is appointed by a nine-member legislature. The main tools of labor-management
cooperation being used in Genesee County are labor-management committees and
mutual-gains bargaining. Through face-to-face and telephone interviews, we examined
how these cooperative structures developed in Genesee and their role in helping county
government function better. The following people were interviewed for this study:
• Jay Gsell, County Manager
• Martha Standish, County Personnel Officer
• Nancy Smith, CSEA General Unit President
• Jack Pease, Administrator, County Nursing Home
• Darlene Acker, CSEA Nursing Home Unit President
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES
THE ORIGINS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES IN GENESEE COUNTY
There are two main labor-management committees in Genesee County. The general unit
labor-management committee includes most county departments, with about 320 CSEA
members represented. The Genesee County Nursing Home, with about 150 CSEA
member employees, has a separate labor-management committee.
The general unit committee was started in 1991, and the nursing home committee was
started during the late 1980s. The nursing home has its own committee because of the
special nature of the services it provides. It also operates as an “enterprise fund,” which
means that its finances are separate from the rest of the county’s departments. As an
enterprise fund, the nursing home is able to keep the money it earns, but when it is losing
money, it cannot draw on other county revenue. Currently, the home is earning money,
which has enabled the county to invest in improvements in the facility.
The two committees operate within somewhat different contexts. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the nursing home was losing money due to a change in the state’s
reimbursement policy for Medicare and Medicaid patients. It faced the prospect of being
sold by the county legislature if it did not become self-sustaining on its own revenues. It
was realized that the home had to change its mode of operating in order to survive, and
that the cooperation and involvement of both management and labor would be necessary.
The labor-management committee provided a good vehicle for the two groups to work
together to try to improve the operations of the home.
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With the general unit committee, management saw great potential in improving
workplace practices through the more cooperative structure provided by a labor-
management committee. The county personnel officer approached the CSEA labor
relations specialist, who agreed that establishing a committee was a good idea.
HOW LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES WORK
The labor-management committees in the general unit and the nursing home work in a
very similar fashion. They both meet once per month at a set time and day. In the nursing
home, the union officers and stewards meet a week and a half prior to the monthly
meeting to develop their list of items for the agenda. The union president and nursing
home administrator then meet one week prior to the monthly meeting to discuss each
other’s proposed items for the agenda, and put it in its final form. Issues are not placed on
the agenda unless agreed to by mutual consent. During this preliminary meeting, the
nursing home administrator and union president are sometimes able to resolve certain
issues, in cases that don’t require the input of other committee members.
While the authority of the nursing home committee is actually written into the nursing
home unit contract, the authority of the general unit committee is not incorporated into
the general unit contract, but is mutually accepted by labor and management.
The purpose of both committees is to serve as a forum for discussion and a vehicle for
active improvement on management issues, labor issues, program ideas, and operations.
The resolution of any issue requires consensus among all committee members. The
committees do not address contract disputes or grievances. These matters are dealt with
using standard procedure.
The permanent members of the general unit committee are the personnel officer, the
county manager, the CSEA general unit president, and the labor relations specialist from
the CSEA regional office. Two department heads and two additional union members also
sit on the committee; these positions rotate in about three-year intervals to give different
people exposure to the process and to the issues being discussed. The nursing home
committee is comprised of the nursing home administrator, the director and assistant
director of nursing, the activities director, the officers of the union, including the
president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, and the head nurse.
Members of the county legislature do not sit on the committees or participate in the
meetings. By not participating in the committees, the legislators can remain more neutral
and objective with respect to the management and labor positions. The legislators are
kept aware of the activities of the labor-management committees through meeting
minutes.
Through the committees, many more union members are involved in labor-
management initiatives than ever before. According to the president of the general unit,
currently about 25 percent of the 320 employees in the general unit participate in some
way through subcommittees and various programs. Within the nursing home unit, union
members also serve on various subcommittees organized around different program
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initiatives. Additionally, according to the nursing home unit president, employees are
always encouraged to bring their ideas and concerns to the committee representatives.
CREATING SOLUTIONS TO WORKPLACE PROBLEMS
One of the greatest concerns of the nursing home is to ensure sufficient staffing 24 hours
a day, seven days per week. Its committee has developed such initiatives as an incentive
program for attendance and a voluntary work program. Because it is crucial to the
operation of the nursing home that there be sufficient staffing at all times, management
has the right to mandate employees to work overtime or to come in on their days off
when there exists a shortage of staff. The voluntary work program allows the employees
to “volunteer” (with pay) to work extra hours at their own convenience. After working a
certain number of “voluntary” hours, employees are then eligible to be taken off of the
mandate list during the upcoming quarter. The nursing home committee has also served
as a forum to discuss worker safety issues during building renovations.
One of the most significant programs developed by the general unit committee is the
sick-leave bank. Through the sick-leave bank, employees may choose to donate some of
their allotted sick days to the bank, which can be used in the future by any employee who
needs to take an extended medical leave. This program serves as a close substitute for
long-term disability, which is not provided to employees of the general unit. Other
programs initiated by the general unit committee include a volunteer tuition
reimbursement program, which grants employees who perform community service tuition
credits for their family members at the local community college; a job-share program;
and participation in Make-a-Difference Day, a national community service day. The
labor-management committee also started a newsletter for county employees, which is
partially funded by CSEA.
Through labor-management committees, the management of the nursing home and
other county departments represented by the general bargaining unit have worked
cooperatively with labor to develop innovative ways to improve productivity, efficiency,
and flexibility in the workplace. Such initiatives have a positive effect on the county’s
ability to deliver services to the community.
MUTUAL-GAINS BARGAINING
THE ORIGINS OF MUTUAL-GAINS BARGAINING IN GENESEE COUNTY
Mutual-gains bargaining was first tried in the general unit in 1996. The assistant county
manager was trained by Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Extension, and he facilitated the negotiating process. Jay Gsell, County Manager, and
Nancy Smith, President of the Local CSEA General Unit, had just taken their positions at
the county a few years prior, and were very interested in trying a new approach to
contract negotiations.
The first tentative agreement negotiated under mutual-gains bargaining was not
accepted by the union membership. Many members were very skeptical, and it took time
for them to trust and accept the process, which was completely different from the way
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previous negotiations were conducted. However, employees eventually came to accept
the process, and in 1997 the general unit contract was successfully negotiated using
mutual-gains bargaining.
The nursing home does not use mutual-gains bargaining. Labor is not yet interested
in implementing the process.
HOW MUTUAL-GAINS BARGAINING WORKS
The mutual-gains bargaining process requires that both parties reveal their true interests
rather than defending their positions. After this is done, the specifics are discussed. For
labor, the priority is in determining what they need in order to achieve a contract that will
provide general satisfaction to the greatest number of people. Management needs to
consider the expectations of the elected officials they represent.
Both labor and management agree that the mutual-gains bargaining process was more
productive than any previous negotiations. There was more input, openness,
brainstorming, and problem solving among the participants. The negotiations were a
continuous, open dialogue between the two sides, with no side discussions taking place.
Even the lunch break was taken together. Another benefit of mutual gains is that it greatly
accelerated the negotiations process. While typical contract negotiations can take up to
six or seven months, the most recent contract was negotiated in about a month. By
revealing their true interests, each group comes to a better understanding of the other’s
goals. Participants look for ways to mutually resolve the issues, instead of wondering
what they will have to concede. County Manager Jay Gsell also noted that mutual gains
helps identify more quickly the issues under negotiation that are most problematic.
In coming to agreement on a contract, although not every interest was satisfied,
participants came away from the process feeling that a great deal had been accomplished.
Because of the cooperation that is inherent to the process, resentment and hurt feelings
are avoided. Agreement is easier to achieve and people feel better, even about the things
that did not make it into the contract.
NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR A COOPERATIVE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP
TRUST AND OPENNESS
In order for the county to use mutual-gains bargaining and labor-management
committees, trust must exist between labor and management. Everyone involved in labor-
management cooperation concurs that keeping to agreements once they have been made
is one of the most important elements in building trust. For union officials, in a situation
where there are preconceived notions about “the union,” delivering on promises you’ve
made is key to allaying the suspicions of management and building trust. Nancy Smith
used this approach when she became the CSEA general unit president. It took some time,
but eventually management started to understand that they could work with her on the
basis of trust.
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In 1996, new union officers were elected at the nursing home, and they proved to be
more willing to hold to agreements than the previous union leadership. Management
concurs it is very important that both sides “stick to the course” of whatever has been
agreed upon.
Both management and labor must be open about their interests and positions.
Maintaining an open-door policy and encouraging employees to approach management
when they have concerns is important to fostering labor-management cooperation.
County Personnel Officer Martha Standish says she believes that openness and honesty
are the best ways to build the trust necessary for cooperation. However, she
acknowledges that sometimes this openness backfires. All it takes is one person to make
a comment, and it can affect people’s trust in you. When you are trying to bring together
two groups that have traditionally been very adversarial toward one another, trust is very
fragile and takes time to build. Yet she still holds to a policy of being “very available and
honest, telling things like they are—even if sometimes people don’t like to hear it.”
THE ROLE OF COMMITMENT AND LEADERSHIP
People who are involved in these joint efforts must be committed to the county. Both
management and labor must think beyond what is beneficial to their own interests and
instead think about what is good for the county as a whole and for their total membership.
Both labor and management feel that it is difficult to get people to shift to this new way
of thinking.
Before efforts at labor-management cooperation can even begin, the key people
involved must see the value of these efforts. There must be a commitment on the part of
both labor and management to invest time and effort in the meetings and in the initiatives
that emerge. Personalities of the leadership can influence whether labor-management
committees are adopted. In the nursing home, the turnover of the union leadership from a
president who had operated for a long tenure in an adversarial manner to a president with
a very different style was very important. Similarly, Nancy Smith has had a very large
influence as president of the CSEA general unit.
There must be a willingness to work things out on the part of the key individuals. In
Genesee County, the individuals active in labor-management efforts come to the table
with a real desire to work together to resolve workplace issues. One indicator of
commitment on labor’s part is that all the current officers in the general unit plan to run
for reelection this year. They all feel very positive about the way things are going and
want to stay involved.
In departments where management and staff do not see the value in trying to address
issues that fall outside of their contract or outside of day-to-day operations in a
nontraditional manner, labor-management committees are difficult to establish. The
county went as far as bringing in a PERB mediator to try to help facilitate the
development of a labor-management committee in one of their non-CSEA units, but it
was unsuccessful. However, this department’s management has recently turned over, as
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has the union leadership, and Martha Standish is hopeful that it may now be possible to
start a labor-management committee there.
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES
Labor and management perceptions clearly play a role in how effective cooperation can
be. At the nursing home, the belief among unionized workers was that when management
spoke to other people, such as the legislature, they were critical of the union.
Management’s perception was that the labor-management committee was something that
they had to do, but not really a useful forum for solving problems. Both of these
perceptions needed change before cooperation could occur.
As Nancy Smith says, in today’s workplace, “we need to realize that change is
inevitable.” One of the challenges of cooperation is that people often find it difficult to
accept that sometimes things have to change, even if they might prefer the status quo.
The elected officials agree with the concept of labor-management cooperation, but
sometimes have concerns about management too often taking the side of labor.
Additionally, there is also some degree of dissatisfaction on the part of some union
members who are less knowledgeable and enthusiastic about the process.
GOALS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
The goals of labor-management cooperation in Genesee County are not written down
anywhere, and the individuals we spoke with each focused on different goals.
Management describes the goal of labor-management committees as fostering an
environment of equality among and between labor and management, encouraging
everyone to bring their ideas forward. One important purpose of committees is to
empower employees, by letting them know their opinion is valued and encouraging them
to share their ideas for improvement. Management strives to have good, functioning
labor-management committees, a good understanding with the union officials, and an
established basis of trust, so they will avoid grievances, which are time-consuming and
costly. However, the county manager notes that the bottom line is the client—the person
they’re serving. Anything they do must be done with the final product (the service) and
the customer (the taxpayer) in mind.
The union has a goal of educating people on the benefits of cooperative efforts.
Believing that most employees sincerely do not want an adversarial relationship, the
CSEA general unit president is getting more people involved in some way in the union,
and in labor-management committees. She also hopes to establish smaller labor-
management committees within county departments.
According to Administrator Jack Pease, one of the main goals at the nursing home is
to address the issue of interpersonal relationships. Everybody needs to be treated
respectfully in order for things to work, so they are going to be looking more closely at
relationships in the workplace. The nursing home staff works in a very demanding
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environment, which puts a great deal of pressure on the employees, and he believes
improving work relationships can help improve overall performance.
IMPACTS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
The county doesn’t have objective measures of the effects of labor-management
cooperation. The county manager acknowledged that any measurements of success
should be implemented through the cooperative process.
The union leadership and county administrators believe that cooperative efforts have
made workers more productive and have improved relationships between people in the
workplace. Because of the programs that have implemented in the county, the workplace
is more family-oriented. For example, you can take a sick day to care for a sick child or
spouse.
Not many grievances are filed in Genesee County. When a problem arises, the
general unit president will call the personnel officer to discuss it, and they will go from
there.
Fortunately, the county has not had much downsizing—most of their workforce
reductions have occurred through attrition. Privatization has not played a significant role
in the county. While some employees have perceived it as a threat, very few, if any,
services in the county have been privatized to date.
Currently, however, the county legislature is considering privatization of the county
Mental Health Services. Cuts in state aid have put the agency under fiscal pressure.
Together, labor and management in the agency responded to the problem by forming a
joint action committee to work on alternatives to privatization. The general unit president
works at Mental Health Services and has been heavily involved in this effort. The process
has not been negative or adversarial; employees have been involved and have agreed to
make changes, some of which have been implemented already. While a decision has not
yet been made, it is very possible that privatization will be avoided because of this
cooperative effort.
The nursing home unit president believes labor-management cooperation enables
management and employees to see the “big picture.” It broadens everyone’s perspective
on the functioning of the facility, and is a good forum for bringing people together and
getting to the root of challenges in operations.
SERVICE QUALITY
The county has not implemented formal measurements of customer satisfaction with their
services. Service quality monitoring and evaluation is probably one of the next areas that
the county will be getting into. County Manager Jay Gsell believes that “it’s a priority to
understand the needs of the customers. Quality of service, reasonable cost and being
treated fairly and equitably are the priorities in service delivery.”
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Personnel Officer Martha Standish notes that programs like TQM are great, but they
take a great deal of time and effort. They have tried instituting quality workgroups in the
Department of Social Services, but they have had a difficult time. Right now they have
one self-directed workgroup there, with about five to seven people.
Especially in the nursing home, the quality of service delivery is critical. Nursing
homes have changed a great deal—they must operate with much more flexibility in
service provision than in the past. So workplace change is happening within the context
of a very different environment. They need to keep employees involved, and use the
labor-management committee. It doesn’t work to make changes in a top-down manner.
Every year the state health department surveys the nursing home. They are trying to
use the state survey to do their own evaluation, and they are trying to come up with other
ways to measure quality internally, using survey of residents or their family and other
information.
COST
The effects of labor-management efforts on cost aren’t formally quantified. Martha
Standish and Nancy Smith both suggested that the sick-leave bank probably contributes
to cost savings, since it encourages people to take fewer paid sick days. There is also a
general impression that labor-management cooperation leads to increased productivity
and less supervision time, which ultimately lead to cost savings.
In the county nursing home, it is easier to determine costs, as the home’s finances are
independent from the rest of the county. They are currently making money and are able to
pay their bills, so this indicates that the labor-management cooperation has had some
positive financial effects.
LESSONS AND INSIGHTS
Training has played an important role in the county’s efforts with the labor-management
committees and mutual-gains bargaining. People are often skeptical of a new way of
operating, and outside assistance can be crucial in resolving such skepticism. Cornell’s
Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) Extension and the New York State Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) are very good resources.
Martha Standish also believes that it’s important that people maintain a “cooperative
spirit.” Disagreements will still occur, yet people must realize that there is a forum for
resolving these disagreements. Labor-management committees and mutual-gains
bargaining provide excellent vehicles for arriving at these resolutions.
For the nursing home, the support of and flexibility allowed by the county manager
and personnel officer were important to the success of the labor-management committee.
Training also helped labor and management at the home to use the committee more
effectively. For some time, the members seemed to get stuck on the same old issues,
meeting after meeting. A trainer was brought in from CSEA who showed them how to
run the process in a more productive manner. The union president recommends
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distributing the monthly meeting agenda to all committee members prior to the meeting.
This ensures no one is surprised or caught off guard by the issues that come up at the
meeting. It also allows participants time to gather any information they feel might be
relevant to the meeting discussion.
Finally, Genesee County is essentially a small community where connections are
close. While the county’s community service programs developed out of the labor-
management committee, they also have served to strengthen the cooperative character of
relations between everyone involved in county government.
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CREATING “WIN-WIN” SITUATIONS: THE CASE OF ONTARIO COUNTY
Authors: Nicole Blumner and Darth Vaughn
From the report, Aspiring to Excellence: Comparative Case Studies of Public Sector
Labor-Management Cooperation in New York State
Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, June 1998
Twenty years ago in Ontario County, labor-management relationships were
confrontational, and walkouts during contract negotiations were not uncommon. Ontario
County was then one of several New York counties to have legislative determinations
(the Board of Supervisors could impose contracts on the bargaining units), a practice that
was very unpopular with employees and was later discontinued. Beginning in the 1980s,
changes in management and union leadership led to a new interest in building “win-win”
situations that characterize today’s more cooperative labor-management relations in
Ontario County. The county has built cooperation through a variety of structures and
tools, including labor-management committees, a “Service Excellence” total quality
management program, and mutual-gains bargaining.
The following people were interviewed for this study:
• Edward Grace, County Administrator
• Geoffrey Astles, Deputy County Administrator
• John Garvey, Human Resources Director
• Robert Russo, President, CSEA Unit #7850
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES
Since the early 1980s, labor-management committees have been key for developing
successful day-to-day labor-management relations. These committees function at
countywide and departmental levels and around specific issues, such as safety and health.
The committees provide an opportunity for workers to bring their issues to the highest
level of management in the county. Currently, the county administrator, the deputy
administrator, the director of human resources, and several local union presidents sit on
the countywide committee. County administrators say they are gradually decentralizing
the work of these committees so that individual departmental committees handle most of
the work.
The committees meet monthly and have dealt with many day-to-day workplace issues,
such as work scheduling, flexible hours and overtime, procedures for dealing with
employee absences, and treatment of employees by supervisors. They also deal with long-
range planning issues related to the workplace. For instance, prior to the recent
construction of the new human services building, the countywide committee met with the
architects to develop a building program that suited their needs. Committees do not deal
with the largest contractual issues, such as compensation and benefits.  Agencywide
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committees have formed in the Social Service and Public Works Departments, and a
committee is currently forming in the County Nursing Home.
County managers laud the committees as being very effective. Although it sometimes
takes a couple of months for people to get used to the idea and build trust, both labor and
management agree the committees are useful in solving daily issues. Now issues don’t
build up until contract renegotiation. Instead, a letter of agreement can be issued,
ultimately allowing for a smoother bargaining process. In fact, one union leader reported
that the existence of the labor-management committee was a form of “preventive
medicine” that allowed him to resolve more workplace problems as they occurred. Labor-
management relations were so improved by the committees that he did not have to bring
many minor issues to the committee meeting. Officials also point to a reduced number of
employee grievances filed, which is likely a result of the committees’ efforts. For both
labor and management, this means increased time to deal with matters other than labor
disputes. Furthermore, labor was able to achieve its goal of gaining greater employee
involvement in the decision-making process.
One drawback of the committees is that they effect a loss of authority for middle
managers that some resent, since employees are now empowered to bring their concerns
directly to the highest level of management. Furthermore, the county only trains the top
labor and management leaders in the concepts and techniques of labor-management
committees, effectively shutting out middle managers from the process. However, despite
middle managers’ resistance, both labor and management leaders view the committees as
successful endeavors. County leaders say they are taking steps to train middle managers
in cooperative processes with the goal of getting them to buy into to the new structures.
However, training is expensive, and so it may not be possible to train every manager
unless proven necessary for success.
THE SERVICE EXCELLENCE PROGRAM
Another cooperative initiative that has been successful in Ontario County is the Service
Excellence Program (also known as total quality management or TQM). This program
was initiated in 1993 with union participation in order to promote “customer satisfaction
by continuous improvement through employee involvement.” Initially both labor and
management leaders as well as county legislators were trained by Rochester Institute of
Technology staff. Initial training cost $35,000 for employees and $50,000 for supervisors,
managers, and elected officials. The county gradually built its capacity to do training in-
house, and today all county employees have been trained in Service Excellence concepts.
The Service Excellence program is structured around a countywide steering
committee that acts as a core planning group, setting the direction for the program and
coordinating the activities of the subgroups. Four of the 37 departments have operational
workgroups, which have the same organizational structure as the steering committee and
coordinate their corresponding functions.
E-3
There are currently six subgroups that perform the following functions:
• Trainers and Facilitators: trains new employees in Service Excellence concepts
• Training and Development: provides technical tools and training to TQM teams
• Measurement and Assessment: surveys and measures customer and employee
satisfaction; develops measures for performance standards
• Team Chartering: selects projects for Service Excellence efforts; provides mentoring
and assistance to teams in improving job performance
• Communications: shares information and ideas through a quarterly newsletter;
publicizes the program and increases awareness of program success
• Recognition and Reward: provides rewards for good work and incentives to
improve operations, with the goal of better service as a result. Rewards include free
dinners at area restaurants, pins for long-serving employees, and engraving employee
names on a plaque in the county courthouse.
The Service Excellence initiative has resulted in “win-win” situations for labor and
management. It has also saved county taxpayers money. The workplace safety team
project, for instance, began with county safety coordinators identifying high-risk job
duties, such as driving and heavy lifting, based on local and national accident and injury
data. Employees performing these tasks were then trained by professionals in safer
driving and lifting techniques. This initiative resulted in a 37% reduction of OSHA-
recordable injuries in the county from 1994 to 1997. Lost days were reduced by 60% in
the same time period. As a result of these safety improvements, a special tax assessment
to pay for workers’ compensation, to be spread out over five years, was paid off in only
three due to reduced injuries, saving taxpayers $1.5 million. Furthermore, employees
received an important morale-building message—that management truly cares about their
safety on the job.
Another example of the benefits of Service Excellence is the county sheriff’s
department, one of only two sheriff’s departments in the state accredited by CALEA
(Commission for the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies), which requires that
800 standards be met before granting accreditation. Managers emphasize that through
Service Excellence, the county aspires to have the highest professional law enforcement
standards in New York State, a goal borne out by the fact that the county jail is also
nationally accredited. It’s a win-win situation for law enforcement and citizens alike,
since there is a lessened liability to the community for lawsuits from dissatisfied citizens.
A string of deficiency-free state auditor’s ratings in the nursing home and in the home
health program further illustrate the quality improvements engendered by the Service
Excellence program.
This is not to say that Service Excellence is without its drawbacks. Training is
expensive and the results are not always immediate. The work groups have experienced
varying levels of success, according to the human resources director. In particular, there is
a need for greater employee-based innovation in both health and social services
departments, both of which have experienced greater resistance from middle managers.
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Finally, it should be noted that the work of the Service Excellence committees does
not overlap with that of the labor-management committees. However, in a small
organization such as Ontario County, there is overlap among the key players in the
various groups that allows for communication between them.
MUTUAL-GAINS BARGAINING
A third tool, mutual-gains bargaining, has been used in the county to negotiate labor
contracts since 1994, when the county used this process to renegotiate four contracts with
CSEA. Training, provided by staff from the New York State School of Industrial and
Labor Relations at Cornell University, helped to educate both management and labor
about the techniques of mutual-gains bargaining. Results were positive, and both labor
and management say they would use mutual-gains bargaining again in future contracts.
Through the mutual gains process, they both have become more adept at cooperative
skills, such as listening to each other and providing information up front.
Union leaders extolled the benefits of mutual gains, although they acknowledged the
difficulty of adjusting to providing information up front. Sounding a less satisfied note,
one manager noted that mutual gains is a “tedious process” and might not be used in the
next contract, now that trust levels are high, making formal processes for information-
sharing less necessary. Mutual gains has proven valuable to smooth negotiation contracts,
but as another manager put it, “it is the respect and mutual trust developed the other 11
months of the year that really matters.”
THE RIGHT CLIMATE
There were several preexisting conditions needed to build cooperative labor-management
relationships in Ontario County. Above all, it was willingness of both labor and
management to risk upsetting a stable but fundamentally adversarial relationship to move
towards a more cooperative, “win-win” model of relations. To do so, county leaders
focused on the county’s changing needs and saw the value of changing the status quo in
order to “be the best,” as one manager said.
There was some initial resistance to the Service Excellence program, for example, on
the part of the Board of Supervisors. They were skeptical of, in the words of one
manager, “another one of those touchy-feely programs.” Today the legislators are much
more supportive of the program, but as elected officials, ultimately they are most
interested in the bottom line. Since improvements are sometimes hard to quantify, this
can be a barrier to gaining their endorsement for new initiatives.
Some employees and middle managers have also remained uncomfortable with the
new cooperative outlook. Middle managers may rightfully believe they are being cut out
of the decision-making loop, and that their jobs are threatened as a result. However,
county leaders say this resentment has diminished over time, as people have gotten
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involved and helped to solve problems. However, some leaders wished they had made
more effort to train middle managers before cooperative processes were instituted. Some
county officials believe it may take up to ten years for a full transition to a new
philosophy of cooperation.
Support from union leadership has been more uniform, especially in regard to safety,
which is also a top priority for national AFL-CIO leaders. Service Excellence parameters
have even been incorporated into the most recent labor contract. Still, leaders on both
sides remark that some people are resistant to change of any kind, and that it takes time to
build the trust and teamwork necessary for change.
PRIVATIZATION, ENGAGING LABOR,
AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
Privatization is a contentious issue that can stymie even the smoothest labor-management
relations. Ontario County has successfully dealt with privatization issues by bringing
labor into the process. When the county receives an unsolicited offer to privatize a
particular service, as it has for the county landfill, nursing home, and home health care,
both management and labor are involved in making the decision. In the case of home
health, employees are giving input to an outside consultant hired to study the costs and
benefits of privatization. County administrators consider the input of employees and the
consultant alike before making a final decision.
As a result of the decision-making process, the landfill and nursing home have
remained county-run, and the study of home health care is ongoing. County officials,
however, do make it clear that just because a service is not privatized today does not
mean it can’t be in the future. If the private sector can provide the service cheaper and
better, according to county management, then the service will go private. This belief, in
the words of union leaders, is a “constant challenge,” but they are glad to have the
opportunity to conduct their own research and bring the results to the table to discuss with
management in a cooperative setting.
In another effort to engage labor in decision making, Ontario County CSEA
representatives serve on the search committees for new county administrators. The
present county administrator was chosen this way, as was the director of planning. County
management and the union also cooperated in developing a new cafeteria health plan,
which, after a year-long education period, now allows workers to choose their own
benefits packages.
The effects on employee morale and citizen satisfaction of Ontario’s cooperative
programs have been positive, but have only been quantified to a limited extent. Officials
cite the difficulty of finding objective measures of performance quality. The county has
obtained some information through a “Citizen Survey” and an “Employee Survey”
conducted under the auspices of the Service Excellence program. The results of the
surveys indicate that both citizens and employees are generally satisfied with county
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services and workplaces. However, there was no survey taken prior to implementing the
changes. Nor was the data compared to national norms. While attitude change may be
difficult to quantify, the county is able to show clear instances of cost savings in
particular departments, such as the workers’ compensation tax windfall. However, the
County still does not have a way to measure cost savings on an interagency level.
KEY LESSONS
Cooperative labor-management structures have had a short but productive existence in
Ontario County. Several key lessons have emerged, according to both labor and
management leaders:
• It may be tempting to jump into the latest trendy program, but few people realize the
amount of work needed to sustain the effort. Begin by understanding the level of
commitment needed to implement these programs.
• It takes time to build a cooperative labor-management relationship. There is no
such thing as a quick fix. However, significant success was achieved in Ontario
County in just three years of Service Excellence and mutual-gains bargaining.
• In any negotiation, it is important to make sure the other side looks good. This
mindset can lead to a more productive negotiation process.
• The right people need to be at the table for a successful result. If labor leaders don’t
represent employees’ true interests but defer to management, for instance, the
negotiation will be futile. The people at the table also need to have the authority to
make a final decision.
• One group can adhere to its principles and still maintain a regard for the other group's
interests. There can be mutual gains in the negotiation process.
• Middle management must buy into the process and be trained in the cooperative
philosophy. Even if top management buys into the idea, middle managers need to
support it. Leaders should not be afraid to make ultimatums if middle managers
continue to resist changes.
• Attain small victories like safety improvements, and build on those successes to
make broader changes.
Certain resources were especially helpful to both labor and management in getting the
cooperative process started. First and foremost, they did extensive background research
on each initiative. For instance, county leaders recruited an advisory council of eight
business people who use Service Excellence in their firms. This council continues to
provide information to the county about private sector innovations that improve
performance and service. Managers cited the importance of looking to the private sector
to learn about successful methods for building labor-management cooperation.
Area educational institutions were also a valuable resource. The Finger Lakes
Community College Business Institute (FLCC), the Rochester Institute of Technology
College of Continuing Education, the Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations,
and the Center for Government Research, a nonprofit public-policy consulting firm in
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Rochester, all aided the process through information and/or training. The FLCC, for
example, houses an Excellence in Government Institute, which offers all county
employees free certificate programs in supervision, customer skills, and workplace skills.
Course topics include conflict management, problem solving, meeting skills, and tools for
process improvement. On a national level, a summer program of the Institute for Local
Government at the University of Virginia gave officials a larger perspective on
government restructuring efforts around the country.
CONCLUSION
Instituting cooperative processes involves a culture change, and an evolution in the way
work systems are designed. It does not occur overnight, nor without careful preparation.
In order to effect changes in working relationships and labor-management relations,
managers, union officials, legislators, and employees need to be trained in the philosophy
behind cooperation. Both parties need to work together continuously to implement
change effectively.
Labor-management cooperation in Ontario County is a testimony to the leadership of
both the union and management in seeking better ways of working and new paths to
success. Ontario County’s example shows that cooperation does not have to compromise
or deny the identity of either party. However, cooperative structures are not panaceas.
Conflict may still arise, and if handled correctly, can spark creativity and change. Ontario
County’s example demonstrates that labor-management cooperation can provide a better
way for government to function effectively.
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COOPERATIVE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RESTRUCTURING TOOLS
IN TOMPKINS COUNTY
Authors: Jon Gans and Kristin Guild
From the report, Aspiring to Excellence: Comparative Case Studies of Public Sector Labor-
Management Cooperation in New York State
Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, June 1998
Tompkins County is located in the Finger Lakes region of New York State at the base of Cayuga
Lake. It has a population of approximately 95,000, and operates under a county administrator
who is appointed by the fifteen-member elected Board of Representatives.
In Tompkins County, the primary focus of cooperative labor-management relations is a total
quality management initiative called Partners for Quality. All labor-management committees are
implemented under the structural umbrella of the Partners for Quality initiative. Mutual-gains
bargaining is another tool used in Tompkins County. However, the scope of mutual-gains
bargaining is not as broad as the Partners for Quality program nor as central to day-to-day
decision making and service delivery.
The following people were interviewed for this study:
• David Chase, President, CSEA Local 855
• Scott Heyman, County Administrator
• Barbara Mink, Chair, Board of Representatives
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES
THE ORIGINS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES IN TOMPKINS COUNTY
Labor-management committees have long been implemented in an ad hoc manner in Tompkins
County. There was a clause in the standard labor contract which allowed for creating labor-
management committees to resolve workplace conflicts or address specific projects, and labor-
management committees were occasionally used in that context. There was also an Employee
Council (comprised primarily of employees) which served as a venue for communication.
These committees set the stage for implementing a formal total quality management program
in the county in several ways. First, they demonstrated to employees, managers, and elected
officials that cooperative structures could be effective. Second, the ad hoc committees on which
any employee, union or non-union, could serve and which were beginning to address contract
matters such as terms and conditions of employment, represented a threat to the authority of the
CSEA Local 855, which bargains for all county employees. Thus, when county managers wanted
to formalize labor-management committees and subsume them under a total quality management
initiative, it was in the union’s interest to work to negotiate an exclusive agreement between the
county Board of Representatives and the union. At that time, the other existing cooperative
structures such as the Employee Council were disbanded.
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HOW LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES FUNCTION NOW
Under the total quality management program, there is a nested system of labor-management
committees, with a hierarchy stepping down from the Leadership Council to departmental
committees to cross-functional project teams.
The umbrella committee is the Leadership Council, which directs the implementation of the
program and provides structural organizational support for departmental labor-management
committees operating under the program. The large departments in the county, such as the
Department of Social Services, the Health Department, and the Probation Department, each have
a departmental labor-management committee that addresses general workplace matters and
formulates policy recommendations designed to improve the efficiency of the department. Cross-
functional project teams are created to work on a particular project such as coordinating intake
systems for welfare and other social service recipients.
PARTNERS FOR QUALITY
In 1993 county administrators and elected officials decided to formalize the cooperative
structures in the county and implement a more comprehensive mechanism for cooperative
decision-making: the Partners for Quality program (also known as total quality management or
TQM).
Tompkins County Administrator, Scott Heyman, had been interested in the concept of TQM
for a number of years, but information about implementing total quality management in the
public sector was difficult to find. After some research of successful examples of total quality
management in the public sector in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Madison, Wisconsin, the Board
agreed to hire Marcia Calicchia from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations Extension of
Cornell University and the Program for Employment and Workplace Systems (PEWS) to assist
in planning the implementation and conduct employee training. These consultants were chosen
due to their jargon-free and labor-oriented approach to TQM. This perspective on total quality
management was, and still is, very important to the goals of the county.
SHIFTING FROM AUTOCRATIC TO COOPERATIVE WORK SYSTEMS
Barbara Mink, Chair of the Board of Representatives, described total quality management as “an
absolute visceral change in the way [we] react to problems and the way [we] take initiative for
change.” As a result of the Partners for Quality initiative, many managers have shifted from an
autocratic way of directing operations to one that is more cooperative. This change in
management style is beginning to impact all departments. Almost everything that is done in
Tompkins County now is done through a labor-management framework. Total quality
management has impacted Tompkins County employees and managers in a profound way; a
higher degree of communication and cooperation is now part of the culture in Tompkins County.
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STRUCTURE OF THE PARTNERS FOR QUALITY PROGRAM
There are three primary components to Partners for Quality:
1) The Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) Local 855 and the Tompkins County Board
of Representatives spent a year negotiating an agreement establishing the labor-management
partnership. The agreement outlines the guiding principles and overall expectations for the
initiative. The agreement is still in force.
2) The Leadership Council—a labor-management committee that guides the implementation of
the Partners for Quality program and provides structural, organizational support for departmental
labor-management committees operating under the program.
3) Every employee, manager, and legislator in Tompkins County is trained in total quality
management techniques and work processes. The goal is to provide training that crosses formal
organizational boundaries. Marcia Calicchia and her colleagues have trained twenty in-house
facilitators in TQM techniques and several people within the county now have leadership roles
with the program.
Tompkins County has invested heavily in training for this program. Between 1994 and 1997,
the county spent just over $300,000 for outside consultants to conduct training. In 1998 the
county will spend an estimated $170,000 for consultants to complete the bulk of the training (for
all departments except the sheriff’s department, which is an independent agency). Since 1997, in-
house costs have been around $100,000. These costs will drop dramatically after 1998, when all
employees, managers, and elected officials will have been trained in total quality management
techniques and only training for new employees and refresher courses will be necessary.
SUCCESSES
Certain projects are ideally suited for joint decision making. It can be a time-consuming process,
but the tangible results are often worthwhile.
Example - Human Services Building
In December of 1997, Tompkins County completed construction on a new building to house the
Department of Social Services. The building was planned using TQM methods with a great deal
of employee involvement in decision making. The old building had inadequate ventilation and a
lawsuit had been filed by employees which prompted the search for a new facility.
When decisions such as these were made in the past, a committee of five legislators was
chosen to oversee the project without representation from labor. When the board announced the
formation of this committee, union representatives requested labor’s involvement in the design
and construction of the facility. The size of the preliminary planning committee grew to twenty-
one members and, although it was large, the contribution of labor to the overall project resulted
in an extremely functional building.
The process took four years from conceptualization to completion. Most importantly, a lot of
the controversy that usually accompanies this kind of dramatic change was eliminated. When the
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committee was first established, labor expressed some fear and anxiety toward the project. These
concerns were largely dealt with in the context of the various labor-management committees that
were formed.
There were at least three committees established to construct the building: a stakeholders
committee comprised of building occupants (both labor and management) to make the
preliminary determination of the requirements for the new building, a building design committee
to determine room sizes, color scheme, carpet types, etc., and a building construction committee
which organized and supervised construction. Barbara Mink reported: “[I]t was extremely labor
intensive, but not agonizingly so, and it resulted in the best building project we have ever had.”
LIMITATIONS
Labor-management committees and total quality management methods can only function well
when committee authority is clearly defined and consistent.
Example - Downtown Ithaca Parking
A county labor-management committee was formed to address the lack of employee parking in
downtown Ithaca, and was charged with the task of making recommendations to the Board of
Representatives. The parking committee did not have jurisdiction over expenditures, so the
members could not recommend putting up a gate that costs $20,000, for example, without going
through the board. However, the committee was given the authority to determine the policies for
county parking lots. The committee has recommended that several parking spaces currently
reserved for board members be reassigned to other county employees. The Board is poised to
reject the committee’s recommendations.
The labor-management committee in this case does not have the authority to determine a
policy that the Board of Representatives does not like. Situations like this which give authority
only to take it away can undermine cooperative efforts and slowly developing trust. To prevent
failures, the role and authority of committees should be clearly defined from the outset, and
elected officials must be as committed to the process as others involved.
MUTUAL-GAINS BARGAINING
In Tompkins County mutual-gains bargaining techniques have been instinctively used for many
years. In 1995 county administrators decided to formalize a mutual gains approach by training
employees in the technique. Bernie Flaherty of the School of Industrial Labor Relations
Extension of Cornell University trained approximately 300 of 720 county employees in mutual-
gains. Now all bargaining units other than the sheriff’s department utilize mutual-gains
techniques for all terms and conditions except salary.
Mutual-gains bargaining is not a panacea for Tompkins County. The impact of using this tool
depends on the commitment of the participant, as the President of the CSEA Local 855, David
Chase pointed out:
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Mutual-gains bargaining can be whatever you want it to be. Some people don’t see [win-
win] as win-win. Some people see it as compromise-compromise...There’s a contract
between labor and management which automatically creates sides. But, that doesn’t mean
that the two shouldn’t look at each other and say: we should do what’s best for the both of
us (and) for the entity that we serve which is Tompkins County...We realize the reality of
the situation; there is X amount of money to be allocated and we need to figure out the
best way to move it around.
Mutual-gains bargaining serves to improve the process of negotiations. Through the use of this
tool, consensus and agreement is reached more quickly and with less aggravation in Tompkins
County.
ADVANTAGES OF MUTUAL-GAINS BARGAINING
All three interviewees recognized the benefits of mutual-gains techniques in negotiations. The
fact that interest-based approaches to problem solving have extended beyond the collective
bargaining process to committees and other arenas is an indication of their usefulness. County
Board Chair Barbara Mink indicated that the sheriff’s department used the language of mutual
gains in the latest discussion of health care benefits.
In collective bargaining, salary remains the only issue that is not negotiated with mutual gains
techniques. The county has offered to negotiate salary using mutual gains but the union has
resisted. However, the issue of salary was “on the table” faster than ever before in the latest
round of contract negotiations, according to David Chase.
BENEFITS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
IN TOMPKINS COUNTY
There are three broad expectations associated with labor-management cooperation in Tompkins
County: to improve labor-management relations, to decrease costs for delivering services, and to
keep taxes down. The decision to establish formal structures to share decision making with labor
was not due to particular fiscal or service pressures. TQM is a formalization of the labor-
management relationship that has been developing since the 1980s.
IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN LABOR AND MANAGEMENT
The focus of the Tompkins County Partners for Quality (PfQ) initiative is on improved labor-
management relations. This reflects the perception that cooperation will directly, and indirectly,
result in cost savings and improved service quality. Barbara Mink describes its effects as:
a shift in our paradigm; an absolute visceral change in the way we react to problems and
the way we take initiative for change...Tompkins County is a good example of how TQM
can work...The best evidence for this, in addition to the cost savings and improvements in
efficiency, is the change in people’s attitudes.
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These goals have been articulated through various mission and vision statements. In addition,
TQM orientation sessions, which have occurred since December 1994, are another forum for
developing a shared understanding of these goals.
GRIEVANCES
One indication of improved relations between labor and management is in the type and number
of grievances that have been filed since the implementation of TQM. The grievances that are
filed today represent issues that are not resolvable through labor-management committees. In
Tompkins County, grievances have been minimized through these new avenues for
communication.
IMPROVED SERVICE QUALITY
In Tompkins County, the focus of labor-management cooperation is on process issues. For
instance, the Department of Social Services labor-management committee developed a
framework for eliminating excessive layers of administration. Now, there is a single intake
system for food stamps and Medicaid. This change both improves service quality and reduces
the cost of providing services.
COST SAVINGS FROM IMPROVED LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Management believes the benefits of TQM more than outweigh the costs and has been willing to
invest heavily in the process. However, figures documenting these cost savings are hard to come
by due to a fear that cost savings will result in budget cuts, punishing successful departments.
Coupling total quality management with performance-based budgeting techniques could help to
encourage documentation of cost savings. Another strategy would be to simply make it clear at
the outset to departmental staff that if funds for training and to sustain the overall initiative were
going to continue to flow, documentation of cost savings must be forthcoming.
KEY LESSONS AND INSIGHTS
TRUST, LEADERSHIP, AND DEFINING ROLES
The most important factor in developing cooperation between labor and management is people.
One of the main reasons for the success of TQM in Tompkins County is that both management
and labor were committed to the idea. The degree of trust that existed prior to the implementation
of TQM enabled Tompkins County to proceed with the initiative.
Both Barbara Mink (Chair, Board of Representatives) and David Chase (CSEA Local 855
President) acknowledged the role Scott Heyman (County Administrator) played in developing
support for the Partners for Quality program in Tompkins County. One concern David Chase has
is the impact Scott Heyman’s retirement will have on the initiative. Subsequently, one priority of
the interview process is to determine whether or not the values of candidates for county
administrator are consistent with the TQM program.
The expectations and roles for labor-management committees must be defined as clearly as
possible to limit misunderstandings. Clear roles enable committees to remain focused. Union
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representatives have played an important role in keeping this focus and pointing out when the
committee is getting off track.
COMMUNICATION AND PLANNING
Communication is paramount to success. Through communication goals are defined,
expectations are delineated, and relationships are built. Limiting the use of jargon also facilitates
the process, especially during training sessions.
Careful planning will result in a smooth transition during implementation. It is important to
make sure the strategy for implementation is clearly defined before presenting it to employees.
Tompkins phased in its program and this led to a lot of confusion among union members and
employees because of the time lag between the start of training in the Department of Social
Services and the full implementation of TQM. Two years have elapsed since the initiative was
announced and some people have just begun their training.
INFORMATION
The major obstacle was not the will to begin using TQM, but the means by which to implement
the program. Tompkins devoted a lot of time and effort to finding the right people to conduct the
TQM training. County Administrator Scott Heyman asserts, “You have to make sure that you get
the right people to do the training; that the consultant’s conception of TQM is what you want;
that it is consistent with what you have been doing.” In addition to finding the right facilitators,
reviewing the experience of local governments through hands-on practice is important.
CONCLUSION
This case study has shown that labor-management cooperation is not only possible, but viable in
Tompkins County. With the right people to coordinate the effort and the support of labor,
management, and elected officials, the TQM initiative in Tompkins County has been, to a large
degree, successful. The insights drawn from this case may provide other county governments
with information necessary to pursue labor-management cooperation as a tool for service
delivery.
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New York State Taylor Law: History
The History of the New York State Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, despite some union organizing and periodic labor unrest in the nation,
there were no Federal or New York State laws addressing labor organizing in either the private or the public
sector. In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (also known as the Wagner Act). The
National Labor Relations Act gave private sector unions recognition for the purpose of collective bargaining,
but did not address public sector unions.
Post WWII Labor Unrest Sets the Stage for a Public Employees Strike Prohibition
Following World War II, as the nation made the difficult transition from wartime to peacetime production,
there was a great deal of labor unrest across the country. In the 12 months following V-J Day, more than five
million workers (nearly one tenth of the nation's workforce) struck in 4,630 reported work stoppages. New
York State was no exception to this national trend, and public sector strikes in the state were particularly
problematic. In 1946, Rochester's mayor summarily dismissed 486 civil servants and threatened to contract
out all government services in response to a request for union recognition. To demonstrate their support of
the union and disagreement with the mayor's reaction, 30,000 public and private workers in Rochester
participated in a one-day general strike. The following year, 2,400 Buffalo teachers struck for a week,
effectively shutting down the schools.
Public Sector Strike Prohibited by US and NYS Law - 1947
Due to the essential nature of many government services, a public sector strike can be extremely costly and
even dangerous to a community. Recognizing this, the U.S. Congress prohibited public sector strikes and
established strict penalties (immediate dismissal and a 3-year bar to reemployment) for striking public sector
employees in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. That same year, New York State passed the Condon-Wadlin Act,
which also prohibited public sector strikes. Under the Condon-Wadlin Act, a striking public sector employee
was to be immediately fired. If reinstated to his/her position, a striker was barred from any pay increase for
three years, and was placed on probation without tenure for five years.
Public Sector Strikes Still Occurred
These penalties were seldom enforced. Through 1964, though there were 21 strikes, the law was only invoked
seven times, and only 18 striking employees were dismissed across the state. Others were rehired or
transferred and it is uncertain if the pay and tenure penalties were applied (Donovan, 6). In 1963, to improve
enforcement of the Condon-Wadlin Act, the New York State legislature revised the penalties for striking to:
(1) a six-month pay freeze to reinstated employees (rather than three years); (2) a one year probation
without tenure (rather than five); (3) two days of pay deducted for each day on strike. In addition to these
revised penalties, private citizens were given the right to file suit against a local government which did not
implement the law or enforce the penalties.
These changes to the law still did not prevent public sector strikes. In 1965, 6,000 Department of Welfare
workers struck for 28 days. Part of the negotiated settlement was the suspension of strike penalties
(Donovan 1990: 12) . Less than one year later, on New Year's Day of 1966, a transit worker's strike shut
Search Cornell
down New York City for twelve days, costing an estimated $100 million each day. The negotiated settlement
included a pay increase, which was contested in a suit by a private citizen. With the threat of a continued
strike looming, the state legislature passed an amnesty bill exempting all strikers from Condon-Wadlin
penalties (ibid.: 19-20). Clearly, the Condon-Wadlin prohibition of striking and its penalties, even in their
revised form, did not prevent costly public sector strikes.
Three days after the end of the New York City transit strike, Governor Nelson Rockefeller announced the
appointment of a Public Employee Relations Committee, to "make legislative proposals for protecting the
public against the disruption of vital public services by illegal strikes, while at the same time protecting the
rights of public employees" (Rockefeller, as quoted in Donovan 1990: 23). Because it was chaired by George
W. Taylor, Harnwell Professor of Industry at the University of Pennsylvania, the committee was known as the
Taylor Committee. The Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Section 14 of the New York State Civil Service
Law) was passed in 1967 based upon the committee's recommendations. It is called the Taylor Law after the
Professor George Taylor, the chair of the Committee.
Taylor Law Mandates Public Sector Collective Bargaining to Prevent Strikes - 1967
The Taylor Law maintains the prohibition of and penalties for public employee strikes, but addresses the root
causes of strikes to prevent them by creating a process for negotiation between management and labor, and
an agency with the mandate to implement and interpret the statute. Some say that the Taylor Law gives
labor the right to bargain collectively in return for taking away the right to strike. In fact, public servants
never had the legal right to strike in New York State, but prohibitions and penalties had not worked to
prevent them. The Taylor Committee believed that collective bargaining would be more effective.
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The Arizona Experience
Michael Ballard
December 1, 1998
This study looks at one state's experience with using managed care to deliver long-term care services for
the elderly.  In the state of Arizona, managed care has been able to reduce demand for both acute care
and nursing home care through an aggressive preventative health care program and extensive use of
home- and community-based services.  Quality of care in Arizona is comparable to that found elsewhere,
but the per capita costs of the program are considerably lower than long-term care costs in similar
states.  Arizona's success rests on the combined efforts of private health care contractors and innovative
state and federal health care agencies.
Introduction
Meeting the long-term care (LTC) needs of the elderly will be one of the greatest challenges of the twenty-
first century. Paying for long-term care is already difficult for both individuals and governments, and the
number of Americans who require some form of long-term care is expected to double over the next decade.
At the same time, governments are under increasing pressure to reduce their role in all areas of social
welfare, including long-term care. In response to these trends, a number of states have turned to prepaid
managed care as a way to control costs and improve service quality.
This paper looks at the promises and pitfalls of managed care for the elderly by focusing on one state's
experience with managed care  over the past decade. The Arizona Long-Term Care System (ALTCS) is the
longest running managed care program for the elderly in the country, and offers important lessons for other
states contemplating long-term care reforms.
Dramatic Increases in Long-Term Care Expenditures
Health care costs overall have risen dramatically since the mid-1980s, and long-term care has not been
immune from this larger trend.   Medicaid expenditures for the elderly alone, for example, more than doubled
between 1988 and 1995 (Wiener 1998, 189).  Spending on long-term care services totaled $91 billion in
1995, representing 12 percent of personal health expenditures and 14 percent of all state and local health
care spending (Wiener and Stevenson 1998, 81).  Roughly 60 percent of LTC spending comes from public
sources, principally Medicaid and Medicare, with the remainder paid by the elderly and their families(GAO
1998, 4).  Spending is expected to rise even faster in the future as the "baby boomers," some 76 million
people born between 1946 and 1964, enter their senior years and demand more health care services. 
Collectively, these changes have worked to create a "crisis" environment in long-term care, with the
government bearing the brunt of the blame for rising costs. As a result, all levels of government are under
increasing pressure to reform the LTC delivery system and to do so with much greater participation from the
private sector.
One outcome has been the rapid increase in managed care programs for both Medicaid and Medicare.
Roughly 6 million or 16 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in managed care, representing a 100
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percent increase from just five years ago (Riley 1998, 69).  As of 1996 eighteen states were enrolling elderly
Medicaid patients into managed care, and it is likely that this number too has increased significantly since
then (Riley 1998, 69)
The Promise of Managed Care
The expanded use of managed care has both potential benefits and risks for LTC patients. Most users of long-
term care are enrolled in both Medicaid and Medicare. For the most part, Medicare pays for acute care needs,
whereas Medicaid pays for nursing home care. These "dual eligibles" stand to gain the most from managed
care because managed care models integrate acute and long-term care into a single service delivery and
financing system. Integration promises to improve service for the frail elderly because dually-eligible seniors
are often caught in the middle of confusing and often conflicting Medicare and Medicaid rules. Clients are
often "ping-ponged" from one bureaucracy to another, at times receive contradictory medical advice, and are
uncertain which program to turn to when issuing a complaint.
In contrast, integration of Medicare and Medicaid benefits under a single plan creates a seamless web of care
for older persons. Case managers are able to custom tailor programs to meet individual needs and coordinate
services to achieve the maximum health benefit for the lowest cost. Accountability is enhanced because there
is only one organization responsible for all care, and therefore responsibility for poor quality care cannot be
shifted to another organization.
In addition, some managed care programs have been highly successful at reducing the use of expensive
institutional care by relying more heavily on preventative health care and home- and community-based
alternatives. These measures not only lower costs, but also keep more older persons out of nursing homes,
which is strongly preferred by elderly in need of chronic care. Finally, some observers have noted that
bringing Medicaid patients into managed care has the effect of "mainstreaming" their care. By being part of a
managed care plan that serves a wide range of people and not just the poor, low-income elderly are able to
gain access to better quality health care professionals (Wiener and Stevenson 1998, 81).  In sum, managed
care offers, in theory, a substantial promise for better health care for the elderly.
Risks Associated With Managed Care
There is considerable debate as to whether managed care has been able to live up to its promise of lower
costs and greater efficiency. Incentives that reduce "unnecessary" services may also limit badly needed
services as well. The degree to which cost containment takes precedence over quality of care varies from
program to program, but fears of withholding service for economic rather than medical reasons have been a
longstanding public concern.
There is also some concern over the ability of states to monitor managed care organizations. To do so
requires states to set up complex administrative structures and information systems to oversee the day-to-
day operations of multiple managed care organizations as well as determine appropriate capitation rates. The
financial benefits from managed care could disappear quickly if rates are set too high or if administration
costs exceed program savings.
Overall, however, the record for managed care remains mixed.  In an extensive survey of current research on
managed care, Friedland and Feder (1998) find that access to care and service quality is equal to or better
than that offered by fee-for-service.  However, the intensity of care was found to be lower, in that hospital
stays following illness tended to be shorter and follow-up care less frequent than under fee-for-service.  In
other words, costs savings come not from lowering the probability of service, but from lower intensity of
service once care is initiated.
Managed Care in Practice: The Arizona Long-Term Care System
Arizona was unique among the states in that it had no Medicaid program at all until 1982. Refusing to let the
federal government dictate how health care should be provided in the state, Arizona relied on county
governments to pay for all indigent care. On average, a quarter of the counties’ budgets was being spent on
care for the indigent, which was financed entirely by local property taxes. Counties’ ability to pay for care
was severely curtailed in 1980, however, when the state set limits on property taxes. Suddenly Medicaid
began to look better and better to county supervisors, and state legislators entered negotiations with the
federal government to introduce Medicaid in Arizona.
Following a two-year review of health care plans, Arizona chose to develop its own managed care plan for
low-income people. Key features of the plan included capitation, nominal copayments, restrictions on freedom
of choice, and competitive bidding for county contracts. None of these features was part of the Medicaid plan
that was then being offered by Washington. However, state reformers in Arizona had a strong ally in
President Reagan who, so the story goes, "picked up the phone, called the head of the Health Care Financing
Administration, and said ‘make it happen’"(Weissert et al. 1997, 1331).
Within six months the Arizona plan became operational as the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System
(AHCCCS), partially funded with Medicaid matching funds. It was not until 1989, however, that long-term care
was included as part of the program. The LTC program is similar to the acute care program in that managed
care organizations are paid a capitated rate for each enrollee and assume total responsibility and risk for
each patient. Medicaid acute care, long-term care, and behavioral care are integrated, but Medicare is not
part of the program. However, "informal" integration occurs because ALTCS contracts are usually held with
managed care organizations that participate in both Medicare and Medicaid and are therefore able to bill
Medicare fee-for-service (Riley 1998, 70).
Most evaluations of the Arizona program have been positive. Its biggest successes have been in reducing
nursing home and hospital use by increased use of home- and community-based services (HCBS), improving
coordination of Medicare and Medicaid, and containing costs. Its record at improving care quality has been
under-studied to date, but fragmentary evidence suggests that LTC users fare no worse under ALTCS than
under traditional programs.
Reducing Use of Acute Care
In a major comparative study of ALTCS and New Mexico’s fee-for-service program, the elderly in Arizona
were found to see health care professionals more frequently (13 visits versus 9) but the number of hospital
days used per elderly person were 22 percent lower in Arizona (McCall and Korb 1997).  While the authors of
that study do not provide any explanation for the difference, it is plausible that the higher frequency of
doctors visits in Arizona resulted in earlier detection of health problems, which in turn reduced the need for
hospital stays.
Reducing Use of Nursing Home Care
The Arizona program has been able to lower total health costs by (1.) providing a wide array of home- and
community-based services to disabled elderly clients in place of nursing home care, and (2.) limiting eligibility
for these services to those most in need. Arizona was able to substitute HCBS for nursing home care by
providing clients with a menu of HCBS options comprehensive enough to allow an individual with high levels
of disability to remain in the community. Private care management organizations are required to offer the full
range of services to both rural and urban areas before being granted a contract by the state (Weissert et al.
1997).
One explanation for Arizona’s success in limiting enrollments has to do with the way eligibility decisions are
made. Rather than allow managed care organizations to determine who is eligible for care (which would raise
enrollments), the state employs preadmission screening teams of registered nurses and social workers to
make all eligibility decisions. In contrast, in most other states eligibility and provision decisions are made by
the same organization, which may lead to admissions based on non-medical criteria, such as excess capacity
in a nursing home.
Improved Coordination of Care
As stated earlier, continuity of care is often compromised in traditional systems of LTC because of the lack of
coordination between Medicaid and Medicare programs. The Arizona program is still not a fully integrated
system in that it has not been able to obtain the Federal waiver required to integrate the Medicare program
into ALTCS. However, informal integration occurs because managed care organizations with ALTCS contracts
are required to participate in Medicare. As a result, ALTCS is able to force all of its dually eligible clients into
participating in its program. The downside of such an approach is that it restricts freedom of choice for
Medicare beneficiaries, which many see as a fundamental right of the patient (although elders can still choose
another provider within the ALTCS network).
Coordination of care is also enhanced by the use of "care coordinators" or case managers within the system.
While the state is responsible for eligibility decisions, once admitted decisions on what services to provide are
made by care coordinators in consultation with patients and their families.
Containing Cost
Savings over the first five years of the program have been substantial, averaging 16 percent per year lower
than total costs in similar states that used a traditional Medicaid program. Savings totaled nearly $290 million
between 1989 and 1993, with savings increasing substantially over time (e.g., 0.2 percent in 1989, 15
percent in 1991 and 21 percent in 1993) (McCall 1997).
Quality of Care
The scant evidence available on care quality suggests that quality of care is similar to that provided in other
states. McCall (1997) finds that quality of care has been better for some measures but worse for others.
Nevertheless, if ALTCS has been successful in "mainstreaming" services to low income clients, improving
coordination of care, widening the range of care options available, and lowering costs for purchasers of care,
then it is likely that overall service quality is better than that found elsewhere.
Can the Arizona Program be Implemented In Other States?
A number of states including Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, Wisconsin and Texas are in the process of
developing integrated programs of health care for the elderly similar to ALTCS. Innovation at the state level
has been greatly facilitated in recent years as the Health Care Financing Administration becomes much more
flexible in allowing states to design their own programs and still remain eligible for federal funds.
Nevertheless, numerous barriers to reform remain. While Arizona did have county-level care prior to 1989, it
was able to start ALTCS at the state level largely "from scratch," a luxury that no other state enjoys. In
many states, political considerations may outweigh the economic and social benefits of large-scale reform.
That reforms should be undertaken, however, assumes that other states would be as enlightened as the
architects of the Arizona plan. At one extreme, more generous states could turn to managed care and expand
HCBS but fail to reduce costs—after all, this has been the outcome of most states’ efforts to expand HCBS
over the last three decades. At the other extreme, some states’ efforts at "reform" may be just thinly-veiled
attempts to reduce costs and benefits to low-income elderly.
The Arizona case represents one of the more mature experiments in health care reform for the elderly. In
most respects, the ALTCS presents a strong case for greater devolution of responsibility to the states and a
heightened role for the private sector in the delivery of public goods. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten
that Arizona’s success was largely the result of a strong federal presence in program design and even
stronger state-level oversight of health care contractors. For states interested in LTC reform, these may be
Arizona’s most important lessons.
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Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly
Modeled after the On Lok Senior Health Services Program in San Francisco's Chinatown, the Program of
All-inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) is an innovative approach to providing long-term care services
to frail senior citizens. By October 1997 more than 70 organizations in 31 states were in some stage of
PACE development (Employee Benefit Plan Review, 1997). This number is expected to grow rapidly over
the next several years because the 1997 Balanced Budget Act establishes PACE as a permanent provider
under Medicare, and allows states the option to pay for PACE using Medicaid dollars (Irvin et al., 1997).
Interdisciplinary Teams Ensure High Quality Care
PACE Costs Less Than Traditional Nursing Home Care
Conclusion
References
Interdisciplinary Teams Ensure High Quality Care
What makes PACE unique is that it is a model of care that provides both acute and chronic care services for
the frail elderly in a day care setting. Although PACE clients are nursing home eligible, they continue to live in
their own homes. Services are provided at day health centers, and attendance requirements vary on a case-
by-case basis, with the national average being 11 days per month (Employee Benefit Plan Review, 1997).
Patients may choose to attend the PACE center for strictly medical reasons, but the center serves an
important social function as well. For many participants, the PACE center is a place to socialize and have
meals with others.
Interdisciplinary teams of physicians, nurses, social workers, dieticians, home care aides, and physical
therapists manage the total care of the patient. The entire team meets weekly to discuss the care needs of
patients under their supervision, making sure that each member of the team is aware of the special needs of
each patient. One result of this system is that patients are able to retain the personal autonomy associated
with living in their own home, but still have their medical condition monitored on an ongoing basis.
PACE Costs Less Than Traditional Nursing Home Care
PACE relies on capitated payments from Medicaid and Medicare to cover expenses. According to the National
PACE Association, PACE costs about 12 percent less than a comparable fee-for service program (Lee et al.,
1998). These results must be approached cautiously, however, as PACE programs serve only a tiny fraction of
the frail elderly. In 1997, for example, PACE centers served less than five thousand enrollees (Employee
Budget Plan Review, 1997). In addition, some claims of "skimming" (the practice of avoiding potentially
difficult clients) have been made by critics of the model, a claim that is often made of capitated health care
plans in general (Branch et al., 1995).
Conclusion
The PACE model has sparked significant interest in many state capitals, and existing programs appear to be
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successful at both providing high quality care and lowering costs. Nevertheless, the newness of the program
and the small number of participating sites make it difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the program.
The number of PACE programs should expand rapidly in the years ahead, however, which will allow for more
systematic analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of the model.
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1SURVEY OF LABOR
CSEA is conducting the following survey in an attempt to understand principal
challenges to public sector nursing home viability in New York State and to contribute
toward a larger process of strategic planning for the future.  Cornell University students
will assist in analyzing the results of this survey and will present these to CNFNY and
CSEA at a future date.
SIZE OF INSTITUTION
A. What is the total number of employees at your facility, including management and
union employees?
B. Of those, how many are full-time employees?_____________________________
Of those, how many are part-time employees?_____________________________
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP
1. Do management and labor share in the decision-making process?
Yes No
2A.      Does your facility have a labor-management committee?Yes No
2B.      If yes, how often does the committee meet?
Monthly     Quarterly     Annually    Never
3.      How would you characterize the relationship between labor and management at
your facility?
cooperativeadversarial don’t know
4.   Does the nursing home have a separate bargaining unit?Yes No
If no, then skip to 5.
4B.  How many bargaining units are there in your facility?  ___________
What are they? CSEA         Yes No
SEIU         Yes No
NYSNA      Yes No
Teamsters    Yes No
Other           Yes No
Skip to 6.
25.    Where is the union leadership employed in your county?
DDS    DPW   nursing home
6. How would you characterize the relationship between union and non-union
employees?
Very Cooperative           Cooperative Adversarial Very Adversarial
QUALITY OF CARE.
7. How would you rate the quality of care in your facility?
Excellent Very Good Good Fair Poor
8A.  Does your nursing home have a team-based management quality program?
Yes No
8B.     If so, how effective is it?
        Not effective Moderately effective     Effective     Very Effective
MARKETING.
9A.   Does your facility market the services it provides?Yes No
If no, skip to 10.
9B. If yes, how important are the following goals for doing marketing?
Very
important
Somewhat
important
Not very
important
Not
important
Build public enthusiasm
Legislative support
Fill beds
Attract paying clients
Educate the public
Other (specify)
__________________________
39C. If yes, have you used any of the following strategies to market the county home?
Print media: yes no
Television: yes no
Radio: yes no
Community events: yes no
Other:______________________ yes no
10.       Are you viewed as a referral point for nursing care?
Yes No
11.       Are you viewed as a referral point for rehabilitative care?
Yes No Do not offer rehabilitative care
12.       Are hospitals currently competing with you for long term care delivery?
Yes No
THE FUTURE/RELATIONSHIP TO COUNTY GOVERNMENT
Please be aware your answers to the following questions will not be linked to
particular institutions or respondents.  The results of this last section of the survey will be
summarized in broad terms for public sector nursing facilities across New York State for
the final report.
13A.     Do you think your county is under fiscal stress?   Y     No
13B.      If yes, does this affect the nursing home’s viability?   Yes   No
414.  Please answer the following questions regarding restructuring options by your
nursing facility or the local legislature.
Is your RHCF Is the legislature
investigating this optioninvestigating this
for restructuring? option for
restructuring your
RHCF?
_________________________________________
a)  performance-based budgeting     Yes    No       Don’t know     Yes       No    Don’t know
b)  privatization Yes No Don’t know Yes       No    Don’t know
c)  voluntary sector Yes No Don’t know Yes       No    Don’t know
d)  public benefit corporation Yes No Don’t know Yes       No    Don’t know
e) closure Yes No Don’t know Yes       No    Don’t know
f)  other Yes No Don’t know Yes       No    Don’t know
15. Does your county legislature see the nursing home as essential to the mission of
local government?
Yes No
16. How involved is the county legislature in nursing home management concerns?
Very involved Somewhat Involved Not Involved at All
17. How would you characterize the relationship?
Very Cooperative CooperativeAdversarial Very Adversarial
18. Are there other issues you see as essential for the viability of your county nursing
            facility that CSEA should know?
19.  What are your facility’s biggest concerns as you look toward the future?
SURVEY OF NURSING HOME ADMINISTRATORS
CNFNY is conducting the following survey in an attempt to understand principal challenges to public
sector nursing home viability in New York State and to contribute toward a larger process of strategic
planning for the future.  Cornell University students will assist in analyzing the results of this survey and
will present these to CNFNY and CSEA in May 1999.
LABOR ISSUES
1. What is the rate of annual employee turnover for these positions at your facility?
a)  RN’s: 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%
b)  LPN’s: 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%
c)  CNA’s: 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%
d)  support staff:0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%
2. For how many shifts per day does your facility have an RN supervisor?
1 2 3
3. What is your normal staffing ratio of licensed nursing staff to beds for the following shifts?
Less than  1:51:5 1:6 1:7 1:8 1:9 1:10 1:11 1:12 More than1:12
7am-3pm
3pm-11pm
11pm-7am
RELATIONSHIP WITH COUNTY GOVERNMENT.
4. How is your facility financed?
a) enterprise budget
b) part of county budget
c)   other:  _______________________
Please describe the current fiscal health of your facility, WITHOUT intergovernmental transfer
monies:
5a.   Do you have a DEFICIT ? Yes No    (if no, skip to question 6)
5b.   If YES, how much?
Under $1 million      $1-3 million     more than $3 million
5c.   If YES, what  percentage is this of your county nursing facility budget?
Less than  1% 1-3% 4-7%    7-10%    more than 10%
6a.   Do you have a SURPLUS? Yes No    (if no, skip to question 7)
6b.   If YES, how much?
Under $1 million      $1-3 million     more than $3 million
6c.   If YES, What percentage is this of your county nursing facility budget?
Less than 1%  1-3% 4-7%    7-10%   more than 10%
Please describe the current fiscal health of your facility WITH intergovernmental transfer monies:
7a.  Do you have a DEFICIT ? Yes No      (If no, skip to question 8)
7b.  If YES, how much?
Under $1 million      $1-3 million     more than $3 million
7c.  If YES, what  percentage is this of your county nursing facility budget?
Less than 1% 1-3% 4-7%    7-10%   more than 10%
8a.  Do you have a SURPLUS? Yes No (If no, skip to question 9)
8b.  If YES, how much?
Under $1 million      $1-3 million     more than $3 million
 
 
8c.  If YES, what percentage is this of your county nursing facility budget?
    Less than 1% 1-3% 4-7%    7-10%   more than 10%
9.  Does your county legislature see the nursing home as essential to the mission of local government?  
Yes No
10a.  How involved is the county legislature in nursing home management concerns?
Very involved Somewhat involved Not involved at all
10b.   How would you characterize the relationship?
Very cooperative CooperativeAdversarial Very Adversarial
11.  Please answer the following questions regarding restructuring options:
Is your RHCF Is the legislature
investigating investigating
this option for this option for
restructuring? restructuring your
RHCF?
a)  performance-based budgetingYes No Yes No don’t know
b)  privatization Yes No Yes No don’t know
c)  voluntary organization Yes No Yes No don’t know
d)  public benefit corporation Yes No Yes No don’t know
e) closure Yes No Yes No don’t know
f)  other: _______________ Yes No Yes No don’t know
12a.     Is your county under fiscal stress? A great dealSomewhat Not at all
12b.     If yes, does this affect the nursing home’s viability?
A great dealSomewhat Not at all
13.     Are there other issues you see as essential for the viability of your county nursing facility that
CNFNY should be aware of?
14.     How could CNFNY help you in meeting such challenge(s)?
SURVEY OF NURSING HOME ADMINISTRATORS
CNFNY is conducting the following survey in an attempt to understand principal
challenges to public sector nursing home viability in New York State and to contribute
toward a larger process of strategic planning for the future.  Cornell University students
will assist in analyzing the results of this survey and will present these to CNFNY and
CSEA in May 1999.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
1.    When was your facility built?
Pre-1960 1960’s 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s
2. When was the most recent significant renovation of your facilities?
1960’s 1970’s 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-present
3. What is the TOTAL NUMBER of employees at your facility?  __________________
4. Of these, how many FULL-TIME employees are there at your facility?  ___________
5. See table. Please answer the following questions regarding range of services, occupancy rates, competition, future demand and anticipated
expansion of services.
Name of Service Do you offer
this service?
Number
of Beds
Average
Occupancy
(in beds)
Does the
competition
offer this service?
Do you anticipate future
demand to be…
Do you plan to
expand this service?
RHCF/Skilled Nursing Y   N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
    Alzheimer’s Unit Y   N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
   AIDS Unit Y   N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
   Behavioral Unit Y   N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
   Head Injury Y   N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
   Rehabilitative Care
  (PhysT/OccT/Speech)
Y   N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
Licensed adult
home care
Y   N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
Respite care Y   N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
Hospice care Y   N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
Assisted Living Y   N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
Other (specify)
____________________
  Y Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
Long term home
health care
Y  N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
Adult day care Y  N Y   N   don’t know Less   about the same    moreY  N   don’t know
MARKET PROFILE
6. Name one service your facility would like to offer, but doesn’t offer currently:
____________________________________________________________________
7. Does your facility contract with a third party to provide any of the following?
A)  maintenance services?    Yes   No If so, is this for (circle):
MANAGEMENT    or    SERVICE PROVISION
B)  dietary services?  Yes   No If so, is this for (circle):
MANAGEMENT    or    SERVICE PROVISION
C)  laundry services? Yes   No          If so, is this for (circle):
MANAGEMENT    or    SERVICE PROVISION
D)  housekeeping services?   Yes   No If so, is this for (circle):
MANAGEMENT    or    SERVICE PROVISION
E)   pharmaceutical services?   Yes   No If so, is this for (circle):
MANAGEMENT    or    SERVICE PROVISION
F)   nursing staff?     Yes   No If so, is this for (circle):
MANAGEMENT    or    SERVICE PROVISION
G)  overall management?      Yes   No If so, is this for (circle):
MANAGEMENT    or    SERVICE PROVISION
MARKETING
8A.      Does your facility market the services it provides?Yes No
If no, skip to 9.
8B. How important are the following goals for doing marketing?
Very
important
Somewhat
important
Not
important
Build public interest
Legislative support
Fill beds
Attract paying clients
Educate the public
Other (specify)
__________________________
8C. Have you used any of the following strategies to market your facility?
Print media: yes no
Television: yes no
Radio: yes no
Community events: yes no
Other:______________________ yes no
8D. Of the strategies you named, which was MOST effective in achieving your goal?
______________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
8E. Of the strategies you named, which was LEAST  effective in achieving your goal?
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
9.       Is outreach and marketing an area where seminars
or educational training would be useful to you? Yes No
10A.   Does your facility monitor clients’ satisfaction with services?Yes No
If no, skip to 11A.
10B. How is client satisfaction monitored?
Resident surveys yes no
Family council meetingsyes no
Resident council meetingsyes       no
Suggestion box yes no
Other (specify)_____________________________________________________
LABOR ISSUES
11A.      Does your facility have a separate bargaining unit?Yes No
11B.      If no, where is the union leadership employed in your county?
           Corrections       DDS        DPW      nursing home        Other: ______________
12A.      Does your facility have a labor-management committee?Yes No
If no, skip to 13.
12B.      How often does the committee meet?
Monthly     Quarterly     Annually    Never
13.        How would you characterize the relationship between labor and management at
        your facility?
cooperative     adversarial don’t know
14.        Beyond contract negotiations, do labor and management share in broader
decision making processes (e.g. total quality management)?
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LONG TERM CARE PROVIDERS
15. What is your latest full-house Case Mix Index?    _____________________
16. Based on your latest census figures, what was your breakdown by payment
class?
Medicaid __________________________________________
Medicare __________________________________________
Other insurance __________________________________________
Private pay __________________________________________
17. Do you currently perceive significant competition from other long term
 care providers?
Yes No
18.      Is your facility viewed as a referral point for nursing care by area hospitals?
Yes No
19.     Is your facility viewed as a referral point for rehabilitative care by area hospitals?
Yes No Do not offer rehabilitative care
20.     Are hospitals currently competing with your facility for long term care delivery?
Yes No
21.     Have hospitals historically competed with your facility for long term care
          delivery?
Yes No
22.      Do you anticipate hospitals expanding into services you currently provide?
Yes No
23.   What are your biggest concerns as you look toward the future?
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 Executive Summary
The public sector, particularly local government, is under pressure to simultaneously improve performance and curtail
costs. Reductions in state and federal funding, a continuing demand for efficient and flexible government services, and
fear of tax revolts are leading to reexaminations of how local governments can best meet the demand for their services.
Governments are utilizing a number of tools for restructuring service delivery to increase efficiency and reduce costs.
In our background research, we identified two types of restructuring: external restructuring, where a government turns
to outside organizations to provide services (through privatization or intermunicipal cooperation, for example), and
internal restructuring, which seeks to improve service delivery by altering organizational structure and decision-making
processes. High levels of public sector unionization in New York State make internal restructuring through labor-
management cooperation an especially important alternative. Through case studies of three New York State counties,
we examined the use of three specific tools for labor-management cooperation: labor-management committees,
mutual-gains bargaining (MGB), and total quality management (TQM). Genesee, Tompkins, and Ontario Counties
were chosen as cases where at least two of these three internal restructuring tools have been implemented successfully.
We found that these cooperative workplace structures improve communication and broaden participation in decision
making, leading to greatly improved labor-management relations and employee morale. They may also reduce costs
and improve service delivery. However, limited evaluation in the three counties makes savings and service
improvements difficult to document.
These tools appear to fall on a continuum of complexity, investment costs, and comprehensiveness. Labor-
management committees provide a foundation for the other tools by building an ongoing forum for communication and
trust building. They are flexible, deal with a wide array of concerns, and require minimal training. Mutual-gains
bargaining requires more training and, in our cases, a preexisting environment of trust. While there are spillover
benefits to other areas, MGB is primarily limited to contract negotiations. TQM is the most comprehensive of the three
tools and requires the greatest degree of training and organizational culture change to be effective. It also may offer the
greatest potential for service improvement.
The case study counties all enjoyed a preexisting environment of trust, committed leadership, and lack of political or
fiscal crisis. Given the investments in training and change in perspective required of labor, management, and elected
officials, implementation of these tools may be more successful in counties not experiencing crisis or a recent history
of labor-management conflict.
These internal restructuring tools are not designed to address external stakeholders. Service improvements may be
limited by higher-level policies and mandates these tools cannot address. Similarly, citizen involvement is not
enhanced by these tools. However, by creating new forums for communication and participatory decision making, local
government enhances its ability to identify and implement programs for service improvement. Adding mechanisms for
citizen involvement and strategies to push for needed policy change at higher levels may further increase local
government's capacity to restructure to meet the needs of its diverse constituents.
 Introduction
The public sector is under pressure to simultaneously improve performance and curtail costs, and this is particularly
true of local government. Reductions in state and federal funding, tax revolts, and the advent of privatization are
leading to reexaminations of how local governments can best meet the demand for their services. Keeping taxes down
while delivering the quality services that citizens expect is a difficult challenge. Local government must become more
efficient and more accountable to the general public.
External Restructuring
External restructuring, which involves privatization or contracting out for services, can create a competitive
environment and result in increased efficiency and cost savings (Savas 1987). In New York State, however,
privatization has been limited (Lauder 1992). A 1997 survey of local government restructuring in the state found
intermunicipal cooperation to be the most common form of restructuring (45% of respondents). Privatization was the
next most common form of restructuring (31%), but reverse privatization (bringing services back into the public sector)
was also significant (Warner and Hebdon 1997). This suggests that local governments in New York State recognize the
value of both cooperation and competition in improving service delivery.
Privatization can create an uneasy or even hostile environment between labor and management. It can result in lower
wages, benefits, and levels of unionization (Hebdon 1995; Chandler and Feuille 1991, 1994) despite government
efforts to ensure no layoffs. Some empirical studies have shown the impacts of contracting on unionized workers' pay
and employment to be minimal (Pendleton 1997). However, lowered employee morale and fears about job security
have significant negative effects on the potential for a cooperative relationship. In addition, public sector unions must
fight privatization if they are to retain their membership base (CSEA 1995).
In New York State, public sector collective bargaining is governed by the Taylor Law, which mandates that employers
negotiate with the union before contracting out a service that is essentially the same as one union members currently
provide. Thus the Taylor Law is often perceived as a roadblock to privatization. However, under some circumstances,
New York State's governments may contract out services without negotiating with the union, and they also may
downsize when there is no longer the need for a particular service or when financial circumstances demand it.
Nonetheless, collective bargaining restrictions under the Taylor Law may limit opportunities for contracting out. This
makes the search for other, more cooperative methods for implementing workplace innovations essential for local
government restructuring in New York State (Donovan 1990; Lawyers Co-operative Publishing 1982).
Internal Restructuring for Transforming Government
In their well-known book Reinventing Government (1992), David Osborne and Ted Gaebler argue that a sweeping
overhaul of how government does business can be achieved through internal restructuring. They describe this as a
move from a supply-driven system to a demand-driven system. The rigidity of budgeting, service delivery, and the
labor-management relationship in traditional supply-driven governments, they argue, must be replaced by flexible,
quality-oriented systems that are responsive to customers' needs. Internal competition and more cooperative labor-
management relationships can provide an effective alternative to privatization for improving government efficiency.
Decentralization of authority can help government achieve better performance. The private sector has demonstrated
that decentralizing authority and flattening hierarchies can be very effective in improving efficiency and product
quality (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). Giving decision-making power to front-line workers, who are closest to most of
the problems and opportunities, and encouraging employee innovation are important steps (Marshall 1992). Direct
citizen participation is also vital to improving government services (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Osborne and Plastrik
1997).
Total quality management (TQM) is one vehicle for internal restructuring. TQM programs are being used to transform
government, especially at the federal level, but also in New York State and in more than 400 municipalities nationwide
(Rusaw 1997, U.S. GAO 1995, New York State GOER 1992). TQM emphasizes an organization's commitment to the
customer and to continuous improvement of every process through the use of data-driven problem-solving approaches
based on empowerment of employee groups and teams. Cooperative processes such as TQM help to create a culture
change, perhaps the most important requirement for transforming the public sector.
The Potential of Labor-Management Cooperation
Traditional industrial relations practices relied on the acceptance of a shared ideology among labor, management, and
government that defined workplace roles and provided stability to the system. The 1990s saw the development of a
new model, one that recognizes there is often a lack of consensus between management and labor, and that both are
greatly impacted by the instability in economic, technological, political, and social environments. In this context,
methods that focus on building communication and cooperation between management and labor offer considerable
promise (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994).
Cooperative labor-management structures such as labor-management committees, total quality management (TQM)
programs, and mutual-gains bargaining can be used effectively in the public sector. While the public sector is distinct
in many ways from the private sector, it can learn from the experiences of private firms in implementing some of these
progressive labor-management practices (Lawler 1990).
However, resistance to cooperative practices can be substantial. Any of the major stakeholders in the process—
management, elected officials, and labor—may resist the change for different reasons, making transition difficult and
time-consuming. Managers may resent their loss of authority and harbor doubts that productivity gains can be attained
through these methods. Elected officials may be hesitant to accept the political risks of instituting change. Unions may
perceive cooperative structures as a ploy to weaken labor and divert attention from basic issues such as wages and job
security. They also fear that by increasing workplace efficiency, they are putting their jobs in jeopardy (Gold 1986). In
addition, participation may not necessarily give workers any real power.
Cooperative tools are inherently limited, since many fundamental decisions about organizational structure and work
processes still remain in the domain of upper management. This is a commonly cited drawback to programs such as
TQM (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). But more and more it is being recognized that all interested parties (labor,
management, elected officials, customers) should have a voice in decision making, and that valuable production
knowledge resides in all levels of an organization, especially with front-line workers (Marshall 1992). Having been
implemented in the private sector with success, cooperative techniques are clearly beginning to take hold in public
sector workplaces, as evidenced by the many examples profiled in the U.S Department of Labor report Working
Together for Public Service, better known as the Florio Report (1996).
The literature indicates that effects of labor-management cooperation on the ability of local government to undertake
internal restructuring and to improve service delivery are worth examining. While obstacles clearly exist, with effort,
many of the barriers to labor-management cooperation can be overcome (Gold 1986). By profiling counties where
several tools of labor-management cooperation have been employed successfully, we hope to add to the existing
knowledge of how these specific tools can be used to improve local government services.
 Methodology
Initial research for this project was conducted in collaboration with the New York State Civil Service Employees
Association (CSEA), the New York State Association of Counties (NYSAC), and the New York State Department of
State's (DOS) Division of Local Government. Representatives from each of these groups were interviewed for their
perspectives on and concerns about local government restructuring. The team found, through these discussions, that
public sector management was searching for ways to improve internal and external operations, while labor was
interested in exploring ways to prevent privatization of services. We hypothesized that labor-management cooperation
can reduce costs and increase service quality, diminishing the impetus for privatization.
Further interviews with key informants helped the team focus on the relevant issues surrounding labor-management
cooperation and identify the types of labor-management tools being employed in counties throughout New York State.
Key informants included: CSEA, NYSAC, DOS, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), the Governor's
Office of Employee Relations (GOER), staff and faculty of Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, and elected officials from counties which had implemented some form of cooperation (see Appendix A for
complete list).
We found that formal labor-management cooperative initiatives were not widely used in the state, but that a handful of
both exemplary and semi-successful cases did exist. In the majority of cases, the most commonly implemented tools
were labor-management committees, mutual-gains bargaining (MGB), and total quality management (TQM) programs.
As a result, the team decided to focus on these three initiatives as tools of the labor-management cooperative process.
A 1997 survey of local government restructuring in New York State provided a preliminary indication of the incidence
of privatization and restructuring in NYS counties (Warner and Hebdon 1997)1. Twelve of the counties that responded
to this survey indicated they had used cooperative labor-management initiatives. Key informants provided names of
counties which had participated in TQM or mutual-gains bargaining training, or had implemented labor-management
committees2. The research team then selected three counties—Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins—which had been
successful in implementing formal labor-management cooperation.
To explore our hypothesis that labor-management cooperative efforts could be an attractive alternative to privatization,
the following key questions were formulated for the case studies based on the preliminary interviews and relevant
literature:
What are the basic elements of a cooperative labor-management relationship in county government?
What are the goals that labor, management, and county officials hope to achieve through cooperation?
What is the impact of a cooperative labor-management program on labor relations, service quality, and cost of
service delivery?
These key questions reflect an attempt to describe the process of labor-management cooperation. Therefore, the chosen
research method for the project is that of a case study, a descriptive research tool (Yin 1984).
The case study counties were selected on the following criteria:
Utilizing several tools of labor-management cooperation. Having examined in our preliminary investigation
several counties that had implemented one cooperative tool with marginal success, the team hypothesized that
several tools may be necessary to substantively change the relationship between management and labor. Thus we
chose counties that had implemented more than one of the cooperative tools identified: total quality
management, labor-management committees, or mutual-gains bargaining.
Key informant recommendations. The case study selection was also based on the beliefs of key informants listed
in Appendix A that these counties were among the more successful of New York State in implementing
cooperative labor-management efforts.
Willingness to participate and proximity. Cases were selected on the basis of the willingness and ability of the
counties to provide us with the necessary access to personnel and resources. Geographic proximity to Ithaca was
also a consideration due to time constraints.
In each case, every attempt was made to interview one or more representatives from each of the three perspectives:
elected officials, management, and organized labor (see Appendix B). An interview guide (see Appendix C) was
developed to provide consistency and direction across all interviews. However, the interview format also provided
flexibility for open-ended responses, so that the elements, advantages, challenges, and lessons of labor-management
cooperative initiatives could be fully explored. Interviewees were able to respond to questions and expand on their
ideas verbally, in a manner that a survey does not allow.
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the majority of interviewees. When this was not possible, interviews
were conducted by telephone. Interviews were summarized and shared with interviewees for review. Where necessary,
follow-up interviews were conducted by telephone.
The research team compared the cases, discussing the commonalities and differences across them. Preconditions, goals,
and limitations of the three tools of labor-management cooperation studied were emphasized. The analysis was written
as a draft report and shared with the key informants in the case study counties. Their comments were incorporated into
the final report. Permission to share the information contained in this report with the public was obtained from all
county officials and staff who were interviewed.
 Findings
The case study counties—Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins—are located in central and western New York State.
Genesee County has a population of about 60,000, while Ontario and Tompkins each have about 95,000 residents.
Politically, Genesee and Ontario are governed by Republican-dominated legislatures and Tompkins currently has a
Democrat-controlled board. All three counties have an appointed full-time county manager or administrator. This is
the most common form of county government in New York State3. The presence of a professional, full-time manager
was a control factor across these three counties. The ability to generalize findings to other counties with county
executives or no full-time, professional manager may be limited. However, key informants familiar with cooperative
efforts across the state indicate that strong leadership and support for change appear to be more important to successful
implementation than type of governance structure.
Additionally, the environment between labor and management in all three cases was found to be generally cooperative,
or at least noncombative, prior to the implementation of cooperative initiatives. Therefore, this study cannot speak to
counties where an adversarial relationship between labor and management is present.
The three labor-management tools were found to exist along a continuum of complexity, with labor-management
committees providing the foundation for the other two tools. These committees provide a flexible forum for problem
solving and building trust, and they require minimal training. Labor-management committees in all cases predated
mutual-gains bargaining and TQM. The interest-based bargaining approach of MGB required substantial training for
successful implementation. Used primarily for contract negotiations, MGB appears to have had very positive effects on
negotiation processes and outcomes, as well as positive spillover effects to other arenas of decision making. TQM was
by far the most comprehensive and complex of the three tools studied. Extensive training of labor, management, and
elected officials was required to support the culture change toward shared decision making required for a successful
TQM effort.
Key elements for successful cooperation include training, committed leadership, communication, and evaluation. In the
case study counties, improved morale, costs savings, and service improvements resulted from the use of these three
tools, suggesting they do provide an effective alternative to privatization. However, limited evaluation in the counties
prevented definitive analysis of the true costs and benefits of labor-management cooperation.
 Labor-Management Committees
Labor-management committees are cooperative structures that focus on problem solving and building trust. They
typically deal with issues including workplace safety, work hours, training, personnel issues, and daily workplace
concerns. Although labor-management committees may initially focus on less controversial issues, such as worker
safety standards, over time they may build a level of trust between labor and management that allows them to deal
with more complex problems (Gold 1986).
Labor-management committees may be permanent or they may form around a particular issue and disband once
resolution is reached. However, they are not necessarily formed to solve crises. Many are proactive and attempt to
improve current work practices. They are flexible and easy to implement, and require minimal training. Labor-
management committees are cornerstones of cooperation in each of the counties studied.
Structure
The labor-management committees in Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties are similar in terms of their goals:
enhanced labor-management relations, decreased costs, and improved services. Each county has a central guiding or
umbrella committee that oversees the activities of issue-based or departmental labor-management subcommittees. They
may facilitate training and provide direction to subcommittees or they may address specific program innovations or
daily operations. All three counties implemented labor-management committees before mutual-gains bargaining and
total quality management.
There are differences in how each county uses the committees, however. In Ontario County, where such committees
have existed since the early 1980s, they operate independently of the TQM program. Ontario County has a countywide
committee, committees that operate within departments, and others that address specific issues, such as safety and
health.
Tompkins County's labor-management committees, which have existed since the mid-1980s, now function as part of
its TQM program. Prior to the inception of the TQM program, non-union members who volunteered or were voted in
by all employees were allowed to serve on labor-management committees. Under the total quality management
agreement negotiated between the CSEA and the county board of representatives, now there are more committees, and
only union-selected representatives may serve on them (see the total quality management section, below).
Genesee County does not have a TQM program, and their labor-management committees are the main venue for
workplace innovation. There is one main committee for the general bargaining unit, which covers most county
departments, and a separate committee for the nursing home unit.
Representation
Labor-management committees are composed of representatives of management and the union. Only in Tompkins
County were legislators also included. Tompkins County's umbrella committee has 13 members, including
representatives from top management, middle management, and labor. In Ontario County, the countywide committee is
made up of the county administrator, deputy administrator, director of human resources, and several of the local union
presidents. In Genesee County, the general unit committee consists of the county manager, the personnel officer, the
CSEA general unit president, and the regional labor relations specialist, as well as two more representatives from both
management and labor who rotate onto the committee in three-year intervals. This provides more people an
opportunity to be part of the process. Size of the committees varies according to the scope of the issue and the need for
stakeholder input. Most have eight or fewer members, but at least one committee in Tompkins County has over twenty
members.
Functions
In all counties, labor-management committees address a broad spectrum of workplace concerns. In Genesee County,
the general unit committee emphasizes relationships and creating an environment where employees feel their input is
valued and decisions are made by consensus. The labor-management committee has introduced policies that create a
more family-oriented environment.
Labor-management committees can also be forums for discussing alternatives to privatization proposals. In Ontario
County, labor has the opportunity to give their input before a decision to privatize a service is made by the
administration. In Genesee County, labor and management formed a special joint action committee to address the
threat of possible privatization in the Department of Mental Health Services.
Labor-management committees can impact the delivery of government services by finding ways to reduce costs while
maintaining or improving the service itself. While hard data documenting the impact of innovations on cost was
difficult to obtain, workers' compensation costs were significantly reduced in Tompkins County as a result of safety
measures and training recommended by a labor-management committee (prior to the implementation of TQM). In
Genesee County, labor-management committee recommendations and process improvements have led to cost savings
through reduced absenteeism, increased productivity, and decreased supervision time. Their nursing home committee
has helped the facility improve efficiency and avoid privatization. Client surveys in Ontario and Tompkins Counties
have indicated overall improvements in services.
Labor-management committees do not address contract disputes or grievances, although they appear to be effective in
defusing potential problems before they reach the grievance stage. All three counties credited labor-management
committees for helping to keep the number of formal grievances low.
Role and Authority of Committees
There is great flexibility in how roles are defined for labor-management committees. Tompkins County has a formal
agreement defining the roles, expectations, and boundaries of authority for the Leadership Council, which took one
year to negotiate and which clearly outlines the scope of the committee process. Genesee County has less formal
written guidelines that articulate the goals and procedures of the committee. The authority of the labor-management
committee is not written into a contract but is accepted by both parties. Ontario County's labor-management committee
is well entrenched and seems to function effectively without a written agreement.
Labor-management committees have varying degrees of authority and power. In some cases, their policy
recommendations are binding, while in others they merely offer suggestions that must gain the approval of elected
officials. This is often the case when budget or cost decisions are involved. Committees in Ontario County are
empowered to draft letters of agreement around issues that would normally be addressed through contract negotiations.
In some cases, the use of labor-management committees may impact traditional lines of authority. Middle managers
may lose some of their decision-making authority because employees can voice concerns directly to top levels of
management through the committee. In Ontario County this was an issue, but in Genesee and Tompkins Counties,
middle managers are included on committees.
Training/Support
Training committee members in conflict resolution and consensus decision making may help committees work more
smoothly. Training sessions allow both groups to establish their commitment to the concept and to forge cooperative
relationships. For example, in the Genesee County Nursing Home, a half-day training session for the entire staff
helped them use their labor-management committee more effectively. In this case, a CSEA facilitator from Albany was
used. The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and Cornell's Industrial and Labor Relations Extension are
other valuable sources of training and information. It is important to recognize, however, that there may be a
significant time lag after training before measurable results are seen.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties, which had longer-standing labor-management committees, have invested more in
training for mutual-gains bargaining techniques and total quality management than for labor-management committees.
Relationships
Labor-management committees can be contentious because they bring together individuals with diverse points of
view. Strong leadership, good communication, and commitment to the process make the difference between success
and failure. Without these elements it is difficult, if not impossible, to build the necessary level of trust to make a
labor-management committee work. Both Tompkins and Genesee Counties had attempted labor-management
committees in the past, with limited scope and success. By focusing on relationships, building trust, and gaining the
commitment of leadership they were able to establish the successful committees that operate today. One strategy used
was to begin by addressing issues that are less contentious, to build momentum so committees can tackle larger, more
difficult problems in the future. This increases the level of trust among committee members and reduces the potential
for early conflict.
Employee morale has been greatly improved in the counties studied. There are still conflicts and differences of
opinion, but labor-management committees provide a mechanism for giving voice to these problems before they
become intractable.
Challenges and Limitations
Several challenges in implementing labor-management committees are evident:
Time is required to build the trust necessary for effective committees.
They have limited authority: they are not designed to make decisions about broad structural changes in county
operations.
Defining the appropriate roles and boundaries of committees is important: many problems lie beyond the scope
of committees and call for wider participation of elected officials and citizens.
Conclusion
Labor-management committees are excellent forums for communication and workplace problem solving. They are
flexible and require minimal training, which also makes them inexpensive. In all three counties, good communication,
strong relationships, committed leadership, and trust proved to be the most important factors for committee success.
While the most compelling impact seen was on labor-management relations, committee efforts also led to
improvements in county government functioning. Labor-management committees are relatively easy to implement and
provide a foundation for incorporating more sophisticated tools, such as mutual-gains bargaining and total quality
management, into an organization.
The following are recommendations to consider for labor-management committees:
Establish a central, guiding committee to oversee the endeavor.
Integrate committees into the organizational structure.
Define expectations and parameters for decision making.
Include as many stakeholders as possible and necessary.
Communicate and foster a shared understanding of goals and objectives for both the committee and the
organization.
Be cognizant of power differentials and the effect these may have on communication.
Address issues where it is easy to reach consensus at the outset in order to build momentum to tackle more
difficult topics.
 Mutual-Gains Bargaining
Mutual-gains bargaining (MGB) is a method of bargaining designed to dramatically improve the quality of contract
negotiations and increase the likelihood of compliance between labor and management, ultimately benefiting their
constituents. The mutual-gains process focuses on negotiations based on interests rather than positions and on building
consensus. Through this process, unions and management identify at least one common goal and find ways to jointly
accomplish that goal (Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton 1993). While MGB can be used for many types of negotiations,
the case studies focused on its use for contract negotiations. Ontario County has been using mutual-gains bargaining
since 1994, Tompkins County since 1995, and Genesee County since 1996.
Preconditions
All three counties had existing cooperative labor-management relationships in place before the initiation of MGB.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties indicated they had been using interest-based bargaining techniques informally for
years, and that they moved to MGB as a way of formalizing the process. This leads us to speculate that counties that
have good labor-management relationships may be more apt to implement MGB because the idea of cooperating isn't
very radical to them and there is less distrust between labor and management to overcome. Genesee County, however,
was less satisfied with their standard negotiation process and wanted to use MGB to improve the quality of
negotiations.
Benefits
Mutual-gains bargaining led to smoother contract negotiations in all three counties. This was especially true in
Genesee, where labor and management agreed the new techniques were far more productive than previous
negotiations. Perhaps because Ontario and Tompkins Counties already had well-established cooperative structures that
resembled MGB in place, the changes were less dramatic, but in both counties labor and management spoke positively
about the effects of MGB techniques on the negotiating process.
MGB can be used to empower workers and strengthen their organizations, as well as to shape their lives at work. The
benefits include increased access to information, prenotification of changes in work arrangements and technology, and
increased input, which helps management avoid errors or decisions that would hurt union membership. There is also an
indication that work satisfaction may increase, and the union may be able to address a broader range of members'
concerns more quickly and fully. In addition, the literature on the subject indicates that union membership, education,
and skill levels increase.
In the public sector, management must make the organization as effective as possible to meet the needs and
expectations of citizens and their legislative authorities. Management's benefits include improved effectiveness,
increased organizational flexibility, an improved working environment, and enhanced productivity (Cohen-Rosenthal
and Burton, 1993).
Labor and management in the case study counties agree MGB has saved a lot of time. The use of MGB allowed
Genesee County to complete their last contract in about a month, whereas it used to take up to six or seven months.
The same is true for Tompkins County, where labor and management found the salary issue was on the table faster
than ever before, in part because the economy was doing well, but also as a result of MGB.
Neither management nor labor see MGB as a panacea, but both concede that both parties walk away from the
negotiating process feeling better. While both labor and management in Ontario County are pleased with MGB, the
union appears to favor the process a bit more. CSEA representatives felt that MGB would definitely be used in the
future. At least one manager, on the other hand, was of the opinion that MGB was a bit "tedious" and might not be
used in the next contract because levels of trust were already high. In Tompkins County, labor felt that the "win-win"
solutions that MGB is supposed to create often result in compromises. Management respected the process, but felt it
was nothing new in comparison to the way they interacted in the past.
Leadership
The commitment of top management and union leaders to MGB is very important to its success. Some people will find
it difficult to accept a new approach and will be subversive to both groups' mutual interests. In some cases, a change in
leadership was necessary before a county could effectively implement MGB. In Ontario and Genesee Counties, for
example, changes in union and/or management leadership preceded their formal implementation of MGB.
During negotiations, and during day-to-day interaction, the administration, union leaders, and managers need to set an
example of open communication for all to follow. Labor and management must be committed to MGB. They must
communicate with each other, understand each other's needs and interests, and pursue answers that benefit both
groups. Tompkins, Genesee, and Ontario Counties' MGB efforts had the support of top management.
Training
Mutual-gains bargaining requires a change in philosophy that cannot occur without careful preparation. Unlike
traditional collective bargaining, mutual-gains bargaining operates on trust and open information sharing, and as
simple as the concept might be, it is critical that labor, management, and legislators receive training before they decide
to embark on mutual gains. While legislators do not participate in negotiation, it is important they understand and
support the process.
In their efforts to implement MGB, Ontario, Genesee, and Tompkins Counties all turned to the New York State School
of Industrial and Labor Relations Extension for training. Tompkins County trained 300 out of 720 employees in MGB
before its formal implementation in 1995, and had few problems. Now all bargaining units in Tompkins County
(except the sheriff's department) use mutual-gains techniques for all terms except salary. In the case of Genesee
County, the assistant county manager was trained to facilitate the negotiations, while Ontario and Tompkins used
outside facilitators. Although Genesee's general unit contract was successfully negotiated using MGB in a much
shorter period of time than was typical, the negotiating process was still very challenging, and the rank and file
expressed skepticism about the initial contract. Because of the distrust that traditionally exists between the two groups,
it may help to use an outside facilitator at the outset. Even with training, it can take employees and management time
to learn to trust and accept the process.
Challenges
MGB can benefit both labor and management, but it can also be risky to both parties. Both union leaders and
management are in danger of being perceived as too close to the "adversary"— legislators may fear management is
being too easy on the union, while union members may fear their leadership is being "co-opted." Since the union is
negotiating the terms and conditions of employment for its members, it has more at stake. The open negotiation process
inherently requires each side to relinquish some of its negotiating power and may limit the union's ability to act as a
unified group. In Tompkins County, the union has not yet agreed to negotiate salary using mutual-gains bargaining
techniques largely for these reasons.
Mutual-gains bargaining is a process that was developed in the private sector to increase labor-management
cooperation, but also to aid downsizing efforts. MGB inherently cuts out middle management as the mediators between
labor and top management. In Ontario County, for example, middle managers were resistant to MGB, as it appeared to
take some of their authority away.
Finally, because mutual-gains bargaining is a tool which is used only during contract negotiation time, it is limited in
its ability to have a direct impact on the daily interaction between labor and management. However, there were
important "spillover" effects of mutual-gains bargaining training to other venues such as labor-management
committees and total quality management teams.
Conclusion
Interest-based bargaining appears to save money and time, and have positive effects on labor-management
relationships. MGB resulted in quicker contract negotiation where both parties walked away feeling better about the
process and the outcome. However, as with other similar labor-management cooperative methods, it is difficult to
quantify the results of MGB. For example, Ontario County tries to quantify cost savings whenever possible but finds it
difficult to assign a dollar value to the intangible benefits of their cooperative efforts. The counties studied did not
establish evaluation measures to determine what impact (positive or negative) MGB has made.
 Total Quality Management (TQM)
While Genesee, Ontario, and Tompkins Counties have all implemented labor-management committees and mutual-
gains bargaining, only Ontario and Tompkins Counties have instituted total quality management (TQM) initiatives.
Ontario County began to implement total quality management in 1993, Tompkins County in 1994.
Total quality management represents a shift in management philosophy from autocratic, hierarchical decision-making
structures to flatter organizational structures and shared decision-making responsibility (Kursat and Calicchia 1994). In
the past few decades, following the model of the private sector, local governments have come to realize that top-down
management is not always the best way to achieve results and that line workers have valuable contributions to make in
identifying strategies for improvement (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).
In Tompkins and Ontario Counties, total quality management has changed the way decisions are made, processes are
designed, and labor and management interact. Informants describe total quality management programs as a "visceral
change," a "paradigm shift," and a "culture change." Both counties' total quality management programs are new, and
therefore conclusions about the programs' impacts and differences between them are tentative.
Three Components: Shared Decision Making, Customer Focus, Management by Fact
Total quality management initiatives have three primary components according to Kursat and Calicchia (1994):
1. Shared leadership and employee involvement
Total quality management programs are based in part on the idea that employees performing the work can create
more efficient and effective processes to produce a higher-quality product. Total quality management programs
typically establish formal structures such as labor-management committees for sharing decision making between
managers and front-line employees.
2. Customer focus and an emphasis on service and product quality
TQM focuses on the needs and wants of two types of customers: "internal" customers—the next people down the
line in the work process—and "external" customers—those who purchase or utilize a good or service. TQM
seeks to improve the quality of both the product and the process by identifying the type and quality of good
desired by both internal and external customers and providing what each customer wants. This can be difficult,
since in the public sector, external customers include the people using a good or service but also the people
paying for the good (taxpayers) and their representatives (elected officials).
3. Management by fact and continual improvement
Total quality management encourages steady data collection and rational decision making based on data rather
than on impressions or uninformed opinions. Labor-management committees are one way to collect data about
many facets of a complex issue. Others include customer surveys and careful tracking and documentation of any
cost or time savings. The second component, a philosophy of continual improvement, encourages employees and
managers to exceed current standards. Continuous improvement is achieved through constant experimentation,
learning from mistakes, and diffusing learning throughout the organization.
Goals
In both Tompkins and Ontario Counties, the goals of total quality management most often articulated by managers and
employees were to improve labor-management relations and work conditions, leading to a more smoothly functioning
organization. All parties also expressed a desire to improve service quality. This desire is exemplified by Ontario
County's slogan for total quality management: "We aspire to excellence." In Tompkins County, elected officials' goals
focused primarily on service improvement and cost savings.
Training
Participatory methods of decision making, identifying customer needs, and determining what kind of data to collect
and how to collect it require skills of employees and managers that are not inborn or traditionally taught in schools or
in the workplace. Thus, to effectively implement a total quality management program and achieve the paradigm shift
required for success, training is essential.
Of the two counties, Tompkins has conducted more extensive training and spent more money. Tompkins County's
Leadership Council (the labor-management committee charged with planning and managing the total quality
management program) has the goal of training all employees, managers, and elected officials in quality methods.
Initial training sessions were conducted by consultants, who are still involved in the process. In the fall of 1996,
however, the county hired a full-time training coordinator, and now more sessions are conducted by in-house staff.
Between 1994 and 1997, Tompkins County spent just over $300,000 for outside consultants to conduct training. In
1998, the county will spend an estimated $170,000 on consultants to complete the bulk of the training. Since 1997, in-
house costs have been around $100,000. These costs will drop dramatically after 1998, when all employees, managers,
and elected officials will have been trained in total quality management techniques and only training for new
employees and refresher courses will be necessary.
Ontario County appears to have spent significantly less on their training program, particularly on outside consultants.
Initially both labor and management leaders as well as county legislators were trained at the Rochester Institute of
Technology. Initial training cost $35,000 for employees and $50,000 for supervisors, managers, and elected officials.
The county gradually built their capacity to do training in-house, and today all county employees have been trained in
TQM concepts.
It is important to remember when comparing these figures, however, that we obtained dollar amounts from Tompkins
County for both outside and in-house costs, whereas the figures reported for Ontario County's training costs are only
initial start-up costs for consultants. Still, there appears to be an appreciable difference in expenditures on consultants.
This difference may be due to the values held by county leaders. Tompkins County leaders are professionally and
personally interested in organizational theory and process, and are willing to wait for long-term results. These may be
the reasons for the strong emphasis on process and formal training. Ontario County leaders seem less interested in
process and more interested in both short- and long-term results.
Support Structures
Individuals, however well trained in new ways of thinking and doing, will not be able to maintain the culture shift
without a system of structural supports that devolve authority for decision making to labor-management teams.
Supportive structures are probably one of the largest differences between total quality management programs which
employees perceive to be "fake" and those which seem more real and effective.
Ontario County's Service Excellence program is structured around a countywide steering committee that acts as a core
planning group, setting the direction for the program and coordinating the activities of the subgroups. The four
departmental work group committees each have the same organizational structure as the steering committee and
coordinate their corresponding functions.
Tompkins County's Leadership Council includes representatives from labor, top management, middle management,
and elected officials. The Leadership Council guides the training process and the activities of departmental committees,
and facilitates the work of smaller, project-oriented or cross-functional committees.
Another support mechanism is in-house training facilitators. Currently, Tompkins County employs a full-time training
coordinator. An additional twenty employees act as facilitators, assuming leadership roles on various departmental and
issue-related committees. They lend practical support based on their understanding of TQM and committee concepts.
In addition, they are role models for other employees and managers.
Advantages
Total quality management is the most comprehensive cooperative tool for restructuring that the research team
investigated. More than labor-management committees, total quality management programs can address inefficiencies
in work processes and strive to identify customer needs. Unlike mutual-gains bargaining techniques, which are used
primarily for contract negotiations once every few years, total quality management is ongoing and suffuses all work
processes. It empowers labor to improve the workplace. In Tompkins County, for instance, labor-management relations
had been good for some time, but TQM forced managers to rethink their traditional style to allow greater employee
involvement in decision making. Employees and management now work together to solve problems, and by all
accounts, both find the new process more productive and rewarding.
The cases studied indicate that total quality management does improve the functioning of the organization, employee
morale, and labor-management relations. Based on the suggestions of a total quality management committee in the
Department of Social Services, Tompkins County streamlined the intake process for several social service programs. A
Tompkins County survey indicates that employee morale in the Department of Public Works improved 22% between
1990 and 1997. Further, since the TQM programs have been implemented, both Ontario and Tompkins Counties have
had fewer frivolous grievances as a result of increased communication and trust.
The programs have also reduced costs in both counties, although the cost savings have not always been well
documented. Tompkins County representatives believe they have saved a great deal due to improved morale and
greater efficiency. Ontario County has documented savings through the efforts of its workplace safety team. The team
project began with county safety coordinators identifying high-risk job duties, such as driving and heavy lifting, based
on local and national accident and injury data. Employees performing these tasks were then trained in safer driving
and lifting techniques, resulting in a 37% reduction of OSHA-recordable injuries in the county from 1994 to 1997.
Lost days were reduced by 60% in the same time period. As a result of these safety improvements, a special tax
assessment to pay for workers' compensation, to be spread out over five years, was paid off in only three, saving
taxpayers $1.5 million.
Limitations
Both middle managers and elected officials may resist the total quality management culture change because it devolves
supervisory and decision-making power to TQM teams and committees. While middle managers and elected officials
are formally involved in several levels of the TQM program in Tompkins County, they are absent from the committees
in Ontario County, and have understandably been more resistant to the process. Middle managers may also fear for
their jobs. Tompkins County is dealing with this issue by retaining middle managers as top-level technical employees
and ensuring their representation on the TQM committees.
Another limitation of total quality management as a tool for restructuring is its internal focus. The difficulty in
identifying the "customer" for public sector goods and services and the focus on internal work processes make it hard
to truly involve citizens in these TQM efforts. Both counties seek to identify external customer needs with surveys, and
Tompkins County includes elected representatives on committees, but neither county includes citizens on committees.
In Ontario County, citizen involvement in the TQM program is slightly greater than in Tompkins, since it includes an
advisory council made up of a select group of local business owners.
Tompkins and Ontario Counties both seem to focus more attention on internal customers, (through surveys and
participation in labor-management committees), in the belief that process improvements will result in product and
service improvements. This is not an unreasonable assumption, though it can be difficult to document. Customer
satisfaction surveys in Ontario and Tompkins Counties indicate external customers are generally satisfied with service
improvements generated by total quality management programs.
The substantial cost of total quality management training and implementation as well as the time required to reap
benefits are also limitations of total quality management as a tool for local government restructuring. Finally, because
total quality management focuses primarily on internal work processes, policy about external factors is outside its
purview. The inability to address broader policy issues may limit the ultimate impact of investments in total quality
management.
 Conclusions
Goals of Cooperative Tools and Processes
Most of our informants articulated their goal as a more smoothly functioning organization, with more creative problem
solving and positive interactions between management and labor. Managers and elected officials focused on increased
efficiency, cost savings, and improved service quality. Labor representatives expressed goals of increasing employee
participation in decision making and improving service delivery by widening employees' stake in the process and
product. Thus, improving service delivery was a goal of all parties, but with slightly different emphases. Elected
officials valued improved service delivery for its impact on citizen constituents, whereas labor representatives valued
increased service quality for its effects on job quality.
Preconditions for Success
Several conditions existed in our counties prior to the successful introduction of formalized cooperative processes.
First, the labor-management relationship in all three counties was already cooperative, or at least noncombative,
providing fertile ground in which cooperative structures could thrive. Second, all the counties we studied were in
relatively stable economic and political positions prior to establishing cooperative structures. We were not informed of
any fiscal or political crises in recent memory that might put pressure on leaders to avoid the risk-taking inherent in
cooperative initiatives. These three counties made a significant culture change not as a last-resort strategy, but as a
means to improve already functional but imperfect processes. However, the cooperative structures have proven useful
in dealing with crisis, such as the threatened sale of the nursing home in Genesee County.
We observed several other essential preconditions in our study counties. Committed, supportive leaders are required.
This sometimes necessitates a change in the legislature, county administration, or union leadership. The attitudes of
those in leadership positions proved crucial to the counties' ability to embrace the new ideas and paradigms of
cooperative tools. Furthermore, in order to buy into the new cooperative relations, middle managers and line
employees had to trust the intentions of both labor and management leaders. Even in counties where cooperative tools
have been used successfully, the departments with a lower degree of labor-management trust have been slower to
make the transition to new tools.
Impacts of Cooperation
Internal Process Improvements
The changes seen in government service delivery seem to be primarily internal in nature. Tompkins County, for
instance, streamlined its intake processes for various social services. Genesee County instituted several policies that
affect employee benefits, encouraging workplace efficiency and increased job satisfaction. The efficiency gains from
internal restructuring are thought to "trickle down" to external improvements. The Genesee County Nursing Home, for
instance, through its labor-management committee, has addressed staffing issues that are crucial to efficient
functioning and effective service delivery.
Employee Morale
The second area where impacts have been significant is employee morale, which was uniformly reported by our
informants to have improved under cooperative processes. Again, data for improvements are difficult to obtain, and
most employee surveys were completed after new structures were implemented, and therefore lack a comparative
benchmark. All counties stated the number of grievances has decreased, and the grievances that are filed are uniformly
serious in nature, the less serious problems being resolved in other forums, due to improved communication and trust.
Cost Savings
Though gains and savings have sometimes proven difficult to measure due to a fear of budget cuts to agencies that
report cost savings, the overriding sentiment is that cooperative efforts are resulting in real cost savings. Ontario
County has documented at least one instance of large financial savings in its reduction of worker compensation costs
due to a safety program implemented by a TQM committee. Genesee County's nursing home has become profitable
again in part due to the efforts of its labor-management committee.
Key Elements for Cooperation
From the case studies, we have identified a number of elements that are necessary for cooperation to be successful:
Training
First, a substantial amount of time and resources were devoted to training labor and management leaders, and more
often than not, legislators and line employees as well, in cooperative structures and processes. In Ontario and
Tompkins Counties for instance, all employees are being trained in total quality management concepts. Line employees
were less likely to be trained in mutual-gains bargaining, which is used primarily by representatives of labor and
management for the contract agreement. In Genesee County, for instance, while the assistant county manager was
trained to facilitate the negotiation process, the employees were not trained prior to the switch to mutual-gains
bargaining, and perhaps for this reason, the first contract negotiated by this method was voted down by union
members. On the other hand, the Genesee County Nursing Home sponsored a half-day training session for the entire
nursing home staff with a CSEA facilitator, which helped their labor-management committee become much more
effective. Whether or not all employees were trained, training brought about a critical shift in how members of the
organization viewed labor-management relations.
Local colleges and universities were valuable resources for training in these methods. Both Tompkins and Ontario
Counties made extensive use of nearby educational facilities.
Leadership Commitment and Support
The counties we studied all shared the presence of an appointed, professional administrator to manage the transition to
cooperative tools. However, one expert on local government told us that the form of government is less important than
the administrator or leader's commitment to the cooperative process. A high level of emotional maturity is essential, as
is the ability to work well with people and to get them to buy into the process. The case study counties possessed
leaders who were willing to work with, but ultimately hold responsible, resistant managers. The commitment of union
leadership was also an important factor. Without the willingness of the union officials in these counties to try new
ways of working with management, cooperative processes would not have been possible.
The role of elected officials was significant only to the extent they were generally supportive and did not interfere with
the process. We did not observe a high degree of involvement in cooperative tools on the part of county elected
officials, with the notable exception of Tompkins County, where a legislator was actively engaged in developing the
TQM initiative.
Additionally, in the three counties we observed a clear commitment to the process of implementing cooperative tools.
Since gains from TQM, for instance, were not immediate, and could take several years after training to realize, the
commitment of leaders to see the process through was essential to its success. Administrators and union officials'
commitment to labor-management committees as an effective vehicle for problem solving also seemed to be a
significant factor in their success. Tools that yield faster results, such as mutual-gains bargaining, perhaps require less
depth of commitment from county leaders. In all cases, however, all parties must buy in to the process. Given the
levels of trust required, cooperative efforts are likely to be sensitive to attempts to undermine them.
Communication
Communication of the goals, structure, and roles of key players in cooperative processes is also important, both within
the organization and in the larger community. Umbrella or countywide committees play important roles here as the
central forums for sharing of information and ideas. Creating public awareness of county efforts also may be desirable
but was not emphasized in our case study counties.
Evaluation
Evaluation is essential to assure appropriate and effective implementation of cooperative tools and to create support
among elected officials and the public. Better evaluation of the cooperative processes in all three counties is needed.
For instance, in Ontario County cooperative relations are so strong that some perceive mutual-gains bargaining as an
administrative burden that in and of itself may not add significant benefits. However, county leaders currently have no
means to gauge MGB's effectiveness. Management in Genesee County indicated that evaluation was an area they
hoped to address in the future. The private sector may be a source for evaluation tools that counties can use to measure
the success of their efforts.
Key Differences Between the Counties
We recognized several key differences among the counties in the implementation of cooperative tools. First, the
amount of money spent on training varied widely. Tompkins County had by far the greatest expenditures, almost
entirely attributable to its TQM program. Tompkins' use of outside consultants on a regular basis also distinguished it
from the other two counties. Genesee County, in contrast, only approached outside consultants on an infrequent basis.
However, Genesee's labor-management committees required lower levels of training and hence less cost, compared to
the formal TQM programs of Ontario and Tompkins. Interest in the process of workplace change rather than a focus on
outcomes or products seemed to guide efforts in Tompkins County, perhaps partly because of its close ties to the
academic community through Cornell University.
The level of involvement of elected officials and middle managers also varied. In Genesee County, middle managers
may participate in the negotiating process and sit on labor-management committees. In Tompkins County, middle
managers are well represented on total quality management committees. In Ontario, where the committees create a
direct channel from workers to top management, it is less clear that middle managers are adequately incorporated into
the structure. Tompkins is the only county in which an elected official sits on the countywide labor-management
committee. In Genesee County, county management felt that by not participating in committees, elected officials
maintained a beneficial distance from the process. Whether elected officials should be involved may depend on the
extent of the changes being implemented; in a more formal and expensive process such as TQM, their participation
seems more appropriate and essential, while it may not be necessary for internally focused committees.
Continuum of Cooperative Tools
The three cooperative tools exist along a continuum based on the complexity of the tool, the level of investment
required, and its degree of departure from traditional labor-management relations. The following diagram illustrates
this continuum:
A government with labor-management committees may not choose to implement a TQM program, but a government
without labor-management committees may not be wise to implement TQM as its first cooperative effort. Thus, the
diagram may also be viewed as a time line of cooperative structures, indicating a progression from relatively simple
tools such as labor-management committees to more complex, formal, costly, and comprehensive processes such as
TQM. Other tools we did not observe in our counties could be added to this model, such as gainsharing.
Limitations and Further Questions
As tools for restructuring, the cooperative methods discussed here have several limitations. Their ability to affect the
external policy environment is limited, so they are constrained by the political contexts in which they must operate.
They also do not afford an opportunity for citizens to become more involved in government. Since public support for
its activities is important to local governments, they should come up with ways for creating greater citizen involvement
in their restructuring efforts.
Many questions emerged during the course of our study. First, what is the true impact of cooperative tools and
processes on middle management? Much has been written about the downsizing of middle management in the private
sector. Is this also the case in government? Second, what are the appropriate roles for citizens and elected officials in
efforts to restructure government—through both internal and external methods? Finally, our cases only addressed
examples of successful cooperative tools and processes in counties that had developed a significant degree of trust
between labor and management. What are the outcomes of cooperative initiatives in counties that lacked this
precondition of trust?
Notes
1.  Conducted by Cornell University in cooperation with the County Legislators and Supervisors Association of
New York State, this survey was distributed to all towns (932) and upstate county governments (57) in New
York State. Responses were received from 196 towns (21% response rate) and 26 counties (45.6% response
rate).
2.  The counties initially considered were Chautauqua, Clinton, Columbia, Dutchess, Erie, Genesee, Livingston,
Oneida, Ontario, Putnam, Schenectady, Tioga, Tompkins, Ulster, and Westchester.
3.  Of the 57 counties outside of New York City, 18 (31.5%) are governed by the county executive structure
(elected official), 27 (47.5%) are governed by county managers or administrators (appointed), and 12 (21%) have
no full-time manager or county executive.
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 Appendix A: Key Informants
Steve Alviene, Deputy Director of Labor Relations, New York Civil Service Employees Association
John Bartow, Director, Division of Local Government, New York State Department of State
Franklin Bassett, Administrator, Livingston County Office of Aging
Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sr. Extension Associate, New York State School of Industrial Labor Relations Divison of
Extension and Public Service
Marcia Calicchia, Sr. Extension Associate, New York State School of Industrial Labor Relations Division of Extension
and Public Service
Ken Crannell, Director of Research, New York State Association of Counties
John Crotty, Deputy Chair and Counsel, Public Employment Relations Board
Ron Dougherty, former County Chair, Tioga County
Kevin Flanigan, Supervising Public Employment Mediator, Public Employment Relations Board
Andrew Goodell, former County Executive, Chautauqua County
Todd Grenci, Governor's Office of Employee Relations
Robert Hebdon, Assistant Professor, New York State School of Industrial Labor Relations
Scott Heyman, County Administrator, Tompkins County
Sally Klingel, Director, Programs for Employment and Workplace Systems, New York
State School of Industrial Labor Relations Division of Extension and Public Service
Karen Macintosh-Frering, Labor Management Coordinator, Ulster County
Alan McAdams, Associate Professor, Johnson School of Management, Cornell University
Barbara Mink, Chair, Tompkins County Board of Representatives and four-year member, Tompkins County
Leadership Council
Jeff Osinksi, Project Director, New York State Association of Counties
David Pilliod, Assistant Director, Department of State, Division of Local Government
Jim Platner, Director, Chemical Hazard Information Program, New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations Division of Extension and Public Service
Keith Stack, Special Assistant, Department of State, Division of Local Government
Jeff Swain, Assistant Deputy Comptroller, New York State Office of the Comptroller
 Appendix B: Case Study Informants
Genesee County
Darlene Acker, CSEA Nursing Home Unit President
Jay Gsell, County Manager
Jack Pease, Administrator, County Nursing Home
Nancy Smith, CSEA General Unit President
Martha Standish, County Personnel Officer
Ontario County
Geoffrey Astles, Deputy County Administrator
John Garvey, Human Resources Director
Edward Grace, County Administrator
Robert Russo, President, CSEA Local 7850
Tompkins County
David Chase, President, CSEA Local 855
Scott Heyman, County Administrator
Barbara Mink, Chair, Tompkins County Board of Representatives
County Case Studies
 Genesee County
 Ontario County
 Tompkins County
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Big Questions
What strengths do county homes already have that can be built upon?
How have county homes across the state responded to changes in the
long-term care landscape?
Where can county homes go from here?
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Quality of Care:Summary
Staff turnover lower in county homes
Low turnover strongly related to high quality care
HCFA data unclear on quality of care in county homes
Previous slide Next slide Back to first slide View graphic version
Methods
Collaborative research design
Surveys of administrators
initial survey (N= 35)
subsequent survey (N=20)
Survey of labor officials (N=14)
Supplemented with other data sources:
CGR Report 1997
HCFA Quality of Care Data 1999
CSEA Survey 1998
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Two Unexpected Findings
1) Nationally, low staff turnover is strongly related to high quality
care, but…
Quality of care data on New York county homes are inconclusive
despite low turnover rates.
2) Fiscal stress is typically a cause for local government restructuring,
but…
County homes in NYS considering restructuring are not under fiscal
stress.
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New York county homes have low annual staff turnover
National rates of nursing home staff
turnover
non-profits: 48 to 86%
for-profits: 72 to 118%
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New York county homes have low annual staff turnover
Among responding New York county
homes:
Eighty percent have RN, LPN and support staff turnover of 25% or
less
Sixty percent have CNA turnover of 25% or less
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Why is low staff turnover important?
Quality and continuity of care
Fewer certification violations
Lower death rates
Fewer problems with bedsores
Better cost containment
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Our use of New York State DOH data as quality index
Scope and severity of deficiencies vary widely
We examined only incidence
Apparently wide variance between counties
We took incidence reports at face value
We took out metro New York
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Quality of care data show mixed results
Average Deficiencies Per Facility
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Quality of care data show mixed results
Average Number of Beds by Sector
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Quality of care data show mixed results
Deficiencies Per 100 Beds
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Statistical Analysis Results
Facility size does not explain variation in deficiency rates across New
York State nursing facilities
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Forms of restructuring
Performance-based budgeting
Voluntary or non-profit status
Public Benefit Corporation
Privatization
Closure
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Methods
This section draws from the survey of nursing home administrators
Higher response rate for management surveys increases confidence in
our findings
Managers more knowledgeable about restructuring possibilities
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Which forms of restructuring are county homes
considering?
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Why do county homes choose to restructure?
Fiscal stress
at the nursing home
in county government
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Restructuring as a response to fiscal stress in the
nursing home*
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Is your county under fiscal stress? If yes, does it affect
the nursing home?
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Why do county homes choose to restructure?
Political pressure
poor relations with the county
shrinking of government
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How would you characterize the relationship between
the nursing home and county government?
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Does your county legislature see the nursing home as
essential to the mission of local government?
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Why do county homes choose to restructure?
poor labor-management relations
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How would you characterize the relationship between
management and labor at your facility?
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Principal findings from administrator surveys
County homes are financially stable
County homes have excellent relationships with local government
officials
Relations between management and labor are strong
Restructuring is under consideration at one third of county homes in
New York State
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Questions for Discussion
We have presented two puzzles on county nursing homes that our
surveys cannot answer.
After-lunch discussion: Can you help us understand these issues
better?
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Restructuring:Unanswered Questions
Why are some county homes interested in restructuring?
Can the benefits of restructuring be captured by county homes while
keeping the nursing home public?
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